Meaning of Moral Realism

Moral Realism

In this Lesson we deal with metaethical views that are quite opposed to each other, moral realism and moral relativism. I don’t support either as may become clear. I should say before we begin that Peirce’s pragmatism flows out of the philosophy of Kant. Kant is a kind of idealist, which means that reality as we know it is some sort of human construct, and does not, as we know it, have an independent existence. Kant called that independent reality the unknown X. Peirce rejected the notion of an unknown reality, claiming that all there is to it is what we know. Kant’s ethics involves human construction, as we shall see, and so his position is not classified under realism, but neither is it relativistic. I’m not a Kantian, but I do agree that ethics involves human construction.

Let’s turn to moral realism.

We claim that to abuse a child, sexually or physically, is morally wrong. Is this merely our opinion, a socially supported opinion, or a report on some objective property, namely the fact that it is wrong to be abusive?

Moral realism is the doctrine that moral judgments, when correct, refer to something that is objective, independent of our opinions, that exists, in some sense, external to human thought in general. Not just external to the thought of you and me, but to all human thought.

Moral realists believe that moral facts support many of our moral judgments.

This often seems to be the case. Observing a child being badly physically abused, we declare that this is morally wrong. If someone objects, claiming that we are simply stating our opinion, we wonder whether this person has seen the same thing we did. Surely they should be able to observe that the abuse is wrong, period. Many examples of moral judgments seem to be as reliable as examples of judging color. Some people cannot make proper observations of even the simplest physical event. This is their deficiency. The event occurred regardless of whether it is properly observed. Likewise, some people cannot make proper moral observations. This does not mean that moral judgments are not based on real properties, but that such people have some deficiency, or perhaps that making the observation was difficult.

This form of moral realism links moral judgment to observations. But we may wonder whether common needs or common cultural conditioning leads us to call the act wrong. That it is not some sort of observable property? Opponents of moral realism claim that moral "facts," the facts required by moral realists, would be strange elements in our ontology. An ontology is a philosophical view that specifies the kinds of entities, broadly conceived, that exist in the universe. In philosophy, for example, some ontologists believe that only physical objects exists, while others hold that other kinds of things, mental and spiritual, exist.

In moral theory, some philosophers argue that objective, independent moral properties are strange and unneeded additions to our ontology; moral theory makes perfect sense, they insist, without an appeal to special moral objects over and above nonmoral objects.

Even though they reject special moral objects, the opponents of moral realism need not claim that moral judgments are subjective. They may claim that we respond with moral condemnation to the abuse of the child because of our nature, our needs, our cultural standards, or our natural sentiments. These all may have an objective base, but they are not moral facts.

The debate goes on. Those favoring moral realism argue that evil can be observed. They maintain that nothing is odd about having objective moral properties in our ontology. We observe that it is evil to abuse someone. Most people would agree that such an act is evil, and most would agree that it is difficult to watch abuse without at least seeming to observe it as evil.

The opponent of moral realism agrees that we "observe" some events as evil, but argues that this can be explained by our psychological disposition rather than by external events.

Moral realism is a general doctrine. It is consistent with Plato's view that morality involves universal, absolute, unchanging moral ideals that may be fully understood only by the wise. Others believe that moral standards are in the mind of God, and so are objective. This is another form of moral realism. However, many philosophers contend that even if God proposes moral standards, we may reject them. If God wanted us to do something evil, we would know that it was evil. Even if God wills only the good, the fact that we can judge what God wills suggests that moral standards are not simply in God's mind.

The American philosopher Stephen Boyd recently proposed some simple tests to confirm the truth of moral realism.

 Moral reasoning must start with approximately true moral beliefs.  True beliefs must have some relation to observations.  Moral terms require definitions in terms of natural objects, like happiness.

Boyd outlines a theory he thinks conforms to these demands nonutilitarian consequentialism. This theory centers on human needs such as friendship, cooperation, autonomy, and physical recreation. These human goods often occur together, and, in proper balance, they are mutually supporting. Moral decision- making is concerned with achieving the proper balance, through enhanced psychological and social mechanisms, so as to strengthen the bond between human values.

Boyd's theory presumes that we have true moral beliefs relating to these human needs, but this is far from clear. Human needs do play a key role in ethics, but other issues, freedom, justice and equality, go beyond basic human needs. Yet it seems that Boyd's defense of moral realism rests too heavily on a form of naturalism that relates to an overly restricted part of moral experience.

Moral realism depends on identifying some objective moral standards that do not vary from place to place. So far this identification appears futile. If moral realism were true, and observed moral properties were as basic as many current moral realists claim, like observing the evil of a child being abused, we would most likely have made more progress in basic moral theory than we have over the last 2,000 years. On the other hand, if moral realism affirms some recondite but real property, like Platonic ideals, then moral progress is less likely.

Morality involves many things, including norms, social practices, and moral principles that are not easily reduced to some basic, objective moral properties, as the moral realist would hope. Observations, however they are made, may play a role, but the role is not as fundamental as it is in the sciences. Moral realism may remain true even if we are ignorant of objective moral qualities, but if we are ignorant, then the support for moral realism is more a hope then a well- established belief. Although moral realists refer to objective facts, these facts are often unknown and so realists frequently fail to show how their view aids moral decision-making.

Here is an interesting rejection of moral realism given by Gilbert Harmon in The Nature of Morality. He asks for the most reasonable explanation for moral reports. I report that it is wrong to torment a young boy who doesn’t fit in with others. Or I might report that the room has one entrance. The best explanation of my report about the entrance is that there is only one. But the best explanation of my report about the torment of the boy may be my disposition to react negatively, however acquired, to such events. If the best explanation of moral judgments does not require the existence of an external reality, then moral realism is false. Or so says Gilbert Harmon.