The Air Force hasn’t thought about air base or the first time in decades, Air defense for a while. Now, things are changing. Force aircraft deployed in an international crisis now face substantialF risk of damage or destruction on the ground. By some estimates, mis- sile and air attacks could disable up to 70 percent of the aircraft at some overseas bases in the opening minutes of a fight. Fighting The problem is not insurmountable; the Air Force and the Pentagon already have the means to start addressing this critical problem. Even so, there is no doubt the threat is growing. Under The affordability, accuracy, and ease of operation of today’s cruise and bal- listic missiles make possible an effective surprise attack on theater air bases. Some of the more obvious countermeasures, Missile such as operating from more-distant bases, raise major questions about the ability of current and planned USAF forces to fight an effective and efficient By John Stillion air campaign. Attack These difficulties are compounded in areas such as the Western Pacific, where the missile and air threat is large, bases are few, and political access to exist- ing facilities often is limited or greatly constrained.

Photo via sinodefence.com The full magnitude of this challenge can be glimpsed by examining a single, highly realistic scenario—emergency movement of US military forces to the Far East in response to a brewing China- Taiwan confrontation in the year 2015. In this scenario, one of the main difficulties facing the Air Force would be the shortage of suitable bases in the Western Pacific. Only four of the eight US Army photo

34 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2009 SrA. Casey Bennett (foreground) and A1C Jacob Sprick guard a US Army Patriot missile air defense artillery battery near Osan AB, South Korea. Photo by Jim Haseltine land-based strategic missile force—in practice a fourth service co-equal with the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The 2nd Artillery modernization has special significance for US air and naval forces. As a “missile-centric” service, 2nd Artillery has created the world’s first large, accurate, conventional missile bombardment capability. The latest DOD report on Chinese military capability observes that, if recent trends continue, the 2nd Artillery by 2015 will have about 500 CSS-6 ballistic and 800 DH-10 cruise missiles capable of reaching airfields in Korea, Japan, or US bases there have hardened aircraft attack from a sophisticated enemy—such the Philippines. shelters. as China—which has large numbers of The speed and accuracy of these sys- Already, three of those four (Osan advanced, long-range weapons ready tems, combined with the difficulty of Air Base and Kunsan Air Base in South at hand. defending against them, make the missiles Korea and Kadena Air Base in Japan) Consider a Kadena scenario, built ideal for carrying out rapid, accurate, and are well within reach of hundreds of around the following realistic assump- intense surprise attacks. Chinese People’s Liberation Army mis- tions: This missile capability is quali- siles. Currently, China has fielded about The attacking force finds two cat- tatively different from anything US 400 conventional ballistic missiles and egories of targets: (1) stationary aircraft forces have faced in the past. The 250 cruise missiles that could reach bases parked in the open, and (2) aircraft that Chinese ballistic missiles of greatest in Japan and South Korea. Beijing also have some measure of protection because significance to US forces operating in boasts a large fleet of advanced fighter- they are airborne, taxiing for takeoff, or the Western Pacific are the CSS-5 and bombers. cocooned in hardened shelters. CSS-6. Both are launched from mo- The fourth hardened base (Misawa AB, Of the total, nonsheltered parking bile vehicles, have advanced guidance Japan) lies just outside this threat ring. space, 90 percent is covered by a mas- systems, and solid propellant motors. However, that puts Misawa about 1,850 sive missile attack. No parked aircraft They have longer range, greater ease miles from the Taiwan Strait, roughly the has time to take off. Of this unprotected of operation, and higher reliability than same distance from the strait as Andersen aircraft force, 75 percent is destroyed. previous-generation missiles such as AFB, Guam, far to the south. All others are severely damaged. the liquid-fueled V-2 and Scud. The US currently operates from only Taxiing aircraft escape without dam- The CSS-5 and CSS-6 also are accurate two bases—both on Okinawa—that lie age. Also undamaged, of course, are and have a range of warhead options that within 500 miles of the strait. Require- aircraft that are already airborne. make them more flexible and destructive ments of tanking, sortie rates, and in- Aircraft ensconced in hardened than earlier missiles. The CSS-6 and frastructure availability make Kadena shelters ride out the attack undamaged. similar Russian systems are for sale on the best theater base for a large fighter However, these bunkered aircraft are the world market. contingent. stuck on the ground due to massive The attack scenario above assumes A typical US crisis response would debris on operating surfaces and more each CSS-6 warhead contains 750 likely see Kadena receiving a mix of than 2,500 unexploded submunitions. 1.1-pound bomblets similar to the M74 aircraft similar to what was sent to Aviano They are targeted in follow-on attacks bomblet carried by the US Army Tactical AB, Italy, for Operation Allied Force in by cruise missiles. Missile System (ATACMS). 1999, or to Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain, for The bomblets also are dispensed in a Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Substantial Losses manner similar to the ATACMS dispens- In a crisis, one could find roughly 190 Losses would be substantial. Ac- ing sequence, with an assumed average aircraft on the ground at Kadena. Virtu- cording to our calculation, only 82 of pattern density of one bomblet every ally all of these would be parked in the 268 aircraft deployed to Kadena—31 51 feet. This gives each warhead an ef- open, as Kadena has only 15 hardened percent—would be available for postat- fective lethal radius against soft targets aircraft shelters. tack operations. These surviving aircraft (such as aircraft parked in the open) of The shelter shortage could be a critical are assumed to land at other airfields in approximately 650 feet. vulnerability if Kadena ever came under Japan where specialized parts, main- Warding off this kind of threat would tenance personnel, weapons, etc., are be difficult. The key would be dispersal. Far left: China’s Dongfeng 15 (CSS-6) unlikely to be available—further reduc- China could theoretically saturate the ballistic missile during a test launch. ing their immediate combat capability. entire airfield at Kadena with only 34 Left: A US Patriot missile is fired from a mobile launcher. The threat comes from the PLA 2nd warheads. That would hit everything Artillery Corps, which operates China’s found on Kadena’s parking ramps. AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2009 35 Pentagon officials believe the PLA has Initial attacks should be conducted by Even if active defenses such as Patriot about 100 launchers for CSS-6 missiles, the best available forces and concentrated become much more effective, the large so a highly scripted, well-rehearsed sur- in space and time “against targets vital footprint of each “leaking” warhead prise attack like this would require fewer to sustaining and supporting the enemy’s (well over one million square feet can be than half the available mobile missile operational system.” covered by dispersed bomblets) means launchers. China would still have plenty The strategists also seek to raise enemy that aircraft must be kept outside mis- more for attacks on other targets. costs by causing significant military ca- sile range, parked inside a shelter, or Current Chinese conventional ballistic sualties early and “smashing the enemy’s face a significant risk of destruction on missiles cannot quite reach Andersen will to resist.” the ground. on Guam. However, improved missiles The PLA has had about a decade to Over the short term, USAF will need having this capability will likely enter develop operational concepts, acquire to use existing systems and facilities in service over the next decade. Assuming systems, and train forces based on these creative ways to negate the growing threat aircraft deployed to Andersen during a principles. The ballistic missile forces of posed by accurate, proliferating missiles. crisis would be similar to those deployed the 2nd Artillery Corps are especially One obvious response is to disperse to European bases and Diego Garcia dur- well-suited for implementing these prin- combat and support aircraft across a larger ing Desert Storm, an attack with as few ciples. number of bases—preferably outside as 17 missiles could produce devastating The problem isn’t just the missiles. US the reach of the majority of PLA sys- results. planners seeking to ensure the availability tems. There are, for example, numerous For more than a decade, PLA planners of air bases overseas must consider that airfields on the eastern periphery of the have assumed that Washington would ballistic missile attacks are likely to be Philippine Sea that could be used by intervene in any future conflict between combined with (or serve as precursors to) USAF aircraft over the short term. The Taiwan and China. This assumption is additional attacks by cruise missiles and inherent drawback is that safety comes buttressed by the US response to incidents fixed wing aircraft. Other nations, such from being outside of Chinese missile such as the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis, as Russia and Iran, have or are working range, but this would simultaneously put the 2001 EP-3 collision and internment, to acquire similar capabilities. aircraft farther from the action. and the October 2006 surfacing of a PLA Fortunately, US airpower bases are not Iwo To (Iwo Jima) is already inside Navy submarine near a US aircraft carrier. mere sitting ducks. Far from it. There are the reach of CSS-5 missiles and therefore Chinese strategists believe a conflict several prudent steps that can be taken is not a good choice as a major deploy- over Taiwan independence would be a or already have been taken to minimize ment base. “local war” where neither the US nor the threat. Wake Island lies nearly 3,000 miles east China would seek to destroy its oppo- of the Taiwan Strait (approximately the nent. The focus would instead end with Defenses distance from Diego Garcia to Baghdad). the political status of Taiwan and the One response, already implemented, is It is best suited to be a bomber base. post-conflict political-military situation the deployment of a Patriot anti-missile Andersen has long runways and ample in the Western Pacific. battalion to Okinawa. With PAC-3 mis- parking and fuel storage areas, but is Chinese strategists also recognize that siles, the latest Patriot systems are much completely unhardened. Washington it will be decades before the PLA could more capable than those deployed during might be tempted to concentrate a large take on the US in a traditional force-on- Desert Storm. number of aircraft at Andersen. That force battle and expect to win. Therefore, However, when presented with dozens would go completely against the logic they focus on strategic principles that of fast, maneuvering CSS-6 re-entry of dispersal. would allow China to prevail in a limited vehicles simultaneously, even the PAC-3 Fortunately, there are additional op- conflict with a “technologically superior system will likely intercept only a few tions, in the Mariana Islands. The civil enemy”—the United States. These prin- incoming missiles. airport on Guam (Won Pat Airport), ciples include: It is probable that any surprise attack along with Tinian and Saipan, could Seizing the initiative early in the would seek to overwhelm the Patriot host reasonable numbers of fighters and conflict. and also include some missiles aimed support aircraft. Achieving surprise by striking at at Patriot radar and control systems—to The remaining three airfields—in the unexpected times and places and/or when help ensure subsequent missile or aircraft Marianas, Micronesia, and Palau—all the enemy is unprepared. attacks face minimal defenses. offer runways shorter than 7,200 feet, Attacking pre-emptively to achieve maximum surprise, psychological shock, disrupt deployments, and in- crease chances of gaining the initiative. Chinese planners say initial attacks should feature “key point strikes” against information systems, command centers, key weapon systems, support systems, and bases. These should be conducted with a USAF photo by SSgt. Araceli Alarcon goal to “paralyze first, annihilate later.”

F-16s of the 80th Fighter Squadron taxi down the runway at Kunsan AB, South Korea. Kunsan is well within the range of Chinese ballistic missiles.

36 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2009 Two F-22 Raptors move down the ramp at Kadena AB, Japan, in preparation for a mission in the Pacific region. In the background are two F-15s.

is expensive, but obviously not as ex- pensive as failing to deter a war with

USAF photo by MSgt. Andy Dunaway China or permanently losing a large portion of USAF combat capability in a surprise attack. Such a shelter could hold wide-bodied aircraft and could protect $10 billion worth of USAF assets from attack. If the Air Force can protect its aircraft, then an opponent such as the PLA can have limited parking space and other shelters were three- to six-feet thick and expect much less benefit from a quick infrastructure, and could at best support could protect aircraft against submunition strike. By targeting runways and taxiways, modest numbers of aircraft. There is also attack but not direct hits by penetrating an adversary may be able to disrupt or the political issue of gaining permission missile warheads. temporarily halt sorties from a given to use airfields outside US territory. The accuracy of modern ballistic and base. When the attacking missiles run Dispersal comes with an operational cruise missiles would allow an adversary out, the Air Force could repair its bases cost. With fighter and attack bases about to put two or three missiles on each shelter and bring its full combat power to bear 1,600 miles from the Taiwan Strait, sortie with high confidence of achieving a hit. with little or no interference. rates (and thus combat power) would be With shelters, instead of killing multiple The key to success is protecting combat reduced by 40 percent or more compared aircraft with each missile, future enemies and support aircraft until an opponent’s to operations from Kadena. may have to settle for killing one front- missile inventory is exhausted. Having Meanwhile, tanker support require- line aircraft with two or three $10 million more long-range bombers wouldn’t hurt, ments would increase enormously— missiles. It is still a good trade. either. with about three tankers required to Shelters with nine-foot-thick walls The Air Force has taken some initial support every five fighters deployed. and 12-foot-thick roofs constructed steps toward beefing up its long-range To fly the same number of combat of high-strength concrete would be combat capability in the region. Interna- sorties per day as if from Kadena, the required to defeat ballistic and cruise tional training exercises and bare-bones US would need to deploy about 100 missiles armed with penetrating war- “lily pad” deployments have become additional combat aircraft and 200 heads. This was done during World common. additional tankers.

Beyond 2020 In the medium term (2015-20), USAF could benefit by making improvements to the airfield infrastructure on the eastern periphery of the Philippine Sea. Extending runways and parking ramps, enhancing fuel storage, and beginning to harden all critical systems would clearly improve the ability of this set of bases to support combat operations under fire. In the years beyond 2020, more will be required—it is likely that China by then will possess a significant number A U-boat takes shelter under a bunker at Lorient, France, in World War II. A hardened aircraft shelter of similar size would cost $700 million, but could of missiles with the range to attack protect 12 large aircraft or 36 fighters. unprotected aircraft operating from the periphery of the Philippine Sea. USAF will need to be able to shelter large num- War II to protect German U-boats. So The Air Force may need to fight from bers of aircraft from missile attack and shelters suitable for protecting any a small number of “bunker spaces” in a conduct significant rapid runway repair USAF aircraft could be built, but as future Western Pacific war, but steps taken and air base damage repair. always, would come at a price. even today to provide access through Given the distances involved and Officials estimate the cost of a large, improved range, dispersal, and hardening limited basing options, it will also be 12-bay shelter at $700 million. This can ease the strain. n necessary to protect not just fighters, but large support aircraft (tankers, AWACS, John Stillion was an Air Force officer from 1984 to 1992 and over the past 15 years Global Hawk, etc.) as well. has published multiple analytic reports on airpower topics. He currently lives in Fighter-size shelters have existed for Virginia and is an adjunct professor at the University of Richmond. This is his first decades: Cold War-era NATO fighter article for Air Force Magazine. AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2009 37