Is the Still Special? Sally McNamara

merica has found its strongest, most enduring alliance in its Special Relationship with Great Britain. This relationship has been defined Aby consistent and recurring cooperation, systematic engagement, and enduring bilateral relations that emerged from common values and obvious interests. Mutual recognition of the value of democratic govern- ment, the rule of law, individual rights, and the market economy are com- bined with a single historical and cultural experience until 1776, continued cultural intermingling since then, and a common language. America and Britain, in other words, have a relationship of both “blood and philosophy.”1

However, there is now a third party in this marriage: Brussels. As scholar Douglas Johnson has noted: “The United States, the (UK), and the European Union (EU) form a triangular relationship that simultaneously conditions and threatens the U.S.-UK relationship, as the UK must participate in European affairs.”2 How Britain navigates the Special Relationship while at the same time dealing with this increasingly assertive supranational body will have massive geopolitical consequences in the years ahead.

The ties that bind Over the years, the Special Relationship has faced repeated challenges, and always emerged unscathed. On occasion, each country has put its national

Sally McNamara is Senior Political Analyst in European Affairs at ’s Center for Freedom. She formerly served as Director of International Relations for the American Legislative Exchange Council, and before that as Chief Parliamentary Aide to European Parliament member Roger Helmer. Sally McNamara interest above that of the other. But Americans and Britons actually mean these instances have not fundamen- something. What’s more, Britain and tally threatened the relationship. America are actually prepared to In their day, for example, Margaret defend these values—with military Thatcher and Ronald Reagan notably force if necessary. Common values disagreed over the U.S. invasion of mean something only if both parties Grenada, but still went on to cooper- are ready to defend them. It is signifi- ate fully in fighting—and eventually cant that Winston Churchill coined winning—the Cold War. the term “Special Relationship” in In fact, the Thatcher-Reagan 1946, after Britain and America had era demonstrates some of the most spilled horrendous amounts of blood enduring features of the Special Rela- and expended copious treasure in an tionship. Thatcher’s ability to be both unwavering defense of their shared a steadfast partner and cautionary values during the Second World War. critic of the United States was not The underlying traditions and simply a demonstration of her mas- history of cooperation between Brit- tery of statecraft; it was a testament ain and America essentially negate to the strength of the alliance itself. any short-term threat to this endur- Shared beliefs do not prevent quar- ing alliance. Indeed, while it was rels, even among allies. More often the French who proclaimed “Nous than not, however, they yield the right sommes tous Américains” in the result for both sides. Critics saw Rea- wake of 9/11, it is Anglo-American gan’s eventual support for the British political, cultural, military, and dip- liberation of the Falkland Islands as lomatic solidarity that has outlasted a departure from America’s long-held this initial show of strength from Monroe Doctrine. But Reagan came America’s Continental friends. to see that supporting Britain’s claim had greater merit and value than did Three’s a crowd supporting the existential, geographi- Today, however, the Special Rela- cal pull of Argentina. tionship faces a new challenge. The Today, the passivity that marked EU’s relentless supranational drive the Special Relationship in the post- has demanded a surrender of British Cold War era has given way to a period national sovereignty in areas such as of frenetic cooperation between the trade, the economy, and even defense. United States and United Kingdom in The institutional and political the War on Terror. The recurring pat- constraints demanded by further tern is of each finding the other a nec- European integration will severely essary, indispensable ally in times of limit Britain’s ability to make foreign need, regardless of left-right orienta- policy, especially in international alli- tion or prevailing political conditions. ance-making. In political, diplomatic, Ultimately, the Special Relation- and financial terms, no good has ship is so special because the shared come from limiting Britain’s geopo- values and common interests that bind litical outlook to the European conti- the two countries reach far beyond nent, and certainly no benefit can be the philosophical utopia of Euro- derived from deeper EU absorption pean Union (EU) elites dreaming of that limits Britain’s historical and a European superstate. The common proven links with the United States. political, diplomatic, historical, and But doing just that is very much on cultural values shared between the minds of European officials. Large

22 The Journal of International Security Affairs Is the Special Relationship Still Special? parts of the EU policy agenda—such national treaties which are inimical as the Common Foreign and Security to U.S. interests. Under the recently- Policy (CFSP) and European Secu- signed European Reform Treaty this rity and Defense Policy (ESDP)—are phenomenon will get worse. Just as designed precisely as counterweights the EU has become an increasingly to American “hyperpower.”3 Since confrontational trade actor unafraid the collapse of the Soviet Union, the to square off against Washington, perceived need for another power to Europe will become more aggressive counterbalance the United States has in the foreign policy arena. consistently motivated advocates of In this regard, it is vital the European integration. U.S. recognize the value of its pre- The 2006-7 investigation by the existing bilateral partnerships. It is European Parliament into America’s equally vital that the United States rendition policy demonstrates the heed the warning signs about how frequently anti-American direction of far the EU actually is prepared to EU policymaking.4 The EU believes go in its effort to centralize foreign that supranational institutions like policymaking. In its desire to create itself and the should ‘One Europe,’ the European Security be the sole arbiters of the use of force and Defense Policy has already cre- and should determine the rules of ated duplicate security structures to engagement for both symmetric and NATO and threatens traditional alli- asymmetric conflicts. This think- ance-building by the United States. ing was further displayed by the Under such conditions, as Henry EU in the run-up to Operation Iraqi Kissinger notes, American interests Freedom, with powerful European will inevitably, even if unintention- nations, including France and Ger- ally, lose out: many, actively seeking to obstruct American foreign policy. EU acces- When the United States deals sion countries were even threatened with the nations of Europe indi- with delays to their membership for vidually, it has the possibility of 5 consulting at many levels and to supporting the war. It was a clear— have its view heard well before a and ominous—signal: Europe had decision is taken. In dealing with issued a direct challenge to a sover- the European Union, by contrast, eign foreign policy decision of the the United States is excluded United States in an effort to contain from the decision-making pro- American power. cess and interacts only after the Underlying this stance is a fun- event, with spokesmen for deci- damentally different global outlook: sions taken by ministers at meet- ings in which the United States one that views “multilateralism as the has not participated at any level… 6 best means to solve global problems.” Growing estrangement between The EU believes that diplomacy America and Europe is thus trumps all other foreign policy tools in being institutionally fostered.8 addressing international threats, and sees economic sanctions and military Neither Britain nor America operations as “a last resort.”7 Brussels should view deeper EU absorption is likewise an enthusiastic proponent as preferable to Britain’s historic and of the International Criminal Court, proven links with the United States. global abolition of the death penalty, The EU’s foreign policy agenda, led the Kyoto Protocol and various inter- by the CFSP and an independent

The Journal of International Security Affairs 23 Sally McNamara

defense identity, is clearly designed poll reveals similar sentiments, with to serve as a counterweight to Ameri- incredible hostility toward American can global leadership. Britain, for its actions on the world stage. An over- part, should no longer risk its endur- whelming majority of Britons disap- ing alliance with the United States to proved of American policy toward pander to anti-American sentiment in Iraq (82 percent), its treatment of Europe. Or, as Sir Winston Churchill detainees at Guantánamo and other so simply put it: “Never be separated prisons (76 percent), as well as other from the Americans.”9 issues, such as its approach to global warming (79 percent).13 Such hostility has been perpetu- The Special Relationship is so ated by a distinct public relations special because the shared values deficit. Neither Blair nor Bush prop- and common interests that bind the erly made the case for the fruits of two countries reach far beyond the the Special Relationship, which has in fact operated to mutual advan- philosophical utopia of European tage in this new era of transnational Union (EU) elites dreaming of a terrorism. Undoubtedly, the plots to European superstate. detonate liquid explosives on up to 10 transatlantic flights in summer 2006 were foiled only because of key trans- Popularity and principle atlantic intelligence exchange and Another major challenge to the cooperation. As Prime Minister Blair Special Relationship is posed by rising said at the time, “There has been levels of anti-American sentiment in an enormous amount of cooperation Britain. Favorable opinion toward with the U.S. authorities which has the United States has dropped from been of great value and underlines 83 percent in 1999-2000 to just 56 the threat we face and our determina- percent in 2006.10 The British press tion to counter it.”14 regularly ridiculed Tony Blair as No incident more ably illustrates President George W. Bush’s poodle, the depth and breadth of the Special and Blair’s successor and Her Majes- Relationship in comparison to the ty’s opposition have both jumped on illusory EU alliance than the 2007 the America-averse bandwagon. The Iranian seizure of 15 Royal Navy Conservative Party even went as far personnel. While Britain’s European as calling for Britain to adopt a less neighbors scurried to protect their “slavish” relationship with America.11 sizeable investments with Tehran Worryingly, anti-Americanism and refused to specify any retalia- is just as widespread among the Brit- tory measures in support of a fellow ish public as the political classes. In EU member, the United States gave a June 2006 YouGov Poll, just 22 per- Britain an unequivocal demonstra- cent of respondents thought current tion of its support, conducting its American policy was helping to make largest naval exercise in the Gulf the world a better place, while 65 per- since 2003.15 Through its deployment cent said U.S. policy was making it of aircraft and warships, America worse. And a whopping 74 percent effectively gave Britain a security of those surveyed thought American guarantee that it would stand shoul- actions were contributing to greater der-to-shoulder at any cost during instability in the Middle East.12 A 2007 this major international incident.

24 The Journal of International Security Affairs Is the Special Relationship Still Special?

Both sides need to make the case ment of the UK’s procurement policy for the Special Relationship much demonstrates the gulf opening up more aggressively, demonstrating between the UK and the United the effectiveness and substantial States.18 North notes that two com- value of the close British-American peting and incompatible high-tech cooperation. Both sides could learn warfare systems are being developed from the golden days of Thatcher- by America and Europe, and points Reagan, as well as those of Winston out Britain’s systematic realignment Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, toward the latter. Procurement is each of whom regarded the other as abstract, technical, and politically an indispensable partner and all of nontoxic, rarely making the front whom made cooperation a politically pages, but this does not mean that a viable policy. wider political agenda is not at work. “For those who would seek to see a The muscle behind European army replace NATO,” Brit- the alliance ish Shadow Defense Secretary Liam A close and unwavering military Fox has observed, “defence procure- relationship goes to the heart of why ment offers the perfect means of undermining the Special Relation- U.S.-UK ties are so special. In his 19 seminal post-war “Sinews of Peace” ship by stealth.” speech, Winston Churchill said that The EU understands Churchill’s interoperable capabilities, personnel thesis very well. The European Secu- exchanges, and doctrinal commonal- rity and Defense College, established ity were the linchpins of the Special in 2005 for the exchange of key mili- Relationship.16 tary personnel among EU member But these ties are clearly under states, will be critical to fostering threat from the European Union’s shared camaraderie and doctrinal integrationist ambitions. Commenta- understanding of the EU’s approach tor Christopher Booker argues that to security and defense policy in the the integration of British military longer term. The development of per- arrangements into the European sonal and professional relationships Union represents a fundamental threat between British and American mili- to the current status quo between tary personnel has sustained the Spe- Washington and London: cial Relationship for many years, just as America’s International Military The nature of this new military Education and Training Program has relationship with her European been a successful tool of U.S. defense partners will make it increas- policy more generally. ingly hard for the UK either to fight independently or to co- operate militarily with the U.S. The EU’s relentless supranational That “special relationship” which drive has demanded a surrender of has been the cornerstone of Brit- ish defense policy from the time British national sovereignty in areas of the Second World War up to such as trade, the economy, and the recent U.S.-British coali- even defense. tion in Iraq will be at an end.17 With stretched defense budgets British academic Richard North and the enormous costs associated maintains that the “secret” realign- with modern high-tech weaponry,

The Journal of International Security Affairs 25 Sally McNamara

defense expenditures must take The U.S. is Britain’s top destination on a more global character. As the for overseas investment. The UK is technological revolution rolls on, the equally America’s biggest trading interoperability of defense systems partner in services, and the top des- will likely become not just desirable, tination for its foreign direct invest- but essential to joint military efforts. ment. In fact, over the past decade, In this respect, jointly funded, the UK has accounted for around a interoperable projects which arbi- third of America’s entire overseas trarily exclude non-EU countries do investments in the EU. not make sense. In the age of digital However, the power of Brussels warfare, procurement decisions are to interfere in this strong relation- absolutely critical, but the EU has ship should not be taken too lightly. made them as political as they are As the largest trading partner of the strategic. With Europe’s dual desire EU as a whole, the United States is to create a stronger defense industrial greatly affected by the regulations base and to advance an alternate war- being churned out by Brussels. Fur- fare system, the procurement agenda ther centralization of power in Brus- has become skewed against sensible sels presents the U.S. with long-term military budgeting and toward the challenges in its economic relation- EU’s narrow agenda. ship with Europe. As EU military planners aggres- Firstly, European elites continue sively pursue an integrationist agenda, to dogmatically defend the European the Special Relationship will undoubt- social model against global competi- edly suffer as British independence as tion. For example, in February 2007 a military power (and buyer) is con- a group of nine EU member states strained. If Britain continues to relin- issued an open declaration calling quish the most critical elements of for stronger social, environmental, sovereign statehood to Brussels—the and work protections, which will right to military action and autonomous only serve to further sap economic foreign policymaking—the British gov- growth.20 As America’s biggest trad- ernment will become little more than a ing partner, the EU’s failure to enact local authority, either unable or unwill- free-market reforms and to reach ing to partner with the U.S. on military agreement on wide-ranging social- missions, even when they clearly serve ist provisions such as the Charter of Britain’s national interest. Fundamental Rights will automati- cally have a negative effect on the Neither Britain nor America U.S. economy. Secondly, the EU is acting as the should view deeper EU world’s greatest regulator. Research absorption as preferable to from Open Europe recently found the Britain’s historic and proven EU’s current body of law—the acquis links with the United States. communautaire—to be a staggering 170,000 pages long, over 100,000 of The economic case which have been produced just in the last 10 years.21 Günther Verheu- for the Partnership gen, European Commission Vice- It should not be underestimated President for Industry and Enterprise, how heavily the UK is invested in estimates that the cost of regulation the United States and vice versa. in the EU amounts to €600 billion, or

26 The Journal of International Security Affairs Is the Special Relationship Still Special? about 5.5 percent of total EU GDP, contrasting with published estimates If Britain continues to relinquish from the European Commission stat- the most critical elements ing the trade benefits of the Single of sovereign statehood to Market to be just €165 billion.22 The Brussels—the right to military EU has a profound inability to under- take serious economic reform despite action and autonomous foreign numerous pledges to do so. Nor is policymaking—the British there any indication that it has a government will become little desire to do so. Indeed, the EU is now more than a local authority, taking its growth-sapping formula global. According to the International either unable or unwilling Herald Tribune, it is now the EU that to partner with the U.S. on determines the antitrust regime for military missions, even when big American companies.23 The EU’s control of member they clearly serve Britain’s states’ trade policies also places limits national interest. on the freedom of economically like- minded countries to the U.S., such as The Special Relationship dem- Britain, to fashion trade policies more onstrates that common interests can consistent with their bilateral inter- overcome past enmities and occa- ests. Britain generates 16 percent of sional conflict. Britain and America EU-27 GDP,24 and is one of just three have stood shoulder to shoulder in the EU countries whose working-age hardest of times and continue to enjoy population is set to increase in the the fruits of a solid relationship. As my next half century.25 Britain’s export colleague at the Heritage Foundation, markets inside the EU are shrink- Nile Gardiner, has stated, “The U.S.- ing while its export markets outside British alliance continues to operate the EU, including that of the U.S., as a strikingly successful partnership are growing.26 With its entrepreneur- of two great nations built on the solid ial Anglo-Saxon economic model, foundations of a common heritage, cul- 28 strong Commonwealth ties, English ture, and vision.” language and powerhouse financial This history suggests grounds capital, Britain is increasingly dam- for optimism for the future, in aged by Brussels’ excessive regula- spite of today’s considerable anti- tions and statist model. American feeling in Britain. The anti- Americanism of the 1980s gave way to Still special after the British- and American-led victory in the Cold War. The passivity of the all these years 1990s gave way to a post-9/11 period “We are with Europe, but not of enormous diplomatic and military of it,” Winston Churchill famously unity. Hostility and indifference are remarked in 1953. “We are linked temporary. The common interests but not comprised. We are associ- and values that drive the Special Rela- ated but not absorbed. And should tionship have proven enduring time European statesmen address us and and again. And, whatever the ups and say, ‘Shall we speak for thee?’, we downs, that is not likely to change. should reply, ‘Nay Sir, for we dwell among our own people.’”27

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1. Douglas V. Johnson II, “The U.S.-UK Spe- Address at Westminster College, Fulton, cial Relationship: Past, Present and Future,” Missouri, March 5, 1946, http://www.nato. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies int/docu/speech/1946/s460305a_e.htm. Institute Conference Brief, May 29, 2005, 17. Christopher Booker, “Foreword,” in Rich- www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ ard North, “The Wrong Side of the Hill: pdffiles/pub712.pdf. The ‘Secret’ Realignment of UK Defence 2. Ibid. Policy,” Defense Industry Daily, August 2005, 3. Former French Foreign Minister Hubert 2, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/ Vedrine coined the word “hyperpuissance,” files/UK-EU-US_Wrong_side_of_the_hill_ meaning hyperpower, to define America’s def_4.pdf. political, military, and economic strength 18. North, “The Wrong Side of the Hill,” 30. after the Cold War. 19. Liam Fox, “Security and Defense: Making 4. See the work of the European Parliament’s Sense of the Special Relationship,” Heri- Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use tage Foundation Lecture no. 939, April 27, of European Countries by the CIA for the 2006, www.heritage.org/research/europe/ Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, hl939.cfm. www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/temp- 20. Honor Mahony, “Nine States Call for Revival com/tdip/default_en.htm. of Social Europe,” EUObserver.com, Febru- 5. Interview with Adam Daniel Rotfeld, ary 15, 2007. “Primum Non Nocere,” The Polish Voice, 21. “Just How Big Is the Acquis Communau- April 4, 2003, www.warsawvoice.pl/ taire?” OpenEurope Briefing Note, n.d., www. view/1892. openeurope.org.uk/research/acquis.pdf. 6. European Union, Delegation of the Euro- 22. Ibid. pean Commission to the United States, 23. Stephen Castle, “Ruling on Microsoft The European Union and the United States: Reflects EU’s Global Reach,” International Global Partners,Global Responsibilities, n.d., Herald Tribune, October 22, 2007, http:// http://www.eurunion.org/partner/euusre- www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/22/busi- lations/EUUSGlobParts.pdf. ness/ruling.php. 7. Ibid. 24. “EFTA Countries Much More Prosper- 8. Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a For- ous Than Either the Eurozone or the UK,” eign Policy? (New York: Simon & Schuster, Global Britain Briefing Note no. 48, Novem- 2001), 57. ber 26, 2007, http://www.globalbritain.org/ 9. Churchill’s words to his non-Cabinet Min- BNN/BN48.pdf. isters upon his retirement, after his final 25. “The EU’s Demographic Anaemia,” Global cabinet meeting on April 5, 1955. Sir Martin Britain Briefing Note no. 47, November 23, Gilbert in Winston S. Churchill, vol. 8, “Never 2007, http://www.globalbritain.org/BNN/ Despair,” 1945-1965 (Boston: Houghton Mif- BN47.pdf. flin and London: Heinemann, 1988) 26. “UK Exports: EU Market Fades, but Imposes 10. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “America’s Heavier Burdens Than Ever,” Global Britain Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Con- Briefing Note no. 44, November 3, 2006, http:// cerns over Iran, Hamas: No Global Warm- www.globalbritain.org/BNN/BN44.doc. ing Alarm in the U.S., China,” June 13, 27. Extract from article, “The United States 2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display. of Europe,” Churchill Archives Centre, php?ReportID=252. Churchill Papers, CHAR 8/279. 11. William Hague, Speech to Conservative 28. Nile Gardiner, “The Myth of U.S. Isola- Party Conference, October 3, 2006. tion,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo no. 12. YouGov/Daily Telegraph, “Survey Results, Field- 558, September 7, 2004, www.heritage.org/ work: 26th-28th June 2006,” http://www.yougov. Research/Europe/wm558.cfm. com/archives/pdf/TEL060101010_3.pdf. 13. Program on International Policy Attitudes, “Global Views of the US,” January 2007, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/ pdf/jan07/BBC_USRole_Jan07_quaire.pdf. 14. “‘Airlines Terror Plot’ Disrupted,” BBC (London), August 10, 2006, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778575.stm. 15. “Blair Steps Up Pressure on Iran as US Moves In,” Times of London, March 28, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ world/middle_east/article1577489.ece. 16. Winston S. Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace,”

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