WIT.004.002.0001

2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION Letters Patent issued 16 February 2009

SECOND WITNESS STATEMENT OF RUSSELL JAMES REES

Date of Document: 8 May 2009 Solicitor's Code: 7977 Filed on behalf of: The State of Victoria Telephone: +61 386840444 Prepared by: Facsimile: +61 386840449 Victorian Government Solicitor's Office DX 300077 Melbourne Level 25 Ref: PAC 944884 121 Exhibition Street Attention: John Cain Melbourne VIC 3000

Table of Contents

MATTERS TO BE ADDRESSED 2 OVERVIEW CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR FIRES 3 Kilmore East fire , 3 Warnings 5 Resources 6 Weather observations 6 Vectis fire 6 Warnings 7 Resources 7 Weather observations 8 Coleraine Fire 8 Warnings 9 Resources 9 Weather observations 9 Weerite fire , " "' .., " 10 Warnings 10 Resources 11 Weather observations 11 Churchill fire ." "' , 11 Warnings 12 Resources 13 Weather observations 14 Redesdale fire 14 Warnings 15 Resources 15 Weather observations 15 Maiden Gully fire , 15 Warnings 16 Resources 16 Weather Observations 17 WIT.004.002.0002

1. By letter dated 4 May 2009, I have been asked to provide a further statement to the 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission (Royal Commission). In that letter, I have been asked to again address the following matters:

"(iii) any changes to the details and content of warnings relating to the 'stay or go' policy over the period of the fires;

(iv) the spread of the fires;

(v) the nature, intensity, rate of progression and particular features of the 2009 bushfires (in general terms) by comparison with other recent major bushfires in Victoria."

2. It is requested that this additional statement set out information providing a chronological description of each of the fires.

3. My response to the request of 4 May 2009 is set out as follows:

3.1 I confirm my response to matters described in (iii), (iv) and (v) of paragraph 1.

3.2 I provide an overview chronology of the major fires for which CFA was the control agency, namely fires at Kilmore East, Vectis, Coleraine, Weerite, Churchill, Redesdale and Maiden Gully. I note that the statement of Ewan Waller dated 1 May 2009 includes a summary for the fires at Bunyip, Murrindindi, Dargo, East Tyers and Murmungee, for which DSE Fire was the primary control agency.

4. In response to the letter of 4 May 2009 I have also provided the following material to the Royal Commission:

• fire investigation reports that have been completed for fires on 7 February 2009;

• chronology of fire events derived from IMS and CAD data;

• State fire situation reports for 7 February 2009;

• incident shift plans from 6, 7 and 8 February 2009;

• diagrams and maps of fires produced on 7 February 2009 in the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre (IECC).

MATTERS TO BE ADDRESSED

5. I have been asked to comment on '(iii) any changes to the details and content of warnings relating to the 'stay or go' policy over the period of the fires'.

6. At paragraph 426 on page 124 of my statement to the Royal Commission on 1 May 2009 (the initial statement), I outlined that I was aware of only one change to the standard content of warnings relating to the "prepare, stay and defend or leave early" advice that was issued during the period of the fires, and I describe that one incident. WIT.004.002.0003

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7. I have been asked to comment on '(iv) the fire spread'.

8. At paragraphs 346-350 on page 86 of the initial statement, I explain that final fire progression maps are not yet available. I describe the maps attached to my statement in general terms. These maps show an approximate point of origin for each fire and an interim final perimeter of the area the fire has burned, and where possible, indicate the spread of the fires over time. In these paragraphs I sought to address the information requested in (iv) in general terms.

9. I have been asked to comment on '(v) the nature, intensity, rate of progression and particular features of the 2009 bushfires (in general terms) by comparison with other recent major bushfires in Victoria' .

10. At paragraphs 287-289 on pages 66-67 of the initial statement I describe the weather conditions of the fire by comparison to the fires of Ash Wednesday. At paragraphs 351-356 on page 87, I describe the behaviour and characteristics of particular types of fires that burned on 7 February. In paragraphs 363-369 on pages 89·90 of the initial statement I describe fire spread and intensity in general terms, as opposed to on a fire to fire basis. In addition, paragraphs 381-385 on page 93 sets out the impact of the fires on a fire by fire basis.

OVERVIEW CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR FIRES

11. I have been requested to provide an additional statement that sets out information providing a chronological description of each of the fires.

12. In this section, I provide a summary of the nature and behaviour of the fire for each of the major fires for which CFA was the control agency. I have provided a summary of key operational considerations and resource deployments and a some examples of the provision of warnings regarding the fires. I note the suspected cause of each fire, its size and resource deployments and provide weather observations recorded at weather stations near to the fire.

13. I have drawn this summary from subsequent discussions with a range of CFA personnel, reviews of IMS and CAD data. preliminary fire investigation reports (where available), weather data and warnings data. The warnings data referred to in this statement is drawn from messages posted to the CFA website on 7 and 8 February 2009, a copy of which was provided at Annexure 31 of the initial statement.

Kilmore East fire

14. A fire was reported to CFA at 1149 hours on Saunders Road. Kilmore East, west of the Hume Freeway and east of the Sydney - Melbourne railway line. Initial reports were from the Mount Hickey fire tower and 000 calls. It is believed the cause of this fire was a failure of electrical assets/powerlines. The origin was in undulating pasture country interspersed with pockets of native vegetation, cleared and standing plantations.

15. Five local brigades were paged to respond to the fire at 1149 hours. Further brigades were paged at 1202 hours. The Midway Forest Industry Brigade was also alerted to the fire. WIT.004.002.0004

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16. Due to fire behaviour, aircraft deployments were ineffective in controlling the fire and only useful in asset protection around houses and buildings. An aerial line scan was conducted on this fire at 1233 hours. Further line scans were not able to be completed due to weather conditions until 2145 hours that evening. As such, personnel developed predictions about the likely course of the fire from information provided from the fire line, lookout towers, ground observers, and radio traffic. Smoke in the area restricted the capacity to view and predict the movement of the fire.

17. At around 1245 hours it was requested that the Hume Freeway be closed. The fire is reported to have crossed the Hume Freeway at 1358 hours. At the time the fire crossed the Hume Freeway at Heathcote Junction, the front of the fire was reported to be 3 kilometres wide between Clonbinane Road and the Wandong Broadford Road.

18. Between 1400 hours and 1700 hours the fire front travelled another 6 kilometres through plantation country and agricultural land before entering forest areas. From there it travelled across the Great Dividing Range at Mount Disappointment to the Whittlesea Yea Road, just south of the settlement of Kinglake West.

19. The forest between Wandong and KingJake is a mixed species forest dominated by Stringybark and Peppermint species with pockets of gum bark species such as Manna Gum, Grey Gum and Mountain Ash in the gully systems and on the higher elevations. These fuels contributed to significant spotting under extreme conditions.

20. During the period from 1400 to 1700 hours the fire was under the influence of a north westerly wind varying in strength from 60 kilometres per hour to 90 kilometres per hour. Upper wind and surface wind were both affecting the fire. By the time the fire had reached the Whittlesea Yea Road, the fire was reported to be approximately 6 kilometres wide. Spot fires were reported at Humevale, St Andrews and Steels Creek, which are all below the ridge line.

21. By 1800 hours appliances (that is, vehicles in CFA's fleet of emergency response vehicles, including tankers, pumpers and communications vehicles) were responding to new fires at Humevale, Strathewen, Arthurs Creek, Yarra Glen, Gruyere and Healesville. All of these fires are considered to have been caused by spot fires from the main fire. When the southerly wind change occurred between 1800 and 1900 hours all of the spot fires and the eastern flank of the main fire generally headed in a north-easterly direction.

22. At this time, it was not possible to secure the eastern flank of the fire. The fire was moving through heavy fuels.

23. From the East Kilmore - Wandong section of the fire, the front headed generally north along the Hume Freeway towards Reedy Creek. Between Wandong and Kinglake West the fire burnt through the remainder of the Wallaby Creek catchment, the King/ake National Park and the Mount Disappointment Forest and impacted on the settlements of Flowerdale, Hazeldene and Silver Creek progressively through the evening. For example, the fire is believed to have reached Flowerdale at approximately 2300 - 2400 hours.

24. From Strathewen and Humevale the fire headed generally north through Kinglake central, Castella and along the Melba Highway towards the settlement of Glenburn. The Kilmore East fire did not join with the Murrindindi fire on 7 February 2009.

25. Throughout the night, and the following days, as the fire reached grassland areas it was stopped and the edge of the fire progressively secured. However, in the

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forested areas particularly in the Maroondah catchment and Toolangi State Forest and Yarra Ranges National Park, considerable work was required to secure the edge prior to upcoming deteriorating weather.

26. In particular, the fire caused considerable concern around the Healesville area over the next few days as containment works, including back burning and burning out, continued.

27. The fire was listed as contained on IMS on 16 February 2009. 'Contained' means the perimeter of the fire is no longer growing, though there may be fire activity within that perimeter. The combined total size of the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was 255,300 hectares.

Warnings

28. Some warning messages for the Kilmore East fire were issued from the Seymour RECC (authorised by the Regional Coordinator) and the IECC (authorised by the State Duty Officer), in addition to those issued from Kilmore ICC.

29. At 1240 hours an initial awareness message was issued for the Kilmore East fire for the communities of Kilmore East, Wandong and Clonbinane.

30. Urgent threat messages were issued progressively for communities to the south­ east and east of the fire and subsequently updated as further information was available. At 1440 hours an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website for the community of Wandong and messages were progressively posted for the communities of Hidden Valley (at 1505 hours), Whittlesea (at 1533 hours), Heathcote Junction and Upper Plenty (at 1605 hours), Humevale, Arthurs Creek, Eden Park, Nutfield and Doreen (at 1635 hours) and for communities from Kinglake to Flowerdale (at 1755 hours).

31. At 1845 hours, an urgent threat message posted to the CFA website noted that the communities of Wandong, Wallan, Wallan East, Eden Park and Whittlesea, Humevale, Bruces Creek, Upper Plenty, Kinglake West, Pheasant Creek, Smiths Gully, Kinglake, Flowerdale, Glenburn and Hurstbridge may be directly impacted by fire.

32. As the fire continued to burn through the night, an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website at 2232 hours advising of possible direct attack on communities in the area of Broadford, namely Broadford, Broadford East in the area of O'Gradys Road, South of Broadford, Broadford - Wandong/Sunday Creek Road, Reedy Creek and Tyaak. Residents were reminded not to expect firefighting trucks to be in attendance if the fire front approached their properties .

33. In the morning of 8 February 2009, the fire was described as burning in the Yarra Valley near Kinglake, burning in a north easterly direction. An urgent threat message posted to the CFA website at 0438 hours stated that the communities of Kinglake, Kinglake West, Toolangi, Glenburn, Strathewen, Chum Creek, Dixons Creek, Castella, Pheasant Creek, Doreen, Yan Yean, Woodstock, Mernda, Mittons Bridge, Hurstbridge, St Andrews, Panton Hills, Arthurs Creek, Smiths Gully, Christmas Hills, Healesville, Yarra Glen, Coldstream, Tarrawarra and Steels Creek have been and may be directly impacted upon by this fire.

34. Further messages posted to the CFA website during the morning of 8 February 2009 advised that the fire was burning towards the Glenburn area, in particular Glenburn and settlements to the north and north east along the Melba Highway and WIT.004.002.0006

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Yea River Valley towards Murrindindi at 0929 hours. Warnings were also posted for the communities of Yea, Seymour and Toolangi.

Resources

35. The Kilmore East fire was managed from the pre-planned Kilmore ICC. The Kangaroo Ground ICC operated primarily as a Divisional Command, as did Whittlesea. Overnight on 7 February leading into 8 February, management of the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was re-aligned on a north-south and east-west arrangement. From the morning of 8 February, Kilmore and Kangaroo Ground ICCs managed the Kilmore East fire, and Alexandra and Woori Yallock ICCs managed the Murrindindi fire.

36. The peak CFA resource commitment over the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was approximately 514 appliances and 2750 personnel.

37. Given the terrain and fuel conditions, it was difficult for many appliances to access the fire edge from the north. Significant resources were deployed to the southern edge of the fire to protect townships from Whittlesea into the Yarra Valley and Healesville area.

38. The multiple large fires in close proximity at Kilmore East, Murrindindi and Bunyip along with a range of other small fires, put pressure on resource capacity.

Weather observations

Observation Kilmore Gap AWS Viewbank AWS Maximum temperature 42.5°C at 1441 and 1442 hours 46.3°C at 1630 hours Minimum relative humidity 8.9% at 1600 hours 6.9% at 1600 hours Wind before change NW 37km/h gusting to 61.1km/h at NW 35.2km/h gusting to 1800 hours 61.1km/h at 1700 hours Wind after change W 16.6km/h gusting to 53.7km/h at WSW 46.3km/h gusting 1810 hours to 98.5km/h at 1729 hours SW 25.9km/h gusting to 50km/h at 1813 hours SW 33.3km/h gusting to 51.8km/h at 1748 hours Maximum FDI >100 at 1442 hours 97.3 at 1630 hours

Vectis fire

39. CFA was first advised of a fire at Remlaw Road, Vectis, near Horsham at 1226 hours. The suspected cause of the fire was powerlines.

40. Initial response to the fire was 4 local brigades with a follow-up request at 1233 for response to increase to 10 tankers. WIT.004.002.0007

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41. The fire was a fast running fire burning through crop and grazing land in a south­ easterly direction. The light to moderate fuel loads on this fire meant that this fire was of moderate to high intensity.

42. Aircraft was requested for this fire at 1246 hours.

43. At approximately 1315, the fire was into the Wimmera River area and was also reported some distance ahead around the Haven area, indicating possible spotting activity. As the fire burned through the dry river bed and surrounding river flats, the river red gums in the river bed and associated scrub provided elevated fuels, and the fire spotted ahead for relatively short distances.

44. The fire burned through the Horsham Golf Club, destroying the club house. The fire burned through the rough areas of the golf course, which also provided conditions for the fire to continue spotting.

45. At approximately 1415 hours, the forward run of the fire to the south was stopped. Most of the eastern flank of the fire was contained. Only a narrow section of the fire broke out with the wind change and continued to burn.

46. The wind change moved through Horsham at approximately 1628 hours. The distance that the short section of fire that continued to burn in an easterly direction is an indicator of the strength of the wind at this time.

47. At 1652 the fire was reported to have crossed the Western Highway

48. The fire was controlled and stopped at various land features including roadside and irrigation channels, hence its irregular shape. At 1820 it was reported that the fire was stopped at the Horsham Lubeck Road.

49. The fire was listed as contained at 1531 on 8 February 2009. The total size of the fire was 2200 hectares.

Warnings

50. An urgent threat message for the communities of Haven, McKenzie Creek and through to Wonwondah west of Horsham was posted to the CFA website at approximately 1320 hours. An urgent threat message for the communities of Haven, McKenzie Creek, Bungalally and Green Lake west of Horsham was posted at 1456 hours. This warning noted that when the wind change came through the area, the communities on the eastern side of the Western Highway between Drung Drung South and Horsham may be under threat. A further message providing information on the progress of the wind change was posted at approximately 1635 hours.

51. An alert message was posted at 2255 hours advising of the fire suppression activity continuing in the area.

Resources

52. The fire was managed by CFA at a pre-planned ICC located at Horsham. Local brigades were dispatched to the fire. Local water-bombing aircraft were also used when weather conditions permitted. At its peak, 41 CFA appliances and 253 personnel attended the fire. DSE crews in Horsham also assisted. WIT.004.002.0008

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Weather observations

Observation Horsham AWS Maximum temperature 45.7°C at 1400 and 1430 hours Minimum relative humidity 7.94% at 1300 hours Wind before change NW 57.4km/h gusting to 81.5km/h at 1500 hours Wind after change WNW 53.7km/h gusting to 64.8km/h at 1517 hours

W 48.1km/h gusting to 74.1km/h at 1530 hours

SW 61.1km/h gusting to 72.2km/h at 1629 hours Maximum FDI >100 at 1400 and 1430 hours

Coleraine Fire

53. The Coleraine fire was a grass fire that started west of the township in undulating grazing land. The first call CFA received of the fire was at 1236 hours. The suspected cause of the fire was a powerline fire.

54. Five local brigades were dispatched to this fire for initial turnout. At 1242 aircraft was requested. Local reports indicated that the fire was growing rapidly. A further 8 tankers were paged at 1243 hours.

55. A major concern from the outset was the township of Coleraine and asset protection for the town was a priority during the initial phases of this fire. Two waterbombing aircraft had been dispatched to this fire following the initial request.

56. There is only limited IMS call data for this fire. Although there was more than one call to 000 regarding this fire, the ESTA operator confirmed with the callers that they were describing the same fire. As such, ESTA only created one event for this fire.

57. The fire behaved typically for a fire occurring in the western districts, albeit in extreme weather conditions. The eastern flank of the fire was not contained before the wind change. The fire burned in a north-easterly direction following the wind change, which passed through at approximately 1300 - 1400 hours.

58. The timing of the wind change was critical to the safety of the town. The fire ran to and through the dry creek bed to the south-west of the town, and then moved with

the force of the wind change at approximately 1323 hours. Generally r grassland fuels were medium and tending to heavy on the river-flat area. Following the wind change, fire behaviour was at its worst with flame heights in the heavy fuels reported at approximately 12 metres. WIT.004.002.0009

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59. There was concern that the wind change would push the fire into the town of Coleraine. Planning was activated for the Coleraine District Health Service to be evacuated. However evacuation did not occur.

60. The fire was stopped at its most easterly point at approximately 1521 hours, and was formally listed as contained at 1721 hours. The total size of the fire was 775 hectares.

Warnings

61. The first urgent threat message for this fire was posted to the CFA website at 1330 hours for the Coleraine fire for the communities of Muntham, Coleraine and Hilgay. The message stated that the fire was burning immediately west of Coleraine, and had jumped the Glenelg Highway, and was burning in an easterly direction. A prior alert or awareness message was not issued for this fire. Updated urgent threat messages were provided with additional information as the fire progressed.

62. There was concern that the wind change would push the fire into the town of Coleraine. Planning was activated for the Coleraine District Health Service to be evacuated. However evacuation did not occur.

63. At 1816 hours a threat downgrade message was posted to the CFA website advising that the fire was contained.

Resources

64. The fire was managed by CFA from a Level 3 ICC, which was located at DSE's Heywood offices. Resources were progressively deployed to this fire from local brigades and other regions. At its peak, there were 55 CFA appliances attending the fire, including a number of Forest Industry Brigade vehicles, with approximately 280 personnel. At least 35 DSE Fire personnel attended this fire.

Weather observations

Observation Hamilton AWS Casterton AWS Maximum temperature 43°C at 1300 hours 42.1°C at 1200 hours Minimum relative humidity 8.9% at 1330 hours 8.9% at 1200 hours Wind before change NW 55.59km/h gusting NW 33.3km/h gusting 77.86km/h at 1330 hours 55.5km/h at 1230 hours Wind after change W 37.06km/h gusting to SW 37.06km/h gustingto 79.6km/h at 1338 hours 57Akm/h at 13:23 hours

SW 33.3km/h gusting to SW 31.5km/h gusting to 42.6km/h at 1617 hours 50.0km/h at 1405 hours Maximum Fire Danger Index >100 at 1300 hours >100 at 1200 hours WIT.004.002.0010

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Weerite fire

65. The first call for a fire grass and scrub south of the highway at Weerite was at 1317 hours. The suspected cause of the fire was originally thought to be suspicious, but it is now thought the fire originated from powerlines. Five local brigades were paged to attend the fire at 1318 hours. Aircraft was requested to support this fire at 1321 hours, as well as police to effect road closures.

66. The fire began near the Princes Highway at Weerite, west of Pomborneit and the Stony Rises. The fire was burning in grazing country in medium to light grassland fuels. The fire burned in a southerly direction, crossing and damaging the Geelong ­ Warrnambool railway line. At 1342 hours V-Line was contacted to stop trains on the railway line.

67. At 1342 hours, advice was received that aircraft was unavailable due to weather conditions.

68. It was reported that the south-west wind change was at Mount Porndon at 1415 hours. Mount Porndon is approximately 5 kilometres south of the fire area. Thereafter, the fire burned in a north-easterly direction towards Lake Corangamite.

69. Resources were progressively increased on this fire, including plans for the protection of Swan Marsh township. Following the wind change, these resources were re-deployed for direct attack.

70. At approximately 1507 hours, the fire crossed the Pomborneit Foxhow Road. The fire continued to burn unchecked in a north to north-easterly direction in grass and stony country until ground observers reported at 1635 hours that the fire had been stopped.

71. Overall, the course of the fire was not unusual. However, fire intensity indicated by flame heights and erratic behaviour made control difficult. The fire exhibited similar fire behaviour to the Coleraine fire, burning through similar fuel types. The fire also burned to a similar fire spread progression to the Coleraine fire. The firefighting effort concentrated on keeping the fire out of the Stony Rises, the elevated basalt lava flows north east of the Pomborneit. If the fire burned through this rough country, it h~d potential to spot erratically and containment time would be greatly extended.

72. The fire was listed as contained at 1211 hours on 8 February 2009. The total size of the fire was 1300 hectares.

Warnings

73. At 1415 hours an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website for residents of Scollers Road, Caters Roads Settlement and Swan Marsh. An awareness message for the communities of Pombornelt, Stoneyford, Swan Marsh and surrounds was posted at 1425 hours. This message was updated and extended to relevant communities as the fire progressed.

74. At approximately 1918 hours a message was posted to the CFA website adVising that the threat had been downgraded to alert status.

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Resources

75. The fire was managed by CFA from a pre-planned ICC located at Colac. The ICC was located in a temporary DSE facility . 42 CFA appliances attended the fire, comprising approximately 298 personnel. .

Weather observations

Observation Mortlake AWS Maximum temperature 45.1°C at 1330 hours Minimum relative humidity 7.9% at 1330 hours Wind before change NW 61.1km/h gusting to 85.2km/h at 1330 hours Wind after change SW 46.3km/h gusting to 72.2km/h at 1413 hours

SSW 24km/h gusting to 31.5km/h at 1930 hours Maximum FDI >100 at 1330 hours

Churchill fire

76. In the initial statement to the Royal Commission of 1 May 2009, the Churchill fire is listed as starting at 1545 hours on 28 January 2009. This is the time and date that the Delburn fire ignited. The Churchill fire was originally considered as a Division of the Delburn fire before it was managed independently.

77. At 1333 hours a fire was reported in open country next to pine plantations on the south side of Glendonald Road Churchill. It is also reported that the personnel at the Churchill Fire Station were advised of the fire by a member of the public who attended the station at around the same time. The fire cause was determined to be suspicious in nature.

78. Four brigades were paged to this fire at 1335 hours.

79. The fire quickly burned into the pine and blue gum plantations to the south. The terrain inclined to the south encouraging rapid fire development and increased rates of spread.

80. The fire burned in a south-easterly direction through the steep gullies and valleys of the Strzelecki Ranges, to the peak at Mount Tassie. The fire spotted ahead considerable distance (in some cases, up to 20 kilometres ahead of the head fire) to outside of Yarram. The ferocious speed of this fire was due to the mix of natural and plantation forest fuels, the steep terrain and its north-facing aspect.

81. Aircraft support was requested at 1336 hours and at 1339 hours the first personnel on scene requested additional tankers. The ICC at Traralgon was operating, maintaining a watching brief on the Delburn fire, and immediately took control of this WIT.004.002.0012

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new fire, initially as a Division, then as a separate event. CFA was the control agency for this fire.

82. By 1420 hours the head of the fire had reached the Jeeratang Creek West Branch. The fire had travelled a distance of approximately 7 kilometres in 50 minutes.

83. Spotting was significant in this fire. At 1440 hours a spot fire was reported near Balook. There were several other spot fires recorded in the same area within 20 minutes of this first one. At 1502 hours, a spot fire was reported in the Jack River area, 6 kilometres west of Yarram . This spot fire was located 14 kilometres from the spot fires in the Little Traralgon Creek headwaters and approximately 20 kilometres southeast of the known head of the main fire. At 1650 hours there were multiple spot fires reported in grassland in and around the township of Yarram.

84. By approximately 1715 hours the main fire was approaching the slopes of Mount Tassie, and there were spot fires on the east side of Mount Tassie.

85. The wind change impacted on the fire area between 1800 and 1830 hours. The wind change impacted on spot fires to the south slightly earlier because the ridge line separated the spot fires from the main fire.

86. Spotting continued after the wind change, including spot fires originating from earlier spot fires. At 1804 hours a spot fire was reported on the South Gippsland Highway approximately 9 kilometres east of Yarram. At 1805 hours a spot fire was reported on the Hyland Highway approximately 5 kilometres north of Yarram. It burnt into the Won Wron State Forest under the influence of the wind change. At 1810 hours a spot fire was reported on the Carrajung Woodside Road, approximately 4 kilometres east of Carrajung South.

87. When the wind change impacted the Churchill fire, there was an uncontrolled flank of fire from the area of origin on Glendonald Road Churchill to the east side of Mount Tassie, approximately 13 kms away. This fire was burning in very steep, inaccessible country with very high to extreme fuel loads in mixed native forests, pine and bluegum plantations.

88. The following areas were progressively impacted after the wind change: Hazelwood South, KoornaJla, Traralgon South, Callignee, Callignee South, Callignee North, Jeeralang North, Devon, Yarram and Carrajung South.

89. By around 2000 hours the rate of spread had slowed, however the fire was continuing to spread in a north-easterly direction.

90. Although the majority of the fire was stopped by 8 February 2009, there were considerable portions of the fire edge unable to be tracked and secured for some time. This was due to the terrain and fuel conditions. The fire was finally listed as contained at approximately 1700 hours on 19 February 2009. The total size of the fire was 24500 hectares.

Warnings

91. A range of warning messages were issued for this fire. An urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website at 1405 hours stating that the communities of Hazelwood South, Jeeralang, Jeeralang North and Jeeralang Junction may be impacted by fire. At 1545, alert messages were posted for the communities of Jumbuck, Le Roy, Budgeree East, Valley View, Traralgon South and Ballook. The WIT.004.002.0013

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urgent threat message was extended to the communities of Balook, Le Roy, Jumbuck, Valley View and Budgeree East at 1545 hours.

92. As the fire progressed, alert messages were posted to the CFA website for the communities of Madalya, Womerah, Callignee, Callignee South and North, Carrajung, Carrajung South and Won Wron at 1620 hours, which was upgraded to an urgent threat message for Womerah and Macks Creek at 1630 hours. The communities of Devon North, Yarram were also included in urgent threat messages at 1640 hours.

93. As the fire was progressing rapidly, the communities of Woodside, Alberton, Tarraville, Manns Beach, Robertsons Beach, Woodside Beach and McLoughlins Beach were included in alert messages at 1705 hours. An urgent threat message was posted for the communities of Alberton, Tarraville, Port Albert , Langsborough, Manns Beach, Robertsons Beach at 1728 hours. At 1803 hours, Devon North, Yarram, Calrossie, were added to this warning, as were campers in the coastal area between Port Albert and Woodside Beach.

94. With the onset of the wind change, further alert messages were posted listing communities such as Willung South, Willung, Stradbroke, Stradbroke West, Giffard West, Darriman, Hiamdale and Gormandale at 1810 hours.

95. Following the wind change, an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website advising that the Glendonald Road fire was currently burning in and around the Traralgon South, Callignee, CaUignee North and Callignee South area at 2025 hours. At 2047 hours, the communities of Carrajung South and Carrajung Lower were included in an urgent threat message advising of impact in 20 minutes or less.

96. During the night, following an unexpected change in conditions, further urgent threat messages were posted to the CFA website for the townships of Carrajung South, Carrajung Lower, Won Wron and Woodside at 0105 hours, 8 February 2009.

97. Downgrade messages were issued to lower alert levels when appropriate on 8 February 2009.

Resources

98. A large number of resources were deployed to this fire. At its peak, 227 CFA appliances attended the fire, with 1250 personnel.

99. Loy Yang power station was a strategic infrastructure asset and substantial planning for its protection occurred. Ultimately, the fire failed to impact on this area. There was concern in respect to the critical communications assets on Mount Tassie, including Loy Yang system controls and a variety of commercial and emergency communication transmitters.

100. The ABC FM transmitter failed on Mount Tassie, however, ABC continued communicating in the area on the AM band.

101. At the peak of the fire aircraft were unable to operate because of weather conditions. WIT.004.002.0014

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Weather observations

Observation La Trobe Valley Aerodrome Yarram Airport AWS Maximum temperature 46.1°C at 1600 hours 44.8°C at 1400 hours Minimum relative 7.9% at 1541 hours 8.9% at 1327 hours humidity Wind before change NNW 37km/h gusting to 61.1km/h NNW 22.2km/h gusting to at 1815 hours 35.2km/h at 1800 hours Wind after change SW 44.4km/h gusting to 63km/h at NW 44.4km/h gusting to 1816 hours 64.8km/h at 1B03hours

SSW 42.6km/h gusting to 53.7km/h WSW 51.8km/h gusting to at 1822 hours 68.5km/h at 1806 hours Maximum FDI 82.7 at 1600 hours >100 at 1400 hours

Redesdale fire

102. A fire at Coliban Park Road, Redesdale was reported to CFA at 1511 hours. The cause of this fire is currently undetermined and is still subject to investigation.

103. Five local brigades were paged at 1511 hours. At this time no aircraft were available for this incident. Two pre-planned strike teams were activated at 1530 hours.

104. The fire burned through undulating grazing country with steep gullies and washaways with grassland and scrub fuels. the fire proceeded in south-easterly direction and crossed the Metcalfe - Redesdale Road around 1527 hours and the Kyneton - Heathcote Road at around 1542 hours. At 1649 Victoria Police were advised to close Watchbox Road to traffic. Further road closures followed.

105. Direct attack on this fire was made wherever possible, however, due to the terrain, dozers and other equipment were needed to secure the fire edge. The speed of this fire was so severe as to cause concern that the fire may reach the Cobaw Ranges or further beyond to communities of Lancefield and Carlsruhe. However, this did not eventuate.

106. At approximately 1830 hours, the wind change impacted on the fire. Approximately two-thirds of the eastern flank of the fire was secured such that breakaway of the fire did not occur. Most of the area that broke away was in the rough steep gullied country. This part of the fire was progressively contained.

107. Firefighting efforts continued over the next few days to secure the fire, including the strategic re-deployment of resources between this fire and the nearby Maiden Gully fire.

108. The fire was listed as contained on IMS at 0956 hours on 10 February 2009. The total size of the fire was 9500 hectares. WIT.004.002.0015

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Warnings

109. At 1613 hours an urgent threat message was posted to the CFA website for the communities of Barfold, Langley and Metcalfe East. At 1647 hours a revised message was posted that advised the communities of Sidonia, Pastoria, and other communities to the east of Kyneton to be alert.

110. As the fire progressed, urgent threat messages continued to be updated and advised the communities of Pipers Creek, Carlsruhe, Woodend North, Newham, Cadello and Carbor to be alert and implement their fire plans. The messages . advised that when the wind change arrived, the fire would run in a north easterly direction. Residents in Redesdale, Glenhope, Baynton and Baynton East and residents in the areas between Glenhope, Baynton, Redesdale and Heathcote, Tooborac, Pyalong were advised that they may also be under threat when the wind change passed through.

111. Threat messages were downgraded to alert status on 8 February 2009 as the fire was controlled. Further urgent threat messages were issued when the fire again threatened communities on 9 February 2009.

Resources

112. The fire was managed by CFA, and later DSE Fire from the Bendigo ICC at Huntly. At its peak, 73 CFA appliances and 400 CFA personnel attended the fire. DSE Fire personnel also attended this fire.

Weather observations

Observation Redesdale AWS Maximum temperature 44.7°C at 1600 hours Minimum relative humidity 6.9% at 1400 hours Wind before change NW 7.4km/h gusting to 11.1km/h at 1800 hours Wind after change SE 27.7km/h gusting to 35.2km/h at 1946 hours

SSE 16.7km/h gusting to 18.5km/h at 2230 hours Maximum FDI 87.2 at 1600 hours

Maiden Gully fire

113. A fire at Bracewell Street, Maiden GUlly was reported to CFA at 1634 hours. This fire began approximately one and half hours after the fire began at Redesdale . Resources from the Bendigo region had been deployed to the Redesdale fire.

114. The cause of the fire is undetermined and the fire is still under active investigation. WIT.004.002.0016

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115. Initial response to this fire was from 3 brigades at 1635 followed by further brigades being paged at 1638 hours.

116. The fire burned through disused mining country in and about the townships of Maiden Gully, Long Gully. California Gully and Eaglehawk.

117. The nature of the fire meant that there was, wherever possible, direct attack on the fire. Resources were deployed to fight the fire as it spotted into grassland from the scrubby disused mining areas. Due to the nature of the fire, the fire impacted on structures very early and house losses occurred through the main run of the fire to the south-east.

118. The wind change, which moved through the area at approximately 1845 hours, extended the fire to the north-east. The wind had been tending from north-west to the west, and then a firm south-westerly change arrived.

119. After the wind change, the fire made significant runs to the north-east. Fire travel was limited by an area of land in Pascoe Street where fuel reduction had been undertaken.

120. The fire at Maiden Gully was a classic interface fire burning in and amongst houses and commercial premises on the outskirts of a large provincial city. The existence of relatively large tracts of vacant unused land coupled with scrub and recreation areas made control extremely difficult. Crowning and short distance spotting from within the fire area hampered firefighting efforts.

121. This fire was contained by direct attack and involved significant community effort. Given the resource demands from existing fires, its early containment and minimisation of damage was a significant achievement.

122. The fire was contained at 2152 hours. The fire burned an area of 330 hectares .

Warnings

123. An awareness message providing initial advice for residents in the Maiden Gully area was posted to the CFA website at 1717 hours. At 2137 hours, an urgent threat message was posted noting that the fire west Bendigo and Specimen Hill was burning in a northerly and north-easterly direction, and a section of the fire was moving towards Eaglehawk. Residents in the Upper California GUlly Road and Hall Street area were warned that their area was under ember attack. This information was updated progressively through the night as the fire was brought under control.

Resources

124. The fire was managed by CFA from the Huntly ICC. 70 CFA appliances and 420 personnel were deployed to the fire. DSE Fire equipment and personnel were also deployed.

125. The fire indicates the surge capacity of CFA, particularly in view of the fire effort to the south of Bendigo at Redesdale at approximately the same time. The fire at Maiden Gully burned within 1.5 kilometres of the centre of Bendigo and posed considerable threat to the city. WIT.004.002.0017

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Weather Observations

Observation BendigoAWS Maximum temperature 45°C at 1531 hours Minimum relative humidity 5.9% at 1500 hours Wind before change NW 31.5km/h gusting to 50km/h at 1830 hours Wind after change SW 35.2km/h gusting to 48.1km/h at 1844 hours

SSE 9.2km/h gusting to 12.9km/h at 2130 hours Maximum FDI >100 at 1531 hours

Dated:

RUSSELL REES