Group Threat and Ethnic Variation in Party Membership Attainment in China

Xiaowei Zang City University of Hong Kong

Does the state, dominated by the majority group in a multi-ethnic society, perceive more threat from some minority groups than from other minority groups? Does the state favor the former over the latter accordingly? What are the plausible reasons for the state’s perceptions, favoritism, or discrimination? Existing studies of group threat theory have not addressed these questions adequately since they have focused on interaction between majority and minority groups and its effect on socioeconomic inequality and discriminatory attitudes and practices. This research contributes to this literature with special focus on the link between the state and minority threat and how it produces ethnic variation in attainment of membership in the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP), the ruling party of the People Republic of China (PRC).

Data are drawn from two surveys (n = 3,568) on Han Chinese, Hui Muslims, and Uyghur Muslims in two Chinese cities in 2001. The Han are the ethnic majority and control the state in China. The Hui and the Uyghurs are two minority groups.

Data analysis shows that the Han are more likely than both the Hui and the Uyghurs to join the CCP. Controlling background characteristics removes the Uyghur-Han difference in CCP membership attainment, yet no similar patterns are found when the

Hui are compared with the Han. This contrast is explained with regard to state reaction to ethnic variation in perceived group threat.

1 This research first reviews group-threat theory and discusses how a state reacts to perceived group threat (a state is defined as a political apparatus, which includes an administrative, judiciary, and legislative branch that govern a given territory). Next, it presents some basic information on the Han, the Hui, and the Uyghurs in China and explains why the state may treat the Hui and the Uyghurs differently. It then discusses data and variables and conduct analysis. This research concludes with a brief discussion of major findings and their implications for the study of group-threat theory and interaction between the state and minority groups in China.

Minority Threat and Ethnic Competition

Much of group threat research has focused on Western societies and has found that perceived minority threat is a key determinant of inter-group relations. Many scholars argue that contrary to the “melting pot” paradigm, some minority groups in the US have struggled to maintain ethnic identity or found themselves shut out of the mainstream (Almaguer 1994; Ruddell and Urbina 2004). A variety of factors such as changing demographics, new political alignments, and rising ethnic consciousness in the West have intensified ethnic competition for resource allocation, posing a threat to long-standing social arrangements and affecting inter-group relations and ethnic disparities (Blalock 1956, 1957; Blumer 1958; Kane 2003; Quillian 1996; Olzak

1993; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006).

Generally, the dominant group ranks minority groups differently with regard to perceived minority threat and acts accordingly. The ranking is based on a variety of factors such as demographics and cultural differences, etc. For example, a minority

2 group is seen as an increasing threat with the real or perceived increase in its population size and geographic concentration. This is because ethnic competition for resources increases with the relative size of the minority group to the dominant group.

Numbers count also because they are a political resource for group contest (Blalock

1957; Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Taylor 1998).

Population concentration is similarly taken by the dominant group as an indicator of minority threat since it facilitates ethnic mobilization. These reasons may explain why

African Americans are more likely than other groups to be viewed as a threatening people by some Whites (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bonilla-Silva 2000; King and

Weiner 2007; Reiman 2001) and why percentage Black is a good predictor of racial attitudes and accounts for a good portion of White prejudice in the US (Baumer et al.

2003; Jacobs and Wood 1999; King 2007; Quillian 1995, 1996).

There is also a cultural dimension of minority threat based on Horowitz’s discussion of ranked and unranked systems of ethnic groups. Ranked systems are those in which class and ethnicity coincide; unranked systems are those in which class and ethnicity do not coincide and hence are the better cases for analysis of ethnic competition. An unranked system is loaded with stereotypical perceptions that define each ethnic group as either “backward” or “advanced”. “Backward” groups are viewed as lazy, traditional, unintelligent, and the like, whereas “advanced” groups are viewed as enterprising, modern, cunning, and the like. These stereotypes define the distribution of group worth and find their ways into governmental policy, which can affect intergroup relations and the strategies of ethnic competition for resources

(Horowitz 2000: 21-41, 148, 169, 233; also Blanton et al. 2001; Mason 2003; Riek,

Mania, and Gaertner 2006).

3 Based on this cultural perspective, it is possible that relations are less intense when two ethnic groups are close to each other than when they are far apart from each other in the “backward”—“advanced” scale. Due to ethnic “misperceptions”, the level of communication between two dissimilar groups may be lower than that between two similar groups. There is “less generalized collaboration” since cultural divergence may foster ethnic conflict (Horowitz 2000: 28, 135; also Riek, Mania, and Gaertner

2006). In comparison, confrontation is less likely to take place between the two similar groups as they are less likely to view each other as a threat due to similar levels of assimilation into mainstream society.

This cultural account may be supported by a socioeconomic rational. For example, the majority group may think that the more integrated an ethnic minority group into mainstream society, the more likely the minority group will invest its future in the existing socioeconomic system, and the more likely it advances its interests through bargaining, negotiations, and reforms within the overall framework of the status quo. Thus, the majority group, which is also the “advanced” group, may consider a “backward” minority group as a greater threat than a less “backward” minority group due to their different levels of assimilation into mainstream society.

This may explain why the concentration of Asian Americans does not engender a great deal of White antipathy toward them, which forms a contrast with White attitudes toward the concentration of African Americans in local areas (Taylor 1998).

Perceived minority threat is a main topic in research on inter-group relations because, as noted above, it is related to prejudice and discrimination, and hence has an

4 impact on ethnic inequalities. Ethnic competition for resources (Horowitz 2000: 105-

35) is perceived to be a zero-sum game: a dominant group takes a proprietary claim over certain rights, resources, status, and privileges that minority groups seek. Thus, perceived group threat invites sanctions against minority groups by the dominant group. The greater the perceived threat from a minority group, the more likely it is subject to discrimination in the labor market by the dominant group, and vice versa

(Kunovich 2004; Semyonov et al. 2002; ; Semyonov et al. 2004).

For example, it is reported that violence against minority groups increases with the strength of political parties associated with minority group interests (King and

Brustein 2006). This is probably because the minority group is perceived to be likely or able to challenge the status quo due to its enhanced political power. Indeed, measures of minority threat such as percent Black are related to Black-White status inequality. There is a direct link between Black population size and White privileges across a wide array of indicators such as educational attainment and earnings in the

US (Cohen 2001; Huffman 2004; Huffman and Cohen 2004; Tienda and Lii 1987).

State Reaction to Perceived Group Threat in China

As noted, many existing studies have focused on interaction between majority and minority groups. This research contributes to group-threat research with a study of state reaction to perceived minority threat and its effect on ethnic inequalities in the

PRC. It holds that both the state and the majority group may rely on the same factors such as population size, residential concentration, and levels of assimilation into mainstream society to assess threat from different ethnic groups. Thus, both of them

5 may find a variation in perceived threat from different ethnic minority groups.

Applying this insight to the PRC, it is possible that all ethnic minorities are regarded to be a threat to the Chinese state since it is essentially a Han regime. But some ethnic minority groups may be viewed by the Chinese state to be more threatening than other groups since they differ from one another greatly in terms of numerical strength, geographic concentration, and nationalistic aspirations.

This research contributes to the literature on group threat theory with a view that the state may be controlled by the dominant group, but it does not treat minority groups the same way as individual majority members do. The state must guard national interests such as territorial integrity and social order, whereas members of the dominant group are concerned about private issues such as labor market competition, neighborhood safety, etc. State action is more important than majority response with regard to the wellbeing of a minority group since the state controls more resources and is more organized than members of the dominant group. This is particularly the case in countries such as China that have a strong and centralized state.

In addition, group-threat theory finds a positive link between perceived group threat from a minority group and the rise of majority prejudice and sanctions. This research reconsiders this link since the state and the dominant group may react to minority threat differently. While a more “threatening” group is less likely than a less

“threatening” group to be discriminated against by the majority group, it is possible that the former is given more concessions by the state than the latter. Of course, the state may discriminate against or even suppress the more “threatening” minority group. But it may find it more cost-effective to accommodate the minority group,

6 especially if the minority group has a large population and the potential to become a secessionist. Ethnic politics is influenced by group size relative to state size (Horowitz

2000: 37, 40). The state may pay less attention to a less “threatening” minority group since this group is less likely to pose serious threats to the state. Indeed, it is reported that a host state is likely to protect minority rights when dealing with a more

“threatening” minority and is likely to use repress when dealing with a less

“threatening” minority (Jenne 2004).

Hence, it is possible that the Chinese state treats minority groups differently, depending on the level of perceived threat from each minority group. The more a minority group is perceived to be a “threatening” people, the more likely the Chinese state uses various incentives to integrate it into mainstream cultural or economic conditions, and vice versa. This possibility is labeled state favoritism in this research.

Suppression or exclusion may be less efficient than state favoritism to serve the

CCP’s interest in maintaining territorial integrity and social order in China.

State Favoritism and CCP Membership Attainment

This research studies ethnic variation in CCP membership attainment in China since it is a good measure of state favoritism. Communist Party membership is a key indicator of upward mobility in China (Bian 1994; Bian, Shu, and Logan 2001;

Dickson and Rublee 2000; Walder 1995). Official policies in China have favored some population segments from which CCP members have been disproportionately recruited. For example, political considerations motivated the CCP to identify state workers as a key target of membership recruitment in the Cultural Revolution (Bian

7 1994; Bian, Shu, and Logan 2001; Walder 1986; Zhou et al. 1996). Similarly, the

CCP may for political purposes prefer to recruit members from one minority group than from another minority group. Ethnic variation thus may reflect state favoritism.

Status attainment in other areas such as earnings, employment, or education may not measure state favoritism effectively. For example, employment or income can be attained in ethnic economies (Kim 2003). Educational attainment can be attributed to individual endeavor such as hard work. Furthermore, state favoritism in these areas is less likely to occur since it would be visible and hence subject to opposition. However, there are good probabilities that state favoritism occurs in CCP membership recruitment since it is a political game. The CCP can disqualify an applicant by questioning his or her political loyalty. Or it can qualify the applicant by taking his or her political loyalty for granted (Bian 1994; Walder 1986). The rules of the political game are obscure and arbitrary, which makes it possible for the CCP to deviate from equality for all ethnic groups with regard to CCP membership recruitment.

There are political reasons for state favoritism to occur. Existing studies shows that the state purposely recruits some people into the CCP, using material rewards to get their political support to CCP leadership (Bian 1994; Walder 1986, 1995). The state may use the same logic to deal with a “threatening” minority group. Namely, it may seek political allegiance of some members of the group by recruiting them into the CCP. For example, if a Uyghur joins the CCP in exchange of career advantages, he or she must go along with the state, which allows the Chinese state to divide and rule the Uyghurs. Hence, there is a good incentive for state favoritism to take place in

8 political recruitment. The incentive must be greater in minority areas that have been reputed for resistance to CCP policies than those without such a reputation.

This probability is examined in this research with a study of ethnic variation in group threat and CCP membership attainment between the Hui Muslims and Uyghur

Muslims. The Hui and the Uyghurs are chosen for the comparison because of data availability. They are chosen also because of their similarity in religious affiliation, differences in the levels of assimilation into Han mainstream society, and perceived threat toward the Chinese state, as discussed below.

The Hui and the Uyghurs

Every PRC citizen belongs to one of the fifty-six nationality groups, which are officially classified by the Chinese state. The Han are the majority nationality. The fifty-five minority groups consist of 8.4 percent of China’s population (i.e., more than

100 million). The Hui are sunny Muslims and are one of the minority groups. They are the descents of foreign Muslim merchants, militia, and officials, who came to

China from Arabian and Central Asian countries from the Seventh through Fourteenth centuries and later intermarried with the Han. The 2000 Census found nearly 9.82 million Hui, establishing them as the third largest minority group in China.

However, the Hui spread all over China and are a minority group in virtually all the places they live. They celebrate many Han festivals, read, speak, and write

Chinese, and wear Chinese costumes. They maintain their ethnic identity by upholding Islamic beliefs, practicing endogamy, and observing pork avoidance. But

9 young Hui are increasingly moving away from these practices (Gillette 2000; Gladney

1996; Mackerras 1995, 2003). Some China experts claim that the Hui have been essentially assimilated to Han mainstream society (Dreyer 1976: 264-5; Heberer

1989: 73; Naquin and Rawski 1987: 128). Lipman (2004: 22, 28, 47, 49) argues that some Hui find their “national” existence false, condescending, or downright silly.

“After all, the vast majority of Hui, even some of those who have traveled extensively in the Middle East, are clearly Chinese in their language, material culture, and textual lives outside the mosque…Despite the Hui being defined as an ‘ethnic minority’, we must nonetheless regard them as unequivocally Chinese, through sometimes marginal or even despised Chinese.”

The Uyghurs are also sunny Muslims. The 2000 Census found nearly 8.35 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Unlike the Hui, they are a Turkic group, wear their costumes, and have their own language. Many Uyghurs do not read, speak, or write

Chinese. They celebrate their own festivals. Also unlike the Hui, over 95 percent of the Uyghurs live and are the majority group in Xinjiang, whereas the Han are a minority group in the territory (Mackerras 1995, 2003; Rudelson 1997; Rudelson and

Jankowiak 2004; Toops 2004).

In addition, Hui-Han relations are relatively good, whereas Uyghur-Han relations are tense. Many Hui seek to climb the socioeconomic hierarchy in Han society (Gillette 2000; Lipman 2004), whereas some Uyghurs reportedly prefer to stay away from the official channel of upward mobility. It is reported that a Uyghur may be regarded as a traitor by some Uyghurs if he or she becomes a government official or a CCP member. It is also reported that some Uyghurs have resented Han migration

10 into Xinjiang since Han migrants have allegedly taken jobs away from them

(Becquelin 2000; Bovingdon 2002; Smith 2002; Yee 2003).

Horowitz (2000: 231) suggests that groups that have a strong sense of grievance may demand complete independence. Indeed, some Uyghurs have since the

1990s sought by all means to form an independent nation state in Xinjiang. In comparison, the Hui are happy to be a member of the PRC (Lipman 2004). Of course, only few Uyghurs in Xinjiang have joined the separatist movement. But they are influential due to their connection with bin Ladin’s al-Qaeda and their efforts to split

China through terrorist activities. The Chinese government requested that the UN

Security Council list a major Uyghur separatist organization, the East Turkistan

Islamic Movement based in Istanbul, Turkey, as a terrorist group. This request was granted in a motion passed by the UN Security Council on September 12, 2002.

The contrasts between the Hui and the Uyghurs suggest that the Chinese state may consider the Uyghurs as a more “threatening” group than the Hui, especially with regard to the Uyghur separatist demands for an independent nation state in Xinjiang.

It is necessary to point out that Xinjiang occupies one sixth of China’s territory. A lot more of state interests are at stake in the interaction between the CCP and the

Uyghurs than that between the CCP and the Hui. The CCP may be more motivated to make efforts to integrate the Uyghurs into the PRC. It can use Uyghur CCP members to counterbalance Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. It does not have such a need for Hui

CCP members, however. Hence, the Uyghur may be more likely than the Hui to join the CCP: the Hui may have to compete with the Han on an equal (or lower) footing for CCP membership, whereas Uyghur applicants may be actively sought by the CCP.

11 Date and Variables

Data for this research are drawn from a survey on the Han and the Hui in

Lanzhou and another on the Han and the Uyghurs in Urumchi. Both surveys were conducted in 2001. Lanzhou is the capital of Gansu province and a major Hui settlement in China. There are approximately 200,000 Hui Muslims in Lanzhou, which accounts for about 10 percent of the total population in the city. The 2001

Lanzhou Survey aimed at achieving a balanced sample of the Han and Hui respondents for a comparative study. A sociologist from a Beijing university and four researchers from the Social Science Academy of Gansu Province chose ten predominantly Han and five predominantly Hui neighborhoods in Lanzhou and then used the disproportionate sampling method to select 2,100 households from the fifteen neighborhood clusters.

In the survey, households in the predominantly Hui neighborhoods were given a disproportionately better chance of selection than those in the predominantly Han neighborhoods so as to yield a roughly similar number of the Han and the Hui respondents in the final sample. A total of 1,992 interviews were conducted, representing a completion rate of nearly 95 percent. The respondents were asked to identify their nationality status. Information on age, gender, education, income, party affiliation, and so on was also solicited. Cases with missing values or on members of other ethnic minorities are excluded from data analysis, resulting in a data set of 1,905 respondents (883 Hui Muslims and 1,019 Han Chinese) for this research.

12 The Urumchi Survey was conducted after the Lanzhou Survey was completed.

Urumchi is the capital of Xinjiang. Of the 1.4 million people in Urumchi, 1.1 million are Han Chinese, 0.2 million are the Uyghurs, and the rest are members of other ethnic minorities. The Chinese collaborators had access to three out of the seven districts in Urumchi (i.e. Dongshan, Xinshi, and Tianshan). These three districts contained half of the city’s population. Many government housing compounds, universities, expensive neighborhoods, etc. are concentrated in these three districts.

Thus, the proportion of higher-status respondents in the Urumchi sample is higher than that in the Lanzhou sample. Findings from this research should be read with caution. Also, multivariate analysis is used to get a better picture of ethnic variation in

CCP membership.

The sampling procedures of the Urumchi Survey were similar to those of the

Lanzhou Survey. A professor from a university in Xian, China, who was a Xinjiang native, and three professors in local universities organized the 2001 Urumchi Survey.

They first selected twenty predominantly Han clusters and ten predominantly Uyhgur clusters and then used the disproportionate sampling method to select 2,800 households from the thirty clusters. The predominantly Uyghur clusters were given a disproportionately better chance of selection than the predominantly Han clusters so as to yield a roughly similar number of the Uyghur and the Han respondents in the final sample. The Chinese collaborators used the Lanzhou Survey questionnaire and hired translators to produce a Uyghur version. In all, 2,600 interviews were conducted, which represents a completion rate of 92.8 percent. In this research, cases with missing values or on members of other ethnic minorities are excluded from data analysis. Also, the CCP’s Constitution stipulates that a Chinese citizen can join the

13 CCP when he or she is 18 years old. Hence, respondents younger than 18 years old are not included from data analysis. The final Urumchi sample includes 1,666 respondents (723 Uyghurs and 943 Han Chinese) for this research.

As noted, the dependent variable used in data analysis is CCP, which is a dummy variable with CCP members coded as 1 and others as 0. The independent variables include age, urban, gender, married, education, state worker, professional, father CCP, and Minority ethnicity. Many of these variables have been used extensively in research on status attainment in China (e.g. Bian 1994; Bian, Shu, and

Logan 2001; Hannum and Xie 1998; Zhou 2000; Zhou et al. 1996). Age refers to the biological ages of the respondents and hence is an interval variable. Urban is a dummy variable with urban residents coded as 1 and rural migrants as 0. Gender is also a dummy variable with men coded as 1 and women as 0. Married is another dummy variable with married respondents coded as 1 and others as 0. State worker is another dummy variable with state workers coded as 1 and others as 0. Professional is also a dummy variable with professionals such as engineers and doctors coded as 1 and others as 0.

Education is measured by six categories (Hannum and Xie 1998; Wu 2002;

Zhou 2000), from low to high: 1 = primary school or less; 2 = junior high school; 3 = senior high school; 4 = vocational school; 5 = community college; 6 = university and above. In the analysis, education is treated as a set of dummy variables with university and above as the comparison group. Father CCP is a dummy variable with respondents whose fathers are CCP members coded as 1. Finally, Hui is a dummy

14 variable with the Hui coded as 1 and Han Chinese as 0. Uyghur is also a dummy variable with the Uyghurs coded as 1 and Han Chinese as 0.

Findings

Table 1 shows the basic characteristics of the Lanzhou sample. It can be seen that the Hui and the Han do not differ from each other greatly in terms of age, gender, and married status. However, the Hui are less likely than the Han to become a state worker, received a good education, and have a father with CCP membership. The percentage of the CCP members among the Hui is lower than that among the Han.

Table 1 about Here

Table 1 also shows the basic characteristics of the Urumchi sample. It can be seen that the Uyghurs and the Han do not differ greatly from each other in terms of gender distribution. However, the Uyghurs seem to be younger and better educated than the Han. The proportion of the Uyghurs whose fathers are CCP members is greater than that of Han Chinese. However, the Uyghurs are less likely than Han

Chinese to become a state worker. The percentage of the Uyghurs who are a CCP member is also lower than that of the Han. As noted above, there is variation in background characteristics between the Lanzhou sample and the Urumchi sample and care should be taken when reading the results of data analysis in this research.

Next, a logistic regression analysis is run on the Lanzhou sample (Model 1 of

Table 2), another on the Urumchi sample (Model 2 of Table 2), and another on the combined sample (Model 3 of Table 2) respectively to examine ethnic differences in

15 CCP membership attainment. It can be seen that the Han are more likely than the Hui and the Uyghurs to become a CCP member, which shows the impact of ethnicity in

CCP membership recruitment. These findings are not surprising since the CCP is and is regarded as the political party of the Han as the Han dominate both the membership composition and leadership positions of the CCP (Bovingdon 2002; Smith 2002)

Table 2 about Here

Multivariate analysis is needed to verify the findings from Table 2 since they are obtained without controls. Model 1 of Table 3 finds that controlling background characteristics does not remove the Hui-Han difference in membership attainment. In comparison, Model 2 of Table 3 shows that holding other variables constant, the

Uyghurs and the Han do not differ from each other in CCP membership attainment.

Table 3 about Here

Model 1 and Model 2 are performed on the Lanzhou sample and the Urumchi sample respectively. Yet there are variations in composition in the two samples. Also, the criteria for CCP membership recruitment may be different in these two cities. For example, the educational requirement for CCP membership may be higher in Lanzhou than in Urumchi. Hence, the two samples are combined for another logistic regression analysis in Model 3 of Table 3, which shows that everything being equal, the Hui are still less likely than the Han to become a CCP member, yet there is no inter-group variation in CCP membership attainment between the Uyghurs and the Han.

16 Table 4 about Here

As noted above, the Urumchi sample is different from the Lanzhou sample.

For example, 47 percent of the Hui respondents are employees in the state sector, as compared with 31 percent of the Uyghur respondents. Selectivity biases of the two samples may affect the findings. Three sub-group analyses are conducted to examine this possibility. They are male respondents (Model 1 of Table 4), married respondents

(Model 2 of Table 4), and state workers (Model 3 of Table 4). Results from these three models are similar to those of Model 3 of Table 3, i.e., controlling other independent variables, the Hui are less likely than the Han to join the CCP, whereas there is no inter-group variation in the probabilities of becoming a CCP member between the Uyghurs and the Han. These findings suggest that the Chinese government favor the Uyghurs over the Hui in CCP membership recruitment.

Discussion and Conclusions

Group-threat theory has guided studies of ethnic relations and inequality in political science (Jenne 2004; Valenty and Sylvia 2004), sociology (Baumer et al.

2003; Kunovich 2004; Semyonov et al. 2002), and criminology (Holmes 2000; Smith and Holmes 2003). These studies have focused on interaction between majority and minority groups. This research seeks to include the state in the literature. On appearance, group-threat theory may not apply to China since the government is required by the Constitution to carry out affirmative action for all minority groups. All of them are officially entitled to affirmative action programs in many tangible areas

17 such as university admission and employment in the state sector in China (Jankowiak

1993; Mackerras 1995; Rudelson 1997).

Yet this research shows that there is a different ballgame in political recruitment. This is because the state carries out equal opportunities programs for social justice. It is also mandated to safeguard national interests such as territorial integrity and social order. It is motivated to treat a minority group preferentially if it is powerful and has the potential to post threat to national interests (Horowitz 2000: 38).

The state will use force to suppress separatist attempts. But it will also accommodate some members of the “threatening” minority to divide and rule. It is less likely to do the same for a minority group that does not pose serious threat to the status quo.

Findings from this research show that this is indeed the case. The Uyghurs are concentrated in Xinjiang where they are the majority group. The Hui live in many places in China where they are a minority group. The Uyghurs are more likely than the Hui to consider the Han and the Chinese state as a competitor for resources. They are much less assimilated into Han society than the Hui. Many Uyghurs have considered Xinjiang their homeland, whereas the Hui cannot make a similar claim.

Some Uyghurs have been fighting for Xinjiang’s independence, whereas the Hui are happy to be a member of the PRC. These contrasts may produce different levels of competition and threat to the state. The CCP thus may treat the Uyghurs and the Hui differently, which may explain why the Uyghurs have better probabilities of joining the CCP than the Hui do. State favoritism occurs because the CCP needs to actively recruit Uyghur members to counterbalance Uyghur separatists. The Hui do not provide this sort of political services and hence have to compete with the Han without

18 state favors. They are less likely than the Han to become a CCP member since the

CCP is essentially the political party of the Han.

In sum, existing research shows a positive link between the perceived level of threat from a minority and majority prejudice and discrimination against the minority group. In comparison, this research suggests a negative relationship between the perceived level of threat from a minority group and state favoritism in China. This is because it is the state’s interest to make efforts to integrate the “threatening” minority into the PRC. The state may not do the same for a less “threatening” minority since it has been more integrated into and has thus posed less threat to mainstream society.

These arguments complement those reported in existing research on the relationship between majority and minority groups: the state and individual majority members have different interests and thus act differently. The common denominator of their different attitudes and behavior is perceived threat form a minority group.

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24 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable Lanzhou Urumchi Hui Han Uyghur Han

Age (mean/s.d.) 45.0/11.7 46.7/11.8 27.7/11.3 33.1/11.0

Urban (%) 82.1 (725) 95.3 (971) 58.5 (423) 51.1 (486)

Sex (%) Men 67.7 (598) 64.9 (661) 51.0 (369) 46.2 (436) Women 32.3 (285) 35.1 (358) 49.0 (354) 53.8 (507)

Married (%) 87.1 (769) 88.2 (899) 28.9 (209) 54.3 (512)

Education (%) Primary school & below 47.3 (418) 16.3 (166) 6.1 (44) 2.0 (19) Junior high 30.5 (269) 26.4 (269) 4.6 (33) 8.7 (82) Senior high 13.6 (120) 24.5 (250) 5.8 (42) 17.4 (164) Vocational school 3.4 (30) 10.8 (110) 5.0 (36) 6.9 (65) Community college 2.3 (20) 14.1 (144) 40.5 (293) 42.4 (400) University & above 2.9 (26) 7.9 (80) 38.0 (275) 22.6 (213)

State worker (%) 47.2 (417) 76.3 (777) 32.4 (234) 55.1 (520)

Professional (%) 5.1 (45) 15.5 (158) 14.7 (106) 19.6 (185)

Father was a CCP (%) 5.7 (50) 21.5 (219) 28.2 (204) 19.6 (185)

CCP membership (%) 7.1 (63) 26.4 (269) 14.0 (101) 25.0 (236)

N 100.0 (883) 100.0 (1,019) 100.0 (723) 100.0 (943)

Figures in the parentheses are numbers of cases.

Table 2: Minority Ethnicity and CCP Membership Attainment

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (Lanzhou) (Urumchi) (Lanzhou & Urumchi)

Hui -1.541 (.149)* --- -1.506 (.141)*

Uyghur --- -.720 (.131)* -.758 (.119)*

2-likelihood 1,630.358 1,645.891 3,276.731 Df 1 1 2 N 1,902 1,666 3,568

* p < .01. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. The comparison group for Models 1-3 is Han Chinese.

25 Table 3: Multivariate Analysis of Predictors of CCP Membership Attainment

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (Lanzhou) (Urumchi) (Lanzhou & Urumchi)

Age .067 (.008)** .059 (.012)** .059 (.006)**

Urban -.374 (.412) .227 (.155) -.185 (.130)

Man .702 (.179)** .767 (.162)** .669 (.114)**

Married .672 (.297)* 1.829 (.290)** 1.502 (.187)**

Education Primary & below -3.349 (.350)** -2.102 (.506)** -2.903 (.263)** Junior high -2.4997 (.296)** -1.335 (.304)** -1.995 (.200)** Senior high -2.055 (.292)** -1.656 (.281)** -1.757 (.192)** Vocational school -1.679 (.315)** -.760 (.308)* -1.198 (.214)** Community college -.404 (.291) -.015 (.210) -.061 (.164)

State worker 1.489 (.266)** .894 (.196)** 1.149 (.151)**

Professional -.508 (.221)* -.055 (.179) -.195 (.136)

Father CCP .572 (.195)** .406 (.206)* .358 (.136)**

Hui -.765 (.176)** --- -1.018 (.165)**

Uyghur --- -.217 (.169) .060 (157)

2-likelihood 1,228.517 1,135.261 2,416.477 Df 13 13 14 N 1,902 1,666 3,568

*p < .05 **p < .01. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. The comparison group for education is University & above. The comparison ethnic group in Models 1-3 is Han Chinese.

26 Table 4: Sub-Group Analysis of Predictors of CCP Membership Attainment

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (Men) (Married) (State workers)

Age .071 (.0070** .052 (.007)** .057 (.007)**

Urban -.479 (.164)** -.383 (.146)** -.090 (.150)

Man --- .708 (.126)** .644 (.126)**

Married 1.411 (.246)** --- 1.396 (.213)**

Education Primary & below -3.067 (.316)** -3.157 (.283)** -2.959 (.295)** Junior high -1.991 (.239)** -2.305 (.222)** -2.102 (.219)** Senior high -1.861 (.238)** -2.134 (.216)** -1.963 (.210)** Vocational school -1.317 (.264)** -1.536 (.236)** -1.300 (.227)** Community college -.085 (.210) -.267 (.199) -.143 (.184)

State worker 1.061 (.186)** 1.090 (.172)** ---

Professional -.157 (.175) -.440 (.149)** -.256 (.143)

Father CCP .353 (.176)* .377 (.154)* .439 (.149)**

Hui -1.066 (.186)** -1.041 (.171)** -.996 (.180)**

Uyghur -.059 (.202) -.104 (.190) .037 (.183)

2-likelihood 1,579.938 1,985.067 1,900.609 Df 13 13 13 N 2,064 2,389 1,948

*p < .05 **p < .01. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. The comparison group for education is University. The comparison ethnic group in Models 1-3 is Han Chinese.