Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Nigeria

Draft (Unpublished Article)

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

Introduction

Religious extremism is a major derivative of terrorism in our contemporary world. All religions have exhibited diverse levels of violent extremism, which has often resulted in terrorist movements (Hoffman 1995, Pipes 2002, Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur 2004, Juergenmeyer 2006, Laqueur 2009, Hent de Vries 2009, Beit hallami 2010 and Martin 2011). In Nigeria, Christian and Islamic religious identities have been culpable in various acts of violent extremism and terrorism. Some Muslim extremist groups such as the Maitasine, the Muslim brotherhood, the Izalla present themselves as the expediter of true Islam and are divinely mandated to cleanse the faith from any form of adulteration, and they also strive to reduce or completely eliminate the sway of the Christian identities in politics. Thus, their standpoint within Islam, is a return to the literal interpretation of the sacred texts and ultimately the establishment of an Islamic Umma (Hayness 1996: 215-219). In the same vein, the Christian extremist groups are not apolitical (Seguy 1975, Marshall 1991, Ward 1990), as has been perceived in many quarters. Christian extremist identities are precursors of various forms of violence in response to Muslim Islamization activities. This was a main factor that militarized some factions of the Christian groups and drew them into national politics (Haynes 1996:206). Resentments extant among Christian and Muslim identities in Nigeria are one of the main political issues that the state has witnessed at different historical epochs. Opposition between the two ascendant religious groups heightened in the early 80s as many Christian extremist identities came to the conclusion that the predominantly Muslim North of the country enjoyed an unequal share of political power and economic resources (Ibrahim cited in Haynes 1996:213). This was further aggravated by the government’s plan to join the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Furthermore, between 1987 and 1988, the state was embroiled in a heated debate about the Sharia legal system. The issue was the establishment of the Sharia Court of Appeal. The Christian identities exhibited their fear that Nigeria’s membership to the OIC and the plan by Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly to incorporate Sharia law in the Nigerian constitution was a conspiracy by the Muslim identities in collaboration with the state to Islamize Nigeria. Antagonisms between the two religious communities deteriorated into various forms of political violence in the late 80s. This continued in the early 90s, following anti-Christian riots in various parts of Northern Nigeria (Maeir 1991). Early 2000 saw the emergence of yet another violent religious extremist groups, such as the the

1 Al-Sunna Wal Jamma, that is, “Followers of the Prophet, “Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda’wati wal Jihad”, popularly Known as Boko Haram, and splinter group Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis- Sudan, popularly called (JAMBS), to perpetrate even worst forms of violence. Since its emergence, the group which claims to be fighting for the imposition of Sharia all over Nigeria has been involved in unbriddled acts of terrorism against the state and innocent civilians (Adesoji, 2010). The arguments in this paper take three paths. First, the concepts of religious extremism and terrorism areexplained; an analysis on the causes of religious extremism and terrorism and this will be followed by a theorization of the concept of fear of de-establishment by religious majorities in Nigeria.

Religious Extremism and Terrorism: Conceptual Discussions

Religious Extremism Religious extremism is not a new concept; it is a century-old problem; a culture that is in existence prior to the first phase of globalization ( Hashmi, 2009). Remarkably, all religions have shown diverse levels of violent extremism (Hoffman 1995, Pipes 2002, Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur 2004, Juergenmeyer 2006, Laqueur 2009, Hent de Vries 2009, Beit hallami 2010 and Martin 2011). According to Prus (2005), religious extremism is an “intense sense of ideological fervor accompanied by highly focused and sustained sets of activities that express the devotion of one or more persons to their particular belief systems”. He further identifies certain features of religious extremism which includes; “monastic seclusion of members, the extended proselytization of non-members, the vilification of outsiders as well as sinners within, the criminalization of non compliant persons, and the eradication of designated enemies.” Prus, however, posits that religious extremism reflects the norms and ritual activities of diverse religions, which are supported, sanctioned and certified by members and are not perceived by members as extreme but a normal mode of doing things sanctioned by a superior being. Thus, for the members their actions are moderate. For Liebman (2001), religious extremism is the “desire to expand the scope, detail and strictness of religious law; social isolation, and the rejection of the surrounding culture”. Religious extremism can either be “a process or an institution” that is a process of expanding religious laws to the extent that it is incorporated not just in the private realm but

2 in the public realm. In other words, extremists strive to enforce their laws on the society hence creating political conflict or isolate themselves and wait for a divine interpolation for their ideals to become reality. Moreover, their laws are elaborated and are strictly observed to the extent that leniency in the interpretation of sacred text is prohibited. Liebman, thus submitted that, religious extremism is detrimental to collective formation and “all historical religions recognize the destructive capacity of extremism and sought strategies to contain it”.

Beit- Hallahmi, (2001) posits that religious extremism tends to antagonize the forces of secularization and other religious groups that are opposed to it through the instrumentality of violence. In various parts of the world these violence against secularization and other religions have been seen among the Hindus in India that attacked Muslims and destroyed their mosques; in the United States, religious extremist groups have demanded for policies and laws that ensures prayers in public schools and have destroyed hospital and killed doctors who engage in abortion. The Jewish religious extremists in Israel have also demanded for a theocratic state and have attacked and killed Palestinians. The 1979 Iranian revolution carried out by Ayatollah Khomeni, is a key example of what religious extremism could result in.

Terrorism

There is still no universally accepted definition on the concept of terrorism. The term has generated quite a lot of debates among scholars in our contemporary society, as scholars are divided in their opinions as to what and what constitute terrorism. This is because the concept is essentially complex and shrouded with a lot of controversies and misuse (Wilkins, 1992; Laquer, 1999 Lee & Perl, 2002; Cronin, 2003; Kalic, 2005; Franks,2005, Makinda, 2005, Obi, 2005; Held, 2008; Hoffman, 2006; Nathanson, 2010, Schmid, 2011) Although, the terms “terror”, “terrorism” originated from the Latin word “terrere” which means to tremble or cause something to tremble or dread, etymologists claim that the word was not used until 1793 and 1798 during the French revolution, when the French word terrorisme, terroriste, terroriser came into usage. It was however popularized in English by Edmund Burke who opposed the revolutionaries and describe them as “Thousands of Hellbounds called terrorist are let loosed on the people” (Wilkinson 1976). The French revolutionaries launched what is known as “ regime de la terreur” on their people, a period that witnessed the wanton killings of real and perceived enemies of the state in order to consolidate and retain their hold on power (Wilkinson, 1976; Hübschule, 2005; Hoffman, 2006). The definitional challenges that the concept has faced over the years have been attributed to its dynamic nature in terms of the actors and the actions involved. In the 1930s, the concept retained its previous subtext as the abuse of power by

3 repressive governments. Its main focus was the authoritarian political systems such as fascist Italy, under Benito Mussolini, Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler and Stalinist Russia that were prominent at that time. These governments established a political system of fear, intimidation, coercion and violence over its citizens and those who opposed the state. Furthermore, in the 1960s and 1980s the understanding of terrorism expanded from the revolutionary posture to incorporate the activities of nationalist /ethnic separatist, radical ideology organization which emanated during the colonial and neocolonial political systems, and in the 1980s, terrorism was regarded as a grand conspiracy precipitated to destroy the West (Hoffman 2006). However, in the 90s, there was a paradigm shift in the conception of the term. It was essentially used to refer to the activities of non- state actors or groups against the state (Chomsky 1986, Falk 2004, Franks 2005, Kalic 2005, Hoffman 2006, Held 2008). Within these periods scholars viewed terrorism as only what groups or non state actors engage in. Thus, the historiography of state involvement in terrorism was gradually eroding. This followed diverse conceptualizations of terrorism by states and their agencies, intellectuals and policy makers, as essentially violent activities carried out by clandestine groups on civilians and un-armed combatants to influence the actions of states.

11th September, 2001 was a watershed in the intellectualization of the concept of terrorism. According to Hoffman (2006), in a swift reaction following the attacks on the United States, President George Bush while addressing the Congress in a joint session used the term “terror”, literally and completely neglecting the essential characteristics and the trajectory of the concept. Bush used the term to mean a “state of being terrified or greatly frightened” (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001). Hoffman stated that “the consequences of his semantic choice of words whether deliberate or not, nonetheless proved as portentous as they were significant: heralding a virtually open-ended struggle against anyone and anything that arguably scared or threatened Americans.” Thus, Bush’s statement indicated that the war on terror went beyond Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, to refer to regimes that seem to support or sponsor terrorism. Consequently, the war on terrorism became, in President Bush’s infelicitous choice of words, as much as a crusade against evil as it was an unwavering reaction to the multiplicity of new security threats confronting the nation, and therefore accounts for the way terrorism was redefined in the early 21st century (Hoffman, 2006). Hence, the term terrorism for the United States Government, is any group or states that threaten its very existence, given them the moral justification to first attack a potential threat in order to eliminate that threat. However, Hoffman submitted that terrorism is “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of political change”. Hoffman’s theorization of the term is more generic and covers a whole lot of salient issues in the debate on the concept of terrorism. First, it emphasizes that

4 terrorism is not only established when there are clear cases of violence; the threat of violence can also constitute acts of terrorism because it creates similar effects. Secondly, the definition incorporates terroristic violence executed by both state and non state actors. This paper thus adopts the conceptualization of terrorism by Bruce Hoffman.

Exploring the Causes of Religious Extremism in Nigeria

Religious extremism and terrorism has become the most dangerous and threatening trend in the post cold world war era. Scholars have postulated various alternative explanations to the surge of religious extremism and terrorism globally. One of such rationalizations traces the root cause to the activities of the United States internationally, especially its foreign policy objectives of enforcing democracy all over the world particularly, in the Muslim states (Mamdani 2004, Chomsky 2002). The US engagement in proxy wars to stop the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East by supporting the Mujahedeen fighters through the provision of training and military hardware to fight Soviet encroachment in some parts of Africa such as Congo, Angola and other parts of Southern Africa are regarded as remote factors that have given rise to terrorism (Mamdani 2004). Furthermore, the US involvement in the War in Iraq, the support for Israel during the Israel and Hezbollah war, the Palestinian question, and its impact on the Middle East; the US and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and her current war on terror which has seen the death of Al Qeada leader, Osama bin Laden, and other key Al Qaeda leaders, have generated resentment in the Muslim community and it has reverberated in diverse regions of the world including parts of Northern Nigeria, where more than 100 people lost their lives in 2001, following US military campaign in Afghanistan (Lewis, 2002; Heskey cited in Lengmang, 2011). However, this explanation failed to account for low level of religious extremism and terrorism in some Muslim states particularly in Saudi Arabia which is the symbolical headquarters of the Muslims all over the world. The Saudi Arabian government has been a strong ally of the US for years and has not witnessed an upsurge of extremism and terrorism in comparison with other states in the Middle East such as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, e.t.c

Another alternative explanation to the rise of religious extremism and terrorism is poverty, which stems from state policies that engender economic inequities, marginalization, and corruption. As Thakur (2006:1) puts it, “poverty can be an incubator of terrorism”. The terrorist leaders who are often influential and wealthy people find their members or followers among the poor, marginalized people in the society, who are then indoctrinated and end up as terrorist foot soldiers. Therefore, “alienation, despair, discontent provide fertile grounds to would-be terrorists.” According to Dagne (2002), in Africa, the rising incidences of religious extremism and terrorism, is attributed to the fact 5 that most African states are either failing or failed states, unable to provide and protect their citizens leading to an upsurge of diverse militant groups. Defunct Sudan has been regarded as a safe haven and training ground for terrorist groups such as Hizballah, Egyptian Islamic group, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and the Abu Nidal organization. This is attributed to years of poor economic conditions, government repression and conflicts (Dagne 2002). Moreover, in Nigeria, high employment rate, poor per capita income of less than a dollar per day, lack of adequate infrastructure, high rate of corruption at all levels of government, particularly the Northern part of the country, which has over 70 percent of the people living below poverty line, explains the rising incidence of terrorism in that part of the country (Danjibo, 2009). Most of these violence have been carried out by the Almajeris; “a large army of unemployed youths roaming the streets paying their dues of discipleship by begging and scavenging”, and who are prepared to engage in any violence for a fee. Wealthy terrorists have exploited their social state to commit acts of terrorism (Lewis 2002, Obi 2005, Makinda, 2005, Danjibo 2009, Ogundiya 2009, Bolaji 2010, Lenmang 2011, Gwamna & Dayil 2011).

However, poverty thesis has been a subject of debate by scholars. Some argue that the belief that poverty is a root cause of religious extremism and terrorism is a myth and empirical evidence has shown that most terrorists are in fact from the wealthy or upper class in the society (Gorski, 2002). Furthermore, Pipes (2002) argues that empirical proof that wealth rather than poverty is a root cause of terrorism can be seen in a 1980 study of imprisoned Islamic militant in Egypt, which showed that terrorists emanated from the “middle or lower middle class” ,armed with education; secondly, “a full 25 percent of Turkey’s Islamic militant party, the Sadeet Party, have been engineers (Pipes, 2002). Events that further weaken the poverty thesis can be seen in Nigeria. Individuals associated with terrorism have been reported to been born into the wealthy class. Governor Isa Yuguda of Bauchi state, reported that, Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of the Boko Haram Sect, lived a life of opulence (Newswatch, August 10, 2009, p.14). Similarly, Umar Farouk Muttalab, the Christmas day terrorist, was also born in a wealthy family (Newswatch 2010, p.18). Therefore, the poverty thesis fails to account for the variations that we see or observe in practice. Explanations based on elite interest/manipulation have taken us much further in explicating and understanding the increase in the acts of violent extremism and terrorism. However, scholars have different approaches to the thesis on elite’s interest/manipulation. Some stress the view that political elites particularly those who feel deprived or who are opposed to the prevailing socio-economic order, find as attractive and useful, the violent dispositions of religious extremists and terrorists, which they exploit for socio-political and economic gains (Muogbo 2009, Onuoha 2012); others identify religious elites as agents that most often initiate violent extremism and terrorism as tools to express their 6 grievances against the state by mobilizing their followers against constituted authorities. Thus, they employ or exploit their religious affiliations to score political goals. Also, as Falola (1998:103) has observed, religious leaders have much in common with politicians: they lead sizeable flocks, speak on behalf of millions, and pressure the state for specific policies. Moreover, they organize protest against the state and their rivals. The question that seems to challenge this theoretical viewpoint is, why will an individual give himself up to the whims and caprices of religious or secular elites to perpetuate acts of violent extremism and terrorism against the state of which they are integral members. This has been attributed to the fact that the people have already been exposed to religious extremist ideologies or teachings (Stitt, 2003; Kramer, 2004). Substantial literature that focuses on appraising ideology, specifically religious ideologies, as an explanation for the rise of religious extremism and terrorism, vary from scholars who see religion as essentially violent (this includes: Beit Hallami 2010, Hent de Vries 2009, Augustine Martin 2011, and Mark Juergenmeyer 2006) to those who view Islam as far more violent than any other religion (Bruce Hoffman, Daniel Pipes, Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, Walter Laqueur1), and others who argue that it is not religion itself, but the subjective re-interpretation of the sacred text or religious thoughts by religious ideologues (Mamdani 2004, Black 2011, Walter, 2011). The concern of this paper is on the later postulation. The subjective re-interpretation of religious thoughts such as: millenialism, halacha, jihad, takfir, Jahaliyya, and Jewish adherents to the theological belief of millennialism2 argued that, for the end of the world to come quickly, followers must work towards it, thus certifying the adoption of violence (Hoffman 2006:99). Similarly, the ancient law of Halacha 3 is

12.Beit Hallami, argues that the history of religion has been the history of violence. From one historical epoch to another religious groups have asserted their dominance and relevance through violence. Hent de Vries, (Cited in Hashmi 2009:2) also states that “there is no religion without violence of some sort and no violence without religion of some sort.” For Martin (2011) “some religious terrorists are inspired by defensive motives, others seek to ensure predominance of their faith and others are motivated by an aggressive amalgam of both tendencies. Mark Juergenmeyer in his classic book “ Terror in the Minds of God” advances that, religious followers involved in various forms of violence are convinced that they are in a cosmic war between the forces of good and evil. Thus, their actions are divinely allotted by their gods. Another school of thought which includes Bruce Hoffman, Daniel Pipes, Weinberg and Pedahzur and Walter Laqueur are united in the view that, although religion has played crucial role in the rise of Jewish, Christian, Hindu terrorism for centuries, Islam has changed the trend of terrorism (Hoffman, 1995; Pipes 2002; Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004, Laqueur 2009) For Hoffman, the rise of modern terrorism that is today described as more lethal, is traced to Islam specifically the Iranian revolution of 1979, which triggered a whole new pattern of terrorism in the modern world (Hoffman 1995). Pipes further argued that “radical Islam is an ideology that is incompatible with secular society. Muslims want to force the secular world to submit to their principles (Pipes, cited in Hashmi, 2009:2 ) Ben-Dor and Pedahzur (2004:75) further argue that “the willingness to sacrifice for one’s faith may be a requirement in most religions, but it is only in Islam that there is such an explicit doctrine of fighting for the faith and a doctrine too that is so deeply ingrained in the popular mind.” 23. Millennialism is a central element of eschatology, which refers to a period in time which the world is expected to come to an end and a new world begins. “The vision of an ingathering of Jews in the present day to the land of Israel is an essential part of Jewish eschatology. Upon the defeat of Israel’s enemies and the reconstruction of the Third temple, the period of resurrection of the dead and the advent of messiah are anticipated, to be followed by age of peace, tranquility, and spirituality” .Although, millennialism is an ideology that is more promoted by Judaism than other Abrahamic faith , other religions such as Hindus believe in Rajneeshpiram and sects like the Aum Shinrikyo, demonstrates that the concepts is endemic in all religious groups (Forum on Foreign Policy 2007). 3 Halacha, found in the Bible, Exodus 22:2 “if a thief found breaking in and be smitten so that he dieth, there shall be no blood guiltiness for him,” 7 regarded by Jews as a divine mandate that requires Jews to apply self defence in the event of an impending danger to their lives and that of others. This religious thought has however been reinterpreted by religious extremist to mean anyone that opposes the existence of the Jewish state and the return of the Jews to their Holy land. This was what Yigal Amir cited as justification for his assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin Yitzak (Kahane and Al Khattor cited Lavene 2011). Furthermore, the concept of Jihad has been reinforced and reinvented by Islamic scholars such as Abul A’la Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb. Scholars are of the opinion that a remote factor which has spawned religious extremism and violence is attributed to subjective interpretation by these religious ideologues (Laquer 1999, Mamdani 2004: 53). Mamdani (2004: 58) further posits that the subversion of the concept of jihad4 to denote violent struggle against unbelievers, can be traced to the writings and teachings of these two intellectuals, Abu’-A’la-Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb.5 Central to the idea of Mawdudi is his position that Muslims must struggle through jihad to attain the Islamic Umma. Mamdani advances that Mawdudi’s argument was based on the precept that, the only true and pure state is one sanctioned by God. Thus, he advocated for an ideological state that is essentially theocratic, which he believed can be achieved through violence. According to Mamdani, Qutb argued that the perception of jihad entails both the proselytization of friends and the use of force against enemies. “Only physical force will remove the political, social, economical obstacles to the establishment of the Islamic community. The use of force to realize freedom is not a contradiction for Qutb” (Mamdani 2004: 60). Furthermore, Lavene states that, Qutb reinterpreted the concept of Jahiliyya.6 Qutb subverted this concept by associating it with the modern society. He advanced that the modern society has deviated from the rules and principles which Allah prescribes due to the influence of secularism and westernization and thus termed the modern secular political terrain as being in a state of Jahiliyya, having turned away from the principles of Allah. Qutb therefore advocated that, it is morally justified that true Muslims should fight and destroy the existing system which has been secularized and

45.See Lacquer, Walter. (1999) The New Terrorism. Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. stressed that the traditional Islamic understanding of the concept of jihad is that it can be divided into two, the greater jihad which means the struggle by Muslims to live a pious life, while the lesser jihad entails the defence of the Islamic faith. Islamic clerics have placed more emphasis on the greater jihad and it is therefore considered more important than the lesser jihad. This is not the case with radical Islamist where the greater jihad is significant. 56.See Black, Anthony (2011) The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present 2 nd (eds) Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press pp. 307-310. Abu’-A’la-Mawdudi was the first Muslim intelligentsia who advocated for the integration of religious life and the political life and reject entirely the modernist approach of adopting sharia. He posits a literalist interpretation of the sacred text. He is regarded as the father of Muslim fundamentalism. Sayyid Qutb is regarded as one of the most influential Islamists who advocated r the subjective interpretation of the sacred texts. He stresses the need to examine the sacred text from the perspective of a poetry. Specifically, allusions for a deeper or hidden truth that can only be discovered through intuition. He was quoted as saying, “it is an allusion to the great truths which are not represented by words but alluded to by world”. 6 Lavene, Sarah 2011 states that classic Islamic perception of the concept refers to “the period of paganism that prevailed in Arabia before the advent of the prophet and Islam. (Terrorscope. Sara-lavene.blogspot.com/2011/10/15-religious-justification-provided- by.html). 8 westernized (Lavene 2011). Lastly, according to Lavene (2011), another Islamic thought elaborated by Qutb is the concept of Takfir (Al-Takfir W’al Hijra).7 This is one of the central thoughts that have strengthened the resolve by radical Islamists. Schmid (2011) thus states that “most Salaﬁsts base the rhetoric of international jihadism on Qutbism” It was the writings and teachings of these Islamic intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s that formed the basis upon which radical Islamists draw their inspiration. “Usama Bin Ladin and other Islamist terrorist leaders draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within one stream of Islam (a minority tradition), from at least Ibn Taymiyyah, through the founders of Wahhabism, through the Muslim Brotherhood, to Sayyid Qutb. Criticisms have however trailed the explanation that the increase of religious extremism is a major cause of violence. Mamdani (2004:6) argues that those who engage in violent religious extremist acts do so for political reasons and not cultural (religion). The crops of Islamic extremist are not from the conservative Muslim societies but from the secular intelligentsia, whose agenda is the attainment of power in this world. Moreover, for the secular intelligentsia to legitimize their ideology, they sought for an Islamic political thought, which they found in the idea of jihad, giving it a subjective interpretation as opposed to the true Islamic teachings about jihad. While we are not denying the fact that the factors discussed above, despite criticism, illuminates to a great extent the rise of religious extremism and terrorism, an alternative explanation which has not gained much attention as a factor that gives rise to religious extremism and terrorism is the concept of “fear” by religious majorities.

Fear of de- establishment by Religious majorities in Nigeria

When Winston Churchill warned, “we have nothing to fear, but fear itself,” it is doubtful he realized the sweeping political accuracy of those inspiring words (Hashmi 2009, Mattil 2012). According to Matill, “the common thread that weaves violent political movements together is fear. It is not the only motivating factor behind political violence, nor necessarily the most obvious, but it is virtually always there.” He further stated that:

Perhaps it’s not surprising to realize that it is fear that also connects the myriad of nationalist, separatist and independent movements who also engage in political violence.

7 Lavene, Sarah (2011) further states that takfir in Islamic teachings refers to the avowal of community of individuals who have backsliden from their faith; a declaration which attracts a death penalty according Islamic law, although, Islamic legal scholars have declared that the law should not be applied recognizing the dangers involved in the implementation of such law. Terrorscope. Sara- lavene.blogspot.com/2011/10/15-religious-justification-provided-by.html.

9 Although experts, academics and analysts hypothesize about a multitude of causal effects that lead to violence and terrorism, fear is an essential underlying motivator. These fears resonate loudest among those people who have least. For people mired in poverty, lacking hope and education, frustrated by political and economic systems they can neither understand or control, religion holds meaning and offers hope, at least for future salvation, if not in this world (Mattil 2012).

Similarly, Hashimi (2009) argues that “the fear of being deprived of something drives one to act aggressively, while the fear of being left out drive movements against prevalent forces”, this is the case of violent religious movements. In her analysis of the rise of religious extremism and terrorism in South Asia, specifically Pakistan, she asserted that all religious institutions have exhibited one element of fear or the other.. Fear of being deprived their place, fear of secularization, and the fear of Western education. In Pakistan, the fear by religious majorities is a driving force behind the successful implementation of acts of religious extremism and consequently, terrorism; “fear that has often led to extreme and unfortunate occurrences like the pogrom in Gujarat unleashed by the Hindu majority, Jihad waged by Islamic militants against the infidels in Pakistan, or the Sinhalese Buddhist engaging in violence against Tamil Hindus and Christians in Sri Lanka”. She concluded by stating that the fear expressed by a Indian Muslim majority of losing their identity and status in the society due to the close affiliation with the Hindus facilitated the secession of Pakistan from India and the fear of radical Islamist of losing their acquired status of influencing the decisions of the state over the years due to the state’s withdrawal of it support and patronage provided religious political parties, are factors that have motivated Muslim majorities in Pakistan to engage in acts of religious extremism and terrorism (Hashmi 2009).

Just as was observed in Pakistan, the concept of fear of de-establishment is an explanation for upsurge of religious extremism and terrorism in Nigeria. This is consequent on the fact that over the years in Nigeria, there has been increase in various forms of political violence, which has been more consistent in the Northern part of the country beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Maitatsine uprising , the Muslim Students’ Society, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Izalla Movements and the most recently the the Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda’wati wal Jihad also known as Boko Haram and its splinter group, Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis- Sudan, popularly called (JAMBS) have been key actors.

The fear of de-establishment among religious majorities in Nigeria is a main factor behind the upsurge of violent extremism and terrorism. Three key issues in Nigeria political trajectory stimulate this mutual fear. These include: the colonial state structure, postcolonial state structure and the

10 Christian oriented legal system. These three variables have combined to create a state of mutual fear and suspicion among these ascendant religious identities in Nigeria. It is argued in this paper that these variables are the foundational cause of violent extremism and terrorism in contemporary Nigerian State.

The colonial and Postcolonial Political Structures

Modern Africa is largely a colonial construction. The colonizers, which comprise mainly of Britain and France, established sundry contraptions of domination without regard to democratic principles. Thus, contemporary African states have been described as “an artificially constructed agglomeration of diverse ethnicities and other loosely united groups built by conquest and subjugation; the state never acquired any enduring legitimacy or trust from the various indigenous groups and nationalities” (Falola 1998: 52). Religion was one of the main instruments appropriated by the colonizers to achieve political domination (Haynes 2006:24). This was achieved with the help of the missionaries who acted in the guise of advancing Western education, but were agents of cultural domination in Africa (Ndeda 2008:1). Gray (1982), reiterates this when he asserted that “Christianity, it is argued, made its rapid advances precisely because its emissaries, the missionaries, were so closely linked with the whole apparatus of colonial rule.” African Muslim societies who unsuccessfully fought against Christian European powers through the force of arms struggled to adapt to the Eurocentric modernization processes without undermining their Islamic ideologies (Hayness 2006: 24-25). According to Hamadou Adama, “but most of all, the change of comportment from mutual tolerance to reciprocal suspicion was followed by the collaboration of Muslims under colonization. The end of Muslim political militancy (jihâd), due to the intrusion of Europeans armed with more sophisticated technologies, also opened up a new era, another turning point in relationships between natives and foreigners. This factor would, as well, impose a radical redefinition of Muslim and European roles and give rise to unpredictable alliances...... ”(Adama 2003: 47). The British contact with Nigeria during colonialism was decisive in that it significantly influenced the evolution of the Nigerian state. The British adopted a system that created and nurtured identity consciousness, which according to Suberu and Osaghae (2005), is the major cause of identity conflicts in Nigeria. The system of administration alienated various identities and some have argued it

11 is an instrument appropriated by the British to ensure continued domination of the Nigeria state in the postcolonial and modern Nigeria (Suberu and Osaghae 2005). Political disputes which most often lead to diverse levels of violence and division, run along the tribal and religious lines ( Smyth and Robinson 2001 ). According to Suberu and Osaghae (2005), “the issues that generate the fiercest contestation include those that are considered fundamental to the existence and legitimacy of the state, over which competing groups tend to adopt exclusionary, winner-take-all strategies. These include the control of state power, resource allocation, and citizenship.” The roots of these issues in contemporary Nigeria can be traced back to the colonial state structure, which is strategically constructed to pitch an identity group against the others in order to ensure a continued socio-political and ultimately economic domination of the postcolonial Nigerian state. Sanni and Amoo (1983) argue that the colonial state was largely discriminately because it is oriented towards Christianity thus principally antithetic to the principles of Islam. The Muslim identity groups asserted that the colonial state is irreligious irrespective of the colonialist espousal of an arrangement that recognizes its creed. Western values which was believed to be in tandem with Christianity, were blamed for moral bankruptcy and excessively avaricious nature of the Nigerian state (Sanni and Amoo 1983). Therefore, pockets of Islamic extremist groups emerged in the Northern parts during colonialism to protest (most times through violence) against the colonial Nigeria state. Even in the West, groups such as the Lanase movement emerged to remonstrate the colonial state (oyelade 1980).

The subtle and violent protest against the colonial state did not stop at the end of colonial rule in Nigeria. It has been reiterated in our contemporary context. Majority, if not all colonial contrivances were appropriated by the political elites in the postcolonial setting. These can be seen in the socio- political, economic, and legal sectors of the postcolonial Nigerian state. Although, the British left powers in the hands of the Muslims identity groups, the outlook or structure of Nigeria was inherently Christian. The Muslim Identity group, taking advantage of their political power, sought to Islamize or restructure the Nigerian state by arrogating Islamic principles or adopting policies that are biased in favour of Islam in the political and legal sectors of the political system. These Islamization movements include: adoption of Sharia legal system and establishment of Sharia Court of Appeal, Political affiliation with the Islamic organisations, establishment of Mandrasas (Islamic schools), and most recently, the adoption of Islamic banking system (Anderson 1959, Kukah 1993, Haynes 1996, Falola 1998, Sramek 2009). However, the Islamization activities of the political and Islamic elites in Nigeria faced both non-violent and violent resistance by the Christian identities who fear the continued success of the Muslim Islamization programmes will put Nigeria in similar status with Iran, which became an archetype of true Islamic Umma (Islamic State) after the Iran revolution led by Ayatollah Khoemini in

12 1979, thereby relegating them (Christians) to the background of political obscurity. One of the issues that garnered much contestation and resistance in the 1990s was Nigerian membership to the British CommonWealth and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

Nigeria’s political affiliation to the British common wealth was one of the main factors behind the move for Nigeria’s membership of the OIC (Hayness 1996). While the Christian identities raised fear that Nigeria’s membership of the OIC will not only jeopardize her secular status, it is part of the Islamization agenda by the Muslim Identities facilitated by their political and religious leaders (Falola 1998:100). In February 1986, the Catholic Bishops stated in a press release in reaction to Ibrahim Babangida’s surreptitious action:

Our continued membership is perceived by many as directly but effectively making Nigeria an Islamic State despite all assurances to the contrary. To elevate one religion to the status of a state religion is clearly against our constitution...... with its religios pluralism, Nigeria cannot as a state become a member of an international body whose objective are essentially the promotion of one particular religion.... to do that would mean injustice to other religions and to their adherents. This basic injustice in an area so all-embracing and sensitive as religion, is bound to manifest itself also in other areas of national life-political , economic, social, culture, legal etc. (cited in falola 1998:100) However, proponents of the membership of the OIC refuted the claims by the Christians by stating that, Nigeria is a membership of the Commonwealth, a Christian organization and led by a British monarch who must be a protestant Christian (Hayness 1996:213).

The Nigerian legal system, which was borrowed from the English common law, is another main factor that nurtures this fear, consequently fanning the flames of violence in Nigeria political history. During colonialism, the Islamic law or Al-sharia played a subservient role and has remained so ever since. There have been various forms of rejection by the Muslim Identity in Nigeria over the superiority of the English common law or what they termed “Christian law”. Although, the British sought to pacify the Emirs by introducing an appeal procedure in 1958 “it had in the process also sowed the seeds of conflict in view of the fact that appeal was hitherto, unknown in the Sharia law (Anderson 1.959; Kukah 1993:116). In one of the conferences held in 1983, Muslim continued to voice their rejection of the obsequious role of Al-sharia in Nigeria. According to Mahdi Adamu cited in Falola 1998:

One of the far-reaching consequences of Nigeria’s colonial experience was the imposition, by our British colonisers, of the English common law which has now largely supplanted our time-honoured judicial principles and processes, most especially in regard to Shari’ah (Islamic Law) to which the majority of Nigerians, being Muslims, subscribe to. The contempt and antagonism with which the English common law holds the Shari’ah has meant that Islamic legal practice was, and still is relegated and restricted to civil matters and other

13 personal issues such as marriage and inheritance, while English law claims monopoly over nearly all other forms of Law-Constitutional, Criminal, Commercial,etc. Thus, despite the fact the majority of Nigerians are Muslims, Common Law, rather than Shari’ah, serves as the main judicial code and procedure. To this extent, Law in Nigeria is largely divorced from its socio-cultural and religious contexts. What an injustice.

The Muslim Identities however anchored their arguments on the doctrine of democracy, which entails that the will of the majority is given priority. They posit that, majority of Nigerian are Muslims thus the country ought to be governed by Islamic laws because it reflects the decisions of majority of the Nigerian people (Falola 1998). Secondly, the Muslims believe that Al-sharia is fundamental to the doctrines of their faith “Muslims are bound by faith to order their lives by Al-sharia (Rashid 1988). Furthermore, they advanced that the present legal system which is tainted by colonialism needed to be replaced with Islamic legal system in order to break free from the chains of imperialism (New Nigeria 1976). There is also a moral angle to the demand of Sharia legal system. Muslim clerics argue that the Nigerian state is morally bankrupt and Sharia would not only correct the societal ills, it will promote social justice (Falola 1998: 79).

However, Christians in Nigeria were and are still inclined towards the principle of separating the church from the state, and thus saw nothing wrong with the non-application of Sharia legal system particularly outside the Northern part of the country and among Christian Northerners during the 80s (Mala 1988 and Falola 1998).Christian Identity groups rejected the call by their Muslim counterparts on the implementation of Sharia legal system in the country for fear that any constitutional recognition of Sharia Court of Appeal was not only an indication of government prejudice in favour of Islam but a grand strategy to Islamize Nigeria. This was a main factor behind diverse levels of political violence witnessed in the 1970s (Anderson 1959: 442, Kukah 1993:116 and Hayness 1996: 213). In illuminating the rationale behind this outright rejection, the Christian leaders posited that the Sharia legal system does not take into cognizance the dynamics of contemporary society. They are of the view that the laws are too crude or draconian and feminists have also criticized the Islamic laws because it largely ignores the inalienable political rights of women (Awopeju 1977). Mala cited in Falola 1998: 178) raised fears on the likely outcome of the adoption of sharia legal system. According to him, “Nigeria under Al- sharia in which only Muslims will be allowed to lead the country, major political offices would go to Muslims, non-Muslims would be officially inferior to Muslims, intermarriage would be forbidden, conversion to Islam will be enforced, and the army would be no more and less than an arm of the Islamic jihad.”Granted that the Sharia legal system is currently being practiced in majority of the Northern states, the decision of the supreme court supersedes the decisions of any other appellate court, including the Sharia Court of Appeal. By this, the Sharia legal system still 14 retains its subservient role. This has been rejected by groups of Muslim extremists who have voiced their rejection of the current practice of Sharia through terrorist violence in recent times

Conclusion

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