A Critical Study of Representations of Embodiment and Immersion in Virtual Reality

A Critical study of representations of embodiment and immersion in virtual reality Melanie Chan, School of Cultural Studies Leeds Metropolitan University

Introduction

In contemporary culture the term virtual reality can be used to refer to such technologies as flight simulators, theme park rides, large-scale projection systems known as CAVES and desktop computer graphic applications. It is possible to interact with virtual reality environments by using goggles, trackballs, data gloves, head mounted displays, retinal display systems and even cybersuits. An overview of the historical development of computer generated virtual reality has been provided by Howard Rheingold (1991), so in this paper the focus will be upon representations of embodiment and technology. The chief concern of this paper is the ways in which representations of virtual reality have been contextualised and how this relates to the notion of transcending the physical body. Transcendence through immersion in virtual reality will be considered in relation the philosophical model of mind/body dualism, which has a long historical trajectory that can be traced back to the work of René Déscartes (1596-1650). This paper will indicate that in Western and Westernised cultures the mind/body dualism found in Déscartes work became associated with immersion in virtual reality particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. The notion of transcendence in virtual reality will be shown, in some cases, to be extremely compelling. Nonetheless the mind/body dichotomy which underpins transcendence places limits on the understanding of the relationships between technology and embodiment. Claims for transcending the body can, for example, deflect attention from the social, cultural and historical factors that surround the production and consumption of virtual reality. For as Erikki Huhtamo points out:

The quest for immersion manifests itself both as the product of an experience industry and as discursive formations – dreams, beliefs, desires and fears. It has surfaced most sensationally in the discursive formations around virtual reality (VR) technology. (1995:159).

An alternative way of thinking about immersion and virtual reality will be considered by drawing upon phenomenological theory which emphasises the sensory motor features of embodiment and being-in-the-world. A note of caution will be sounded as the discussion considers the ways in which the relationships between being-in-the-world and virtual reality might become problematic. Finally there will be a consideration of how virtual reality could

1 develop in the future and the possible impact this may have upon our sense of embodiment and what it means to be human.

Simulation and virtual reality

The ability to simulate, to imagine different scenarios and possible outcomes seems to be a fundamental part of human existence. Douglas Hofstadter (2007) and Richard Dawkins (1989) for example, have both suggested that consciousness may arise when the brain simulates a world that is so complete that it includes a model of consciousness itself. Kevin Kelly, founding editor of Wired Magazine, also points out that human beings ‘have always made miniature worlds – of dolls, novels, and plays – but these new worlds (think Sim City or Ultima Online), so expertly crafted on a matrix of silicon, are of a kinetic complexity never before possible’ (Kelly, 1999:388).1 Kelly’s comments provide a reminder of the ways in which computer generated virtual reality builds upon earlier historical devices yet also has specific qualities which could have implications, in contemporary culture, for the relationships between embodiment and technology. Michael Heim, for example, discusses specific qualities of immersion in virtual reality in comparison to other symbolic models of reality;

The computer’s allure is more than utilitarian or aesthetic; it is erotic. Instead of a refreshing play with surfaces, as with toys or amusements, our affair with information machines announces a symbiotic relationship and ultimately a mental marriage to technology. (1993:85).

Human beings have attempted to explore other realities throughout the ages, through the use of hallucinogenic plants, or rituals involving music and dance. In some cases, only certain members of society were considered as worthy of exploring other realities and aspects of consciousness such as shamans or mystics. In the 1960s it was thought that LSD could provide a chemical basis for what were considered mystical or spiritual experiences. In the United States research into LSD was conducted in academic circles, at Harvard and Berkeley and there is a connection between these experiments and the development of virtual reality environments. Timothy Leary a major proponent of virtual reality experimented with hallucinogenic drugs as a means of accessing alternative realities during this time. In the following statement, Leary outlines the connections between research into LSD and the development of personal computing:

In 1976, the Apple computer was introduced. At the same time video games provided young people with a hands-on experience of moving flashy electronic, digital information around on screens. It was no accident that many of these early designers and marketers of these electronic appliances lived in the San Francisco area and tended to be intelligent adepts in the use of psychedelic drugs. (1994:40).

2 By the 1980s the term ‘virtual reality’ was accredited to computer scientist Jaron Lanier. To begin with Lanier was enamoured with the term because it was quirky and contradictory, but by 2001, in an interview with Oliver Burkeman from the Guardian newspaper, he was reported as saying that he found the term problematic due to the overly optimistic views that surrounded it (Burkeman, 2001). Indeed Erik Davis contends that virtual reality ‘rapidly took on the millennialist charge of all pop futurisms’ (1999:190). Jean Baudrillard however, provides a critical view towards the proliferating interest in virtual reality and simulation warning that:

Enquiry into the virtual is made even more delicate and complex today by the extraordinary hype surrounding it. The excess of information, the massive advertising effort, the technological pressure, the media, the infatuation or panic – everything is contributing to a kind of collective hallucination of the virtual and its effects. (2002:111).

The high point of virtual reality

Governments and other public institutions were involved in the promotion of virtual reality technology during the 1980s and 1990s. In May 1991, a United States Senate Sub-committee, chaired by Al Gore, was held to discuss virtual reality, science, technology and space. A report on the sub-committee produced by Ben Delaney (1991) suggests that it involved discussion around competitiveness in relation to Japanese research and the economic advantages of U.S. investment into virtual reality. Al Gore is reported as stating that ‘we need to make sure that the federal government does all it can to stimulate innovative and truly important new technologies like virtual reality’ (Gore quoted in Delaney, 1991). In the UK, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) supported research and development into virtual reality. The DTI commissioned the report Converging Technologies: Consequences for the New Knowledge Driven Economy (1998) which made reference to virtual reality as a means of enhancing economic prosperity through its use in education, design, manufacturing and commerce. Whereas the ESRC developed a £3 million programme on the virtual society, from 1997-2000, which involved 25 academic institutions.2 During the 1990s virtual reality systems, such as those produced by Virtuality Group PLC, entered the gaming arena. Interactive art was also prominent at major exhibitions such as Mediascape at the Guggenheim Museum Soho, New York (1996) and Serious Games at the Laing Gallery in Newcastle Upon Tyne and the Barbican Art Gallery in London (1996). 3 Magazines and journals such as Wired and Leonardo also showcased the latest developments in virtual reality technology albeit in different ways. Through the use of stylish, computer

3 generated, typographical layouts Wired became synonymous with cutting edge, utopian visions of technology. Leonardo, however, was more affiliated with contemporary art and academic research, since it was published by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. The novels of William Gibson, such as Neuromancer (1986), Virtual Light (1993) and Count Zero (1986) also featured representations of immersive virtual reality systems. Other novels which explored virtual reality themes during this time include Snowcrash (1992) by Neal Stephenson and Greg Egan’s Permutation City (1994). Additionally, there were several Hollywood films during this period which featured virtual reality such as: Tron (dir. Steve Lisberger, 1982), Total Recall (dir. Paul Verhoven, 1990), The Lawnmower Man (dir. Brett Leonard, 1992), Strange Days (dir. Kathryn Bieglow, 1995), The Matrix (dir. Andy and Larry Wachowski, 1999) and eXistenZ (dir. David Cronenberg, 1999). These cultural representations of virtual reality are significant because they have a bearing on the ways in which this technology is interpreted and understood. As Philip Hayward remarks, counter culture, new age and science fiction all contribute to the ways in which virtual reality is understood and these representations ‘are significant because they have shaped both consumer desire and the perceptions and the agenda of the medium’s developers’ (1993:182). Whilst Tron could be thought of as marking the start of the high point of representations of virtual reality in the early 1980s, The Matrix could be thought of as its end point just before the millennium. Both Tron and The Matrix represented complete sensory immersion in virtual realities and explored some of the possible, undesirable, aspects that might result from such experiences. In both films, there is the suggestion that immersion in virtual reality involves issues of power and control, with respect to artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The main protagonist in Tron, Kevin Flynn, is transferred from the real world to a virtual environment by a malevolent AI. In The Matrix, however, Neo escapes from the AI controlled virtual world of the matrix, to the real world. The blurring of the boundaries between the virtual and the real is also played out in Total Recall and eXistenZ. In Total Recall, the main protagonist Douglas Quaid/Hauser has dreams about visiting Mars. However a visit to a memory implant service is the catalyst for the emergence of another identity. As a result Douglas/Hauser is unsure which identity is real, or what is reality and what is the dream world. Whilst in ExistenZ game designer Allegra Geller enlists marketing trainee Ted Pikul to help her test a new immersive virtual reality game. This game which is accessed via a bioport near the bottom of the spine is called eXistenZ. The game is represented as being incredibly immersive thereby unsettling the relationships between reality and illusion. Consequently at the end of the film viewers are unsure if they were watching a representation of the game or reality.

4 Through the character Jobe, The Lawnmower Man, explores the possibilities of transforming mental capabilities using virtual reality. Although after undergoing learning programmes in virtual reality, Jobe becomes a megalomaniac who discards his physical body for a post embodied, virtual existence. Strange Days puts forward another scenario, whereby it is possible to record and reproduce sensory experiences which provide vicarious, realistic play backs to consumers. These play backs are achieved through a special virtual reality system which comprises of a headset known as a SQUID and a ‘deck’. 4 Play backs are recorded experiences taken straight from a person’s neural cortex. The use of play backs indicates how notions such as ‘real time’ can be distorted as recorded ‘live’ experiences can be repeated using virtual reality technology. Although the recordings can be edited afterwards, the film puts forward the notion that customers prefer uncut ‘play backs’ since these are thought to have more authenticity. Lenny, the main protagonist of the film, is a dealer specialising in uncut play backs. He is portrayed as knowing the importance of fantasy and the pleasures associated with immersion in virtual reality ‘to him it is not scopophilic, or voyeuristic, but a search for understanding, enlightenment, knowledge’ (Cameron, 1996:20). In this way the film suggests that virtual reality can provide vicarious pleasure, as well as knowledge. Whilst virtual reality was particularly prominent during the 1980s and 1990s it has been argued that there is now diminished interest in this technology. Joanna Buick says that ‘the general public, having been bombarded with a frenzy of hype about VR and shoot-em-up computer simulation games in the last couple of years, are already disappointed – they think it’s all over’ (Buick, 2002: 110). Buick rightly points out some of the early forms of virtual reality ‘shoot-em-up’ games found in gaming arcades had slow refresh rates and low graphic resolution so this could have led to some disillusionment with this technology. On the other hand, it could be contended that virtual reality is now more common place, or already embedded, within the aerospace, automobile industry and the US military rather than applications aimed at individual consumers.5 So whilst virtual reality may not appear to be as prominent as it was during the 1980s and 1990s, perhaps, it has become mainstreamed in industrial and military applications and less of a technology novelty.

Virtual transcendence

The notion of transcending the physical body for a kind of exalted wonderment in virtual reality, can be traced back to the mind/body philosophical framework proposed by René Déscartes during the seventeenth century. In Déscartes philosophical framework four faculties can be used to investigate reality these are: the intellect, the imagination, sense perception and

5 memory. According to Déscartes the imagination and sense perception are lower in rank than the intellect because they provide unverifiable knowledge. Experiential knowledge is dubious because it is prone to error. On the other hand, for Déscartes, deduction which relies on reason and exercises the intellect is a more precise form of knowledge. Déscartes also values the use of mathematics and geometry as a means of acquiring knowledge because it is based upon logic and reason rather than sensory experience. After much deliberation, Déscartes contends that the ability to think and reason is central to what it means to be human. As Margaret Wertheim points out, Déscartes philosophy is underpinned by the faculty of thought: ‘His famous maxim “I think therefore I am” grounded reality not in the physical world but in the immaterial phenomenon of thought’ (Wertheim, 1999:34). Furthermore in Déscartes work there is an attempt to reconcile the world of matter, which could be mapped spatially and accounted for, with the soul which is neither visible nor subject to the same sort of empirical testing. To overcome this dilemma Déscartes put forth the notion of two realms, res-extensa (matter) and res-cogitans (spirit, thought, feelings). So the dualism of Déscartes does not relate solely to the mind/body; it also refers to two distinct realms of existence. Moreover for Déscartes the soul can be regarded as something separate from the body. Whilst Déscartes was writing over three hundred years ago, at a very different historical moment and within the context of debates that concerned religion and science, some of his philosophical ideas are detectable in contemporary representations of virtual reality. The separation of two distinct realms of existence, for example, seems to be have become re-worked and associated with claims of transcendence through immersion in virtual reality. Nonetheless there are tensions between Déscartes notion of the logic and rationality of mathematics and transcendence from the physical body through immersion in virtual reality. Since virtual environments are generated by the logic of mathematical algorithms but immersion is a sensory experience. In some respects, within contemporary culture, philosophical and religious notions of the body, mind, soul, or spirit appear to have been revised. According to Baudrillard, in Western culture the concept of the soul served an important ideological function because it provided a strict moralistic framework. The soul also offered the hope of salvation whatever one’s situation in the social hierarchy. However for Baudrillard the ideology of the soul is ‘inadequate for a developed productivist system’ (1998:136) and a more functional ideology which preserves consumer values is now in place. So the notion of a transcendent soul has not disappeared entirely but is now associated with pleasure and consumption. For as Ken Hillis remarks, transcendence has now become associated with technology, individuality and the pursuit of pleasure:

Virtual technologies encourage belief that they constitute a “transcendence machine” within which the imaginative self might escape its privatized physical anchor and live in an iconography of pleasure. (1999:172).

6 Moreover computer scientist Ray Kurzweil suggests that the World Wide Web could develop so that it offers pleasurable, commoditised immersive virtual experiences:

Debate with Benjamin Franklin on the war powers of the presidency at the history society site. Ski the Alps at the Swiss Chamber of Commerce Site (while feeling the cold spray of snow on your face). Hug your favourite movie star at the Columbia Pictures site. Get a little more intimate at the Penthouse or Playgirl site. (1999:144).

Kurzweil also promotes that notion that exponential developments in computing will radically alter the notion of immersion in virtual reality and what it means to be human. Kurzweil claims that by 2029 ‘we’ll be able to build nanobots, microscopic-sized robots that can go inside your capillaries and travel through your brain and scan the brain from inside’ (2003:228). These nanobot cartographers will map all the neural connections in the brain. Kurzweil points out that there are already examples of transistor circuits and neurons working together and this will develop exponentially in the next few decades. Once these developments are in place electronic transistors could be used to stimulate sensory experiences:

For full immersion virtual reality, we will send billions of these nanobots to take up positions by every nerve fiber coming from all our senses. If you want to be in real reality, they sit there and do nothing. If you want to be in virtual reality, they suppress the signals coming from our real senses and replace them with signals that you would have been receiving if you were in the virtual environment. (Kurzweil, 2003:221).

Professor Hans Moravec also contends that developments in computing will lead to the demise of human existence (as we know it) and there will be a shift towards what he calls post-human existence in virtual realities (1988:1997). A question that needs to be considered further is why would anyone want to download his or her consciousness into virtual environments, even if this does become technologically achievable? Hans Moravec makes similar claims to Kurzweil, that computer intelligence will soon surpass the capabilities of human beings and this is one reason why post embodied existence in virtual realities would seem an attractive proposition. Furthermore Moravec claims that intelligent machines will extend the human mind beyond the temporal limitations of the physical body:

It is easy to imagine human thought freed from bondage to a mortal body – belief in an afterlife is common. But it is not necessary to adopt a mystical or religious stance to accept the possibility. Computers provide a model for even the most ardent mechanist. (1998:04).

Echoing Moravec’s pronouncement, Kurzweil says ‘there won’t be mortality by the end of the twenty-first century. Not in the sense that we have known it’ (1999:28). On a similar note, Professor Frank Tipler (1995), contends that human beings will evolve into intelligent agents through the downloading of consciousness into virtual environments and that this will lead to a

7 form of digital resurrection. Daniel Dinello discusses the context in which Kurzweil, Moravec and Tipler are writing and how this might impact upon the celebration of a virtual, post- embodied existence:

Tortured by the absolute certainty of suffering, growing old, and dying, the mostly white, affluent, male prophets of perfectability put their faith in technology to save humanity by transubstantiating the organic body. (2005:19).

Embodied and embedded in virtual reality

Debates regarding downloading consciousness into virtual reality seem to be underpinned by the philosophical position of mind-body dualism. In this context the mind is something which can be separated from the body in order to achieve a post-human virtual life. At present one of the stumbling blocks to the notion of downloading consciousness into virtual reality environments is that consciousness does not seem to be completely reducible to the firing capabilities of neurons. Furthermore brain activity does not seem to be completely translatable into computer programming language. As Professor Susan Greenfield (1998) points out there are both electrical and chemical processes within the human brain. The brain is also continually changing but there does not appear to be any hardware or software underlying these changes. Whilst computers may seem to learn from pre-programmed algorithms ‘few are changing all the time to give novel responses to the same commands’ (Greenfield: 1998:105). According to Greenfield ‘this molecular symphony [of the human brain] can hardly be regarded as comparable to the scenario inside a computer’ (1998:104). Karen Franck (2002) also questions if complete sensory immersion in virtual reality is possible and to what extent the physical body is involved in the immersive experience. Talking about the physicality involved in immersion in virtual reality, Franck says ‘to see I must move my head. To act upon and do things in a virtual world I must bend, reach, walk, grasp, turn around and manipulate objects’ (2002:240). At the present time at least, Franck states that in a virtual environment:

I will certainly need my brain so that I can be stimulated to see and feel this created world; my eyes and ears to do the seeing and hearing, my arms, hands, legs and feet, and other bones, muscles and tendons to do the moving. (2002:240).

In agreement with Franck it seems that the physical body can simultaneously interact with a virtual environment and the world outside it. Roy Ascott also remarks that ‘migration from the body does not imply its disappearance but the emergence of the multiple self, the distributed body, whose telepresent corporeality creates its own field of being’ (1999:67). So

8 when someone becomes immersed in a virtual world they can have the impression that they are walking through solid objects, or flying with little physical effort and it is these aspects of the experience, which may produce the feeling of transcending the body. Endeavours to separate the mind and body as two distinct realms of existence has led to a series of tensions which inflect the ways in which virtual reality is interpreted and understood. Hillis (1999) acknowledges the ways in which we extend our bodies through communication technologies such as mobile phones or e-mail but he points out that we still like things to remain in the same place or space because it gives us a sense of security. In our everyday world we are required to play different roles - worker, lover, partner, parent, or employee, but ‘our bodies remain with us both as testimony to who we are and as unifying dimension of ourselves within social polyvalency’ (Hillis, 1999: xxxi), consequently it seems that the physical aspects of embodiment and identity are not easily discarded.

Phenomenology and Being-in-the-World

Phenomenology is a philosophical theory that can provide a useful counterpoint to dualistic models of embodiment. Although there are various facets within phenomenology the common ground between them is the emphasis on embodied experience which Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty refer to as being-in-the-world. Phenomenology regards sensations as part of our exploration of the world around us and it is within this context that Paul Crowther remarks:

Our sense of self is not a wholly private thing. Rather, it is a function of the reciprocity between our unique position in the world qua particular embodied subject, and the broader physical and social circumstances in which we both locate ourselves and are located by forces beyond our control. (1993:01).

One of the drawbacks of cognitive science is that this approach has not yet accounted for the ways in which similar sensations can be brought about by different parts of the brain. Neural cells are not activated in isolation; they act synchronously producing a kind of temporal flow to our experiences. Indeed Merleau-Ponty (1999) uses the example of amputees who claim that they still feel pain in their missing limbs to show that sensation is not mechanistically related to sensory data. From the perspective of phenomenology it is the structure of sensory motor features of the human body in conjunction with brain activity and interaction with the environment that produces a wide range of sensory experiences. Moreover the sensory motor capacities of the human body both enable and constrain our adaptation and orientation in the world (O’Reagan, & Noe, 2001). Our senses operate differently, interacting with the world in a variety of ways.

9 Seeing is a specific activity because the retina is spherical, the eyes rotate and we blink. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the multi-sensory aspects of embodied experience by referring to the body as a ‘synergic system’ (1999:234). Sensations also extend beyond the boundaries of the physical body, for instance, it is possible to feel the texture of paper when writing with a pen, although the sensory information stems from friction in the finger-tips. Drivers also report that they gain a feel for the road when driving. Similarly it seems likely that we can extend our sensations beyond the physical body while immersed in virtual reality environments. A person who is immersed in virtual reality can to a certain extent understand their experiences in the virtual environment on the basis of their prior experience of being-in-the- world. Notions of illusion, imagination and reality are therefore inter-related. It is not really possible to understand the concept of illusion without having some sense of reality and vice- versa. The two concepts are not in opposition; rather they are mutually defining. For as Merleau-Ponty contends theoretical examination or philosophical debates of the real and the imaginary are already separating different aspects of our being:

If I am able to talk about “dreams” and “reality”, to bother my head about the distinction between the imaginary and real, and cast doubt upon the “real”, it is because this distinction is already made by me before any analysis; it is because I have an experience of the real as of the imaginary.(1999:xvi).

In summary, phenomenology can be a means of moving beyond binary oppositions such as mind versus body or reality versus simulation in order to open up complex debates regarding the multi-faceted aspects of embodiment and technology. Furthermore posing a further challenge to desires for transcendence via virtual reality are prosaic considerations such as how this technology actually operates. Paul Virilio’s work is useful in this respect because he contends that technology produces both positive and negative outcomes which he refers to as accidents. Virilio does not use the term in a moralistic way, rather he shows that there are unexpected and possibly undesirable aspects to technological development. The speaker systems used at music concerts can lead to deafness, telephone lines may be crossed and the prolific use of computer keyboards can cause repetitive strain injury. In the case of virtual reality, there is research that shows that this technology can lead to such undesirable things as simulator sickness, migraines and eyestrain (Kolanski, et al 1995; Jones, et al 2004). Michael Heim describes his experience of simulator sickness after he was immersed in a virtual environment, at the Banff Centre for The Arts in Alberta, Canada. He recounts that hours after the immersive experience he ‘still felt a touch of perceptual nausea, a forewarning of the relativity sickness I call “Alternative World Syndrome” or “AWS” (1995:67). From the perspective of those who have a vested interest in promoting virtual reality, such as politicians, financiers and industrialists, simulator sickness could be thought of as a relatively minor side effect which is far outweighed by the beneficial aspects of this technology. Nonetheless

10 immersion in virtual reality is tainted to a certain degree by the less desirable aspects of simulator sickness. Further criticism of the ways in which computer technologies, such as virtual reality, have been contextualised comes from Jaron Lanier. In The Third Culture, Jaron Lanier (2000) uses the term cybernetic totalists to describe those intellectuals, scientists, researchers and developers who promote the notion of a digital utopia which can be achieved through computing technology. Lanier is not denying that computing and information technology have changed the ways in which we think and communicate, however he is cautious about claims of universality with respect to computer development. He says that cybernetic totalists claim that computing is a global phenomenon yet some countries are not able to fully participate in this developing field. Lanier asks us to remember that whilst cybernetic totalists are fantasising about post-human life, AI and virtual reality, a large part of the population on this planet are concerned with surviving, dealing with the pragmatics of food, health and clean water. Lanier outlines the main beliefs and values of cybernetic totalism; that patterns of information provide the ultimate way to understand reality, and that nature and human beings are patterns of information which can be expressed mathematically. Lanier’s argument against cybertotalism is ongoing whilst Kurzweil, Moravec and Tipler remain undeterred in their optimism with respects to the development of virtual reality technology.

Conclusions

This paper has shown that the term virtual reality became well known in the 1980s as a means of referring to computer generated environments. At first the term was both quirky and contradictory and soon became thought of as the next big technological development. In this context, virtual reality had a high profile in popular culture during the 1980s and the 1990s and was featured in magazines, contemporary art exhibitions, novels and major Hollywood films. This paper has also indicated that politicians and government institutions took an interest in the social and economic benefits of virtual reality during this time. Although the high point of virtual reality may appear to have diminished, this technology has now become more mainstreamed in a variety of industrial and commercial settings, such as the aerospace and automobile industries. Claims for transcendence from the physical body through immersion in virtual reality were shown to have a long historical trajectory which was connected to the philosophical framework of Déscartes in the seventeenth century. Whilst Déscartes was dubious of sensory experience, he did value the faculty of thought and based his philosophical framework upon it.

11 In this context, his work separated thought from matter by considering them to be two distinct realms. For Déscartes the human body is part of the material realm; but thought is not. This philosophical stance was shown to give rise to the notion that the mind and the body can be separated. Additionally this paper pointed out that religious and philosophical notions of transcendence appear to have been reworked in contemporary culture so that they were associated with immersion in virtual reality technology. Themes of transcendence were, for example, detected in the work of Ray Kurzweil, Hans Moravec and Frank Tipler since these writers suggest that the mind can somehow be set free from the physical body and downloaded into a computer program for a post-embodied virtual existence. On the other hand, themes of transcendence were shown to have been represented in an ambivalent light through popular Hollywood films. The relationships between virtual reality, knowledge, psychosis and megalomania were, for example, explored in The Lawnmower Man (1992). The pleasure of looking was also shown to be taken to extremes and somewhat perverted in Strange Days (1995) as consumers of virtual reality play backs came to crave the experience of virtually sharing other people’s experiences, however dark or troubling they may be. Moreover the high point of representations of virtual reality in the 1990s came to a close with The Matrix, a film which explored the possibility of humans being imprisoned in an AI controlled virtual reality system. During this paper phenomenology provided a useful contrast to mind versus body dualism by focusing on the experience of being-in-the-world. Phenomenology suggests that we cannot reduce, or possess the world around us through mathematical or computational models. We do not experience the body as a collection of different parts, or like different objects placed beside one another because the body seems to be a unified entity. Embodied experience is connected to being in the world and is not solely definable according to a set of mathematical co-ordinates, or measurements. Key to this sense of being-in-the-world are such concepts as space and time. It is not possible to experience time and space as something outside of our body, rather we seem to be fully integrated within them. If downloading human consciousness into virtual reality becomes technologically possible then it would begin by replicating our prior human experiences of being-in-the-world, because it would be based upon our memories of embodied, sensory experiences. However after the initial downloading, the computer based consciousness might continue to develop in the virtual realm thereby becoming more distant from prior sensory human experiences. Nonetheless it is not yet clear if downloading consciousness into virtual reality will be technologically possible or whether it will become desirable. The discussion has shown that a counter argument against the claim for transcending the body for a post-human life in virtual reality has been put forward by Jaron Lanier. As Lanier pointed out there are important social

12 relations arising from the production and consumption of virtual reality such as the uneven access to technology. In conclusion this paper is in agreement with the following statement by Lanier, ‘if we allow our self-congratulatory adoration of technology to distract us from our own contact with each other …then somehow the original agenda has been lost’ (Lanier, quoted in Burkeman, 2001).

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14 1 Ultima On-line is an interactive, multi-user role playing, subscription based fantasy environment. Sim City is a city building simulation computer game, which was first released in 1989.

2 Details of the ESRC project (consulted Jan 2003) http://www.virtualsociety.sbs.ox.ac.uk .

3 The Serious Games exhibition was held at the Laing Gallery Newcastle from 16th Nov 1996 to 9th Feb 1997 and at the Barbican Art Gallery, London from 19th Jan 1997- 17th Aug 1997.

4 SQUID is an acronym for superconducting quantum interference device, Cameron, J. Strange Days, London: Penguin, 1996, p11.

5 Lanier makes the point about the increased use of virtual reality in industrial based settings in The Top Eleven Reasons VR has not yet become commonplace (consulted Nov 2005) http://www.advanced.org/jaron/topeleven.html.

Bibliographic references