Military Strategic Communication at the Tactical Level in Counterinsurgency Operations: the Case of Sweden in Afghanistan by Elin Norrman and Mikael Weissmann

peer reviewed tidskrift Military Strategic Communication at the Tactical Level in Counterinsurgency Operations: The case of Sweden in Afghanistan by Elin Norrman and Mikael Weissmann

Abstract Denna artikel undersöker implementeringen av strategisk kommunikation på de lägre nivå- erna av den militära organisationen (den taktiska nivån). Den strategiska kommunikationen på den taktiska nivån är ett underutforskat område då existerande forskning fokuserar på den strategisk nivå och på de strategiska narrativen. Det fall som studeras här är den svenska insatsen i Afghanistan 2012–2013. Resultaten visar att befälhavare på alla nivåer kan vara kommunikatörer. Resultaten visar även att en kognitiv splittring existerar när det gäller upp- fattningen av kommunikatörens roll. Å ena sidan anser sig de flesta inom manöverförbanden inte ha en viktig roll att spela när det gäller att sända meddelanden. Samtidigt visar studien på en acceptans hos samma personer att de själva har en betydande effekt på värderingar och attityder hos den lokala befolkningen. Trots detta synliggör resultaten att man på den taktiska nivån ofta distanserar sig från kommunikatörens uppgifter och menar att dessa uppgifter är andra enheter eller personals ansvar. Studien visar även på flera svårigheter som hindrar genomförandet av den strategiska kommunikationen på ett effektivt sätt. De mest framträdande områdena är motsägelser i meddelanden på grund av skyddsåtgärder för de egna enheterna (force protection) och brist på synkronisering.

this study aims to investigate the implemen- The findings show that commanders at tation of strategic communication within a all levels can be communicators. While most military context. This is important since in do not think of themselves as having an the field of information engagements in the important role to play in sending messages, military arena little research has focused on the study shows an acceptance that the ma- the lower segments of the military hierarchy, noeuvre forces themselves have a significant effect on the shaping of beliefs and attitudes as the focus tends to be on the strategic level of the local population. Nevertheless, the and strategic narratives. This article will fo- findings reveal that those at the tactical level cus primarily on the experiences of commu- often distance themselves from the communicating strategically on the lower segment nicator tasks, arguing that those tasks are of the military hierarchy (the tactical level), the responsibility of other units or personnel. pursuing a bottom-up approach during the The results thus indicate a cognitive split in Swedish Armed Forces 2012–2013 rotation the perception of the communicator’s role. in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the study reveals several obsta-

19 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed cles that hamper communicating strategically military forces need to focus on integrating in an effective manner. The most prominent different outlets to frame the discussion and areas are contradictions in messages due to position themselves within it. It is essen- to force protection measures and lack of tial that communication is deliberate and synchronisation. thought-through, rather than reactive and It is recommended that commanders need short-sighted. A strategy is needed to shape to ensure that subordinates understand the the behaviours and attitudes in the area of valuable role manoeuvre forces play in shap- operations, as well as in the international ing the beliefs and attitudes in the area of or domestic perception of the conflict. In operations. There is also a need for higher response to this conundrum, different ideas operational levels to affirm that the lower-tier of information engagements have appeared units not only have some leeway in the shap- in the military context. ing of messages but are also provided with The authors argue that in the field of in- a type of mandate to negotiate. formation engagements in the military arena, certain perspectives are missing. Firstly, little Introduction1 research has focused on the manoeuvre forces’ experience of sending messages in the field. In the last decades, the world has undergone The focus tends to be on the strategic level an information technology revolution and and the strategic narratives, mainly on the 2 continues to do so today. This fundamen- overarching narrative rather than on its im- tal change has central effects on how par- plementation in the field, tend to be vague, ties wage war and can pose serious security with overarching guidance that there should challenges. An increasing level of attention be a red thread running between the stra- is being paid to controlling the narrative of tegic level and the field implementation.5 If the battlespace. Narrative meaning is shap- we accept that these forces are the ones that ing the conceptions of acts, outcomes and predominantly shape the perception of an 3 contingencies. In the context of irregular international force locally, it is essential to warfare, the framing of issues and possible investigate the tactical segments’ experience responses to them become even more cru- of sending messages. It is thus important cial. There is a focus shift from that which to explore how messages and themes are tactical commanders understand, such as implemented in the tactical chain of com- conventional fire and manoeuvre, to trying mand, and what problems in execution can to undermine the narratives that the enemies be identified in the low level, non-specialised promote or base their appeal upon.4 manoeuvre forces. One could argue that in each conflict, there To fill this gap, this article will investigate is an ongoing battle in the arena of informa- information engagement in the context of tion between the combating sides. This idea strategic communication at the lower seg- is not new, military philosophers like Sun ment of the military hierarchy (the tactical Tzu emphasised the weight of information level, here defined as stretching from the in battle long ago, but it has been accentu- Commanding Officer (CO) of the Swedish ated anew by the information technology force down to the junior leaders of the field revolution. What seems evident is that some (section commanders) (also see “Research military objectives cannot be solely pursued design” below). By doing so, this study fur- through the traditional use of force. Instead, thers our knowledge about not only how

20 peer reviewed tidskrift manoeuvre forces contribute to the imple- officers and soldiers, can be argued to be mentation of strategic messages and how those most likely to affect the sentiments of this contribution is achieved, but also to that audience at large. research on strategic communication by add- The article will focus on the role of ing knowledge of strategic communication small states’ manoeuvre forces, using the at the tactical level. Swedish Armed Forces deployment in Strategic communication, very much like Afghanistan during its 2012–2013 rotation the other concepts, is contested and suffers (Fortsättningsstyrka [Rotational force] FS 24) from intellectual ambiguity. Here the concept as a case study. Small states will of course is preliminarily defined as “the purposeful never be able to compete fully with large use of communication by an organization states – including in strategic communica- to fulfil its mission”, a definition that falls tion. However, small states are active partic- within the basic consensus in the wider aca- ipants in many international operations, and demic community.6 Strategic communication, thus despite often being one of many minor which covers a considerable span of activities partners, their strategic communication is and different organisational levels, is also important especially on the local level where affected by the intellectual discussion’s bias the manoeuvre forces are the ones in most towards higher organisational levels.7 And at close contact with the local population. This times while doing so, misguided conclusions is so in particular in a case like the one cho- are drawn about the lower level troops with- sen here, as in this so-called Peace Support out proper insight into them.8 In addition Operation some of the countries, including to the tendency of the academic debate to Sweden, got responsibility in a set area as focus on the strategic level, it also seems to a so-called Provincial Reconstruction team primarily stress communicative outlets via (PRT).11 It is, of course, difficult to know psychological operations such as the use of what exactly the differences are between trained groups, flyers, or radio broadcasts.9 different small states; thus there are limits Relevant as it is to interview IO-officers or to what generalisations can be drawn from to analyse PSYOP-messages from leaflets the study of one state in one case, as well and billboards in order to understand how as between cases. However, if nothing else, military forces seek to affect the information lessons can be drawn and mistakes avoided environment, what of the significant dis- by understanding and studying previous semination executed by ‘ordinary’ soldiers experiences, and furthermore, it is expect- and officers? ed that similar challenges have been met by Some rightly argue that the manoeuvre different states on the local level. forces should be seen as a capability in stra- The question asked is how the tactical lev- tegic communication, due to their ability to el was used as a communicator of strategic influence through actions.10 However, it is messages in the FS24 rotation in Afghanistan. also apparent that the lower echelons of the This study is limited to the Swedish Armed tactical hierarchy, such as patrolling infantry Forces 2012–2013 rotation (Fortsättnings units, are those predominately in contact with styrka [Continuation force] FS 24). This the local population on a broader scale. They particular rotation was chosen as it took are not only present through their physical place after 2010 which was the year that visibility but also through interaction. Thus ISAF changed its approach to one of coun- the manoeuvre forces, i.e. the lower-ranked terinsurgency with an emphasis on winning

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‘hearts and minds’. Thus, as the ambition is nication in the case of the Swedish Armed to map out the strategic communication Forces and a discussion on organisational usage, and to enhance understanding of the levels in strategic communication. Finally, tactical aspects, it is relevant to investigate a forces move to strategic communication at period in which the physical footprint and the tactical level. The second part outlines willingness to communicate were evident. the research design, outlining the chosen Lastly, the Swedish contribution significantly analytical approach, data collection and decreased after this rotation. sampling procedures. Thereafter the arti- Strategic communication in a complex area cle moves on to the empirical part, where of operations like Afghanistan 2012–2013, the findings of the case study are presented. of course, comes with challenges relating to Finally, in part four, conclusions are drawn, the sender – members of the international and policy recommendations are made. manoeuvre force – and the recipient – a local population caught in the middle of two Review of the field fighting forces. In short, the study of strategic communication at the tactical level in an This article focuses on strategic communica- active operation is somewhat different from tion. For the purpose of this article, Christo other research on civilian organisations and pher Paul’s definition is used, defining stra- agencies (also see research design). tegic communication as the “coordinated The study is not only relevant in the mil- actions, messages, images, and other forms of itary domain but other fields as well. The signalling or engagement intended to inform, research on strategic communication in, for influence, or persuade selected audiences in example, economics and management re- support of national objectives [italics in orig- 14 search often focuses on goals, outcomes inal]”. However, strategic communication and higher organisational levels, leaving is just one of several concepts available to the micro-level neglected.12 This tendency is those wishing to apply a label to the idea equally visible when turning to the military of information engagements, and many of context; few reports focus on the tactical them tend to blur. Information operations, level and the relevant experiences. The few psychological operations, military informa- communications that are unclassified and tion support operations, propaganda, framing available to the public tend to be experience operations, influence operations, perception reports by high-ranking officers rather than management and strategic communication follow-up data from lower-tier units.13 Thus, are only a few of the concepts used. Even there is clearly a hole to be filled, as strategic though this problem was pointed out many communication is in practice implemented years ago, more recent investigations still em- by lower-tier units, who are responsible for phasise that “little progress has been made executing strategic communication on the in the area of doctrine integration and har- ground. monization”.15 Not only is this a problem The article is organised into four parts. In in the conceptual world, experience reports the first part, a review of the field, a concep- indicate that the overall field of information tual discussion on the idea of information engagements in the military context tends to engagements is conducted with a focus on be highly ambiguous and that there is con- strategic communication. This discussion is siderable confusion of roles. The American followed by a section on strategic commu- experience, for example, indicates confusion,

22 peer reviewed tidskrift not only in the Department of Defense but manual on Information Operations argues “especially in the field, because the terms SC, along the same lines. The manual states that IO and PSYOP (now Military Information “in order to coordinate players’ information, Support Operations [MISO]) are frequently both actions and messages, an information used interchangeably”.16 strategy is formulated”.22 It further empha- What then, are information engagements? sises that there should be a common thread As noted above, many different labels are cir- from initiating directives to tactical orders culating in the academic community. Some to reaching planned effects. The American tend to emphasise the same ideas but under definition of IO was interestingly somewhat different headings. The concept of infor- recently changed (2004), due to an earlier mation operations, for example, stretches version placing too much emphasis on the between a wide range of capabilities such as core capabilities which caused confusion electronic warfare, computer network op- between utilising them compared to the inte- erations, psychological operations (PSYOP), grating function of IO.23 Clearly, some steps military deception and operational security. are taken in the right direction. Nonetheless, Some argue that the concept has been so there still is confusion. broadly applied that “it has become the How do Public Affairs (PA) fit into this common term to describe the process of using then? PA support the overall execution of information to influence”.17 In Afghanistan, information operations by coordinating ef- the Combined Forces Command started a forts with other organisations and agencies unit called Theater wide Interagency Effects to ensure themes and messages are consistent which was supposed to synchronise “Public and deconflicted. Public affairs can thus be Affairs (PA), PSYOP, IO and political-military argued to represent an activity connected to operations”.18 The unit providing the same and in support of information operations. type of support in Iraq was on the other hand However, some argue that the goals of the known as the Strategic Communications functions are entirely different. Public affairs Office.19 are responsible for supplying the public with As described above, information opera- factual and truthful information. Information tions as a concept encompass many differ- operations, on the other hand, seek to influ- ent functions, and can thus be regarded as ence audiences in order to change perceptions an umbrella term. NATO views IO as “a or behaviours.24 military function to provide advice and co- Even though doctrine makes quite clear ordination of military information activities what the IO function should entail (the in order to create desired effects on the will, coordination of different capabilities and understanding and capability of adversaries… at the tactical level possibly Key Leader in support of alliance mission objectives”.20 Engagement (KLE)), the term is frequently The doctrine further states that it can be used as a synonym for psychological oper- performed by any actor, but that tactical ations. Military personnel frequently avoid level information operations should focus using PSYOP, probably because it has the on “creating an effect on key local deci- stigma of propaganda due to its ambition sion-makers and groups by affecting their to influence.25 The US doctrine of PSYOP will, decision-making processes and capa- states its purpose: “to induce or reinforce bility”.21 The Swedish Armed Forces basic foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to

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U.S. national objectives”.26 This is done by The distinction between SC and IO is blurred “conveying selected information and/or ad- because, in its broadest sense, strategic vising on actions that influence the emotions, communication involves the integration motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately of issues of audience and stakeholder perception and response into policymaking, the behavior of foreign audiences”. The doc- planning, and operations at every level. trine does not seem to pinpoint the relation IO should be consistent with [U.S. gov- to conventional forces in any greater detail ernment strategic communication] goals but merely concludes that “PSYOP forc- and objectives. Where DoD is the lead or es support conventional forces and special a major means to achieve [U.S. government operations forces”. Some argue that every strategic communication] goals among a action of a military force in a conflict zone particular audience, IO efforts may become has a psychological impact and that PSYOP essentially SC efforts.28 thus applies to the manoeuvre forces in the sense that “every infantryman is a PSYOP It is thus clear that IO and strategic communi operator”.27 cation resemble each other to a large de- However, if following the line of argument gree. What is then more applicable to the that every military action has a psychological manoeuvre forces? The discussion above impact and thus could be labelled PSYOP, states that IO is the coordination of military we again lose some of the intellectual ground information activities. The messages sent covered while committing to the conceptual by troops can in this regard be argued to debate on these issues. If every military ac- represent one aspect of IO. Thus, it is very tion is viewed this way, is electronic warfare similar to the definition of strategic commu- PSYOP due to its possible psychological nication as outlined above; one could argue effects? Are computer network operations the differences being a matter of semantics. PSYOP due to their possible psychological However, if coupling IO and a conventional effects? No. In comparison to this, one could, force one should, at least in line with doctrine, on the other hand, argue that the different think of several different capabilities used capabilities and their military actions func- along with force in pursuit of an objective. tion as strategic communicators. Viewed in Whereas when linking strategic communi- this way, the capabilities do not lose their cation and a conventional force, one could conceptual distinctness, and the manoeu- argue that it more correctly describes what vre forces are not reduced to a tool used by the article tries to show: how the tactical level PSYOP. The authors of this article argue communicates strategically through actions that the manoeuvre forces do not conduct and words. Thus, strategic communication PSYOP, they conduct tactical operations that can be seen as stretching from the creation might have a psychological impact, as well of policies in the Department of Defense as a strategic effect, through the messages down to a psychological operation officer’s they send. gathering and disseminating information in Whereas PSYOP and IO at least doctrinally the field, or even a ‘simple’ infantry units’ are reasonably precise, strategic communi- patrol in the field. cation and IO overlap. An American senior In the end, a soldier in an infantry pla- analyst at the IO directorate, the Office of toon cares little if his or her paper sheet the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, with talking points stems from the Strategic summarises the problem in the following way: Communications Office at Regional Head

24 peer reviewed tidskrift quarters, from an IO-officer at brigade level need for tactical flexibility and adapting or a PSYOP-officer at the battalion level, they to the situation at hand is acknowledged. will execute it just the same. Nevertheless, Alternatively, strategic communication might whichever label we apply, it is hard to dis- not concern the tactical level. However, the regard the importance these ground forces text also makes clear that communication play. Moreover, if in line with military hi- should be an “evident opening value in all erarchy, all efforts work in coherence with military decisions, on all levels, to ensure the top of the pyramid anyway. that we do what we say and say what we do” and by doing this “act to retain all our Strategic communication in target group’s confidence”.33 The strategic military communication should further be the case of the Swedish consistent with the political will, and this Armed Forces should be reflected in the Swedish Armed While Sweden’s role in Afghanistan has been Forces’ operations and messages. subject to extensive research,29 it does not cover the dimension of strategic communica- Organisational levels in strategic tion. In fact, in the case of the Swedish Armed communication Forces before 2015, to the knowledge of the In the military context, it is evident that the authors,’ no publication mentions strategic concept per se is not limited to a particu- communication. The term first appears as lar organisational level; it can encompass a a term in a short section of the document wide range of activities. In order to clarify “Strategic Direction for the Swedish Armed the focus of the article, it is necessary to Forces 2015” [Försvarsmaktens Strategiska break down the meta-phenomenon one step Inriktning 2015] in which the concept is not further into its different components. When clearly defined but in essence, corresponds deconstructing strategic communication, five 30 with many aspects of the text above. The different elements can be discerned.34 document states that messages “should be The first element, enterprise-level strategic cohesive and coordinated from the strategic communication, is of little importance here level to practical execution of communication since it involves wide-ranging government activities”.31 The linkage between the strate- activities. This applies to the second element, gic and the tactical level is thus pinpointed. strategic communication planning, integra- Interestingly, new terminology surfac- tion and the synchronisation processes as es: “Military Strategic Communication” well. The second element relates to a set of [Militärstrategisk kommunikation]. This activities in an inter-agency perspective that term represents “coordination of words and necessitates distinct organisation, procedures deeds on a strategic and operational level”, and personnel. The third element, howev- which is “to be an active part and multipli- er, communication strategies and themes, er of military activities in order to optimise is closer to the essence of this study. This desired effects”.32 This could indicate that element involves both the “desired informa- some leeway is possible on the tactical level. tion effects (inputs) that planning processes All actions and words uttered do not have will translate into communication goals and to be in strict correlation with operation- themes (outputs) and incorporate into plans. al and strategic objectives but rather the Content outputs, such as communication ob-

25 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed jectives and themes, are the elements that are overall effort of strategic communication.40 integrated and synchronized across the joint Thus, when formulating strategic messages, force, especially to and for communication, the balance between flexibility and coordi- information, and influence capabilities.”35 nation must be considered. The fourth element will constitute the However, coordination does not only in- focal point of this article: communication, volve having clear objectives, it also relates information and influence capabilities. It to the command and control structure. As involves “the broadcast dissemination, mes- stated previously, the information arena in- saging, and engagement elements of strategic corporates several different components that communication.”36 This component may could support, or ruin, any strategic commu- include various levels: public affairs, psy- nication efforts. One could even broaden the chological operations, defence support to perspective further, including non-military public diplomacy, defined visual information actors such as public diplomacy activities and civil affairs. However, this essay will and private security companies. Furthermore, solely focus on the tactical military force other functions that are present at the low- elements: the manoeuvre forces. This part of est tactical level, such as intelligence, have strategic communication “might include the prominent interests in the information are- interactions of any element of the force with na and provide vital support to operations. foreign populations […] They might include Coordination between these arenas do not every action or utterance of every deployed happen by magic. An additional considera- soldier, sailor, airman, and marine.”37 The tion is: who is really in charge here? last element concerns knowledge of human dynamics and analysis or assessment ca- Strategic communication at pabilities and will not be reviewed in this the tactical level article. This category incorporates media and target-audience analysis, social/histor- There is very limited research on military ical expertise, and assessment capabilities.38 strategic communication in relation to the As shown, the deeper we delve into stra- executing aspect of the manoeuvre forces, tegic communication, the wider it seems to such as junior officers and soldiers. It is un- become. It is clear that the concept involves clear how units on the ground contribute to several different organisational levels, which the strategic communication goals. Keeping in turn correspond to one of the problems: in mind the elements stated above, one needs coordination. “If every communicator has to ask, how do the low-level capabilities complete latitude without being bound by function and what is their relationship to themes or guidance connecting messages to other levels? This is the fragment missing objectives, then many representatives would in theory, at least when looking strictly at become loose cannon in the ship of commu- research relating to the military hierarchy. nication”.39 Tools of influence, as well as When widening our view from the military different units within the manoeuvre force, context, clues appear. thus need to work together for a complete The principal-agency theory can help us realisation of the objective to take place. The pinpoint the relationship between levels of opposite of synergy is known as “information hierarchy given information asymmetries. fratricide” when one piece of information Lower levels tend to know more about their contradicts another. This severely impedes the tasks, whereas the higher levels may be more

26 peer reviewed tidskrift focused on the objectives. This means the in- points when analysing the empirical data. centives of agents (lower levels) and principals Nevertheless, one aspect that needs to be (higher levels) are not always aligned.41 This highlighted is that this framework was in- also is likely to be right in the military arena. tended for communicators from the centre of If the higher-level military commanders lack an organisation, meaning professionals with competence in using the lower segments or specific schooling. In contrast, this current just have a diverging view on how to em- study will focus on the lowest tactical level ploy them, the messages passing through the within a military hierarchy, which, howev- communicators will be disarrayed regardless er, can be argued to incorporate a span of of the effort expended. knowledge, stretching from young soldiers to The perceived role of communicators has experienced officers with university degrees. been widely studied, showing an increased One thesis is that different communicator influence and new models for communica- roles can be attributed to different levels in tion.42 In this article a communicator will be the tactical span. viewed as a person who is able to convey or exchange information (Oxford Dictionary). Research design Results of interest for understanding the role of communicators, and therein how the A case study approach is used in this study tactical level perceives itself, can be found in and thus allows us to examine strategic a study from 2014.43 Most communicators communication in-depth, as the case study view themselves as facilitators between the design “allows for conceptual refinements public and the organisation and as speak- with a higher level of validity over a smaller 46 ers for the organisation. The top managers’ number of cases”. The case studied, i.e. the answers correspond to these results. This Swedish Armed Forces 2012–2013 rotation indicates homogeneity between the upper in Afghanistan (FS24), how the tactical level and lower levels of hierarchy regarding un- was used as a communicator of strategic derstanding the role of the lower-tier or- messages in the FS24 rotation is a case of a ganisation elements. Besides the two afore- small state working within an international mentioned role categories, the study shows framework. This case was chosen because other types: the representative of interests, it provided unique access to information the advisor for the top management, the in- through gatekeepers in the author’s network house journalist and the scout. The scout is while at the same time it was unexplored. the “the listening aspect of communications, Other countries participating in interna- which includes monitoring public opinion tional military crisis management encounter and identifying threats and opportunities the same problems; thus, the Swedish case within stakeholder settings”.44 Top managers may offer insights of value also beyond the seemed to support advanced and strategic case itself and Sweden. The results can be tasks in the advisor, interest-representing seen, if not entirely comparable, as a good and scout roles to a lesser degree than their contrast to other small state nations work- lower-level counterparts.45 ing within similar international frameworks. This branch of research thus provides Of course, as with all case studies, there is the study with six types of roles that can an inherent design problem relating to the be attributed to communicators. This will ability to generalise the results.47 However, serve as one of the study’s contrasting stand- the chosen design enables the study to find

27 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed new aspects of implementation, which is the tactical level is used, it is necessary to un- purpose, being an explorative study. derstand who sends the messages and how More specifically, the study will investigate these units’ work. From the literature review, the lower segment of the military hierarchy, it appears that there is a fine line between namely the tactical level, stretching from the freedom in phrasing and coordination in Commanding Officer (CO) of the Swedish implementation, making it of interest to ask force down to the junior leaders of the field the informants of their experience in adapting (section commanders) during the tour of 2012, messages and if they experienced any con- FS24. By interviewing the tactical chain of trasting messages and/or actions. Lastly, in commanders of the Swedish force, it is pos- order to argue that the study is examining sible to outline how the lower-tier organisa- strategic communication, it is further crucial tional element, the manoeuvre forces, operate to study the messages themselves and their with information engagements. Even though continuity. This has the benefit of revealing the battlespace owner (CO) is typically seen how the units view themselves and their as a part of the operational level seeing as communicator role when being asked the he/she coordinates and commands multiple relevance of the messages.49 capabilities rather than only tactical units, The different staffing categories were asked due to the small size of the Swedish force slightly different questions. This is because he/she also represents the highest tactical these two categories (officers and section command with the company commanders commander/soldiers) have access to different directly subordinated.48 spheres within the tactical level. It is unlikely Within this context, it is asked how the that a soldier has the opportunity to read the tactical level was used as a communicator full operation order from the CO or has the of strategic messages during the tour. In opportunity to take part in any discussions order to answer this question, the analysis when receiving the orders from the higher will first shortly touch upon if the themes command. Furthermore, it is difficult for the and messages can be argued to be strategic soldier to reveal how messages were coordi- or not. The central aim will follow: investi- nated higher up in the tactical chain. What gating how the tactical level communicates. the soldiers (section commanders) can share The study is explorative in its nature and is their first-hand experience of talking to pursues the higher aim of possibly uncovering locals and spreading messages, which does difficulties in operationalising strategic com- not diminish their importance, but instead munication while mapping out its usage. In highlights their direct access to and contact essence, this is a study attempting to develop with the audience as well as their dissemi- overall knowledge of the tactical execution nating role. of strategic communication. Being guided by an inductive logic the content analysis focuses on extracting new Analytical approach aspects or relations from existing data rather than proving or falsifying existing theories. The research question was operationalised To succeed coding is central. From the codes through logical reasoning, guided by previ- patterns and themes are discerned that there- ous research and strategic communication, after can be clustered into meaningful con- to identify problems in implementation. For clusions concerning the material. This study example, in order to understand how the adopts a six-step process based on Bruce L

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Berg’s structures of content analysis.50 First, informants’ identities remain confidential. data is gathered and transcribed into texts Informants were selected based on a snow- (interview transcripts). Thereafter, the texts balling-technique with the goal of staying are coded with codes extracted from the da- within the same tactical chain. By doing so ta material. Thirdly, the codes are classified certain variables such as regimental culture into categories or themes. Fourth, the data and operational climate remained the same is sorted into the categories to reveal similar for all participants, but perhaps most impor- statements, patterns, correlations, similarities, tantly it was possible to follow the execution and differences. Fifthly, the sorted data is through the same tactical chain. investigated in order to identify meaning- To ensure the validity of the data focus ful patterns or processes. Finally, identified was on identifying themes in the transcripts. processes are considered in light of existing Thus, the study is not depending on one research and theories, and a small contribu- single quote in establishing facts, but that tion of transferable knowledge is made. (Also a reoccurring theme or topic has the ben- see “Analysis and coding process” below.) efit of validating itself by reoccurring with Thus, all interviews were transcribed into different informants.52 Here one strength texts. Relevant parts of the transcribed ma- of the study is that all sources are primary terial were extracted and condensed, which sources and share their own experiences. in turn were coded depending on the topic. This, of course, comes with its own potential These different codes were afterwards cat- problems, relating particularly to the time egorised. After categorising, the material elapsed since the tour ended which could was clustered into themes to reveal patterns, cause gaps in the informants’ accounts and as well as to distinguish differences within risk for biases in the respondents’ accounts if the material. they consciously or unconsciously provide a misleading picture of how the communication Data collection occurred. The fact that confidentiality was used, seeing as no one will be able to trace The primary source for information was a statement back to the informant except qualitative interviews with key personnel the author, there would at least not be any and field staff. Documents could not be used need to hide any problematic aspects due to since the bulk of relevant documents were fear of being singled out in the organisation. classified. An interview model was developed Another predicament is that all sources are to structure the interviews, focusing on the linked to each other in a line of hierarchy. planning and implementation of strategic This is evidently a strategic choice, but it communication (see Appendix 1). The in- also raises the question of their dependency terviews were semi-structured, giving the on each other. needed space for allowing the informants to fully develop their ideas as we sought Sampling to investigate the experiences of the people interviewed. They were conducted in the The informants are chosen because of their officers’ native language (Swedish), and each position in the hierarchy, seeing as the study interview lasted approximately 30 minutes.51 strives to get an overall understanding of how All interviews were recorded and transcribed. messages are sent across the tactical spec- Except for the Commanding Officer, the trum, ranging from the CO down to section

29 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed commanders. A number of informants were the type of pre-mission training is also the accessed by a snowball-sampling technique, same. Nonetheless, several of the informants where those interviewed help recruit future have participated in more than one tour to informants based on their own contacts. Afghanistan, meaning their impressions might However, the sample is still strategic in the blur with previous tours. This could be ar- sense that all informants were from the tour gued to give the study a broader perspective FS24 in 2012, and their position within the on obstacles facing international operations, hierarchy is in accordance to figure 1 below. seeing as the informants can compare and The picture below illustrates the tactical contrast their experiences. On the other hand, chain and the number of informants. All in all, it could be argued to decrease our validity 16 informants were interviewed. By choosing seeing as it could be hard to separate one to stay within the same tactical chain, some tour from another in retrospect. factors can be isolated against, for example, The chosen company hierarchy is infantry. ensuring that the leadership and regimen- The reason for this choice can be traced back tal culture remains constant. Furthermore, to the introduction in which it is argued that

CO Company Platoon Section

Section Commander

Platoon Section Commander Commander

Section Commander

Company Platoon Section Commander Commander Commander

Deputy Section Company Commander Commander CO Company Section Intelligence Commander Officer Platoon Section PSY OPS Commander Commander

Figure 1. Selection of informants.

30 peer reviewed tidskrift the manoeuvre forces should be the ones mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 in- predominately affecting the sentiments of habitants were as high as 74.9 percent (UN the locals. Data). The literacy rate among the adult population was in 2011 estimated by the Case study: Sweden in World Bank to be 31. 7 percent (World Bank Afghanistan Data), thus making the audience for written material small. The information environment Compared to other larger nations, the for the Swedish force was thus primarily Swedish contribution to ISAF has been rela- characterised by an illiterate population tively small. From 2002 to 2014 around 8 000 in the countryside with small to no means Swedish soldiers participated in operations in of interacting with other actors than those Afghanistan. This was only about 0.8 percent passing through their village. of the total amount of ISAF-personnel, but from a Swedish perspective, the efforts were strenuous. From 2006 Sweden took charge Analysis and coding process over the Provincial Reconstruction Team in The first part of the analysis below connects Mazar-e Sharif which contained the provinc- to the defining aspect of the concept: can the es of Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan and Sar-e communication be said to be strategic? The Pul. The area is about five times as large as second part aims at answering the research the size of Kosovo, in which approximately question regarding how the tactical level is 50 000 soldiers were stationed at its peak. used as a strategic communicator. The third In comparison, when the Swedish force in part concludes with discussing the military Afghanistan was at its largest in 2011, it communicator’s role, and analysing what had 570 soldiers stationed. The rotation role the tactical level seems to play: can scrutinised in this article was only slightly any specific traits for the military context smaller.53 be discerned? At the beginning of the engagement, the During the coding process of strategic Swedish state characterised the conflict-level in northern Afghanistan as “calm but with communication in Afghanistan six categories an underlying instability”.54 Over time, the emerged: 1) National Anchoring (Present, situation worsened in the four provinces. Absent), 2) Target Audience (Outbound, In- When the Taliban were embattled in the house), 3) Planning (Obstacles, Multipliers, south, they increased their presence in the Approach, Coordination), 4) Message (Verbal north. Northern Afghanistan also increased content, Non-verbal, Applicability), 5) in strategic importance seeing as a major part Communicator (Holistic mindset, Specific of ISAF logistics went through this region. unit, Attitude) and 6) Execution (Obstacles, In 2012 the “security situation improved” Multipliers, Sending-type, Method). The first and in 2013 the “situation had changed its part, asking whether communication can character but was still challenging”.55 be said to be strategic, consists primarily of The overall information infrastructure quotes belonging to categories 1-3. Quotes in Afghanistan can be argued to be rela- from categories 4-6 are part of answering tively poor. The United Nations estimated how the tactical level is used as a strategic in 2014 that approximately 6.4 percent of communicator. If a presented quote deviates the population had internet access, although from the title of the section, the footnote

31 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed will reveal how it was categorised to foster the prerequisite of a transfer of authority further transparency. (which is done by all units entering the ISAF environment) the military strategic, operative Is it strategic communication? and tactical levels all adhere to the NATO Drawing primarily upon the CO’s interview, operation plan, and within the operation this section aims to clarify how communi- plan the components of strategic commu- 57 cation can be claimed to be strategic. Using nication are present” (MG2016a). Thus Paul’s definition, strategic in the sense that when fulfilling a Transfer of Authority - the we are talking about “coordinated actions, formal process which is used to transfer the messages, images, and other forms of sig- right of command, or parts of it, to another naling or engagement intended to inform, actor than the national chain of command influence, or persuade selected audiences (MG2016b) - one could argue that the na- in support of national objectives [Italic in tional strategies are included in the ISAF 56 original]”. umbrella through the operation plan. This makes it possible to argue that some form of Political-strategic level strategic communication was present during The empirical data reveal that no nation- the tour in terms of the condition pursuing al directives were issued concerning what national objectives stated in the definition, communication strategies to pursue during as these matters were effectively executed the international mission. The Commanding through ISAF, though sanctioned by the officer specifically stated that “not anywhere Swedish government. on the political-strategic nor military strategic Studying the Swedish government’s strat- level was there a clear concept concerning egy for Afghanistan (2010), it is possible strategic communication for the Swedish to find directives concerning the Swedish effort in the ISAF-mission (MG2016a)”. The contribution to ISAF. However, these are CO emphasised the need for a “political-stra- somewhat generic in shape and do not spec- tegic overarching structure (MG2016a)” that ify key themes or narratives. For example, the military strategy, as well as the rest of it is stated that “Sweden shall strengthen the commanding hierarchy, can be attached Afghanistan’s ability to uphold stability and to. He further described that this is difficult security, democracy and human rights, and to implement due to non-existing planning offer its inhabitants the possibility to improve structures. However, the fault does not seem its living conditions and fair and sustainable to reside in a lack of knowledge, but rather in development”. Apart from universal values culture and leadership. “Sweden is not gov- erned the way described in different planning like human rights, it continues by emphasis- methods (MG2016a)”. The military-strategic ing the need for: “compassion and solidarity communication cannot be argued to be an- with the Afghan people” and pinpoints “the chored in the political will from this view- global responsibility”, but nowhere does it point and is thus not in extension reflected mention key narratives or themes. One could in the messages and themes sent. argue that this is a missed opportunity for On the other hand, if one adds a NATO- the political level to steer the military, its label the question at hand “the answer is outlets, and in extension, its communicative definitely yes”. The CO clarified that “under effects in changing perceptions.

32 peer reviewed tidskrift Target Audiences seems to pinpoint the PSYOP element in G3 (brigade executive-section staff). The CO identified the local population, the It is clear that several different functions Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) within the military structure wanted their and the insurgents as the main target audi- voices heard. One informant even said that ences (MG2016b). A Brigade staff member the head of G3 forced G9 to “get in line” within the PSYOP function mentioned the (NN31). In sum, it appears that both PSYOP, same groups with the addition of leaders PA and CIMIC were involved in the process among the insurgents (NN31). This picture but de-confliction before execution did not is confirmed when studying the rest of the always appear to be an opening value consid- tactical command structure. For example, ering soldiers’ experience (note the example 13 of 14 tactical commanders (stretching of the conflict between PSYOP and CIMIC from the company down to section), indicate below). This further works in line with what they interacted with the local population to is already argued in theory, that we cannot some degree. say that the communication executed by ma- It is clear that most of the target audiences noeuvre forces is a psychological operation, were outbound, but on a couple of occasions, seeing as they are clearly influenced by a informants mentioned that their own forces number of other actors and functions within were the target audience (in-house). More the military hierarchy. It seems that an offi- on this is found in section “messages” below cial, overarching and coordinating function indicating that it intertwines with the con- of the communication field, besides that of tent of messages. All in all, it can be argued the CO, did not appear to exist. Who really that the rotation informed or persuaded a owned the arena of strategic communication selected audience. in this rotation remains unclear. This seems to further work in line with the experience Coordination of other nations, emphasising the need for an overarching coordinating function. What about coordination of messages then? Within the organisational structure, messages are passed on in orders, often vocally pre- The tactical level as a strategic sented by the PSYOP element. This resource communicator? was also involved in the planning process when participating in a particular operation Content of messages (NN23). An officer at the company level also The figure below illustrates all the codes indicates that “we collaborated to a large extracted from the subcategory of verbal degree with the CIMIC section” (NN23). content. When studying this summary, it Also, the CO points to the press information becomes clear that there was indeed cohesion officer (PIO) being involved in the planning between the different levels, that the strategic of messages (MG2016a). This point is thus aspects (extracted from the CO) are visible somewhat vague, some informants point even on the lowest level. The differences to G9 (bridge press-section staff) and the instead appear to regard the degree of the CIMIC function, whereas the CO highlighted detail based on the different approaches of the PIO. The majority, on the other hand, a theme expressed in a message. The theme

33 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed

Afghan forces ready - ISAF change profile info supporting role

Enforce Afgan forces – Show the locals that we support the Afghan forces – Swedish force is leaving – We support Afghan security build up – Afghan lead

Support the Afgan government – Criminals cannot govern – Afghan lead, we support – Support the Afgan Local Police – Afghans need to take care of their own security

Joining the Taliban is only a short term solution – We are here to support the Afghan people/Afghan security forces – We care – Things has become better, girls in school etc. – ISAF is leaving – Afghan security forces are doing a good job – Afghan lead – Trust Afghan forces, we are working with them

Figure 2. The tactical hierarchy and consistency of messages.

can be viewed as the overarching topic and could argue that the section commanders in the message as aspects of that theme. a way function as a facilitator, trying to ease The pyramid above illustrates how the the relationship between the public and the overarching objective, the changing profile organisation, enabling the message to get of ISAF, was interpreted on various levels in through to the locals. This oddly enough the tactical hierarchy. Company commanders works in line with the rather bland and emphasised the importance of actively enforc- unspecified strategic goals of the Swedish ing the Afghans, of showing the locals that government that emphasised value-oriented the Swedish force supports them. Platoon objectives. commanders’ answers varied from overar- In relation to this and the applicability ching objectives like “support the Afghan of messages, four informants on the lower government” to pointing out that “Afghans tactical levels specifically said that the mes- need to take care of their own security”. The sages tended to be high-sounding in their most interesting difference in interpretation original shape (NN1; NN3; NN4; NN11), can arguably be found in the section com- whereas only one stated that they were easy manders’ answers compared to the rest, who to understand (NN5). This can be corre- tended to involve softer aspects such as “we lated to the statement of a company-level care” and “things have become better, girls officer who said that strategic messages can get to go to in school”. Also, they appear be disseminated on a tactical level given to have been delivering concrete examples that they are manageable. “You need to on why the audience should adhere to their think about what it means to the people on arguments such as “trust Afghan forces, we a local level.” (NN23) This is particularly are working with them”. Based on this one important when operating in an environ-

34 peer reviewed tidskrift ment like Afghanistan where “focus is on them to be viewed positively by the locals. your own village and family (…), there is That the locals could start trusting them a a limited chance of success when trying to little bit” (NN6). promote central power” (NN23). Probably It was thus simultaneously a matter of this is what the section commanders were convincing the Afghan security forces to trying to do, hence their slightly different take charge, making the locals trust the se- approach to the central theme. curity forces, and making sure the Swedish Furthermore, the Afghan context is not force understood the role it was about to the only challenge; this rotation was different play during the deployment. The same key in the sense that most operations were exe- message can, therefore, be seen as having cuted in close collaboration with the Afghan three different target audiences, where one forces. The Afghan lead can be argued to of them was the Swedish force itself. One represent the central theme of the rotation. could argue that by repeating the verbal Some informants indicated that a part of the message of “Afghans lead operations – we message was directed towards the security support them when they request it” in-house, forces in order to make them understand it ensured that the actions of the force cor- that they were the ones that needed to plan responded with that very idea. An example and execute operations while specifically re- can be drawn from a company commander questing support from the international force who said: when needed. One informant, for example, The Afghans had received a bunch of old stated that “Our message was constantly: RPG grenades at a police station. We had you need to do this yourself since we will the opportunity to destroy them on loca- leave.” (NN21) Another informant pointed tion and help them with it, but my decision to the message as representing an in-house was to let them take care of it themselves, communication strategy: “at the start, I guess they have resources within their own or- the message was directed towards us, so that ganisation. […] That decision was not very we would understand that we were there to easy, seeing as we could have taken care of it, but that would not have helped the support” (NN12). One could thus argue that Afghans. (NN21) the higher officer who stated this initially acted as an in-house journalist. This indicates that if this company command- The section commanders mostly relat- er had not been receptive to the in-house mes- ed messages as directed towards the civil- sage, he/she would likely have taken charge ian population, one, for example, stated of the situation and ordered the disposal of that when talking to the locals “the official the grenades rather than fostering Afghan message was that the Afghan government forces’ long-term problem-solving capabili- wants us to be here and help out with the ties. It illustrates how not taking action can security and that it is our job to support the send a message and can be argued to work Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan in line with the role of a representative of National Police (ANP)” (NN5). Another interest. The commander’s active choice section commander stated that: “we con- not to do anything actively worked in line ducted more or less all operations with the with a major communicative theme. This ANA and the ANP and this was to send a theme was in turn repeatedly emphasised by signal to the local population that we have higher commanders among the informants; a relation to these people. (…) We wanted that it was up to the Afghans to take charge.

35 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed

They often waited for the Afghans to request units and ultimately, soldiers. The CO men- support, rather than commence operations tioned the manoeuvre forces and CIMIC themselves. Thus, again not just verbally teams as the backbone with reinforcements of communicating but passively working in PSYOP capability occasionally (MG2016a). line with the main message. However, the However, who then does actually commu- weight of sending a message through action nicate? In this sample it seemed that one cannot be understated, as one commander person in each infantry section had been characterised his impression from another assigned the task of handling the talking deployment: points. It was quite common for the section It was hard to earn the Afghans’ trust, but commanders themselves to interact, but it at two times we did it particularly well. The could also be a delegated person within the first time was when we got into combat section. As one platoon commander stated: action with our combat vehicle 90 (CV90) “it could very well be the section commander, and obviated a number of insurgents. The but above all the one most suited. (…) At Afghans thought: okay they are not just times it could be the platoon commander” driving around, they are actually prepared (NN12). A company commander developed to do something. The second was when a Swedish soldier got his leg blown off. Unlike this further by stating that: “some section any other unit, that went back to base, this commanders were very good at sending mes- company commander stayed on location, sages whereas others did not even perceive with the mindset that his task was to help it as their role at all” (NN22). Besides the the Afghans, and the Afghans were still commanders of sections and platoons, the there. That one of his soldiers had lost his company commander and the intelligence legs had nothing to do with the task. This officer often interacted with the target audi- attitude, we are prepared to take casualties, ences, personnel from the Afghan National it is not just empty words, gained a large degree of trust from the Afghans. (NN22) Security Forces (ANSF) (NN23). It seems that higher commanders mostly participated As mentioned above, the sending of messag- in Key Leader Engagement (KLE), whereas es is not only limited to the verbal mode. It the lower commanders interacted with the is clear that the things we do or do not do local population in general. can have profound effects in strengthening Instead of focusing on specific units with- a particular message. in the tactical hierarchy, another recurring theme in the transcripts was explicit com- Communicator ments on being a part of a whole, a holistic As already established the manoeuvre forces mindset that the entire tactical chain matters. are those in contact with the local population Nonetheless, when studying the empirical and hence the soldiers that predominately data, different attitudes among the commu- affect the information arena. But who are nicators arise. Three different attitudes could the communicators within the manoeuvre be identified among the informants: disbelief, forces? How do they perceive their role? trust and indifference. The majority belong All platoon-level and higher ranked com- to the category of indifference--typical for manders were asked who matters most in this cluster is that the informants emphasise shaping the perception of an international that they are there to solve their military force and all answered it was the infantry tasks (e.g. NN4, NN5). Another informant

36 peer reviewed tidskrift specifically said that communication is not Having reviewed the actual communica- his/her task (NN3). tors and their attitudes towards the sending In contrast, those fitting into the trust clus- of messages, the focus will now shift to how ter accentuated that: “it is not always that the messages are actually passed on. you understand why they want something, but you have to trust that a higher com- Execution mander does” (NN5). The same informant Apart from the verbal and non-verbal mes- further stated that to some degree you need sages already accounted for, and the com- to believe in the message you send, how else municators themselves, how does the tactical could you communicate it? (NN5) Another level really execute their communication? In commander stated that many of the talking what way, shape or form do we send mes- points are those constituting the basic rela- sages, and why does it sometimes go wrong? tion that enables the international force to The tactical level usually sends verbal mes- operate in the area at all (NN6). sages through the patrols delivered by either Conversely, there are the informants who section, platoon or company. During patrols, expressed an attitude of disbelief. A platoon the individual given the task usually interacts commander stated: “our view on the value of based on the talking points. This approach the message changed” (NN12). The context is often targeted, whereby the commander around this statement is that the commander is informed about whom to talk to; however, expressed disbelief in the truthfulness of the informants also expressed situations where message “Afghans lead”. According to the interaction simply occurred due to opportu- informant, the Afghan police did not seem nity or in order to solve other tactical tasks. interested in conducting operations inde- The talking points are the lowest level of pendently, rather the Swedish Commanders structured communication, which can be virtually had to force them into action, thus viewed as enforcing a message. The talking undermining the message. One section com- points are shaped as questions and as one mander even stated that the messages sent informant pointed out: “a message was of- were “a type of propaganda” (NN3). An ten sold together with a follow-up question” officer at the company level said that it does (NN12. Category: Sending, Execution). not matter what message we send to the lo- However, at times the talking points seem cal population, it has no effect, what really to have blurred with the general intelligence matters is KLE (NN12). This can be seen to requirement. One platoon commander spe- represent a partial distrust, having a lack of cifically said that it was hard to “separate faith in the small number of soldiers trying talking points from intelligence needs, per- to affect the general public, but having no haps they merge” (NN11. Category: Planning, objection to trying to influence key leaders. Coordination). A lot of the RFIs (Requests for The indifferent and disbelief attitude can Information) given to the manoeuvre forces interestingly be correlated with having a ho- naturally contained requests about enemy listic mindset, many of those commanders activity and positioning. What needs to be seemingly uninterested in the info-arena, later considered is that even these questions send emphasised that the whole tactical chain is a message. Obviously, they are an inevitable essential, and it is hard to isolate one output part of military activity, meaning they can- from another. not possibly be circumvented. However, one

37 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed could speculate whether they can be coupled the purpose of their presence, some brief more effectively with certain messages, thus small talk, after which they slowly began painting a less confusing picture. Another seeking information, combined with sending informant, for example, stated that: messages often correlated to the questions I sometimes got the feeling the different sec- posed. A standard intelligence request was tions had not spoken to each other. On the frequently based on where the enemy was, one hand, we got intelligence needs from G2, and who they were. on the other we got messages from PSYOPS. One could strongly assume that these These were not always synchronised. I do types of questions were coupled with mes- not say they were contradictory, but that sages discrediting the insurgents. One section in the end there were a lot of questions commander also pointed out that during and a lot of messages. (NN12. Category: Execution, Obstacle) operations in the areas known as red (hostile), the talking points could be slightly The statement above indicates that at times more aggressive, stating that an increase in the amount of information to be gathered hostile activity is countered by an increase and/or disseminated reached a kind of sat- in the military presence (NN1). Another uration limit. It appeared that stakeholders interesting fact is that not only did the talk- in the form of higher officers promoted their ing points change slightly depending on the own function without having the ability to village or task, the standard inquiries also condense messages and coordinate between varied according to the season. The fighting themselves and thus ease the pressure on season being the half-year of summer where subordinates. Interestingly enough, a com- the insurgents are more active, compared pany-level officer pinpoints that very fact, to what several informants call the “winter that messages need to be carefully prioritised framework” (NN23), where many of the and shaped in direct relation to the given fighters from, for example, Pakistan return tactical tasks in order to be operational and home, and the armed resistance is less intense. efficient. “All actions, all talking points, need The actual sending of messages seems to to correlate. They need to be synchronised, to have occurred differently depending on who avoid passing double and diverging messages.” (NN22. Category: Planning, Approach). the communicator was. Some expressed the However, with the above quote in mind, it communicator’s role as “a postman” (NN11), did not appear to have worked problem-free others stated that they broadcast messages on during the tour. a broad front (NN13). All said that they had During this rotation, it seems that the the freedom to adjust the messages or talking majority of the interaction was handled by points if necessary. Many of the informants the company commander, intelligence of- linked this to mission command, the military ficers, PSYOP officer, or a liaison officer approach that enables subordinates to solve during company operations. However, the tasks as they see fit, working along the lines section commanders often shared insights of the commander’s intent. Informants also from other tours where they stated that in- expressed the view that communication oc- teractions during social patrols often started curred as an enabler; that communication (i.e. with a light warm-up conversation in order a good relation) opened doors for those per- to establish some sort of relation. The pro- forming basic military tasks such as clearing cedure was often a presentation of ISAF and roads or guarding locations (NN11). This

38 peer reviewed tidskrift further frames the tactical level’s communi- of the main themes such as “we support the cator role as a facilitator. ANSF” is undermined by the priority of Factors that seemed to ease communica- avoiding your own casualties, then actions tion relate to mutual trust--commanders said and behaviour contradict the very messages that they felt they had the support of the the manoeuvre forces are trying to send. One higher commander to adjust behaviour in informant voiced that ”if the most important accordance with the situation on the ground thing was no one dies, then we might as well (NN22). The same informant also mentioned not have gone there” (NN22). the fact that the unit had served together for Lack of synchronisation among functions a long time, which also seemed to increase is, unsurprisingly, another example of con- the confidence in solving tasks (NN22). The tradicting messages. If the PSYOP section CO indicated that a certain Swedish mil- wants to emphasise a certain message, then itary culture seemed to exist, a disarming that theme needs to be anchored within other and caring mindset of a non- judgmental sections, as others might need to adjust their character that the local population found own operational planning. Inability to do positive (MG2016a). so results in information fratricide. One in- One of the most prominent factors which, formant stated that he and a CIMIC officer on the other hand, served as an obstacle to (civil-military relations) were having a fruit- effective communication, was contradictions ful meeting at a school in one of the villages in messages. There are several examples of when a “PSYOP guy walked in and razed the this, one being rigid instructions from the entire meeting” (NN23). This can be related higher command. If the higher command tried to function-centred work, whereby some to centralise campaigns even though out of officers wish to promote their own function context in a particular region, it could under- rather than the higher purpose or, because of mine effective communication. Endeavouring lack of knowledge regarding the operational to send the message that “I come in peace” environment among higher staff members. in full combat gear does not send the most This further confirms what is already argued: cohesive message to the local population the command and control structure has an (MG2016a). Trying to convey the message important role to play here. Without a clear that the military forces are present in order coordinating role, each officer has the duty to support and protect the local population, to seek information from colleagues and is hindered by instructions ordering units coordinate with them to ensure that pos- to gather the local’s DNA and fingerprints; sible actions work in line with operational which one could argue implicitly sends a objectives without hindering others. Thus, message of distrust. One informant explic- the practical execution of exerting influ- itly stated, “it gets a little weird if you state ence appears to be just as confusing as its that you are there for their [the locals] sake theoretical discussion. Practical experience and then start gathering everyone’s finger- seems to indicate the need for merging IO, prints” (NN1). CIMIC, PSYOP and strategic communica- Informants commented that at times there tion goals into one operational cell, at least appeared to be an emphasis on force protec- at tactical levels. tion, where there was a political reluctance Another barrier to effective communica- to sustain Swedish casualties, which in some tion is the faulty usage of procedures. For ex- instances hindered the main message. If one ample, random patrols provide little security,

39 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed but consistency in patrol areas, checkpoints was not their main task, and expressed little and proactive searches do (NN31). Others interest in the information arena. Also, one highlighted the difficulty of not being able informant highlighted the problem of passing to promise anything (NN11). If the lower on messages yet not having the mandate to tactical level is not provided with a man- provide anything in return to the locals, a date to negotiate with the counterpart, and feeling of being restrained to some degree. given the resources to do so, there is little This was in sharp contrast to the very concept leverage in trying to solve the tactical tasks. of mission command which some informants Furthermore, some informants expressed also emphasised. Many informants reiterated having problems with an inactive counterpart, that there were no restraints in adapting the the ANSF, which was supposed to lead, but messages or talking points. The informants did not, which forced the Swedes to take a seemed to have the freedom in phrasing more active role rather than that of a sup- while sending or inquiring for information, porting one. Ultimately, this clashes with but in some cases did not have the mandate the message of “we are here to support the to fully negotiate with the locals. Afghan forces”. One could thus assert that the tactical Finally, practical obstacles to effective communicator also adhered to the role of a communication were lack of personnel, lan- ‘speaker’, a person who makes statements on guage skills, education and resources such as behalf of a group. This works in alignment interpreters and vehicles. It is thus clear that with informants’ statements like “postman” within the lowest level several aspects inhibit (NN11) or “broadcasting messages wide” the full strategic communication potential (NN13). Another communicator role, the conducted by manoeuvre forces. ‘representative of interests’ is applicable if the aspect of non-verbal communication Discussing the military is included. Specifically given higher tac- communicator’s role tical commanders opportunity to work in alignment with mission command, as the When contrasting the results with the com- case with the company commanders and the municator’s roles found in other academic RPG-grenades demonstrates. The impact of fields, it becomes clear that they apply to section commanders’ tactical choices can be some degree to the military context. When argued to not have the same impact as that one considers the most frequently found role of company commanders given the mere ‘facilitator’ in civil organisations, it could be numbers they command and in extension argued that it is partly compatible with the the limits to their commanding rights. The behaviour of manoeuvre forces. It could be verbal aspects of the ‘representative of in- contested that the tactical communicator may terests’ is probably more applicable to liai- be seen as an enabler of tactical activities son and PSYOP officers. Additionally, these on location, that he/she helps foster rela- functions probably embody the role of an tions in the area which may not be possible ‘advisor’ to top management. without the established connection, easing A reoccurring theme was that the inform- the bridge between the international force ants did not see the sending of messages as a and the target audience. central task. However, gathering intelligence However, it is important to note that the is, and this sends a message too, whether tactical level often stated that communication we like it or not. This is compatible with

40 peer reviewed tidskrift the role of a ‘scout’, as the tactical level shaping of beliefs and attitudes among the can definitely be seen to be “monitoring the local population. At the same time, there is public opinion and identifying threats and a tendency to distance oneself from this ob- opportunities within stakeholder settings”.58 servation. Here a lack of interest and activity Summary: the manoeuvre forces can ar- is rationalised as the task of communication guably be primarily taking on an enabling not being part of the primary tasks of the and scouting communicator’s role, and oc- manoeuvre forces. casionally, the role of a spokesman. To sum up, the findings of this study are important for the future implementation of Conclusions strategic communication in military systems. Commanders need to ensure that subordi- The tactical level is used as an enabling force nates understand the valuable role manoeuvre that monitors the operational environment forces play in shaping the beliefs and atti- while passing on pre-packaged messages with tudes in the area of operations. Also, higher a degree of interpretation freedom. While it operational levels need to affirm that the appears that the messages or themes from lower-tier units not only have some leeway the Commanding Officer did find their way in the shaping of messages but are also pro- down the tactical hierarchy and were even- vided with a type of mandate to negotiate. tually communicated by the manoeuvre This will further foster the tactical level’s forces, the study uncovers problems in the opportunity to promote, and to some degree implementation of strategic communication. shape, the underlying strategy. Furthermore, Contradicting messages stem from various segmentation of staff sections risks causing factors, stretching from lack of coordination incoherence in messages. Communicators in amongst sections and rigid instructions from all military functions need to work together the higher command (perhaps ultimately rather than solely within their own skillset, permeating from lack of knowledge among and preferably with someone in charge of the higher operational levels), down to field-re- overall coordination; only then can effective lated problems such as lack of interpreters, output be achieved. skill and the proper approach. This study sheds light on strategic commu- Despite problems with the implementa- nication in the context of Sweden in during tion; it is clear that commanders at all levels one rotation in Afghanistan, there is a need can be communicators. Nevertheless, most to go beyond a single-case study, both in op- do not think of themselves as having an im- eration area and in time. There is also a need portant role to play in sending messages as to study other small states’ communication they are primarily in the international force activities, as well as to conduct comparative to solve traditional military tasks. This said, studies if general patterns useful for future when the higher tactical levels were asked tours are to be found. Arguably, this study (platoon and upwards), they all agree that offers valuable insights also for other small the manoeuvre units are those that have the states working in international frameworks, most significant opportunity to influence but more research is needed to know this for the local population. There appears to be a sure and what lessons are most important for cognitive split here. On the one hand, there moving towards research-based best prac- is an acceptance that the manoeuvre forces tices. There is also a need to look in more themselves have a significant effect on the depth into the link between the strategic and

41 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed tactical levels, and to trace better how the field. Furthermore, strategic communica- intended message moves through the levels. tion would also be valuable in the context The finding’s policy-making implementa- of national defence, where communicating tion is clear. Strategic communication is vital efficiently with the Swedish population and for the effectiveness of a security building possibly also with members of the opposition effort. One key issue is to carefully consid- would at least in part be the work of the tac- er the threat level in the area of operations. tical level, which is always in close contact Political unwillingness to take any risks, and with the population by virtue of being on the strict policies of force protection in a rel- ground, in the field. This is possibly more atively calm area, will inhibit the ground important than before, as the border between force’s possibilities to conduct operations peace and war has become more and more which ultimately could have strengthened the blurred in the context of hybrid threats and 59 overarching objective and thus, the audienc- hybrid warfare. With this increased grey es’ positive perception of the international zone between war and peace also followed presence. In the military context, not taking an increased use of, and need for, offensive as well as defensive information operations action can speak far louder than actions and and strategic communication. words combined. If turning to the Swedish context more specifically, some would perhaps argue that Elin Norrman is a lieutenant at the Swedish this topic is no longer important due to the Armed Forces Headquarters. She holds a reemphasising of national defence. However, degree in Political Science from Uppsala the effects of globalisation and the inter- University. dependence it fosters make it unlikely that Sweden would stop participating in inter- Mikael Weissmann is a PhD and Head of national military crisis management, thus Research and deputy at the land operations pointing to the continuing relevance of this section at the Swedish Defence University.

42 peer reviewed tidskrift Appendix

purpose sightedness, - Reveals: Autonomy? Long higher Topics? Coordination communicates coordination? How the lowest tactical unit Lack of Important communicators?

the

intent info -

messages?

are messages Questions: How is the section used? Key messages from messages Key Con flicting Own messages/possibility to adapt? Who shapes info - arena? Platoon and higher Commander’s arena? higher command? coordinated? How

sightedness -

Topics Targets Autonomy Long Perception own role

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Topics? Techniques? Lack as an skill of obstacle? Lack of coordination? Reveals: Higher purpose? Who communicates? How? From whom?

- messages?

knowledge?

Key Who did they concern? Freedom in phrasing? Continuity? Importance?/Relevance? commanders -

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Interview questions Section Questions: Did you have contact with the locals? How? What did you talk about? How did you motivate your presence? motives these get you did Where from? fromMessages higher command: Sufficient Contrasting messages? 25 Appendix

43 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed List of interviews

NN1, Section-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-28. NN2, Section-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-19. NN3, Section-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-19. NN4, Section-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-22. NN5, Section-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-20. NN6, Section-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-22. NN7, Section-level, Phone interview, 2016-05-10. NN8, Section-level, Phone interview, 2016-05-13. NN11, Platoon-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-20. NN12, Platoon-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-29. NN13, Platoon-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-21. NN21, Company-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-27. NN22, Company-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-20. NN23, Company-level, Phone interview, 2016-04-19. NN31, Brigade-level, Phone interview, 2016-05-17. MG2016a, Michael Claesson, Brigadier General and Commanding Officer of FS24. Phone interview, 2016-04-12. MG2016b, Michael Claesson, Brigadier General and Commanding Officer of FS24. Email, 2016-05-15.

44 peer reviewed tidskrift Notes

1. The views expressed in this article are those ”Toward Strategic Communication”, Military of the authors alone and does not represent Review, vol. 87, no. 4. 2007, pp. 61-70. the views of their organisation(s). The authors 8. Op. cit., Dimitriu, George, see note 5. would like to thank the anonymous reviewers 9. Munoz, Arturo: U.S. military information oper- for their valuable comments. ations in Afghanistan. Effectiveness of psycho- 2. Baller, Silja; Dutta, Soumitra and Lanvin, Bruno logical operations 2001-2010, RAND, Santa (eds.): The Global Information Technology Monica 2012. Report 2016: Innovating in the Digital Economy, 10. Paul, Christopher: Strategic Communication: World Economic Forum, Geneva 2016. Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates, Praeger, 3. Narrative interpreted as originating from the Santa Barbara 2011, p. 95. theory of framing, see Tversky, Amos and 11. On Provincial Reconstruction Teams, see e.g. Kahneman, Daniel: ”The framing of decisions Maley, William: ”Provincial Reconstruction and the psychology of choice”, Science, vol. Teams in Afghanistan – how they arrived and 211, no. 4481, 1981, pp. 453-458. where they are going”, NATO review, autumn 4. Freedman, Lawrence: ”Networks, culture and 2007, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/ narratives”, The Adelphi Papers, vol. 45, no. issue3/english/art2.html, (2019-08-27). 379, 2006, p. 26. 12. Aggerholm, Helle Kryger and Asmuß, Birte: ”A 5. See for example Graaf, Beatrice de; Dimitriu, practice perspective on strategic communica- George and Ringsmose, Jens (eds.): Strategic tion”, Journal of Communication Management, vol. 20, no. 3, 2016, p. 198. narratives, public opinion and war: winning do- 13. See for example op. cit., Baker, Ralph O.; Eder mestic support for the Afghan War, Routledge, Mari K., see note 7. Abingdon, Oxon 2015; Dimitriu, George: 14. Op. cit., Paul, Christopher, see note 10, p. 3. “Winning the story war: strategic communica- 15. Muñoz, Arturo and Dick, Erin: Information tion and the conflict in Afghanistan”,Public Operations: The Imperative of Doctrine Harmo Relations Review, vol. 38, no. 2, 2012, pp. 195- nization and Measures of Effectiveness, PE- 207. For the case of the US see e.g. Bokma, Lee E.: 128-OSD (2015), RAND, 2015, https://www. Strategic Communication for Tactical Leaders, rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/ Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army PE100/PE128/RAND_PE128.pdf, (2019-08- Command and General Staff College, Fort 27), p. 1. Leavenworth, Kansas, 2010-01, https://apps. 16. Op. cit., Munoz, Arturo, see note 9, p. 9. dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524396.pdf, (2019- 17. Rohm Jr, Fredric W.: ”Merging Information 08-27), for Sweden see e.g. Försvarsmaktens Operations and Psychological Operations”, Strategiska Inriktning 2015 ändringsutgåva 1 Military Review, vol. 88, no. 1, 2008, p. 108. (FMSI 2015 Ä1), Försvarsmakten, FM2015- 18. Keeton, Pamela and McCann, Mark: ”Infor 1597:7, 2016-07-01, https://www.forsvarsmak- mation Operations, STRATCOM, and Public ten.se/siteassets/4-om-myndigheten/vart-up- Affairs”,Military Review, vol. 85, no. 6, 2006, pdrag/bilaga-1-fm2025-1597-7-fmsi-2015-a1. p. 83. pdf, (2019-08-27), esp. pp. 72-73. Also see re- 19. Ibid. view of the field below. 20. AJP-3.10 Allied Joint Doctrine For Information 6. Hallahan, Kirk; Holtzhausen, Derina; Ruler, Operations, NATO, 2009, https://info.pub- Betteke van; Verčič, Dejan and Sriramesh, licintelligence.net/NATO-IO.pdf, (2019-08- Krishnamurthy: ”Defining Strategic Commu 27), pp. 1-3. nication”, International Journal of Strategic 21. Ibid., pp. 1-15. Communication, vol. 1, no. 1 2007, p. 3. 22. Grundsyn Informationsoperationer, Försvars 7. Baker, Ralph O.: ”The Decisive Weapon: A makten, Stockholm 2007, pp. 17ff. Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective 23. Joint Publications 3-13. Information Operations, on Information Operations”, Military Review, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, https://www. vol. 86, no. 3, 2006, pp. 13-32; Eder, Mari K.: jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/

45 nr 3 juli/september 2020 peer reviewed

jp3_13.pdf, (2019-08-27); Memorandum: Stra- 31. Ibid., p. 67. (Authors’ translation.) tegic Communication and Information Opera 32. Ibid., p. 67. (Authors’ translation.) tions in the DoD, US Secretary of Defence, 2011, 33. Ibid., p. 68. (Authors’ translation.) http://www.ecrow.org/assets/osd%2012401-10. 34. Op. cit., Paul, Christopher, see note 10, p. 30. pdf, (2019-08-27). Also see Paul, Christopher: ”Strategic Com 24. Op. cit., Keeton, Pamela and McCann, Mark, munication is Vague – Say What You Mean”, see note 18. Joint Force Quarterly, vol. 54, 1 quarter 2010, 25. Paul, Christopher: Information operations: pp. 10-13. Doctrine and practice, a reference handbook, 35. Ibid., 2011, p. 31. Praeger Westport, CT 2008. 36. Ibid., p. 31. 26. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, US 37. Ibid., p. 31. Army Headquarters, Department of the Army, 38. Ibid., p. 31. 2005, p. 1-1. 39. Ibid., p. 10. 27. Op. cit., Munoz, Arturo, see note 9, p. 16. 40. Ibid., p. 10. 28. Ibid., p. 10. 41. Pratt, John W. and Zeckhauser, Richard J.: 29. See for example Agrell, Wilhem: Ett krig här och nu: från svensk fredsoperation till upp Principals and agents: The structure of busi- rorsbekämpning i Afghanistan 2001–2014, ness, Harvard Business School Press, Boston Bokförlaget Atlantis, Stockholm 2013; Johns 1985, p. 3. son, Magnus: Strategic Colonels: The Discre- 42. Invernizzi, Emanuele and Romenti, Stefania: tion of Swedish Force Commanders in Afghani- ”Institutionalization and Evaluation of Corporate stan 2006–2013, PhD dissertation, Acta Uni- Communication in Italian Companies”, Inter versitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala 2017; Roosberg, national Journal of Strategic Communication, Henric and Weibull, Anna: Försvarsmakten vol. 3, no. 2, 2009, pp. 116-130; Swerling, Jerry; efter ISAF: lärdomar och påverkan på mil- Thorson, Kjerstin and Zerfass, Ansgar: ”The itärstrategisk nivå, FOI-R--3914--SE, Total role and status of communication practice in the försvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI, Stockholm USA and Europe”, Journal of Communication 2014; Sverige i Afghanistan 2002–2014, Afgha Management, vol. 18, no. 1, 2014, pp. 2-15; nistanutredningen, SOU 2017:16, Wolters Zerfass, Ansgar; Verčič, Dejan; Verhoeven, Piet; Kluwer, Stockholm 2017; Sveriges bidrag till Moreno, Angeles and Tench, Ralph: European ISAF 2002–2014 - en insatshistorik: en rapport communication monitor 2012. Challenges and från INS ERF ANA [Insatsledningens avdel competencies for strategic communication: re- ning för erfarenhetsanalys], Försvarsmakten, sults of an empirical survey in 42 countries, Högkvarteret, Stockholm 2015; Det är på EACD/EUPRERA, Brussels 2012, http://www. riktigt nu! Hur det svenska Isaf-deltagandet zerfass.de/ecm/ECM2012-Results-ChartVersion. har påverkat Försvarsmakten, Totalförsvarets pdf, (2019-08-27). forskningsinstitut, FOI, Bilaga 1 till skr FOI- 43. Zerfass, Ansgar; Schwalbach, Joachim; Bentele, 2015-1631 2016-06-15, https://www.foi.se/ Günter and Sherzada, Muschda: ”Corporate download/18.3b9d745f1683075a7f61f9/1547 Communications from the Top and from the 481230880/Det-ar-pa-riktigt-nu_bilaga-1-till_ Center: Comparing Experiences and Expectations FOI-2015-1631.pdf, (2019-08-27); Olsson, Stefan: Stabilitet i Afghanistan: en kritisk gran- of CEOs and Communicators”, International skning av ISAF:s strategi för counterinsurgency, Journal of Strategic Communication, vol. 8, no. COIN, FOI-R--3212--SE, Totalförsvarets for- 2, 2014, pp. 61-78. skningsinstitut, FOI, Stockholm 2011, https:// 44. Ibid., p. 72. www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--3212--SE, 45. Ibid. (2019-08-27). 46. George Alexander L. and Bennett, Andrew: 30. Försvarsmaktens Strategiska Inriktning 2015 Case Studies and Theory Development in the (FMSI 2015), FM2015-1597:2, 2015-06-26, Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA, USA 2005, p. Försvarsmakten, Högkvarteret, 2015, pp. 67- 19. 68. 47. Ibid., p. 72.

46 peer reviewed tidskrift

48. Claesson, Michael, Brigadier General and 52. Op. cit., Johanssen, Asbjorn and Tufte, Per Commanding Officer of FS24. Email 2016- Arne, see note 50, p. 265. 05-15. 53. Op. cit., Sverige i Afghanistan, see note 29, p. 49. In its original form, the study covered a larger 16. spectrum of tactical level activities, apart from 54. Ibid., p. 54. the actual execution, questions about evalua- 55. Ibid., p. 56. tion and planning were also included. The orig- 56. Op. cit., Paul, Christopher, see note 10, p. 3. inal interview guide thus included more ques- 57. For details, see complete list of all interviews. tions than those relevant to this particular es- 58. Zerfass, Ansgar; Schwalbach, Joachim; Bentele, say (execution). The planning aspect was part- Günter and Sherzada, Muschda: ”Corporate ly included in order to answer the fundamental Communications from the Top and from the question if the communication can be argued to be strategic at all. Presented below are the Center: Comparing Experiences and Expecta- questions from the execution cluster, and the tions of CEOs and Communicators”, Interna- planning cluster (platoon and higher only). tional Journal of Strategic Communication, vol. 50. Johanssen, Asbjorn and Tufte, Per Arne: 8, no. 2, 2014, p. 72. Introduktion till samhällsvetenskaplig metod, 59. Weissmann, Mikael: ”Hybrid warfare and hy- Liber, Malmö 2010, pp. 109f. brid threats today and tomorrow: towards 51. Citations in the texts were translated by the an analytical framework”, Journal on Baltic authors. Security, vol. 5, no. 1, 2019, pp. 17-26.

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