Wit.004.002.0001
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WIT.004.002.0001 2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION Letters Patent issued 16 February 2009 SECOND WITNESS STATEMENT OF RUSSELL JAMES REES Date of Document: 8 May 2009 Solicitor's Code: 7977 Filed on behalf of: The State of Victoria Telephone: +61 386840444 Prepared by: Facsimile: +61 386840449 Victorian Government Solicitor's Office DX 300077 Melbourne Level 25 Ref: PAC 944884 121 Exhibition Street Attention: John Cain Melbourne VIC 3000 Table of Contents MATTERS TO BE ADDRESSED 2 OVERVIEW CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR FIRES 3 Kilmore East fire , 3 Warnings 5 Resources 6 Weather observations 6 Vectis fire 6 Warnings 7 Resources 7 Weather observations 8 Coleraine Fire 8 Warnings 9 Resources 9 Weather observations 9 Weerite fire , " "' .., " 10 Warnings 10 Resources 11 Weather observations 11 Churchill fire ." "' , 11 Warnings 12 Resources 13 Weather observations 14 Redesdale fire 14 Warnings 15 Resources 15 Weather observations 15 Maiden Gully fire , 15 Warnings 16 Resources 16 Weather Observations 17 WIT.004.002.0002 1. By letter dated 4 May 2009, I have been asked to provide a further statement to the 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission (Royal Commission). In that letter, I have been asked to again address the following matters: "(iii) any changes to the details and content of warnings relating to the 'stay or go' policy over the period of the fires; (iv) the spread of the fires; (v) the nature, intensity, rate of progression and particular features of the 2009 bushfires (in general terms) by comparison with other recent major bushfires in Victoria." 2. It is requested that this additional statement set out information providing a chronological description of each of the fires. 3. My response to the request of 4 May 2009 is set out as follows: 3.1 I confirm my response to matters described in (iii), (iv) and (v) of paragraph 1. 3.2 I provide an overview chronology of the major fires for which CFA was the control agency, namely fires at Kilmore East, Vectis, Coleraine, Weerite, Churchill, Redesdale and Maiden Gully. I note that the statement of Ewan Waller dated 1 May 2009 includes a summary for the fires at Bunyip, Murrindindi, Dargo, East Tyers and Murmungee, for which DSE Fire was the primary control agency. 4. In response to the letter of 4 May 2009 I have also provided the following material to the Royal Commission: • fire investigation reports that have been completed for fires on 7 February 2009; • chronology of fire events derived from IMS and CAD data; • State fire situation reports for 7 February 2009; • incident shift plans from 6, 7 and 8 February 2009; • diagrams and maps of fires produced on 7 February 2009 in the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre (IECC). MATTERS TO BE ADDRESSED 5. I have been asked to comment on '(iii) any changes to the details and content of warnings relating to the 'stay or go' policy over the period of the fires'. 6. At paragraph 426 on page 124 of my statement to the Royal Commission on 1 May 2009 (the initial statement), I outlined that I was aware of only one change to the standard content of warnings relating to the "prepare, stay and defend or leave early" advice that was issued during the period of the fires, and I describe that one incident. WIT.004.002.0003 3 7. I have been asked to comment on '(iv) the fire spread'. 8. At paragraphs 346-350 on page 86 of the initial statement, I explain that final fire progression maps are not yet available. I describe the maps attached to my statement in general terms. These maps show an approximate point of origin for each fire and an interim final perimeter of the area the fire has burned, and where possible, indicate the spread of the fires over time. In these paragraphs I sought to address the information requested in (iv) in general terms. 9. I have been asked to comment on '(v) the nature, intensity, rate of progression and particular features of the 2009 bushfires (in general terms) by comparison with other recent major bushfires in Victoria' . 10. At paragraphs 287-289 on pages 66-67 of the initial statement I describe the weather conditions of the fire by comparison to the fires of Ash Wednesday. At paragraphs 351-356 on page 87, I describe the behaviour and characteristics of particular types of fires that burned on 7 February. In paragraphs 363-369 on pages 89·90 of the initial statement I describe fire spread and intensity in general terms, as opposed to on a fire to fire basis. In addition, paragraphs 381-385 on page 93 sets out the impact of the fires on a fire by fire basis. OVERVIEW CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR FIRES 11. I have been requested to provide an additional statement that sets out information providing a chronological description of each of the fires. 12. In this section, I provide a summary of the nature and behaviour of the fire for each of the major fires for which CFA was the control agency. I have provided a summary of key operational considerations and resource deployments and a some examples of the provision of warnings regarding the fires. I note the suspected cause of each fire, its size and resource deployments and provide weather observations recorded at weather stations near to the fire. 13. I have drawn this summary from subsequent discussions with a range of CFA personnel, reviews of IMS and CAD data. preliminary fire investigation reports (where available), weather data and warnings data. The warnings data referred to in this statement is drawn from messages posted to the CFA website on 7 and 8 February 2009, a copy of which was provided at Annexure 31 of the initial statement. Kilmore East fire 14. A fire was reported to CFA at 1149 hours on Saunders Road. Kilmore East, west of the Hume Freeway and east of the Sydney - Melbourne railway line. Initial reports were from the Mount Hickey fire tower and 000 calls. It is believed the cause of this fire was a failure of electrical assets/powerlines. The origin was in undulating pasture country interspersed with pockets of native vegetation, cleared and standing plantations. 15. Five local brigades were paged to respond to the fire at 1149 hours. Further brigades were paged at 1202 hours. The Midway Forest Industry Brigade was also alerted to the fire. WIT.004.002.0004 4 16. Due to fire behaviour, aircraft deployments were ineffective in controlling the fire and only useful in asset protection around houses and buildings. An aerial line scan was conducted on this fire at 1233 hours. Further line scans were not able to be completed due to weather conditions until 2145 hours that evening. As such, personnel developed predictions about the likely course of the fire from information provided from the fire line, lookout towers, ground observers, and radio traffic. Smoke in the area restricted the capacity to view and predict the movement of the fire. 17. At around 1245 hours it was requested that the Hume Freeway be closed. The fire is reported to have crossed the Hume Freeway at 1358 hours. At the time the fire crossed the Hume Freeway at Heathcote Junction, the front of the fire was reported to be 3 kilometres wide between Clonbinane Road and the Wandong Broadford Road. 18. Between 1400 hours and 1700 hours the fire front travelled another 6 kilometres through plantation country and agricultural land before entering forest areas. From there it travelled across the Great Dividing Range at Mount Disappointment to the Whittlesea Yea Road, just south of the settlement of Kinglake West. 19. The forest between Wandong and KingJake is a mixed species forest dominated by Stringybark and Peppermint species with pockets of gum bark species such as Manna Gum, Grey Gum and Mountain Ash in the gully systems and on the higher elevations. These fuels contributed to significant spotting under extreme conditions. 20. During the period from 1400 to 1700 hours the fire was under the influence of a north westerly wind varying in strength from 60 kilometres per hour to 90 kilometres per hour. Upper wind and surface wind were both affecting the fire. By the time the fire had reached the Whittlesea Yea Road, the fire was reported to be approximately 6 kilometres wide. Spot fires were reported at Humevale, St Andrews and Steels Creek, which are all below the ridge line. 21. By 1800 hours appliances (that is, vehicles in CFA's fleet of emergency response vehicles, including tankers, pumpers and communications vehicles) were responding to new fires at Humevale, Strathewen, Arthurs Creek, Yarra Glen, Gruyere and Healesville. All of these fires are considered to have been caused by spot fires from the main fire. When the southerly wind change occurred between 1800 and 1900 hours all of the spot fires and the eastern flank of the main fire generally headed in a north-easterly direction. 22. At this time, it was not possible to secure the eastern flank of the fire. The fire was moving through heavy fuels. 23. From the East Kilmore - Wandong section of the fire, the front headed generally north along the Hume Freeway towards Reedy Creek. Between Wandong and Kinglake West the fire burnt through the remainder of the Wallaby Creek catchment, the King/ake National Park and the Mount Disappointment Forest and impacted on the settlements of Flowerdale, Hazeldene and Silver Creek progressively through the evening. For example, the fire is believed to have reached Flowerdale at approximately 2300 - 2400 hours. 24. From Strathewen and Humevale the fire headed generally north through Kinglake central, Castella and along the Melba Highway towards the settlement of Glenburn.