Mercenaries, Missionaries Or
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MERCENARIES, MISSIONARIES OR….CONSULTANTS? Is administrative reform in transition countries a business, a religion or … surgery?
Ronald G Young M.A M Sc
1. Introduction
1.1 A long journey This paper is written by someone who started in 1970 what has been a long journey in trying to make public bureaucracies more outward-looking and responsive to community problems and concerns. For the first 20 years I did so as a local political leader who helped introduce to a Region which covered half of Scotland and employed 100,000 staff - more open systems of policy-making1. A community-based2 approach to local public services
Having worked with self-help groups in a low income community, I became fascinated with how the segmented structures and operations of our political bureaucracies seemed to sustain rather than solve the problems of disadvantage. I found myself increasingly challenging the assumptions of those who argued for more investment in sectoral approaches (such as education and health programmes). My experience favoured a more holistic approach. At the time this was a minority view – it is now the conventional wisdom in Britain although I left that country in 1992. I have been based since then first in Central Europe, then Central Asia and Caucasus, working usually as Team Leader of EU projects in administrative reform – at both local and central government level. Most of the foreign advisers I meet in those countries are sectoral specialists – assisting the construction of the very departmental systems I railed against in Britain!
I have, however, managed to retain my inter-sectoral focus – working initially with those involved in the new local government and regional development systems and then on administrative and civil service reform. In my latest assignment I returned to my roots in local government – and find myself revisiting my critique of the segmented systems of government3.
1.2 The system in which we work Diagram one is a crude attempt to map the various factors which have a bearing on the issue of administrative reform in countries in which we work in Technical Assistance programmes. The structure chosen by EU for its TA is understandable for a system which tries to minimise its administrative costs – projects defined by logframe and procured by competitive tendering. But the results are problematic – Inflexibility Mismatch between needs and what is supplied Little organisational learning (despite – or perhaps because of – a complex monitoring and evaluation system)
On the other hand, those with experience can make the system more flexible than it appears. And the lack of hierarchical control does give more scope for unorthodox approaches and thinking than is apparent in the international bureaucracies. As a mercenary – rather than a World Bank missionary – I welcome this opportunity to tell the tale of technical assistance from the perspective of the foot-soldier!
1 By the establishment of what we called “member-officer” groups – composed of ordinary councillors and younger officials who looked together at the quality and relevance of services in which several departments were involved; sought evidence and made recommendations; see article by author in Local Government Studies 1978 2 See "Boosting People's Confidence in Themselves" in Dyson 3 although the book is simplistic, David Osborne’s reference in Banishing Bureaucracy to the DNA of public administration is an insightful metaphor to make us focus on the essential forces of political bureaucracy. Perri 6 has an interesting literature review on this subject - but JQ Wilson, however, remains the definitive book.
1 Diagram 1
1. International organisations 3. ·ideas Academia ·priorities 2. Transition Management ·people Structures Governments
Recruitment processes
Programmes Projects ·consultants
·tools
·networks, transactions government sector private NGO sector sector 4. Beneficiaries ·elections ·capacity integtrity responsiveness
1.3 The context in which we work Of course, Central Europe is different from Central Asia – and each country indeed has its specificities. In some places, the carrot of EU accession has been sufficient to motivate reform – in others it has not. In many of the countries the authors have worked in recently, there has been no strong incentive for administrative reform – survival and ethnic struggle has been more of a reality. Classifications which recognised the reality of “authoritarian” and “sultanic” systems have been dismissed as politically incorrect in the reform literature4. During one of my assignments I wrote the following (confidential) assessment of the context in which I was working – “country x falls into the “slow and reluctant” category for political, administrative and economic reform. Its system can be defined as Centralised/feudal Closed corrupt
It is centralised in - policy-making style; new policy directions are signalled in Presidential Decrees developed in secret – with parliament and state bodies playing no real role in developing policies management style and systems in state bodies; where old Soviet one-man management still prevails, with crisis-management modes evident and no managerial delegation the absence of conditions for the new local government system make it no more than a paper exercise it has, however, feudal elements inasmuch as Ministers – although without policy-making powers – have a very strong position
It is closed in that -
4 Bekke and Linz have been two such neglected books.
2 There is little acceptance of pluralist methods of thinking; for example about the need for separation of power; and challenge to ideas and conventional wisdom Elections are fixed; It is difficult for independent-minded reformers to stand for election Recruitment to civil service is done on the basis of (extended) family links Bright graduates now go either to the private or international sector (including TA) Censorship is widespread – whether formal or informal through media being owned and controlled by government and administration figures
It is corrupt in that significant numbers of – Key government and administrative positions are bought students can and do buy educational qualifications public officials (are expected to) accept informal payments for special favours senior administrative figures have substantial and active economic interests”
Table one puts it more crisply – Institution Comment Extent of reform effort Political executive Centralised and opaque. Baronial system. Non-existent
Parliament Low – elections controlled; and not permitted to Minimal change draft laws from President Judiciary Still not independent Good TA – but Ministry of Justice a laggard Media Strong state control (formal and informal) Non-existent
Civil service Positions bought and appointments made on grace Civil Service Agency established and favour basis on paper State bodies Corrupt and insensitive to public need Ministry of Taxation and Min of Foreign Affairs making efforts Local government elections controlled; No real powers Non-existent
Civil society Major registration problems
University Examinations and Degrees are bought by more than Minimal half of the students
2. An overview of organisations and their “ideas in good currency” for rebuilding the state structures of transition countries Nobody had ever lived through this triple transformation (Markets, nations, democracy) ever before. People had been writing profusely about the transition from capitalism to communism – but not the other way around. The collapse of communism was a great shock. Few – except the Poles and Hungarians5 - were at all prepared for it. And understanding such systems change requires a vast array of different intellectual disciplines – and sub-disciplines – and who is trained to make sense of them all6? The apparently irreversible trend toward greater and greater specialisation of the social sciences places more power in the hands of technocrats7 and disables politicians from serious involvement in the discourse of the international bodies who have the temerity to engage in the reconstruction of other country’s state systems. Both of our papers suggest that social scientists divide into “liberals”, “neo-liberals” and “functionalists.
2.1 The different lens The “liberal” perspective can be found in constitutional literature and mainstream political science writing about the workings of liberal democracy – where the “public good” is achieved by free peoples voting in and out politicians who form governments (national and local) - advised by neutral and honest civil servants. Government policies (and reputations) are subject to constant and detailed scrutiny by a large community of pressure groups, researchers and media.
5 who, with other countries admitted in 2004, had experienced these systems earlier in the 20th century! 6 Elster and Offe 7 JR Saul is one of the few who have tried to expose this
3 The “neo-liberal” perspective is economic - talks about “state capture” and “rent-seeking” – and advises that the public good is best achieve by the role of the state being minimised and the role of the market and contracts maximised.
The “functionalist” lens is more anthropological – and starts with an attempt to understand who is actually doing what – regardless of whether they are “legitimate” or “effective” players according to the constitutional and economic models which dominate donor thinking. Its interventions are pragmatic – using change management perspectives (Carnall).
In a sadly out of print and much neglected book, Hood and Jackson suggested more striking metaphors we use in our thinking about organisations –
Table 2; 1. Military 2. Business 3. Religious Stereotype9 Stereotype8 Stereotype Slogan Run it like the army Run it like a business Run it like a monastic order Work force Limited career Hired and fired Service for life Motivation Fear of punishment Fear of dismissal Fear of damnation Hope of honours Hope for money Hope for salvation Control Audit of war Impersonal Faith; social acceptance Objective Orders of day Profit Worked out at length in setting discussion and reflection Belief Obedience to Incentives to reduce Lifetime internal commitment leadership brings waste and search for limits rash selfish ideas efficiency innovations
2.2 New worlds to conquer An army of economic experts from the second battalion had the bit between the teeth from the privatisation which had swept the world in the 1990s – and was looking for a new challenge! So no humility was on display. They knew what had to be done! And the bodies which employed them (such as the IMF and World Bank) were international and therefore protected from effective challenge – although for those who cared to read the numerous critiques of their work10, their record and structure of ways of managing programmes and personnel was highly questionable. In Central Europe, of course, such bodies had to share the place at the table with the European Union – whose fiefdom this was – and with EBRD. As has been well documented by Santos, however, the EU, however, despite all the vacuous rhetoric of common administrative space11, has no intellectual line12 of its own and simply follows the “intellectual” lead of international bodies such as the World Bank. So even the EU was slow to wake up the significance of a strong and effective machinery of state. When it did, accession was the name of the game and legitimised a rather “imperial” approach to public administration reform – with accession countries required to learn the Acquis Commaunitais 13 and annual report cards. EU “experts” (of varying background and levels of expertise) found themselves working on programmes restructuring Ministries and helping introduce and implement civil service laws. Others in civil service training. But far too quickly the EU decided to make accession (rather than development) the driving force of its technical assistance. At that stage it was patently obvious to those who knew countries such as Romania and Slovakia that the culture of patronage and corruption was so deeply embedded in these systems that Ministry twinning14 was no answer. But we
8 which is as good a summary of the legalistic culture of CIS systems as we will find! 9 A good summary of the classic civil service! 10 the critiques are too numerous to mention – starting from Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli Faith and Credit - the World Bank's Secular Empire (Penguin 1994) through to Reinventing the World Bank (Ithaca 2002). See also article “Our poverty is a world full of dreams; reforming the World Bank” by Catherine Weaver and Ralf Leiteritz in Global Governance; a review of multilateralism and international organisations 11 see paper in SIGMA series 12 It is quite scandalous, given the scale of money spent by the EU on the topic, that the EU has no lead experts exercising any leadership or quality control over, for example, the ToR drafted in this field. 13 basic subjects were access to regional funds, project management. For the advanced there were recondite subjects such as comitology 14 Giving accession countries a civil servant from a matching Ministry in a member country. To such people, giving advice was a novel experience, let alone to countries so different from their own.
4 were only experts in the field – employed by companies on contract to the EU – mercenaries. And who listens to mercenaries? And yet the management theory of the time was preaching the importance of the bosses listening to the views of their workers in the field. But such a view is and remains anathema to the elite culture of the Commission15.
Further afield in Russia and Central Asia, the Washington consensus had full rein. And what a disaster it has been16! Initially, of course, there was no talk of administrative reform. The language was functional transfer or, more euphemistically, review. The central state was to be stripped – and its assets transferred ideally to something called the private sector. This line went down well with the apparachtniks who were well placed to benefit – so “local ownership” was clearly in place! As it slowly dawned on these zealots that market transactions did require some element of regularity and legality – otherwise society reverted to banditry – the academics discovered the writings of people like North17 and Schick and started to allow some experts in to help construct some of the machinery of government which is required to ensure the minimum level of social trust required for economic transactions.
2.3 Some results State bodies (at all levels) in many transition countries have been regarded by the international community as so contaminated with soviet centralist thinking and corrupt informal coping practices as to be beyond hope. The strategy of international donors during the 1990s to avoid working with or through them. Instead they channelled assistance to building up the private and NGO sectors18. The privatisation process has been very extensively documented. Different models were followed in different countries – and worked more or less satisfactorily depending on the local context. In much of Central Europe, the process and outcomes were, given the novelty of the process, not excessively contentious19. But the selected methods and context in Russia combined to create a criminal class able to buy anything - including elections20. And most NGOs in transition countries – funded as they are by the international community – are not NGOs as we know them. They have, rather, been a combination of entrepreneurial bodies or fronts to disburse money to causes acceptable to donors. In the accession countries, serious efforts at administrative reform only really started in the late 1990s – and still receive very little serious attention in Central Asia. And it is only in the last few years that a real effort has started in Russia to try to build up a civil service system which serves the state rather than its own interests21.
2.4 intellectual signposts The website set up by the World Bank, UNDP and others22, although useful, as an introductory tour of some tools for admin reform, tantalises rather than instructs. And the voluminous Manual on PAR produced in 2004 by the Asian Development Bank23 – which one would imagine to offer some perspectives on the Asian context - reflects neo-liberal Western thinking. A lot of the World Bank papers take a statistical approach to problems and try to identify correlations – presumably because it employs so many people with econometric qualifications and because its mission does not allow it to get into political matters. However staff such as Shephard have bravely asked critical questions. Nick Manning has been an indefatigable writer prepared to write in an accessible way about his work – and Tony Verheijen’s papers have also been very helpful to those of us in the field as we struggled to make sense of our work.
15 Although I was very impressed in the 1980s with the openness of the Delors regime to the views and role of local government 16 for a definition and history see Gore. For the definitive critique, see Stiglitz. 17 for a summary see “The Theoretical Core of the new institutionalism” by Ellen Immergut Politics and Society vol 26 no 1 March 1998 (available via google scholar) 18 The various Annual World Bank Reports charted this process of thinking. 19 this is, of course, a very sweeping statement – with exception in certain countries and sectors. In Bulgaria and Romania the process was highly contentious – and Gatzweiler and Hagedorn, amongst others, argue that land privatisation was highly deficient (in “People, Institutions and Agroecosystems in Transition”). 20 The most accessible account is Freeland. See also Black and Tarassova 21 “Hard cases and improving governance; Putin and civil service reform” by Pat Grey (2004) 22 www.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice 23 Available on their website
5 3. Forgetting History One would have thought that before rushing into transition countries, donors and experts might have asked themselves the basic question about the process by which their own economic and political institutions were constructed. But the economist thinking which was then so rampant has no place for history – only the latest nostra and equations. Joon Chang has been one of a few prepared to challenge with proper analysis the facile assumptions of the various economic and political prescriptions which lay inside the advice offered by World Bank advisers. David’s paper, for example, makes the very correct point that elections themselves are not the defining feature of democracy. The Government system in a democracy is made up of several structures or systems each of which has a distinctive role. It is this sharing of responsibilities – in a context of free and open dialogue – which ideally gives democratic systems their strength – particularly in Producing and testing ideas Checking the abuses of power Ensuring public acceptance of the political system – and the decisions which come from it.
The key institutions for a democratic system are - A political executive - whose members are elected and whose role is to set the policy agenda- that is develop a strategy (and make available the laws and resources) to deal with those issues which it feels need to be addressed. A freely elected legislative Assembly – whose role is to ensure (i) that the merits of new legislation and policies of the political Executive are critically and openly assessed; (ii) that the performance of government and civil servants is held to account; and (iii) that, by the way these roles are performed, the public develop confidence in the workings of the political system. An independent Judiciary – which ensures that the rule of Law prevails, that is to say that no- one is able to feel above the law. A free media; where journalists and people can express their opinions freely and without fear. A professional impartial Civil Service – whose members have been appointed and promoted by virtue of their technical ability to ensure (i) that the political Executive receives the most competent policy advice; (ii) that the decisions of the executive (approved as necessary by Parliament) are effectively implemented ; and that (iii) public services are well-managed The major institutions of Government - Ministries, Regional structures (Governor and regional offices of Ministries) and various types of Agencies. These bodies should be structured, staffed and managed in a purposeful manner An independent system of local self-government – whose leaders are accountable through direct elections to the local population24. The staff may or may not be civil servants. An active civil society – with a rich structure of voluntary associations – able to establish and operate without restriction. Politicians can ignore the general public for some time but, as the last ten years has shown, only for so long! The vitality of civil society – and of the media – creates (and withdraws) the legitimacy of political systems. An independent university system – which encourages tolerance and diversity
Such a democratic model is, of course, an “ideal-type” – a model which few (if any) countries actually match in all respects. A lot of what the global community preaches as “good practice” in government structures is actually of very recent vintage in their own countries and is still often more rhetoric than actual practice. Of course public appointments, for example, should be taken on merit – and not on the basis of ethnic or religious networks. But Belgium and Netherlands, to name but two European examples, have a formal structure of government based, until very recently, on religious and ethnic divisions25. In those cases a system which is otherwise rule-based and transparent has had minor adjustments made to take account of strong social realities and ensure consensus.
24 Encouraging a strong and free system of local self-government is perhaps the most difficult part of the transition process – since it means allowing forces of opposition to have a power base. But it is the way to develop public confidence in government! 25 Ie each of Belgium’s 3 Regions has a both an executive and a “community” structure – with the latter reflecting ethnic issues. Netherlands has long had its “Pillars” which ensured that the main religious forces had their say in nominations and decisions. This has now weakened.
6 But in the case of countries such as Northern Ireland (until very recently), the form and rhetoric of objective administration in the public good has been completely undermined by religious divisions. All public goods (eg housing and appointments) were made in favour of Protestants. The Italian system has for decades been notorious for the systemic abuse of the machinery of the state by various powerful groups – with eventually the Mafia itself clearly controlling some key parts of it26. American influence played a powerful part in this in the post-war period – but the collapse of communism removed that influence and allowed the Italians to have a serious attempt at reforming the system – until Berlusconi intervened. These are well-known cases – but the more we look, the more we find that countries which have long boasted of their fair and objective public administration systems have in fact suffered serious intrusions by sectional interests. The British and French indeed have invented words to describe the informal systems which has perverted the apparent neutrality of their public administration – “the old boy network”27 and “pantouflage” of “ENArques28”. Too much of the commentary on Central Europe and Central Asia seems oblivious to this history and these realities – and imagines that a mixture of persuasive rhetoric and arm-twisting will lead to significant changes here. The result is inappropriate mechanisms and an alienated and offended beneficiary.
4. Priorities, projects and programmes
4.1 Issues The diagram in the Annex29 details the various ingredients of the government reform stew – ten elements, each with about 20 categories. And each category (whether election systems, local government structures or consultative procedures) handled differently in each of the European countries. It indicates the scope for working at cross purpose – and for the problems of sequencing which Beblavy and Verheijen have discussed. Somehow, donors have had to cut through that and come to some decisions about – Priorities Specific mechanisms beneficiaries Who takes these decisions – using what processes? Highly educated people no doubt – but certainly without much practical experience, it seems, of managing real change!30 Clearly judicial reform is a sine qua non. Without rule-of-law, none of the other programmes of technical assistance will work. And the introduction of new financial and economic systems - banking, stock-exchanges, bankruptcy and financial management and control systems, customs and taxation – have been clearly the priorities for institutional development. This paper is not concerned with those fundamental aspects – but rather with the more classic issues for public administration or “governance” of coordination, effectiveness and public interest.
In the EU, the drafting of project terms of reference (ToR) is a notoriously random process leading often to poorly designed projects whose ToR have to be significantly amended. This has happened in both of my most recent projects. I am not so familiar with the processes of other donors. Bilateral work does seems to be more focussed (and long-term) but the frustrations in field offices of international donors with their bureaucratic planning systems indicate problems at the opposite end of the spectrum from those of EU TA. But both seem to create the same sorts of problems. Take one recent example – in one country where local government exists in name only, such is the emphasis the donors now place on the mantra of accountability and governance that their “assistance” to local government takes the form of – “Monitoring and evaluation” - of policies which actually don’t exist
26 There is a voluminous literature on this – the most lively is Peter Robb’s Midnight in Sicily (Harvill Press 1996). For an update, read Berlusconi’s Shadow – crime, justice and the pursuit of power by David Lane (Penguin 2005) 27 published critiques of the narrow circles from which business and political leaders were drawn started in the early 1960s – but only Margaret Thatcher’s rule of the 1980s really broke the power of this elite and created a meritocracy 28 business, political and Civil service leaders have overwhelmingly passed through the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA) and have moved easily from a top position in the Civil Service to political leadership to business leadership. 29 Borrowed with thanks from Guy Hollis of Nicolaas Witsen Foundation 30 how many of them, I wonder, have read James Scott?
7 “municipal budget transparency” projects with local community groups when no municipal budgets exist “report cards” on local public services which simply don’t exist.
Gajduschek and Hajnal gave us one of the very few comprehensive and public assessments of TA in PHARE countries; and a recent report from International Crisis Group has also given a good overview31 of the problems.
4.2 Mechanisms One assignment required me to help a country implement the Civil Service Law which had been passed 2 years earlier32. The Law had been drafted by international experts but was not being implemented simply because very few people knew what it was for – it had been passed simply to keep the international community happy. One of the tasks therefore of my project was to explore that question. The ultimate purpose of a Civil Service Law is to develop public confidence in government service. But there are various ways in which this might be done – and a particular law will emphasise one of these approaches more than others. Poorly-drafted laws will embody contradictory theories about how to achieve the ultimate goal. The various arguments are summarised in the table –
Table 3; Injunction Reasoning Make recruitment open and A more representative system will be trusted competitive more Pay well Minimise temptation Give good training It is performance which inspires trust
Check the performance – and Ditto promote the performers Have a code of ethics – and enforce Moral persuasion it Public standards which will shame officials into changing behaviour Have strong leader cadre Behaviour of senior executives services as an example – “walk the talk”
This table shows the different types of reasoning involved and reminds us that people have various reasons for behaving the way they do – obedience to the law is only one of the reasons. If we wish to change people’s behaviour, we should look at all options – and, where behaviour patterns are strong, we often need to use a battery of mechanisms. The next table illustrates some of these –
Table 4 Motivating Factor Example of tool Particular mechanism
Understanding Training Rational persuasion Campaigns Functional review Factual analysis Commitment Leadership Legitimisation Communications Training Personal Benefit Pay increases Monetary calculation Bonus Winning an award Psychological Status Personal Cost Named as poor performer Psychological (Shame) Demotion Monetary Report cards Obligation Law Courts Action plan Managerial authority
31 Although its suggestion that local companies should be used more (which is actually EU policy) fails to appreciate that these (like NGOs) simply ape the defective thinking criticised in this paper. 32 Our project was supposed, of course, to have arrived much earlier!
8 Family ties Social pressure Peer influence Bribery Pressure Quality circles Support Social influence Opinion surveys Feedback from public about service quality
Clearly some of these approaches work in some countries – but not in others. Performance bonuses, for example, just don’t work in societies whose values stress the group and community. And styles of leadership (and follower-ship!) vary enormously in countries. I have to question how carefully such issues are explored when ToR are drafted! Of course donors will have their country profiles – and often their manuals on what they consider (at that moment) “works” in various sectors. But this does not mean that these are read and understood And I know this is an issue not just for the EU – not so long ago I sat at a meeting in Central Asia with a (visiting) World Bank expert who announced one of their initiatives in the country with reference to it having worked well in Pakistan.
4.3 project Selection procedures The procurement methods used by donors are not exactly calculated to obtain consultants who will “make a difference”. A points system is used to evaluate bids for projects which marks for – Project methodology Staff experience Financial bid
The first is generally written by junior personnel back in Western Europe specially trained in this arcane skill in a contracting company – the first the Team Leader sees it is when he arrives in the country to start the project. And, in any event, it can be thrown into the bin since the Team Leader has to write an inception report which takes proper account of the situation. Nonetheless this methodology accounts for more than 50% of the points awarded by evaluation panels to the competitive bids. “Key experts” are then assessed – but only in relation to the particular qualities which have been specified. And these are about the location and length of the experts’ experience – never for the quality of their team management, initiative, commitment or professional outputs. And yet these, surely, are precisely the features of a potential team we need to know about in the selection of personnel for a project. The private sector would never allow itself to be hamstrung by such nonsense. But such a system prevails when the interests of the beneficiary are given no consideration.
4.4 Control and performance management It is highly ironic that we use such a Soviet instrument as the logframe33in the transition countries!! It is doubly ironic for those of us who are supposed to be bringing a more flexible approach to public administration. Do the designers of such instruments not realise that its use sends such a powerful message about administrative methods as threatens to undermine all the training done in our projects? But part of the problem is that noone can really take such responsibility…… Why are the subjects of the “risks” in the logframe of our projects always on the beneficiary side? Why is there never any reference to badly-designed projects, of too short a duration - with inappropriate foreign experts? After all, it is these latter factors as much as local conditions which make technical assistance projects that much less effective than they might have been. And do we realise how much of the limited time of top-level advisers TA takes. I work closely at the moment with the Head of one national municipal association and he seems to spend half his day meeting such people.
33 See Lucy Earle’s paper “Lost in the matrix; the Logframe and the local picture” –given at INTRAC’s 5th Conference on Evaluation in 2003 for an interesting comparison of the rational and anthropological approaches to consultancy
9 5. Experts
5.1 Lacunae The world of consultants in administrative reform has no real identity and professional loyalties. We are either staff members of the big international donors and lenders – governed by strict rules of confidentiality and peer review – or mercenaries employed by small edgy contractors. And we generally come to the work from long practical experience in one sector in Western country – with at least four huge deficiencies – lacking the anthropological skills needed to understand the totally different context in which we are working; little comparative knowledge about how our professional field (eg local government) is dealt with in other European countries; absolutely no experience of consultancy! No sense of historical processes of development
And no attempt is made to help us recognise these deficiencies – let alone deal with them. I reckon it has taken me 10 years to reinvent myself from an academic (in urban management) and a Regional politician in Scotland to a reasonably effective midwife in transition countries for the birth of new civil service and local government systems. To perform that new role, I’ve had to do a lot of reading and learning about different systems of public administration and local government than the British – but know a lot of advisers who are trapped in their own national systems. In taking stock of the new skills and tools I use in my new role, some of my previous political skills have been useful (rapid analysis of new fields; and communications). But others have had to be unlearned very thoroughly (eg arrogant claims to legitimacy)
5.2 Ethical issues And, confronting as I do, the strength of old corrupt systems of government, I recognise the moral corruption I saw in the local government system I first encountered in Britain the 1970s34 – and wonder why there is so little serious treatment given in the mainstream public admin literature to the sort of malfunctioning which comes simply from systems appointing incompetent people to top positions who have skills of survival but no vision35.
5.3 implications for academia Most consultants I know are subject specialists - and university specialisation and labour markets in W Europe mean that young graduates don’t get the chance to practice. The disrespect for politics and the damage passion and commitment do to career structures also filters out unorthodox thinking from those who enter the profession. Russia, it seems, has been able to develop the discipline of PA. In most other CIS countries there are few young specialists in the field – the salaries and programmes are absent which might such that young people have an incentive to get into these fields. How can one conduct administrative reform when there is not even a language for it – or when the language is only foreign?
34 Widdicombe The Conduct of Local Authority Business - Royal Commission Inquiry 1986 35 Al Mant’s The Leaders we Deserve ( ) remains a classic on this neglected topic. There are also a few articles in the academic literature about evil in organisations – a subject sadly left to historians and moral philosophers or journalists such as Robert Fisk
10 6. A look at one Tool - Building capacity The ultimate purpose of most technical assistance is the development of institutional capacity. This concept belongs to those who see themselves in the field of “development” - working in fragile states. The recent literature36 is interesting – but potentially dangerous if put into the wrong hands since it seems to be based on the outdated notion that external “experts” can engineer change by the use of special tools they take around the word with them. And the very phrase “capacity development” is an excellent example of the jargon George Orwell preached against – after all who decides who has capacity and how it can be developed? For me, the capacity of an organisation is built as it has the opportunity to take decisions for itself and learns from doing. It is exactly the same process as good parenting. Of course inexperienced young people will make mistakes – but it is the job of responsible parents who care about their children to create the conditions in which their children learn for themselves – at minimal cost to themselves and others. And some of the qualities therefore needed, for example, in those purporting to offer support to local government are care and compassion. To explore this further we need to look briefly at learning theory. Those who talk about “lack of municipal capacity”, for example, generally don’t have any clear idea about how that capacity will be built up. They tend to assume that courses will somehow equip the staff to do the new work. But this is not actually how learning and competence develops. People develop competences by actually applying their knowledge and skills – and learning from the results37. Without that application, any training is wasted. But generally we are left to draw the lessons ourselves – the training is given and then we are left on our own. Of course, these are essentially individual processes and will contribute to organisational capacity only with good management of the individual’s department – and then good leadership of the organisation. The diagram below tries to make these various points. To build the capacity of an organisation or system therefore requires us to pay attention not only to individual skills but to the style, skills and structure of management and leadership. And, given the scale of delegated functions which municipalities in many transition countries are given, this puts the structures and style of local state administration under the microscope. How well are these systems led and managed? And how can they realistically be improved?
Here, of course, there are wider issues involved – about whether the Heads of State bodies are appointed on their merit or on other criteria and what incentives they have to operate in the public interest! Hence the two levels at the top of the diagram – about (a) the extent to which rule of law exists and (b) public appointments are made on merit.
36 Useful recent summary papers are - The Challenge of Capacity Development; working toward good practice (OECD – Network on Governance Feb 2006); Capacity Development for Policy Advocacy; M Blagescu and J Young (ODI January 2006); Capacity Development Practice Note (UNDP December 2005 draft); The Idea and practice of systems thinking and their relevance for capacity development; Peter Morgan (European Centre for Development Policy Management – March 2005); Capacity Enhancement Indicators (WBI 2004); Special issue on Technical Cooperation of Development Policy Journal (UNDP volume 2 December 2002) 37 for a brief but very clear exposition of theories of learning as they apply to training in organisations see the chapter “Managing Learning” in Managing Public Services; implementing changes – a thoughtful approach by TL Doherty and T. Horne (Routledge 2002) pp 414-439
11 Diagram 2; how state capacities develop PROCESS INTERVENTIONS?? NATIONAL SOCIAL CAPACITY
RULE OF LAW ????
PUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITY
OPEN COMPETITIVE RECRUITMENT TWINNING CIVIL SERVICE AGENCIES
ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY
ORGANISATIONAL LEADERSHIP ORGANISATION SPONSORS THE TRAINING TO ASSIST SPECIFIC CHANGE DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF A PARTICULAR FUNCTION MANAGER’S ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE TRAINING EVENT INDIVIDUAL COMPETENCE
SYSTEMATIC LEARNING
CARRYING OUT NEW TASK ACTION-LEARNING
INFORMAL LEARNING TRAINING FOR PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE RESPONSIBILITIES
PREPARATION FOR JOB OR PROJECT BASIC EDUCATION (INDUCTION TRAINING)
The argument, so far, reduces to three basic points - ask the question – “capacity for what?” Then check that the task given in the answer actually relates to something considered to be important to local people! There are too many people wanting to build the capacity of municipalities to do things which are useful only to those in central government (such as collecting statistics and reports!). Those about to be involved in new responsibilities in municipalities (eg introduction of new water system; or new local budget system) should receive not only appropriate advance training but ongoing practical advice as they implement the new measures. Those managing and leading at state and local state admin level need also to receive help in assessing their styles, skills and structures; and to work with their staff to introduce systems which are more community- and customer-oriented. For those who are interested, there are various surveys available which can be used to introduce changes38.
But can we be more precise? There are now a variety of bodies – national, local and international – which, in different ways are helping to build local capacities. Most focus on community capacities to create local infrastructure and set up NGOs for that purpose – but do work with people from municipalities to develop, for example, local water systems. What is the net result of all this disparate
38 see, for example, those in chapter 11 (“Diagnosing Change”) of Carnall. The UNDP also offer a “Systemic Capacity Assessment Tool” available from their website. See also the long paper “The introduction and use of quality management tools in CEE candidate countries – current practice, needs and expectations” by Christian Engel (Maastricht 2002)
12 work on the building of municipality capacity? And should such efforts be more integrated – rather than left to the whims of various donors?
7. Networks, alliances and transactions
7.1 Changing people or systems? Crisis management – and financial and moral corruption – are some of the presenting features of all centralised systems. How does one change such cultures? This is the fundamental issue 39 which has to be tackled before administrative reform will readily take hold. Where are there examples of highly centralised societies developing systems of staff involvement in the improvement of services. Japan is one obvious example – famous now for the way management engage staff in a continuous dialogue about how to improve what their services and products offer the customer. But this is a relatively recent phenomenon – brought on by the combination of the shock of Second World War defeat and the import under General MacArthur’s regime of a little-known American management guru, Edward Denning whose statistically based approach to “quality management” so transformed Japanese – and, ultimately and ironically, - American industry. Before then, organisational structures had the same features of subservience as CIS countries. This raises the conundrum – is it people who change systems? Or systems which change people? Answers tend to run on ideological grounds - individualists tend to say the former; social democrats the latter. And both are right! Change begins with a single step, an inspiring story, a champion. But, unless the actions “resonate” with society, they will dismissed as mavericks, “ahead of their time”. A significant number of people have to be discontent – and persuaded that there is an alternative. The wider system has to be ready for change – and, in the meantime, the narrow and upward accountabilities of the administrative system can be – and is so often – malevolent, encouraging people to behave in perverse ways.
7.2 Some preconditions of change? Formal and informal systems are a well-recognised fact of organizational life40. Whatever new formal systems say, powerful informal systems tend to ensure the maintenance of unreformed systems – until, that is, and unless there is a determined move to change. What do I mean by “determined move”? - Ensuring, by communications, leadership and training, that people understand what the reform is trying to achieve – and why it is needed Development and enforce detailed instruments Networking in order to mobilise support for the relevant changes building and empowering relevant institutions to be responsible for the reform – and help drive it forward
Administrative reform is an intervention in a social system – or rather set of interlocking systems. Like an organism, it will quickly be rejected or absorbed unless it can relate to elements in these larger systems. We are these days advised always to carry out “stakeholder analyses” – to track who will be affected by the changes and how the indifferent or potentially hostile can be brought on side or neutralised41. This is sound advice – and such an exercise may sometimes suggest that certain aspects of reform should be delayed. A paper42 on the Russian experience of civil service reform is one of the few to try to offer an explanation of how the combination of specific internal and external factors has constrained the reform process in that particular country eg variable political leadership and support; variable administrative leadership and capacity; political and social instability; minimal civil society; the preponderance of old apparatchniks; cultural factors; and ‘windows of opportunity’ “Cultural factors” is a general term which includes the role of the extended family 43 which undercuts competitive hiring practices. And it is well known that in such societies, public positions which give access to lucrative revenue flows are bought at huge sums of money44 Such practices hardly give
39 The other, related, one is that of the lack of management systems in state bodies. 40 In 1970, Donald Schon coined the phrase “dynamic conservatism” in Beyond the Stable State to describe the strength of these forces in an organisation. 41 see the useful discussion in Lovell’s paper on “Gaining Support” by which uses the dimensions of “agreement to change” and “trust” to distinguish allies, adversaries, bedfellows, opponents and fence sitters 42 “Hard cases and improving governance; Putin and civil service reform” by Pat Grey (2004) 43 see the paper “The role of Clans in post-independence state-building in Central Asia” by Janna Khegai (2004 ECPR conference paper available at www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/)
13 promising preconditions45 for introducing a competitive system of meritocratic recruitment to the civil service! Civil Service Reform in CIS countries needs widespread acceptance that change is needed spurred on by an event some workable propositions an action plan a lead structure with skilled change agents
7.3 Windows of opportunity The point about such windows is that they have to be prepared for – and recognised when they arrive!! The public administration reforms of Poland and Hungary were, arguably, as effective they were because of the extent of preparation by reformers46 during the 1980s – in isolation from the power structure. Why such reforms were not effective in Kyrgyzstan in the last period of President Akaev’s rule despite the scale of foreign assistance is still an open question. But perhaps one explanation is the failure to establish a local analytical capacity in universities and consultancies. Without a vocabulary and conceptual framework for reform, efforts to create a purposeful administrative system will stumble from crisis to crisis.
8. In-conclusion “I don’t care what you know. I want to know how much you care!” A Romanian colleague in 1992
The title of this paper asks a question – a rather rhetorical, if not ironic, one perhaps. My argument has been that the TA system in this field of administrative reform cannot be conducted like a business, religion47 or surgery. Too many programmes and projects are designed out of context in a high-handed manner (counter to basic principles of organisational consultancy) by highly trained people in highly bureaucratic organisations who have little direct experience of the messy nature of real change. What they produce are the typical products of rationalist mentality – which no amount of tinkering can make more effective.
I suggest that this presents those of us who have got involved in these programmes of advising governments in these countries with a real moral challenge. After all, we are daring to advise these countries construct effective organisations – we are employed by organisations supposed to have the expertise in how to put systems together to ensure that appropriate intervention strategies emerge to deal with the organisational and social problems of these countries. We are supposed to have the knowledge and skills to help develop appropriate knowledge and skills in others! But how many of us can give positive answers to the following 5 questions? - Do the organisations which pay us practice what they and we preach on the ground about good organisational principles? Does the knowledge and experience we have as individual consultants actually help us identify and implement interventions which fit the context in which we are working? Do we have the skills to make that happen? What are the bodies which employ consultants doing to explore such questions – and to deal with the deficiencies which I dare to suggest would be revealed? Do any of us have a clue about how to turn kleptocratic regimes into systems that recognise the meaning of public service?48
44 an extended article on the Uzbek system by Dmitry Pashkun of the National University of Uzbekistan quotes prices of $2 million for the position of regional governor is published in the spring 2004 issue of NISPAcee News – at www.nispa.sk 45 The “strategies and sequencing” section of the very useful World Bank website on Administrative and Civil Service reform contains a fuller discussion of this, developing a typology with the twin axes of capability and motivation. This can be found in – www.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice 46 See unique account written in the book by insider Regulski of the almost 20 years of preparation and change which went into the construction of the Polish local government system (available on the LGI Budapest website). 47 At least not in the dogmatic sense – although, as Harrison argues, consultants do perhaps need to have more “love” 48 Anti-corruption strategies have, of course, become very fashionable in the international community – but seem to me a good example of a mechanism which serves the interests of donors (jobs) and beneficiary countries who
14 Innumerable initiatives in innumerable countries over decades have shown a far more powerful and effective way of building capacity – based less on technocratic approaches and more on working pragmatically at different levels on appropriate developments defined by the beneficiaries. During the 1990s, when new economic, electoral, financial and parliamentary systems were being constructed from scratch, it was reasonable to insist that foreign experts with the knowledge of those systems were needed to take the lead in transition countries. And as accession countries neared the point of accession, it was reasonable to insist that civil servants from the matching EU Ministries should come and tell the transition Ministries how to work the Acquis Commaunitaire. But the task of making these systems actually work and achieve public benefit in the conditions which operate in CIS countries requires a very different approach. International organisations have proved their inability to deliver on the rhetoric of local ownership and should now change their role to that of creating an environment in which effective donors can work. Humility rather than hubris is needed. And so-called experts should ban use of that term and start reading the works of people like Robert Chambers, Tony Gibson, Ivan Illich, Paole Freiere and Roger Harrison.
Bibliographical references My location makes it impossible to give complete references. Many of the most useful papers can be accessed by using Google Scholar.
Beblavy M (?) “Management of Civil Service Reform in Central Europe” in Mastering Decentralisation and Public Administration Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (LGI paper)
Bekke HAG (1996); Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective (Indiana University Press)
Black, B and Tarassova, AS “Institutional Reform in transition; a case study of Russia” by (google) in Beyond Privatisation; institutional prerequisites for Transition by T Heller and L Liu (2003)
Boyle, D (2001); The Tyranny of numbers (Flamingo)
Carnall C (2003); Managing Change in Organisations (4th edition Prentice Hall).
Chambers Robert (1997); Whose Reality Counts? (ITDG);
Chang, Ha- Joon (2002) Kicking away the Ladder – development strategy in historical perspective; (Anthem)
Dyson K (1989); Long-term Unemployment in Europe - the EC/local dimension ed. K.Dyson (Routledge and Kegan Paul)
Elster J. and C. Offe. (1997) Institutional Design in post-communist countries - rebuilding the ship at sea; (Cambridge 1997)
Freeland, Chrystia (2000); Sale of the Century – Russia’s wild ride from communism to capitalism (Little Brown)
Freiere Paolo (1970?); The Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Penguin)
Fisk, Robert (2005); The Great War for Civilisation; the conquest of the Middle East (Fourth Estate)
Gajduschek, György and Hajnal, György “Civil Service Training assistance in the former communist countries; an assessment” (NISPace)
Gore, C: (1999) “The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a paradigm for developing countries” (UNCTD 1999)..
Harrison Roger (1995) The Collected Papers of Roger Harrison (McGraw Hill)
Hood, C and Jackson(1986); Administrative Argument (Wheatsheaf); Hood (2000); The Art of the State – culture, rhetoric and public management (Oxford)
Illich Ivan Deschooling Society; and Limits to Medicine - Medical Nemesis have such strategies wished upon them. For the latter it gives the pretence of action and also fits with the traditional culture of rhetorical exhortation.
15 International Crisis Group (April 2006) ; Central Asia; what role for the European Union? (Report 113, pages 11- 16
Linz J and Stefan A (1996); Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation – S. Europe, S America and post-communist Europe (John Hopkins)
Lovell R. (1994) “Gaining Support” in Managing Change in the new public sector (Longmans)
Manning, N and Parison N (2003); “International Public Administration Reform – implications for the Russian Federation” (World Bank)
Mant, A (1985); Leaders we deserve (Blackwell)
Moore, Mark (1995); Creating Public Value – strategic management in government (Harvard)
Orwell George (1947); “Politics and the English Language” in Collected Letters and Essay of George Orwell (
Osborne, David (1998); Banishing Bureaucracy – five strategies for reinventing government (Plume)
Perri 6 (2004); “Joined-up government in the western world – a preliminary literature review and exploration”
Peters, Guy (1996); The Future of Governing – Four emerging models (Kansas)
Pollitt C (2003); The Essential Public Manager (Open University Press)
Ryan, W (1971) ; Blaming the Victim (Orbach and Chambers)
Santiso Carlos “Development Finance, Governance Conditionality; Politics matter” (2004 internet)
Saul JR –in his trenchant Voltaire’s Bastards – the dictatorship of reason in the west (Vintage 1993)
Schick, A (1998); Why most developing countries should not try to use New Public Management (World Bank Observer)
Scott, James (1999) ; Seeing like the State – how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (Yale)
Shepherd, Geoffrey (2003) “Civil Service Reform in Developing Countries; why is it going badly?” (Seoul)
Stiglitz, J (2002); Globalisation and its discontents (Penguin)
Stone, Deborah (2002); Policy Paradox- the art of political decision making (Norton)
UNDP (2001) Rebuilding State Structures; methods and approaches – the trials and tribulations of post-communist countries
Verheijen Tony; “Public Administration Reform – a mixed picture” in Handbook of Public Administration ed G Peters
Verhiejen, T and Coombes D (1998); Innovations in Public Management, experiences from East and West Europe (Edward Elgar publishers)
Wheen F (2004); How Mumo-Jumbo conquered the world (Harper)
Wilson JQ (1989); Bureaucracy – what government agencies do and why they do it (Basic Books)
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