Government 1300 Final Exam Study Guide

Notes:

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3/21

 Major 1970 Reform  The major transformation of congress in the 1970’s  This reform was watched by a bunch of frustrated liberals who saw their bills being blocked by the conservative coalition.  They figured to get the bills passed they had to publicize the biases that existed with congress. These bomb throwers helped get some seats for the democratic party  Newt Gingrich did the same thing and got more seats for the Republican party  They took power from the committees and transferred it up to the parties  Curbine Rules committees –  In 1974 the democrats gave the speaker the power to pick who would be on the rules committee. This made the committee under the speaker again like it was when it was under the control of Joe Cannon.  Committee assignments – took democrats from the ways and man committee and put them on the steering and policy committee. The speaker and majority serve on this committee and they also appoint people who are on these people.  Multiple referrals rule – also adopted in 1974, this gave the speaker to send a bill to more than one committee at a time. This was all part of a phase were power was taken from the committees and was given to the heads of the parties.  There was also reform on committees from below. Committees established sub committees. The speaker would appoint the sub committees head and he would also control the agenda.  Sub committee bill of rights – changes everything. This gives sub committees control of there own budget and staff. This essentially gave a lot of power back to the sub committees.  There are now tons of subcommittees and congress was extremely cluttered and this took a lot of powers away from the committees.  Sunshine rules – this makes committees be much more open to the public. This says that all committee meetings must be open to the press. This pretty much takes a lot of power away from the chairs.  Seniority System – was eliminated. The democrats in 1971 decide that they would like to have a vote every two years during a caucus to see if the chair will stay. IN 1973 they made a law that there would be a secret ballot to vote on the chair if 1/5 of the committee members suggest it.  Watergate Babies – New selected class in 1975 into congress after the Watergate scandal. They wanted to redefine congress. There was 75 of them and they could vote against anyone that they want. They wanted to interview every head of the committees to see if whether or not they would vote for them.  Explaining Reform – “Conditional Party Government” (David Ronde)  Party strength is conditional to level of agreement with the party  If party members agree on most policy if they delegate to promote those policies.  You get centralization from the party and then you can delegate to the leaders.  When party members are divided internally, instead of empowering party committees you empower party leaders.  The key to the reform era was the southerners became a smaller share of the democratic caucus and internally the democrats were more unified.  Effects of Reform  A lot of African Americans moved to the north, which made a lot of southerner turn into conservative republicans.  When African Americans were granted the ability to vote, southern democrats had a hard time getting their votes so they all switched to all white coalitions.  Zelizer argues that reform happened because coalitions were being developed because of social groups of people.  People tried to make names for themselves because election was more candidate centered and people wanted to do crazy things so that they could gain recognition.  Rise of the Bomb throwers  Jim Wright (1987) – takes over as speaker when the Democratic Party agrees on policy because there are very little southern democrats.  Wright would routinely pressure members on how to vote. He would actually tell them that if they voted they would get a good committee assignment.  He also used the rules committee very aggressively to shut out amendments.  These very aggressive tactics by Wright made the republicans miserable.  Newt Gingrich saw that these tactics were not in favor in the republicans so he decided that the Democrats had to be kicked out of the chairs of congress.  Newt started the conservative opportunity society – it was a small group of young conservative aggressive republicans. They started throwing bombs at the Democrats by speaking against them so that they showed America that the Democrats were corrupt.  Cam Scam – when people would talk to congress and pretend that everyone was there but they weren’t. One time they scanned the room and made a guy like a fool.  Gingrich started calling out on Wright and the Democrats didn’t support him either.  When Wright saw that he didn’t have the confidence of the Democrats he resigned ad mince the scandal.

3/23  GOP Revolution of 1995  Partisan warfare began in the 1980’s with the rise of Speaker Jim Wright (D)  Newt Gingrich led the bomb-thrower wing of the Republican Party  Forced Wright to retire in 1989  Made Democrats look inept, especially Tom Foley, the new speaker  Clear sense of drift on the part of Democrats  Unable to pass Clinton’s agenda from 92-94 even though D’s majority  1994 midterm elections, Republicans pick up 52 seats in house, 8 in senate  Ran on party manifesto called the “Contract with America”  Promised to pass everything in the “Contract” within first 100 days  Term limits  Balanced budget amendment  Cut waste  Crime bill  Fairer floor procedures  Big contrast with typical candidate-centered elections  In campaigns, Republicans tied incumbent Democrat’s voting records to the records of the house leadership, and specifically, Bill Clinton  Face morphing ads from candidate to Clinton  The newly elected members feel a big obligation to Gingrich, because he was the architect of this campaign format, the Contract, and the bomb-throwing  Realigning of power structure  Gingrich personally selected committee chairmen  Violated seniority in 3 cases in order to put people he trusted into power positions of importance  Put Bob Livingston in charge of Appropriations Committee, because Gingrich trusted him to be more tight fisted with spending  Gingrich commanded loyalty from leadership team  Sub-committee chairmen were required to sign a pledge avowing to support the party on spending cuts  Republicans implement term limits for committee leadership  6 year term limit for all leadership positions  Prevented chairmen from building up independent power base  Republicans bypassed committees entirely  Appointed “task force” to write very important legislation and bring it to the floor of the house  Task force appointed by Gingrich  Committee Chairs gain more power over subcommittees  Under Democrats, subcommittees had a great deal of independence  Could hire their own staff, etc  Chairmen get to select leadership of subcommittees  Creates hierarchy wherein Leadership has power over committees, and committee leadership has power over subcommittees  Consolidating the Republican system  Gingrich is wildly successful in the first one hundred days  Gingrich looks like a hero, appears to be almost a prime minister  This same high profile ends up being his downfall  Wasn’t able to manage house business while traveling around country trying to act like a prime minister  Held accountable for the things he said, had many verbal slips  Pinned with the responsibility for the government shutdown  Democrats came to see Gingrich as an incredibly juicy target  Ethics investigations ensue  Gingrich takes lots of flack  Government Shutdown  Republicans thought Clinton would be blamed  Public actually blamed Republicans for being obstructionists  Republicans lose seats in 96 and 98  Gingrich blamed for this loss of seats  Resigns  Scandal warfare and scandal politics makes the leadership of the house extremely vulnerable  Regardless of the merits of the cases, the reaction 40 years ago of the party leadership on both sides of the aisle was to rally around the individual  Scandals make congress look bad  40 years ago, the leadership of both the Republicans and the Democrats feared congress being hurt as an institution by the appearance of scandal by any of its members  Today, there is incentive in using scandal and pushing it to dethrone the leadership of the opposite party, because the minority party is entirely left out of the process today, whereas back 40 years ago the minority was included in major decisions and thus they were less willing to entirely revolt against the majority  Tools of party government  Implications of party government

4/4 Senate Individualism and Partisanship:

Individual Senator prerogatives: -Senators are restrained by norms instead of regulations. -Individual Senators have much greater rights than Congressmen: a. Open Amending Process: -Senate does not have a “germaneness” rule meaning that amendments in the Senate do not need to relate to the content of the original bill -The minority party often offers non-germane amendments to the majority party’s legislation. -Rules committee in the senate can write a “restrictive rule” so that no more amendments can be offered. -The gatekeeping process in the senate is not very strong. b. Unlimited Debate: -Senators can speak as long as they want. -“Right of Recognition”- All senators must be recognized if they want to speak. -Filibuster: -Usually reserved for particularly important topics. -The filibuster was extremely rare in the first 100 years of American history. -Traditionally, the filibuster was not particularly effective because the agenda was not very crowded and the majority party would simply wait it out. -“Norm of restraint”-senators do not filibuster trivial issues. -Filibuster becomes more effective in the 20th century when 11 senators filibuster an act to essentially prevent entrance to WWI. -Woodrow Wilson became outraged and enacted the “closure rule,” where 2/3 of the senate can end and override a filibuster. -In 1975 the closure rule was lessened to 60% of the senate. -Beginning in 1960s and 1970s the filibuster becomes unrestrained and more effective.

Sources of Increased use of Filibuster: 1) The agenda is more crowded so the majority party cannot afford to keep a bill on the floor forever. -“Unanimous Consent Agreement”- debate is limited to x number of hours before it is voted on. -“Holds”- A message goes out to members of both parties to ask if they oppose unanimous consent. -“Holds” are secret, and can often kill a bill that is not a top priority. -There are 2 tracks for bills: 1) filibustered bills, and 2) non-filibustered bills. As a result, the filibuster no longer requires talking. 2) Increase in individualism: -New breed of senators in 1960s and 1970s who are activistsmove away from party machine.

Implications for Policy: -You need to appeal to filibuster pivots (i.e. 40th and 60th senators). -Status quo moves towards minority party -Gridlock between 40th and 60th senators. -There are more party votes in the Senate than in the House -The rising polarization in the senate makes the majority party’s agenda more difficult to pass. -1/2 of all major bills are killed/seriously amended due to the filibuster.

“Nuclear Option”: The majority party prevents obstruction.

4/6 - Difficult to be the Majority Leader in the Senate (CQ article) - Frist is serious about scaling back the filibuster - Why have they allowed the Senate to filibuster? Benefits: - Gives Senators chance to get more attention, higher profile - Allows moderates to restrain their own party from becoming too extreme - Majority today might become minority tomorrow - Costs of filibuster? - Potential for gridlock – popular bills might not pass and majority might not be able to push through a big agenda - Anti-democratic – norm is majority rule - Accountability issue – who to blame if something fails? Maybe the filibustering side, but maybe the other side because if they had compromised the bill would have passed - If majority keeps getting filibustered on policies it cares about most, then they may be willing to absorb costs and get rid of the filibuster - Battle over judicial nominees – 10 blocked so far - Republicans say this is unprecedented - However, did they do this to Abe Fortas 1968? - Republicans also blocked Clinton nominees in committee - Frist says it is the first systematic use in trying to defeat a whole range of nominees - “Nuclear option” – In the Senate, the vice president is the presiding officer, so a Republican Senator will make a point of order asking the chair to enforce the rules because further delay will prevent majority from “advice and consent” - VP agrees and ends debate - Democrats could appeal, citing the precedent of the Senate, and also just filibuster the appeal - However, Senate can “table” the appeal – this motion doesn’t have debate and you can force a vote – only a majority is needed to pass the motion - This will enforce the VP’s ruling and set a new precedent - This option came up before in 1950’s-1960’s, but liberal Democrats couldn’t secure the majority to get it to work - Binder & Smith – majority can never have majority rule in Senate because of filibuster - Because of the benefits, Senators have never formed a majority to end the system - Likely response by Democrats – regard the ruling as illegitimate and will use all their prerogatives to bring the Senate to a standstill, object to all Unanimous Consent Agreements - According to Senate rules, the bill must be read on the floor, which could take forever – usually this part is waived in the UCA, but Democrats will now use this procedure to delay - Can Frist get the necessary 50 votes? - Moderates and mavericks won’t like it - Frist has strong pressure on him to act - Social conservatives are very interested in the judiciary - Frist has presidential ambitions - Democrats will also have strong interest groups backing them - George Will – worries about slippery slope - As parties become more polarized, its more difficult to conduct business if the minority is willing to filibuster - Yet, the filibuster makes individual Senators much stronger - Committee System – multiple interests shaped them - Under what conditions do some interests dominate? - Origins - All bills were debated on the floor in 1789 and with majority approval, a select (temporary) committee would further debate and write specific language and then dissolve when the bill went to the floor - This was rooted in egalitarian values – important decisions were made on the floor so that all members were equally powerful - Prevented individuals from establishing independent power bases and doing things that others don’t like -Problems – hard to develop expertise, which means that members will have to rely on interest groups or the executive branch for information - Early 19th century and on – began to rely on permanent standing committee that exists from Congress to Congress and divides the labor - with expertise, can keep independence from executive branch - Number of standing committees kept growing as more new topics appeared – railroads, public works - Too many committees – 50-60, so that members spread thin and overlapped - 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act to streamline the system – down to 20 - Each committee given professional staff and resources - This was a Congressional reaction to FDR’s power - “Information model” – committees provide members with information and expertise rooted in a need to keep up with the President and the Executive Branch - Distributive model - “Individual Reelection and Power” - 3-4 really powerful committees – Appropriations, Ways and Means, Rules, and Budget - Freshmen in Congress get onto less important ones, and so they try to get on a committee that is relevant to their district - David Price onto Banking because NC was headquarter of banks - Committees allow members to efficiently distribute goodies to their constituents - Divides up the turf to allow for pork-barrel legislation - Members can also claim credit for successes - Information and Distributive Models do not see any conflict between members - Partisan Model – majority party uses committees to produce outcomes it likes (they have all the chairmanships, after all)

4/11 - Two possible committee systems - (1) Committees do most of the work writing bills, influence on final language of bills, policy is what the committee brings to the floor—creates a fragmented system - (2) Party – leadership figures out priority for bills – chairmen are responsive to party, not autonomous actors - Committee gives Congress power and control over details of policy independent of the White House - However, harder to make coherent policy, especially with majority legislation that cuts across multiple committees - Party good at setting general policy direction but may lose specialization and expertise and information needed to write good, detailed laws - Committee – rules specify jurisdiction in both House and Senate - House: all bills referred to relevant committee - Senate: that’s the norm, but sometimes it is violated - (1) Referral: in the past, just refer to committee with right jurisdiction (only one) - (2) Hearings: to gather information about the issue - (3) Mark-up: to amend the existing bill, possibly totally rewriting the bill - (4) Report: send bill to the floor - (5) Debate, Amend, and then Vote - In House, there is a lot of deference to the committee’s product, and usually not too many amendments are added - Information: belief that the committee members have the best expertise on the topic, so rely on their judgment - Belief in reciprocity so that your bills will not be torn up on the floor - Distributive benefits (pork) – members are all on committees relevant to their district – all members benefit from deference because each member is on the right committee – logroll – helps members bring pork to their own district - Committee power - Negative “gatekeeping” – stop bills from getting to the floor through “reporting” power - 90% of bills are killed in committee - In House, need a “discharge petition” to get bill out of committee and save it (218 members, or half the House) – this is especially hard with the norms of deference - In Senate, weaker negative power because of non-germane amendment - Positive – get chamber as a whole to get things done – persuade the floor - This power exists if members defer to committee - Weaker than negative power - Now Congress is shifting to the party system of committees, in the past 30 years - Conditional party government theory – when the majority is unified on policy, incentive to strengthen party leaders - Majority party seizes the common agenda - “Crack-up” of committees - Signs - Weakening of the committee chairs – weakening of seniority, which forces chairs to look toward the party and not work with the other party – must be loyal rather than independent - 6 year term limit – prevents chair from building up an independent power base - Some members retire rather than step down from the chairmanship - In Nov, Arlen Specter had to fix what he said about Bush’s judicial nominees to become Judiciary Committee chair - Advantage is that won’t have 80 year old senile senators - However, you lose expertise - Rise of multiple referrals in house – started in 1974, rooted in the failure of the Democrats to realign committee jurisdictions - Many new issues like environment did not fit just one committee – but members were unwilling to give up their turf and realign - System of conflict and overlap in jurisdiction - So if a bill dealt with several areas – then refer to several committees who all have jurisdiction - Impact: strengthen leadership of party, weaken committees who don’t have a monopoly over the area anymore - Speaker decides where the bills go, and he has to intervene to get bills through - Committees no longer write the language of bills - A) with multiple referral, the committees each report a different version, so you have to meld them together – party leaders negotiate the post- committee adjustment - B) committee by-passed – special task forces of just one party are created to write the bills (Democrats) - C) bill written and deals negotiated among Republicans even before it goes to committee – there is a “mark-up” session, but Republicans can vote against Democrat changes because of the prior negotiation - Committee resources cut – staff cut from 2300 in 1993 to 2000 now - Fewer committee meetings – from 8,000 to 10,000, now down to 5,200 - Traditional Committee System has been changed - Now process is more ad hoc, with multiple committees involved as well as leadership to negotiate - Usually a party-line vote – deliberation outside - Conference committees after House and Senate passed their own versions now have the majority party shutting out the minority, whereas it used to be an effort by the senior committee members - More partisan and divisive issues - Is this cause for worry? - Some sacrifice of the details of policy - Less care in writing the bills - Stronger, sharper policy direction though

4/13  Many writing write than interest groups dominate the congress.  There are hundreds of millions of dollars spent on lobbying and on campaigns. Does this money have significant impacts or does is not do anything at all.  Interest group  Dexter (1950’s) said that there are so many demands on a congressman that a member has to pick and choose with groups he wishes to help out.  E.E. Shcattschneider – 1) Said that organization is the mobilization of bias. Just by being organized it gives you a big power over other groups. 2) There is an upper-class bias to organization. “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is the heavenly chorus sings with an upper class ascent. 3) Weak parties advantage interest groups. If parties were effective then it would shut out the pressure groups.  How do we prove that money buys votes? We look to see if a member switches positions. We also look to see if a member votes against what his constituents want. When political scientists look for this they rarely find anything.  Rick Hall – Participation in congress – shows that money doesn’t change votes and legislation. But it shows how much more participation and effort is given to those who are receiving money.  If a group has money they won’t get them to change their actions but they will put more effort into it.  Access – Focus of Mark Hanson’s Book – A close working relationship between members of congress and outsiders.  Members have a lot of freedom who to give access to. Hanson argues that there are multiple groups competing for access but there are only a few that have the most influence.  There are some specific reasons why a group might bet better access than others. 1) When a group has a competitive advantage in getting a member reelected. Groups can play an important informational role in getting a member reelected. They can tell their members what the constituents want. They can also talk to the constituents and tell them what a member is up to. 2) The member has to know that the group’s advantage will always exist.  When a group has access and they think there is a problem they will work hard to get that problem on to the agenda.  Since parties have gotten stronger their leverage with interest groups have gotten stronger.  Tony Coehlo – saw a big shift in corporate PAC contributions  Today more and more groups are aligned with one party. In the past groups would give money to both parties so that they could gain access on both fronts.  What do interest groups get back? They affect the priority that each party puts on issues. You can see this when a party sticks with an interest group even though it would cost the party a lot.

4/18 The President and Congress

- The Early framers were afraid that congress would run roughshod over the other branches o So they made the executive branch as independent as possible - In a parliamentary system, the prime minister comes from within the elected legislature, and the parliament acts as a sort of rubber stamp for legislative ideas suggested by the president - In America, the President is not attached to the legislative branch o The belief was that a fusion of powers would lead to some sort of tyranny. - In terms of legislation, the Constitution gave Congress the lead role o It has to approve all expenditures (power of the purse) o Tax bills must originate in the house o Congress can override a presidential veto o The president can make recommendation, but there is no guarantee or expectation that congress will act on them - For the first 100 years or so, both of the branches stuck relatively close to these roles. - (SUNDQUIST) In the 20th century, presidents start to take a more active role - The President has evolved into a chief legislator o The president is expected to have a program, and has become the key agenda-setter for Congress § In 1937 the OMB was given the job of sifting through all government proposals and deciding whether or not they are consistent with the president’s program - In the 20th Century, one of the key developments of presidential power is the ability to “go public” o In this way he can rally public opinion to overcome obstacles - All of this makes the president the single most important person in the legislative process What led to these increases in Presidential Power?

- the most common explanation is that modern conditions of having a more activist national government (new deal) requires greater central leadership. o When a government isn’t doing much, Congress can handle things o But when the pace ad stakes of politics are higher, you need a single, unitary actor running things o Across governments, the 20th century has seen a decline in the importance of parliaments. - Congressional organization itself affects the power it has o Some argue that congress itself has abdicated power to the executive branch. o Congress has become so decentralized that it has tot rn to the president to get things done. § What does this say about today’s trend toward more centralized government - The media/public pay more attention to the president than to Congress o The president can personalize politics in a way that congress cannot

What are the limits of the President’s Power

- George Edwards looks at the big issues in Congress - He finds that when the president makes a proposal a priority, he is almost always able to get it on the agenda o But only about 34% of Congresses important agenda items are initiated by the President o Although there is a very great variation over time § Attributable to divided government - The success rate of presidential initiatives is higher than congressional initiatives o 42% vs. 25% o but since more of the agenda comes from Congress, slightly more important laws have come from Congress than from the President o Half of major laws passed are originated in Congress

4/20

4/25

I. Balance of War Powers: Considerations --people expect president to reflect national viewpoint; Congress should reflect local interests --efficiency considerations: foreign policy/war issues often fluid and changeable; president can act quicker and adapt policies easier than the more inefficient and slow- moving Congress --president has multiple agencies and experts at his immediate disposal (e.g. the CIA) --on the other hand: Congress more stable, changes more slowly (maybe this is a good thing) -president might be better at executing war but not at deciding when it should be waged -Congress has greater diversity of interests represents public opinion better and its endorsement carries more representative weight -democratic need for deliberation --an additional consideration: has unique nature of the War on Terror necessitated a strong executive in order to be waged successfully?

II. Founders’ View --Locke: wanted to vest powers of war, peace, and treaties in executive b/c these issues are so important and also b/c it’s crucial for nation to avoid internal divisions and present a united front to other countries -also, historical tradition generally suggested more executive power in foreign policy --Founders: thought traditional model gave too much power to executive, decided to divide power as follows: -Congress can: -declare war -call up and set rules governing navy -call up militias -power to ratify treaties (Senate)

-President: -can negotiate treaties -is commander-in-chief of the armed forces --Founders’ deliberately eschewed language in the Constitution which would invest Congress with the power of “make war” (instead gave them the ability to “declare war”) b/c they felt the president should be able to take swift action in emergency situations

III. Rise of the “Imperial Presidency” --for the first 150 years of the country’s existence the model set by the Constitution was generally realized in practice -there were a few exceptions (e.g. Polk provoking war w/Mexico) but these actions were always widely viewed as illegitimate (Congress eventually censured Polk) -prez generally felt need to explain himself to Congress (ex: Lincoln admitted some of his wartime actions were not fully legal and asked Congress to grant retrospective approval) --a strong norm that legitimacy of military engagements depended on congressional approval --for a long time, Congress, not the president, was the dominant actor in foreign policy (e.g. some members of Congress actually sought to provoke the War of 1812) --since WWII, a dramatic shift: prez became more willing to commit troops w/o congressional approval and even claim that he does not need to consult Congress at all --Korean War: marks first time prez acts w/o Congress and more importantly, there was no outcry from Congress (even though Truman’s claim his actions were justified based on UN resolutions was highly dubious) --later: JFK quarantined Cuba without congressional consultation despite risks of war; again, Congress did not object --Vietnam: Congress overwhelmingly passed Gulf of Tonkin Resolution- basically a blank check to LBJ allowing him to continue (and even expand) the war indefinitely -Nixon used this to expand war to Cambodia w/o telling Congress or public Reasons: -necessities of Cold War- permanent state of conflict and constant need to be able to respond quickly to dangers more value on centralization of command (although there was nothing particularly urgent about either Korea or Vietnam) -president became too attached to his policies, began to exclude all dissenting voices; by contrast, Congress more amenable to different views and more responsive to public -another view: not the necessities of war but rather Congress deliberately abdicated power b/c of political pressures; preferred to let prez take the political risks in foreign policy

IV. War Powers Resolution of 1973 --passed w/broad bipartisan majority widely seen as effort to reassert congressional powers after the Vietnam disaster --provides that prez can only send troops into combat if war declared or national emergency created by attack; the resolution’s next sections implicitly assume prez will violate this by stating that the prez must consult with Congress in every possible instance before sending troops and orders prez to file a report within 48 hours of military action; unless Congress then grants authorization the military action must be terminated within 60-90 days --in practice, has actually proved very weak but this might have more to do w/political incentives of members rather than the substance of the bill --resolution may have altered prez’s incentives: e.g. keep conflicts short, otherwise, strong political pressure to report to Congress in accordance w/the resolution --while presidents still claim they can act w/o Congress, in practice they usually do consult --Limits: -no incentive for Congress to actually make independent judgments- usually just responding to presidential initiatives -usually troops are already in the field by the time Congress is consulted -president in better position to rally public opinion, apply political pressure to Congress 2002 Iraq resolution: -president still very popular, esp. on security matters -vote scheduled right before midterm elections (pressure on Democrats)

V. Evaluating Congress’ Role --arguably, the biggest influence on congressional behavior is the political incentives; when prez and war become more unpopular, Congress more willing to challenge executive (e.g. Fulbright hearings in Vietnam era) --stronger congressional role ultimately depends on the standards to which voters hold Congress

4/27 The Budget Process

- the key to understanding the budget process is the tension between individual incentives to dole out programs, and a need to make sure that the budget as a whole doesn’t get out of control.

Budget Basics

- two key sets of committees that handle budgets o authorization committees . agriculture, armed services, transportation . these committees write bills that authorize new programs to be created. . But authorizing programs doesn’t allow money to be spent. o To get money, you need an appropriation committee . The idea was that this second step would provide a way to control spending - Pre 1921 budget process o Departments submit estimates (without needing approval from the White House) o This request would go to the appropriations committee in each chamber . The committee was responsible for scrutinizing the budget and making cuts o This went to the floor and was signed by the president - In the aftermath of WWI, we faced massive deficits - The idea was that the only way to address the problem was to centralize and coordinate - Congress passed the Budget Act of 1921, which gave the president a greater role o Each department would first submit their request to the president, who was charged with turning it into a coherent plan an submitting it to congress . To aid in this process, the BOB (OMB later) was created. . This gives the president to put his own stamp on the budget, and this is one of the institutional changes that helped make the president the chief legislator. o Then the bill went on to the appropriations committee and the floor - Challenges leading to 1974 reform o The rise of backdoor spending . Rooted in the tension between the authorizing and appropriating committee . If appropriators didn’t give programs enough money, the authorizing committee had incentive to design programs that didn’t have to go through appropriations. . The fastest growing form of backdoor spending is called entitlements  An entitlement is a law that establishes a legal right to a particular government benefit. (SSI, Medicare, farm programs, etc.) . A second problem with backdoor spending involves impoundments. . Nixon told Congress to appropriate less money, or he would refuse to spend it.  Nixon actually impounded 18 billion  Liberals in Congress respond by trying to ban impoundments o This led to the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 . Restricted impoundments . Created the CBO to help it have the information it needs to scrutinize the budget. . They add a new layer to the budget process called the Reconciliation process  Congress must pass a budget resolution  And also must report more bills that will respond to the budget resolution - Analysis of the reforms o Reforms have given the congress more power relative to the president o But the deficits have continued to grow . It is still easier politically to vote for a deficit than it is to vote for a tax increase or a spending cut o You can alter incentives (pay as you go) but they’re not always doing it

The Bush Tax Cuts as a Case Study:

- President Bush campaigned in 2000 on a 1.6 trillion dollar tax cuts - The bill was expected to pass easily in the House - The big fight would be in the Senate, which was split 50-50 o To ensure the victory, the president had to make som slight compromises . The price was lowered to 1.35 trillion . Still the biggest cut since 1981  Decrease in marginal tax rate  Child tax credit  Repeal of estate tax  Immediate tax rebate for all filers  More benefits for married couples - What does this tell us about how Congress works o Clearly, we have party government today in Congress . The democrats were completely shut out of the creation process. . In the house the republicans used their agenda control to help pass it through the chamber with minimal amendments. . This shows that through party government it is possible to get outcomes different than what the median voter wanted

5/4 1. Deliberation and descriptive representation 2. Types of “significant” member actions 3. “Oppositions” 4. Current Condition of Congress

This course started with questions about representation and balance of power; this lecture intends to provide a conclusion.

Deliberation and Descriptive Representation  Gender and race don’t matter for roll call voting, but they do for trust, participation and effort. Mansbridge conditionally endorses descriptive representation; the majority of political scientists have endorsed the Federalist idea of substantive representation.  The goal of deliberation is to understand the country’s or constituents’ interests. Mansbridge says it’s important to represent a group if o the group has distinctive insights, o there is a communicative distrust between groups, or o the issues are still new or uncrystallized. In this case representatives might not yet know which views each group will adopt (e.g. the outrage of women during Clarence Thomas’ confirmation hearing / Anita Hill’s testimony).  Policies that promote descriptive representation: o Majority-minority districts o Social / campaign finance networks for particular groups (e.g. EMILY’s list) o Proportional representation (as it provides incentive to run female candidates). o At-large or cumulative voting (for instance, voters are given 5 votes apiece and told distribute their votes between candidates however they wish).

David Mayhew’s The Electoral Connection (1974) transformed the study of Congress by assuming that members merely wanted reelection. This rational choice model analyzed members’ actions as a means of promoting reelection and their own interests. Mayhew’s newer book suggests that members are also partially-autonomous political actors. He canvassed history texts to see which actions the public considers significant; 2300 noteworthy actions were categorized as follows…

Types of “Significant” Member Actions  50% are legislative actions  5% are investigative actions. These were common in the 1910s (with liberals / progressives looking for corruption), the late ‘30s through the ‘50s (communism, labor unions, abuses of power, and reining in New Deal liberalism), and the late ‘60s-early ‘70s (Vietnam, Watergate, CIA scandal). Except for Clinton, the number of significant investigations has recently declined.  Taking stands (registering a position before an audience, engaging in deliberation with the public, etc.). Examples include Joe Lieberman’s stand against Clinton for his “moral failings,” Brooks caning Sumner, most of Daniel Webster’s career, the Contract with America, and Chris Shays’ call for DeLay to resign. It is also important to note stands that members do not take (for example, no Democrats are supporting privatization of social security even if it could help them in elections).  Clusters of action: these include… “ Oppositions” Here Congress attempts to thwart the designs of the current administration; 22% of all significant actions involve oppositions to the White House. Examples include Madison in the 1790s, the Conservative Coalition against FDR, Republicans against Clinton. These challenges are most important when they come from within the party. They are crucial to the vitality of separation of powers.

Current Condition of Congress  The media now pays less attention to Congress. If the public doesn’t care, Congress doesn’t matter. Mayhew proposes more descriptive representation, greater use of the Internet, etc.  Institutional environment: Autonomous action by individual members can either be prevented or encouraged. The decline in committees and the rise of party government have reduced connection to the public. Congress is probably less effective this way, as members become teammates rather than entrepreneurs. The public just sees parties squabbling; breaking the ranks is somehow more powerful.  Congress continues to encourage member/constituent relationships, providing a rough accountability. Again, this does not add up to effective lawmaking as a whole, thanks to the decline of committees and the rise of the party system. Congress has ceded a lot of power to the president in past years; it must have the will and incentive to resume a more powerful position, even if it’s currently being undermined.

Readings:

3/14

3/21 1. Franzen “The Listener” - Article discusses Dennis Hastert (speaker of the House) - Hastert is an ex-wrestling coach from Illinois. Likable. - He gets the job done- compromises and behind the scenes deal worker. Gets the Bush agenda through - Love-hate relationship with DeLay. He used to be DeLay’s right hand man and DeLay picked him for speaker because he (DeLay) was too controversial a figure after Gingrich. Who’s really in charge? - How conservative is Hastert? He does block the Dems but not as outwardly partisan and aggressive as DeLay type…

2. Poole “Party Unity Vote Study” - Parties in Congress more polarized than ever 2003 and 2004. - Most “party unity votes,” which are votes where over 50% of one party votes against 50% of the other party - Most people vote with their party 85% of the time or more

3. Waller “Bickering Heights” - In both the House and Senate the atmosphere is more partisan divided and less collegial - In the Senate it used to be sort of club-like and friendly. Now there is filibustering of nominees problem and attacks back and forth through the media. Frist (Majority Leader) is pushing to end the filibuster for this end. - In the House the speaker and minority leader used to meet and discuss things. Now they only email and don’t even eat together.

3/23 “The New World of U.S. Senators” by Barbara Sinclair -article examines how/why the Senate changed from the 1950s to the present Development of the Individualist, Partisan Senate -in the 1950s, Senators focused on their issues, didn’t put up too much of a fight on the floor -new issues came to the forefront (ie civil rights, Vietnam); media role changed -by the 1970s, an individualist Senate emerged; partisan polarization The Legislative Process in the Contemporary Senate -senators stretched thin w/committees; chairs use it as “starring” vehicles -party leaders involve themselves w/committees -floor scheduling is important -senators strategically use the rules with things like the filibuster; frequency of obstructionism has increased -Senators now often block nominees they do not oppose in order to gain a bargaining chip for use with the administration -offer large numbers of germane amendments to major bills -most of Senate’s work done by unanimous consent agreements -also use holds: when a senator informs his leader directly or through the party secretary that he wishes to be consulted before a measure is scheduled (may be unsure, want debate, or want to offer an amendment) -whether in the majority or in the minority, senators now expect their party leader to promote their collective partisan interests through message strategies directed at the public as well as through internal procedural and legislative strategies -this causes dilemma for majority leaders who are expected to push the party agenda and keep the others off the floor, but also must make the Senate function with supermajorities Individualism, Partisanship, and Legislative Outcomes -combination of individualism and partisanship depresses the likelihood of legislation successfully surviving the legislative process Dodging Legislative Breakdown -Senators do want to get stuff done and want to guard their reputations, which constrains them -“Most of the time, the Senate manages to maintain the minimum restraint and cooperation necessary to avoid total gridlock, yet the chamber regularly seems to teeter on the precipice of legislative breakdown.” A Less Effective Senate? -no

“Two Years In, Frist Struggles to Tame an Unruly Senate” by John Cochran -Frist seemed to have negotiated to pass a bill to change the rules for class action lawsuits -did not get passed; both sides dispute as to why -w/closely divided Senate, majority leader has to decide between working with the other party of drawing hard lines and establishing them as obstructionists -Frist describes himself as a “leader-manager” -Frist’s leadership is loved and hated; listens, compromises -Frist must satisfy the White House, but is also willing to go against it

“The Politics and Principle of the Filibuster” by Binder -filibuster reform hard; a source of senator’s personal power The Framers and Minority Rights in the Senate -maybe Framers did not into the Constitution any procedural protections for Senate minorities because they saw how ineffective supermajorities were -by the 20th century, unrestrained filibustering had wreaked havoc on the Senate The Modern Senate Filibuster -# of filibusters has increased -way to end filibuster: Rule 22 or cloture; rules of it have evolved -senators have grown much more willing to threaten filibuster -over time, holds had the effect of keeping legislation off the floor, rather than simply warning senators in advance that measures of interest to them were headed to the floor -“There is little doubt that obstructionist behavior in the Senate has left any remaining tradition of deliberation in tatters.” -expansion of Senate workload: more targets for Senators to filibuster; strict time constraints on the chamber -the “tracking” system Mansfield introduced made filibusters more tolerable and less costly to filibustering senators -filibusters make it easier for senators to exploit chamber rules to pursue their goals Revisiting the Received Wisdom -little evidence to show that filibuster has a constitutional basis -the view that Senate tradition demands unlimited debate also called into question -the idea that filibuster was once reserved for a few issues of utmost national importance is a myth -no necessary connection between the filibuster and the moderation of legislation -the Senate sometimes does sacrifice tradition for more practical procedural rules A Perspective on Institutional Change -debate whether the development of the Senate better reflects the influence of redistributive or collective interests – politics or principle -institutional reforms rare in the Senate Reforming the Senate -“Calibrating procedural reform to preserve the traditional advantages of the Senate is difficult, but both possible and desirable”

March 23 Reading Scott Shane: “Henry Clay Hated It. So Does Bill Frist”

 The filibuster has a long, colorful history: from Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939) to Huey Long reading recipes (1935) to Strom Thrumond bravely holding out against Civil Rights for 24:18 until he eventually had to pee (1957).  Historians justify these delays as a valuable check against ill-considered legislation, but Sen. Maj. Leader Frist recently called the filibuster “tyranny by the minority,” which may have been an implicit threat.  The Senate’s presiding officer could rule that filibustering to block confirmation is unconstitutional; this would only require 50 votes to insert new judges (as opposed to the 60 currently required to invoke closure). Observers fear the whole filibuster may go.  Filibuster is derived from a Dutch word meaning pirate. The idea is that the filibustering senator takes hostages.  Until 1789, debate could be ended with the previous question motion. This system ended in 1806. Sen. Henry Clay (W-Ky) threatened to kill the filibuster in 1841 when he couldn’t pass a banking bill. Pres. Wilson made Congress create the cloture option in 1917, which required 67 votes; the number was reduced to 60 in 1975.  The two-track process allows senators to filibuster without delaying all legislation. This measure, intended to promote efficiency, has increased filibuster use dramatically.  Zelizer calls the filibuster a relic (stained by the civil rights debates) that remains one of the few ways to check partisan domination and push legislation to the center.  The filibuster also retains a romantic aura thanks to Mr. Smith and the ideal of endless debate; even Frist sees this.

March 23 Reading George Will: “Shock and Awe in the Senate”

 Republicans are considering changing Senate rules to stop filibuster of Bush’s judicial nominees.  Republicans actually blocked Clinton’s judicial nominees; both parties have a history of obstruction here.  It takes 60 votes to invoke cloture (end a filibuster). The GOP has 55 votes for this, but probably not 5 Dems. Using the nuclear option, in which VP Cheney would rule that filibustering judicial nominees is an abuse of Senate power to advise and consent to nomination, only 50 votes be necessary.  Will argues that the Senate is not preventing the president from fulfilling his constitutional duty to staff the judiciary: 1. The president has a duty to initiate a staffing process, in which the Senate has a role. 2. Filibuster doesn’t prevent the president from doing his duty; it simply prevents him from getting what he wants.  This is a short slide down a slippery slope to total elimination of the filibuster.  The filibuster is an important defense of minority rights; Conservatives, who traditionally try inhibit extension of government power, should appreciate this. Besides, the GOP will eventually be back in the minority.  Filibusters have perhaps trivialized this right, but never has filibuster stopped anything the public strongly supported.  If anything, the Republicans should allow the Dems. To filibuster all they want; they’ll merely look like wasteful obstructionists and lose seats next election [note that Will is conservative].

4/4 1) Deering and Smith “Committees in Congress”  3 perspectives on committee power: authors hold it is a mix of these actually 1) distributive- members self-select onto committees that are appropriate to the interests of their own constituency. Extreme of this view suggests autonomous committees where non-members are indifferent to policy 2) party-dominated- committee members are agents of the parties, b/c parties control appointment, they shape the composition and policy 3) chamber-dominated/ informational- committees are subordinate to parent chamber. They exist for division of labor/ expertise/ information that the chamber as a whole uses to decide policy - When does Congress rely on these different committee views? -when the agenda is large, issues are distinct from each other and not salient, then committees dominate -when majority party agrees on most issues, issues are salient, then party- dominated committee system develops - Negative Committee Power: This refers namely to “gate-keeping” power, where Committees can bottle up legislation and keep it off the floor. This is more important in the House where germaneness requirements keep certain policy agendas from even being broached. House special rules and unanimous consent agreements also serve to prevent amendments to bills that committee likes. - Positive Power: Few direct sources of positive power to actually force through committee agendas. Legislation from committee does have a privileged status. Informational advantage of committees lets them know where to expect support. Also there is the norm of deferring to committee expertise in many instances. - Types of Committees: Main committee powers are collecting info, drafting the language of bills, and reporting legislation to the floor. Not all committees have all of these powers. -Conference committees: temporary. They resolve differences between House and Senate versions of a bill -Select Committees- temporary. Appointed to draft specific legislation or investigate a specific issue Joint Committees- permanent committees that lack ability to draft and report legislation. They are informational committees that serve both Houses and are Economic, Taxation, Library, and Printing. -Standing committees- Within the House and within the Senate there are specialized permanent committees that draft legislation and report it (ie: Agriculture committee). - Sources of committee power: Chamber rules (establish jurisdiction), Federal statutes (Legislative reorganization acts), Party caucus rules (seniority systems, etc within each party caucus), committee rules, and norms. - History of Committees in Congress can be divided into 7 periods. Basically this includes development and expansion in the 1800’s, consolidation in the 1900’s to 1946, committee government (when Southern dems were in power), Reform (1965-1980), and Post-reform. -Early Congress relied on select committees. Eventually standing committees developed and by the early 1900’s they had proliferated out of control. Seniority develops. -Consolidation occurred between 1919 and 1946- reduced number of standing committees. -Committee government- 1947-1965. Seniority system proliferates. Weak party leadership and committee chairs have the most power (apprentice system). - Reform- revolt gainst conservative coalition’s power. Give more power to sub- committees and party leadership with LRA 1970 and select committee proposals.

2) Mayhew “Congress: The Electoral Connection” - The main focus of the article is the design of Congress and how it relates to members’ need for reelection - 2 major points: 1) Congress is organized almost perfectly to meet members’ electoral needs. 2)satisfaction of electoral needs requires almost no conflict among members (one’s gain isn’t another’s loss) - Organization that promotes reelection prospects by virtue of the office: salary, staff that also helps with campaigns, franking privileges -Structural feature that promotes reelection: committee system. Can be a good position- taking platform, allow for trafficking of benefits (pork barrel legislation), specialization (actually have discernable influence on something that happens for credit taking purposes) -Congressional norms that enhance reelection prospects: seniority system- “converts turf into property.” Once a member is in for long enough, he’ll gain power- to not reelect would be to lose his power, especially because his power will multiply over time.

4/6 April 6: The New Committee System *Barbara Sinclair. Unorthodox Lawmaking, 2nd ed., CQ Press, 2000, pp. 1-5 and 9- 41. *Richard Cohen. “The Crack-Up of the Committees.” National Journal, July 31, 1999. *Richard Cohen et al. “The Ultimate Turf War,” National Journal, January 3, 2003. *Adriel Bettelheim, “Senate Seniority System Helps Specter Stay the Course,” CQ Weekly, November 13, 2004. IV. Congress and Policy-making April 11: The Role of Organized interests: *John Mark Hansen. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981. University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 1-25 and 215-30. *David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf. Tell Newt to Shut Up, Simon & Schuster, 1996, pp. 11-21 and pp. 110-124 *Jim VandeHei. “GOP Monitoring Lobbyists’ Politics.” Washington Post, June 10, 2002. *Susan Milligan. “Energy Bill a Special Interest Triumph.” Boston Globe, October 4, 2004.

APRIL 6

UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING

 The Clean Air Act is an example of how legislation has changed over past 30 years  In 1970 Senate and House passed legislation, Senate was far stronger, the conference committee rewrote the bill much closer to the Senates, and it was passed in both houses and Nixon signed it although it was stringent.  In 1989 a major revision was worked on. Senate again sought a strong bill, but the threat of filibuster forced them to make it less stringent. 250 amendments were proposed and 9 of them were approved.  In the house it was refered to three committees rather than one, and after protracted negotiations in subcomitte committee and on the floor, it was passed. Once again it was strong, but Bush approved it as Nixon had.  The process in 1970 perfectly fit the bill-becomes a law diagram that is a staple of American politics. o It was considered by a single ccomittee in each chamber, it was considered under open rule allowing all germaine amendments, there were no threats of filibuster, and the conference committee was small and quick  1990 bill was extremely complex: it was considered by several committees, compromises in both chambers altered the bills significantly floor procedures were complex and unique to the specific bill. The threat of filibuster shaped the process in the senate and the final conference committee was large and slow.  Current congress resembles 1990 bill much more than traditional sense of 1970 bill.  Most major legislation does not follow the textbook process as it used to. The only bills commonly following that formula are small and insignificant  Constitution allows congress to set its own rules, so this is not unacceptable  From here, Sinclair spends a chapter on how bills are introduced in the two chambers, how many committees it is typically referred to, when it bypasses committees, and adjustments that are made on the floor.  In the house: o In order to save time and prevent obstruction, special rules are sometimes used to make sure that important legislation is passed quickly o New parliamentary devices, such as the king of the hill provision make sure that amendments are only voted on once and that the last one approved is enacted  In Senate: o Same situation: subcommittee referrals, adjustments, and special rules

CONGRESS- CRACKUP OF THE COMMITTEES

 A pretty clear reading detailing the loss of power of congressional committees  Tax cuts and other bills were quickly considered the house recently  Woodrow Wilson outlined the current system of committees in 1880s.  But in last 30 years the committees have continually been systematically emasculated  Beginning with gingrich, who undermined the committees in favor of a top down system.  Since then both parties have taken the power upwards to the speaker and leaders  They are increasingly irrelevant from the standpoint of legislation.  The coming years are going to make necessary a search for a new model of legislation regardless of which party takes power  The rest of this article outlines the history of the house, starting with “czar” joe cannon and the power that the committees got after that.  The rise of medicare through the committee system.  Even in those days the committees had trouble- civil rights legislation had to be taken straight to the floor in order to get away from racism in the committees  The signal of the end for the comitteees was when Clinton’s plan for health care stalled in the committees  The rest of the article outlines the rise of the power of the house majority and minority leaders at the expense of the committees- basically everything we learned in class reiterated in the readings.  The highlights are the misconception of the ways and means and senate finance committee are the most powerful committees- they have recently been ineffective in legislating.  Party driven legislation is the future of the senate at least, the only currently to that form of legislation is the filibuster- as a result it has taken off exponentially with the death of the committees

ULTIMATE TURF WAR  In creating the homeland security department, bush and others had to fight over the turf with congress.  By the white houses count last june, a total of 88 congressional committees have jurisdiction over issues related to homeland security.  Homeland security is going to have to suck up to a lot of congressional bosses to get things to work.  Those committees include all 100 senators and 412/432 of house  There is fear that they will “try to get Ridge involved in petty committee fights’  The basic fear here is that homeland security will be put at risk because of the petty arcane issues of congressional organization and procedure  A number of members have been trying to rearrange comm. System to benefit DHS but many chairmen don’t want to give up power in order to form a single committee related to all aspects of national security.  Many experts see it as the only option  Current house setup is a “big mistake”  Congress affects nominations, budget, oversight, and future legislation in DHS  Without centralized control, congress will likely screw up DHS  As a result, many studies are finding minimal progress since 9/11  Reform efforts of the past have been effective  In 46 committees were reduced from 48 to 19  But since then little progress has been made other than Gingrich’s reforms when GOP took power in 1994  The best chance would be a lightning strike by leadership, but it would have to be soon, before chairmen get used to f-ing up DHS  Meanwhile, chairman are beginning to get defensive  (typical politicians, putting own self interest before welfare of country, homeland security isn’t important enough for them to give up power)  Either way, whatever is done will be very difficult, but the biggest danger is not doing anything, and allowing the problem to stagnate SENATE SENIORITY SYSTEM HELPS SPECTER STAY THE COURSE

 Arlen Specter, one of the senate’s moderate republicans, says what he thinks, as long as he doesn’t lose his job  He walks the line between conservative and liberal, and ends up contradicting himself a lot  He is now the head of the judiciary committee looking at Bush’s prospective nominations  Religious conservatives hate that the always switches sides  he has pledged however, to respect Bush’s right to nominate anyone he sees fit.  “he has two conflicting motivations; his ideological beliefs and the need to maintain a position of power”  Republicans don’t want to swerve from the seniority system, though they may require an assurance that he will not block Bush’s nominees  Specter is known for his agile mind, abrasive manner, and ideological flexibility  It remains to be seen whether he is independent or simply disloyal.  For example, he voted against Clinton impeachment but also voted against repetitive motion injuries, betraying organized labor that he had fought for previously  Although some of GOP see him as worse than a democrat, “the senate tends to err on the side of institution”

4/11 GAINING ACCESS  The evolution of interest group access in congress  Discusses degree of influence of interest groups and historical changes  Some argue that lawmakers are at beck and call of powerful lobbies  Others say legislators are free agents, amount of demand effectively limits how much they can cater to one party o Legislators receive so much advice that it cancels itself out  Result- lobbies achieve influence in Congress to the degree that legislators choose them, to the degree that legislators allow them to influence  Book is in two parts- one is the origin of interest group access and other is evolution of that access,  Over view of argument: o Interest group access results from congressional strategies for dealing with electoral uncertainty o They do not know exactly what position to take to get reelected o Interest groups offer to help with political counsel, intelligence, and propaganda o Lawmakers grant interest groups access only when an interest group is more qualified than its competitors and when legislators expect the issues the interest group represents to reoccur  Political economic and social change alter the congressional environment, brining new issues to light, and making new interest groups important  For example, agriculture was huge in 1920s, set back in years after WWII bc no longer important ORIGINS OF ACCESS  In order for interest groups to take root, the conditions above must be met  The two main conditions are competitive advantage and that congress expects the circumstance to reoccur  COMPETETIVE ADVANTAGE-To be advantageous, interest groups must offer better info or lower costs  In exchange for influence on decisions, interest groups provide technical information on policy questions.  Lawmakers look for cost efficiency and effectiveness o Efficiency- lawmakers look for the interest group that can provide them the most information at the least cost, either monetary or influential o Effectiveness- some interest groups are more effective, by mobilizing voters or providing other electoral assistance  RECURRENCE- lawmakers are at a disadvantage bc they don’t know if Igroups have kept up their end of the bargain until election day  Therefore, they only put trust in IGroups when the circumstances they represent tend to persist  Their willingness to trust IGroups depends on whether the competitive advantage now will recur in the future. CONCLUSION  Using “the league against saloons” as an example, the author outlines the rise of the IGroup to power and policy success in prohibition  Their success rose chiefly from their ability to defeat candidates for public office  And also from the idea that the problems associated with drinking would occur  Therefore they were competitively advantageous- they could get you elected, and they recurred- the problems were going to be around for a while  A main source of competition for IGroups is political parties, who offer similar services for less cost  Important divisive issues, such as education, labor, and poverty normally tend to go to the parties, because Dems and Reps don’t agree on those issues, in those areas IGroups don’t really have much pull A MORE SUBTLE UNDERSTANDING OF IGROUPS  Interest groups are influential, but not because they bring pressures to bear on Congress  Instead, they are influential bc they attract attention to some issues rather than others  There is little evidence that they buy off candidates or make any real impact in political campaigns  Instead they represent constituents that politicians assume they represent the preferences of more accurately than other informants  By this view, they simply report the preferences of voters that would ecist in their absence.  Therefore, interest groups are not influential, their constituents (the voters) are  But what IGroups do is slightly change that influence, they redirect the influence of the constituents to serve their own goals. o They represent some voters but not others o They turn complaints into demands with appropriate policy responses o They aid the detection of voter demands that would otherwise go unnoticed o They homogenize and generalize demands. o They identify common problems and present common solutions  They amplify some voices, dull others, and promote issues of common interest  Their stock is information and intelligence, not pressure  We sympathize with them bc they represent popular demands, but we distrust them bc they represent only some demands, and by no means the most popular  At once they are both democratic and elitist

TELL NEWT TO SHUT UP

LET THE LOBBY BOYS IN  Tom DeLay began his Congressional term as Majority whip with a crusade to end “oppressive and counterproductive” regulations in the workplace  The plan he presented was written by a lobbyist named Gordon Gooch  On key amendments, DeLay’s coalition of lobbyists and supporters, nicknamed “project relief” served as draftsmen  Many of the groups 350 members had spent the last years making massive donations to Democratic Party and jockeying for a position in that government  He admitted that he turned to the lobbyists because they had the expertise  Turns out that public did not like Republicans’ move to get rid of environmental protection- even Republicans thought that congressmen like DeLay were trying to kill environment  Newt Gingrich failed to see until much later that if Republicans continued to legislate for special interests than they would be perceived as no better than the Dems by the public  DeLay graduated from UHouston, managed a pesticide company, but his frustration with govt rules increased as company grew  Viewed ban on DDT as excessive  The cost of regulations drove him into politics  In Dem led house he had little effect  Government has estimated cost of all the regulation opposed by DeLay as 430 Billion passed on to consumers  DeLay ran for whip with many lobbyists and raised a lot of money for other GOP members  He also got lotta money from PACs  He impressed Gingrich as a team player, but alarmed him bc he had an independent power base  DeLay embraced lobbyists as an interactive family meant to attain their common goal of deregulation  Paul Smith helped Gooch to write a moratorium putting a 100 day freeze on all deregulation  DeLay went to work sending lobbyists to get Democratic co-sponsors to make it unvetoable  It was a success, 276-146, with 51 democrats supporting THE HAMMER  DeLay’s nickname became the Hammer bc he was hard hitting  He had a book that had amounts of money PACs had given to GOP or Dems. Those who had given to GOP were friendly and those who were Dem were unfriendly  As whip, his job was to regulate and enforce issues of money and politics  The role was important; Gingrich’s transformation of the House centered on money  DeLay and others wanted to raise as much money as possible, moderates argued that the GOP would be seen as too rich, Gingrich tried to moderate between the two stances  As recently as ’93 GOP had been near bankruptcy, now that they were in power, they were raking in cash  Basically republicans raked in all kinds of cash once they took power, in part due to tactics like Delay’s  DeLay’s shop, after the revolution of 1995 that brought in 75 freshman republicans, set up orientations for them based on how to get more $.  They also launched the K Street Strategy, which was meant to pressure firms to remove Dems from power and replace them with Republicans  He refused to meet with “hard-core liberals”  Basically DeLay went hardline and forced PACs and lobbyists and other firms to start playing ball by GOP rules  Newt Gingrich never was able to fund raise like DeLay, he always spent money instead of raising it  However, gingrich was responsible for turning the revolution into the money machine it became- he was the one that persuaded DeLay and others to get active about fund raising  He arranged DeLay, Paxon, and Armey as the men who would get it done  Ultimately, what the Republicans did differed from Democrats not in what they did, but in how far they took it.

“GOP MONITORING LOBBYISTS”  Republicans are researching party affiliation and contributions of hundreds of lobbyists in Washington  It is a campaign that could deny government access and prime lobbying jobs to Dems  Grover Norquist and other GOP lobbyists will give the dossier to top republicans  The report, the “K street project” is planned to be used by white house officials lawmakers and staf to determine who can meet with party leaders  Democrats are pissed, but GOP are doing it anyway  DeLay, Bill Paxon and others have advocated this for some time.

“ENERGY BILL A SPECIAL INTEREST TRIUMPH”  Recent energy bill was a cash bonanza for special interests because many different firms were added to receive funding after it had been voted on  The bill was crafted behind closed doors, as most business in republican controlled house and senate is conducted  the special interest groups got billions of dollars in payback for the millions (400 million) they put in  all kinds of energy groups made killings  the conference committee, once the bill had been approved in both house and senate, added all of these projects that never appeared in either version of the bill  it ended up being a thinly disguised disregard for legislative tradition in America  the bill has been held up because of the controversy it stirred  as a result, many of these projects have found other bills to be tacked on to  however, the biggest gain may be to the energy lobbyists who convinced lawmakers to deregulate  some deregulation is financial, but others go far enough to loosen regulation on air quality  in the conclusion of the article, experts say that environmentalists have become less effective than they could be in protecting the environment if they spent more time working on policy rather than simply attacking Bush  Environmentalists complain that the White house completely ignores them  Basically, this bill is an instance where overzealous lawmakers have taken too far their urge to deregulate and at the same time spent far too much money frivolously. When the bill does pass, it will undoubtedly include many of these inappropriate bills which were added in the conference committee to appease special interest groups

4/13 The President as Chief Legislator- Sundquist -Congressional acceptance of President as chief legislator begins in 1930’s with New deal -Since congress hasn’t reasserted authority, President is head of party and pushed congress accordingly -In 19th century congress resisted presidential interference -Wilson asserts more authority at time when speaker of the house Cannon’s powers were sharply restricted -None of FDR’s proposals were altered in any way; democrats felt it was their duty to defer -In being reelected three times, people approved not only of FDR’s program but also of his leadership style -Bureau of the Budget, later renamed Office of Management and Budget, created in 1937 centralized executive control of legislating –exercised veto on all workings of executive branch, told congress what bills President liked and disliked -FDR brought legislative lobbying out into the open -President’s since FDR have expanded on presidential power -Truman systematized weekly meetings with congressional leaders to discuss passage of his bills -LBJ appointed outside task forces to write bills instead of congress -no record of congress ever resisting these usurpations of power -Various bills asked the President to come up with plans -Congress didn’t take lead on broad, coordinated policies- left this to the President on the big issues -President now a kind of prime minister, we judge presidential success on how well they lead congress to some extent -Congress often follows or obstructs president now, no mechanisms for creating its own broad policies with dispersed and specialized committees -when president and congressional leadership of different parties then this trend not as pronounced

“ Presidential Support Vote Study: With a Deft and Light Touch, Bush Finds Ways to Win”- CQ Schatz -Bush didn’t intervene into passage of the Intelligence overhaul bill until he was asked to by GOP leaders and it looked like the bill could be passed if he intervened -Bush picks his battles, doesn’t get too involved in Congress on many issues, but on a select few spends his political capital -He only lost a few votes but some of those like judicial nominations and the ban on same-sex marriage helped him politically in the long run -Bush has like-minded leadership in Congress and they work together to assure that he hasn’t had to veto bills, has used unified party government to greater advantage than most presidents -Bush’s success rate higher than most presidents -In Senate, success rate drops on nominees. In House, rate drops on appropriations bills -First president since John Quincy Adams to not veto a single bill -Mutually beneficial relationship Bush has with Congressional republicans

“ More Aggressive Congress Could Hinder Bush’s Plans” –Washington Post VandeHei and Babington -Republicans rubber-stamped much of Bush’s first term agenda but won’t do the same in second term, plan to assert themselves -Initial trouble passing Intelligence overhaul bill which required the President and Hastert to intervene and make deals -Bigger majority means more difficult to enforce discipline -Some republicans think they gave up too much power in writing bills to the white house in the first term and need to take power back -Many in the GOP in congress fear Bush’s Social Security plan and will not back it 4/18 Sundquist: The President as Chief Legislator

I. Before the Hundred Days a. President could choose to be the leader of his party b. The candidate took the party’s cause to the electorate, so he felt suited to take legislation to Congress c. Acceptance of rejection of the President as a legislative leader depended on support of the substance of the legislation and often followed party lines. d. Before the hundred days, this power was not institutionalized i. Wilson’s methods for promoting legislation were often called secret and underhanded ii. Hoover felt that the President or Congress could not act to end economic hardship II. Hundred Days a. People felt they could not look to Congress to lead them out of the Depression so they turned to the President i. Democrats began to follow their leader because of this b. Politicians no longer were defined by their party but by their support of Roosevelt i. Created a subordination to presidential leadership c. Congress also started paying attention as to whether or not a President would veto bills they were considering III. The President as Legislative policy Planner a. The Congress began assigning the president specific tasks for planning and initiating policy b. Whenever Congress felt the need for development of broad and coordinated policies, it assigned the responsibility to the President i. Congress did not have the cohesiveness to do this on its own ii. This occurred in 7 areas 1. budget 2. housing 3. economy 4. national security 5. manpower 6. environment 7. urban growth IV. The President as a “Sort of Prime Minister” a. Most scholars felt that legislative initiative had passed from Congress to the President in the mid 1960s b. Congresses role was now either to follow or obstruct c. However, some show that Congress can and does pass laws without subordinating itself to the President especially in areas of taxation d. This created a kind of specialization as well i. The President cares about the national interest ii. Congress focuses on the state, local and group interest. iii. This only works though when the President and a majority of Congress are from the same party

Schatz: Presidential Support Vote Study

I. Bush did not act according to the last model a. On the intelligence bill, he did not take a firm stance until the final weeks when success looked attainable b. His legislative choices also had political motives i. He lost the constitutional ban on gay marriage, but it was used to motivate his base c. He often remains unengaged from legislation and chooses his battles carefully to minimize his losses d. Over his first four years, he had a 81% Congressional success rate. i. This is aided by like-minded GOP leadership in the House and Senate e. Bush is also aided by omnibus spending bills that have provision that some people would not support but they vote for the bill as a whole anyway i. They can take amendments that many moderates support in those bills b/c they have unified government f. Bush and the Congress work together to highlight successes b/c they wanted to support the reelection of the President

VandeHei and Babington: More Aggressive Congress

I. Bush is facing legislative challenges this term from congressional Republicans a. Delay has privately criticized the President for his handling of the intelligence bill and his plan to postpone tax reform to 2006 or later b. Republicans also want stiffer immigration restrictions c. House members have shown to want a larger role this term and Senators with Presidential ambitions might be harder to deal with. d. Competition also among conservative House members and more moderate Senators i. Members in the House are less willing to compromise if their bills are blocked by the moderate Senate.

4/25 -1-Fisher, “War Powers and Foreign Affairs” taken from “The Politics of Shared Power” -The Constitution intentionally splits foreign policy between the President and Congress in order to foster consultation, coordination and cooperation between the two branches -Cutiss v. Wright in 1936: Justice Southerland said that Presidents can act in external, rather than domestic, affairs without Congressional authority -The legacy of this case and those that relied on its precedent is still important today: Justice Rehnquist believed that Congress could give the President power without specific guidelines in matters of foreign affairs -In treaty making, the President is not meant to have the sole power to negotiate (this role must be shared with the Senate) -Because treaties must be ratified by the Senate, the President needs to secure legislative support -In addition, because the House has the power of the purse, they can influence treaties through their power to grant the funds needed to implement treaties -When the President cannot ratify a treaty with a 2/3 majority in the Senate, he can get a majority in each house to pass the treaty by a statute or joint resolution -The termination and interpretation of treaties is not discussed in the Constitution, and therefore is a matter of more contention -The President can act on implied Constitutional powers to enter into “executive agreements” with foreign nations, often with but not requiring the support of Cogress -The war power originated in Congress but has leaned more and more towards the President in recent years -The framers purposefully wanted the power to decide to go to war (Congress) kept separate from the ability to lead a war (the President) -Congress has actually declared a war, however, only on five occasions -More often, Presidents use force with the authorization of Congress but in undeclared wars -Harry Truman in Korea and JFK and LBJ in Vietnam acted to involve the nation in undeclared wars in ways that were much more controversial in terms of lacking Congressional approval -War Powers Resolution of 1973 -Meant to “assure that the collective judgment” of both branches is needed to go to war -Says that Presidents need to report to Congress within 48 hours after introducing troops into hostilities -It also allows Congress to tell Presidents to remove troops, but this is not often done due to political pressure -However, these measures are argued against by those such as Fisher who feel that members of Congress should instead rely on their own institutional powers to limit the President, since this law has been used by Presidents to enter troops into short-terms conflicts without seeking Congressional approval at all unless the conflicts extend beyond 60-90 days -Covert operations, such as the Iran-Contra affair, were limited by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 which said the Presidents had to give good cause for the necessity of such operations -Some people began to argue, as a result of the Iran Contra Affair, that Presidents, if denied money from Congress, could get money through either citizens or foreign nations -However, this is contrary to the intentions of the founders who gave Congress the power of the purse and also may lead to corruption -Foreign policy is meant to be worked out between both Congress and the President, and this is indeed the best method -The President dominating foreign affairs too much is harmful to the nation as a whole since policy would be more incoherent and would change whenever a new President was elected -2-Wolfensberger “Congress and Policymaking in an Age of Terrorism” -Historically, Congress has supported the President in national emergencies -However, despite September 11, Congress “is not as acquiescent and deferential as some would…have us believe it is” (486) -Although there was an immediate rise in compromise directly after 9/11, this trend reversed shortly after and the two parties began to oppose each other once again -Congress is driven not only by “institutional prerogatives” but also by “partisan and individual forces, motives, and interests” (345) -Often through negotiations behind closed doors, Congress has helped to shape the major measures with which the President is often credited for initiating and getting passed -Even acts such as the USA Patriot Act were influenced by Congress and not entirely what the President had wanted -Thus, the government is still working as the founders intended it to, and the President has not taken over all of Congress’ power -3-Victor, ‘Congress in Eclipse” -While Clinton had to argue that “he was still relevant” (496), Bush “has made himself the dominant player in Washington” (496). -The President and the executive branch are willing to put Congress, which is supposed to be an equal branch, into an inferior position that was not intended by the Constitution -Congress, however, is not asserting its power against this executive dominance -In addition, the Supreme Court has taken away some of Congress’ power, often claiming that Congress has exceeded its Constitutional powers -Congress has had a difficult time performing its oversight role during Bush’s time in office -Some argue that Congress will reassert power when attention is focused away from Iraq and back towards domestic policy issues

4/27 Davidson and Oleszek (“Congress and Its Members”) --basically outlines the congressional budget process --2 major steps: authorizations and appropriations (the former are basically IOUs which need to be funded by appropriations) --note: page 402 (sourcebook pg 506) provides useful glossary of budget terms --since 1970s, trend toward more short term authorizations in order to give committees more control and oversight over agencies --amount proposed by Appropriations Committee is called the budget authority (“BA”), which is described as equivalent to depositing money in a checking account; the budget outlay (“BO”) is the check written by the Treasury --Appropriations Committee can either adopt, raise, or lower the amount recommended by the authorization committees. Bill then goes to the floor of the House for vote; if it passes, goes to the Senate for approval. --among the authorizing committees, the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance committees are the most powerful --whenever Congress can’t reach a budget agreement on time they can approve continuing resolutions (which provide temporary funding for agencies); also, Congress can pass supplemental appropriations as well --Backdoor Spending- defined as authorizations which “mandate, not simply recommend, the expenditure of federal funds;” called “direct spending” (as opposed to the discretionary spending which is controlled by the House and Senate Appropriations committees). 3 main types: i.) contract authority (permits agencies to enter into contracts which then in turn must be funded by appropriations) ii.) borrowing authority (allow agencies to spend money they borrowed from the public or the Treasury) iii.) mandatory entitlements (establish legally enforceable rights) --mandatory entitlements are growing rapidly and are the main cause of higher federal spending --spending on entitlements is automatic and cannot be controlled by the Appropriations Committee --primary examples of entitlements are Social Security and Medicare (programs to which people have a legal right if they meet the qualifications; govt must come up with the cash) --authors claim that Congress has done a good job at controlling discretionary spending but notes that since discretionary spending is becoming a smaller proportion of the budget there are more political battles over this shrinking share of money (esp. questions of military v. domestic spending) --1974 Budget Act- est. nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide an independent source of info for Congress -limited presidential use of impoundments -est. timetable for actions on authorizations, appropriations, tax measures -est. concurrent budget resolution and the reconciliation process --concurrent budget resolution: formulated by House and Senate Budget Committees; composes fiscal aggregates (total amounts of revenue and spending) and breaks it down into 20 categories (defense, agriculture, etc.) basically sets overall levels of discretionary spending; essentially a blueprint of the budget; used by authorization and appropriations committees as guideline --House and Senate then debate the budget resolution (in the House, the Rules Committee generally applies special rules limiting debate and amendments) --budget resolution is not submitted to the president and is not legally binding --reconciliation: brings revenue and direct (entitlement) spending into conformity with the targets set in the concurrent budget resolution; basically forces committees to control spending for entitlement programs under their jurisdiction --The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act: established annual deficit reduction targets; if Congress failed to meet targets, president would impose automatic across-the-board spending cuts designed to force Congress and president to compromise on deficit reduction --The Budget Enforcement Act: 3 main features: -shifted focus from deficit reduction to spending control and removed threat of automatic across the board cuts if the deficit increase was caused by factors beyond Congress’ control (e.g. inflation, a recession, etc.) -set caps on discretionary spending; caps could only be altered if Congress and president agreed; if Congress exceeded the caps, then automatic across the board reductions would take effect -est. PAYGO (“pay as you go”) system; basically, this means that if Congress increases spending by X dollars on any discretionary or entitlement program then they must either cut X dollars from other programs and/or raise taxes to make up the difference; this rule remained in place until 2002

--by 2000 there was actually a projected budget surplus but it is important to note that the size of the surplus and even its existence was highly dubious; such economic forecasts are often wrong and usually are based on unrealistic assumptions. Still, both parties embraced the idea of the surplus, with Democrats promising more money for domestic programs and the GOP promising tax cuts --reasons for the return of deficits: end of economic bubble of ‘90s; 9/11 attacks and subsequent War on Terror; Bush tax cuts; end of budgetary controls (e.g. PAYGO) which restrained spending --authors argue that the parties have essentially switched positions, with Democrats now pushing for deficit reduction while Republicans focus more on tax cuts and reducing the size of govt. The authors point out that neither party is willing to sacrifice immediate political interests for the long-term good of the country; as a result, the deficits continue to grow

Fortier and Ornstein (“President Bush: Legislative Strategist”) --Bush’s 2 top priorities after becoming president were education reform and tax cuts --notes that Bush’s strategy of an intense focus on just 2 issues was wise b/c tackling too much at once can be dangerous b/c it dilutes his political influence --institutional differences btw the 2 houses of Congress was key: tax cuts were much easier to pass in the House than in the Senate b/c of strict limits on debate and amendments and stronger party cohesion let GOP majority exclude Democrats from the process of writing the bill --in the Senate, a much different environment: a 50-50 split, less party unity, lax rules on debate and amendments, more autonomous members --in the Senate, Bush adopted a strategy of appealing to a few conservative Democrats and moderate/liberal Republicans; excluded the rest of the Democrats from the negotiation process --in the House, a key player was Bill Thomas, chair of Ways and Means Committee; he was crucial in shepherding the bill through committee to the floor -split the bill into three parts; each was voted on separately and passed through committee along party lines; later passed the House w/unanimous Republican support and very few Democrats --meanwhile, Bush used his platform as president to go public, traveling to states he had won in the election but which had Democratic senators --basically: in the House, restrictive rules, strong party unity allowed Republicans to get it passed with only marginal changes --in the Senate, Bush was successful but had to do a lot of behind the scenes bargaining; Daschle pressured members to oppose the plan but Bush was able to get the support of Democrat Max Baucus (on the Finance Committee) who agreed to a bill very close to what Bush wanted --the bill passed the Senate nearly along party lines; went to House-Senate conference committee; the final bill approved in House w/unanimous GOP support and only two opposing GOP votes in the Senate --end result: Bush was generally successful, getting a tax cut 80% of the size he originally proposed -the fact that his party had a majority in both houses of Congress as well as the institutional arrangements of each house were crucial factors in the process

Hacker and Pierson (“Abandoning the Middle”) --the argument is basically that the Bush tax cuts of 2001 provide strong evidence against the conventional wisdom that legislation generally reflects the public’s preferences --2 general reasons: -greater need to appease the ideological base of the party -easier to escape political retribution through the use of framing, agenda control and policy design --Hacker and Pierson argue that the theories of “old pluralism” (i.e. that the influence of a wide range of competing interest groups will eventually produce legislation that reflects public opinion) and the “new pluralism” (i.e. that voters are generally good at holding elected representatives accountable for legislation) fail to explain the tax cut --the authors point to poll data indicating that voters’ were not demanding a tax cut and thought that if there was one it should be targeted at the middle and lower classes; authors then ask how Congress could get away with producing legislation that the majority apparently opposed --Reasons Why the Plan Passed: -Republicans were afraid to incur the anger of conservative interest groups (e.g. the Club for Growth) whose support was necessary for avoiding challenges in the primaries and which provide crucial financial resources. The authors point out that some interest groups threatened to withhold campaign funds from GOP members who opposed the plan and threatened to target them for challenges in the primaries. -growing partisan polarization made it much more difficult for moderate and liberal Republicans to defect members’ positions are more reflective of the party platform than of the median voter in their district -GOP control of the White House and both houses of Congress allowed them to set the agenda and control the terms of the debate --Reasons for Lack of Voter Opposition: - tax cuts supposedly based on unrealistic projections about the budget surpluses and costs of the tax cuts (e.g. failure to include the effects of the Alternative Minimum tax) -Bush allegedly used misleading rhetoric when describing how the typical worker would benefit -crafting of the legislation (3 features in particular: “phase-ins,” “sunsets,” “time bombs” --phase-ins: meant that middle and lower income people would receive the bulk of their benefits right away, the affluent would get more in later years intended to mute opposition among middle class voters --sunsets: most of the tax cuts would expire in 2010, thus returning tax rates immediately back to their 2000 levels. The rationale is that those who benefit most (supposedly the affluent) will exert strong political pressure on future Congresses to prevent the cuts from expiring --time bombs: the tax cut legislation failed to account for the need to correct the Alternative Minimum Tax, a tax intended to affect only the very wealthy but which would soon be applied to the middle class unless it was immediately amended

--the authors argue that all of these features made the tax cuts seem more beneficial than they really were to the average voter and made it harder for the Democrats to rally public support against the tax cuts. Also, b/c of GOP control of the White House and both houses of Congress, the Democrats lacked a well-known national figure to serve as a spokesman for the party

Moore (“Lessons Learned”) --basically, the thrust of his argument is that the tax cuts are a great victory for Bush (both substantively and politically) --outlines 10 reasons why the tax cut is good policy: 1.) the size of the tax cut will deter more govt spending b/c there’s less revenue 2.) provides greater incentives for individuals to save, invest and take risks helps economy 3.) proves “Moore’s Law of Politics”: no member of Congress ever lost reelection for voting in favor of tax cuts and he points out a number of prominent Democrats who supported the bill (this is basically the counterargument to Hacker and Pierson’s claim that the public didn’t want tax cuts) 4.) the fact that liberals are so upset indicates that the tax cuts must be a good policy and a big win for Bush 5.) the GOP has regained voters’ trust on tax issues (after Bush Sr.’s broken promise of no new taxes) 6.) McCain’s opposition to the bill ensures that he could now never hope to win the GOP nomination for president 7.) tax cuts create the political momentum for even more tax cuts 8.) the class warfare strategy of the Democrats failed (he cites a poll that 60% of voters supported the elimination of the death tax even for billionaires) 9.) proved the Joint Tax Committee’s estimates of the costs of the tax cuts were wrong 10.) GOP solidarity on the tax cuts will yield political benefits b/c voters will associate Republicans with lower taxes

5/2

Mansbridge: “Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A contingent ‘Yes’ ”

- descriptive representation: representatives are in their own persons and live in some sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent - lifetime experience increases the representative’s common experiences with and attachment to the interests of the constituents - argument against: “morons should not be represented by morons” – descriptive representation doesn’t necessarily make good representation - less ability, expertise, and possibly commitment to public good - Mansbridge: it is possible to get good representation from a representative sample of the US population - microcosmic design: representative body should be a microcosm of the electorate - institutional design: gives selected groups greater descriptive representation

Selection: Which Groups, Why, and How Many from Each - deliberative function of representative democracy aims at understanding which policies are good for the polity as a whole - aims at transforming interests and creating commonality - ideally should include at least one representative who can speak for every group that might provide new information, perspectives, etc.

- aggregative function of democracy: aims at producing some form of relatively legitimate decision in the context of fundamentally conflicting interests - Should represent the interests of every group whose interests conflict with those of others, in proportion to the numbers of that grp in the population - in aggregation, interests are relatively easily represented by nondescriptive representatives

- nondescriptive representatives do not promote effective deliberation (communicative and informational advantages) - in practice, disadvantaged groups often need the full representation that proportionality allows in order to achieve deliberative synergy (more representatives produce better information and insight), critical mass, and a range of views within the group

Essentialism as a Cost of Selection - essentialism: the assumption that members of certain groups have an essential identity that all members of that group share and of which no others can partake - the essentialist aspect can be mitigated by stressing the nonessentialist and contingent reasons for selecting certain grps for descriptive representation - descriptive representation most closely approaches normative ideals when it reflects the inner diversity of any descriptively dominated group

Other Costs of Descriptive Representation - develops institutions that encourage citizen to see themselves as members of a subgroup that may erode ties of unity across a nation or a political party - drawing electoral boundaries to create homogeneous districts  potential loss of influence in other districts - reduced accountability (lulls voters into thinking that their substantive interests are being represented when they’re not)

Contexts of Distrust: benefits of Enhanced Communication - historical circumstances can interfere with adequate communication between members of one group and members of another, particularly if one group is historically dominant - communication btwn rep and constituent: black representatives are likely to be contacted by blacks throughout the regions and not just their constituents

Contexts of Uncrystallized Interests: The Benefits of Experiential Deliberation - when issues are uncrystallized, the best way to have one’s most important substantive interests represented is often to choose a representative whose descriptive characteristics match one’s own (a voter can expect that as unexpected issues come up, the rep will respond in a similar way that the voter would) - example: Carol Mosley Braun as the sole objector to when Jesse Helms wanted to renew a design patent of a confederate flag (she was the only black senator at the time)

Beyond Substantive Representation - the presence or absence of certain minorities in a representative body is important because it shapes the social meaning of the characteristics of the minority - low percentages of blacks/women representatives creates the meaning that they are not suitable to rule - descriptive representation creates de facto legitimacy of the polity (when minorities see other minorities in the polity, they attribute legitimacy to it)

Institutionalizing Fluid Forms of Descriptive Representation - should institute descriptive representation when: 1- communication is impaired, often by distrust 2- interests are relatively uncrystallized 3- a gropu was once considered unfit to rule 4- de facto legitimacy is low within the grp

“Black Faces in the Mirror” Katherine Tate Do Blacks represent their Black constituents differently than do Whites?

Ch 4 – Legislative Styles and Voting Records - large plurality of White Democrats have assignments to prestigious committees compared to Blacks - Blacks same at lawmaking as Whites (they don’t sponsor as many bills, but they get more of the ones they sponsor passed) - White Democrats and Republicans are less responsive to Blacks in their district if they make up less than 40% of the population - Black Democrats generally unified on economic and racial issues, but divided over trade policy, the environment, farm legislation, and defense - they are more Democrat than White Democrats on issues of welfare reform, crime, and immigration - Black legislators are more unified than Black opinion - Black opinion has become somewhat more conservative over time - while Congress tries to represent their constituents’ interests, they also direct them in a more liberal or more conservative direction

Chapter 5: Symbols and Substance - joint resolutions: bills by another name. require the presidents signature to become law - simple and concurrent resolutions must pass one or both chambers of Congress to be enacted, but don’t go to the president; they don’t have the force of law - symbolic legislation: conceals a voting record, initiates a larger political objective, persuades fellow members on core principles, cultivates support in the White House, address the concerns of constituents - 3 standard types of policy: distributive (distribute public goods to a vast array of groups); regulatory, and redistributive - Black legislators chiefly have worked toward the symbolic recognition of Blacks - are the legislative objectives of black members symbolic, substantive, or both? - symbolic = substantive - Congressional Black Caucus: organized to maximize their collective influence in Congress, their mission was to represent the concerns of African Americans - intragroup conflict - as Black members rose in seniority, the type of combative strategy employed by the CBC was professionally dangerous

“In the Rural White South, Seeds of a Biracial Politics” Kevin Sack - Representative Sanford Bishop in rural Georgia, won almost 4 out of every 10 white votes; v. unusual - Bishop acts in the interest of white farmers in GA, wont ehir support - 9 blacks were elected to Congress from majority white districts in 1998

5/4 Mayhew starts out his essay by stating that “if a group of planners sat down and tried to design a pair of American national assemblies with the goal of serving member’s electoral needs year in and year out, they would be hard pressed to improve on what exists.” And saying that the get reelected, there is little zero-sum conflict among members. This is not true all the time, but members come from different districts and have different constituents, and they rarely have to attack each other to get re-elected. Mayhew analyses capital hill offices, calling it a vitally important unit “part campaign management firm and part political machine.” The franking privilege is included in the perks of the incumbents and an important part of the incumbency advantage. Mayhew also looks at committees as helping elected officials. He looks at different ways committees could be helpful, “some committees supply good platforms for position taking.” There are “cause committees, where membership denotes identification with salient public causes. Other committees “traffic in particularized benefits. Those benefits tend to have diffuse costs, and will reward one congressman without obviously hurting another will be dealt out universally. There will sometimes be efforts to try and capture public attention but these efforts have “little or no effect.” Mayhew puts the most importance on how committees allow a division of labor among congressmen. There is a creation of smaller voting bodies where membership is more valuable, and it allows individual congressmen to have more power, or seem to have more power. Mayhew ends the article with a discussion of proposed reform. There have been some rule changes, and this has led to an increase in the number and importance of subcommittees.

The Cohen article argues that “the congressional committees have lost their long-standing pre-eminence as the center of legislative ideas and debates.” It seems that the leadership has been responsible for writing many of the important bills. The article shows many examples including tax an gun control bills. There is an argument that because the leadership is drafting the legislation it is being done hastily and without the proper vetting and the expertise of those on the appropriate committees. Cohen shows that this is a recent development and that for most of the 20th century the reality is different. He looks at turning points, , the 1911 revolt against Joe Cannon and then the events surrounding the passage of Johnson’s Great Society. He looked at the weakening power of House committee chairmen, including the elimination of proxy voting. Most of the article looks at the specific events of surrounding the passage of tax bills and such without the usage of the traditional committee system. He ends by looking at party driven legislation and how it has led to a large increase in filibusters and cloture votes.

Chapter 13 of the book is called Concluding Reflections. He begins by saying that he enjoyed his years in congress, but he seems to believe that there are cases that congress does not do what’s best for the American public. He believes that the public is not of one mind. He looked at the short comings and the missed opportunities of democrats in the early 90s and the problems with Republicans in the era after 1994. Price is quick to point out the divisions of public opinion and how that affected the dynamic between the different political parties. He believed that congress resisted change. Party entrepreneurship is, then, akin to the “strong and slow boring of hard boards.” Once there was unified party control in congress after 2000, there seemed to have been changes. The changes were seen in tax and medicare policy. However, problems still remained. Price talks about institutional reform, saying it is part of what has to be done, but is not by any means the only thing that much be accomplished. The goal should be to find a common good articulate is, and strive to attain it. Price looked at the importance of reform agendas, starting off by saying that he was, in fact, a political scientist going to Washington. He talked about how many officials campaigned for congress by bashing congress. Today people said that congress should function efficiently. In the 1960s and early 1970s the aims were to create a more democratic body and put out a better, more informed product. Price then attacked two aspects of the Contract with America, the line-item veto and congressional term limits as not being effective, good policy. Price calls the reform of the committee system the most difficult and least successful of the reforms of the 1970s. “The key litmus test for any congressional reform should be whether it will leave congress stronger and make it a more competent and efficient institution, able to produce better policy. Price ends by talking about the fact that “ reforms made to the Congress and other institutions of government will accomplish little if they do not rest on a firm foundation of public understanding, confidence and trust.” He believes that this foundation is currently shaky. Campaigning and governing are not the same thing. “David King linked public dissatisfaction to what many people regard as excessive and unnecessary partisanship.”