MUDDLING THROUGH ON MISSILE DEFENCE: THE POLITICS OF INDECISION

David Rudd

Prime Minister Martin’s decision that Canada would not participate with the United States in North American missile defence was driven by his priority of gaining a parliamentary majority, and particularly by his hopes of re-gaining seats in , where to ballistic missile defence is strongest. The prime minister’s February 24 announcement was also timed by his need to pre-empt a youth resolution opposing BMD that would have carried at the Liberal convention the very next week. “The decision not to embrace BMD as a matter of national and continental importance,” writes David Rudd, “should therefore be viewed as one determined by party politics rather than an appreciation of the strategic landscape.” Politics, not policy, drove the entire process — the politics of indecision.

La décision de d’exclure le Canada de la défense antimissile balistique (DMB) a été motivée par la priorité qu’il s’était donné d’obtenir une majorité parlementaire, et notamment de regagner des sièges au Québec, où l’opposition au projet de défense américain est la plus forte. Sa déclaration du 24 février visait aussi à court-circuiter une résolution s’opposant à la DMB que l’aile jeunesse de son parti aurait présentée au congrès libéral de la semaine suivante. « On doit donc considérer que la politique partisane a déterminé cette décision de rejeter un projet d’importance nationale et continentale comme la DMB, écrit David Rudd, plutôt qu’une appréciation de la conjoncture stratégique. » Au lieu de principes politiques, l’ensemble du processus aura reposé sur un jeu politique : celui de l’indécision.

n a press conference on February 24, Prime Minister he reject the rationale behind the defence system. This is Paul Martin ended years of speculation as to whether very significant, in that he conceded the day to BMD-pho- I Ottawa would support Washington’s plan to develop a bic Liberals without explicitly endorsing their view that mis- system to shoot down inter-continental ballistic missiles sile defence is a dangerous pursuit — one from which fired by so-called rogue states. In Canada, few were surprised Canada should dissociate itself in thought, word and deed. by the negative response, although the manner in which it That the prime minister’s number one political priority was arrived at caused widespread consternation even among is gaining a parliamentary majority is well-known, as is the those skeptical of the program’s merits. This article will fact and he did not want to jeopardize his electoral fortunes assess the reasons given in public and in private for the deci- by fomenting a caucus revolt in advance of the Liberal con- sion (including the Liberal party’s principal arguments vention on March 2. By pre-empting the firestorm that against missile defence) and evaluate its impact on Canada- awaited him, he showed extreme sensitivity not only to his US relations in the short term. own leadership prospects, but to party concerns, insofar as Martin straddled the fence for as long as he could before they depended on shoring up support in his home province. finally, albeit reluctantly, jumping down on the side of The reported on March 4 that Defence Minister those counseling against Canadian participation in the bal- Bill Graham had stated that the government’s position had, listic missile defence (BMD) program. With a palpable sense in effect, been determined by a “peace camp” working with- of awkwardness, and knowing that he was speaking to in the Quebec wing of the Liberal party. domestic and American audiences, he delivered the “no” in a solicitous, almost apologetic fashion. He was careful not to ike his predecessor, Jean Chrétien, Martin did not order begrudge the United Sates its right to defend itself, nor did L a made-in-Canada study of the immediacy of the ballis-

30 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MAI 2005 Muddling through on missile defence: the politics of indecision tic missile threat or how it might (or other orbiting sensors would be direct- Kinsella offered as “evidence” the results might not) have been made more so ly and solely related to missile defence of an opinion poll stating that many by the undeniable proliferation of are inaccurate. The technology Canada European countries disagree with the nuclear weapons and missile technolo- is considering for space surveillance course of US foreign policy. This is con- gy. Had Prime Minster Martin declined would be deployed even if missile fusing one issue with another, as there is participation based on a sober judg- defence was a non-issue. no indication that the poll sought opin- ment of the likelihood of a terrorist Further post facto justifications ion on the wisdom or desirability of group or rogue state launching a mis- appeared in the March 2 edition of the missile defence. Critics may be surprised sile at North America, he may have . Former Liberal party to learn that Britain, Denmark, and been on solid ground. That he did not strategist Warren Kinsella mounted a are on board, and that do so robbed the public of an opportu- passionate defence of the govern- Germany, Italy and Japan are co-operat- nity to do something it seems strange- ment’s decision not to take an active ing with the US on projects to defend ly disinclined to do: separate the part in program, citing the technical against medium-range ballistic missiles. As to whether missile The governing party may now rest easy that the issue has been defence is irrevocably unpop- decided. But it was clearly not done so for the reasons put forth ular in Canada, there is no by one of its leading members. That the decision was reached evidence of this. Until recent polls, the country was about without the promised parliamentary debate will come as cold evenly divided in polls on comfort to some, but not to everyone. For the activist whether Canada should par- passionately opposed to BMD, the intellectual journey toward ticipate in BMD, with the the political decision is not important. Only the outcome is. strongest opposition in Quebec. Yet there remains a hypothetical from the hyperbole and immaturity of the system, its alleged solid base of support for missile defence, make a fair, rational decision on a mat- unpopularity in Canada and around even though it has been a cause without ter affecting the security of Canadians. the world, and its capacity to stoke the a champion in Canada. At the The decision not to embrace BMD embers of a new arms race. Conservative convention later in March, as a matter of national or continental The succinctness with which these Stephen Harper did re-open the debate, importance should, therefore, be arguments were presented was in inverse saying Canada should be at the table, viewed as one determined primarily by proportion to their value as a reasoned and that as prime minister he would re- party politics than by an appreciation assessment of the Martin government’s open talks with the US. Even at the of the strategic landscape (a fact decision-making. If there was indeed a Liberal convention, Michael Ignatieff in recently confirmed to the author by a thought process (other than one involv- his keynote address also suggested former Liberal cabinet minister). This ing those considerations listed above) Canada needed to be at the table. No is arguably the Canadian way. All poli- which culminated in the February 24 policy proposal is likely to be popular tics is local, even in matters pertaining announcement, it is unlikelly to have unless it is discussed thoroughly and to international security. Martin’s followed the intellectual path laid out by without rancour or fear-mongering. As apparent flip-flop, after all but endors- Kinsella in his editorial. the government refrained from fostering ing Canada’s participation in April of The argument that missile defence debate on the matter, the public cannot 2003, may be incomprehensible to doesn’t currently work, is certainly be assured that it had all the facts before some, particularly in the United States. correct. But neither did humanity mas- it is alleged to have made up its mind. But this too is the Canadian way. ter powered flight until many years The prime minister justified his (and many costly failures) after the erhaps the answer to the unpopu- stance by saying that Canada had other first attempt. Breakthrough technolo- P larity of the issue rests in the oft- defence priorities, as if to suggest that gies take time to mature, and ones cre- repeated but thoroughly discredited participation in BMD would preclude ated specifically for tasks that have no argument that missile defence would the fulfillment of the defence commit- civilian equivalent take even more ignite an arms race. A cursory review of ments (worth an estimated $12.8-bil- time to come into their own. The truth history reveals that countries do not ini- lion) announced in the February 23 may be that critics, including many tiate arms races just because one nation federal budget. This was somewhat learned scientific minds, do not want has purchased a new system; they begin disingenuous, as there is no evidence the technology to work. This is not the first with deep, mutual suspicions, a that Canadian participation in the US same as saying that it can never work. sense that one’s nation is destined, at program would have required massive To prove that participation in the some point in the future, to come into outlays of capital. Suggestions that US-led program would pit Canada conflict with another. This explains the expenditures on RADARSAT-2 and against the tide of world opinion, battleship race between two imperial

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rivals — Britain and Germany — prior arsenals are shrinking in size, not As to the principal fear among the to the First World War, and the nuclear expanding. And China’s limited arsenal Liberal party rank-and-file — that the arms races of the Cold War. In both would exist (and be modernized) even missile defence will inevitably cases, the protagonists responded to in the absence of missile defence. weaponize space — no argument was their mutual suspicions (cause) by ratch- Kinsella’s defence of Martin drew put forth as to why this was inherent- eting up the number of strategic upon Russia’s objections to BMD, but ly more objectionable than the weapons in their arsenals (effect). without examining whether they had weaponization of the skies, land, and For an arms race to occur in con- any legitimate basis, or why they neces- oceans. Nor was there any concession temporary times, the purveyors of the sarily counted more than American con- to the possibility that US strategic arms race theory would have Canadians cerns over the proliferation of missile goals could one day be achieved with- believe that the Cold War did not really technology. The issue may be of less out recourse to space-based weapons. end, and that Russia and the US are on importance now that both Moscow and (The technology absorbing the lion’s a collision course. The reality is some- Beijing have basically resigned them- share of research and development what less dramatic. No one in selves to Washington’s plans. Both feel funding involves land- and sea-based Washington or Moscow can conceive of that there is more to gain by co-operating interceptors, as well as a laser mounted a situation in which the two former on trade and counter-terrorism than in in a modified passenger jet.) rivals will lock horns militarily. There is bickering over who deploys what tech- Related fears that missile defence is no US-Russian nuclear “balance” to nology, especially when that technology but a fig-leaf for a plan to wage war upset; mutually assured destruction is a gives America a more palatable option against the satellites of others nations relationship made obsolete by the fall of than obliterating a country foolish ignores the fact that the technology the Berlin Wall. US and Russian nuclear enough to throw a nuclear missile at it. required to shoot down a satellite has

CP Photo

Prime Minister Paul Martin, here with US President George W. Bush in the Oval Office, failed to inform him at the NATO summit of Canada’s decision not to participate in the missile defence program, which may explain why it took Bush nine days to return Martin’s call. The whole process was driven by party politics, not by public policy considerations.

32 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MAI 2005 Muddling through on missile defence: the politics of indecision been proven without having to base member of the North American Minister Pierre Pettigrew to inform Dr. any weapons in orbit. (In 1986 the US Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Rice that the matter had been decided. Air Force launched a rocket-powered Part of NORAD’s mandate is to detect This is in contrast to Brian anti-satellite weapon from the belly of missile launches and track the missile to Mulroney’s forthrightness with Ronald an F-15 fighter, which in turn deployed its intended target. These are the first two Reagan, with whom he had cultivated a solid metal cylinder into the orbital steps in the interception process. Thus as good personal relations long before he path of a derelict satellite.) Indeed, as long as Canada is a member of NORAD it said “no” to participation in the US the US is the most space-dependent will have one foot planted firmly on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). country in the world, it has the least to playing field. Indeed, Canada’s foot has There were no hurt feelings in gain and by far the most to lose by wag- been there since the first Soviet missiles Washington, as Mulroney had never ing war via “killer satellite.” The notion, entered service decades ago. To pretend articulated his support for SDI, only to put forth by some BMD opponents, that Canada is (or will be) virginal when withdraw it a year later. that such devices would inevitably be it comes to ballistic missile defence is an deployed and used to bombard cities is exercise in naïvete, if not outright self- rom the point of view of the Bush sooth-saying at its worst, and as far- delusion. F administration, Canada’s support fetched as the idea that their true pur- In the immediate aftermath of the was desirable on practical as well and pose would be to protect the earth from decision US Secretary of State political grounds; it makes sense for errant asteroids. Condoleeza Rice cancelled a planned NORAD’s warning and tracking func- The governing party may tions to be married with the now rest easy that the issue has On the security side, several interception function. But been decided. But it was clearly questions need to be answered. Will American officials have known not done so for the reasons put all along that the decision ulti- forth by one of its leading the US agree to install a partition at mately facing Canadians was members. That the decision NORAD headquarters, separating not whether to acquiesce to the was reached without the prom- the joint warning and attack inclusion of the system within ised parliamentary debate will assessment infrastructure from the NORAD, but rather how they come as cold comfort to some, would reconcile themselves to but not to everyone. For the interception capability? It seems a decision that was, to all activist passionately opposed to improbable that Washington would intents and purposes, BMD, the intellectual journey tilt even further at Canadian political Washington’s to make. toward the political decision is windmills, especially given the Thus despite the surprise not important. Only the out- and bewilderment in the White come is. obfuscation and meandering that House, the Bush administration have characterized Ottawa’s position will likely mutter to itself and hortly before the PM’s on the issue. get on with the job. The actual S announcement, Canada’s interception of an in-bound mis- new ambassador to the US, Frank trip to Ottawa. Amid the usual protesta- sile will be handled by US Northern McKenna, remarked that Canada would tions that the visit was a casualty of a Command (NORTHCOM), a headquar- have some role to play in the system — scheduling conflict, unnamed US ters established post-9/11 to handle this despite the government’s insistence sources maintained that the Bush unconventional threats to North that no decision had been made. His administration’s beef was the expecta- America, and one Canada made great statement, and the uproar it caused, tions Martin had raised, as well as the spectacle of refusing to join. But the should be viewed as the consequence of way in which the answer was ultimate- division of labour does little to mask Ottawa’s decision not to engage ly conveyed. On March 7, Canwest close co-operation and co-dependence Canadians directly on whether Canada’s News Service printed remarks by out- between NORAD and NORTHCOM. security would be enhanced or dimin- going US Ambassador Paul Cellucci to Indeed, an April 5 Canadian Press story ished by BMD. When the government the effect that Martin had long assured quoted Defence Minister Graham as say- absents itself from national discussion Washington that Canada would even- ing that NORAD would have died in on key issues, confusion, ambiguity and tually climb aboard. As Martin’s mind 2004 had Canada not consented to the consternation are the inevitable result. was probably made up by the time par- sharing of missile flight data gathered But McKenna was essentially correct. liament rose for the Christmas 2004 by NORAD radars with NORTHCOM. It is misleading to suggest that Canada break, he could have expressed his new- Canadians will now have to assess will be completely divorced from the found reservations to President Bush at the politico-economic and security missile defence effort as a result of the the NATO summit the following implications of their government’s government’s decision. Canada is a February. Instead he left it to Foreign response. Will relations with their most

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important economic and security part- as merely a fence-mending gesture or One senses is that by saying “no” ner be plunged into the deep freeze? the result of a sober appraisal of so politely to ballistic missile Unlikely, as there are too many areas of Canada’s security interests? And what defence, the prime minister was common interest, including the free will Ottawa bring to the table in terms attempting to defuse a bomb which flow of goods in both directions and the of hard assets? The much-touted appro- could have scuppered his pre-election increasing dependence of the US on priations for defence made no mention goal of improving relations with the Canadian oil and gas. Will relations remain Will Ottawa consent to the expansion of NORAD’s mandate harmonious at all levels? during the 2006 renewal talks to include coastal defence? If it That is equally difficult to does, should this be seen as merely a fence-mending gesture or say, although talk of link- the result of a sober appraisal of Canada’s security interests? age between BMD and outstanding trade disputes And what will Ottawa bring to the table in terms of hard is being discussed openly. assets? The much-touted appropriations for defence made no A telephone call from the mention of additional ships for the Canadian Navy or Coast prime minister to Presi- Guard, both of which face varying degrees of obsolescence. dent Bush after the announcement went unanswered for of additional ships for the Canadian Bush administration. He was at pains ten days. A senior Canadian consular Navy or Coast Guard, both of which to minimize the fallout of his retreat official in the US told the author that face varying degrees of obsolescence. from clear, if not qualified, support the administration had no expectations for a program which, for better or that anything of substance would result learly, any claim as to how the worse, lies at the heart of US national from the US-Mexico-Canada summit in C “no” will affect Canada-US securi- security planning. Had Martin deliv- Waco, Texas on March 23. In the mean- ty relations over the long term requires ered his answer in a truculent or defi- time, security continues to trump trade the ability to see into the minds of ant fashion, had he threatened to in the United States — something that, future administrations and congres- lead an international crusade against according to the same consular official, sional leaders. An impossible task to be BMD, Washington would have taken Canadian politicians and business lead- sure, although the tone and results of a much keener interest in Canada’s ers forget at their peril. the NORAD renewal talks in 2006 BMD “debate” (and its distinctly On the security side, several ques- should give some clue as to whether anti-American undertones) than it tions need to be answered. Will the US there is sufficient mutual trust and con- ultimately did. With a security-con- agree to install a partition at NORAD fidence to let the relationship evolve in scious neighbour holding the keys to Headquarters, separating the joint warn- a manner advantageous to both parties. a harmonious trading relationship, ing and attack assessment infrastructure In the meantime, Canada’s appetite the prime minister could scarcely let from the interception capability? It seems for deeper collaboration was reflected in that happen. improbable that Washington would tilt the caution with which the recommen- Canada’s position on BMD is analo- even further at Canadian political wind- dations of a tri-national panel of govern- gous to the conscription crises of the two mills, especially given the obfuscation ment and business leaders were greeted. world wars. Back then, the issue of com- and meandering that have characterized Speaking on March 14, the senior pulsory military service was so con- Ottawa’s position on the issue. Canadian member of the panel, former tentious that the Liberal government Deputy Prime Minister John Manley, pro- feared an internal revolt, led by its ill Martin’s demand that “sov- posed the creation of a “North American Quebec wing. Thus the mantra, W ereign” Canada be consulted economic and security community.” The “Conscription if necessary, but not nec- before the United States acted against intent would be to allow the free flow of essarily conscription.” Fast forward to and incoming missile? Leaving aside goods and labour within the geographi- the BMD muddle of 2005 and Canadians the question of whether there would cal space. New, tri-service defence ties are left with “Participation if necessary, even be time to do so, it is difficult to would be co-ordinated through a second- but not necessarily participation.” conceive of any circumstances under generation NORAD, while more strin- Only a Canadian could have which the US government would seek gent and harmonized border controls forged (fudged?) such a compromise. the approval of anyone outside the would be established at the peripheries — Martin could have done worse. But he BMD tent. a prospect which prompted a string of could also have done better. Will Ottawa consent to the expan- editorial criticism and re-ignited fears of sion of NORAD’s mandate during the the imminent death of Canada’s unique David Rudd is president and executive 2006 renewal talks to include coastal immigration policies, plus an irrevocable director of the Canadian Institute of defence? If it does, should this be seen loss of sovereignty. Strategic Studies. (www.ciss.ca)

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