Australia and the Asia-Pacific R. James Ferguson © 2004

Lecture 7:

Asia-Pacific Patterns of Transnational Transition: Foci of Instability and Underdevelopment

Topics: -

1. Transnational Linkages 2. Case Study: The Illicit Drug Trade in the Golden ‘Quadrangle’ 3.Case Study: Uncontrolled Labour and Migration Flows 4. Conclusion: The Case for Layered Cooperation 5. Bibliography and Further Resources

1. Transnational Linkages

Today, we will study the day-to-day problems that impact on the sense of well- being of people in the Indo-Pacific region and challenge the regional system. Some of these are routine national problems, but in many cases they flow beyond the control of individual states or societies. Problems of infrastructure development, international disease vectors, poverty, environmental disasters, crime and smuggling, economic and political instability are of immediate significance for national and regional planning. These issues are of immediate concern to all countries which are still in the 'developmental stage', i.e. going through rapid modernisation and industrialisation, as well as to developed economies that sit within a wider region of uneven development. We will look at several examples which show how these 'low level' internal challenges have become a major problem for several nations in the region, but also strong grounds for international cooperation. We can see these problems, for example, and in the problem of the drug trade in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia (referring to the mountainous terrain between Myanmar, Thailand and Laos (sometimes now dubbed a quadrangle, including southern inland Chinese provinces), and the only partly controlled flow of labour and migration in the region.

2. The Illicit Drug Trade in the Golden ‘Quadrangle’

The Golden Triangle refers to the region where the borders of Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and Laos meet. It could now be dubbed the Golden Quadrangle, since south-west China also abuts this region, and the drug trade now flows through it into Chinese provinces such as Yunnan. There is a direct connect between military conflict, regional instability, and drug production, with illegal drugs providing a main funding mechanism for insurgent or military regimes in Afghanistan, Columbia and Myanmar (see Steinberg 2000). It has also been suggested that arms traffickers in the Golden Triangle may also have supplied arms to regional terrorist groups as well, and it is possible that funds are transferred from drug operations to terrorist groups (Xinhua 2002a; New Straits Times 2002). This emphasises an international problem for the region, compounded by the oppression of the Burmese regime against the National League for Democracy, whose

1 general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi makes international headlines regularly. Yet, it must be emphasised that the SPDC's (State Peace and Development Council) poor human rights record and its greed for power have helped cause 'the narcotics explosion in northeastern Burma after 1988' (Lintner 1994, p305). There is no immediate prospect that the military-authoritarian government will quickly chart a path towards a liberal democratic system, in spite of calls by ASEAN for some reform, and some efforts by SPDC leaders to seem more accommodating to international demands, e.g. PM (Lt-General) Khin Nyunt’s holding of a constitutional convention from May 2004 (see Khosla 1998; Strategic Comments 2003; Strategic Comments 2001; see lecture 6). The regime has not allowed Suu Kyi to attend the convention, in spite of Thailand’s expectation that this would be the case, and the National Convention has spoken of reform based a ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ (Lyall 2004).

Myanmar was the name given to the country by the military regime when it felt that Burma (corrupted by English pronunciation of the colloquial ‘Bama’) emphasised too strongly the dominance of the largest ethnic group in the country, the ‘Burmese’ (Lintner 1999, p15). Myanmar is a federal state, and has some 100 smaller ethnic groups that comprise 32-40% of the population, with the Shan (a ‘Tai’ people related to the modern Thais) being the second largest group with 7% of the total population (Lintner 1999, p15). Somewhat different official figures suggest a breakdown of ‘Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Mon 2%, Indian 2%, other 5%’ (UNDCP 2002).

Part of the nature of this borders problem has to do with the traditional development of civilisation in Southeast Asia. Geographically, Indochina is dominated by the orientation of the Mekong, Red, Salween and Irrawaddy Rivers in a basically north-south orientation, with the structure of the peninsula forcing the use of rivers and coastlines to facilitate trade and communications. In Southeast Asia today the major states have developed along river basins or with access to the sea, and in many cases minorities have inhabited higher and less productive land, often along borders. Minority groups, ethnic groups, and opposition parties are often forced up into the mountainous and forested inland terrain which lies along many of the borders of the region. These borders are either rather relatively 'porous' (as in the Thai-Cambodian and the Burma-Chinese border), or problematic in that highland and forest territories are often occupied by minority peoples, who straddle key border areas. The Meo, the Karen (for the impact of the refugee experience and Christianity on the Karen’s sense of nation, see Rajah 2002), the Karennis, Pa-os, Kachins (who had a powerful military organisation and have opposed opium growing), Lahu, Wa, and the Montagnard peoples do not readily fit into one state region and remain remote from central state control. These porous borders intensify the problems of gun and drug smuggling, the issue of cross-border 'rebel' groups, and refugee exodus, which can constitute a major security problem for these nations (Harris 1993, p23; Loescher 1992). As of mid-2000, for example, some 90,000 people remained in refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border, most of them having fled from the repressive military regime which still used forced corvee ('slave') labour, especially in the border Shan and Karen areas, in the 1980s (Economist 2000). Through 2002-2003, due to conflicts with the Myanmar government, some 100,000 Karen were pushed across the Thai border (see Checchi et al. 2003). The Karen and the Mon are two

2 minorities that are generally not involved in ‘narcotics business’ (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p14).

In fact the power of the ancient political kingdoms was based mainly on the lowlands of Southeast Asia, with remote hill peoples being much more difficult to control (Wolters 1982, p32). It is no accident that during the main period of communist insurgencies (approx 1950-1980), most insurgent groups used remote border regions for their activities, e.g. the communist parties of Malaysia, Thailand and Burma. Likewise, weaker ethnic groups were often forced up into mountain terrain, e.g. the Karen people of Myanmar were forced up into mountainous territory during 1970-1976, and suffered further major offensives against them in 1989 (Lintner 1994, p239; Boyd 1989). Since that time, some 75,000 Karen have been forced to flee into Thailand, where they are found in refugee camps along the border (Corben 1995).

These themes of porous borders, and lack of direct control of ethnic minorities, were complicated by the threat posed by communism to the post-War governments of Southeast Asia. These governments, especially in Myanmar and Thailand, were often willing to use rebel minority groups, including opium warlords, to help patrol their borders, provide intelligence information, and contain communist infiltration. This was a conscious policy used by both the Thai and Burmese governments in the 1960s and 1970s. Even academic institutions had their role to play. In the 1960s, the anti- communist organisation, SEATO (formed in 1955, dissolved in 1977), sponsored the creation of 'the Hill Tribe Research Centre at Chiang Mai University, where well- qualified scholars, sometimes unwittingly, provided the Thai and US security agencies with useful research on the hill peoples of the Golden Triangle' (Lintner 1994, p240).

This anti-communist aspect is seen most clearly in the fact that with the defeat of the Kuomintang (Nationalist, KMT) forces in the Chinese Civil war in 1949, various KMT groups and their leaders (including Generals Li and Duan) fled into the northern sections of Thailand and Burma. From this position, they hoped to continue waging their war against communists, sometimes in raids launched into Yunnan province, and with aid supplied by the CIA during the 1950s (Lintner 1993a, p56). It is also possible that the CIA supported drug production through the 1970s to fund anti-communist groups along the Thai and Burmese border (Takano 2002, p7). However, after Taiwan cut off economic aid in the early 1960s, the KMT groups had to rely on the only cash resource with which to buy arms and keep their struggle going - the opium and heroin trade. Likewise, insurgent groups such as the Burmese Communist Party, though opposed to opium in principle, in the long run also had to become involved in the opium trade.

3 Myanmar (Burma): Political Divisions (Map Courtesy PCL Map Library)

Ironically, the Myanmar government helped boost these activities by the way they created local militia units to fight regional communists. They allowed the creation of the Shan United Army in 1963, and permitted the militia the use of government controlled roads and villages, but offered no wages, and little equipment. It was the commander of this Shan United Army (SUA) who would become the most famous drug warlord of the region - Khun Sa, alias Chan See Fu, wo has since retired under a Myanmar government amnesty and lives comfortably under a surrender agreement

4 (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p13). Khun Sa soon moved into the refining of opium into heroin, and that by the 1970s was responsible for 40% of the drug output of the Golden Triangle (200-300 tons). Ironically, Khun Sa became a regional strongman not as the leader of a separatist revolt, but as a local militia commander was supposed to suppress such groups. In this his chief lieutenant was Phalang, an ethnic Chinese who also received military training with the KMT. In time, Khun Sa established bases inside Thailand north of Chiang Rai, and his stepbrothers Oscar and Billy joined him in a prosperous international trade (Lintner 1994, p244). Khun Sa fought against the remaining KMT operations, and soon established his position securely. His main role was to retain control of a stretch of the Thai border where heroin refineries were placed, with the owners of these refineries being syndicates based in Bangkok, Hong Kong and Taiwan - these groups paid a tax to Khun Sa in exchange for protection by his army (Lintner 1994, p254).

Table I: Post-Independence Timeline of Myanmar (BBC 2004a)

1948 - Burma becomes independent with U Nu as prime minister. Mid-1950s - U Nu, together with Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Indonesian President Sukarno, Yugoslav President Tito and Egyptian President Nasser co-found the Movement of Non- Aligned States. 1958-60 - Caretaker government, led by army Chief of Staff General Ne Win, formed following a split in the ruling AFPFL party. 1960 - U Nu's party faction wins decisive victory in elections, but his promotion of Buddhism as the state religion and his tolerance of separatism angers the military. 1962 - U Nu's faction ousted in military coup led by Gen Ne Win, who abolishes the federal system and inaugurates "the Burmese Way to Socialism"- nationalising the economy, forming a single-party state with the Socialist Programme Party as the sole political party, and banning independent newspapers. 1974 - New constitution comes into effect, transferring power from the armed forces to a People's Assembly headed by Ne Win and other former military leaders; body of former United Nations secretary-general U Thant returned to Burma for burial. 1975 - Opposition National Democratic Front formed by regionally-based minority groups, who mounted guerrilla insurgencies. 1981 - Ne Win relinquishes the presidency to San Yu, a retired general, but continues as chairman of the ruling Socialist Programme Party. 1982 - Law designating people of non-indigenous background as "associate citizens" in effect bars such people from public office. 1987 - Currency devaluation wipes out many people's savings and triggers anti-government riots. 1988 - Thousands of people are killed in anti-government riots. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc) is formed. 1989 - Slorc declares martial law, arrests thousands of people, including advocates of democracy and human rights, renames Burma Myanmar, with the capital, Rangoon, becoming Yangon. NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, is put under house arrest.

1990 - Opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) wins landslide victory in general election, but the result is ignored by the military. 1991 - Aung San Suu Kyi awarded Nobel Peace Prize for her commitment to peaceful change. 1992 - Than Shwe replaces Saw Maung as Slorc chairman, prime minister and defence minister. Several political prisoners freed in bid to improve Burma's international image. 1995 - Aung San Suu Kyi is released from house arrest after six years. 1996 - Aung San Suu Kyi attends first NLD congress since her release; Slorc arrests more than 200 delegates on their way to party congress. 1997 - Burma admitted to Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean); Slorc renamed State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). 1998 - 300 NLD members released from prison; ruling council refuses to comply with NLD deadline for convening of parliament; student demonstrations broken up.

5 1999 - Aung San Suu Kyi rejects ruling council conditions to visit her British husband, Michael Aris, who dies of cancer in UK. 2000 September - Ruling council lifts restrictions on movements of Aung San Suu Kyi and senior NLD members. 2000 October - Aung San Suu Kyi begins secret talks with ruling council.

2001 Ruling council releases some 200 pro-democracy activists. Government says releases reflect progress in talks with opposition NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi who remains under house arrest. 2001 February - Burmese army, Shan rebels clash on Thai border. 2001 June - Thai Prime Minister Shinawatra visits, says relations are back on track. 2001 September - Intelligence chief Khin Nyunt visits Thailand. Burma pledges to eliminate drugs trade in the Golden Triangle by 2005. 2001 November - Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits, issues statement supporting government, reportedly urges economic reform. 2002 May - Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi released after nearly 20 months of house arrest. 2003 May - Aung San Suu Kyi taken into "protective custody" after clashes between her supporters and those of government. 2003 July - Military leadership says it has uncovered plot to "sabotage" government and assassinate some leading members. 2003 August - Khin Nyunt becomes prime minister. He proposes to hold convention in 2004 on drafting new constitution as part of "road map" to democracy. 2003 November - Five senior NLD leaders released from house arrest after visit of UN human rights envoy. 2004 January - Government and Karen National Union - most significant ethnic group fighting government - agree to end hostilities. 2004 April - Government says pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi will be released from house arrest by 17 May, ahead of a constitutional convention on Burma's future. 2004 May - Constitutional convention begins, despite boycott by National League for Democracy (NLD) whose leader Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest.

From 1985 Khun Sa merged his forces with other Shan elements to form the Shan State Army (SSA), an 8,000 strong force. Khun Sa had claimed to be earning $8 million as his cut in the opium trade (Asiaweek 1987a). Yet the Thais 'were not entirely unhappy' with Khun Sa's army acting as an unofficial border control unit, and his usefulness as an 'intelligence asset' was widely recognised (Lintner 1994, p263). Indeed, elements in the Thai military were keen to gain millions of dollars in foreign aid for drug suppression, but did not wish to actually destroy Khun Sa - as a result they arranged a series of fake drug suppression raids in 1984 and 1987 - in return, Khun Sa was allowed to build a road in Northern Thailand up to his Homong headquarters in Shan State (Lintner 1994, pp305-6). The Shan State Army remains active in resisting the Burmese military, though now not led by Khun Sa (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p13).

The Myanmar government, too, was willing to use his trained troops against minority insurgent groups and communist guerrillas (Lintner 1994, p264) and officials in the Myanmar military were soon either involved in direct corruption, or in indirect money laundering schemes (Bernstein & Kean 1996). Revenue from the drug trade also flowed into the national economy - revenues in Thailand from the Golden Triangle drug trade were estimated at US$3.2 billion for 1989 (Lintner 1994, p327). By 1996, this had greatly increased. The total Asian heroin trade in the mid- 1990s was estimated as producing about $63 billion in profits each year, with Myanmar supplying up to 50% of the world supply (Bernstein & Kean 1996), though

6 in recent years Afghanistan has also increased production. At the same time, other operators have taken up the trade, e.g. Lin Mingxian, a former member of the Communist Party of Myanmar, well connected with Chinese officials in Yunnan, has been routing drugs through China, but 'for transit only, not for sale in China' (Lintner 1993, p27).

Thailand too, has had its role to play, both as an early opium producer, and then more often a route for drug exports. Although most of the KMT remnants in the north had settled down by the late 1970s, and were growing tea, coffee and vegetables, it was true that opium growing had been an integral part of the north Thai economy in the 1960s and 70s. Bangkok's Office of National Narcotics Control Board estimated that some 260 villages in the northern provinces of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son and Payao were involved, with some 200 villages heavily reliant economically on this crop. There have since been persistent attempts by government and drug agencies to encourage new legal crops, including coffee, kidney beans, vegetables and fruit, while more recently input from the tourist industry has helped the Chiang Mai region. However, it must be stressed that replacement crops are not as lucrative as the poppy, and that replacement policies are often enforced with stiff penalties for the unregistered growing of opium. However, down till the 1980s the Thais were 'caught in a dilemma. They needed support from the nations concerned about communism and drugs, but many drug trafficking bands were closely connected to Thailand's security agencies, and the Thais benefited economically from the trade' (Lintner 1994, p246). It must be stressed, however, that though the Thai authorities were keen to reduce opium growing in their country, Thailand in fact had never been a major grower - it was as a transit country, with international communications, that Thailand was important (Lintner 1994, p253). Through the 2004, these problems have taken on a new form, with new drugs taking on large user markets within Thailand, and creating a nexus of organised crime, corruption and localised violence that has been of major concern to the country even as it become more affluent. This has led to Thai government under Prime Minister Thaksin through 2003-2004 to take on a tough law and order approach, hunting down, arresting, and in many cases killing known drug distributors. However, this approach is not a long-term solution: it has since been recognised, that up to one third of those arrested may have been innocent, that numerous police officers have died during the crackdown, and that the drug flows may have slowed but the problem has not been solved.

Within Myanmar, locally, these drug runners were often not viewed as criminals. On the contrary, they brought wealth to poor villages, helped build schools and hospitals, and gave donations 'to charities and religious institutions' (Lintner 1994, p248) - they provided a social infrastructure to bind local groups to them loyally, a technique used by small insider groups around the world. Thus the Wa people of Burma (who live in remote parts of Shan state), for example, even into the early 1990s lived in a region largely without roads, educational systems, health care or electricity, and therefore found opium one of the few viable crop alternatives. It was no surprise that they therefore were one of the main producers of opium, especially when this was encouraged by local 'warlords' and elements in the military (see Bernstein & Kean 1996). As of 2000-2002 it was estimated that some 300,000 members of these ethnic minorities were still involved in drug production, with Wa region being the largest drug producing area of the country (followed by Kokang state), with production being controlled and protected in part by the anti-government United Wa State Army

7 (UNDP 2000; Takano 2002, pp1-11). A cease-fire for 1989-1999 had been signed between the Wa and the government on the basis of the establishment of ‘transportation routes, communication, electricity, education, medical services’ etc. but through 2002 little of this had been done (Takano 2002, p13). Some of these tasks have been taken up by a UNDCP project, emphasising alternative ‘agriculture, road building, water and sanitation, and community development’, especially in the southern Wa area and around Kyaingtonge (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p16). The Wa region is basically a ‘no go’ area for government troops, and local level autonomy largely recognised (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p8). At the same time it should be noted that Myanmar has something in the order of 500,000 addicts, indicating a real social cost for a relatively poor country (see Brook 2001).

Since the 1970s, organised crime groups have had a major role in networking the production of opium to the global demand for heroin. The active intervention of various Triad organisations soon allowed them to dominate the international trade through Hong Kong, Singapore, and into parts of Europe including Britain, Holland, Sweden and Germany. Triad groups involved included the 14k organisation (as they were called), and the 'Ah Kung' or 'The Company'. Such groups, of course, sometimes have a political origin, either as insurgents, separatists, or revolutionaries. Even the Chinese Triads originally had a nationalistic role in China by opposing the Manchu dynasty and attempting to restore the 'more indigenous' Ming dynasty (Lintner 1994, p249). Thus early secret societies such as the White Lotus Society and the Hung Society grew powerful in the 17th century China (Lintner 1994, p250). Other groups included the Heaven and Earth Society (also known as the Triad Society) and 'First Heaven' remained active from the 18th century and early 19th centuries, and were actively associated with peasant resistance to exploitation by landlords and corrupt government officials (Shouyi 1982, p397-401). The Society of Three Harmonies and the Green Gang in Shanghai also played a role in the early quest for nationalism in 20th century China (Lintner 1994, p250). In 1986, the Hong Kong Fight Crime Committee reported that there were 'fifty different Triad societies in Hong Kong varying in size from a hundred members to several thousand' (Lintner 1994, p250). These groups, of course, became active in the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, and then in other international settings (e.g. the US and Europe). In Thailand, these foreign Triads had limited influence, largely due to the active role of the ethnic Chiu Chao Chinese, who had immigrated into Thailand in earlier periods - various Chiu Chao syndicates 'financed and controlled the major heroin shipments destined for the international market' (Lintner 1994, p252). Journalist Melinda Liu accurately described the international nature of the trade: 'Hill tribes in Burma grow the opium. Insurgents in Shan State transport it. Yunnan Chinese tax it. And Chaozhou [Chiu Chao] Chinese buy and export it' (Lintner 1994, p252).

The connection between the Golden Triangle and the Yunnan region can be seen in the way the border trade could be used as a base of power. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the 1980s, for example, used its control of the town of Pangsai (7,000 people) to regulate trade into China. The town 'had several video halls, beauty parlours, hotels, a big market place with plenty of contraband goods and excellent Chinese food' - yet its main benefit was that the CPB could tax the drug trade flowing into China. Hence the loss of this town in 1986 dealt an almost fatal blow to the finances of the group (Lintner 1994, pp270-271). It is significant to note that only after this, in 1988, could the Chinese and Myanmar governments sign an

8 agreement recognising official cross-border trade between the two countries - this would allow a huge influx of Chinese consumer goods into Myanmar and then out into the Indian Ocean trade routes. In turn, Myanmar became a political and military ally, with China trading military equipment (F-7 jet fighters, patrol boats, tanks, APCs etc.), as well as helping build road, rail and port facilities (Lintner 1994, pp313-5). Ironically, however, this in turn intensified the porousness of this border from the Chinese point of view, and drug abuse soon emerged as a major form of 'social and cultural pollution' (and associated AIDS problems due to the shared use of needles) in Yunnan province. Routes also opened up from Yunnan to ports in Southern coastal China (Lintner 1994, p324). Things became so serious along several borders that in 1992 the People's Liberation Army brought in thousands of troops supported by tanks to take a border town, Pingyuan, near the Vietnamese border, totally run by drug smugglers. After 80 days of fighting, 854 people were arrested, 981 kilos of drugs taken and 353 assorted weapons found (these details were reported in the People's Armed Police News, see Lintner 1994, pp324-5; Lintner 1993b, p27). From 1991, China has also regularly executed smugglers of drugs, and engaged in regular crackdowns (Boyd 1991). Street posters throughout Chinese cities emphasise the degrading social and health effects of drug abuse. Since the late 1990s, Myanmar has opened to wider international trade and investment, especially from Thailand, other ASEAN states, from the EU and the U.S. (for the major companies involved, e.g. Total and Unocal ,and the efforts of some of them to moderate local conditions, see the Economist 2003a), but also with growing interest from India, partly facilitated by ASEAN regional agreements (see lecture 6).

In general terms, the drug trade was easier to organise during periods of civil war, ethnic violence, and during nearby large scale conflicts, e.g. during the Vietnam War. The war in Vietnam not only turned many ordinary American and Australian soldiers into addicts, it also allowed an Asia-Pacific drug trade to be set up by unlikely figures, e.g. (US) Army Sergeant Leslie 'Ike' Atkinson. Atkinson set up a drug empire, using the Army Post office, USAF transport plains, and retired and active servicemen to run drugs out of Thailand (partly operating out of Jack's American Star Bar in Bangkok), but with connection points in North Carolina (Fort Bragg and Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base) leading to organised crime networks in New York, Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati and Philadelphia. In 1977, Atkinson was eventually caught through a finger print on a packet of heroin, while detailed detective work by Thai Police Captain Kulachate Singhara na Ayutthaya helping capture other members of the gang. This did not stop increased production from that time onwards. Estimates for Laos in 1978 suggested that 500-1000 tons was produced, and for 1981, some 500 tons would be exported from Myanmar. According to US intelligence sources, satellite photographs of the Yunnan area showed that some 300 tons was produced in 1978, though this may have been part of a anti-Chinese propaganda scheme which labelled Burmese opium as grown in China (i.e. the so- called 'China White', Lintner 1994, p332).

9 A Busy Street in Kunming (Yunnan, PRC): A Multicultural Society, as much Southeast Asian in Style as Chinese. (Photo Copyright: R. James Ferguson 2001)

Ironically, is spite of sustained anti-drug efforts by international agencies, production has grown over the last two decades, though there may have been some reduction in production through 2001-2002. Through 1992-2002 ‘opium cultivation in Burma has ranged from 247,000 to 419,900 acres during the last 10 years, an annual yield of up to 2,865 tons’ (Emery 2003). Drug production peaked in 1997, followed by drought years in 1999 and 2000 (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p7). Thereafter drug production decreased, with UNDCP figures of 1097 metric tonnes for 2001, down by 25% to 828 tonnes in 2002, though Myanmar remains the second largest producer of opium and heroin (UNDCP 2002; for somewhat low estimates, see Gibson & Haseman 2003, p7).

Against this background we can see why most governments of the ASEAN grouping take a very hard line on drugs, drug use, and drug running. In most countries, the possession, manufacture or smuggling of relatively small amounts of heroin (usually 100 grams or more) results in a mandatory death penalty or life imprisonment (e.g. in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand). At the same time, this has resulted in diplomatic tensions with foreign governments, who do not have the death penalty and whose citizens are sometimes caught smuggling drugs, e.g. friction with Britain, Australia, the US, and New Zealand. Moreover, the ASEAN target that the region would be drug free by 2015 (and Myanmar claiming to eradicate its own problem by 2005), with a special reduction of drug flows from Myanmar (Razak 2001; BBC 2004), will not been easy to achieve.

10 The deeper problem of this drug trade is that there is a thriving local and global market for the product, not just in Penang, Hong Kong or Myanmar’s cities such as Yangon (Rangoon) and Mandalay (Bernstein & Kean 1996), but in the US, Australia (which has 30,000 addicts, Lintner 1994, p332), and Europe. The trade in fact forms one of the largest single-product commodities in the world, and therefore returns large profits which are then re-routed into local economies, and laundered through large-scale, legitimate national industries. In this sense, it has been rightly called a 'global epidemic'. It is also big business. We can sense some of the complexities generated by this global market by a few observations. In February 1990, when the Myanmar government announced a tax amnesty at a flat rate of 25% to secure income from undeclared earnings by businessmen, the programme may also have allowed a substantial amount of drug money to be declared and then pumped into above-board concerns (Lintner 1994, p312). Through the 1990s, Myanmar’s economy as whole, its private banks, and the national company Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) had been implicated as largely operating on laundered or in actually laundering drug funds (Bernstein & Kean 1996). To some extent, the economy of Myanmar remains partly dependent on flows out of the drug trade. In general, the country’s ‘lax banking and commercial laws have encouraged the laundering of drug profits, a major source of capital and infrastructure investment over the last decade’ (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p13). The country itself earns something in the order of US$700 million to 1 billion each year from drugs, as well as seeking to garner some limited military and economic support from the US by running anti-drug suppression campaigns of limited success (Steinberg 2000). It is not clear that the government formally encourages drug production, but corrupt military commanders, often at regional level, do gain benefits (Gibson & Haseman 2003, pp4-5). Likewise, the drug issue has been used as a political tool against particular ethnic groups, often tolerating one group or pitting it against another.

It must be stressed that though crop production has been reduced in some countries, e.g. Thailand, the drug problem remains very real.. Nor have the actions of the US's DEA and the UNDCP (United Nations International Drug Control Program) been entirely effective. Indeed, heroin production in Myanmar rose from 68 tons in 1988 to an estimated 185 tons in 1991, most of which was intended for export (Lintner 1994, p317). Even more problematic was the fact that the DEA and other enforcement agencies for a time continued to believe that the Myanmar government was activity fighting the drug lords, giving the Yangon regime contacts, intelligence and some international recognition. Yet between 1988 and 1990 Burmese production probably doubled, largely due to 'co-operation between the military government and the opium growers' (Swain 1990). In spite of some displays of opium burning in 1990, in 1993 Myanmar remained the world's biggest producer of heroin at that time, and provided a large percentage of the heroin used in the US and Australia (Lintner 1994, p329, p332). This trade is largely the consequence of 'the inability of successive governments in Rangoon to come to terms with the country's ethnic minorities and the refusal of post-1962 military-dominated regimes to permit an open, pluralistic society' (Lintner 1994, p332). Indeed, it seemed that the Myanmar government was 'dangling the lure of heroin, . . . using a territorial war to destroy minority groups battling for control of the Golden Triangle', i.e. allowing drug running for selected former insurgent groups in return for their political cooperation (Boyd 1991). Thus, Myanmar were willing for a time to support the minority Wa army against Khun Sa (Boyd 1991). Since 1989, the Burmese government had reached 'accommodations'

11 with the Wa and Kokang drug trafficking groups in return for limited autonomy, using this deal to end regional insurgencies (Lintner 1993b, p26). The government have also been able to split the Karen ethnic group, and supported the Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) in its attacks against the Karen National Union (KNU), a move which has inflamed conditions on the Thai border (Corben 1995). Overall, it is correct to note that 'heroin trafficking continues unabated. Assistance of any kind to the SLORC for the purpose of addressing the drug flow is unlikely to be effective' (Dae Jung 1995, p9). Indeed, it now seems likely that a large segment of the national economy, and perhaps even the military acquisitions of Myanmar, are indirectly funded through flows of drug-money (Bernstein & Kean 1996).

There has been some limited improvement in regional cooperation in dealing with these drug and related problems (money laundering, arms smuggling, transnational criminal groups). As noted by some Thai sources: -

Meanwhile, Royal Thai Police (special branch) deputy commissioner Maj Gen Amarin Niemskul said cooperation between Thailand and Myanmar in countering drug- related problems was going in the right direction. He said the drug problem affecting the countries of the Golden Triangle - Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam - has to be seriously addressed as the illegal activity was closely linked to acts of terrorism. "The funding of terrorists' activities comes from illegal activities, mainly drugs as it derives the largest revenue for those involved," he said. The on-going meeting, he said, should initiate further actions to combat the problem. "Then we can work more efficiently. We hope to concentrate on the fight against drugs," said Amarin, who is also Thailand's head of delegate, chairing the drug trafficking task force. Myanmar is also on the task force as the deputy. Amarin added that Thailand would now strive even harder in addressing drug problems. "Through the many years of discussions with other Asean member countries, we have set up several working committees and sub-committees but now we have to focus more on follow-up actions." (New Straits Times 2002)

There have been serious efforts in Thailand to develop a multi-level ‘interlocking series of programs’ (Emery 2003) to counter these problems including: -

• The authorities have persuaded most opium growers to switch to legal "cash" crops. • The Thai army and police cooperate with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and UN International Drug Control Program to eradicate and interdict drugs. • In recent years, Thailand set up antidrug education centers in communities throughout the country. Thai schools launched a successful Drug Abuse Resistance Education program based on the U.S. model. • The Thai Ministry of Public Health has greatly expanded the number of drug treatment centers. (Emery 2003)

Likewise, the UN has sought over three decades to develop a comprehensive anti- drug program with key features proposed for the 2003-2007 period including: -

 ‘ Objective monitoring of the drug situation in the country and evaluation of interventions  Provision of holistic alternatives for opium poppy farmers living in areas accounting for about 70%of nation-wide opium production.

12  Intensive cross-border cooperation with emphasis on halting production and trafficking in Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS) and trade in its precursor chemicals.  Effective implementation of the 2002 money laundering legislation and the pending mutual legal assistance act.  Introducing targeted demand reduction activities, including prevention focussed on the needs of youth, and treatment and rehabilitation for addicts.  Introduction of solutions to drug use and HIV transmission through co-ordination, scaling up and implementation of innovative initiatives.’ (UNDCP 2002)

However, new problems have emerged out of this region of poorly controlled borders, poverty, and regional insurgence. Moreover, a strong security response will not only increase violence within society but drive many operations underground, but only temporarily. Although heroin flows directly into Thailand from Myanmar have been somewhat reduced, new products have been developed: -

While Thai authorities have been successful in eradicating the indigenous opium crop and intercepting heroin shipments coming from Burma, they have been plagued by a growing problem with amphetamine-type stimulants, primarily methamphetamine. Called ya ba in Thailand, methamphetamine pills have been around for decades. The Thai government estimates that over 600 million pills are smuggled into the country each year. Virtually all of the production takes place in Burma and is smuggled across the border into Thailand, with some shipments being routed through Laos. The Wa and Shan tribes are the primary players in the "meth" trade, just as they have been in opium and heroin. (Emery 2003)

Likewise, Myanmar has emerged as a major source of fake antibiotics and illegal pharmaceuticals, many of which lack the active or appropriate levels of ingredients to be effective and safe, e.g. in treating malaria and tuberculosis (Health and Medicine Week 2004).

Here we can see how a simple illicit trade is part of both a civil and national struggle, forms part of the complex legacy of relations between Southeast nations, and has a large impact on world affairs. This one issue is perhaps as significant as any single external military threat to the region, and in the long run may be more problematic than international terrorism. The issue is not the private morality of drug use, but the fact that as banned or controlled commodities, the production and use of opium, heroin and metamphetamines become a criminal activity linked to regional conflicts, local insurgencies and transnational criminal networks. It indicates why 'comprehensive security' issues need to be taken into account by the governments by Southeast Asian nations, and form a central part of international affairs in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, these interconnected issues indicate how hard it will be to really deal with the drug trade. In the case of the Golden Triangle 'No anti-drug policy in Myanmar has any chance of success unless it is linked to a real political solution to the civil war and a meaningful democratic process in Yangon. The alternative is a continuing strife which will keep the heroin flowing.' (Lintner 1994, p335). Basically, Myanmar would need to meet the ‘legitimate political aspirations’ of the country’s diverse minorities, and offer these people realistic economic alternatives for making a living (Gibson & Haseman 2003, pp1- 2).

Furthermore, traditional military organisations are not very effective in dealing with the international drug problems, with criminal organisations treating national

13 borders with contempt, and often being able to suborn elements of the military forces used against them (Dziedzic 1989, pp543-4). This is not a problem that can be dealt with by normal enforcement, either at the final sale point on the street, nor just by attacking the producers. As noted by Michael Dziedzic: 'Countries that provide a demand for illicit drugs thus create conditions that can lead to a serious deterioration in the security environment of producer countries' (Dziedzic 1989, p546). Here we see a problem which is at once national, regional, and global. This means that the problem is complex, and must be approached by a multifaceted program, with real, alternative development counterbalancing the economic benefits of drug production (see further Gibson & Haseman 2003).

3. Case Study: Uncontrolled Labour and Migration Flows

One of the last liberalisations in the 21st century is the prospect of the free movement of people and labour regionally and globally. Though partially achieved within the EU, this has been a major problem for NAFTA, APEC, and the Asia-Pacific as a whole. Migration and labour flows have been a major complication, with surplus labour moving from countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Myanmar into Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, and when possible into countries such as Australia. This has complicated relations among ASEAN members, caused major diplomatic problems between Indonesian and Australia, and raised the issue of lack of genuine global commitment to the problem of dealing with refugee flows in a sustained, comprehensive and timely fashion (these issues are dealt with in more detail in the context of transmigration flows in the subject Advanced International Relations).

The problem of legal and illegal labour flows has been both a resource and problem for Indonesia. Thus hundreds of thousands of Indonesians have worked, both legally and illegal in nearby countries, especially Malaysia. These trends became problematic during the Asian financial crisis, and again in 2002 when Malaysia cacked down again on illegal workers, leading to the outward movement of tens of thousands of Indonesians who could not always make it home (Smith 2003, p111). The perceived poor treatment of these workers caused tensions between Malaysian and Indonesian officials, e.g. between the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar and Amien Rais (Smith 2003, p11). In the end, however, Malaysia remains dependent on Indonesian labour in key areas, e.g. in the construction industry (Aziz & Hashim 2002). This provides both benefits and risks for Malaysia: -

Judging from people movement over the last two decades or, Malaysia is well integrated into the global economy. For a relatively small country, the absorption rate has been high, alarming various local quarters, such as the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER). This respectable think tank opined that out of a labor force of about 9 million, one fifth is estimated to be made up of foreign nationals, a ratio which is among the largest in the world. Notwithstanding this worrying statistic, foreign labor has in no small measure contributed towards the impressive economic growth during the 1987-1997 period. It certainly has made Malaysia's dream to become an industrialized nation by the year 2020 closer to reality. (Aziz & Hashim 2002, p175).

In this area ASEAN cooperation needs to go beyond existing trade and investment agreements. Large numbers of Burmese workers in Thailand presentan

14 ongoing area of friction: almost 4,000 illegal workers were returned to Myanmar in 2002, while there may be as many as 140,000 illegal migrants from Myanmar still within Thailand (Xinhua 2002b). There is an almost global reach of Filipino labourers, finding work in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, and parts of the Middle East (see Piper & Ball 2001). Philippines are also a major source of migration into the cities of East Asia, with an estimate of 1.88 million undocumented workers overseas in the late 1990s (Piper & Ball 2001, pp533-554). Southeast Asia is both the source and destination for sustained labour flows. In the case of the long and problematic Thai-Burma border, there has been a regular pattern of refugees and non registered labour flowing into Thailand. Some of this has been into domestic and low skill labour areas, as well as flowing into prostitution networks with ongoing concerns over related patterns of drug-use and AIDS transmission (Takano 2002, p18).

In 1997, Malaysia alone hosted some 1.2 million registered workers, mostly from Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines (see Azizah 2000). Over the three decades, Indonesia has been one of the main sources of labour in the developing Malaysian economy: -

In 1981 for example, it was estimated that there were 100,000 illegal Indonesian immigrants in Malaysia. By 1987, the figure was placed by the Malaysian Trade Union Congress at close to one million. In the Migration Policy Institute Report cited earlier, it was noted that an amnesty offered by the Malaysian Government in 1993 to Indonesian illegals saw half a million undocumented migrants come forward; it noted further that "since coming forward meant that employers had to pay migrant workers the same wages as Malaysians and provide them with the same working conditions, it is clear that not all undocumented workers were detected in the amnesty". Indeed, during subsequent government operations aimed at flushing out illegal foreign labour throughout the country, it was revealed that 83.2 per cent of the 483,784 illegals uncovered in 1992-94 and 59.4 per cent of the 554,941 in 1996 were Indonesians. (Liow 2003)

Although ASEAN has conducted recent dialogues for integration of labour rules at the regional level, and some regional use of foreign labour through the 'growth circles' and 'sub-regional economic cooperation' strategy, much more needs to be done to avoid key bilateral tensions. Thus the securitisation of the problem of these undocumented workers, as seems to be the trend in Malaysia, will not solve the problem (see further Liow 2003). Likewise, there have been strong calls from Indonesians for this issue to be more effectively handled at the ASEAN level: -

ASEAN countries urgently need a commitment to formulate and implement the minimum standard for safe migrant worker placement policies, pressure for the conclusion of a bilateral agreement among ASEAN member countries on migrant workers with agreed minimum standards, and preparation for an ASEAN regional convention regarding migrant workers' protection and prevention of the trafficking of women and children. The addressing of these issues by ASEAN would hopefully lead to less cases of abuse and even unexplained deaths among migrant workers in the region. This would thus remove potential stumbling blocks in political interaction among ASEAN member countries when it comes to issues related to the right and the efforts of their people in seeking a better life across their national borders. (Jakarta Post 2003a)

This issue of undocumented migration has become a major issue at the bilateral, regional and global levels. One recent shift has been an increase of refugees within

15 the Asian region with 4.8 million refugees, 1.7 million internally displaced persons, and 1.2 million returnees (McMaster 2002, p22), followed by a boost in refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan due to regional turbulence through 2000-2004. These figures need to be placed against the high mobility of people under the current phase of globalisation: -

International migration in all its forms is now an integral part of world development. Along with the increasing pressures for global integration in the guise of globalisation and global capitalism, migration is increasing in the categories of business, labour migration and economic refugees. These pressures are mainly economic as the processes of globalisation and transnational companies compete on the open world market. (McMaster 2002, p35)

Here we can sense certain trends in the terminology used. The narrow definition of refugee as established within United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees contains an essentially political definition, based on persecution, the 'risk of serious harm', or at least a well-founded fear of persecution on discriminatory grounds. However, it does not cater for those suffering from situations of 'generalised violence', 'economic deprivation' or severe poverty (McMaster 2002, p24; Silove 2000, p604). The problems of stateless people, internally displaced populations, 'in transit' refugees and de facto refugees are becoming more pressing, as is the reality of migrant workers (McMaster 2002) as they fulfil essential roles in Southeast Asia and he wider Asia- Pacific (see above).

In the Australian case, there has been some conflation of refugee policy and immigration policy, with a tendency to view undocumented or unregulated arrivals onshore of asylum seekers as problematic for immigration policy as a whole. In this context, asylum seeks can be usefully but narrowly defined 'as persons who seek protection under the Convention on Refugees after entering another country on a temporary visa or without any documents' (Silove 2000, p604). The problem, of course, is that people who fail to fit the criteria of the Convention may still suffer abuse of human rights, or be escaping conditions of extreme poverty. The castigation of these arrivals as 'queue jumpers', an idea fostered both by the Hawke and Howard governments, also conflates potential refugees with illegal migrants (McMaster 2002, p57). However, refugees often explicitly come from countries racked by violence, civil war, low-intensity conflicts (which often feature attacks on civilians or 'ethnic cleansing') or by persecution from authoritarian regimes. Under such conditions that refugees will often be unable to gain proper documentation (passports, visas, exit documentation), or will indeed be forced to secure false documentation in order to escape (Adelman 2002, p25). Such people can often not get to consulates or embassies, and in any case may not survive long processing delays for offshore intakes, e.g. long delays of months and sometimes years for entry into the Global Special Humanitarian Program (Maley 2001, p360).

However, under current distinctive Australian legislation, undocumented arrivals who set foot on Australian shores are subject to mandatory detention, a process largely without independent judicial review, and may have in the past facilitated ‘human rights abuses' (Bessant 2002, pp3-5; Burnside 2001). Detention periods range from one day to five years, while during 1996-1997 average stays varied in different centres, ranging from 32.33 days in Perth up to 137.38 days in Port Hedland (Bessant

16 2002, p15). What these averages conceal, of course, is a tale end of longer stays which range from several months to several years, with a strongly 'indeterminate' nature for the refugees concerned. Approximately 25% of these people are detained for more than 6 months and some 80 for 2-5 years, a figure which seems longer than needed for basic processing, and not compatible with international conventions nor the normal rule of law (McMaster 2002, pp16-18; Silove 2000, p607). Furthermore, the 'burden of proof rests with the asylum seekers', an extremely difficult task without adequate legal advise and cultural support (Silove 2000, p605; see further Gibney 1999).

These events have suggested a return of negative identity politics, where security concerns are fed into the debate on migration control. Early Australian Federation, of course, was partly based on a fear of vulnerably for a continent remote from Britain, a small outpost that needed to unite to protect itself against other powers, French and German, then Chinese and Japanese (McMaster 2002, p3; see further Ferguson 2004). Bereson, Matheson, and Yuan Chung-Ming argue that this anxiety was one of the main factors behind federation (McMaster 2002, pp130-134; Yuan 1983; Bereson & Matheson 1992). This view has been contested as an exaggeration by Yarwood and Knowling, and by Ronald Norris (see McMaster 2002, p134). On this basis, Australian identity was based on a specific connection to Mother Britain, on being Australians and Britons in some fundamental sense, included racial categories that excluded 'others', and on an egalitarianism based on sameness (Murdolo 2002, p124; McMaster 2002, p135). In the early 20th century the new Commonwealth excluded permanent, legal non-white immigration (Immigration Restriction Act 1901), used but limited non-white labour, and protect what came to be viewed as a privileged 'working man's paradise'. By 1908, in part due to the rise of the Australian labour and union movement, most Melanesians had been returned (Yuan 1983, p66; McMaster 2002b, p279). Such policies were continued via the Migration Act 1958, with the 'White Australia' policy only being official discarded from 1973 and new program criteria put in place from 1979 (McMaster 2002, p47; Yuan 1983, p202). Although the 'White Australia' policy was finished, the issues of race, national identity, exclusion, and the perceptions of those who came to Australia were not (McMaster 2002b).

Entitlement to a court hearing before deprivation of liberty or detention is a central These policies were not just rational or instrumental: they were also based on the manipulation of symbols and emotions, 'drawing on a collective memory nurtured by threat, anxiety and defensive actions when confronted by uninvited guests' (McMaster 2002, pp29-30). They were also a part of a 'culture of control' within the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) itself (Maley 2001, pp353-354). Yet ‘boat people’ comprise a tiny proportion of all arrivals into the country, and in comparison, only about 5% 'on top of the orthodox migrant intake', which in 2001-2002 allowed for 12,000 places in the refugee and humanitarian categories, with 85,000 in total for the migration program (Burnside 2001; McMaster 2002, p67; Bailey 2002, p64). They constitute approximately a third of the total humanitarian intake (Tascon 2002, p125). Furthermore, most of the 60,000 'unlawful non-citizens' in Australia have overstayed their visas, while only around 8,000 in a given year will be in detention (Murdolo 2002, p127). During 2000-2001 there were 4,141 boat arrivals, and in 1999-2000 there were 4,175 (Bailey 2002, p64). Through 2001, 84% of those held in detention would eventually be 'assessed as genuine

17 refugees' (Tascon 2002, p131). In the case of the refugees from Tampa vessel, some 213 were either recognised as refugees or resettled in New Zealand, while through September 2002, some 176 have had their final appeals fail (Gordon 2002b), and were strongly 'encouraged' to return to Afghanistan (though some since have been given temporary protection visas). This encouragement includes difficult conditions in their detainment in Nauru. In total, some 1,500 people were diverted from landing in Australia, to be detained and ‘processed’ in centres in PNG and Nauru (Moris 2004; see further below).

From late 2001 through 2002, partly due to the perceived global terrorism threat and instability in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, there was a tendency to see the boat people arriving at that time as potential 'enemies' (McMaster 2002, pix; Murdolo 2002, p125; Hugo 2002, p40). However, terrorists do not usually arrive in target countries in leaky boats, nor by the very slow routes of such groups. For example, the terrorists who perpetrated the acts of September 11 entered the U.S. legally with valid passports and visas (Adelman 2002, p16). In a sense, this was an 'extension of the zone of combat' to those who seemed different, and posed a threat to jobs, borders, moral values, and even to 'collective identities and cultural homogeneity' (Faist 2002, p7). At least in some of these public debates, there has been a tendency to link the protection of physical borders to broader cultural threats in a simplistic and irrational way (Murdolo 2002, p124).

In the case of the Tampa incident, the imagery in the media was crucial in setting a tone that helped mobilise initial support for the government. The interceptions of Norwegian ship (MV Tampa), the rapid interception of the Navy, the operations on board by the elite SAS troops, the news footage of armed soldiers in speedboats turned the affair into a militarised operation with overtones of threat. There was little imagery available (at first) to generate images of pity, helplessness, or even common human sympathy. We were assured that the health of these 443 boat people was adequate, and that the matter was being robustly but efficiently managed. Neither claim would bear close inspection during the following year (Mathew 2002, p131; Metherell 2002). At the time of the arrival of army doctors two people were in need of urgent medical care, and a total of four needed IV support (Wilkinson 2002). The transfer of the these asylum seekers onto naval vessels that took them first to PNG and thence by air to Nauru for processing was presented as a form of deterrence for queue jumpers (Hugo 2002, p38; Mathew 2002, p662).

The public were also told in separate incidents that 'these people' were morally suspect: in the 'children overboard' affair we were assured that these were 'the sort of things these people did', negative imagery supported by the Prime Minister and Minister Ruddock but later shown to be without foundation (Tascon 2002, p129; Mathew 2002, p676). Over the following year it emerged that in fact the media images of the 'children overboard' had been manipulated or at least misreported by government representatives. This was apparently done of the basis of the 'ignorance' of the Prime Minister and former defence Minister Peter Reith, both of whom sought to off load this interpretation onto incorrect reports from the Navy (Sydney Morning Herald 2002, p14). Efforts to shift blame back onto poor reporting by the Navy officers were in the end highly unsuccessful, resulting in deep resentment by the officers involved and their higher chain of command. This has highlighted the real gap in reporting and impression management between the Australian military

18 and government, a problem that has re-emerged in relation to the knowledge of the treatment of prisoners in East Timor and recently in relations to what was known of the Iraq cases (May-June 2004).

The extremely high cost of using major naval assets and elite troops in intercepting small numbers of boat people soon emerged. This was not in any sense an efficient usage of warships and highly trained military personnel. The following Operation Relex, whereby vessels would be deployed to forcefully turn back asylum boats, soon led to tensions between the Navy and the government. As revealed in declassified documents, secured after a drawn-out freedom of information request, by the Sydney Morning Herald: -

Internal minutes, briefs and reports show that senior military officers challenged the government on fundamental issues including: The fraught questions of the navy's obligations under international law to ensure the safety of life at sea, exactly the same issue that fractured relations between Australia and Norway during the Tampa stand- off. The strain of Operation Relex on military resources after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The micro-managing of the naval operation by ministers and public servants. The lack of any coherent plan on what to do with the boat people after the navy had intercepted them (Wilkinson 2002, p1).

By conservative estimates, in the year 2001-2002, the government would spend some $200 million 'on locating, removing and detaining asylum seekers', while only $20 million would be contributed to the UNHCR (McMaster 2002, p189). Nauru's support in receiving refugees to be processed, naturally enough, was premised on increased aid: as early as October 2001 Australia agreed to pay the tiny nation $A20 million for its role' and 'pledged a further $A1 million to help pay outstanding bills for Nauruan citizens treated in Australian hospitals.' (Williams 201, p20) This approach is also extremely expensive: by one estimate the total budget for dealing with refugees and boat people would have doubled through 2001-2002 to almost $500 million dollars, with 'the cost of housing 1,120 asylum seekers at a camp on the poor Pacific state of Nauru is expected to reach A$72m . . . ' (March 2002, p12). The high cost of detentions procedures even on the mainland has also been noted, at $104-$105 per head per day, in contrast to much lower estimates for parole, probation, and home detention systems, ranging from $4 to $59 in terms of government costs (McMaster 2002, pxii; Tazreiter 2002, pp5-6).

International condemnation soon emerged, impinging on Australia's perception overseas, with strongly negative reports in Norway, England, the United States, and parts of Asia (Xinhua 2002c). Newspapers and magazines such as the New York Times, New Statesman, the Independent and even the Wall Street Journal carried critical stories (see Pilger 2002; Rundle 2002). This can be gauged not only by the tone of newspaper articles, but also by the fact that the 'captain, crew and owners' of the Tampa received the Nansen Refugee Award by the UNHCR, placing their actions in high contrast to that of the Australian government. Sustained criticism of detention policies were also carried forward by the UNHCR, Amnesty International, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, professional medical organisations such as the Australian Medical Association (AMA), while the Government refused to allow the visit of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in September 2001 (Tazreiter 2002, p7; McMaster 2002k, pxi; Burnside 2001, p15; Silove 2000).

19 The Government moved to exclude offshore islands and reefs, such as Christmas Island, from the Australian migration zone, based on intelligence that such islands might be landing areas. Combined with this was an ‘innovative’ Amendment (Migration Amendment Bill 2) allowing the expulsion of asylum seekers from Australia to a third country as decided by the Immigration minister, in this case leading to the so-called Pacific Solution, which involved agreements for asylum- processing in Nauru, PNG (Manus Island, closed down through mid-2004), and small numbers being sent to New Zealand. Through May 2004, a further 92 of Afghans being held were to be accepted as refugees and given temporary protection visas, while some 260 asylum-seekers were still being held on Nauru, including 80 Iraqis (Morris 2004).

Likewise, the Border Protection Bill, even in its amended form, allows the Australian navy to intercept asylum seekers and take them outside Australian territory (Mathew 2002, pp661-662), e.g. to Pacific islands, or to turn ships back towards Indonesia. Combined with the lengthy periods of detention, these provisions may result in breaches of Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (McMaster 2002, px). Turning boats back to sea or even back towards Indonesia may involve a breach in that it implies 'chain' refoulement (Mathew 2002, pp666-667), i.e. turning back of refugees to conditions of persecution. This is based on the fact that Indonesia has not signed the Refugee Convention, and therefore offers at best temporary refuge. It must also be noted that Pakistan and Malaysia similarly have not signed the Refugee Convention, indicating that in the route taken by most Afghan refugees, Australia is the first Convention country they reach (Maley 2002, p357). Since these issues can no longer find effective review in Australian courts, there is now a clear gap between Australia's signing of such treaties and their lack of legal status within domestic law (Burnside 2001; Mathew 2002, p665). Combined with the mandatory nature of the detention schemes, which includes children, these processes may also breach the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as the intent of the Refugee Convention itself (Article 31), under which children should only be detained under 'exceptional circumstances' (Bessant 2002, p4; Bailey 2002, p63; see further HREOC 2004). In sum, control of ‘boat people’ has been a dangerous and controversial policy that has not solved the regional refugee problem, and has held up Australian policy to sustained international criticism.

20 5. Conclusion: The Case for Layered Cooperation

There have been some limited approaches within ASEAN to deal with these issues regionally. In 1999, ASEAN's Bangkok Declaration on Irregular Migration began this process, with a lead taken by Thailand and the International Organization for Migration (Schloenhardt 2001, p87). Likewise, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (within the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime) is a useful legal framework which targets smugglers rather than migrants. In Bali on the 26th-28th February 2002 a major Regional Ministerial Conference also reinforced the theme of cooperation among nations, IGOs, NGOs and INTERPOL (the latter groups represented by observers) to prevent people-smuggling while still protecting the rights of refugees (See DFAT Co-Chair Statement at http://www.dfat.gov.au/illegal_immigration/cochair.html). Regional cooperation is crucial in dealing with both illegal migration and organised crime networks that are at least in part involved (Schloenhardt 2001, p87).

On a parallel theme, a major Asia-pacific conference on anti-people smuggling, organised jointly by Indonesia and Australia, met in February 2002 and May 2003 to set up the voluntary Bali Process whereby frameworks of cooperation could be established to improve the control of smuggling and transnational crime (Jakarta Post 2003b). Officials from 32 countries, 14 observer nations, and 15 international agencies, setting the grounds for technical assistance and legal infrastructure, designed to cooperate with source countries and crack down on people smugglers. Following through on this process, Foreign Minister Downer in June 2004 committed more funds above the existing $20 million package, with ‘an additional $665,000 to the International Organisation for Immigration (IOM) to help finance a project for the return and reintegration of trafficked’ and another ‘$580,000 provided for a new three year project to combat child sex tourism in ASEAN countries’. (AAP 2004a)

However, refugees, humanitarian assistance, and migration policies do not benefit when policy is shifted too far into the domain of security policies and threat perceptions. The danger is well expressed by Thomas Faist: -

Securitizing migration is also part of elevating migration to a meta-issue: In this case, international migration, immigration and emigration can be conveniently connected to a host of other issues, especially danger and threat, military - but above all social, economic, political and cultural. Meta-issues form the basis for symbolic politics, more precisely, meta-politics. . . . In referring to these fears and in being responsive to the expectation of their constituency, especially politicians from populist parties have in fact introduced and reinforced xenophobic tendencies. This is not to say that threats to security in immigration countries are without any real-world foundation. However, through meta-politics, low-level threats usually gain out-of-proportion significance. Of course, all politics has a symbolic content. Otherwise political actors could not aggregate and articulate interests and mobilize supporters. However, meta-politics unsettles the precarious balance between the material and symbolic content of politics in connecting substantive issues such as unemployment and security to symbols which signify threats in factually incorrect ways (Faist 2002, pp11-12).

The current system is expensive, does not deal efficiently or effectively with refugees and undocumented arrivals, undermines elements of Australian foreign policy, distorts Australia's relations with its neighbours, erodes the prime functions of the Australian defence force, and places asylum-seekers, guards, police, protesters and the wider

21 Australian public at risk of further violence and brutalisation (Silove 2000; Murdolo 2002). Rather than being mere 'border-crossers' and 'strangers' who should be excluded from the 'national imagination' (Tascon 2002; Tazreiter 2002), such migrants are part of the new global and regional flows, in which both refugees and workers utilise transnational flows, needs and competencies to try to better their own lives (Hyndman & Walton 2000).

Likewise, the drug problem (opium, heroin, metamphetamines) of what used to be called the Golden Triangle directly affects the people of Burma, Laos, Thailand, nearby areas in Southeast Asia, as well as flowing into Australian and some north American markets. On this basis, illicit drug flows have funded turbulence within Burma, exacerbated border control issues with PRC and Thailand, and given ASEAN a major challenge which at present seem to be only slowly moderating (through 2001-2004). Nor has subtle pressure from ASEAN been able to greatly moderate military control of Myanmar’s government. With an army of around 400,000 which is still modernising and strengthening, the fate of Myanmar’s constitutional debate and political reforms process remains important and ASEAN and other neighbouring states (Strategic Comments 2001).

Other areas in the Indo-Pacific region where layered regional approaches might apply include the development of resource security in the South Pacific, the management and control of water and riverine resources in South Asia and Southeast Asia (especially Nepal, India, Bangladesh, nations along the Mekong River system, see Hassan 1991; Bengwayan 2000), and the international management of oil, gas, and maritime resources in contested areas of the South China Sea. These examples, including the shared environmental problems of Southeast Asia, the drug trade from the Golden ‘quadrangle’, and regulated migration and worker flows show some of the 'on the ground' problems which occupy Indo-Pacific nations. As such, they indicate that many of these nations have rather different priorities to ‘great and developed’ nations like the US or the European Union countries. They are also of direct interest to the trading and regional partners of the Indo-Pacific, indicating that further investment and research in these areas by countries such as Australia may be required. These problems will need to be met if the region is to become stable and prosperous in the 21st century. At present, there has been some limited progress in this area, but secure solutions within limited timeframes have not emerged.

5. Bibliography and Further Resources

Resources

The official Webpage of the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) can be found at http://www.undcp.org/index.html

A Webpage outlining the activities of CSCAP, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific will be found at http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au

The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) webpage will be found at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home

22 The Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission has a range of related material, including discussions of refugees and detention centres, which can be access via http://www.humanrights.gov.au

Further Reading

EMERY, James “Thailand's World-Class Antidrug Program”, World & I, 18 no. 2, February 2003, pp56-63 [Access via Ebsco Database] GIBSON, Richard M. & HASEMAN, John B. “Prospects for Controlling Narcotics Production and Trafficking in Myanmar”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 no. 1, April 2003, pp1-19 [Access via Ebsco Database] LIOW, Joseph "Malaysia's illegal Indonesian migrant labour problem: in search of solutions", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 no. 1, April 2003, pp44-64 [Access via Ebsco Database] McMASTER, Don Asylum Seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2002 UNDCP Myanmar Country Profile, Myanmar Country Office of UNDP, 2000-2002 [Internet Access http://www.odccp.org:80/myanmar/country_profile.html] MAIDMENT, Richard et al. (eds.) Governance in the Asia-Pacific, London, Routledge, 1998, pp221-274 SHINN, James (ed.) Fires Across the Water: Transnational Problems in Asia, N.Y., Council on Foreign Relations, 1998 STEINBERG, Michael K. "General, Guerrillas, Drugs, and Third World War Making", Geographical Review, 90 no. 2, April 2000, pp260-267 [Internet Access via Library Databases]

References

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