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MEMORANDUM DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
The Sttttttttote in Vietnam
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This document contains classified information affeeting the national} security Code of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Title 18‘ Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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HIGHLIGHTS
US and South Vietnamese forces inflicted heavy casualties on a Viet Cong unit they trapped in the delta on 4 December.
I. Military Situation in South Vietnam: US infantrymen and South Vietnamese Marines trapped a Viet Cong force in the Mekong Delta and killed nearly 200 in a day-long battle on 4 December. To the north allied forces in Quang Ngai Province repelled a heavy enemy attack at the Binh Son District Headquarters on 3 December. Viet Cong guerrillas also staged a series of attacks in the Saigon area on 4 December (Paras. l-7). Recent well—coordinated Viet Cong at— tacks in the delta indicate that the enemy in this area has improved his command and control capability (Paras. 8-9).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: Some 20 persons are to be tried on l9 December for their part in the 1966 Buddhist struggle movement in Hue and Da Nang (Para. l).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments: MACV reports that over @7,000 North Vietnamese troops infiltrated into South Vietnam through 30 November (Para. l). Infiltrators in 1967 made heavy use of the Demilitarized Zone but the Laos panhandle was still the primary route (Paras. 2-9).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developgents: The So- viets are again trying to persuade t é*US to prolong the projected holiday bombing pause (Paras. l-3).
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VIETNAM I. MILIQARY SITUATION I?! SOQTH
l. US infantrymen and South Vietnamese Marines trapped a Viet Cong force in the Mekong Delta and reported killing nearly 200 in a day-long battle on 4 December. First reports put US casualties at four killed and 38 wounded and South Vietnamese at l5 dead and 50 wounded.
2. The fighting erupted 66 miles southwest of Saigon as an allied task force, part of Operation CORONADO IX, moved up a delta waterway in armored troop carriers. When the leading troop carriers carrying South Vietnamese Marines came under heavy Viet Cong fire from the right bank, they proceeded past the enemy positions, landed, and swept back toward the enemy. The Communists are believed to have been the 502nd Viet Cong local force battalion. At the same time one battalion of the 2nd Brigade, 9th US Infantry Division, landed from troop carriers below the Viet Cong and another battalion was landed by helicopter behind the enemy. As the US forces moved to link up with the South Vietnamese Marines, the armored troop carriers laid down a barrage of fire.
Viet Cong Attack in Quang Ngai
3. US, South Vietnamese, and South Korean forces assisted beleagured South Vietnamese troops defending the Binh Son District Headquarters in northeastern Quang Ngai Province which came under heavy enemy attack early on 3 December. The attackers, probably from the 48th local force battalion, were driven off after a six—and—a—halfehour battle which left 52 enemy soldiers killed. Allied casualties included 40 killed (22 civilians) and l2 wounded. The recent increase in enemy activity in Quang Ngai suggests that Viet Cong units there may be attempting to launch their winter—spring campaign.
4 December 1967
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Guerrilla Activity Near Saigon
4. Viet Cong guerrillas staged a series of attacks in the Saigon area on 4 December. Casu- alities were light but damage was considerable.
5. The first attack shortly after midnight was against the US supply complex at Long Binh in Bien Hoa Province--the largest US base in South Vietnam. Four enemy rockets struck the ammunition storage area but did little damage. Other rockets set fire to nearly 1.5 million gallons of liquid asphalt and other building supplies. This was the second attack on Long Binh in less than a week.
6. Later in the day some 13 miles east of Saigon the enemy used recoilless rifle and small- arms fire to attack a river convoy consisting of four ammunition barges and a floating crane. One barge was sunk, another partially sunk, and the three remaining barges damaged. Some 21,000 rounds of 4.2-inch mortar and 105-mm. howitzer ammunition were lost.
Enemy Command and Control
7. During the night of 24-25 November in the Mekong Delta, Viet Cong gunners shelled ten districttowns,l2 government outposts, two South Vietnamese Army night defensive positions, and two airfields. The Viet Cong also launched ground attacks against seven outposts on the same night and cratered Route 4--the main route from Saigon southward into the delta--in nine places. Surges of coordinated attacks like these have occured periodically in the delta since late October. Prior to that time coordinated enemy activity in the delta was generally confined to a selected prov- ince. The recent attacks show that the Viet Cong have considerably improved their command and control capability in this region.
8. The attacks were timed with large-scale Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army offensives in the Loc Ninh - Song Be - Bu Dop area north of Saigon and in the Dak To area of the central highlands, and
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are probably part of the Communist country-wide winter-spring campaign. In recent weeks examples of closer coordination between Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces have been noted in a number of other cases. Viet;Cong local forces south of Da Nang in the coastal districts of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces have sustained a damaging campaign of sabotage and harassment in an effort to relieve pressure on the main force regiments of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division operating in the Que Son Valley.
9.
3.3(h)(2)
/ A skirmish on 20 October\ near Phu Cat in which both the North Vietnamese l8th Regiment and the Viet Cong 50th Battalion were identified confirms that North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units are conducting joint operations in Binh Dinh. Similar close coordination between North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units has been noted in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa provinces along the central coast and in the highlands of Kontum and Pleiku provinces.
4 December 1967 I-3
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II. PoLIT1c@L DEVELOPMENTS IN souqn VIETNAM
l. The government will try leaders of the l966 Buddhist struggle movement in Hue and Da Nang. A government offical announced on 4 Decem- ber that about 20 persons implicated in the struggle will stand trial before Saigon's special military court on 19 December. The 20 include several army officers and Nguyen Van Man, the former mayor of Da Nang.
4 December l967
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INFIETRATIDN TOTALS SINCE l October 1965
Based on MACV Holdings as oi 30 November I957
' ACCEPTED MONTHLY CONHRMED PROBABLE TOTAL POSQBLE TOTALS
1965 October 7,000 - 7,000 400 7,400
A November ' 3,300 -_- 3,300 4,300 . 1,000 December 200 400 500 -800 1,400
1 Sub—Totol 10,500 400 10,900 2,200, 13,100
1966 200 2 000 5,200 3,000 January 4, , ,9,200 ‘ 800 2 300 February 6, , 9,100 2,100 11,200
4 1 1 1 300 March , 800 , 13,100 3,500 15,700 Apfil 100 500 500 7 500 1,200 May’ 1 , 300 500 1,000 3,500 5,400 June 12, 300 700 13,000 1,700 14,700
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July » 4,000 700 4,700 4,200 's,900
i ' August" 1 800 , 400 2,200 3,700 5,900
September 1 ‘.400 700 2,100 700 2,000 Qctober 100 600 700 5,200 5,900 November 500 TOO 500 500 1,200 December OOO 600 1 , 1,500 2,500 4,100
Sub—Total ' 45, 300 10,400 55,700 31,500 87,200
1967 January 1 000 800 1,800 3,700 5,500 ,
1 700 2,000 - 3,700 1,500 February , 5,200 March 4, 300 400 4,700 4,500 9,200 _ 0 April 4, 000 600 4,500 300 4,900 ,
1 1
M97 4,000 1 300 5,300 1,500 5,800 , g , , June 4, 200 - 4,200 1,700 ‘5,900
' July ‘ 800 100 900 900 1,000 1 August 3,500 ' 300 3,300 1,400 5,200
September ' 400 100 500 900 1,400 October 500 - 500 700 1,200 November -
Sub—Total 24, 400 5,500 30, OOO 17,100 47,100
TOTALS 80, 200 15,400 96, 600 50,800 147,400
MONTHLY AVERAGE(l 0CT1965 -31 MAY 1961) ACCEPTED: CONHRMEDAND PROBABE M350
1 10TAl ACCEPTED AND PDSSIBEE 6,600
ACCEPTED lNFlLTRATlON: Those NVA personnel, groups, and units which have entered South Vietnam and are carried . in the confirmed or probable categories.
CONFIRMED: A confirmed infiltration unit/group is PROBABLE: A probable infiltration unit/g|OUp is one which
‘ one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis is acce pt ed in V'el on e asrs oT'nF t' S ou th 1 nom th b orma 1 ton of information provided by a minimum of two POWs provided by one POW or returnee (H01 Chanh) Trom the
or returnees (Hot Chanlw) tram the unit/group, or two unit/group, 0| c1 captured document, supported by inlormation captured documents from the unit, or a combination of Trom other sources which can be evaluated as probably true. personnel and documents.
POSSIBLE INFILTRATION: A possible infiltration unit/group is one which may be in South Vietnam on the basis of g
intormution which can be evaluated as possibly true even though no POW, relurnee (Hoi Chanh), or document is available to verify the reports“
NOTE: In addition to the intiltrotors which tall into the above infiltration categories, other units or groups have been mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, interrogation reports and sightings by Friendly forces, but the information is insulticient to worront inclusion of these units or groups in any 0F the above categories.
MONTH OF INFTLTRATION: The month established as the date an iniiltration unit/group crosses the internotional border into South Vietnam for the first time. 3 5 C 68535 12 67 CIA
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l. MACV reports that the evidence so far shows over 47,000 North Vietnamese troops have infiltrated into South Vietnam during the first ll months of 1967. Of these, 24,400 are listed by MACV as confirmed, 5,600 as probable, and 17,100 as possible.
2. An analysis of infiltration units and groups which arrived in South Vietnam through 31 October indi- cates that at least 60 percent of the infiltrators were replacements or fillers for North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and local force units. The percentage probably is even higher because the disposition or assignment of a number of infiltration groups is not yet known.
3.3(h)(2)
goutes of Infiltration
4. Infiltration in 1967 has been marked by the use of the Demilitarized Zone./
3.3(h)(2)
Use of the Demilitarized Zone complicates infiltration analysis because units suffering casualties in the area often return to North Vietnam for replacements, and it frequently is impossible to fix the number of new infil- trators when these units return to South Vietnam. There are also some North Vietnamese units which have taken part in actions in the area but have not yet been in- cluded in MACV's infiltration statistics.
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' ' " ' ' 5 . The infiltration trails whic h ertend t h rough the Laos panhandle continue to be the primary means 3;xhX2) of travel.
\ 3.3(h)(2)
6. Sea infiltration appears to have been al- most totally thwarted. Only six infiltrators were detected entering South Vietnam by sea in the first ten months of 1967, and all of these were captured.
7. An additional 6,800 infiltrators--some l7 percent--came by unknown routes. It is believed most of these probably came through Laos.
Indications of Additional Infiltration
8. There are indications of other large- scale infiltrations whichauxanot yet reflected in MACV's statistics. Prisoners and defectors in recent weeks, particularly in the central high- lands, have identified a large number of new infiltration units and groups. In addition, there are reports of additional regimental-size for- mations--such as the 40th Artillery Regiment, which have not yet met all of MACV's criteria. There is a time lag of six months and longer for the detection of a new infiltration group, and the problem is exacerbated by replacement personnel who are even harder to detect.
3.3(h)(2)
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4 December 1967
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report;
4 December 1967
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Z;W%MWNEflJ@E@§E£Rfl@HE%@E§ to persuade the l. This year's Soviet effort prolong the projected holiday bombing pause US to London, has begun. Last week a Soviet diplomat in told\ ‘that speaking "personally," 3:NhX2)' the Soviet Union could persuade Hanoi to he felt terminal enter negotiations if the US announced no date for the bombing pause. ammo)
More such approaches can be expected, but 3. acting at there is no indication that Moscow is Hanoi's behest.
4 December 1967
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