USAF Withdrawal from Southeast Asia T- IRIS Number 1009462, Call Number K717.D423-1
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This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military. Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE HISTORICAL RESEARCH AGENCY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 30 September 2009 AFHRAlRSA 600 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6424 (334) 953-5834 John Greenewald Dear Mr. Greenewald, I am writing in response to your FOIA request. which we received on 17 September 2009. We have aSSigned this request AFHRA inquiries reference number 903. Since your request was made under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act it has been designated FOIA number 2009-3962F. Enclosed is a copy of the requested document, ·USAF withdrawal from Southeast Asia t- IRIS number 1009462, Call number K717.D423-1 . If you have any other questions, please let us know. Thank you for your request. Sincerely. Kevin Burge Archivist AFHRNRSA Attachments: 1. · USAF withdrawal from Southeast Asia,- IRIS number 1009462, Call number K717.0423-1 • • DECLASSIFIED SAF/AAZD BY AFHRA 11 ; ,"') .-- ' CORONA HARVEST I USAF FORCE WITHDRAWAL FROM I. SOUTHEAST ASIA . I 1 JANUARY 1970 - 30 JUNE 1971(U) I I PREPARED BY HQ PACAF CH pr tr~'.d. 8 y If<!l. y>'!cl'\f , .~ CLASSIFIED lIY CINe. 'PIJCAfI c. c- =0-_-,-.;:.,.1 ~ -- I SURIEC1' TO r.F.l'ry;: lt .. L flV.r.LA&C;l'FlC'ATlON ' 1 \. fry- f'-..f;(?'''- -zj S(':Hf.PUT J+: ()r- rXVI1 JTWP; ()IItDFI\ 1l()52 ../ I It' ~ .-<--'-'0, ~ Al!T():'-f .4 T lr.;\LT,Y Th}'q,,·r,PAnf,O AT TWO YEAR t · ~- . ~ II'TF.lIVALS [)F.CLA~S''''F.(l ON DECEMBER v ,. .~~--- oJ" I a ~ I \ I . J . C 31, [-, \ '.. ~ - (J , ~ \ . ~~ . - .& '\. , .. ' ~ ~ a I r:< • DECLASSIFIED OOA-72-1( ••' SAF/AAZD BY AFHRA c:.y lID OF It. - DECLASSIFIED > SAF/AA'll> BY AFHRA OJJ{/ (;l ..... :c ; , "¥'15 i~ • " " {~ " ~'" ,c-, \'i ~ A > ~ •• ;j :.:: "I ., -< 0 \oj PROJECT CORONA HARV EST ~ I ~ 't • "- l STUD Y ... USAF FORCE IIITHDRAWAL • FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA •( 1 JANUARY 1970-30 JUNE 1971 (U) MICROFILMED BY HOTM; ),., L ) '" ~ j(i11.o;n-1 y \ ''\;. .i;w.alJ) ,,(JJJ. ~ ~ , l. / • Prepared 'by : • Headquarters PACA F • L. D. CLAY . Jr•• G Commander in Chi ef Pacific Air Force s I 31 MaY 1972 I (Corrected copy : see p. i i.) HQ PACAF DOA-72-1014 I CY , ~ OF i1L CYS .. DECLASSIFIED • SAF/AAZD BY AFHRA I UNCLA !S fi.FIED I ABSTAINER I The evaluations in this document repre~ent the efforts of .gev~al working groups and critique panels of USAF officers who -were knowledgeable in the subjects addressed. Tney were based on reports, letters, message s, etc.) written during the cour~e of the war without benefit of a long .term per6p~ctive. The CaRONA HARVEST reports were prepared to acquaint present and future Air Force leaders with air power lessons learned during the Southeast Asia conflict. The CCRONA HARVEST project loo·a.s not undertaken to produce a historical report, but rather was designed to point out problems experienced, identify areas which deserved further study, and recommend future courses of action. Little effort was made to balance this material by pointing out the achievements of airpmJer during the conflict. ' ·'l"be docwnent i s the property of the U. S. Government ard is not to be released in whole or in .part without the specific permissi on of HQ USAF (AF/1WDD) . • I I i J UNCLASSIFIED • I UNCLASSIFIED ~i:; .... ~ j s~ ~ ~ I I ) ~~ .5- '"~ )./ ABSTRACT b ~ ~ " ~ C . I ~ ~;1 " ~,... (U) Th j sis the fi rs t COROllA HARVEST s.tudy to a\i'dress -it AF force ~ c.a ~ 0 9' ~ withdrawals from Southeast Asia. Although the COR II~ HARVES V series 'c!i-. ~ I) is concerned with the . January 197D- June 1971 peria ,~ roper reatment of the subject requires that the discussion begin with the first incre- mental withdrawal of U.S. forces in August 1969 . The report documents I problems encountered by the Air Force in mai ntaining an effective force I during the redeployments, enumerates lessons l earned . and offers recommendations . ~ (U) This PACAF study was revised to incorporate the Air Staff , editor 's comments which enhanced cl arity. consistency. syntax , and grammar. The result i s a greatly improved, more readable volume. ) I J I ~ I ) i i I • • UNCLASSIFIED , I TABLE OF CONTENTS Page OISCLAIMER 0 .... i ABSTRACT . 0 • • ; i LIST OF FIGURES v :1 OVERVIEW . • . 1 L BACKGROUND 4 I A. The Pivotal Year 4" I 1. The U.S. Decision to Escalate the War 4 B. 1965-1969--THE ESCALATION YEARS 6 OJ C. EARLY PLANS FOR REDEPLOYMENT . • 6 1. The Manila Conference Communique ' B 2. CINCPAC OPLAN 67 -68 (5067) . 9 1 ) 3. CINCPAC OPLAN 69-69 (5069) .. 9 II. DISCUSSION •• o ••••• ••• 11 A. TROOP WITHDRAWALS BEGIN . 11 1 1. Nixonls Midway Announcement 11 2. The KEYSTONE Redeployments 12 3. The BANNER Redeployments 19 I B. USAF , FORCE PLANNING ' .• .•• '. .. 23 1. Cancel lation of Early, Plans 26 2. Budget Restrictions . .. ., .. 26 3. Political Considerations . 30 4. Additional Considerations 34 S. Vi etnami zatl on . .. .. 40 6. USAF Personnel Management in SEA 42 7. TOY Control in SVN and Thailand 44 S. SVN Personnel Headroom .... 46 9. Thailand Personnel Headroom . 48 C. IMPACT OF FORCE REDUCTIONS ON USAF .. 52 " iii UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 1. Opera ti ons . 52 I . " 2. Personnel 57 3. Air Base Defense 61 I D. USAF EFFECTIVENESS DURING THE REDEPLOYMENTS 63 I III. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 68 APPENDICES i I U.S. Military Personnel i n Southeast Asia - 1962 1971 .' . 75 I II USAF Aircraft Possessed--1 965 - 1971 •• .• • • •• 76 III Southeast Asia Major Base SUll111ary as of June, 1969 77 1 IV USAF Aircraft Deployment i n Southeast Asi. as of June, 1971 .. ..•.. .... 78 1 ) V Air Force Combat Sorties-- 1962-1 971 79 FOOTNOTES 80 I BIBLIOGRAPHY 87 I GLOSSARY • • 92 I I iv r ) UNCLASSIFIED I UNCLASSIFIED I ) LIST OF FIGURES ·Figure No . 1 u.s . Military Personnel i n Southeast Asia 7 2 KEYSTONE Series •• . • • . • . • • 18 3 Force A<jj us tJnent Requi rement Flow Chart 25 I I ~ 1 , I ) v ) UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED OVERVIEW 1 (u) Future historians. in researching the contributions of airpower 1 during the Vietnam war, will find an abundance of ,statistical data relating to U.S. Air Force operations 1n Southeast Asia: Numbers of .bombs dropped. 1 numbers of sorties flown. damages, both sustained and inflicted by U.S. ·a1rcraft. What 1s 11kely to be lost (if precautions are not taken) is i an insight into the problems of USAF management that were experienced I .during the complexities of the buildup of U.S. forces in Southeas-t Asia and the subsequent withdrawing of those forces • . 1 (U) The President's announcement in June 1969 of the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces signaled the start o~ a reduction in American I ) involvement in Southeast Asia. That involvement began, for the Air Force. in the fall of 1961 when the first USAF combat unit deployed to Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon. J (U) Executive decisions in 1964 and 1965 resulted in an escalation of the war that required over 500,000 Air Force personnel to see service I in Southeast Asia by the summer of 1971. However, during this same I summer the program of withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam was well underway. and it appeared that the process was to be irreversible . __._-- - .--- -.--.--- ------ (U) Ostensibly tied to the redeployment schedule for U.S. forces. was the success of Vietnamization--the replacing of American "fighting 1 UNCLASSIFIED · I UNCLASSIFIED I ) men by the improved and modernized Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces . I B¥ the very nature of the technical expertise required in operating an j air force, a most difficult portion of the responsibility for transferring I the fighting to the Vietnamese fell on the USAF . ' For the same reason, I it could be expected that the USAF would be required to conduct large scale operations in Southeast Asia for an indefinite pe riod after other i U.S. services had sharply reduced their activity in Southeast Asia . (U) Complicating matters for the U.S. military were severe bud I get constraints, the first of which followed closely behind the -J President's initial withdrawal announcement . It was due . almost solely, to these budgetary constraints that the American forces in Thailand {which drew far l ess world attention than those forces in i ) South Vietnam} were reduced. Political intervention created addi- tiona l problems for USAF force planners in Thailand where, on occa- J sian, USAF planning was delayed or negated by decisions at the State Departmen.t 1eve l. I (U) Looking back from mid -197l, the President' s program was work ing. The Vietnamese Air Force was providing almost all of the air . .' ---- -_. ~ support for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in South Vietnam and Cambodia while the USAF was engaged primarily in out-country inter diction operations . The enemy had not launched a major offensive in South Vietnam during the two years of U.S . redeployments and American casualties were at their lowest point in years . 2 ; UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ", I (U) It appeared, then, that the President was making good his I announced goal of providing the Saigon government a reasonable chance for survival .