DSICPPIRI5I8I2OI2 (White Paper)

DSICPPIRI5I8I2OI2 (White Paper) EDITED REPORT I

"DEFENCE UPDATE 2005" Chapters

A Changed Security Environment South Africa's Approach to Security Role, Functions, Objectives and Missions

CHAPTER ONE

A CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Introduction

1. Since South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994, the international security environment has changed dramatically. Security threats that were overshadowed by the possibility of direct superpower military confrontation during the Cold War have surfaced to dominate the current international security agenda. Non-traditional security threats, non-state actors and non-conventional methods of insecurity and instability confront the contemporary international environment. Consequently, the shift in focus of threats and sources of insecurity has necessitated a review and/or update of defence and security policies world-wide. South Africa has not been immune to these changes.

2. Given "the space occupied by the powerful [of the developed world] in determining the central and principal threats faced by humanity", terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are currently considered to be the primary sources of global insecurity1. South Africa acknowledges such threats to global security. However, factors of insecurity such as underdevelopment, poverty, access to vital resources, the spread of killer diseases and environmental degradation, are more critical for the security and stability of South Africa and the developing world. Consequently, the changed security environment, moulded by a multitude of political, socio-economic, environmental and military threats, has had a profound impact on South Africa's defence and security policy.

3. Equally driving the need to update South Africa's defence policy is the prioritisation allocated to stabilising parts of the African continent. The 1996 South African White Paper on Defence, "concentrated on transforming the defence function" and forces of the country2. Subsequently the growing utilisation of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in fulfilling collateral functions, in particular peacekeeping on the African continent, has compelled a review of the distinction between primary and secondary functions3. In other words, "there is now a need to prioritise peace missions and give peacekeeping its correct place in the roles and functions of the SANDF"4. i 1 T Mbeki, 2004. Address to the 59 Session of the United Nations General Assembly. New York. 2 M Lekota, 2005. Budget Speech by Minister of Defence. cape Town.

3 Chapter four of the 1996 South African White Paper on Defence stipulated that the primary function of the SANOF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression. The other functions are secondary. 4 M Lekota, op citii The Global Context 4. The projection of threats to global peace and security is often based on the perceptions and assessments of the powerful nations. Indeed "differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what is perceived as the gravest threats to global security"5. For example, some states view poverty as a development problem and not a factor of insecurity, while some states view "civil wars in Africa as humanitarian tragedy, and not a problem for international security"6. Similarly, terrorism has been viewed as a threat to some states, and not to others.

5. Nevertheless, over the past decade a number of general trends and prominent characteristics of the international security environment have become clearly visible. The following is an attempt to provide a balanced account of these trends.

a. Intra-state Conflict: The likelihood of inter-state conflicts has declined considerably with the termination of the Cold War. The vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts are taking place within, rather than between, states. Although occurring within states, the consequences of such conflicts with regards to refugee flows, the trafficking of small arms, and the disruption of trade; have profound spill over effects on neighbouring states. Equally, in situations where neighbouring states sponsor warring parties to an intra-state conflict, attempts to achieve a resolution are often frustrated. Intra-state conflicts thus have inter-state consequences.

b. Mercenaries and Private Military Companies: The activities of mercenaries and their participation in armed conflicts have often been controversial, especially when they provide military services in violation of domestic and international law. Attempts to address this issue have been complicated by the difficulty of achieving a universal and concise definition of mercenarism as opposed to activities of private security companies. Mercenarism is a manifestation of unregulated foreign military assistance and has the potential to undermine legitimate constitutional democracies, as experienced in Africa.

c. Acts of Terror Events within the global security environment have compelled recognition that terrorist groups pose a serious security threat. Indeed, acts of terror have become less territorially defined and more global in reach. In addition, it assumes a level of anonymity that is increasingly driven by non-state actors. No country can be considered to be immune from acts of terror, and more especially in the way in which the international community responds to this threat.

United Nations, 2004. A more secure world: our shared responsibility Report of the High-level Panel on iii Threats, Challenges and Change. www. un orgisecurewo rId 6 United Nations, 2004.op.cit. d. Possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): The threat posed by WMD, such as attacks by chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons, is of no less a concern than it was during the height of the Cold War. The difference is that these weapons are no longer confined to the major powers. The possibility of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, acquiring WMD is undeniably a reality as material and technology become more readily available. Efforts to regulate the proliferation of WMD such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have slowed down the spread of such weapons but not stopped their production. As long as the powerful states claim the sole monopoly over the possession and use of WMD, proliferation of these weapons by less powerful states and non-signatories of the NPT, will continue. e. The Military Capacity of States: While most states in the post-Cold War era have reduced their military spending, some have strengthened their military capacity. At the global strategic level, military power continues to be exercised alongside economic and political leverage. Of great concern is the use of such capacity to pursue unilateral (military) action in resolving disputes or to act outside of global collective security arrangements. f. Unilateral Acts of Force: The reconfiguration of military power after the Cold War has produced a world in which major powers bestride the globe with a military capability that is unlikely to be contested in the near future. Such military strength provides these powers with the capacity to act unilaterally in fulfilment of their national security objectives and interests. Unilateral acts of force have the potential to weaken multilateral institutions established to promote global peace and security. Moreover, such acts can be counter to the basic tenets of international law. g. Climate Change: Climate change as a result of greenhouse gas emissions is presently one of the most serious threats to humanity. The emission of the main greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, is the result of fossil fuel usage. The burning of fossil fuels, in particular, coal, oil and gases, is undertaken at extremely greater levels in the rich, industrialised and developed world. However, the dire consequences of the disruption in global climatic conditions and weather patterns are most felt by the poorest and least developed nations. For example, prolonged droughts and rising desertification, as a result of climate change, has crippled food production and in turn exacerbated the levels of famine in the underdeveloped world. At the same time an unrelenting increase in the frequency and severity of natural disasters caused through floods, hurricanes, cyclones and wildfires affects all parts of our planet. This threat warrants the intensification of collective action in the implementation of the principles of sustainable development, as agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Equally critical is the implementation of reduction targets of greenhouse gases as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol.

h. Competition over Scarce and Strategic Resources: The current international security environment is significantly influenced by the competition for access to scarce and strategic resources such as water, land, oil and gas. Some of Africa's conflicts are the direct result of foreign and domestic competition over access to such resources. Of particular concern is the exchange of arms for strategic resources found in Africa. "Current trends and modalities of protracted conflicts [in Africa] reflect transnational economic linkages with foreign states and multinational companies that are based on the smuggling of a state's natural resources for the supply of military hardware required for sustaining a war

I.Globalisation: The economic, social, cultural and political processes of globalisation are characteristic of the hyper-mobility of information and capital that has been driven by the rapid advancement in technology over the past decades. However, "while globalisation offers great opportunities, ... its benefits are very unevenly shared and its costs, unevenly distributed. Developing countries face special difficulties in responding to this central challenge"8. Furthermore, in a globalising world, "...no country or individual, no matter how remote, remains unaffected by security-related developments".9

j. North - South Disparities While globalisation has increased opportunities for economic growth and development in some parts of the world, there has been an increase in the disparity between the rich and poor countries. As a result there is a major fault line regarding the levels of development and wealth between the countries of the North and those of the South. This trend has grave implications for the development and hence the security of countries in the South.

k. Regionalism: The movement toward the consolidation of regional economic blocs continues. In the past years the expansion of the European Union bears testimony to this trend in international relations. For most regional economic blocs emphasis has been on the facilitation of intra-regional trade. Increasingly though, there is a noticeable movement toward the consolidation of regional collective security mechanisms.

I.Information and Communication Technology (ICT): Modern information and communication technology and systems are critical for commerce, trade and military operations. At the same time they create security challenges. The international community through the UN has undertaken to pursue mechanisms that will promote international cyber-security.

S Naidoo, Dialogue, Vol. 5.2. 8 United Nations, 2000. United Nations Millennium Declaration. September. 9 R kasrils, 2004. Reviewing National Security after Ten Years of Democracy. National Security conference. CSIR. October.iv

The Continental Context

6. The African continent continues to find itself within an international system structured and driven along clear lineages of economic, political and military power. The inauguration of the African Union (AU) is, therefore, "a milestone in Africa's quest for a dignified and equitable place in such a world" 10. However, this will be hugely influenced by its ability to maintain a peaceful and stable environment.

7. Proxy wars that were fought on the continent in furtherance of bi-polar competition during the Cold War have ended. Nevertheless, armed conflicts, violence and the use of force have continued. While some of these sources of insecurity are based on longstanding disputes, others are recent.

8. Contemporary conflicts and insecurity in Africa emanate from, among other factors: weak and dysfunctional states; poor political and economic governance; the politicisation of ethnicity; the marginalisation of groups within a state; armed competition over scarce and strategic resources, (especially over land, water, energy and maritime resources); the involvement of the military in inappropriate political and economic roles; and unconstitutional changes of governments.

9. Of particular concern for the security of the continent and its people, are:

a. Poverty and underdevelopment;

b. Proliferation of small arms, light weapons and child soldiers;

c. Intra-state conflict; and

d. Unlawful activities of mercenaries and non-state actors in armed conflict.

10. A further concern is the possibility that the continent can be used as a base for international terrorist groups, as well as a target for their activities. In addition, trafficking in small arms, light weapons, drugs and humans are detrimental to Africa's peace, security and development. Increased piracy along Africa's coast is a noted concern.

11. Therefore, the institutionalisation of the AU and the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) are critical for a conflict-ridden continent. The PSC entered into force in December 2003 and is comprised of fifteen member states, five of which will serve a three-year period and ten who will serve for a two-year period each. The mechanisms of the PSC are: the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (EWS), the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the Peace Fund.

T Mbeki, 2002. This is Africa's Time. The African Union Directory. Millennium Africa communications, South Africa.v

12. As a collective security and early warning arrangement the PSC will allow for timely and effective response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The ASF will be established through contributions of a brigade within each region. As discussed in Chapter Two, this process has made significant progress.

13. Movement toward the implementation of a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) will enhance efforts to secure peaceful co-existence among AU member states. The CADSP pursues a broad understanding of security, based on a core value of the indivisibility of continental security. In other words, the security of each African country is inseparably linked to each other's and to that of the continent as a whole. Accordingly, the CADSP prescribes how AU member states will collectively respond to threats.

The Regional Context

14. Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, the Southern African region as a whole has undergone substantial change, with considerable progress being made towards the resolution of long-standing internal conflicts and the institutionalisation of democratic practices.

15. However, post-war reconstruction has posed many challenges, particularly in regard to socio- economic reconstruction, the integration of former combatants and the consolidation of democracy. In addition much of the region continues to be stricken by chronic underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. These human security and developmental problems continue to impact negatively on the region in the form of a range of non-military threats, namely, the spread of killer diseases; the flow of refugees; the illicit cross-border trafficking in drugs, goods, small arms and light weapons; and environmental destruction

16. The region also faces the problem of ensuring maritime security. Regional states with coastline borders generally lack the capacity to monitor maritime traffic. Consequently, piracy and the smuggling of weapons, contraband, people and goods take place. Of particular importance is the protection of maritime trade and the region's maritime resources including fisheries, seabed minerals and energy resources.

17. The operationalisation of the security structures and institutions of the SADC is, therefore, of paramount importance. The finalisation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) on Politics Defence and Security (OPDSC) is a positive development in the co-ordination and implementation of SADC's security management. Another development to promote regional peace and security is the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP), which was signed by the SADC Heads of State in August 2003.

Department of Defence, 1996. South African White Paper on Defence in Defence in a Democracy, chapter Three.

The Domestic Context

18. South Africa's domestic security environment has improved significantly since the inception of democratic governance. The security sector has been transformed to display values of democratic governance that reflect the principles of transparency, accountability and representivity.

19. Nevertheless, South Africa's domestic security environment continues to be dogged by crime and criminal violence that affects all sectors of society and is influenced largely by foreign and local criminal syndicates. The problem of crime continues to be exacerbated by the availability of illicit small arms in the hands of criminals. In addition, the population remains susceptible to the spread of killer diseases, such as HIVIAIDS, and environmental degradation.

20. Acts of terror have also affected the domestic security environment. Along with the threat of international terrorism, political, ideological and religious extremism, albeit not at the levels experienced in some other states, requires continuous monitoring.

Conclusion

21. For South and Southern Africa, the end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid has had a significant impact on the security environment that resulted in the termination of conflict between South Africa and its neighbours. In the absence of an identifiable conventional military threat to South Africa and its people, non-military factors of insecurity that emanate at the global, continental and regional levels, are the main concern. Of these, poverty, underdevelopment and poor governance constitute the central factors contributing to insecurity in Africa.

22. Accordingly, security can no longer viewed within its traditional and narrow interpretation as militarily securing the state. Security encompasses as its objectives not only the absence of war, but also the eradication of poverty and the pursuit of sustainable economic development, social justice and democratic governance.

23. Furthermore, the inter-relatedness and transnational nature of many contemporary security threats dictates that solutions are often beyond the control or capability of any single state and would, therefore, require collaborative action within multilateral organisations and collective security mechanisms at the international, continental and regional levels.

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CHAPTER TWO

SOUTH AFRICA'S APPROACH TO SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

1. In responding to the changed security environment, South Africa's approach to security has undergone a marked overhaul since the end of apartheid. The practice of the apartheid government maintained a repressive and undemocratic state that countered anti-apartheid resistance, both internally and externally. This goal was pursued through extensive use of military and police force.

2. The government of a democratic South Africa has adopted a fundamentally different approach to security. In a democratic South Africa, security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social, and environmental matters. Accordingly, security has been conceptualised as an all-encompassing condition in which all South Africans live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of democratic governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well- being"12

3. South Africa's approach to security is informed by the discourse on Human Security and the principles of Collective Security. Also significant for the successful promotion of peace and security, is South Africa's bilateral and trilateral relations in the field of defence co-operation.

SOUTH AFRICA'S APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY

4. South Africa's approach to national security is governed by constitutional principles, the country's national interests, and governmental priorities as espoused through the Cabinet Makgotia and the Ministerial and Director-General Cluster system of governance.

5. The objectives that are central in the formulation of South Africa's National Security Policy (NSP), are:

a. The consolidation and maintenance of democracy;

b. The achievement of sustainable economic development;

c. The pursuit of social justice;

12Department of Defence, 1996. South African White Paper on Defence in Defence in a Democracy, chapter One.

d. The attainment of a peaceful and safe environment by addressing the levels of crime, violence and political instability; and

e. The promotion of security within the principles of collective security, non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes.

6. While South Africa's Constitution and national interests provide clear direction for the formulation of a NSP, guidelines for its implementation are central to governmental priorities provided for by the Cabinet Makgotia and the Cluster System of governance at Ministerial and Director General level. The main clusters dealing with national security matters are the International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS), and the Justice, Crime Prevention and Safety (JCPS) clusters.

7. Some of the most significant changes in government policy since the inception of the democratic government are reflected within the IRPS and JCPS priorities. Critical defence-related cluster priorities that provide direction for the DOD include:

a. Supporting of the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) in efforts to contribute to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-keeping in Africa; b. Ensuring AU structures and programmes are implemented, operationalised and consolidated by playing an active and leading role in the implementation of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM);

c. Promotion of regional, continental and international peace, security and stability;

d. Promotion and strengthening of multilateralism at regional, continental and global levels; and

e. Pursuing Defence Diplomacy initiatives.

A 'HUMAN SECURITY' CONCEPTUALISATION

8. In the past, security was predicated on a conceptualisation that solely advanced the protection of the state from external military attacks. The practice of this conceptualisation was particularly rife during the Cold War. Threat assessments of the current security environment, however, reflect a range of non-military threats and sources of insecurity. The bulk of such threats emanate from poor political governance, environmental degradation, poor human development, the inaccessibility to vital resources, the spread of killer diseases and unfettered crime. As such, security and development are inseparably linked.

9. Therefore, there has been a need for a shift in focus from solely securing the state by military means, to the provision of security for its people by addressing critical political, socio-economic and environmental problems. This shift has placed emphasis on the realisation that states are no longer the sole or primary referent or object of security.

10.Accordingly, the concept of human security is a response to a range of non-military threats that currently confront humanity.

11. In this way, security becomes an all-encompassing condition in which individuals can be free from fear and free from want. This understanding of security does not replace the security of the state with the security of the people. It sees these aspects as mutually dependent. After all, the state retains its obligation to facilitate, if not create, the necessary conditions and environment for the fulfilment of human security.

12. Within this conceptualisation of security, the DOD is but one of the institutions of the state that will be requested to promote national and international security. In providing adequate responses to some security threats, the DOD will assume the lead role, while with others it will be required to play purely a supportive function. This necessitates the requisite inter-agency co-ordination mechanisms to be established in government.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

13. Collective Security entails states acting together within an agreed upon set of principles and/or rules, in the promotion of peace and security. Put differently, collective security is about the collaboration among states in the defence and protection of an existing security order from mutually recognised threats.

14. In an era of globalisation and interdependency, many threats to peace and stability, such as global poverty, climatic change or terrorism, cannot be addressed by states unilaterally or individualistically. Indeed, “globalisation has set in motion far reaching change and challenges affecting everyone and in all spheres of life. In this sense, no country or people can claim to be islands onto themselves no matter how rich or powerful they may be"13 15. Mutually recognised threats are, therefore, vital for the indivisibility of security in undertaking collective responsibility, not only for a resolution of conflict, but also for the promotion of economic and social advancement of all peoples"14. This requires collective action based on a shared assessment of the current global threats and sources of insecurity.

16. The UN constitutes the most prominent organisation dedicated to the principles of collective security. South Africa has, since its re-entry into the international community, committed itself to multilateralism and the recognition of the UN as the primary multilateral body to ensure collective peace and security, as well as facilitating economic and social development. In order to deal effectively with future challenges, South Africa fully supports the reform of the principal organs of the UN."15

13 N Dlamini Zuma, 2005. Budget speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Cape Town. 14 Ibid. 15 A Ntsaluba, 2004. South Africa's Foreign Policy since 1994. Annual address by the Director- General of the Department of Foreign Affairs. South African Institute of International Affairs. Johannesburg.vivii

17. The corollary thereof, is that since the security and stability of South Africa is inextricably linked to that of the African continent and the developing world, continental and regional security mechanisms are of growing importance. In this regard, South Africa has become one of the critical players in shaping the security and developmental agenda of Africa. This has been demonstrated by the fact that South Africa, as a founding member of the African Union (AU), has been influential in the conceptualisation and promotion of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

18. In addition South Africa plays a lead role in the AU and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) in addressing the security challenges faced throughout the continent. The institutions of the PSC that will fulfil these objectives are the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), and the Panel of the Wise.

19. Critically for the DODISANDF is the establishment of the ASF. The ASF comprises of a brigade- size force from each of the continent's five regions operating on a standby basis. In the establishment of the regional stand-by brigades South Africa has made a meaningful contribution to the establishment and maintenance of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) brigade.

20. Southern Africa commands a special priority in South Africa's defence and foreign policies. Since 1994, South Africa, together with other Member States of SADC, have been fully involved in the restructuring of the organisation, with the objective of increasing its efficiency and effectiveness in order to address the region's security and developmental challenges. The following achievements are worth mentioning:

a. The development and adoption of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic

Development Plan (RISDP)16;

b. The operationalisation and effective functioning of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) through the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SI P0); and c. The development and adoption of common security arrangements, in particular, the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP).

21. At the continental level, the adoption of the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), furthers collective security on the continent. The CADSP, in essence, provides a framework for a common vision for undertaking collective responses in defending and protecting member states from both internal and external sources of insecurity.

16 The RISDP is a 15-year development plan for the region that was informed by NEPAD principles, see A Ntsaluba 2004. op. cit.viii

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY Draft Only - No Status Page 12 22. In addition to multilateral approaches and collective security mechanisms, South Africa also conducts foreign relations on a bilateral and trilateral level in the pursuit of peace and security. Since its inception into the international community, South Africa has entered into a number of international agreements, either at a bilateral or trilateral level. These generally entail reciprocal obligations and an undertaking to engage in some form of co-operation in various sectors - defence being one of them

23. The signing and implementation of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral international agreements is a critical policy action at the disposal of the DOD to ensure the implementation of governmental direction aimed at the attainment of peace and security, both nationally and internationally.

24. The practice of the DOD in the conclusion of international agreements with foreign states is well established and will continue to play an important role in advancing defence diplomacy, participation in peace missions, co-operation in the defence industry, arms control and non-proliferation of WMD, and international law.

25. South Africa pursues defence diplomacy initiatives in furtherance of the peace, stability and security objectives of government. For political, strategic and geographic reasons, defence co- operation with other states in SADC, Africa and beyond, is a priority for the achievement of peace and security. Consequently, the DOD will engage in co-operative ventures with its counterparts throughout the world in such fields as training and education, defence planning, exchange visits, combined exercises, and procurement of military equipment.

26. Defence diplomacy will always be the first option to be pursued by government in the promotion of peace and stability. Only where the elements of defence diplomacy have been exhausted and have failed to stabilise and resolve an ensuing conflict, will the DOD consider the deployment of its armed forces.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DODISANDF

27. National security is viewed in a broader context as an all-encompassing condition, which includes the safeguarding of South Africa and its people against a wide range of threats, many of which are non-military in nature. Since many of these sources of insecurity transcend state borders, collective action must be undertaken within multilateral organisations to provide adequate responses and lasting solutions.

28. In addition to the accepted military function of defence against external armed aggression, national security policy and priorities thus imply that government will require the DODISANDF to participate in and contribute to the combating of a range of non-military threats to security. These may include crime, terrorism and the effects of natural disasters. 17 Since 1994, the DOD has entered into 97 international agreements with sovereign states and international organisations.ix

29. South Africa's national security policy and cluster priorities also reflect a strong commitment to regional and continental peace, stability and development. This manifests in government's commitment to NEPAD, the AU and SADC and their structures and mechanisms.

30. Government's commitment to international peace and security and its manifestations at regional and continental levels consequently imply a long term DOD/SANDF involvement in collective defence and security including participation in security structures, peace missions, standby arrangements and other defence co-operation. These include the PSC, ASF, Continental and Regional Early Warning, and the SADC Brigade.

31. Prioritisation is increasing being placed on peace missions, with particular focus on post-conflict reconstruction especially in the areas of security sector reform and the successful integration of the armed forces.

32. South Africa's national security policy and priorities thus have clear implications for the role, functions, objectives, missions and capabilities of the SAN DF.

CHAPTER THREE

ROLE, FUNCTIONS, OBJECTIVES AND MISSIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. For political, economic and geo-strategic reasons, the South African government views the security and stability of the African continent as a priority. In this regard, critical governmental departments such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence are required to pursue a vision and mission that strives for peace, stability, democracy and development in Africa18.

2. Pursuant of this vision and mission, the 1996 White Paper on Defence (WP) stipulates the use of political, economic and defence co-operation, and other non-violent means, as preferred approaches in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, with the deployment of the SAN DF as a measure of last resort. This strategy provides for the participation of the SANDF in collective security mechanisms and peace missions.

3. In view of the above strategy and, moreover, the growing involvement of South Africa in institutions such as the AU and SADC, the role and functions of the SANDF have been reviewed to verify their validity within this security environment. Accordingly, this chapter articulates the role and functions of the SANDF within this context and specifically addresses the issue of self-defence, the review of primary and secondary functions, and the foreseeable challenges and constraints in fulfilling these roles and functions.

THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SANDF

4. The role and functions of the SANDF is contained in the constitution and the 1996 WP. According to the Constitution, the "primary object of the SANDF is to defend and protect the Republic of South Africa, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force"19

5. To 'defend' and 'protect' does not only entail engagement in conventional warfare or defence against external threats of military force, but also includes defence diplomacy and participation in peace missions. 'Protect' highlights the SANDF's responsibility towards the people of the country in terms of protection against environmental and non-military threats.

18 The promotion of this vision and mission informed South Africa's involvement in countries such

as Angola, comoros, DRC, Lesotho, Rwanda, Burundi, Madagascar, Cote d'lvoire, Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, to mention but a few, see Ntsaluba, 2004. op. ciL 19 The constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, chapter 11, Article 200(2), page 113.x xi

6. According to Section 227 (1) of the 1993 Interim Constitution, (and as retained in the 1996 Constitution), the functions of the SAN DF are:

a. service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;

b. service in compliance with international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and states

c. service in the preservation of life, health or property;

d. service in the provision or maintenance of essential services

e. service in upholding law and order in support of SAPS; and

f. service in support to departments of state for socio-economic upliftment.

7. Based on the defensive posture of the SAN DF20, the imperatives of self-defence, the statutory obligations towards the people of the country, and the mission of promoting peace and security; these functions remain relevant and valid. What has clearly emerged, however, is that the prioritisation and emphasis placed in the execution of these functions has changed.

8. Responding to the changing security environment, the SANDF has been increasingly undertaking functions aimed at addressing conflict and stability on the continent, rather than being solely preoccupied with deterring or preventing an external military attack. In other words the SANDF has become significantly occupied with the function of compliance with the international obligations of the Republic.

9. The 1996 WP states that the functions of the SANDF do not carry equal weight. The "primary" function of the SANDF is the defence of South Africa against external military aggression. All other functions are "secondary". Consequently, "the size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF were determined mainly by its primary 21function" . It was posited that the 'collateral capability' derived from this primary function would be used (and be sufficient) to meet the demands of the "secondary functions".

10. However, South Africa's growing involvement in stabilising parts of the continent, in compliance with its international obligations, has assumed a primary importance and focus. This change in focus predicated on the increasing prominence of certain "secondary" functions, namely participation in peace missions, has necessitated a review of the validity and accuracy of the distinction

20 The SANDF has a defensive non-threatening posture that best accommodates the international and domestic legal imperatives guiding defence. This posture allows for the involvement of the SANDF in collective security structures, bilateral and multi-lateral mechanisms and the promotion of regional and continental security through participation in peace missions. However, this does not abrogate capabilities that can provide the ability to operate in a tactically offensive manner. 21 Department of Defence, 1996. South African White Paper on Defence in Defence in a Democracy, chapter Four.xii

between 'primary and 'secondary' functions. Given that the "secondary functions" now enjoy priority in the current activities of the DOD, the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' functions must now be discarded.

11. In the past it was assumed that equipping and preparing the SAN DF for its "primary" function would enable the execution of the "secondary" functions. The change in focus and the increasing prominence of certain "secondary" functions have, however, brought this assumption into question.

12. Performing the secondary functions has necessitated an increase in certain functions such as, military engineering skills in the army. Therefore, given its functions in response to the realities of a changed security environment, innovative measures are necessary to ensure an effective, efficient and economical SANDF.

OBJECTIVES OF THE DOD

13. The approach adopted by the DOD is to group and combine the above functions, as well as Government prescripts, into five defence objectives. These objectives, which are not prioritised, are basically the end-goals to be achieved by the DOD. They are as follows:

a. Defend and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, as well as supporting its people, by maintaining cost-effective defence capabilities that are prepared and equipped to participate in operations as ordered and funded by Government.

b. Promoting regional and continental security through diplomatic initiatives, regional defence co-operation and participation in peace missions.

c. Assuring the continuous improvement of defence capabilities. This is to occur by means of quality command and control, as well as by improving the skills and capacity of people, equipment and facilities of the DOD.

d. Implementing the "One-Force Concept" by adequate resourcing and utilising both regulars and reserves, as well as rejuvenating and right-sizing the DOD human resource composition according to law.

e. Ensuring good governance of the DOD by effective, efficient and economical management, administration and accounting within the regulatory framework and government policy.

MISSIONS 14. The funding of a defence capability commensurate with functional realities and constitutional imperatives constitutes a major challenge to government and the DOD, especially given that differences exist in terms of focus and priority.

15.Confronting this challenge without eroding capabilities that are necessary for self-defence is only possible through the implementation of a novel approach which addresses the current functions and objectives of the SANDF. The functions and the resultant objectives of the SANDF are heterogeneous in nature. For example, to defend the Republic implies countering a conventional and non- conventional threat, amongst others. These could occur simultaneously or exclusively. Each threat will necessitate a different response and force design. Similarly, service in the preservation of life, health or property could entail disaster relief, search and rescue and other tasks as ordered by the President.

16. Functions and objectives can, therefore, be divided into more homogeneous groupings of tasks, called missions. These missions can subsequently be prioritised and categorised. The SANDF can subsequently prepare to perform all missions, taking into account the mission priorities; instead of only concentrating on primary functions. This negates the debate on primary and secondary functions and the resultant anomalies in terms of funding and force preparation.

17. Prioritising and categorising the missions can be done in terms of the expected impact of failure in execution and the probability of occurrence. By evaluating these two parameters and applying sound military judgment and experience, these missions will provide direction for the design and structure of the DOD and specifically the SANDF, given budgetary constraints.

IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE DOD/SANDF

18. South Africa's inherent right to self-defence in terms of international law and the UN Charter is undeniably and irrevocably a key component of the mandate of the SANDF. The central premise of South Africa's principal defence strategy is to ensure national security by securing the regional, continental and international environment. The inter-relationship between self-defence and of promoting security, especially in southern Africa, has become critically important to the strategic direction and functions of the SAN DF.

19. The use of defence resources in support of the people of South Africa and other government departments will also remain a permanent feature of the security landscape. This must, however, be undertaken within the inherent capacity of the SANDF.

20. Meeting the challenges of the role and functions of the SAN DF in the next decade would entail the following.

a. Adopting an approach, which acknowledges that defence tasks are more diverse than the six functions outlined in the 1993 Interim Constitution (as listed above). The SANDF should, therefore, be prepared and capacitated to execute all ordered missions.

b. As the SANDF will be expected to execute all above missions, the existence of a conventional capability is inevitable. However, by applying innovative training solutions such as Multi-Skilling i.e. providing personnel with more than one skill and by preparing units to act in more than one role, the conventional capability can, in the perceived absence of an immediate conventional threat, be employed temporarily in other higher profile missions. c. Establishing and maintaining a robust suite of defence capabilities to provide a level of deterrence and enable the effective execution of any mission the SANDF might reasonably be called upon to execute. d. The SANDF should only be employed within the means that Government can afford. Compliance with this principle is only possible if selective engagement in deployment is achieved through a process of consultation between the Minister of Defence (as advised by the C SANDF), and Cabinet and the President. e. In order to maintain the SANDF in the most economic, effective and efficient manner, the Reserve component of the SANDF must be given its rightful place. This implies involving the largest possible part of South African society in Defence matters (the "Citizen in Uniform" concept). f. Implementing this policy through a comprehensive Defence Strategy, which, as one of its elements, should include a Military Strategy, drafted by the Chief of the SAN DF.

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S Naidoo, Dialogue, Vol. 5.2. 8 United Nations, 2000. United Nations Millennium Declaration. September. 9 R kasrils, 2004. Reviewing National Security after Ten Years of Democracy. National Security conference. CSIR. October. ii iii iv v T Mbeki, 2002. This is Africa's Time. The African Union Directory. Millennium Africa communications, South Africa. vi 13 N Dlamini Zuma, 2005. Budget speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Cape Town. 14 Ibid. 15 A Ntsaluba, 2004. South Africa's Foreign Policy since 1994. Annual address by the DirectorGeneral of the Department of Foreign Affairs. South African Institute of International Affairs. Johannesburg. vii 16 The RISDP is a 15-year development plan for the region that was informed by NEPAD principles, see A Ntsaluba 2004. op. cit. viii ix 17 Since 1994, the DOD has entered into 97 international agreements with sovereign states and international organisations. x 18 The promotion of this vision and mission informed South Africa's involvement in countries such

as Angola, comoros, DRC, Lesotho, Rwanda, Burundi, Madagascar, Cote d'lvoire, Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, to mention but a few, see Ntsaluba, 2004. op. ciL 19 The constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, chapter 11, Article 200(2), page 113. 20 The SANDF has a defensive non-threatening posture that best accommodates the international and domestic legal imperatives guiding defence. This posture allows for the involvement of the SANDF in collective security structures, bilateral and multi-lateral mechanisms and the promotion of regional and continental security through participation in peace missions. However, this does not abrogate capabilities that can provide the ability to operate in a tactically offensive manner. 21 Department of Defence, 1996. South African White Paper on Defence in Defence in a Democracy, chapter Four. xi 20 The SANDF has a defensive non-threatening posture that best accommodates the international and domestic legal imperatives guiding defence. This posture allows for the involvement of the SANDF in collective security structures, bilateral and multi-lateral mechanisms and the promotion of regional and continental security through participation in peace missions. However, this does not abrogate capabilities that can provide the ability to operate in a tactically offensive manner. 21 Department of Defence, 1996. South African White Paper on Defence in Defence in a Democracy, chapter Four. xii