MAY-JUNE 1973 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR U N I V E R S ITY

PROFESSIONAl JOURNALrevicw OF THE UNITED STATES AIR T H E FORCE

OpTIONS IN THE FüTURE ...... 2 Maj. Gen. Kenneth R. Chapman, USAF Lt. Col. John F. Gander, USAF Rea l ist ic Doctrlne: Basic Thinkinc Today...... 21 Capt. Ravmond S. Blunt, USAF Capt. Thomas O. Cason, USAF Out er Spa c e and Air Spa c e: T he Difficult ies in Definit io n s ...... 34 Dr. Ravmond J. Barrett The Air Force Museum ...... 40 William J. DePaola Lt. Col. Philip M. Flammer, USAF Loyalty, Honor, .and the Modern Mil it .ary ...... 50 Capt. Michael O. Wheeler. USAF Air Force Review Let ha l it y/Vulner ability: T he Touchstone for Procress...... 56 George C. Crews A L it t l e Thoucht Prevents Bic Waste...... 65 Maj. James H. Conely, Jr., USAF The USAAF in China, 1946-47 ...... 69 Lt. Col. Gordon K. Pickler, USAF Military Affairs Abroad The Soviet Air Force Hic h Command...... 75 Alexander O. Ghebhardt Dr. William Sehneider, Jr. Books and Ideas Out side Involvement in Latin Amer ic a ...... 84 Lt. Col. Laun C. Smith, Jr., USAF (Ret) Stratecic Power: On Balance...... 89 Col. William T. Ballard, USAF The Co .vtributors ...... 95

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Addro, manuwnpb (o Editor. Air Univmity the cover Review Drvison. BUJs; 1211. MaiwcII AFB. a L Weapon Systems for the operational eleineuts of the .Vir 38112. Prínted by Government Printing Offic*. Force, present and future, are producLs of a lengthy Addrert tubicriptioni to Superintendem of Documents. CPO. Wnhington DC 20402: yearlv joiirney through the developmcnt plunning pipeline. M.00 domestic, 110.00 foreign; iingle copv 11.50. Major General Kenneth H. Chapman and Licutcnant Colonel John F. Gander expiam how the dcvelop- ment planning specialty functions at Air Force Sys- tems Comrnand, yielding sueh recent safeguards agamst the future as the AWACS. the A-10A, and the F-lõ (top to hottom). In "Lethality/Vulnerahility: The Touchstone for Prqgress” George C. Crews discusses Vol. XXTV No. 4 M at-June 1973 another aspect of the diverse capahility of AFSC.

OPTIONS IN THE FUTURE

Major Gener a l Kennet h R. Chapman Lieut en a n t Colonel John F. Gander

A IR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND is unique among major / \ usaf commands in that it assigns a principal staff element / \ to the specialty of development planning. afscs success in pro- viding technology support for future force structure options depends to a great extent upon a strong, technically oriented planning staff. For this reason, the Development Plans deputate at afsc headquarters was decoupled from the traditional planning activities in order to concentrate its total effort on plans to fulfill the dominant function of the command: to provide weapon systems for the operational elements of the Air Force, present and future. The same planning structure exists in the afsc product divisions as at the headquarters. Within each division, a development planning staff element carries out the responsibility for the form and content of major system acquisitions as well as guidance of the research programs that will be needed to provide hardware for the next generation of force structure. At whatever levei, development planning is not by any means a peripheral activity. The formative stages of new development/ac- quisition programs involve a great many years of concentrated effort over a wide range of activities. Every major system the Air Force is sponsoring—the F-15, the B -l, the awacs, and so on down the list—has followed this lengthy joumey through the development planning pipeline. Little wonder, then, that Systems Command allo- cates a considerable share of its resources, manpower in particular, to these activities. Three basic motifs underlie the development planning mission of providing options in the future:

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(1) Assuring that emerging technology re- its components: the Space and Missile Systems mains relevant to the future needs of the oper- Organization (samso) in Los Angeles, Califór- ating forces; nia; the Aeronautical Systems Division (asd) at (2) Structuring new programs for develop- Wright-Patterson afb, Ohio; the Electronic ment and acquisition; and Systems Division (esd) at Laurence G. Han- (3) Seeking more effective ways to accom- scom Field, Massachusetts; and the Armament plish the acquisition job. Development and Test Center (adtc) at Eglin afb, Florida. These are, in effect, the “product Relating Technology to Needs divisions” of the Systems Command, and each is capable of turning out one or two mission The projection of hiture force needs involves analyses per year. a great deal more than a brilliant leap of the These major study efforts identify new and imagination or consultation with the Delphic promising concepts to correct existing or po- oracle or lengthy contemplation of a crystal tential operational deficiencies. They explore bali. It depends upon developing perspective alternative options in terms of current and pro- from numerous and diverse factors. All plan- jected technology, propose realistic program ning projections used by the Air Force must be alternatives, and identify the high-payoff areas brought into focus, including the Joint Strategic of technology as well as criticai technological Objectives Plan (js o p), the Joint Research and limitations. Development Objectives Document (jr d o d ), An analysis of conus Air Defense completed the U.S. Air Force Planning Concepts Docu- in 1971, for example, provided a roadmap for ment, and so on. Development planners, in developing a research base in advanced turbine order to accomplish this task, make use of two engine propulsion, ramjet technology, hyper- principal investigative techniques—mission anal- sonic aircraft design, surveillance techniques, yses and mission area studies—in addition to an look down/shoot down airborne radar tech- array of preliminary system design efforts. nology, and related areas. This research base is currently keeping pace with the potential So- viet threat in preparation for the eventuality mission analyses that major force improvements in air defense A mission analysLs is a major undertaking that will be required in future years. draws heavily upon threat assessment and oper- Current conus air defenses were based on ational concepts as well as available and pro- technologies of the 1950s and designed to coun- jected technology. On the average, such a study ter high-altitude subsonic and transonic bomb- will last about six months and involve well over ers. Although the Soviet Strategic Offensive 150 man-months of intensive effort. The com- Forces today consist primarily of ic bm s and position of the study team is clearly vital: per- slbm’s, a significant bomber force remains. For sonnel from the afsc divisions, centers, and example, the present Soviet bomber force is laboratories are teamed with experienced capable of attacking the United States by pene- officers and civilians from the using commands trating at low levei and launching standoff and appropriate representatives from industry. air-to-surface missiles. The conus air defense A steering group of sênior officers and civilians, mission analysis quantified the capabilities of representing both the r &d community and the our present air defenses against these tactics interests of the operating commands, gives di- and assessed the vulnerability of the present air rection to the study team. defense ground support elements to an At present Air Force Systems Command ic bm/ slbm attack. possesses a mission analysis capability in four of The study then definitized a number of time- OPTIONS IN THE FUTURE 5

phased elements, based upon realistic threat could: (1) provide more versatile, yet more assessments and plausible technology projec- economical and less manpower-intensive c&c tions, to modernize the air defense forces. The operations for the 1980s; (2) reduee the typical Aerospace Defense Command (adc) and Air c& c information-processing system develop- Force Systems Command, using the results ment time from six to four years, and the re- of this mission analvsis as a foundation, have sulting Computer hardware age at initial opera- jointly prepared a master plan on conus air tional capability (ioc) from three or four years defense. This plan addresses system concepts to one or two years; (3) reduee significantly the and their requisite supporting technologies for danger that software errors could escalate erisis the next fifteen years. situations or degrade defenses at criticai times; Another example showing how mission anal- and (4) provide combat-ready c& c informa- yses relate technology to future force structure tion-processing systems that are far more reli- needs derives from the recently completed able and responsive in their support of dynamic studv entitled Information Processing/Data force management requirements. Automation Implications of .Air Force Com- mand and Control Requirements in the 1980s— mission area studies called CCIP-85 for short. The purpose of the study was to construct an integrated Air Force The second major investigative tool of develop- r &d program for the 1970s that will develop ment planning for reeonciling technology and the information-processing technology needed force needs is the mission area study. By use of to meet the likely Air Force command and this technique, air power missions are arbitrar- control (c&c) information-processing require- ily separated into groupings (areas) that ean be ments of the 1980s. The central concem was treated analytically to relate technology pro- with c&c for Air Force combatant units. grams to specific tasks underlying the applica- Information-processing technology is barely tions of air power. Mission areas “bound” the adequate to support ,\ir Force c&c functions problem to facilitate analysis; they also make it todav. The major technological strains are not simpler to estimate the potential payoffs of in the Computer hardware area but in software competing technologies. This technique for technology: the technology of transforming “viewing” the problem forms a communication broad functional c& c requirements into spe- link from the laboratories, through the develop- cific, detailed, and unambiguous sequences of ment planners, to the system operators in the commands for the Computer hardware to using commands, and to the Air Staff. execute. Within each mission area, the development To correct this mismatch between c& c re- planners maintain an overview and projection quirements and r &d support, the study pro- of the technical programs; from this an assess- vides a series of integrated r & d “roadmaps” for ment can be made as to how adequately the improving information processing. Roadmaps technology base is providing future force struc- are included for preparation for the next- ture options, so that appropriate adjustments generation World Wide Military Command can be made, if necessary. Where technology is and Control System (wwmccs) Computer thin, efforts are fortified. Where duplication is procurement, for interservice coordination ac- found to exist, technology programs are com- tivities, and for a usaf Computer hardware lab- bined or eliminated. To insure that the technol- oratory. ogies in question offer the highest payoffs in These roadmaps or integrated program plans relation to projected needs and requirements, provide r &d project guidelines that lead infor- measures of effectiveness are generated for mation-processing technology in directions that comparing the alternative system options de-

Continued on page 8 Intricate workmanship is the handmaiden o f intricate inven- tiveness at AFSCs Electronic Systems Division, Laurence G. Hanscom Field, Massachusetts.

Satellite Control Center o f AFSCs Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO), Los Angeles

8 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

veloped from eompeting technologies. Finally, are primarily technological in nature—for more in order that the results may be put to work detailed definition of optional capabilities for where they count, they are sequenced to coin- the force structure. cide with the annual formulation of the rdt&e budget. Structuring New Programs Let us consider, as an example, the search and rescue mission area. The mission-essential From the foregoing it is obvious that the elements in combat search and rescue are (1) studies and mission area work form the nucleus notification (alerting and dispatching rescue for additional development on a more detailed forces based on emergency data from wingman basis—specialized and specific major design reports, distress/bailout calls, or voice/beacon study efforts and actual hardware development. signals); (2) localization (accurate identification This planning process is a rather extensive and and location of downed personnel); (3) recovery often time-consuming part of the acquisition (getting the downed crew member(s) from the cycle.1 The B-l program was approximately hostile ground environment into the rescue eight years in the planning process. The Sub- vehicle); (4) the rescue vehicles themselves. sonic Cruise Armed Decoy (scad) program was Primary equipment available at this time in- worked and reworked over a period of four cludes beacons, rádios, fiares, markers, crash years, through innumerable variants in the sys- position indicators, hoists, hamesses, and the tem design, the most demanding of which con- Fulton recovery system. Rescue vehicles in- cerned protecting the armed option. Addition- clude the HC-130 airplane and the HH-3, ally the Air Force could not afford a large HH-43F, and HH-53 helicopters. investment in the system, so a low-cost acquisi- Near-term options for enhancing recovery tion plan had to be structured. This was done encompass distress incident locators and accu- by placing responsibility for system integration rate localization devices; recovery equipment with the Program Director and the Aeronauti- to minimize loiter and hovering time for the cal Systems Division. rescuing vehicle; and improved recovery vehi- cles (e.g., a replacement for the HH-53). scoping requirements Longer-range requirements look toward an advanced rescue system that would include a Long before the using commands formally State self-contained rescue device, combat rescue their requirements in terms of new weapon Sys- aircraft, and possibly a replacement for the tems, development planners are on the scene, HC-130. In addition, the imminence of the assessing the potential threat, directing tech- space shuttle under development by nasa and nology, and anticipating user-level needs. The the opportunity it will provide for extended mission area work and related studies have set space operations necessitate Air Force reaction the stage for the “requirements process —on to the problems of space rendezvous and res- the one hand, by examining current systems for cue. their effectiveness against anticipated threats, In general, the mission area studies are a seeking new ideas, and study ing ways of im- continuous process, constantly making proving their capabilities (the problein-oriented trade-offs among stated requirements, concepts approach); on the other hand, by seeking to of operations, and available or projected tech- formulate new uses for areas of technology for nology. They draw upon many other more spe- which there is no current application (the solu- cialized studies of criticai subsets of the tion-oriented approach). broader mission task. In all, these analytical The requirements process is the pipeline and study techniques establish the bases—which through which the operating elements of the OPTIONS IN THE FUTURE 9

Air Force obtain new or iniproved operational experimental (F-X) concept of 1961 evolved capabilities. It starts with the submission of a into todays F-15 and A-X demonstrates how Required Operational Capability (roc) docu- a program is fashioned to meet requirements. ment, establishing a need, outlining existing The F-X started out as an aircraft with good deficiencies, describing the operational concept, air-to-air capability and excellent air-to-ground and setting performance parameters. By keep- capability—a multimission aircraft. After sev- ing in close contact with the user organizations, eral iterations, additional evaluations, and an through mission analvses, staff visits, and ex- interim buy (the A-7), the original requirements change of planning documents, development were transformed into requirements for a cas planners have an appreciation for their needs aircraft tailored to survive in the European and can better provide appropriate technical environment (the A-X) and an air superiority information and solution alternatives. fighter capable of successfully countering the If Headquarters usaf decides affirmatively on potential Soviet threat aircraft projected for an roc submission, a Program Management the 1975-1985 time period (the F-15). Directive (pmd ) is issued. The pmd fumishes the acquisition cycle guidance for initiating the program. Usuallv the afsc planners are directed to provide analvses The acquisition cycle consists of five major of the preliminary system/key subsystem per- phases: (1) conceptual phase; (2) validation formance specifícations and to verify the dem- phase; (3) full-scale development phase; (4) onstrated State of the art for key subsystems, production phase; and (5) deployment phase. components, and fabrication/production tech- Approval by the Secretary of Defense is re- niques. At the same time, the credibility of cost quired before proceeding with the second, and schedule estimates is estabÜshed, and the third, and fourth phases. Development plan- procurement strategy and management plan ning activities occur primarily in the concep- are outlined. tual and validation phases of the acquisition The completed analvses—trade-off studies cycle. The conceptual phase is a highly itera- and preliminary design and development tive process, with continuous dialogue among studies—of the program concept as well as the planners, designers, technologists, developers, preferred management approach are utilized to and users. The objective of this phase is to structure the development program package. A define and select the system coneepts that best key aspect of this work is constant iteration meet user requirements, under the constraints between system capabilities requested in the imposed by technological feasibility and re- roc and the cost, schedule, and technology sources. The final output is a preferred program contraints under which the system must be approach in the event a decision is made to acquired. proceed into the next (validation) phase of the This work also supports Air Force inputs to acquisition cycle. the draft Development Concept Paper (dcp). In the validation phase, the characteristics of The dcp is a decision paper for the Secretary of the system concept are refined and validated Defense and contains the record of primary through study and analyses, hardware develop- program information, the decision rationale, ment, or prototype testing. The overall objective and the decision-review thresholds. The latter here is to establish firm and realistic perfor- are program boundaries which, if breached or mance specifícations that will meet operational expected to be exceeded, cause a review of the requirements and to determine whether to pro- program by the Secretary of Defense. ceed with full-scale development. This work of scoping requirements can span The development planners transfer the pro- many years. The route by which the fighter- gram to the system engineers at a time in the 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

A contract for the Close Air Sup- port A-10A has been auiarded to Fairchild Industries, Republic Division. Ten Rir D A-lOAs will first be built, with an option to produce 48 additional ones.

validation phase when they have determinecl for structuring new development and acquisi- that it is in good financial shape, the schedule is tion approaches. Much of the restructnring established, the program is technieally sound, evolved ont of what had been learned (the hard and an organization, the System Program Office way) in earlier management experiences with ( spo ), has been formed to nin it. such programs as the C-5, the F-lll, and the

short-range attack missile ( sr a m ). Thus it is natural that the management ap­ adaptability in buying proaches to major new weapon system pro­ The “fly-before-buy” philosophy rejuvenated by grams like the F-15, B -l, and A-X emphasize former Deputy Seeretary of Defense David Hexibility and allow the latitude for program Packard ushered in a whole new set of flexible goal adjustments when they are justified. The procurement techniques—prototvpe develop- F-15 program, for example, involved competi­ ment, competitive flyoffs, advanced prototyping— tive development of some criticai components OPTIONS IN THE FUTURE 11

(like the attack radar) and extensive hardware the structuring of the advanced prototyping testing to verify that design specifícations were program. Here the objective is to provide pro- being met within cost goals. totype hardware with which the Air Force can The B-l program is a classic fly-before-buy test and evaluate new design concepts, relevant example. The A-X development eoneept went technology, and military usefulness as they ap- one step further: it was keyed to a competitive ply to anticipated requirements. This, in turn, prototype seleetion of a development contrae- will reduce the uneertainties of possible future tor. In addition, firm price proposals were re- developments in terms of technology, opera- quired from each of the contractors before the tions, performance, cost, and scheduling. end of the competition, thereby giving assur- Basically, however, the major motivation for ance that the .Air Force objective of low cost the advanced prototyping program was the can be met. possibility of making further significant im- A further step beyond the A-X program is provements in the acquisition process itself. In

Another product o f the flex- ibility in the acquisition pro- cess is the F-15 (opposite. re- fueling), intended for air su- periority in the 1975-85 period. ... The Advanced Médium STOL Transport (AMST) is in the con- tract stage of developing pro- totypes by McDonnell Douglas and Boeing (the latter s con- cept illustrated at right).

the management approach fashioned for these benefits becaase of the close working relation- projects the Air Force retains responsibility for ship and reduced manpower complexity. establishing technology objectives, for main- The advanced prototyping program has taining the proper balance between the objec- moved closer to realization with the awarding tives and program progress, and for evaluating of contracts to General Dynamics and Nor- the final results of the project. The contractor is throp to build two lightweight fighter (lwf) pro- assigned responsibility for establishing the tech- totype aircraft. Technically, the lwf project nical approach, for study design and fabrication was fashioned to achieve extremely high ma- standards, and for exercising adequate manage- neuverability while still maintaining precise ment control of the project. control. There is no Air Force commitment to Each project office is manned by a small production of these vehicles. team of from three to five men, supported by The Advanced Médium st ol Transport afscs laboratories, centers, and product divi- (amst) is another project in this category. It is sions. This is in contrast to the .50- to 400-man to be a médium-weight, high-performance air- system program offices that are found in craft that can operate in and out of austere full-scale development and production efforts short landing strips. The project is scoped to for major programs. The industry teams should provide data on the cost and design features experience the same order of manpower associated with short-field performance in an

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aircraft of the C-130 class. McDonnell Douglas log systems. Beyond that, digital avionics ap- and Boeing have been awarded contracts to pears capable of slowing the accelerating develop amst prototypes. cost-growth characteristics of the way we now design, produce, operate, and maintain elec- tronic subsystems. As an example, we can ex- digital avionics pect a 32 percent weight and 17 percent vol- The concept of modularity is another interest- ume savings in power-distribution systems ing example of a way to structure development alone. programs. The aim is to design a system to Lower costs will also accrue from eommonal- some minimum performance levei but provide ity of components among different types of air- flexibility in the design so that performance craft, as well as from the basic modularity growth can be achieved through modular (or whereby added capability, as required, can be “building block”) modifications. This is not a “plugged in” to the core system. These same simple thing to do, but neither is it simple to characteristics, of course, should substantially restructure our defense posture every few years improve reliability and maintainability, helping as machines are made obsolete by new tech- to bring the operations and maintenance (o &m) nology or changes in the potential threat. costs of new weapon systems down to a tolerable One form of modularity being advocated levei. After all, the investment cost of avionics today is in avionics. A series of programs is on today’s typical attack aircraft represents 30 being launched to prove the feasibility and de- percent to 40 percent of the total system cost, sirability of a digital avionics concept. Digital and in too many cases a few years of mainte- avionics uses the same principies employed in nance cost more than equals the original invest- the modem Computer: physical characteristics ment. are converted to numbers represented by a se- All in all, the digital avionics approach is ries of discrete ones and zeros or on and off doubly attractive, from the standpoint of re- switches. (The older analog Systems use contin- duced initial and total life-cycle costs and from uously varying electric characteristics to repre- the standpoint of the marked improvements in sent physical characteristics; for example, a performance that it promises. varying voltage to represent temperature change or fuel levei, as in a car.) The essence of Improving Acquisition the digital avionics concept is that airborne electronic subsystems—software, computers, sen- Accelerating competition for public funds, sors, displays, Controls, and the like—are in- coupled with increasing cost of individual tegrated via this discrete (digital) process for weapon systems, decreasing purchasing power managing the resources of the aircraft. The of the dollar, and increasing personnel cost, is beauty is that no major technological advances reducing the number of new weapon system are required; the concept requires only the program starts. (Figure 1) In addition, defense bringing together of existing and proven tech- hardware acquisition costs have been rising nologies in a total system of on-board equip- over the past 20 years at roughly five times the ment and two-way data and control linkages rate of inflation. There are simplv not enough between large numbers of aircraft and ground funds available to replace the existing force (or airborne) terminais. structure at parity within foreseeable budget The end product will be a highly automated limitations and at the same time to match cur- system that is far more responsive to command rently planned forces with currently projected and control and makes better use of the pilot’s equipment costs. decision-making capabilities than today’s ana- Control of system costs therefore becomes a Figure I A2D F4D F3H X-3 A-3D S-2 F-100 F10F B57 F-102 F-104 SP-5 B-óó F11F C-97 C-123 C-121 F-101 C-124 F-8 C-130 F-105 C-133 A-6 F5D C-135 E-2 F-107 B-52 C-140 F-106 B-58 X-21 C-141 E-l YB-60 C-2 YF-12 F-4 YP-6M F-lll XB-70 A-5 P-3A XC-142 FB-111 X-15 R-3Y A-7 C-5 ade 1 st flight 1950s 1960s 1970s

Department o f Defense aircraft systems initiated in the 1950s-l970s provide graphic evidence o f the fiscal pressure occasioned by the national policy o f cutting down on military expenditures. (Left half of column, gross weight 25,000-100,000 lb; right hulfi greater than 100,000 Ib)

categorieal imperative. To that end, a number nel exists from the System Program Director to of promising steps are being taken. One is to the Commander of afsc, to the usaf Chief of curtail the management bureaucraey in order Staff, and to the Secretary of the Air Force in to alleviate the overlapping paper work and all matters that have a direct impact on his ease the compounding “people costs” prob- program. lems. Another is to simplify procurement tech- Similarly, by shifting more responsibility to niques, for the benefit of both the Air Force the contractor and bacldng it up by tight disci- and the contractor. And we are also pursuing a plinary measures, it should be possible to re- variety of cost-reduction techniques. duce the size of major spos signifícantly. The way has been shown by the advanced prototyp- ing program, and, while by their very nature streamlining management major spo ’s cannot be that lean, there is un- Systems Command recognizes the importance questionably a middle ground that can reason- of people and the role they play in acquisition ably be achieved. management. Accordingly, the best personnel Improvements in the procedures for control- are being assigned to these jobs and given a ling management systems are also under way. clear mandate, flexibility to bring their own Emphasis is being placed on reducing the large style of management into play, and longevity. number of documents and eliminating overlap­ Further, a “Blue Line’’ direct reporting chan- ping requirements used to specify conceptual

Continuai on page 18 The Airlxnne Warning and Control System (AWACS), another product of AFSC development planning l lq lndnatmg . ha .fly befi buy ... 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW needs. The approach has been to establish first for supervising his subcontractors, and the lati- the requirements for management systems and tude of the subs will have to be reduced. Pro- then identify documents pertaining to them. gram architects, development planners, and industry will have to break the habit of rede- signing or reinventing every piece of equip- tightening procurement ment and subsystem that goes into each new At the heart of every weapon system acquisi- weapon system. The systems development tion program lurks a requirement for a Request team and industry must be impelled to thinking for Proposal (rfp) and a Statement of Work in terms of designing around proven off-the- (sow). The mere simplification of rfp’s and shelf equipment. The same applies to the use sow’s can substantially lower the cost of doing of govemment-fumished equipment (gfe). business, without sacrificing the program. Sub- Redevelopment practices are responsible for stantial progress has already been made in many increases in the cost of new weapon sys- streamlining this mountain of paper. tems. Being technology-oriented, our engineers Under older system-management concepts, a sometimes are too much inclined to use tech- considerable amount of Air Force management nology to improve performance rather than to and documentation was called for. The A-X reduce costs. An increase in performance, more was the first major program to depart from often than not, means development of a new such practices by minimizing documentation. item. Thus, another item is added to the inven- The A-X rfp totaled only 102 pages, as com- tory, training time for maintenance personnel is pared to the several hundred pages normally increased, more data are generated, and so on sent to the contractors. In the advanced proto- down the line. Today, as a result of that sort of typing program we have done even better; the process, there are almost 1200 different car- rfp for the lightweight fighter was only 38 tridge and propellant-actuated devices, 104 pages, including model contract. And while this different tires and tubes, and 56 different air- is primarily a technology-oriented program, the borne radio sets in the inventory. So it is very intent is clear, and slimmed-down documenta- clear that technology must be utilized to cut tion will be the order of the day. costs; components and subsystems must be stan- New approaches in the source selection pro- dardized; gfe must be utilized to a greater ex- cess can also bring substantial gains. Here the tent; and the concept of modularity and digital idea is to narrow the base to those contractors avionics must be exploited to the maximum who have been screened and found fully degree. qualified to do the work in question. One of the The concept of “should cost” reviews holds factors used to determine eligibility is past per- out great promise—indeed it has already been formance. rfps are then sent only to those se- used in a number of programs with spectacular lected by the screening process. results. Should cost reviews are a special, coor- In the case of the lightweight fighter, rfp s dinated, in-depth procurement cost analysis to were issued only to the firms already screened determine the amount that the procurement by the Prototype Program Office of Aeronauti- ought to cost, given attainable efficiency and cal Systems Division and known to be capable economy of operation. This technique gives of performing in the fighter design area. negotiating teams an alternative to relying on In another direction, a parts control program contractors’ historical cost pattems, which of- has been established to eliminate the prolifera- ten are already inflated by previous ineffi- tion of nonstandard parts during the design ciencies. It develops a better quality of data process. Here the prime contractor will be than that normally made available to the called upon to share more of the responsibility contract negotiator. It provides longer-term OPTIONS IN THE FUTURE 19

The Air Force need for a lightweight fighter with both high maneuverability and precise control led to the awarding o f corxtracts to build L\VF proto- types without AF commitment to produce them. Nor- throp'’s design (below). General Dynamics s (nght).

recommendations developed to correot—rather at least in some cases, the cost of disposal. The than perpetuate—contractor ineffieiencies. And real challenge is in how to project what the life it provides a stimulus to motivate sole-source cycle cost of a new or proposed development contractors to make improvements through will be; or, more to the point, how to develop better control and more aggressive manage- and acquire a system that will represent the ment. Should cost review teains in the design lowest attainable life cycle cost for a given and production areas are going to be expanded in-service performance. to force lower cost assembly. Intuitively, one recognizes that any given system will have a “minimum” life cycle cost. It is always possible to spend more and more reducing cost acquisition dollars to get more effective oper- Emphasis on life cycle cost (lcc) is a logical ation, reliability, and logistic support and step in reducing operations, maintenance, and thereby come up with a system that is less support costs. lcc encompasses the total cost to costly, in the long rim, to operate and main- the Air Force of developing and aequiring a tain. The theory is indisputable. In practice, system, training crews to operate and maintain however, it is far from being a nicely cal- it, all the other costs associated with supporting culable mathematical Science to know how the operations and maintenance structure, and, many additional acquisition dollars to spend, 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and where, and how many ownership dollars As reaffirmed here, planning for the develop- will be required to keep the system opera- ment of a major weapon system is a compli- tional. cated, demanding, and often frustrating business. And yet, realitv demands that the attempt be Changes in technology, potential threat, and made. Both Air Force Systems Command and resources occur almost daily and impact on the Air Force Logisties Command have made life process. This article could cover only a few of cycle costing a fundamental way of doing busi- the ways being pursued by Systems Command ness. A study has recently been completed to to accommodate to these changes and provide determine the long-term afsc/ aflc life cycle options for the future of the Air Force. Neces- cost objeetive, to identify the additional tools sarily, the emphasis has been on the way busi- needed for lcc estimating relationships and ness is done, for the simple reason that the models, to select meaningful data for expanding acquisition practices of the past have finally the data base, and to develop working-level intersected with the realistic resource con- expertise. The study recommendations have straints on what the American people are will- been approved and implemented bv the Com- ing and able to expend on military commit- manders of afsc and aflc. ments. The Air Force is also supporting the concept If there is to be a future for the Air Force, that price will often be the most important sin- new ways of doing business must be found and gle specification for a new weapon system. exploited. There will have to be a virtual "Design to Cost" leveis have already been revolution—of which the beginnings have al- placed on the amst ($5 million flyaway cost for ready been undertaken—in the way we design, the 300th production article) and the A-X ($1.4 develop, acquire, operate, and maintain our million average flyaway cost per aireraft in a weapon and support systems. usaf develop- 600-aircraft buy). The A-X system target price ment planners are at work on an Air Force that was established on the basis of cost trade-off will not only be effective against any threat it studies during the conceptual phase. Once the may face but also be an Air Force that the na- performance and the target unit prices were tion can afford. established, the design to a price ceiling fo- Hq Air Force Systems Command cused the contractors attention on cost during the design phase. Thus, through this method, contractors are encouraged to use low-cost de- sign techniques and proveu off-the-shelf equip- Note ment and components and to minimize manu- 1. Major General Donavon F. Smith, "Development Planning: A Link Be* tween Requirements and Systems.’’ Air Vniversity Review. XXII, 1 facturing and tooling costs. (November-December 1970), 11-18. REALISTIC DOCTRINE Basic Thinking Today

Captain Raymo.vd S. B lunt Captain Thomas O. C ason

21 Air Force doctrine is not a thing apart nor a code sufficient unto itself. The Air Force is a national instrument and evolves no doctrine, makes no plans, and makes no preparations other than those clearly and unmistakably called for or anticipated hy the national policy. Gener a l Thomas D. White1

HE STUDY of economics has often half security of our nation. This explanation is im- humorously been referred to as “the dis- portant both to ourselves and to those who mal Science.’’ 2 To those students puzzling must make the decisions on national priorities. T over a confusing array of demand, supply, cost,Thus doctrine acts as a definitive and accepted and revenue curves, this might seem a rather guideline in times of peace and war for the apt labei. The student of military affairs would development and employment of the force that perhaps likewise assign to military doctrine a is unique to our Service. similar epithet. In its most basic form, doctrine, to para- In fact, Dr. Robert Futrell, in his definitive phrase General White, is a conduit of thought study of the development of basic thought in between the interests and objectives of our na- the Air Force, identified the predilection of af tion and the plans and preparations that in- leaders for action rather than thinking and volve our daily lives as military men. Between writing as a major reason for the slow develop- these two poles lie certain layers of abstracted ment of a significant body of Air Force doc- thinking. This is not to say that doctrine ig- trine.3 While the study of Air Force doctrine nores the lessons of history and experience, the may not rank in excitement with the strapping principies of war, and other traditional sources of oneself to a jet engine or with seeing the of military thinking. Doctrine is still in essence bottom of one’s in-basket, it is nevertheless a what we believe. Yet doctrine should be criticai area for concem by those in the mili- viewed as a way to incorporate proven and tary profession. In fact, in any true profession, sound ideas within the intellectual framework the study, understanding, and development of established by the people and leaders of our fundamental guiding principies is an essential nation. for members of that profession. The year 1971 marked something of a mile- In the military, intellectual fogginess or mis- stone in military thinking in general and Air understanding can be the precursor of loss of Force thinking in particular. The first key de- life, whether it be the lives of those whom we velopment was the issuance of Secretary of are swom to protect or the lives of men in bat- Defense Melvin R. Lairds budget statement to tle. In a similar vein, in a time of clarifying and the House Armed Services Committee.4 This redefining national priorities, our profession defense report was to be the best defined and must be able to explain clearly and logically most widely distributed statement yet of the why what we believe is of importance to the meshing of foreign policy and national security

22 REALISTIC DOCTRINE 23

policy and strategy. The second key event was and reinforces the three pillars of the Nixon the long-awaited publieation of the new Air foreign policy: strength, partnership, and will- Force Manual 1-1, United States Air Force ingness to negotiate. Secretary Laird set forth Basic Doctrine.5 It had been seven years since the basic criteria for national security planning, this manual was updated, a period of some and it is from these criteria that the design and upheaval in militarv thought that had yet to be structure of the national security forces are reflected in printed doctrinal change. molded. The translation of these criteria into In this article, we will attempt to sketch forces necessitated some new thinking and new briefly the general guidance ofFered in Secre- approaches. tary Laird’s defense report, to show some of the In the strategy of realistic deterrence, two more important changes in .Air Force thought, new coneepts or emphases were introduced: to define the nature of the relationship between net assessment and total force planning. Each the two key documents mentioned, and, finally, of these coneepts is an integral part of realistic to show some of the inconsistencies between deterrence and must be understood in order to the two and suggest some wavs to relate Air appreciate fully the implementation of realistic Force doctrine more clearly to our evolving deterrence. national security strategy. Secretary Laird described net assessment as . . . a comparative analysis of those factors, mili- tary, technological, political, and economic which S ecretary Laird’s Fiscal Year 1972 impede or have a potential to impede our national Defense Budget message, entitled “Toward a security objeetives with those factors available or potentially available to enhance the accomplish- National Security Strategy of Realistic Deter- ment of those objeetives. Through this process we rence,” was followed in Februarv 1972 by are able to determine how to apply our resources his fy 73 Defense Budget message, entitled most effectively in order to improve our total ea- “National Security Strategy of Realistic Deter- pability to accomplish our national security goals.8 rence.” 6 Together, these two published reports The results of net assessment become the bases constitute a statement of the national security for force planning because it is in such analyses strategy of the Nixon Administration. Realistic that deficiencies and surpluses in force leveis deterrence has as its ultimate purpose to dis- are revealed. Net assessment is linked to four courage (and ultimately eliminate) the use of realities: strategic, political, fiscal, and man- militarv force as a means by which one country power. These realities must be a part of any imposes its will on another. Although this pur- comprehensive analyses relating to national pose is not profoundly different from the pur- security planning. poses of previous national security strategies, Total force planning emphasizes burden- the plans for implementing the strategy, as well sharing and partnership as it applies to mili- as the attitudes of the planners, are different. tary forces for deterrence. Secretary Laird has To implement the realistic deterrence strategy, described total force planning as meaning the United States seeks to deter conflict at all ... to plan for optimum use of all military and leveis. Secretarv Laird described this new related resources available to ineet the require- strategy in these terms: ments of Free World security. These Free World Military and related resources include both active The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence will provide and reserve components of the US forces, those of through sufficient strength and full partnership the our allies, and additional military capabilities of indispensable and realistic basis for effective free our allies that will be inade available through local world negotiation. Most importantly, it was de- efforts, or through provision of appropriate secu- signed not to manage crisis but to prevent wars.7 rity assistance programs.9 This strategy is based on the Nixon Doctrine Total force planning is primarily concemed firepower

with conventional forces although some total fundamental leveis of U.S. interest, responsi- force planning involves the nuclear forces of bility, and potential involvement. Forces ade-

our allies. SecretarvJ Laird lists a number of quate for simultaneously deterring conflict at guidelines in force planning to achieve the total each of these leveis should provide a total ca- force concept and breaks the total force plan- pability for deterring conflict throughout the ning into four categories, each of which in- spectrum. Equally important, these forces must volves a different role and responsibility for be adequate to meet the threat should deter- U.S. forces. Total force planning must be based rence fail. The role and responsibility of the on the results of net assessment and must be in U.S. military forces and the overall involve- terms of both short-term and long-term require- ment of the U.S. vary within the spectrum. At ments. These requirements must ultimately be this point a brief examination of each of these translated into a force structure. four leveis of conflict is in order. Secretary Laird views deterrence in terms of • Strategic nuclear warfare involves the the entire spectrum of potential international use of nuclear weapons in a direct attack on conflict and has set forth four basic leveis of the United States. The primary responsibility potential warfare. (See chart.) The variables in for deterring such warfare rests with U.S. stra- this spectrum, firepower and crisis, depict a tegic forces. President Nixon has labeled the general relationship: as the intensity of the U.S. nuclear strategy “nuclear sufficiency’ and crisis increases, the potential amount of has described it in these terms: firepower applied to that crisis also increases. . . . sufficiency means the maintenance of forces Although these warfare leveis are somewhat adequate to prevent us and our allies from being artificial, they do differentiate between the coerced. Thus the relationship between our strate- REALIST1C DOCTR1NE 25

gic forces and those of the Soviet Union must be It is at this levei that total force planning based such that our ability and resolve to protect our on net assessment seems most evident and most vital security interests will not be underestimated. 10 criticai. • Subtheater conventional warfare is Particularly significant is the absence of nuclear nonnuclear warfare that does not involve a di- superiority and the emphasis on the relation- rect conflict with either the U.S.S.R. or China. ship between U.S. and Soviet forces (i.e., net It represents the most likely kind of conflict. assessment). To implement nuclear sufficiency Responsibility for deterring or meeting conflict the U.S. must meet these four criteria: at this levei rests primarily with our allies, the 1. Maintain an adequate second-strike capa- U.S. providing both economic and military as- bilitv to deter an all-out surprise attack on our sistanee (i.e., Security Assistance Program) strategic forces. where U.S. interests are involved. The U.S. 2. Provide no incentive for the Soviet Union maintains no special forces to deter conflict at to strike the U.S. first in a crisis. this levei; rather, it maintains the capability of 3. Prevent the Soviet Union from gaining the employing general purpose forces to deter or ability to cause considerably greater urban/ meet a conflict should U.S. interests dictate. industrial destruction than the U.S. could inflict Although Secretary Laird has presented only on the Soviet Union in a nuclear war. four leveis of conflict and has described how 4. Defend against small attaeks or accidental the U.S. will deter conflict at each of these lev- launches from any source. eis, one must remember that the U.S. objective Bv developing and maintaining forces capable is to deter conflict at all leveis. The force struc- of satisfving these criteria, the U.S. can deter ture and strategy of U.S. military forces, in con- strategic nuclear warfare. junction with the forces of our allies, are de- • Theater nuclear warfare involves the signed to achieve deterrence across the entire enemy use of nuclear weapons overseas without speetrum and to meet any threat should deter- a direct attack on the United States. The U.S. rence fail. U.S. Air Force doctrine then must, has the primary role for deterring conflict at first, provide options to achieve deterrence and, this levei, but the nuclear forces of our allies do second, provide options to meet any threat share the role. The criticai requirement of our should deterrence fail. strategy at this levei is that we have theater forces capable of deterring or meeting not only a theater nuclear attack but an all-out conven- I n io en t ifyin c some of the major tional attack by the Soviet Union on nato Eu - changes in Air Force doctrine, one may best rope or by China on our Asian allies. begin by looking at the changes in overall phi- losophy. Basic doctrine can essentially be broken • Theater conventional warfare is a down into two categories: dynamic and static. major nonnuclear war involving the Soviet Tasks, characteristics, and capabilities fali into Union or China; at this levei of warfare the the latter category. Dynamic doctrine, that which U.S. and its allies share the responsibility for is subject to change, is essentially concerned with deterring or meeting conflict. Secretary Laird preventing conflict and, failing that, with pursuing has described U.S. strategy at this levei as conflict. It is in this area that the major philo- . . . general purpose forces in peacetime to be sophical changes have taken place. Preventing adequate for simultaneously meeting together with our allies a major communist attack in either Eu- conflict is deterrence and constitutes one major rope or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese philosophical idea that has evolved markedly. threats in Asia, and contending with a minor con- The pursuit of conflict entails what the Air tingency elsewhere.11 Force is capable of doing should deterrence 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

fali: the options or capabilities that we offer to sufficieney is presented as being best achieved our national decision-makers. These options through a mixed force of manned and un- have also undergone change to some extent. manned offensive and defensive systems. How­ Probably the primary shift in the concept of ever, force sufficieney is a concept applicable deterrence lies in the condition upon whieh mainly to the strategic area. In discussing de­ deterrence is based. Previously this basis was terrence against hostilities initiated by small that of strategic superiority. In discussing deter­ powers, Basic Doctrine refers to strategic force rence, the 1964 manual stated: sufficieney as being possibly inadequate against small power threats and States: Of utmost importance, however, is that we main- tain superior capabilities for the higher intensities Deterrence of these threats comes from the of war. Sueh a posture makes it evident to an maintenance of sufficient general purpose forces enemy that if confliet escalates the advantage will capable of rapid deployment and sustained opera- become more and more elearly ours.12 tions combined with the national resolve to deploy and employ these forces.16 Such a status was to give a “clear advantage in the capability to destroy selectively the A sufficient combination, then, of strategic and enemy’s military forces." 13 (Emphasis added.) general purpose forces is needed to ensure ade­ The crux of the deterrence process was seen to quate deterrence. be “dependent on a credible capability to raise The change involved is more than a matter the threshold of confliet to a levei at whieh the of semantical substitution of sufficieney for United States and its allies can hold the advan­ superiority. VVhile remaining a general term in tage.” 14 Thus deterrence was based not only on keeping with the fundamental nature of doc­ superior capabilities, particularly those at the trine, sufficieney nevertheless describes a rather upper end of the confliet spectrum, but also on profound philosophical break with past think­ a stated credibility of escalation. ing. Strategic superiority called for clear-cut How has this idea evolved in seven years? advantages: the capability for selective destrue­ Today, the basis of deterrence is viewed not as tion of an enemy’s military forces and a will- superiority but as force sufficieney—a somewhat ingness to escalate to higher confliet leveis nebulous yet adequate term that describes the where U.S. superiority would coerce enemy shift in doctrinal thinking. As defined in the aetion. Sufficieney, on the other hand, empha- new afm 1-1, sufficieney is sizes forces that are adequate to deter and That degree of military power whieh can be ex- forces that offer a wide flexibility in possible peeted to deter a potential enemy from attacking application. The new manual, when addressing the United States and its allies. In addition it is deterrence, leaves out the previous discussion that degree of military power whieh provides na­ of the capability to selectively destroy the tional leaders with the Hexibility to exereise a enemy’s military forces and the capability to wide range of politieal and military initiatives.15 escalate to a higher levei of confliet. This is a It is. then, a levei of force that will at once tacit admission of retaliatory force strueturing deter and provide options. Sufficieney is further focused on enemy urban/industrial areas. Large broken down into two basic components: as- and small power threats are dealt with in the sured destruetion and damage limitation. As- new manual in a discrete manner. The only sured destruetion is the capability to survive an real ambiguity lies in the discussion of damage all-out surprise nuclear attack and respond with limitation, whieh is an older concept not totally sufficient strength to destroy the enemy as a divoreed from the need for clear-cut superiority. viable society. Damage limitation is the capa­ This ambiguity will be discussed later. bility to limit, to some extent, the damage an A second philosophical shift is evident in the aggressor can inflict on our nation. In addition. discussion of the options and operations the Air firepower

crisis

Force is capable of should deterrence fail. In As to substantive changes in the general op­ the treatment of the role of the Air Force in tions themselves, there is apparently verv little conflict, the spectrum of potential international divergence from the thinking of seven years conflict is used in both the old and the new ago. Editorial and organizational changes seem manuais to describe what is termed “the nature to be the major extent of change, plus accom- of modem conflict.” The 1964 manual detailed modation to various interests within the Air some general leveis of conflict ranging from Force. However, some subtle but nonetheless counterinsurgency to general war. The 1971 profound changes exist in the options and oper­ manual indicated dissatisfaction with this cate- ations presented in Basic Doctrine. gorizing and instead chose to group Air Force The lowest-level option offered bv the Air efforts under four separate rubrics, which out- Force at the lowest levei of conflict is special line four general options or operations the Air operations. There is a definite change here. Even Force can offer national decision-makers the switch of terminology, from counterinsur- throughout the spectrum of conflict. (See gency to special operations, tells a tale. It sug- Aerospace Operations Chart.) A separate chap- gests a reduction from active eífort to one em- ter is devoted to each of these operations. This phasizing support, training, and assistance. The is perhaps nothing more than a rearrangement, old manual, in contrast, detailed the use of direct but it does serve to highlight the flexible nature air action against insurgents and interdiction of of aerospace operations in dealing with conflict externai support. Also joint Service, multiagen- rather than prescribe courses of action in the cy, and indigenous involvement are stressed in conflict itself. the new version, while the old version seemed 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to imply that unilateral Air Force effort might under deterrence. Gone are old terms such as be effective. counterforce, which implies leveis of superiority Conventional operations continue to be di- in general war. Also gone is discussion of the vided into three distinct forms: the probing at- requirement for superiority and of U.S. first- tack and the operations with and without the strike considerations. In its place is treatment enemy having adjacent sanctuary. No real of the two components of force sufficiency— changes exist here other than an admission that assured destruction and damage limitation— conventional operations are no longer confined and their relation to nuclear operations against to tactical air operations but have been broad- enemy military forces and enemy urban/indus- ened to include strategic systems. trial areas. Curiously, the approach in pursuing Low-intensity nuclear operations (formerly this type of conflict is to employ initially tactical nuclear operations) constitute an area “only a military targeting philosophy regard- of significant development. Tlie major philo- less of relative strength.” 18 The purpose is sophical shift concerns the use of low-yield nu- to hold an adversary’s cities hostage. Retalia- clear weapons and the limited use of larger tory attacks against urban/industrial centers nuclear weapons. Previously these were viewed are viewed as most likely to come about to some extent as substitutes for manpower and through “miscalculation or misinterpretation of resources, a point of view prominent during the the magnitude or intent of an opponent’s at- Dulles era of massive retaliation. Also there tacks against military forces.” 19 This appears was some tendency to treat the use of nuclear to be a counterforce strategy without calling weapons as a natural progression of firepower for a counterforce capability. It also seems to to be used in almost any situation, such as conflict with the retaliatory countervalue ap- against enemy aircraft and in interdiction and proach outlined in the discussion on deterrence. close air support. The new version is more cau- .Vlore will be said about this later. tious about the introduction of nuclear weap- It should be evident by now that there has ons in a conflict situation and ties them more to been a rather obvious influence of the thinking the achievement of specific objectives than to embodied in Seeretary Laird’s defense state- particular military advantages: ments on the new afm 1-1. This, of course, is Employment of nuclear weapons in any conflict not surprising. Defense thinking is an evolu- requires special emphasis on command and control tionary process, and while Basic Doctrine may procedures to insure that weapons employment is not have been derived from the thinking em- in consonance with specified political-military ob- bodied in realistic deterrence, it was subject to jectives.17 the sarne contemporarv influences. By dividing low-intensity nuclear operations This is evident particularly regarding the into two categories, namely tactical nuclear subject of deterrence. Both the Defense Reports operations and operations against a major pow- and Basic Doctrine view deterrence at the up- er, another distinct difference is recognized. per leveis as being based on the idea of a Previously, the selected, precise usage of nu- sufficiency of nuclear strength. Even though the clear weapons against a major power was con- terminology is somewhat different (nuclear sidered to be of such gravity as to be part of a sufficiency as opposed to force sufficiency), the general war situation; now, such operations are basic concepts are somewhat similar. Both de- considered to be one step back from the abyss cry the need for superiority, and both view as of unrestrained nuclear war. key a retaliatory posture that can survive an The discussion of high-intensity nuclear oper- all-out surprise attack while retaining the capa- ations, or, as previously stated, general war, bility to destroy the enemy as a viable society. contains an extension of the ideas developed Both also view mobile, general purpose forces REALIST1C DOCTRINE 29

as being important for deterrence at lower lev­ force must be structured to meet the various ob­ eis of conflict. jectives of national policy.20 In the pursuit of conflict, similarities also ex- For the civilian authority to view Air Force ist. Basic Doctrine stresses flexibilitv and the options as relevant and usable in conflict situa- possession of several viable options across the tions, we must structure our thinking, our spectmm of conflict as being key to the plans, and our forces in accordance with na­ efFective prosecution of war. This need for op­ tional policy; and since thought precedes ac- tions and flexibilitv is also strongly inherent in tion, our basic guidance should be the first area our evolving national security strategy. An to reflect change. It matters little that we pre- example of this search for options and scribe a broad range of capabilities and options flexibilitv lies in the discussion of the role of if they are outside the framework of our na­ the Air Force in special operations. Basic Doc- tional security policy and strategy. This does trine places small emphasis on active U.S. in- not mean that doctrine needs to be completely volvement in such low-level crises, instead tied to the language of one particular adminis- placing the main thrust on training, equipping, tration. Yet doctrine must necessarily be consis­ advising, and encouraging indigenous forces. tent with our evolving national security This is the sanie approach as indicated in the strategy and policy. In this light, certain rec- Laird Defense Report concerning aspects of ommendations for changes to basic doctrine subtheater conventional conflict. Thus, pre- become clear. scription of military options at even the lowest levei of conflict is consistent with policy guid- ance as stated in the Nixon Doctrine and the D et er r en c e, being the fundamen­ realistic deterrence strategy. tal militarv task and the primarv aim of our While similarities in basic doctrine and real­ national security strategy, is a good beginning istic deterrence abound, dissimilarities are nev- point. A start has already been made in basing ertheless present. In describing changes in the the Air Force articulation of deterrence and our current Basic Doctrine manual, one runs across role in it on the idea of sufficieney. Two things an apparent inconsistency in what doctrine is remain to be done: first, remove the vestiges of supposed to be in the first place. To some, doc­ an old philosophy that have somehow been tied trine is literally what we believe, "we” mean- to todav s view of deterrence; and second. State ing the corporate Air Force. The other view more clearly what is embodied in the idea of holds to the idea stated by General White, that sufficieney. doctrine must necessarily be linked to our na­ At present, the Air Force statement of deter­ tional objectives and national policy. There is rence eontains reference to two basic compo- actually little inconsistency between these two nents of force sufficieney: assured destruetion positions, however. In regard to the tasks, capa- and damage limitation. Basic Doctrine also in- biüties, efforts, and characteristics of our dicates that the best way of implementing force unique force, we can with little contradiction sufficieney is through the mixed force. Assured State what we believe. Yet when we come to destruetion is a given: it is a necessary portion articulating our role in deterrence and our role of our deterrent philosophy and probably will in the pursuit of conflict, the .Air Force must continue to be so for the foreseeable future. operate within the framework of national pol­ Nevertheless, as a specific term, it has lost a icy. As stated in afm 1-1: certain degree of usefulness because of its ties Military power is an instrument of national policy to an earlier nuclear policy: flexible response. directed by civilian authority, and employed in Assured destruetion ealled for the capability to support of national objectives. As such military destroy a fixed percentage of the enemy urban/ 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

industrial areas. President Nixon rejected this strategy, Basic Doctrine combines a pervasive somewhat restrictive policy plus the use of strategic nuclear policy with an imprecise the term assured destruction: conventional force policy to deter war. What is . . . A simple "assured destruction” doctrine does lacking is a coherent expression of how deter- not meet our present requirements for a Hexihle rence is to be effected against ininor nuclear range of strategic options. No President should be powers, against a major nuclear power in a left with only one strategic course of action, par- theater conflict, and against either in a conven- ticularly that of ordering the mass destruction of tional conflict. In short, Basic Doctrine talks enemy civilians and facilities.21 flexibility through the idea of a mixed force but In essence, President Nixon asks for a broader, fails to define exactly what the mixed force more Hexible strategic posture. means in relation to deterrence at all leveis and Likewise, the second basic eomponent of how the idea of sufficiency relates to this. Real- force sufficiency, damage limitation, has ties to istic deterrence calls not only for flexible op- an earlier era. It is a term that implies some tions but also for deterrent positions in support levei of superiority—an ability to destroy of our national interest throughout the conflict enemy forces on the ground (and in the air) spectrum. Basic Doctrine needs further clari- while having enough forces left to meet a sec- fication and development to explain this role ond-strike requirement against enemy urban/ adequately. industrial centers. This concept calls for a The options we possess can be effeetivelv force levei and an approach that is not ac- integrated to develop more fully the ideas of ceptable under the new thinking as set forth in sufficiency and deterrence. This must be done the recent Defense Report; Secretarv Laird clearly and unambiguously to fulfill the basic outlined a requirement for only a very low militarv task—deterrence—that we have been levei of ballistic missile and bomber defense. assigned. As an alternative, and more in keeping with In addition to deterrence, a second area in the approach embodied in realistic deterrence, which doctrine can be more closely related to sufficiency should be outlined in afm 1-1 in national policies is in one levei of the pursuit of terms of criteria to be continuously met. One of conflict, nuclear operations. It is in these opera- these criteria is a reliable, survivable retaliatory tions that a fundamental inconsistency exists force posture. In addition, a minimum levei of between the eurrent Basic Doctrine and the defense is essential to defend against small mis- current national security strategy of realistic sile attacks or accidental launches, and a pos- deterrence. This inconsistency is both stated ture that does not provide the Soviet Union and implied. We need to analyze two facets of with a first-strike incentive is essential also. Bv nuclear operations and strategy: first, we must casting aside terminology that may no longer examine the statements on low-intensity nu- eommunieate clearly and by adopting clearer clear operations and theater nuclear warfare; guidance for sufficiency through specific criteria, and second, we must probe into the statements the Air Force can defínitely improve the enun- on high-intensity nuclear operations and .strate- ciation of deterrence in Basic Doctrine and gic nuclear warfare. However, when comparing better fulfill its contribution to realistic deter- USAF Basic Doctrine and the strategy of realis- rence strategy. tic deterrence, we must bear in mind the neces- Related to this is a need to develop the idea sary relationship between the two. Realistic of sufficiency in Basic Doctrine more fully. At deterrence is designed to deter war and provide present, this manual defines deterrence at both adequate forces to meet the threat should de- the upper and lower ends of the spectrum of terrence fail; Basic Doctrine offers options and conflict. Much like the massive retaliation capabilities. The actual force structure of the H EAL1STIC DOCTIi INE 31

military must be capable of supporting national may be strong incentives to iimit initial nuclear action to attacks on selected targets which would objectives. cause grave concern, but not necessarily lead to Where, then, are the inconsistencies? First, the triggering of a inassive exchange.22 low-intensity nuclear operations, as tlescribed in afm 1-1, are limited nuclear operations by This contradiction is further bolstered in Basic the U.S. against nonnuclear or minor nuclear Doctrine by defining these nuclear attacks as powers. They also include nuclear operations possibly being against targets in the enemy between the major nuclear powers in which hoineland, such as oil refineries, nuclear plants, highly selective and limited strikes are em- and hydroelectric facilities. ployed in an attempt to achieve national objec- On the one hand, since both major powers tives at a conflict levei below high-intensity have survivable retaliatory forces, and given nuclear warfare. The four objectives of low- that the U.S. will use its strategic nuclear forces intensity nuclear operations stated in the doc- against the Soviet homeland only in a second trine manual are limited in scope and refleet strike, the quoted statement ean only be rele- a noticeable change from the earlier editions vant to theater nuclear warfare. However, ac- of the manual. The key shortcoming of this cording to the section of realistic deterrence treatment of low-intensity nuclear operations concerning theater nuclear warfare, low- lies in the options offered. First of all, realistic intensity nuclear operations between the Soviet deterrence calls for a very limited role for Union and the United States will likely occur theater nuclear warfare: e.g., deterrence of only if there is an all-out attack against nato a Soviet attack on nato Europe or a Chinese Europe by the Soviet Union. And even then attack on our Asian allies. The options offered the limited U.S. nuclear response would be by the doctrine manual to deal with nonnuclear against the attacking Soviet/Warsaw Pact or minor nuclear powers are too broad and do forces and not against the Soviet Union itself. not relate to current policy. Part of this prob- Of what use, then, is this option offered by lem is no doubt the lack of parallelism between Basic Doctrine? the spectrum o f potential conflict as stated by If, on the other hand, one uses the definition Secretary Laird and aerospace operations used of strategic nuclear warfare as stated under in the doctrine manual. The Secretary’s analvsis “Realistic Deterrence,” low-intensity nuclear of nuclear warfare below the levei of strategic operations between the two major powers nuclear war is closely linked with U.S. national would be part of strategic nuclear warfare. interest and objectives; the usaf doctrine man- But here again, what is stated in the doctrine ual describes several options in low-intensity manual about low-intensity nuclear operations nuclear operations that are not closely linked to between major powers does not correlate with the national interest and objectives and thus not our current strategic nuclear strategy. Our stra- meaningful options for realistic deterrence. tegic nuclear strategy is fundamentally a sec- This inconsistency is even more apparent ond-strike strategy that emphasizes deterrence. when one examines Basic Doctrine concerning It makes little sense to talk about limiting nu- low-intensity nuclear operations involving two clear attacks when the overriding objective is major powers. It is the implication and tone of to deter them. If deterrence fails, it will fail the following statement that signals a contra- only because the Soviet Union chooses to initi- diction between current doctrine and current ate conflict. If that occurs, the United States national security strategy concerning theater offers no guarantee that its response will be nuclear warfare and strategic nuclear warfare: limited to the intensity of the original attack, When both adversaries possess survivable forces nor does it suggest any automatic escalation. having recognizable retaliation capability, there Deterrence must be based on this uncertainty 32 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW of the U.S. response, or else there is little in- forces or his population” does not fit the crite- centive for the Soviet Union to be deterred in ria of a second-strike capability. Instead, it its actions. Hence the options otfered by Basic hints of counterforce options that exceed the Doctrine concerning low-intensity nuclear oper- stated sufficiency criteria for deterrence and, in ations are not consistent with our current na- fact, may be destabilizing in the pursuit of a tional security strategy for deterring either the- deterrent strategy. ater nuclear or strategic nuclear warfare. Such A second criterion of nuclear sufficiency ealls inconsistencies must be corrected so that Basic for providing no incentive for the Soviet Union Doctrine vvi 11 offer U.S. leaders meaningful op- to strike the U.S. fírst in a crisis. Two very clear tions. incentives for such a first-strike would be A second inconsistency between current doc- —that the Soviet Union believes its first-strike trine and current national security strategy lies capability could cripple the U.S. retaliatory in the area of strategic nuclear warfare and forces and that it is in the interest of the Soviet high-intensitv nuclear operations. The U.S. stra- Union to do so; tegic nuclear strategy is “nuclear sufficiency” —that the U.S. has a viable first-strike capabil- and is based on the four criteria listed earlier. ity and the only chance the Soviet Union has in It is basically a second-strike strategy that a conflict is a surprise fírst strike. emphasizes deterrence of high-level nuclear conflict. This emphasis is translated into a force strueture primarilv designed to be reliable and Our current national security strategy is de- survivable, vet capable of wreaking such a levei signed to ensure that the Soviet Union has no of urban/industrial destruetion that the Soviet such incentives bv, fírst, always having reliable, Union vvill be deterred from initiating a nuclear survivable retaliatory forces, and, second, by fírst strike. In addition, our current national not posing a first-strike threat to the Soviet security strategy makes no mention of an Union. The cited statement from the doctrine all-out dainage-limiting eífort. In contrast, manual, as well as other statements therein, il- however, the Basic Doctrine manual states: lustrates a failure of doctrine to reflect current national policy as expressed by our national Nuclear warfare, initiated hy an enemy surprise or security strategy. It is because doctrine must as an outgrowth of ongoing conflict at a lower lev- ei. can assume various forms depending on the support the national policies and strategies targeting and force employment options pursued which implement national objectives that these by the adversaries. . . . Regardless of the form inconsistencies must be addressed and recon- which the conflict takes, national leadership must ciled. be provided with a continuing credihle capability Realistic deterrence strategy and basic doc- to attack enemy military forces or his population and industry. At the same time, defensive forces trine have both complementary and noncom- must be postured to ensure a capability to limit plementary aspects. The complementary as- damage to the U.S and its allies, and to preserve an peets need to be reinforced so that our national assured destruetion capability even alter suffering leaders can always know that the options a large-scale attack on the United States.23 offcred bv basic doctrine are appropriate and The doctrine manual ealls for certain usable. The noncomplementary aspects, par- offensive capabilities and options which the ticularly the ones highlighted in this artiele, national leadership has rejected as criteria for need to be addressed bv the Air Force, and its nuclear sufficiency and which are fundamen- Basic Doctrine should be revised accordingly. tallv in opposition to Secretary Laird s criteria For as it is defitied by General John C. Meyer for deterrence. For example, “a continuing in the Foreword to the current afm 1-1. usaf credihle capability to attack enemy military basic doctrine is REALISTIC DOCTRINE 33

. . . the fundamental principies and concepts for mental military employmeut policies expressed l>y employing aerospace forces in support of United national leadership.24 States objectives. . . . Thev are based on knowl- How can Basic Doctrine be otherwise? edge gained through experience. studv, analysLs, and tests and are designed to support the funda- Squadron Officer School

Notes 1. "USAF Doctnne and National Policv,’* speech delivered to the USAF 10. “US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s, Tlie Emerging Structure of Pcace.” A Sdentific Advisory Board as published in .Air Force Magazine. January 1958. Report to the Congress l>v Richard M Nixon. Prcsidcnt of the United States. 2. Thumas Caríyle. Lattcr Day Pamphlets, Xo. I [1850]. Febmary 9. 1972. p. 154. 3. Robert F Futrell. Ideai. Concepts. and Doctnne .A Hutory o f Basic íhink- II FY 72 Defense Report. p. 76. ing in the Vnited States .Air Forre, 1907-1964 (Maxwell AKB. Alnbama. Aero- 12. Air Force Manual 1-1. Vnited States Air Force Basic Doctrine. 14 August space Studies Institute. 19711. 1964. par 1-5. -1. "Toward a National Securíty Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.” Stateinent 13. Ibid., par 3-7. of Secretarv of Defense Melvin R. Laird on tlie Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense 14. Ibiii. Program and the 1972 Defense Budget belorc the House .Armed Services 15. AFM 1-1 (1971). par 1-3. Committee. March 9. 1971. 16. Ibid. 5. .Air Force Manual l-l. Vnited States Air Force Basu Doctnne 28 Septem- 17. Ibid.. par 4-3. ber 1971. 18. Ibid.. par 5-3. 6. National Securitv Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.” Statement of Secre- 19. Ibid. tarv of Defense Melvin R. Laird beforc the Senate Arnied Services Committee 20. Ibid., par 1-2. on FY 73 Defense Budget and FY 1973-1977 Program, 15 Febmarv 1972. 21 Nixon s 1972 Foreign Policy Report, p. 158. 7 FY 72 Defense Report p 2. 22. AFM 1-1 1971 . par 4-5. 8. FY 73 Defense Report p. 26. 23. Ibid.. par 5-2. 9. FY 72 Defense Report, p. 21 24. Ibid., Foreword. OUTER SPACI AND AIR SPA The Difficultivs in Deíir

I)m. li w\KiM> J. B vhhi i i HAT is the deíinition of outer space? the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons Or, more specifically, what is the or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruc- W difference between national air space tion, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or and outer space? The air space over each na­ station weapons in outer space in any other tional territory is subject to that country s sov- manner.” It also bans military bases, weapons ereign control. In outer space, claims of na­ testing, and military maneuvers from celestial tional sovereignty have been prohibited. How bodies. The 1963 limited test-ban treaty prohib­ is one to be distinguished from the other? The ited nuclear explosions in outer space, as well question has received much attention in recent as in the atmosphere and under water. In 1968, years, and many proposals on how it might be the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, resolved have been put forward. A great deal the Return of Astronauts and the Return of has also been written on the subject, and sev- Objects Launched in Outer Space was con­ eral pubücations of the United Nations have cluded. A convention dealing with liability for discussed it at some length. As yet, no eonsen- damage caused by objects launched into outer sus has emerged. However, the progress of space is also being negotiated. technology mav make some solution more ur- The actual practice of nations also indicates gent in coming vears. .An arbitrarv decision a difference between national air space and may be the only feasible answer. outer space. Hundrecls of objects have now National sovereignty over air space is a pri- been launched into orbit around the earth; in mary feature of the intemational agreements recent years no nation has protested such pas- regarding aviation. The Convention on the sage over its territory as violating its sover­ Regulation of Aerial Navigation, signed in Paris eignty. In fact, no nation has explicitly reserved on 13 October 1919, provided in Article I that its position eoneeming the passage over its ter­ . . every Power has complete and exclusive ritory of a space object of another country. On sovereignty over the air space above its terri­ the other hand, no nation has been willing to tory.” The basic agreement goveming postwar limit its air space to a specific height; to do so civil aviation, namely, the Convention on Inter­ would define the upward extent of its sover­ national Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on 7 eignty and, implicitly or explicitly, the lower December 1944, reiterates the same principie, limit of what it considered to be outer space. in virtually identical language. There are two general schools of thought In direct contrast, claims of exclusive na­ regarding the need for and desirability of arriv- tional sovereignty in outer space are prohibited ing soon at a clear line of demarcation between by intemational agreement. The Treatv on air space and outer space. One approach cites Principies Goveming the Activities of States in the need to delimit the legally binding obliga- the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, in- tions regarding the activities and authority of cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, nations in outer space and air space, respec- was concluded in 1967 under the aegis of the tively. Without such a demarcation, it is contend- United Nations. Article II provides that: ed, there will arise, as technology advances, Outer space, including the Moon and other celes­ disputes regarding the extent and natnre of tial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation the obligations nations have assumed in the by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occu- intemational agreements related to outer space. pation or by any other means. Similarly, without agreed definitions, a nation International agreements are also developing could assert claims of sovereignty that would mies of law for outer space. The Outer Space interfere with space activities desired by many Treaty itself (Article IV, paragraph 1) pledges other countries. the signatories “not to place in orbit around The other approach argues that there is no 35 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

evidence that a demarcation line is needed and íace of the earth, extends up to about 9 to 10!6 that to set one now would be premature and miles at the equator and 6 to 7 miles at the possibly counterproductive. The proponents of poles. It is the layer in which weather phe- this point of view call attention to the rapid nomena occur, and it is the field of operation pace of spaee technology and the practical for conventional aviation. The troposphere con- uncertainties regarding the characteristics of tains three-fourths of all the air surrounding the feasible and desirable space aetivities. Trying to earth. set a boundary now, they feel, would risk get- Most of the rest of the air in the atmosphere ting it too high or defined in a way that might is contained in the next layer, called the strato- turn out to be detrímental to future spaee ac- sphere. It is above the weather and is reaehed tivities. (Implicit in this viewpoint, there seems only by the most advanced aircraft and re- to be the expeetation that the later agreeinent search balloons. Its upper limit is about 25 is reaehed, the more likely the boundary is to miles. The troposphere and stratosphere con- be set lower than it would be at present.) tain about 99.7 percent of the air. Those who endorse a eautious approach note A third layer, called the mesosphere, extends that the laek of specific agreeinent has not led to about 50 miles, and beyond that is the iono- to any international difficulties and does not sphere. The latter is sparsely occupied by gas seem likely to. They also suggest that the effort particles, less dense than the most complete to establish a definitive boundary could, itself, vacuum that can be achieved on earth. The lead to controversy and confusion, as has hap- upper limit of the ionosphere is not defined. pened in regard to the demarcation between The major difficulty in trying to define a territorial waters and the high seas. boundary by utilizing the characteristics of the Why not simply set the dividing line be- atmosphere is the laek of uniform criteria. The tween air and outer space at the upper limit of physical characteristics of the atmosphere and the atmosphere? That would probably be one of the various layers can be judged by a variety of the first questions by a lavman. Furthermore, of criteria, such as the composition of the gases, the international conventions that regulate air- their densities and their temperatures. These craft seem to suggest this eoneept in their use properties are not uniform at a certain altitude. of such terrns as “air,” “atmosphere,” and “at- They can also vary with solar activity, time of mospheric” space. The practical difficulty, day, season, region, and other circumstances. however, is that the earth’s atmosphere does The boundaries between the layers of the atmo- not end abruptly; it gradually transforms into sphere are thus not precise, uniform in height outer space. Some estimates place the altitude above the earth, or constant. Nor is it possible, at which air space ceases well beyond the or- beeause of the variance in the properties of the bits of some existing earth satellites. In fact, atmosphere, to arrive at any other boundary there is no scientific agreement on the altitude between air and outer space that would be at which air space ceases. precise, uniform, and constant. A scientifically more sophisticated proposal The layman, faced with these scientific might be to use the characteristics of the atmo- difficulties, might suggest using the characteris- sphere to determine an appropriate dividing tics of aircraft flight to arrive at an adequate line between air and outer space. Suggestions boundary. Surely, he might think, we can have been made to establish the demarcation define the height at which aircraft can actually on the basis of differentiation between the sev- fly, and everything above that could be consid- eral layers into which scientists divide the at- ered outer space. The Council of the Interna- mosphere. tional Civil Aviation Organization (ic a o ) de- The troposphere, the layer nearest the sur- fines an aircraft as “any niachine that can OUTER SPACE AND AIR SPACE 37

derive support in the atmosphere from the the lowest perigee reached by any satellite reactíons of the air other than the reactions of placed in orbit before 27 January 1967, the the air against the earth’s surface.” The max- date on which the Outer Space Treaty was imum altitude at which a machine can derive opened for signature. The Association, howev- support from the reactions of the air is pres- er, added that this definition was without preju- entlv estiniated at about twenty one iniles by dice to the possibilitv of including later any the ic a o Secretariat. part of the space below that perigee. One of the most widely discussed proposals The association’s added qualification indi- for a demarcation between air space and outer cates one of the difficulties in this approach. space is that it be established at the altitude The perigee of a durable satellite orbit at pres- where aerodvnamic lift vields to centrifugai ent is about 95 to 100 miles. However, im- force, what is known as the “Von Kármán provements in space flight technology, such as line.” To accomphsh aerial flight, weight equals orbiting with continuing rocket thrust, may aerodvnamic lift plus centrifugai force. Aero- lower this perigee to 70-75 miles. That large

dvnamicJ lift decreases with altitude because of an element of legal uncertainty would hardly the decreasing densitv of the air. Beyond zero be compatible with a definition seeking to de- airlift, centrifugai force takes over. termine national sovereignty over air space. This approach also involves several diffi- Another problem with this definition involved culties that seem to preclude a uniforin and the practical questions of who determined pre- constant boundary. The theoretical limit of the ciselv the lowest perigee of a satellite before 27 height of air flight mav increase as the result of January 1967 and whether it was an active sat- such developments as improved cooling tech- ellite or a piece of space debris. niques or more heat-resistant materiais. The More generally, this approach also fails to aerodynamical forces also vary with the charac- provide a precise and continuing boundary ter and speed of the specific object involved. because, scientifically speaking, no precise alti- Vloreover, the densitv of the atmosphere itself tude can be determined as the single lowest is not constant but is subject to a variety of possible perigee of any artificial satellite. Such fluctuations, as already noted. a determination would depend on the charac- teristics of the object and the atmosphere; and these vary, as already noted in connection with If an approach based on the char- aircraft. acteristics of the atmosphere and aircraft is not To try to meet these difficulties, a number of adequate, how about tackling the problem from other approaches have been suggested. All, the other side, that of outer space? For instance, however, seem to involve shortcomings of their could not outer space be defined as everything own or do not solve all the problems that we beyond the lowest point íperigee) of an orbiting have noted. One suggestion has been to set the satellite? At a certain altitude, the earths at- boundary at the point where the gravitational mosphere is too dense for an artificial satellite pull of the earth ceases, this approach deriving to stay in orbit. The lowest perigee approach from the idea that a nations sovereignty need would have the advantages of being in accord only extend to the height from which an object with existing practices in orbiting satellites and can be dropped on its territory. However, grav- with the attitudes of countries toward objects in ity ceases very gradually at remote heights; it is earth orbit. not possible to indicate an exact altitude where The International Law Association (not an a boundary could be drawn based on the intergovemmental body) did adopt in 1968 a earth s attraction. And, even if one were feasi- definition of outer space as the space beyond ble, it would probably be much too high; one 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

calculation, for instance, indicates that the there would be no way to resolve them except earths attraction in relation to the moon is naked power. The eriterion of effective power dorninant up to some 205,000 mil es, and much would also create marked uncertainties beeause farther in relation to the sun. A further practi- sovereignty would vary with the development cal diffieulty is that the gravitational effeet of of teehnology. the earth depends on the escape velocity of the Another attempt to avoid the difficulties of object, whieh, of course, can vary. spatial definitions proposes that a distinetion be Another approach tries to overcome the made between aeronautieal and astronautical difficulties in defining the outer limit of the activities, rather than trying to decide on a atmosphere hy proposing an intermediate zone demarcation between air space and outer between air space and outer space. It has been space. The proponents of this approach argue noted that, as a practical matter, there exists a that a legal definition is usually needed to per- buffer zone between, on the one hand, the mit certain activities and prohibit others. Ac- highest altitudes reached by balloons and air- cordingly, they feel that in regard to outer craft and, on the other hand, the lowest alti- space activities, it would be better to seek this tude at whieh satellites remain in orbit without objective, not by trying to set boundaries but any means of propulsion. Details vary, but gen- by defining objectives and missions for space erally this proposal suggests an appropriate in- vehicles. Their thought is that the important ternational regime in this area, between the interests of all countries can be protected more national sovereignty of air space and the free- effectively, not by putting territorial limits to dom of outer space. One immediate diffieulty national sovereignty but by legally prohibiting with this approach is that the present inter- those actions in the course of space activities mediate zone is likelv to narrow with teehno- that would endanger these interests. logical developments and may well disappear This approach proposes that astronautical entirely. More basically, the proposal still does activities should be subjeet to one and the same not solve the difficulties we have noted above legal regulation, irrespective of the altitude at in finding uniform and eonstant criteria that whieh they are carried out. It would apply to would make possible precise dividing lines them the moment they leave the earth, in order between the zones. to avoid a complicated determination of their An effort has been made to get around all passing from one legal status to another. This these problems of scientific definition by pro- concept stems from the belief that, as the seope posing that the exclusive sovereignty of an of international space law gradually extends, underlying eountry should extend as high as it international regulation will have to approach could effectively apply its authority. This prin- the launching pads. The only way to preserve cipie has often been asserted in efforts to ana- the logical unity of legal regulation, it is con- lyze the seope and effects of the international tended, is by dispensing with a demarcation in agreements goveming civil aviation. However, space and adopting a functional eriterion. it has equally been challenged on the grounds However, there are difficulties with this ap- it would produce unacceptable disparities, proach, too. It is not always possible to distin- conflicts, and uncertainties. Since nations are at guish precisely between space activities and widely different leveis of scientific and techni- other activities. Using the purpose of each ac- cal development, their air spaces would vary tivity as the eriterion has been suggested; but greatly. If each eountry were allowed to pro- often this could be ambiguous (e.g., an aircraft ject its sovereignty upward and sideward in equipped with scientific instruments to observe accord with its effective power, conflicting an eclipse, or balloons bearing instruments for claims would seem highly likely to occur; and space observations). Moreover, the prospects of OUTER SPACE AND AIR SPACE 39

scientific and technical progress in the develop- low-on program to the projected Apollo and ment of aircraft and space vehicles make the Skylab series, apparently will be such a vehicle. practical problem of distinguishing between Aeronautical researchers are reported to be them ever more complicated. Another intricate thinking about a hypersonic transport (hst) as a problem of potentiallv great scope is how na- next step after the supersonic transport, for tions could differentiate between space activi- about the year 2000. Some of the features being ties at low altitudes and air activities, so as to considered are described as “rocket-assisted regulate each effectively and discretely. take-offs” and “space vehicle-like bursts beyond the atmosphere followed by semi-orbital 'free fali’ until descent.” 1 A bo u t the only sound conclusion Developments such as these are bringing from a review of the various approaches to dif- closer the day when some formula will be ferentiating between air space and outer space needed, as a practical matter, to accommodate is that no fully satisfactory answer is in sight. In the differences between air space and outer fact, each of the approaches seems to have at least space. The difficulties involved in all the ap­ one serious defect. The problem has not been a proaches that have been suggested indicate that pressing one. Indeed, the many uncertainties the decision may well have to be an arbitrary and potential developments in space activities one. The goal obviously should be to select a have even suggested some wisdom in waiting un- boundary that seems to balance best the vary- til man’s abilities and needs in space are much ing difficulties, advantages, and other perti- better defined. nent considerations. Some demarcation line in However, technology is moving on. In the the 50- to 75-mile altitude range may be the not too distant future, machines capable of most satisfactory—or least unsatisfactory. flying along a ballistic trajectory are expected Fort Bragg, North Carolirui to orbit the earth, fly in outer space and air space, and make soft landings on the earth. The Note 1. Albert R. Karr, "The SST Is a Turtle Compared to the HST, Which May space shuttle, which nasa hopes to make a fol- Be on the Way.” Wall Street Journal 4 January 1971, p. 1. The Air Force Museum

William J. DePaola Lieutenant Colonel Philip M. Flammer

I — ------ILITARY activities that use the land and sea as their "are- nas" took centuries, if not millennia, to mature. Air power, on the other hand, has come of age in less than three Mgenerations. The era of the Wright brothers is still part of human recollection, and there are men among us yet who flew combat in World War I. By comparison with the usual time frame of a military arena development, talking with one of these men is like conversing with a knight out of the middle ages or, more appropriate, one of the Spartan elite in the Peloponnesian War. However, after the next decades, personal contact with military aviation s first great eras will have to come through the machines and relics left by those who used them. That is why institutions such as the huge Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson afb, Ohio, will continually grow in importance. They are not only a major link with the past but also, in a very real sense, part of the past inas- much as these exhibits "were there." The Air Force s new Museum is the most complete of its kind in the world Dedicated by President Nixon on 3 September 1971, it

41 occupies a 400-acre site, with ample space for exterior display, upkeep and repair facilities, and, most impressive of all, a striking display building that has some 160,000 square feet of exhibition area. More than 100 aircraft are housed inside, ranging from a rep- lica of the Wright Model A, the first military aircraft in history, to the giant B-36, which was on the drawing boards less than 40 years after the Wrights' first flight, yet has a wingspan more than double the distance covered on that epic venture. The interior displays are carefully arranged so that the visitor has a chronological tour. It is only a few short steps from the Wright Model A to the World War I area, where several machines are dis- played from that era, when planes and pilots caught the imagina- tion of the world. The period between the wars is dominated by such craft as the sleek Curtiss R3C-2 racer, in which Lieutenant Jimmy Doolittle won the Schneider Trophy Race in 1925, and the P-26, a rare fighter plane that marks the changeover from the liq- uid-cooled, fabric-covered biplane to the air-cooled, metal-skinned, low-wing monoplane. World War II dominates much of the display, if only because there are so many important airplanes, and people are better ac- quainted with them than perhaps any other group. The work horses—the B-17 Flying Fortress, B-24 Liberator, and B-29 Superfortress—are there, as are the P-51 Mustang, P-47 Thunder- bolt, and P-38 Lightning, which helped wrest control of the skies from the Germans and the Japanese. There are also sleek post-World War II craft, ranging from jet fighters of the Korean War to more recent experimental aircraft. Some of these exhibits, such as the cobra-like B-70, the only one of its kind in the world, are simply overwhelming. Yet there is also something awesome about the little A-1 in which Major Bernie Fisher won the Medal of Honor in Vietnam. The A-37, looking like a toy near the B-36, enjoys the distinction of having left the Museum to fly a tour in Vietnam and then returned to its place of honor. Some of the most memorable stories from the Air Force Museum relate to activities few visitors get to see. These are the acquisition and restoration programs, which range from the seemingly simple, such as getting certain World War II aircraft out of Europe, to some- thing as romantic and adventurous as recovering a Japanese Zero that had nestled for years in the jungles of New Guinea or a pre-World War II observation plane from the desolate wastes of Alaska. People who recall World War II in the Pacific may well imagine that Zeros still exist in substantial numbers. But the one that now rests outside an old hangar near the Museum was a real find. Shot up by the Americans and abandoned by the Japanese, it remained in the rotting jungles of New Guinea until it became the property of the Papuan and New Guinea War Memorial Trust. From there it went to Tom King, an Australian, who traded an old Wirraway for it. But King, who couldn t afford to restore the machine, sold it to the Air Force Museum for $3000 through the Museum Foundation

42 Flying th is Curtiss R3C-2, Lieu- tenant James //. Doolittle won the Schneider Cup in 1925 at 232.57 mtíes per hour and two weeks later set a world speed record for sea- planes at 245.7 mph. Though de- signe d for racing, the plane con- tributed most hy probing the frontiers o f aviation technology.

Like a toy beside the giunt B-36 of post- World War II days, the Cessna YAT-37A had the distinction o f being recalled to active duty from the floor o f the Air Force Museurn, flown in Vietnam, and retumed to an- other honorable retirement at the Musetim.

When towed seven miles to the new Museum site, the huge B-70 had to be stripped to reduce weight and tails removed to avoid power Unes. On Mad Biver bridge it had a four-inch clearance on each side. This is

43 44 (the Museum has no funds of its own for such purchases). This Zero still shows the scars of battle. Indeed it looks as if it had been in a disastrous accident. Yet when it appears on the Museum floor at some future date, visitors will no doubt remark how incredibly well preserved it is and that the Museum must have been very fortunate to find one in such beautiful condition. The secret between the now and the then will be the structural and cosmetic skill of master craftsmen at the Museum and the thou- sands of man-hours spent in renewing the old. Old plans will be studied, dents hammered out, new pieces manufactured, and vital parts restored. When the workmen are through, the difficulty will be remembering what the machine looked like in its derelict State.

Sktlled craftsmen restore damagrdaircraft, rrumufacturing needed parts according to authentu spedficatums . . A shattered Japanese Zero. after nuiny years in a Seu' Guinea jungle, will look rume the wone for its odyssey when it goes on exhihit. . . . The Zero s engine, one of many aircraft components uu ait- ing resturation in the Museum shops, will he reunited with its fuselage and then displayed with other trophies o f World War II.

45 0-38 Recovery

Barely surviving a controlled crash landing in The engine was reinoved from the fuselage, and 1941, an ancient 0-38 observation plane lay for- each was separately secured and lifted out by gotten in the Alaskan wilds, 70 miles north o f Amuj CH-47 Chinoók and sent on to the Museum. Fairbanks, until brought to the attention of Despite more than a quarter century o f arctic ex- Museutn personnel. A closer look from the ground posure, the skeleton was sound, and the rtidder found it to be woríh recovering, but sal vage fabric did not have to be replaced. When res- could be effected onhj by helieopter. Work be- toration is complete, the old veteran rescued gan in eam est in June 1988. Shifting its posi- from Alaska will be all but indistinguishable tion for pickup required many hands (below). from 0-38s of an earlier d ay (lower right).

Building a Sopwith Catnel from original World War 1 plans involves matching the rotanj engine to the airframe, the cylinders revolving around a station- artj crankshaft iright). Genuine World War l machine guns will find a place on the finished airplane. . . . In the Museum restoration hangar, specialists ply their skills on the Camel (left), 0-38 (right).

48 Perhaps no story of acquisition and restoration is more dramatic than lhat of the 0-3 8 observation plane that was rescued from the Alaskan wilds and is now undergoing extensive rebuilding. The pi- lot, a lieutenant who later became a general, mushed the stricken plane into a controlled crash in 1941. Damage was so extensive that no salvage was attempted, and Air Corps officials soon forgot about the wreckage Then in the late 1950s a prospector came in to inquire about salvage rights. Officials recognized the plane for the rare old bird it was, and a recovery operation was put in motion. A surprise greeted the rescuers when they arrived by helicopter. Sturdy spruce had grown up through the fuselage, moose had eat- en much of the fabric, and that which remained on the wings car- ried unmistakable traces of marauding bears. Yet there was almost no corrosion. The frail craft had survived more than a score of arctic winters with as much ease as the celebrated Lady Be Good had sur- vived the African desert. The propeller still turned. the framework was as bright and sturdy as the day it began its cold confinement, and the fabric on the rudder remained so well preserved and tight that it will be left as is. Airplanes, like animais, are usually not the subject of great mter- est or concern when they exist in large numbers, and thus they can too easily become extinct through simple neglect. Thousands of B-1 7s flew combat during World War II, yet only three of them are known to remain. One, which went by the name Shoo-Shoo Baby, wandered around western Europe for a quarter of a century before its recent acquisition by the Museum. (See William G. Holder, "The Return of Shoo-Shoo Baby," Air University Review, XXIV, 2 [January-February 1 973], 22-31.) Other B-17s may still exist, but the Museum does not know of them. A recent "want list" specifies more than fifty aircraft, plus "any World War I aircraft, (U.S. and foreign)" that the Museum would like to add to its inventory. But what if a much-desired plane is simply not available? If it falis within the capabilities of the restoration and repair crews, the an- swer is simple: they build one. The Museum has long wanted a Brit- ish Sopwith Camel of the World War I era, but only a set of plans, still marked "Confidential," was available. The framework of a brand new Camel now sits on the hangar floor, the metal and wood pieces cut to exact specifications. Nearby sits a rotary engine—one in which the crankshaft is stationary and the cylinders rotate—in perfect condition. Eventually it will be matched to the frame, and another treasure from the history of flight will be wheeled to the Museum floor. No doubt the new Museum will never be as complete as its direc- tors would wish. Perhaps, too, the present cavernous display area will someday be as crowded as the building recently vacated. Such thoughts will hardly disturb the visitor. Already there is enough to give dramatic evidence of the history of military aviation. Many if not most of the items on display are themselves impressive mile- stones in an almost overwhelming epic Air University Review

49 30.

;*» y 4

LOYALTY, HONOR, AND THE MODERN MILITARY

(' ' ' i\ M i< ii \n O. W iii i i i h

n— X / / \ \ \ \ \ \ IKE many other abstractions, loyalty is an ful man to eondemn a soldier cutegoricullij for often confusing, much abused concept. It sincerely following orders and remaining loyal has been employed bv different people in to his superiors. In the military environment, a LdifFerent ages to mean a host of differentset of related virtues—sueh as loyalty, obedi- things. For instante, author Hannah Arendt has ence, and discipline—is necessary for the suc- written in her highlv aeclaimed work The Ori- cessful employinent of military forces in the gins o f Totalitarianism that "Himmler s inge- pursuit of politico-military goals. If wars are to nious watchword for his ss-men [was] My be with us for the foreseeable future, as most honor is my loyalty/ ” 1 Himmler’s use of “loy- students of human behavior reluctantly agree is alty” was intended to convey a certain idea to the case, then how are we to strike a balance his listeners. Unfortunately, one finds much the between the necessary virtue of loyalty in the same distorted idea in eontemporarv American military, on the one hand, and on the other the societv—the notion of the dedicated military democratic social goal of having every Citizen professional as one who gives his unthinking become a morally sensitive human being? That consent to all orders issued to him, whose very is the question to which my article is addressed. honor is a function of his unquestioning obedi- ence. Giving and Obeying Orders Upon examination, it becomes apparent that this view of the military man is troubling to To get into this question, let us fírst examine professional military officers as well as to civil- the sorts of situations in which a soldier gives ian critics of the stereotyped “military mind.” or obeys an order. In combat situations, orders To quote Colonel Malham M. Wakin of the are frequently given where life or death de- United States .Air Force Academy faculty: “We peneis on instant obedience. For example, the are concemed, all of us, about a picture of a infantry platoon leader upon seeing a suspi- profession that leaves us feeling that a man cious inovement out of the comer of his eye must give up his rationalitv, his very creative- yells, “Hit the dirt!” Or the flight leader, spot- ness, the source of his dignitv as a man, in or- ting a missile rising through the clouds to meet der to play his role as a soldier.” 2 What should his flight of aircraft, shouts “Break left!" or especially concem the eontemporarv .American “Break right!” Tliese are instances where un- in this view of the man of loyalty is, I would thinking, instant obedience is necessary to pre- suggest, a twofold sort of thing. First, when serve lives. soldiers have in fact wrapped themselves up in I would suggest that tliese sorts of instances their jobs and olieved orders unthinkingly, thev are often taken as the paradigm when one sets have aided in perpetrating some of the gravest out to defend the thesis of unthinking obedi- crimes in human historv. .An example that ence to orders, despite the fact that the in- comes to mind is that of the German officer stances eited are themselves the exception and insuring the timely arrival of trainloads of Jews not the rule where the activities of the modem bound for concentration camps.3 Surely this and military are concemed. Most orders are given any similar instanee of aiding in the eommis- in peacetime, not in combat. And even in com- sion of a clearlv immoral act would be vigor- bat environments, there is usually some reason- ously condemned by the American military able delay between the giving and the carrying tradition, the tradition of a Robert E. Lee, a out of an order. This interval allows time for Hap' Arnold, or a George Marshall. But sec- reflection upon the order, and reflection may ond, even given the evils which unquestioning produee a concem for the rationale of the or- obedience has helped produee, there is still a çler. Why was the order given? What purpose certain reluctance on the part of any thought- does the order seek to obtain?

51 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Those operating under the suggested para- note that this style of leadership is certainly not digm tend to question vvhether such reflection unique to Marshall. Intelligent commanders ever has any place at all in the military. Is it have recognized the effectiveness of such lead- not true, they might point out, that the mili- ership for centuries. But what makes Marshall tary nins on discipline, and is not discipline important for our purpose is that he is elose to aequired hy strict compliance with orders? The the temper of our times. The problems that mistake in their reasoning is that they tend to Marshall faced—in raising and equipping an reduce all instances of ‘discipline’ to the model armv in a time of austerity, in maintaining the of the life-and-death combat situation, either morale of the military in a society that was eonsciously or unconsciously. If they are con- largely antimilitary, in developing discipline in scious of vvhat they are doing, they may em- men from all walks of life, in coordinating na- plov the Aristotelian arguinent that the soldier tional military ai ms with the aims of allies—are acquires the habit of instant obedience in com- not far different from the problems faced by bat by practicing instant obedience in peace- the American military today.6 Perhaps, then, time. But even with this seemingly sound ar- Marshall s approach to these kinds of matters gnment before him, one might still raise a has lessons for the present. question as to which is the proper goal of the Three recurring aspects of Marshalls mili- military, blind obedience or reflective obedience. tary experience are especiallv valuable here. That is the question to which I shall now turn. First, Marshall valued loyalty. Second, he was It is interesting first to note that some of the recognized by friend and foe alike as a man of most effective military leaders in modem his- imposing moral integrity. And third, in the tory have been sympathetic to the combat major war of this century, Marshall passed the needs of the soldier and have nevertheless ultimate military test of the eommander: he stressed training the military in intelligent brought his nation victory. These three things rather than blind obedience. General George C. are important, and I shall spend much of the Marshall provides an excellent instance. I shall remainder of this article arguing that, given the frequently be citing him in this article, but let proper view of loyalty, there need be no in- us first turn to Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, Marshalls compatibility between loyalty, honor (in the respected official biographer, to find Marshall s sense of preserving one s moral integrity), and views on the matter. In the Tenth Harmon military success, even in today’s world. Memorial Lecture in Military History at the United States Air Force Academy in 1968, Dr. A Perspective on Loyalty Pogue said of Marshall: VVhenever we speak of loyalty, we are speak- While he would not codclle soldiers, he would ing of a two-object context: a context in which not attempt to kill their spirit. “Theirs not to rea- one gives loyalty and another receives loyalty. son why—theirs but to do or die” did not fit a Citi- zen army, he said. He believed in a discipline Now, given this rather simple conceptual pie- based on respect rather than fear; 'on the effeet of ture, what we might focus our attention on is good example given by officers; on the intelligent neither the giving nor the receiving of loyalty comprehension by all ranks of why an order has to but instead is the inspiring of loyalty. That is to be and why it inust be carried out; on a sense of say, put yourself in a commander s position and duty, on esprit de corps.’ 4 ask, “What inspires men to be loyal to me? In the first volume of his biography of Mar- Once the semantical issues are sifted through. shall, Pogue writes that “it had always been there will remain, I would suggest, a single Marshall s style to lead by eommanding assent theme which forms the answer to that question. rather than mere formal obedience.” 5 One can The theme is “trust.” If a eommander can in- LOYALTY, HONOR, AND THE MODERN MILITARY 53 spire trust, he will at the same time inspire received. Many other competent men of his era loyalty. Without trust, he may be able momen- were unable to inspire the same sense of trust. tarily to compel compliance with his orders, Marshall was a powerful man, a man in a posi- but this compliance will not be the same as tion of authority, but the authority alone did lovaltv. Loyaltv is not compelled; it is inspired. not explain the sense in which he was trusted, Where loyaltv exists, obedience to orders is for he had inspired trust long before he at- characterized bv a certain kind of superior- tained the heights of power. It was, quite sim- subordinate relationship. Colonel Truman ply, the moral integrity of the man, an unmis- Smith, one of Marshalbs subordinates at the takable hallmark, that inspired the trust and—in Infantrv School. Fort Benning, Geórgia, before turn—the loyalty which characterized Mar- World War II, put this in words: “He would shalls public Service. tell vou what he wanted and then you would The thesis which 1 have proposed is that loy- do it. There was something about him that alty is primarily a function of trust, and that made you do it, and of course you wanted to trust is usually given if integrity is perceived in do it the way he wanted—which is the trait of the object of ones trust. To evaluate this thesis, a commanding officer." 1 let us consider it in two parts. The first part Now whv, one might ask, did men respond concerns loyalty, with ancient lineage in the to Marshall in this way? What was it about Western tradition. In his classic treatise on Marshall that inspired trust? This is a complex leadership in the sixteenth century, Machiavelli question, but of all Marshalls character traits, advised the Prince that he need not be loved there is one that shines through and perhaps by his subordinates in order to lead them. He suggests the main part of the answer to that need only be feared, Machiavelli suggested.12 question. Marshalls acquaintances, in com- But Machiavellfs analysis of leadership was menting on the man, invariably come around to defective, as Rousseau was to demonstrate two a discussion of his personal integrity. For exam- and a half centuries later. A man may obey you ple. General Ornar N. Bradley, in his foreword if he is afraid of you, but his obedience is a to the first volume of Pogues biography of weak and fleeting thing. Remove the immedi- Marshall, immediately stresses the integrity of ate grounds of his fear and you have removed the man.8 Pogue himself in writing of Marshall his sole reason for obeying. But if that same says, “Born in an era which spoke often of re- man is loyal to you, his obedience will have sponsibility, duty, character, integrity, he was been insured in a much more lasting way, for marked bv these so-called 'Victorian’ virtues.” 9 the attitude of loyalty is a stronger stimulus Dean Acheson, who served with Marshall in than the attitude of fear. Rousseau wrote: “The the postwar period, speaks of “the immensity strongest is never strong enough to be always of his integrity, the loftiness and beauty of his the master unless he transforms strength into character.” 10 And Sir Winston Churchill, in right, and obedience into duty.” 13 a tribute paid Marshall shortly before his death, Now, a danger still lurks in this kind of loyal- said: "During my long and close association ty, inasmuch as the demagogue can inspire with suecessive American Administrators, there blind, unthinking loyalty to himself and his are few men whose qualities of mind and char- programs simply through his personal charisma. acter have impressed me so deeply as those The danger is precisely that this view of loyalty of General Marshall.” 11 is compatible with Himmlers dictate to his Integrity. I would suggest, was the crucial troops, that their honor was their loyalty. What factor in inspiring men to trust George C. Mar- I now shall turn to, however, is a different view shall. Marshall was a competent man, but of how loyalty can be inspired, in a manner competence did not account for the trust he such that the military goal of discipline can be 54 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW

achieved along with the social goal of having Even when he agreed, at the Presidents insis- soldiers who are also refleetive, morally sensi- tence, to accept personal decorations, he held tive men. This conception of loyalty is one of them to a minimum, saying: “I thought for me loyalty inspired by trust, where that trust re- to be receiving any decorations while our men sides in the moral integrity of the commander. were in the jungles of New Guinea or the is- lands of the Pacific especially or anywhere else there was heavy fighting . . . would not appear Trust and Personal Integrity at all well.” 16 This statement was made with The Oxford English Dictionary defines trust an attitude of humility, indicating the strict as “confidence in or relianee on some quality or command Marshall had over his own ambitions attribute of a person or thing.” The attribute as well as his true concern for his soldiers. that we shall focus on is moral integrity. Now, This concern for his soldiers had character- the minimum content of moral integrity is ized his entire career. While he was assigned to being a morally sensitive person, and to see the Infantry School, for instance, he was re- what this means, we shall turn to the respected sponsible for training several groups of Air British social philosopher H. L. A. Hart. Profes- Corps National Guardsmen and reservists. In sor Hart writes: one group were two black officers. Given the prejudices of the times and the location of the In moral relationships with others the individual training base (Fort Benning, Geórgia), it was sees questions of conduct from an impersonal point of view and applies general rules impartially not surprising when some of the students eircu- to himself and to others; he is made aware of and lated a petition demanding that the blacks takes account of the wants, expectations, and reac- withdraw from the school. When Marshall tions of others; he exerts self-discipline and control learned of the petition, he exercised his moral in adapting his conduct to a system of reciprocai leadership and defeated the petition. One of claims. These are universal virtues and indeed constitute the specifieally moral attitude to con- the two blacks involved was to write Marshall duct.14 many years later: “Your quiet and courageous firmness, in this case, has served to hold my be- Hart’s important points are three: an impartial lief in the eventual solution of problems which point of view, an active concern for others, and have beset my people in their ofttimes pathetic a disciplined attempt to meet the claims made attempts to be Americans.” 17 on one s behavior. These are the marks of the Marshall could fire subordinates, but he morally sensitive man, and they constitute a never became hardened to the needs and con- large part of what we ordinarily mean when cerns of his men. He had, one must conclude, a we speak of personal integrity. These qualities notable moral attitude toward his military are found in great leaders in any age, and they duty, and this attitude merely reflected his integ- are exemplified by George C. Marshall. He rity as a man. He directed one of the most paid strict attention to the notion of impartial difficult wars in history, without surrendering behavior, so as not to use his position to benefit that integrity to the needs of the moment. He himself or his friends unfairly. For example, was, in the highest sense, the truly moral mili- Pogue writes; tary leader. Marshall applied the same rigid standards to him- self that he set for others. During the war, he told his Secretary, General Staff, that if he received Loyalty and the Needs any decorations, honorary degrees, or had a book of a Democracy written about him, he would transfer out of the Pentagon. Only at the Presidents personal direc- Thus, in George C. Marshall a reasonable tion did he waive the first prohibition.15 blend of loyalty, honor, and military success LOYALTY, HONOR, AND THE MODERN MILITARY 55

was achieved. The question remaining is comes to doing what he tells you to. Thus, the whether the perspective on loyalty that I have soldier of a democracy can remain a moral proposed is the proper perspective for today’s agent, ultimately responsible for his actions, müitary. and can at the same time obey the orders of a In America todav, the young officer or en- person he trusts, on the presumption that the listed mau who is beginning his military Service orders are legal ly and morally correct. This is comes from a society whose values do not sup- a presumption that all Americans would like to port the rigidly conceived notion of discipline. be able to make about the military commander, That is to say, discipline is not valued for disci- and it is one which they are justified in making plines sake. The young American is attuned to if the commander is a man of integrity. questions conceming morality and war. He expects to be given a reason when told to do T his pic t u r e of the military places a heavy something. He does not always accept estab- responsibility (some would say burden) on all lished traditions without question. He is often those in positions of eommand, commissioned suspicious of bureaucracv and its ways.18 He is, and noncommissioned officers alike. But this is in short, the tvpe of person who leads re- no more than ought to be expected of those in spected military writers to say that “the gap such positions in the military Service of a de- between the values held by a large percentage mocracy. The military life has long been eon- of American youth and those required for sidered a life of sacrifice, not a life of personal effective military Service is probablv larger gain. It is essential that the emphasis remain on todav than ever before." 19 the former in developing a professional soldier. There remains, however, at least one thing Given this perspective, and with the humility that such a young man (or woman) responds to, and wisdom characteristic of the soldier-scholar todav as in the past. He recognizes a man of of Plato’s Republic, the modem American sol- integrity and can be inspired to trust such a dier can revise Himmlers phrase and write his man. This trust can serve to close the gap be- own epitaph: “My loyalty is my honor”—my tween the values of the soldier and his com- loyalty resides in a man of integrity, to whom I mander, for trust creates a sympathetic attitude give my trust. and a propensity to obey. If you trust someone, you give him the benefit of the doubt when it United States Air Force Academy

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of significant visual changes. This evidence is viously a trade-off must be made between pat- coupled with individual submunition impact tern size and probability of coverage for opti- points, dud rates, and deliverv conditions to mal kill probability of a selected target. formulate an official operational test and eval- Once munition pattern sizes are correlated uation. This, then, established the worth of the with delivery conditions, distances can be com- design. puted between individual munitions and targets These procedures are indeed useful in the positioned within the pattern. In many cases, evaluation of a new munition system. Thev are especially where high munition spatial densities inadequate, however, to establish statistieally exist, damage may be generated on one target significant differences in the effectiveness of the by many different munitions. High-speed com- svstem compared with other systems. In order puters can accurately simulate the intereactions to gather enough test data to build such a sta- between these separate munitions and any tistical case for or against a new design, many number of targets within the pattern. Actual repeated tests would be necessary, at far too field tests cannot evaluate this overlap. Further- great an expense. As an alternative, the Air more, any distribution of munitions within a Force Amiament Laboratory is using high-speed pattern can be duplicated in the Computer computational techniques to evaluate new simulation. Generally, a random unbiased dis- munition designs. These techniques combine tribution is used, but any desired distribution is the results of a few selected tests with a Com- possible, such as the doughnut-shaped pattern puter simulation of the entire munition/target from certain bomblets. interaction, to produce a representative measure Munition orientations, velocities, and fuze of the munitions effectiveness. funetioning times at impact are required for a This article brieflv reviews the technologv complete munition effectiveness analysis, espe- areas considered in an evaluation of a tvpical ciallv where the munition’s effects are biased in encounter between a target and a munition svs- certain directions. The orientation will affect tem. Although they are directed towards eval- whether or not the munition damages the tar- uation of cluster munitions, thev are applicable get. Impact velocities onto the ground surface to unitary munitions as well. must be added vectorially with fragment veloc- ities to establish striking velocities on the tar- get. Fuze funetion times (relative to the ground delicery surface) must be established to assess the degra- When cluster munitions are airdropped, their dation of the kill mechanism by the surround- individual impact points are contained within ing terrain. For example, should the impacting certain pattem sizes on the ground. The air- munition bury itself in the ground prior to det- craft delivery conditions establish both the de- onation, the fragments may be degraded li verv accuracy (cep) of the pattem center and significantly. the pattem size. Thev determine the probabil- ity of covering the target with the munitions. A munition effects small pattern (with small spacings l>etween munitioas) will produce a high target kill prob- Munition effects are established through care- ability should the target be covered. However, fullv controlled and instrumented characteriza- the probability of covering the target with a tion tests. These tests, standard in all Air Force small pattern is low. Conversely, a large pat- munition development efforts, establish the tem has a high probability of coverage but a physical and functional characteristics of the low associated probability of target kill (due to munition kill mechanisms, induding the follow- the large spacings between munitions). Ob- ing: 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

(1) Fragment velocities, masses, and spatial are determined from arena tests. An item to be distributions tested is statically detonated on the ground, so (2) Blast overpressures and impulses that some of the fragments produced are cap- (3) Shaped-charge jet penetration characteris- tured in a soft, wall board recovery material, tics from which the fragment weights and spatial (4) Thermal effects. distributions are determined. Other fragments, All these factors are considered in an overall not captured, are permitted to perforate thin munition effectiveness evaluation. Once the electronic plates. These plates send electronic performance data are accumulated, the results signals to chronographs, which measure the may be used in an accurate and realistic eval- time taken for the fragments to travei the dis- uation against many targets, under any selected tance to the plates. These arenas may also be set of delivery conditions, pattern sizes, accura- equipped with electronic pressure gauges for cies, aircraft load-outs, and sorties. measuring blast overpressures and impulses, or The characteristics of fragmenting munitions blast effects can be computed analytically AIR FORCE REV1EW 59

based upon the amount of explosive contained through arena tests, but in this case the arena in the munition. consists of flammable fuels, such as gasoline, Shaped-charge jet penetrator eapabilities are diesel oil, and jet fuel. These flammables are determined bv measuring the penetration into spaced on the ground at intervals about the semi-infinite Steel targets. The profile of the munition, which is then statically detonated. cavitv produced in the Steel target, as a func- The number of flammable targets ignited deter- tion of depth of penetration, ean be extrapo- mines the range of thermal effects for the par- lated to damage effects against armored vehiele ticular design. Careful control must be main- targets. This extrapolation is based upon the tained of the ambient conditions under which number of steel spall particles emanating from these tests are performed, to ensure uniformity hull armor into the interior of armored targets. between sets of results. The number of particles is directly related to targets the size of the cavitv produced. Munition thermal effects are also established Methods used for evaluating munition effects

Before lhe days of higfi-rpeed computatum, the principal mearu of evaluating a new munition was hy actual íí íí, a.1 on trucks po h t ú m e d in a target array. u ith inspection of damage afterward. But testa enough to he conclunve were too erpenxive, so Computer* notv supplemcnt the test data. 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW against battlefield targets have improved signifícantly over the past years. These methods have been made possible through the use of high-speed electronic computers, which permit storage and ultrafast manipulation of target physical and functional characteristics. Basical- ly, for computerized munition lethality evalua- tions, targets are represented by one of two different methods: (1) a series of triangular sur- faces, sized by the complexity of the target being described, and interconnected so that no surface discontinuities, or voids, exist; and (2) a series of basie geometric figures interconnected and combined to form a mathematical replica of the actual target. Either of these techniques may be used to describe a target, no matter how complex or intricate, by merely inc-reasing the number of triangular surfaces or geometric figures used. The descriptions must, as a minimum, include all components criticai to the total target Sys- tem operation and some degree of component shielding from skin or exterior sheet metal. Metal types, thicknesses, and spacings are criti- cai to sensitivity analyses from penetration and blast kill mechanisms, and they must be re- corded exactly. All foreign target descriptions depend upon accurate and thorough intelli- gence data and exploitation results to provide this exact input information. Given this infor- mation, the computerized target description can be completed with precision for subsequent vulnerability assessments. Once target components have been iden- tified, described, and positioned correctly within the overall target system, they must be defined in terms of sensitivity to damage. Effects on the target system, should damage occur, must be known. Sensitivity to damage is usually determined from field tests, using actual components and a variety of kill mechanisms. These usually include fragment impacts for different fragment sizes and impact velocities, also bullet impacts for various caliber weapons and weapon standoff distances. Knowing these component damage functions, one can deter- V* K « ,l A ty picai bomb fragmentation arena tests munitions that are statically detonated on the ground. Metal flash paneis measure explosive time and impact, and numbered wallboard recovenj bundles capture bomb fragments for weight and distribution determinations.

mine the effects of damage to the target from a positioning of a grid system over the target Fault Tree analysis. This analysis maps out the profile so that selected portions of the target entire target operation, from input commands, ean be studied independently. The grid cells, of through funetional Controls, to output perfor- a size commensurate with the degree of com- mance. Interruption of anv vital component plexity of the target being assessed, are copla- will degrade the system performance. The ex- nar and oriented normally to the attack direc- tent to whieh the system is degraded is deter- tion. In this way the target outline is projected mined hy an assessment of those components onto the grid as the munition threat views it, that are damaged. Once a target has been de- thereby exposing all portions of the target that scrihed in Computer format, it may he used would occur during a real encounter. over and over again. Vulnerability evaluations VVhen the target orientation and grid system may he made for a large number of attack are set, the assessments proeeed by the genera- aspects—elevation and azimuth angles—and for tion of rays, or shot lines, through the indi- a large number of replications. In this way, tar- vidual grid cells and target positioned beneath get soft spots or sensitivities to particular the grid. The rays may be parallel to one an- threats may be readily identified. This advan- other, or they may emanate from a point source. tage is extremely difficult to discover from full- A single ray is generated randomly through all scale field demonstrations. the cells, and each ray penetrates completely through the target. As the rav encounters sheet metal, airspaces, components, fuel tanks, etc., vulnerability assessments the information is tabulated for subsequent use. Procedures followed in computerized vulnera- It represents what a fragment or bullet would bility assessments usually start with the super- encounter should it strike the target. Predictive AIR FORCE REV1EW 63 methods are used to assess penetration perfor- encountered. Their sum then represents the mance of fragments and bullets that strike tar- target vulnerable area, that is, the target area get plate and sheet materiais. The capability of which is sensitive to the damaging effects of the projectile to perforate the target com- bullets and fragments. pletelv is predicted and also the residual quali- A target may be vulnerable to kill mecha- ties of the impacting threat. These include resid- nisms other than bullets and fragments, such as ual mass, velocity loss due to momentum blast, high-explosive ammunition direct hits, transfer to the target, and spatial distributions shaped-charge jets, and thermal effects. These of target and projectile fragments resulting vulnerable areas are computed for each of the from the interactions. Each of these fragments munition kill mechanisms, so that they may all has subsequent damage potential, and each be considered in an overall effectiveness eval- must be assessed for effects on criticai internai uation. components. For these effects, the component kill criteria damage functions referred to earlier are con- sulted. As these components are stmck by par- It is jiLSt as important to define the target kill ticles whose size and velocitv are known, possi- criteria used in a weapon system effectiveness ble component kill is predicted. Should a kill evaluation as it is to define the munitions eval- be probable, the incrementai cell area is added uated or the targets attacked. Target kill crite- to all other cells in which kill components are ria are defined in aceordance with either the

A Soviet ZlL-157 truck target rnodel illustrates one of two methods o f representing targets for computerized evaluation o f the lethality o f a munition: hy using a series o f triangles so that no surface voids exist. 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

extent of damage produced, from an encounter delivery accuracy relative to the truck (the aim with a weapon system, or the time it takes for point). The pattern center may fali at an the target to eease to function. Following are infinite number of positions, but one-half the examples of these criteria: time this center will be within the delivery (1) K-Kill: Total catastrophie destruction of cep. Once each bomblet impact point has been the target, rendering it suitahle only for sal- generated, the probability of truck damage vage. from all bomblets in the pattern is computed. (2) Mobility A Kill: A target vehicle will This entire computational procedure is re- eease to operate vvithin 5 minutes after being peated and averaged, until the variation in the damaged. average is small, usually less than one percent. (3) Mobility B Kill: A target vehicle will At this point it may be presumed that the eease to operate within 20 minutes after being Computer simulation has predicted a reasonable damaged. representation of an average interaction of the Other criteria presently in use eonsider the munition system with the target. Manv simu- time it takes to plaee a damaged target back in lated engagements led to the results obtained, operation. These criteria are termed “interdic- íar more than could have been collected tion” kills, and they are used for speeial appli- through actual field tests. As a result, we have cations, sueh as attrition analysis. It is impor- an answer to the question, “How good is that tant, then, to carefully select the kill criteria munition?” most applieable to the requirements of the study, The Air Force Armament Laboratorv has the since the sensitivity of any target varies accord- sole usaf resources for vulnerabilitv assess- ing to the criteria chosen. ments of foreign targets to conventional muni- Knowledge of these five technology areas tion developments. Much of the information will permit the statistical simulation of a typi- used in these vulnerability assessments is ob- cal munition/target interaction. By repeating tained through eontrolled munition characteri- the simulation manv times (200, tvpicallv) and zation tests conducted at the Armament Devel- averaging the results, one can infer a reason- opinent and Test Center. Target descriptions, able representation of the results of an encoun- using data furnished by Foreign Technology Di- ter. The significance of this statement may be vision, VVright-Patterson afb, are often con- illustrated by the following example. tracted to firms specializing in work of this Consider a CBU-24/B munition delivered type. But the basic interactions between muni- against a truck target with a specified pattern tion kill mechanisms and these targets depend of BLU-26/B bomblets and a specified delivery upon a select group of scientists and engineers accuracy. The CBU-24/B system contains 660 for their proper definitions. This group, repre- BLU-26/B bomblets; the BLU-26/B bomblet senting wide areas of expertise, completes the contains over 300 Steel balis uniformly distrib- vital network of knowledge necessarv to a uted over the surface of the bomblet. A single complete munition evaluation.

Computer simulation will position each of these Air Force Armament Laboratory, 660 bomblets on the ground, aecording to the Eglin AFB, Florida E ALL KNOW that clear writ­ ing is important. We also know that the Air Force makes a continuing demand on us to improve our writing. But despite our knowing all that, we still generate too much prose with peculiar, if not in fact confusing, problems. Consider the following examples; in some of them, emphasis has been added: • A base newspaper recently told about a certain re-enlistment and reported, “Sgt. Smith was given a guilt edged three- A LITTLE TH O U G H T day pass.” Move over, inmates—this pass wasn’t the one Sergeant Smith expected. PREVENTS • A USAF message began, “It is BIG WASTE* desirous for officers to establish direct com- munication with. . . .” Let your dictionary Some Suggestions tackle that one, and don’t be surprised by for Clear Writing what you find. • A wing bulletin announced an “Aircraft Accident Investigation Board M ajor James Conely Training Session.” Now then, what session was that? • An instructor in an Air Force survival course directed each student to “compare the rattlesnake’s tail to the structure of his fíngernail.” Snakes are stranger than we thought. • Another USAF instructor asked his students to “place a piece of paper on the table in front of you that is free of any folds,” not, apparently, on a folded table. And so on. Dr. Vincent McGuire of the University of Florida estimates that 75 percent of the common errors in writing are “thought” errors. For example, “When barking, I hate dogs.” A rule can be cited to correct this faulty reference, but if the writer thinks about what he says, he doesn’t need a rule either to recognize the mistake or to correct it. The same is true • The Imperial Cup Corporation 65 66 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

for inaccurate or unnecessary words, sentences we are all susceptible. For example, USAF Acad- that are too long or too awkward, confusing sen- emy cadets have written such gems as these: tence or paragraph organization, and many The purpose of Mr. Moore's speech was to con- other problems. vince and inspire the college editors he was talk- Consequently most of the problems we have ing to that they should attempt to maximize satis- are the ones easiest to correct, namely, errors faction to themselves and to others while in the pursuit of excellenee. of thought. Notice that of all the examples just o O o given, only one is strictly a rule mistake: “gilt” The cuisine is excellently prepared by qualified in the first example is misspelled. The others chefs ranging from tastv Nlaine lobster to corn- could have been corrected, or at least significantly fed beef from Colorado. improved, if each writer had thought carefully Highly educated, professional writers can also about what he wanted to say. have problems, as in these examples from the So- Only 25 percent of the more common mis- ciologjlcal Inquiry: takes, says Dr. McGuire, are caused by “rule” errors. For example, “The boys is present.” In Without predicament and perplexity, the plausible this example the problem is simply that the rule and the absurd, vicissitudes remain unshared, in- telligence goes unchallenged, and wisdom cannot says, “Use a plural verb with a plural subject.” grow. The only way to correct rule errors is to learn OOP the rules and apply them. This is easy to say but Having said which, it should be noted with empha- not always easy to do. sis, this entire discussion—even if fully compre- But back to errors of thought. hended—constitutes nothing more than a bare be- Why are these mistakes so common? Certainly ginning to a full understanding of that which has been discussed. we would expect that problems so easy to recog- nize and so easy to solve would in fact be both Commissioned officers are not immune, either. recognized and solved. Unfortunately, this An officers open mess administration wrote the doesn’t happen often enough. If it did, the Air membership: “It is requested that each member Force would not have the continuai need to return the enclosed ballot as soon as possible.” admonish its people to write more clearly. The first six words could be deleted without chang- No one can say for sure, but there are prob- ing the meaning or tone, but the usaf behest ably five reasons whv thought errors go uncor- both to omit deadwood and avoid passive voice rected: was no more complied with by this club than it (1) People don’t read what they write. Perhaps is by most other organizations. The problem here they see the words they wrote, but that isn’t the is not serious; after all, it won t make a discern- same as reading. As their eyes glide over the page, ible difference in the nation s defense. But com- they unconsciously overlook anything extra or pound these wasted words by the length of the omitted or inaccurate. Their meaning is too fírmly whole letter, the number of letters sent by that in mind to see that it isn’t on the page. The an- club, the number of times such waste co mm only swer to this is simple: proofread carefully and occurs elsewhere, and the problem no longei critically. Better yet, let somebody else proof- seems small. read, or let a few days pass before you proofread In other words, it makes no difference what de- yourself. grees we have, what rank we wear, what posi- (2) People don’t think they have problems. tions we hold, or how much experience we have: They may consider themselves too intelligent or the basic problems of writing are problems foi too simple or too average to have problems. We us all. The answer is simply to recognize this will allow for a few people having no problems, fact. but the thought mistake is no respecter of persons; (3) People don t want to insult their readers. A LITTLE THOUGHT PREVENTS BIG WASTE 67

Some people actually believe that readers who instead of accepting the assignment, he should have above-average intelligence will be offended do so within a specified time after “notification if the writing is too simple. Even if this were of end assignment.” The eaptain did indeed want true, it doesn’t show proper consideration for to be separated. less fortunate readers. However, no one has ever Some time later he got another letter whieh been offended by writing that is easy to under- named a specific assignment. He then contacted stand. The answer to this? Write to express, not the cbpo within the specified time to make ap- to impress. plication for separation. But shortly thereafter, (4) People don’t think clearly about what to pes orders arrived. Furious, the officer returned write. Not long ago an instruetor in one of the to the cbpo and learned that “notification of end most important schools in the Air Force sat at his assignment” apparently meant the letter that desk, apparentlv occupied, as he stared at the wall projected reassignment, thereby ending his for about half an hour. A colleague carne in and present assignment—not the letter giving the as- asked what was going on. The instruetor replied, signment he would have in the end. “I have to write a letter to all instruetors for Finally, after a great deal of time wasted in the boss’s signature. It’s about a new lesson pro- researching records, making long-distance phone cedure, and I dont know how to write it.” calls, rescinding and rewriting paperwork, the His colleague then asked, “What do you want problem was resolved. The person who had been to say?” The instruetor told him. “Well, why “too busy” to think about and revise what he had don’t you write what you just said?" It never written in that first letter ended up being even occurred to the instruetor that it could be so busier making other changes. easv. There is no more excuse for laziness in writing We all tend to speak more fluently than we than in anything else. And there simply is no such write. It is much easier, for example, to give a thing as being too busy to rewrite. lecture (hard as that may be) than to write the Whv is it that we so rarely assume that these same lecture as a paper for people to read. For problems could apply to us? Even as you read this some unknown reason, writing seems to tie up article, you are probably thinking about similar our thinking. The usual result is either wasted problems that someone else has. It is easy to spot time or writing that is too vague, too general, their problems: too awkward, and too wordy. In addition to the fine work done by the Irish Therefore, if the written words don’t come eas- regiments he assured them that many a warm Irish ily, say aloud whatever it is you want the reader heart beat under a Scottish kilt. (From a London to know. Then write what you just said and pol- daily paper) ish as necessary. O O O (5) The fífth reason for uneorreeted writing is Maternity wear for the modern miss. (Sign in a the most criticai: people are often too lazy or too London store) busv to revise what they have written. These o O o are the people who either don t proofread at Split and wanned and served with our cheese, all or else look back over their letters, handouts, you will be the envy of your guests. (From a cata- log of a store in Sugar Hill, N.Y.) or whatever and say, “My reader will know what I mean.” But spotting similar problems in our own writ- This kind of thinking resulted in the following ing is not so easy. Most of us take a jealous incident: Recently a eaptain got a letter from pride in what we write. Once the words are his cbpo notifying him of a projected reassign- written, we resent the suggestion that something ment at a future date. The letter also explained could be wrong with them. We don’t like to that if the officer wished to apply for separation check and change the words, the organization, 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the limits of the subject, spelling, punctuation, is think clearly about what ijou want to say. or anything else. And even when vve admit the Then write simplv, write directly, and proofread advisability of ehange, we are often unwilling carefully. to take the time to do so. Few of us challenge If we develop the habit of criticai self-evalua- our own writing. tion, all the problems cited here will be elimi- The real problem, then, is self-evaluation. nated. Otherwise, they will continue to occur as Numerous gnides and checklists tell how to do often and as severely as they have in the past. this, such as in this list of five reasons for problems. The basic suggestion of all these guides A cadem ic Instructor ò Alliecl Officer School CHINA, 1946-47

Lieu t en a n t Colonel Gordon K. P ic k l er

RESIDE.NT NlXON's visit to China and its spectacular TV coverage have dra- matically rekindled American interest in things Chinese. Capitalizing on this P heightened interest, journalists, scholars, retired foreign Service officers, and others with experience in China are offeríng up a spate of articles and books. Many of the c ■ writers are delving into the American governments deep involvement in Chinese h affairs during the decade of the forties and are producing a varied abundance of surveys, vivid descriptions of Chinese life, memoirs, and new insights and vignettes eie f conceming American policy toward the Chinese Communists during that era.1 This p 4 litefature is arousing a great deal of attention and causing some controversy. For fc' $ - example, a most interesting and well-written article by Barbara W. Tuchman ap- peared in a recent issue of the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs.2 P* P ; Mrs. Tuchman uses recently declassified material to serve up a speculative essay pt 69 ex ^ Pe ' 'l 70 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

about what might have occurred hatl Mao Tse- Had the Communists desired talks with Ameri- tiing and Chou En-lai come to Washington. This can officials, channels were open for making hypothetical proposition was prompted by a the arrangements, and indeed there were some message in 1945 from an American military contacts. An instance, perhaps one of the last representative in Yenan, relaying Mao and friendly contacts, took place between the Chou’s expression of interest in visiting Presi- Communists and American airmen. dent Roosevelt in order to develop a working In March 1947 the U.S. Army Air Forces relationship with the American government. used its aircraft and crews to evacuate Chinese However, Mrs. Tuchman nimbly refocnses her Communist officials, their staffs, and their fami- emphasis: instead of making suppositions about lies from Nanking and other Nationalist cities what might have been, she launches into a ti- to the Communist capital of Yenan in Shensi rade against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek province.5 The airlift was prompted by termi- and Patrick J. Hurley, FDR’s personal represen- nation of Communist-Nationalist discussions tative in China in 1944-45. The main sources that had been held mainly in Nanking. Having of her support material seem to be information no transportation of their own, the Communists supplied by Colonel David D. Barrett, Chief of were faced with having to trek the 600 miles the American Mission to Yenan, and John S. through Nationalist territory before reaching a Service, a career State Department officer, sanctuary in the north. Because of the distance neither of whom can be considered an unbiased and the danger of “bandits” or agents provoca- source because their careers were injured by teurs waylaying them, the Communists re- Hurley’s vindictiveness. Her main contention is quested transportation from their compound in that Hurley was one of the primary obstacles— the city to the Nanking airport, where they if not the primary obstacle—in blocking Mao and could board American aircraft. The Air Force, Chou from having direct parleys with Washing- by providing the means of safe passage across ton. Accordingly, the U.S. lost the opportunity hundreds of miles of Nationalist-held territory, to preserve viable contacts and establish ami- probably saved the lives of most of the Com- cable relations with the Chinese Communist munist group, the most notable among them leaders. being the present Premier of the Chinese Peo- Mrs. Tuchman gives the impression that this ple s Republic, Chou En-lai. failure to eommunieate American friendliness The American aircraft and crews that carried to the Communist leadership represented the out this evacuation belonged to the Air Force end of any serious attempt to have meaningful section of the Army Advisory Group in China. contacts with them. She overlooks the efforts of The Air Division, as it was called, had been General George C. Marshall, President Tru- established in early 1946. It was headquartered man s special envoy, who tried for over a year in Nanking, comprised of about 250 officers and to bring about a lasting truce—even coalition— men, and commanded by Brigadier General between the Chinese Nationalists and Com- John P. McConnell (later to become usaf Chief munists (fighting had broken out between them of Staff). This activity was designated Opera- in late July 1946). By the end of 1946 Mar- tion Catfish and occupied the Air Division s shall had quit in disgust, but his departure still staff and facilities in early March 1947. did not end all American contacts or friendly The operation began on the morning of gestures toward the Chinese Communists. March 9. The Communists and their families, There were additional meetings between with their luggage, arrived at Tai Chiao Chan Americans and the Chinese Communists, other Airfield, Nanking, aboard American trucks. The than the ones highlighted by Mrs. Tuchman’s lower-ranking functionaries boarded C-47 article and Marshalls conciliatory endeavors. transports, while Chou En-lai and the more Chinese Communists prepare to board a USAAF C-47 at Tai Chiao Chan Airfield, Nanking, after breakdown o f Communist-Nation- alist discussions in March o f 1947.

S»x hundred miles away at Yenan, the caves (actually tunnels) in the hills bordering the landing strip served as offices and homes for Chinese Communist leaders.

On completion of the evacuation, per- haps the last friendly association of our Air Force and Chinese Communists for a quarter century, Chou En-lai had coffee at Yenan with USAAF officers. Operation Catfish complete, some o f the American airmen who flew the Nanking to Yenan Circuit posed heside a C-54 involved. . . . Four days after the goodwill operation, Chinese Communists luid dugdeep trenches at intervals across the Yenan airstrip, render- ing it unusahle by friend and foe alike.

important delegates were flown to Yenan in the cially equipped C-47 containing complete radio more comfortable C-54. General McConnell, facilities—including a homing station, air-ground who had earlier landed a C-54 carrying Mao Communications, and an instrument approach Tse-tung to Yenan, briefed his crews that the system. The American pilots completed the Communists had laid out an airfíeld in a can- passenger shuttle in one day without mishap. yon along a Yellovv River tributary, which their The Communists seemed extremely appreciative austere capital overlooked. A sheer wall at the and hosted the American airmen with coffee end of the runway ruled out the likelihood of a and sandwiches before thev took oíf for the return suceessful go-around in case of an emergency.4 flight to Nanking. Since there were no navigational aicLs at the Just after our planes were airbome, the field, the Americans had earlier flown in a spe- Communists surprised the Americans, wrho

72

74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

were circling to gain altitude, by blowing up T his gesture of goodwill by American airmen in portions of the runway, thus making it impossi- 1947 was probably the last friendly meeting ble for planes to return for an emergeney land- between the Chinese Communists and mem- ing. In retrospect, this gesture indicated quite bers of the U.S. Air Force for almost a quarter dramatically that the Communists wanted to of a century. Despite the time lapse, mainland end all contacts and future parleys. Within a China’s indefatigable Premier would probably week, their troops had dug deep trenches— recall this instance of friendliness and perhaps possibly to conserve explosives—across the re- might even consider that the Air Force on that mainder of the strip, so as to render it totally day had saved his life. useless. Air Command and Staff College

Notes 1. Two such boolcs are John Paton Davies. J r. . Dragou hy the Tail (New York: 3. The description of the evacuation and the accompanying photos were W W. Norton & Co.. 1970) and Seyniour Topping, Joumey Between Two Chi- taken from "History of .Air Division, Ariny Advisory Group. March 1947." nas (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). 861.01, Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB. Alabama. 2. "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives," Foreign 4. Jnterview with General John P. McConnell, former Chief of Staff. U.S. Air Affairs, Vol. 51 (October 1972), pp. 44-64. Force. Washington. D.C., 9 February 1971. HE organizational structure of the Soviet Air Force is a useful vehicleT for an luiderstanding of the fundamental militarv concepts and doctrine that support the raison d - être of the militarv organization. This is especially true of Soviet armed forces because of their acute general awareness of the necessity that organizational form follow doc- trinal underpinnings. The Soviet armed forces in general and .Air Military Affairs Abroad Force in particular have departed radicallv from the Western form of militarv organization to meet their specific and unique requirements. THE SOVIET All branches of the Soviet armed AIR FORCE forces are subordinate to a single Minister of Defense, a key element HIGH COMMAND of the post-Stalin reorganization of the Soviet armed forces in 1953.

A lexander O. Ghebhardt Dr . William Schneider, J r .

75 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The Defense Ministry itself is one of several The Soviet Air Force cinc has largely adminis- ministries within the governmental apparatus trative rather than operational control over the known as the Council of Ministries. There is an most important elements of the Air Force, elaborate parallel structure for the political reflecting broader Soviet organizational frame- control of the armed forces through the Military work and preferences predating World War II. Committee of the Central Committee of the There are eleven Deputy Air Force cinc’s, five Communist Party. This control extends of whom are in charge of semiautonomous throughout the armed forces through the politi- commands that are under the operational con- cal directorates for each of the respective trol of other branches. These five are the Long branches. This aspect of Soviet Air Force or- Range Aviation (the strategic bombing compo- ganization will not be discussed here, to facili- nent of Soviet forces), which is subordinate to tate a sharper focus on the purely military as- the Minister of Defense; the Aviation (manned pects of the Soviet Air Force High Command. interceptor) branch of the Soviet Air Defense Directly subordinate to the Minister of De- forces (pv o ), which is operationally subordinate fense are three First Deputy Ministers, one of to the Air Defense Forces cinc; Naval Avia- whom is the Chief of the General Staff, while tion, which is subordinate to the Navy cinc; another is Commander in Chief (cinc) of the and the Tactical Air Force (or “Frontal Avia- Warsaw Pact forces. In addition there are ten tion” in Soviet parlance) and Airborne forces, Deputy Ministers of Defense, who are the which are operationally controlled by the cincs of their respective branches.1 The group Ground Forces cinc. of Deputy Ministers forms the Military Coun- The remaining Deputies perform key admin- cil, a parallel advisory body to the Defense istrative and support functions, including Rear Minister, along with the General Staff. The Services, Engineering, The Chief Inspector, High Command of the Soviet armed forces is Training, Finance, and the inevitable Chief of currently in a process of revitalization. More the Political Directorate.3 youthful officers are being placed in sênior po- sitions to replace aging incumbents, with at least a limited expansion of the Military Coun- leading personalities cil. (Average age within the Soviet High Com- At each turn in the history of the Soviet Air mand until recently exceeded that of U.S. coun- Force, changes in organization and doctrine terparts by nearly ten years.) In addition to the have been accompanied by changes in person- creation of a Deputy Minister for Civil De- nel in sênior positions. Thus, in 1949, just before fense, it appears likely that the Soviets will the start of the Korean War, Stalin replaced reinstate the position of Deputy Minister for Chief Aviation Marshal Konstantin Vershinin Combat Training, which was abolished in 1968. with Chief Aviation Marshal Pavel F. Zhigarev. The Soviet Union is divided into sixteen Mili- In 1957 the reverse move took place when tary Districts, four Groups of Soviet Forces in Vershinin replaced Zhigarev, this time for a Eastern Europe, four Fleet Commands analo- period lasting until 1969. At that time Aviation gous to Military Districts, and two autonomous Marshal Pavel Stepanovich Kutakhov, the First Naval Flotillas.2 The most important districts Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force, are Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, and the 49 years of age, became the youngest cinc of Northern Fleet is the most important naval a Service in the Soviet High Command. element. Kutakhov’s career up to that point had been As is already apparent, the mission, and con- marked by rapid promotions as a result of his sequently the organizational structure, differ combat experience in World War II, when he substantially from their American counterparts. was credited with having destroyed 13 German MIL1TARY M TAl RS ABROAD 77

militarv aircraft. After the war Kutakhov held Also in 1969 Kutakhov appointed a new First various staff positions in several Soviet militarv Deputy, Colonel-General A. N. Efimov. Efirnov districts, including Odessa, to which he was is a World War II bomber pilot credited with appointed Air Force Commander in 1965. In flying 2(X) missions against German positions. 1967 he was transferred to the Air Force Head- After the war he attended the Soviet Air Force quarters in Moscow. His involvement in politics Academy and subsequently held various com- paid otf when he was elected a delegate to the mand posts in military districts. In 1970 the Air 23d and 24th Congresses of the cpsu, where he Force cinc replaced the Chief of Staff, Colo- was selected as a member of the Central nel-General Braiko, who had held the post Committee bv virtue of heading a branch of since 1963, with Colonel-General A. P. Silan- the anned forces. His replacement of 65-year- tyev. Silantyev appears to share his Chiefs old Marshal Sergev Rudenko as Vershinin’s predilection for offensive operations. His selec- First Deputy in March 1968 was apparentlv tion of a young Deputy, Ivan F. Modiavev, a in preparation for the invasion of Czecho- one-star major general, is further confirmation slovakia. Kutakhovs promotion was almost that the new generation of Russian airmen is completely overshadowed bv the events in likely to differ substantially from those who Czechoslovakia and the replacement of Army were in command during World War II or General Kazakov by Sergey Shtemenko as even during the Korean War. Another influ- Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces. Ku- ential position was filled in 1967, following takhovs appointment therefore should be inter- the death of Colonel-General A. G. Rytov, preted as having resulted from a combination when Colonel-General I. M. Moroz became of political acceptability, relative youth, and Chief of the Political Directorate. favorable circumstances within the High The shake-up of the Air Force High Com- Command brought about by the invasion of mand was apparently carried out for two Czechoslovakia. different reasons: first, because of the advanced On 7 November 1972 Kutakhov was pro- age of the ineumbents, the average age of the moted to Chief Marshal of Aviation, the highest top four officers before 1969 being 66. Second, rank achieved by an Air Force officer and in advance of an apparent shift from a defen- equivalent to Marshal of the Soviet Union. sive to an offensive strategy, possibly caused by Thus he attained the same rank as his predeces- the realization that the growth prospects of the sors Novikov, Zhigarev, and Vershinin. His Moscow (Galosh) abm system were not such as promotion may indicate satisfaction with his to give the Soviet High Command the performance, length of tenure as the Air Force confidence necessary to deploy a nationwide cinc, or an attempt to appease the Air Force active defense system against ballistic missiles officers for a series of advantages given to the comparable to the existing system against aero- Navy. dynamic threats, as well as decisions to move On the whole, since he was appointed, Ku- heavily into new areas of weapons development takhov has maintained a low levei of visibility. including slbms, surface Naval combatants, He is believed to lean toward an offensive and ic bm’s.4 strategy in contrast to the defensive orientation One interesting aspect of the command of most Soviet generais. One of his first moves change is to understand to what extent this has was to reshape the Air Force High Command influenced the positions of the Air Force cinc by replacing the aging Marshal Agaltsov with within the Ministry of Defense and the Soviet the then Lieutenant-General Vasilii Reshetni- Air Force as a whole in comparison to the kov as Commander of the Long Range Avia- other branches of the armed forces. As is well tion. known, Soviet military strategy has been domi- 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

nated by offieers whose experience was in the Deputy Minister of Defense, cinc Navy tank and artillery forces. The present composi- Chief Aviation Marshal Pavel S. Kutakhov5 tion of the Soviet High Command reflects this Deputy Minister of Defense, cinc Air fact. Today it continues to be dominated by Force Army offieers, as demonstrated by the fact that Army General Semyon K. Kurkotkin5 despite his title of Deputy Minister of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense, cinc Rear Ser- Kutakhov ranks tenth in the overall High vices (Logistics), Army Command. The following list provides a better Colonel-General Aleksandr T. Altunin idea of the rank-ordering of the speeialized Deputy Minister of Defense, Head Civil Services within the Soviet military hierarehy: Defense, Army Marshal Andrei A. Grechko Marshal Kiril S. Moskalenko Minister of Defense, Army Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief Inspec- Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovskii torate, Army First Deputy Minister of Defense, cinc Engineer-Army-General Aleksandr N. Kom- Warsaw Pact, Army arovskii5 Army General Viktor G. Kulikov Deputy Minister of Defense, cinc Construc- First Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief of tion and Billeting of Troops, Army the General Staff, Army Engineer-Colonel-General N. N. Alekseyev Army General A. A. Epishev Deputy Minister of Defense, Head Weap- Chief, Main Political Directorate of the ons Development (r &d ), Army Soviet Army and Navy, Army. (He is not The same is true about the position of Air listed as a First Deputy but obviously Force offieers within the General Staff. Neither ranks as one.) the Chief nor any of his Deputies is an Air Army General S. L. Sokolov Force officer. The Navy was in the same posi- First Deputy Minister of Defense without tion as the Air Force until recently, when Gen- speeified duties but presumably in charge eral Kulikov, as part of his program of restruc- of coordination and administration, Army. turing the General Staff, decided to appoint an The Service chiefs are then listed in the order Assistant Chief of Staff for Naval Operations—a of importance of their respeetive Services re- move long overdue in view of the growing role gardless of their actual rank. They all hold the of the Soviet Navy. The appointment went to position of Deputy Minister of Defense, which Admirai of the Fleet S. M. Lobov, until re- is roughly equivalent to the U.S. Assistant Sec- cently Commander of the Northern Fleet.*’ It is retaries. interesting to note that in 1960 when Khrush- Army General Vladimir F. Tolubko chev split the aerodynamic and missile forces Deputy Minister of Defense, cinc Strate- by creating a separate Strategic Rocket Troops gic Rocket Troops, Army Service no similar move was undertaken in re- Army General Ivan G. Pavlovskii speet to the General Staff. If the Air Force is Deputy Minister of Defense, cinc Ground given the same importance as the Navy, the Forces, Army effect will be that in the near future an Assis- Marshal Pavel F. Batitskii tant Chief of Staff for Air Operations will also Deputy Minister of Defense, cinc Air De- be appointed. This in turn may lead to a frag- fense Troops, Army (Artillery). (Previously mentation of the centralized Soviet High he was First Deputy Chief of the General Command, with corresponding effects for Soviet Staff.) strategy, tactics, and organization. Technology Admirai of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Ser- seems, however, to make such appointments gey G. Gorshkov desirable in view of the increasing complexity MIL1TARY AFFA1RS ABROAD 79

of operations and management. Currently the The subordination of the Fighter Forces Com- Air Force has a three-star general representing mand-Air Defense Command ( ia - fvo ) both to it on the General Staff in the person of Colonel- the Air Defense cinc and the Air Force cinc General N. P. Dagavev and a two-star general enables the Front Commander in time of war in Lieutenant-General V. Minakov. Since the to shift fighter imits from defensive to offensive appointment of Admirai of the Fleet S. M. operations. They may also be transferred to Lobov as Kulikovs Assistant Chief, the General support a different army or front as battle con- Staff has the following structure: ditions may require. Army-General Viktor G. Kulikov The impossibility of a Kutakhov or Vershinin Chief, Army to achieve the high position that General Twin- Colonel-General Nikolai V. Ogarkov ing achieved in the U.S. as Chairman of the First Deputv Chief, Armv Joint Chiefs of Staff is quite clear at the present Colonel-General Mikhail M. Kozlov time. Technological developments and the Deputv Chief for Operations, Armv growing complexity of operations and coordina- tion will, however, probably persuade the So- ArmvJ General P. I. Ivashutin Deputv Chief for Intelligenee, Armv (kcb viets to appoint a Deputy Chief of Staff for Air background) Operations and one for Naval Operations. The Colonel-General V. V. Druzhinin enhaneed role of both the Soviet Navy and Deputv Chief, unspecified duties. (Former the Air Force, highly visible in recent Soviet Chief Radio Engineering Forces .Air De- maneuvers, makes it a future likelihood. fense Command 1961-1967.) Air Defense Command Admirai of the Fleet S. M. Lobov Assistant Chief for Naval Operations, Navy Since positions on the General Staff are hard to The Air Force officers’ inabilitv to become attain, Soviet Air Force generais appear to di- Chiefs, or at least Deputy or Assistant Chiefs, rect their ambitions in other directions. The Air of the General Staff is probably one reason for Defense Forces or pvo Stranny (for Protivo unhappiness among their ranks. Traditional Vozdushnaya Oboronu) are a separate com­ Soviet militarv doctrine has relegated Air Force mand staffed by both Air Force and artillery and Naval officers to “specialists” in a particu­ officers, the latter holding all four top positions lar field and as lacking general knowledge and at the present time. In 1966 the present Com­ expertise to assume the duties of the Chief of mander in Chief, Marshal Batitskii, replaeed the General Staff of what was and continues to Aviation Marshal Sudets, and another artillery be mainlv a continental militarv force. The in- officer, Army General A. F. Shcheglov, took over terservice rivalrv, up to this point, has not been as pv o First Deputy from Colonel-General of comparable to that in the U.S., and although it the Air Force G. V. Zimin. This left Colo­ should not be completely ignored, it is not as nel-General Alexei I. Pokryshkin, the famous sharp or as important as among our Services. As World War II Red flying ace eredited with the a result the Soviet High Command is among destmction of 59 Nazi planes, as the most sê­ the best integrated in the world, a fact illus- nior Air Force officer in the pv o . In 1972 Po­ trated not only by the position and role of kryshkin was appointed Chairman of the para- different Services in the overall strategy, or the military Volunteer Organization for the Support concept that all Services and branches will play of Army, Navy, and Air Force ( dosaaf), re- an equal role in a future war, but also by oper- placing Army General Getman. Pokryshkin ational characteristics. The flying of Air Force has recently been promoted to aviation mar­ médium and long-range bombers with the So­ shal, as has also Colonel-General I. Borzov, viet Navy in naval exercises is one example. Commander of Naval Aviation. 80 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEXV

Pokryshkin’s departure left two other Air the Ministry of Defense responsible for rela- Force officers in contention for Batitskiis and tions with foreign military attachés assigned to Shcheglovs jobs when one or both of them are Moseow. This subsection has subsequently been retired. The Coinmander of the Fighter Forces, upgraded into a section similar to the Foreign Colonel-General A. Borovykh, may be helped Ministry Protocol Service and an Air Force bv both his eommand abilitv and political eon- Major-General, S. N. Sokolov, put in charge. nections should one or both jobs be given to Sokolovs appointment appears to be a plum the Air Force. A more probable candidate for a for the Air Force, although only the future will eommand position (barring some unforeseen tell whether this position will be filled in rota- eircumstances) appears to be Colonel-General tion of the three major Services. A. I. Koldunov, whose military eareer in the Other young Air Force generais have past few years has been surprisingly successful. achieved status via the Political Directorate. In 1968 Koldunov was Deputy Commander of Major-General F. Ishchenko, who has recently the Baku Air Defense Distriet. One year later become Head of the Political Directorate and he was moved to the Ministry of Defense for a Member of the Military Council of the South- brief tour of dutv, and in 1970 he suceeeded ern Group of Forces in Hungary, began his Colonel-General Vasilii V. Okunev as cinc of eareer as a Komsomol organizer and rose rap- the important Moseow Air Defense Distriet. idly until 1970, when he was appointed Deputy Okunev was made Chief of the Soviet sam Chief of the Political Directorate in the Far Expeditionary Corps in Egypt, where he stayed Eastem Military Distriet. In Hungary he re- until the Russian units were expelled in June placed an Army officer, Lieutenant-General P. 1972. Koldunov’s rapid promotion, current po- Petrenko. Currently Ishchenko is the only Air sition, and age (49) make him an obvious con- Force officer heading the Political Directorate tender for one of the two sênior positions in the in a Military Distriet. However, the former ex- pvo Command. Politically he is also well clusive .Army domination is changing rapidly as placed, as demonstrated by his eleetion as a young one-star Air Force generais are now Candidate Member of the Central Committee holding the positions of First Deputy or Dep- at the 24th cpsu Congress held in 1971. uty Head of the Political Directorate in a The appointment of an Air Force officer number of Services and districts and are proba- would increase both the prestige and power of bly earmarked to take over when the present the Service and may have wider doetrinal im- incumbents are transferred or retired. The Air plications, especially on whether the role of the Force major-generais in such positions include air defense artillery against low-flying targets the following: Major-General N. Kozlov, Dep- will increase when the B-l bomber enters Ser- uty Head of the Political Directorate, Air vice. An Air Force officer in charge of air de- Defense Forces; Major-General V. Semenov, fense is also bound to play an important part in Chief, Political Directorate, Air Force Staff and the reshaping of strategy and procurement pol- Administration; Major-General F. Kletskin, icy for the next generation of interceptors and First Deputy Head in the Belorussian Military tactical aircraft, which will probably be heavily Distriet; Major-General N. Tsymbal, Head of influenced by advanced technology. the Air Force Political unit, Far Eastem Mili- tary Distriet. Kozlov and Kletskin are in the other channels o f promotion best positions to be made head of a Political Another important current avenue of promo- Directorate in a Military Distriet when a vacancy tion for both Air Force and Navy officers is occurs. Nevertheless, despite all these steps through political channels. In 1970 a Colonel forward, the Air Force is still behind the Armv Larionov of the Army headed a subsection of in the number and importance of political ap- MILITA HY A FIA IH S A BR O A D 81

pointments held. Technological development ress in development has barely been noticed in combined with the process of rejuvenation of the West because the Missile Forces and the the entire Soviet High Command will undoubt- Navy caught the public eye. Kutakhov took edlv help the careers of a number of Air Force over at a time when technological develop- officers. Both politically and professionally they ments were beginning to exert a considerable are likely to play a greater role in the future. influence on the shape of nurnerous changes in Despite the fact that only one man is in a Soviet Air Force strategy, taetics, weapons position to becoine cinc of the Air Force at development, and rapid growth. any one time and that, once appointed, that It is too early to conclude on the basis of ex- person is usuallv kept on the job for a long pe- isting evidence that a major shift in Soviet riod (as the careers of Novikov, Zhigarev, or strategy is clearly on the horizon. Nevertheless, Vershinin attest), the rejuvenation process be- a strong case can be made for a hypothesis gun by Kutakhov brought to the forefront a which holds that the coineidence of a number number of offense-oriented young generais who of evolutionary changes, including shifts in the tit better into the overall changes in the Soviet High Command of the Soviet Forces, a shifting Ministry of Defense and the General Staff that strategic balance move in the Soviet’s favor, are now taking place under the personal super- and an apparent Soviet decision to develop vision of the Chief of the General Staff, Army Naval forces capable of projecting Soviet General Viktor G. Kulikov. Bv Soviet standards, power beyond her borders—all these might be Kutakhov at 52 could be in charge for the next the result of a change in strategy. Develop- 15 years. Konstantin Vershinin held the job for ments over the next few years will likely repay a longer period, and during his time the prog- careful attention.

The Soviet .Air Force (ws) High Command (year of appointment in parentheses)

Commander in Chief Aviation First Deputy cinc Col.-Gen. Marshal P. S. Kutakhov (1969) A. Efimov (1970) Head Political Directorate Col.- Chief of Staff Col.-Gen. Gen. I. M. Moroz (1967) A. P. Silantyev (1970) Deputy Commander, Combat Commander, Long Range Training Col.-Gen. I. Pstygo Aviation (Dalnaia Aviatsya) Deputy Chief of Staff Maj.-Gen. Col.-Gen. Vasilii I. F. Modiaev (1972) Reshetnikov (1969) Chief Rear Services Col.-Gen. Chief Engineer Maj.-Gen. F. Polynin V. Z. Skubilin

Air Force Officers attached Io the General Staff: Col.-Gen. N. P. Dagayev Col.-Gen. Ivan Kozhedub, also Chairman of the Aero-Sports Federation Col.-Gen. V. Davidkov, speeialist in comhat trainine Lt.-Gen. V. Minakov 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

The Soviet Air Defense (pv o Stranny) High Command

Commander in Chief Marshal of Deputy Head, pd Maj.-Gen. the Soviet Union (Artillery) P. F. (Avn) N. Kozlov Batitskii (1966) First Deputy cinc Army General Head, Politieal Directorate Col.- (Artillery) A. F. Shcheglov Gen. I. F. Khalipov (1958) (1966) Deputy Commander, Air Defense Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Command Avn. Marshal E. (Artillery) V. Sozinov (1968) Savitsky (1972) Commander, Fighter Forces Deputy Commander, Combat Col.-Gen. A. Borovykh (1969) Training Lt.-Gen. (Avn) Chief Rear Services Lt.-Gen. N. Grishkov (Avn) V. Shevchuk Commander, sam Forces Lt.- Gen. (Artillery) F. M. Bondarenko (1968)

Air Force Commanders in Military Districts

Group of Soviet Forces in Northern Group of Forces Germany Col.-Gen. (Avn) A. N. (Poland) Lt.-Gen. (Avn) V. Katrich Golichenko (1972) Carpathian md Lt.-Gen. (Avn) Leningrad md Lt.-Gen. (Avn) S. Gorelov A. I. Babayev Moscow md Lt.-Gen. (Avn) Kiev md Lt.-Gen. (Avn) N. M. M. Odintsov Skomorokhov Siberian md Lt.-Gen. (Avn) Urais md Maj.-Gen. (Avn) A. I. Kulichev Demchenko Baltic md af Chief of Staff Maj.- Far Eastern md Maj.-Gen. (Avn) Gen. (Avn) M. M. Kapustin P. Bazanov (1973)

Air Defense Districts

Moscow Bakn Commander Commander Col.-Gen. (Avn) A. I. Col.-Gen. F. A. Koldunov (1970) Olifirov (1966) Chief of Staff First Deputy Lt.-Gen. (Artillery) Lt.-Gen. (Avn) A. N. A. Asriev (1969) Konstantinov (1969) Chief, pd Chief, pd Col.-Gen. (Avn) N. Lt.-Gen. V. I. Petukhov (1962) Bychenko MU ATAR Y AFFAIRS ARRUAI) 83

Other positioris held by Air Force Officers: Trans-Buikal md, Chief pd , Air Force Chaimian, DOSAAF(Volunteer Organization for Maj.-Gen. (Avn) I. Timoshevskii the Support of Army, Navy and Air Force) Military Academies Avn. Marshal A. I. Pokryshkin (1972) Gagarin Air Force Academy Head Aviation Head, Foreign Relations Section, Ministry of Marshal Sergey 1. Rudenko (1968) Defense Maj.-Gen. (Avn) S. N. Sokolov (1971) Zhukovsky Engine ering Academy Political positioris in Military Districts: Lt.-Gen. ( it s ) N. Fediayev Southern Group of Forces (Hungarv), Chief, Air Defense Command-Staff Aciulemy pd Maj.-Gen. (Avn) F. Ishchenko (1972) Head, Col.-Gen. (Avn) G. V. Zimin (1966) Belorussian md, Deputy Chief, pd Maj.-Gen. (Avn) F. KJetskin (1971) Air Defense Academy Marshal (Artillery) Yu. P. Bazhanov Far Existem md, Chief pd , Air Force Maj.-Gen. (Avn) N. Tsymbal Minister o f Civil Aviation Lt.-Gen. P. B. Bugayev New York— Wash i ngton

Notes 1. The functional distríbution of the Soviet Service branches is a major element consists of some 500 regular inititarv aircraft and an additional 2(KK» departure from traditional Western practice. The branches are Navy, Strategic aircraft nonnally in civilian service. Approximately 1000 aircraft of light. Rocket Forces* Constmction. Air Defense. Inspectorate, Ground Forces, Re ar médium, and heavv types are assigned to Naval Aviation. Services. Air Force. Weapons Development. and a recentlv upgraded branch. 4. .As indications of a possible shift, see Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, Nastu- Civil Defense. plenye ("The Offensive'). Moscow Military Pwblishing Mouse, 1970; Lt-General 1. G. Zavyalov, "Weapons and Military Art.” Soviet Military Revicw. nr 8. 2. MtUtary Districts August 1971, p. 2; also Marshal Grechkos Red Army Dav artide "Bom in Baltic Kiev Siberían Battles," Red Star, 23 February 1970. in which he lavishlv pr;used the per- Bebrussia Leningrad Trans-Baikal formance of the Calosh ABM system. However. not a single word on this Carpathian Moscow Trans-Caucasus subject was said by the Soviet Defense Chief in 1971 and 1972. Central Asian Northern Caucasus Turkestan 5. Besides Kutakhov, Kurkotkm. and Komarovskii. two others were promoted Far Eastem Odessa Urais from colonel-generais to Arrny generais on 7 November 1972; Evgeny F Ivanov- Volga skii. CINC CSFG, and Aleksandr I. Radzievskii, Chief. Frunze Military Acad- emy; see Krtisnaya Zvezda, 7 November 1972, p. I. Foreach of them prornotion Croup t of Soviet Forces Fleet Commands Flotillas wilí. however. mean a different thing. Kurkotkin and Ivanovskii at 55 and 54, Cermany iCSFC Northern Caspian respectively. are part of the rejuvenated High Comrnand and as such can look Northern Poiandl Baltic Kamchatka forward to a long period of tenure or in the latter's case to a higher position Southern (Hungary) Black Sea in the Ministry of Defense in Moscow. For Komarovskii at fífi and Radzievskii Central (Czechoslovakia) Pacific the prornotion appears to be the signal tliat they are on their way out and wili soon be retired and replaced by younger generaLs. It is also possible that the 3. The Soviet Tactical .Air Force consists of 12 Frontal Air Armies com- posts of Deputy Ministers ol Defense and Service heads will from now on be posed of approximately 4000 fighters, light bombers. and reconnaissance and given to Army generais either by direct appointment or through subsequent transport aircraft Long Range Avution consists of 140 heavv Bison and Bear prornotion. In this case Alekseyev and Altunin. the onlv colonel-generals holding bomben and 700 médium Badger and Bhnder bombers. The PVO aviation these positioris, will probably be soon promoted. component consists of some 3200 interceptor aircraft The Military Transport 6. Krtisnaya Zvezda, 3 November 1972. p. 1. OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

O MOST United States citizens, Latin L ieu t en a n t Colonel Laun C. Smit h , J r „ USAF (Rf.t ) America is a Catholie land of mahana, Twhere all people speak Spanish; where the inilitary Controls the govemments; where poverty, graft, and corniption are a way of life; and where the United States has tried its best to “give” a suitable wav of life to the people of the poor, unfortu- nate small republics. Most people do not know that the “tiny” republic of Chile, if superimposed on a map of the United States, would stretch in a 100-mile-wide strip from New York to San Francisco. Nor are thev aware that Argentina is as large as that portion of the United States east of the Mississippi River plus Kansas and Ne- braska. And continental United States could fit into Brazil, where Portugnese has been spoken since the davs of the conquest, and have room to spare. In fact, it is doubtful even that all U.S. statesmen

84 understand the relative sizes of the Latin Amer- Goldhamer quotes President Giuseppe Sara- ican countries. gat of Italy as saying that South America is the Yet another popular misunderstanding con- continent where Europe’s future lies and that cems the degree of United States impact on South America’s destiny is the destiny not only Latin .America. To most people Latin America of the Continent but of the world. This is is a convenient pool for exclusive United States probably an overstatement, but Saragat’s con- political influence and economic investment. clusions have been shared by Sir George Bolton The United States is the largest foreign investor of England, Paul Martin, former Canadian Sec- in Latin America and has had a relatively high retary of State, the late General Charles de degree of political influence there; but it is not Gaulle of France, and former U.S. Assistant true that Latin America is the exclusive domain Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, of the United States. Other foreign govem- Covey T. Oliver. This line of thinking has led ments have always been active in Latin Amer- to considerable inroads into the affairs of Latin ican affairs, and their influence is increasing. America by other foreign powers. Herbert Goldhamer has written a book, The Goldhamer notes that Great Britain, seem- Foreign Powers in Latin America, f which con- ingly in a hurry to divest herself of most of her tains a wealth of information. Originally a possessions in the western hemisphere, has been rand Corporation Studv, his book is the result in conflict with several Latin American States of much research and analysis, and some would over her territories. In spite of the fact that she say that he has tried to pack too much informa- is the second-largest investor in Latin America tion into its three hundred pages. The book is, (after the United States) and despite substantial in places, difficult reading, and to most Latin sales of military equipment to Latin .American American specialists much of the data therein States, Great Britain has suffered losses in po- is well known. However, our military officers, litical prestige as well as in the economic mar- when assigned to a post in Latin America, will ket in Latin America. find a study of Goldhamer’s book helpful in France, on the other hand, has no intention doing a good job there. of relinquishing control over her possessions in While the main focus of the book is on United the Caribbean. Although she has had no in- States/Soviet competition in the area, the crease in her own influence in Latin America, author contends that our preoccupation with her broad interest in redueing Latin America’s the role of the United States in Latin .American dependence on the United States has been affairs has obscured the important part played somewhat gratified. In spite of considerable there by other countries. Within the time military sales to Latin America in the form of frame of the Alliance for Progress, 1961-71, the Mirage jet aircraft and tanks, France has Goldhamer examines the activities of other for- had problems in Latin America, and the future eign powers—the West European States, the does not promise anything better. U.S.S.R., Great Britain, Japan, Canada, Israel— West Germanys drive to re-establish her their Latin American objectives and the methods pre-World War II economic position in Latin and resources used to attain them. America has not succeeded fully but has made t Herbert Goldhamer, The Foreign Powers in Latin America (Prince- ton, N.J.: Prineeton University Press, 1972, $10.00), 302 pages.

85 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW substantial progress. As the third-largest inves- is the best policy” approach that has been suc- tor in Latin America, Germany is also the sec- cessful for such powers as Japan and more re- ond-largest provisioner there, next to the United centlv the Soviet Union. This approach is char- States. Since she does not depend upon Latin acterized for the most part by short-term or ad America for imports, her balance of trade with hoc actions. “The Soviet Union often operates the region is favorable. So the future for Germany in the West by individual offers at strategic in Latin America looks bright, favored by the moments and places. For instance, on the day cultural and economic impact of the great that the United States ambassador visited Bra- number of Germans who have settled there since zil’s President Arturo Costa e Silva to inform World War II. him officially that Washington was reducing its Japanese emigrants have also Hocked to military aid program, the Soviet ambassador Latin .America since World War II, giving their appeared and offered Brazil credits for a sub- homeland a nucleus of economic and cultural way and bridge for Rio de Janeiro.” ^pp. influence in the region. In great need of raw 183-84) materiais, Japan has taken the initiative in Sir George Bolton early had exceptionally Latin America economically and has avoided accurate insight to the major weakness of the political problems by “sticking to Business. ” No Alliance for Progress when he said, “. . . my other industrial nation can show so much gain personal view is that Washington has made a in Latin America at so little cost. mistake in imposing on potential beneficiaries Latin America has also been a haven for Ital- standards of behaviour both political and eco- ian immigrants since World War II. Ranking nomic.” (p. 205) That the Alliance for Progress fifth as a trading partner with Latin America, failed, there is no doubt. One must assume, of Italy has remained free from tensions with the course, that the premise of the Alliance was republics. She will probably continue to get her wrong. But there are other reasons why it share of Latin American trade, but her present failed. Speeialists in Latin American affairs are policy does not constitute a threat to other na- generally little content with the Latin Ameri- tions. can policies of their own governments. They Unlike Italy, Spain has had almost insur- find them to be unclear, vacillating, and mountable poli tical problems, stemming from indifferent to Latin America and executed by her old colonial ties with the Latin Americans officials insufficientiy trained and informed on and from the politics of her 1936 revolution. Latin American affairs.” (p. 71, emphasis add- Both México and Argentina have been highly ed) In this respect the United States is no criticai of Spain, but Spain has nevertheless different from the other powers. been able to increase its share of the Latin Soviet policy in recent years, however, has American market. Spain will always have cul- been different from that of the other nations. tural ties with Spanish America but will be There is no public debate about foreign policy hampered in its New World policy until some in Rússia, nor does the Soviet press publish dis- changes are made in the political picture in torted articles that divulge Soviet planning “in Madrid. the interest of the people." Soviet diplomats Other smaller countries are beginning to are well trained, and their instruetions are trade with and invest in Latin America, too. specific. They know whv they are sent to Latin Various nations' foreign policies toward America and what they are expected to Latin America have been widely divergent. On do—and they do it. the one hand there is the long-term policy of In contrast, private groups in the United the United States that spawned the Alliance for States “solicit and often receive special advan- Progress. On the other there is the “No policy tages from the United States government.’ But BOOKS AND IDEAS 87

this does not mean that "they shape the main pursuit of economic relations with the Latin Iines of its policv in that region [Latin republics. The author points out that the Soviet America]. The principal directions of that pol- Union, in tum, has political interests in Latin icy were, in the decade of the Alliance for America related to its conHict with the West Progress, affected more by the cold war, by generally and with the United States more par- the advent of Castro and sporadic guerrilla ticularly. Recent Soviet behavior in Latin Amer- outbursts, by the political importance of the ica represents “some shift toward pursuing militarv in Latin American affairs, bv strategic political influence . . . where political power considerations, and not least by the alinost in- largely resides, that is, in the govemment of the extinguishable faith that the United States re- Latin American States.” (p. 53) sponsibilities and capabilities extend to the moral The author is particularly criticai of two of and practical guidance of the Latin American the Alliance’s programs: the Peace Corps and States.” (p. 75) Military Civic Action. Regarding the former, This does not alter the fact that not only do he contrasts what he considers (and I agree) the private interests in the United States seek fa- ineffectiveness of the exuberant young college vors and criticize U.S. policy, but so do con- recruits of the Peace Corps with the mature gressmen and other State officials, as well as judgment and specialized skills of the people that self-styled equalizer of all wrongs, the who compose the Cerman Development Ser- United States press. The Latin Americans real- vice (cds). After a while the Latin American ize—long before a measure is passed into law republics refused to request help from the bv the United States govemment—prettv nearly Peace Corps. They u'ould rather rely on the what they can expect to gain or lose by the older and more skilled people of the eus, who law. Thus, they know what thev can get. and could offer them what they needed. By 1970 they will not be satisfied with less. this led to about sixty percent of the new re- Distance alone made Latin .America the cruits of the U.S. Peace Corps being older, backyard of the United States politically, but skilled people. (pp. 170-71) many factors are changing this pieture. In- Goldhamer’s treatment of the U.S. military cluded is the more aggressive approach to presence in Latin America is generally good, Latin American affairs by France, Japan, Ger- but he tends to lump military civic action with many and Italy. The fact that the Latin Ameri- aid programs administered by other agencies. cans are no longer deeplv concemed about the As a consequence, the value of the programs feeling and reaction of the United States to does not, in his opinion, measure up to the their relations w'ith other powers certainly is a costs. The armed forces can put up a convinc- potent cause. Instead, many of the Latin ing argument to the contrary. The author does American nations have made clear their inter- acknowledge that “United States military ob- est in economic and diplomatic relations with servers had a more accurate appreciation [than Europe, Japan, and the Soviet bloc coimtries. members of Congress, the State Department, or Distance today seems to make the Soviets seem the press] of the futility of the United States less dangerous in the eyes of the Latinos. attempts to prevent South American military However, the Soviet Union does pose the establishments from aequiring advanced weap- greatest threat to United States leadership in ons.” (p. 268) Latin American trade and investment today. In However, in writing about relations between varying degrees, the Westem-oriented coun- the U.S. military and that of the host countries, tries shared political objectives in Latin Amer- Goldhamer States, “. . . the training and advi- ica associated both with the containment of sory relations between the United States and Communism and the Soviet Union and with the several of the Latin militaries led to such a 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW close identification of the Latin American mili- ciai, long-term programs; they can be a hin- tary with the United States that it weakened drance. There should be a new emphasis on a the position of the military vis-à-vis their own “low profile” or policy of avoiding a tutelary, people and often was a source of einharrassment paternalistic, and interventional posture. Our to them.”° (p. 264) leaders should also recognize that “the resis- The Soviets, claims the author, have made tance, by no means total, of Latin American mistakes that have led to repeated breaehes of political institutions, attitudes, and practices to relations with Latin American governments. change is determined much more by character- But they have some advantages over other istics of a social structure shaped over several powers. The Latin Americans expect them to centuries than by recent U.S. policy.” (p. 274) resort to propaganda and subversion. It is part Latin America is changing. The United of their way of life. Thns, Soviet officials in States does not have an exclusive sphere of Latin America are not expected to observe the influenee in Latin America. Other nations are same degree of discretion and restraint required making gains at our expense, some of them of others. with our blessing. The ideological confliet, Goldhamer does not credit the Soviets for however, has just begun. Goldhamer opines the failures of the United States in Latin Amer- that the United States, by inference, can proba- ica. “Fortunately," he writes, “failures of ma- bly offset Soviet gains by seeking more modest jor programs are not always as disastrous as aims in Latin America. “Modest aims,” he they well might be.” (p. 302) Failure forces a writes, “and decisions taken with the fullest review of the means employed to implement a provision for withdrawal or radical modification, program. Goals should not have to change. might provide modest successes that in the long Planners should beware of a multiplicity of spe- run could add up to greater benefits than are

*In iny three years with the United States Southern Command I had many provided by ‘enterprises of great pith and opportunities to work with the host military and the people. I was never in- moment’ for which one is ill-prepared and ill- volved in. nor did I ever hear or read of. an incident that was embarrassing to the host military. the people. or ine. equipped.” (p. 302)

El Paso, Texas STRATEGIC POWER: ON BALANCE

CoLONEL WlLLIAM T. B a LLARD

Nothing except a battle lost can be h a lf so melancholy as a battle won. Wel l inc t o n

N INHERENT danger in attempting to Professor Coffey asks some very penetrating A present a quantitative and objective analy- questions regarding the strategic balance. Para- sis of such a dynamic proeess as the world stra- mount among these is “whether the continua- tegic balance is that the analvsis often becomes tion of strategic superiority over the ussk and dated history before it is finished. Such is the Communist China and the construction of inevitable fate, however, of portions of Strate- comprehensive and effective strategic defenses gic Power and National Security,f bv Joseph I. are, as some have argued, essential to dissuade Coffey, Professor of Public and International these countries from attacking the United Affairs at the Universitv of Pittsburgh. Those States, from exerting pressures against its allies, portions of his book dealing with force projec- or from encroaching on its interests.” He an- tions, alliance relations, Communist behavior, swers with a “cautious no." (p. 169) To arrive at and some aspects of disarmament have indeed this conclusion, Professor Coffey analyzes the been dated bv certain events in early 1972, in- evolution of Soviet and United States policies cluding the Strategic .-Vrms Limitation Talks, over the last decade. He then discusses the cen- West Germanys treaties with the Soviet Union tral strategic balance within a rather detailed and Poland resulting from Brandt s Ostpolitik. assessment of the relationship between strategic Nixons visits to Peking and Moscow, and Tana- nuclear power and nuclear war. deterrence, ka’s trip to mainland China. Nevertheless, Communist behavior, alliance relations, arms Coffey’s book is still an excellent primer on the control, and national security. The common general subject of strategic power and its rela- thread woven throughout his work is that both tionship to various phenomena in the political the United States and the U.S.S.R. now possess and military environment. so much nuclear power that hirther qualitative Too brief to be comprehensive, but contain- and quantitative improvements would not es- ing fundamental aspects of strategic issues, the sentiallv upset the strategic balance. book attempts to reverse the trend of the arms Coffey s discussion of the chronology of the race by arguing that nuclear superiority is not U.S./Soviet arms race sets the stage for his ulti- essential to deterrence. To the attentive student mate conclusion. He generously details a nuin- of the strategic balance, his thesis is anvthing ber of force stnicture tables that compare but a surprise. Important, however, in any dis- American and Communist strategic weapon cussion of the subject is the question of Systems. A11 derived from open sources, often whether the thesis reflects a realistic assessment from Congressional hearings on defense ap- of the U.S. strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet propriations, the authors estimates of the Union or whether there is a genuine attempt to number of launch vehicles, warheads, and de- carve out a new policy based on diminishing liverable megatonnage are included. Also in strategic altematives. tabular form is a projection of the U.S.,

f Joseph I. Coffey, Strategic Power and National Security (Pittsburgh: Universitv of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, $9.50), 214 pages.

89 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

U.S.S.R., and People’s Republie of China inter- between strategic power and nuclear war, continental strategic forces circa 1975, which which leads to a rather elementary but essen- reveals a sizable increase in strategic power for tial task of defining terms used in any study of all three. strategic power. He attempts to define strategic One rather generalized conclusion drawn power, strategic sufficiency, and strategic supe- from a comparison of qualitative and quantita- riority, taking care to remind the reader of the tive strategic power portrayed by the projee- problems involved in using terms that are not tion is that, without procurement of U.S. readily adaptable to precise ineasurement. weapon systems now under development These serviceable definitions reveal some of the (longer-range sea-launched ballistic missiles multifarious aspects in attempts to quantify [slbm] and a new bomber), U.S. forces postu- strategic power. Coffey’s preferred measure of lated for 1975 would lie alile to survive a Soviet strategic power is the ability to inflict damage assault and have sufficient residual destructive in a nuclear exchange; but in arriving at rela- power to “hedge against anv fnrther Soviet tive strategic power, he attempts to aecount for deployment of abm’s." (p. 13) The assumptions all the asymmetries that relate to nuclear made in projecting the forces for 1975 credit power: quantitative values, technical capabili- U.S. forces with mir v capability on the Minute- ties, political implications, economic factors, man III and Poseidon systems. According to etc. Dr. Coffeys table, five hundred Minuteman IIIs Coffey persuasively argues that defensive sys- will each have three 2ÍX1-KT re-entry vehicles tems complieate the planning and execution of (rv’s), and 496 Poseidons will each have ten nuclear strikes, reduce the amount of destruc- 50-KT rv's. Each of the 160 Polaris A-3s will tion, and create uncertainties about the out- have three 50-KT multiple re-entry vehicles come of a nuclear exchange. He contends that (mr v). Iii addition, force loading for each B-52 many diverse defensive and offensive scenarios includes four 1.1-MT bombs and twelve 200-KT have revealed the complexities of a strategic short-range attack missiles (sr am) and for each defensive system. As an example, he cites a FB -111 includes two bombs and four sr ams. rand Corporation study which stated that even However, in predictions for the Soviet strategic a $6(X) billion expenditure on defensive systems forces there is no multiple independent re-entry to “protect people, production facilities, and vehicle (mir v) capability credited on any weap- essential supplies could not guarantee Ameri- on system, and only three 5-MT mr v’s on 500 can survival against large-scale attacks.” (p. 34) SS-9 missiles. Coffey maintains that air defenses, although The conclusion based on force projections for essential, are complicated by and vuliierable to 1975, namely, that the U.S. could survive an diverse and unanticipated tactics and new all-out Soviet attack and still have residual penetration aids. Antisubmarine warfare (asw) power to hedge against future Soviet antiballis- effectiveness is even more complicated. Coffey tic missile (ab.m) deployments, neglected to reports that the present U.S. asw system is consider the potential and intent of the Soviet adequate to detect and intercept most So- Union to develop and employ the mir v. The viet-built submarines to a distance of several sensitivity of mir v is criticai to the strategic hundred miles, primarily because of the noisi- balance, and this sensitivity factor must be ap- ness of the Soviet submarine. This still, howev- plied to both sides of the strategic equation er, leaves some key coastal targets vulnerable before such an unequivocal conclusion can be to Soviet slbm s. The improved Soviet subma- drawn. rine is, of course, much quieter and could be- With this foundation for subsequent analysis, come as invulnerable as U.S. missile subma- CofFey turns to a discussion of the relationship rines. He contends that both air defense and BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

asw forces are vulnerable to missile strikes ment of the in-being U.S. strategic mixed force. against defense operations, Communications, In a very credible discussion of the relation- and air bases. ship between strategic power and deterrence, On the surface, then, it would appear that Professor Coffey relates an assessmerit of the efforts to perfect an abm system should enjoy factors bearing on deterrence. He carefully dis- the highest national prioritv despite its high sects the problems and paradoxes of deterrence, cost and as yet unknown effectiveness. An .abm the arguments, pro and eon, for the capability svstem safeguards against accidental launch, of assured destruction, the complexities of de- minimizes damage from relativelv sinal 1 nu- termination (how to measure and how to com- clear attaeks, introduces uncertainties about municate), and the deterrent effect of uncer- reliability into the calculations of our stra- tainty. The reality of man s ability to reason is tegic capabilities, and reduces damage from the framework for the alternatives designed to attack by another superpower. However, despite make one “think the unthinkable.” This same these advantageous features, Coffev asserts that reality, in my opinion, increases the credibility a comprehensive .abm system would not pre- of his thesis that changes in the strategic bal- vent heavy human losses, nor would it hedge ance receive too much attention. Coffey claims against saturation launches with mir v, new that more emphasis should be devoted to the penetration aids, or decovs. Additionally, em- risks, the difficulties, and the costs associated ployment of a fractional orbit bombardment with attempts to alter the political balance. system i fobs) or heavy reliance on bombers and Deterrent factors, not military by nature but supersonic cruise missiles could minimize the which miLst be considered by an aggressor, in- effectiveness of the abm. Professor Coffev cites clude such elements as the probable cost, the President Nixon on this subject, who said that potential risks, internai political conditions, “the heaviest [antiballistic missile] defense sys- uncertainties associated with damage calcula- tem we considered to protect our major cities, tion, and uncertainties of the opponent’s intent still could not prevent a catastrophic levei of or resolve. He sums up that military factors are U.S. fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet diminishing in importance as deterrents in the attack.” ip. 36) In short, Coffey believes that it age of nuclear weapons because of the wider is doubtful either a Soviet or a U.S. abm system demand by people in all nations for a more could reduce damage from an attack in influential voice in decisions on foreign affairs, sufficient measure to change the strategic bal- the increasing requirement for governments to ance between the two. look inward to deal with domestic issues, and Coffey’s discussion of defeasive Systems is the extremely high political and psychological emphasized in this review purposely because costs of aggression. (p. 73) the details presented provide a most compel- In a less-than-totally convincing discussion of ling argument for a strategic mixed-foree con- the relationship between strategic power and cept, the triad. Building from each offensive Communist behavior. Coffey attempts to pre- capability of the triad, defenses are developed sent an insight into the incentives, motivations, that can onlv be neutralized by countervailing and intentions of the Soviets and the People’s measures of the other side or as a result of de- Republic of China. Attempts to provide such voting disproportionate resources in trying to insights are inherently vague and ill defined. He defend against all three offensive Systems. The is convinced that the Soviets will not use force ever compounding difficulties one encounters in because they fear the dangers of nuclear war trying to defend against each leg of the triad and because of their “pride in past achieve- are described by Coffey in such a way as to ments, their desire to preserve and enjoy the provide a complete and unqualified endorse- fruits of previous efforts, and their belief that 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW the inevitable 'victory of socialism’ can be The questions of use of force and threat to promoted through social and economic prog- use force should both be analyzed. Moreover, ress. . . (p. 74) Further, a shift in the nuclear and of immense importance, Coffey’s assess- balance will have only marginal impact on the ment that China would not resort to tactics willingness of the Soviet Union to engage in which could risk the use of force, because of nuclear war or actions risking nuclear war. the overwhelming superiority of the U.S., must Coffey is convinced that while the Soviets be reconsidered when this superiority no longer may rely on a less overt and provocative ap- exists. In other words, a change in the strategic proach to win over the third world countries, balance between China and the U.S. or the the Chinese believe in a return to the funda- Soviet Union is an entirely different matter mental purpose of the Communist party, which from such a change between the U.S. and the is to arouse “class consciousness among the Soviet Union. workers” and prepare “the way for the proletar- As Coffey assesses the relationship between ian revolution.” (p. 90) Coffey believes the strategic power and U.S. allies, he recognizes Chinese have carefully avoided any military the difficulty in trying to assess the myriad action that might lead to a direct conflict with problems, but he is able to highlight some of the United States because of the overwhelming the key issues. The certain focus of this rela- technological lead possessed by the latter. They tionship is the question of the extent of U.S. fear the eonsequences of a nuclear attack de- strategic nuclear forces and whether the spite claims to the contrary. In adchtion, Coffey strategy for employment of these forces is ade- feels that internai weaknesses within China, quate to insure the protection of U.S. allies. He manifested by a decline in industrial produc- also discusses allied assessments of the ade- tion, division among leaders, separatism in the quacy of these forces and strategies in view of provinces, and loss of a generation of students the changed strategic balance. because of the “cultural revolution,” militate Coffey presents a brief but useful description against a provocative or reckless foreign policy. of the various strategies used by the U.S. in all (p. 92) Reduced to its lowest common denomi- parts of the world and how these strategies nator, Coffey considers that China is just too have altered with the dynamics of the interna- far behind the U.S. to get involved in a situa- tional situation, citing the transformation from tion which might result in a nuclear conflict. the strategy of massive retaliation to that of In his discussion of Communist behavior, flexible response in Europe as a case in point. Coffey related that he did not believe the So- He discusses the credibilitv of the U.S. nuclear viet Union would use force for a number of guarantee and European defense in light of reasons. Not discussed in any depth, however, what he believes to be the erosion of U.S. nu- yet certainly an imperative to any discussion of clear superiority, the diminished nato capabil- this nature, was the question whether the So- ity primarily due to the French withdrawal of viet Union would threaten the use of force and, her military forces from nato, the continued if so, the effectiveness of that threat. The United modernization of Soviet forces, and the States was certainly successful by threaten- strengthened Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. ing to use force in the Cuban crisis. Much has Coffey then examines some hypotheses de- been written since then about Soviet assess- signed to increase the credibilitv of the U.S. ments as to whether Kennedy would or would nuclear guarantee and enhance the defense of not use force to preclude the placement of mis- Europe, including an increased European con- siles in Cuba. Kennedy’s threat to use force, ventional force in nato, an increased U.S. strate- however, proved to be a powerful and success- gic nuclear weapons capability vis-à-vis the ful prescription. Soviet Union, an increased defensive system to BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

reduce the leveis of daniage the Europeans Yet it is so iinportant that it demands the un- would suffer from a nuclear strike, and an in- derstanding of every American. Professor creased European nuclear force. He also de- Coffey, in the brief 34 pages devoted to arms bates some of the issues involved in the crea- control, guides any student of disarinament to tion of an Anglo-French nuclear force under an understanding of the criticai issues. It was European control and the construction of a impossible in that space to deal adequately multinational force. None of these possihilities, with the many relevant factors, but he does as the discussion rnakes clear, would resolve all discuss some of the most urgent questions: how the problems of nato. strategic armament limitations would enhance For a number of reasons, Coffey asserts that U.S. security, how various types of arms control American strategy in Asia is not well defined. measures would impact on the strategic bal- The fact that the U.S. has individual pacts and ance, how specific disarmament measures not an overall .Asian treaty, as in Europe, is the would affect the credibility of the U.S. strategic chief reason for lack of definition. However, the deterrent, and how U.S. allies, protected under geographic dispersai of the potential Asian par- the nuclear umbrella, would view the arms ticipants, the diversity of American interests agreement. He bases his discussion of this sub- from area to area, and the power differential of ject on the premise that, although arms control China versus the Soviet Union militates against measures cannot insure security, they can re- such a treaty. (p. 118) duce the risk of accidental war; avoid war The political question, whether the U.S. nu- through miscalculation by providing for com- clear capability will maintain its deterrent credi- munication between parties; “preclude deploy- bilitv in the eyes of the Asian allies, remains ments which may seem threatening or provoca- unanswered in Coffey’s work. Perhaps the most tive”; assure any “adversary that one is not articulate expression conceming this question contemplating a first strike” by revealing in- comes from Professor Makoto Momoi of the tent, capability, and State of readiness; and Japanese War College. Prior to President Nix- minimize the advantage accruing from “strik- on’s visit to Peking, the professor was asked ing first by stabilizing the forces on either side” how he viewed the American nuclear deter- through qualitative and quantitative restric- rent. His answer: "It s like a Bible. Vou may tions. (pp. 137-38) know every word in it, and believe it to be In answer to his original question of whether true, but can vou reallv be sure of salvation?” the continued strategic superiority is essential When asked the same question after the Peking to deter, Professor Coffey argues against striv- visit, he replied: "I think you can say that ing to increase strategic power. Reduced to the we ve put the Bible away. Its something most basic issues, his “eautious no” is based on around the home, but the children don t read it the following: The destructive ability of mod- any longer.' 1 Methods to strengthen the credi- em weapons is so great that only a few of them bility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee and to in- will kill millions of people. The importance of crease the image of the U.S. as the unques- additional forces diminishes once sufficient tioned leader in the free world to protect means of delivery and of safeguarding these against aggression were not discernible in weapons have been achieved. Relatively, in- Coffey s discussion. The question of how the creasing or decreasing the levei of damage is of U.S. would react if put to another test, such as no major consequence. An attempt to alter the Cuba, Korea, or Vietnam, needs further study. strategic balance merely causes the other side Although widely covered by the press, the to take measures to offset any advantage complex subject of arms control is probably the gained, thus perpetuating the arms race. The least understood issue before the people today. continued quest to gain “strategic superiority 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

or to construct strategic defenses can generate lessly inferior by 1975 without some arms con- fears and create tensions, largely l)ecause the trol agreements. Soviets and Chinese Communists tend to be- The single major weakness I find in this book lieve that the United States has aggressive in- is contained in Coffey’s assessment of the rela- tentions.” (p. 170) tionship between strategic power and Commu- Coffey argues that we are hopelessly dead- nist behavior. Professor Coffey examined the loeked in a standoff which cannot be altered by forces and issues that would tend to act as im- a change in strategic balance. One cannot say peratives in policy-making decisions at both categorically that strategic advantage is neces- Moscow and Peking. But do we possess sary “to deter a potential aggressor or influence sufficient knowledge of the way Soviet or his political behavior.” (p. 171) Deterrence in Chinese policy is made and of the institutional the future will depend more upon the reluc- franiework within which it is made? Lacking tance of major powers to take risks, incur costs, such intimate knowledge, we seemingly can and heighteri tensions than upon strategic ad- only suggest or hint at the attitudes of those in vantage. To square the circle, the United States power and at possible outcomes. One must might be better off to insure the continued challenge Coffey’s implied assumption that this effectiveness of its deterrent through arms limi- type of assessment provides sufficient basis for tation measures. valid political conclusions, no matter how thor- Arguments, subject to many value judgments, ough the assessment. The same challenge must will persist and intensifv as to the significance be made of the implication that the complexi- of the Soviet and Chinese buildup in strategic ties of the strategic balance, or perceived power. Because this book was published prior power relationships, can be condensed into the to sa l t I and the promise of further arms con- restricted theory of behavioral relationship. trol measures to come out of sa l t II, and prior National survival cannot be assured by unilat- to those significant events in 1972 mentioned at eral self-restraint and a trust in the rational the beginning of this review, the contents of behavior of potential adversaries. Deterrence is Coffey’s work must be evaluated from that per- too complex a phenomenon and the conse- spective, with an eye on its predictive value. quences of its failure too devastating to rely on The clear and decided nuclear superiority other than hard, objective facts as the basis possessed by the U.S. over the Soviet Union upon which decisions are made. With the secu- since World War II has indeed been trimmed, rity of our country involved, we cannot risk at best, to a levei of much less disparity. There miscalculation on the optimistic side. is no need to recapitulate here the Soviet quan- On balance, the questions raised and issues tum increases in strategic weapon systems, tac- discussed in Strategic Power and National Secu- tical and naval forces, and air defense systems, rity are likely to remain materiallv important as well as her growing capabilitv in avionics for a considerable length of time. The book and Computer Science technology since the therefore will lie a useful addition to the li- mid-1960s. Let it suffice to say that the Soviet braries of students of strategic power. capabilitv in these areas has increased Cambridge, Massachusetts significantly. Some argue that we are now at parity with the Soviet Union and that, given Sote the momentum the Soviets have in building 1 Denis Warner, “Would U.S. Fi^it Again after Vietnam Experiente?” their strategic nuclear forces, we will be hope- Kansas City Star, 13 October 1972, p. 19. The Contributors

Major Gen er a l Kenn et h R- C hapman C aptain Raymond S. B lvnt (USAFà ; M.A., Central Missoun State College) is a research officer and lec- (USMA; MS.. University of Califórnia ) is turer on doctrine at Squadron Officer School. His previous assigmnents were as an ínstructor and Deputy Chief of Staff for Development Plans. stand-board evaluator in the Minuteman systein and as an action officer in the Directorate of Doctnne, Hq Air Force Systems Command. After flying Concepts and Objecdves. Hq USAF. under the ASTRA program. He is a distinguished graduate of Squad- traming, he flew B-29s staleside and o verse as. ron Officer School. . . . C aptain Thomas O. C ason iB.A.. University of Alahamai is a lecturer on na- In 1952 he entered the AFTT program ín nu- tional power and military strategy at Squadron Officer School. His previous Air Force aasignmenb were clear chemistry and has since specialized ín as an electronic counter-countermeasures officer (1963-68) and as data automation officer (1968-70). A nuclear research and development—at the AF graduate of SOS. Captain Cason completes a master's degree in política! Science froin Auburn University Speaal Weapons Center. Los Al amos in May 1973. Scientific Laboratories. Atomic Energy Com- mission. and Hq USAF until his present assign- ment in 1970. General Chapman is a graduate of Armed Forces Staff College and Industrial Coflege of the .Armed Forces.

Dr . R aymond J. Barrett (Ph.D., Trinity Col- L iev t en a n t Colonel PinLip M. F l a mmer lege. Ireland) is Department of State Advisor. (Ph.D., Yale University) is Assoeiate Editor. John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assis- Air University Review. After flying training tance. Fort Bragg. N.C. With State, he has and weather assigmnents, he was with the Air served ín México, Managua. Dublin, Cairo, Force Academy History Department from and Madrid; in the office of Southern and East 1958 until 1971. except for two years at Yale Afncan Affairs, as Canadiari Desk Officer; as under the AFIT program. Colonel Flammer s U.S. Secretary of the U.S.-Canada Permanent articles have appeared in Air University Re- Joint Board on Defense; and as Deputy Chief. view. Aewspace Historian, and Military Re- Program Staff. Office of International Confer- view. ences. He recently served an exchange tour as Assistant Chief. Global Plans and Poiicy Divi- sion, Hq USAF.

LlEVTE.NA.VT CoLONEL JõMN F G a NDER M.S., Flonda State University ■ was a Staff Develop- ment Engineer. DCS/Development Plans. Hq Air Force Systems Command. until his recent asignment to the Office of the Assistant Secre- tary of Defense Manpower and Reserve Afiam He was comrmssoned from fljght traming in 1955. and his Service experience has included asagnmcnts with SAC. TAC. AFSC. and the AFOSR. He attended AFIT, is C aptain Mic h a e l O. W h eel er (USAFA; a graduate of the Air Command and Staff Col- Ph D., University of Arizona) is an Assistant lege. and served a Southeast Asia combat tour W ii.liam J D e P aola ís Art Editor and IUus- Professor of Philosophy at the United States ín F~4s trator. Air University Review. Followmg four Air Force Academy. Before this assignment in years in the USAF as an electronics techni- January 1971, he had tours with Air Force In- cian, he was graduated from Philadelphia Col- stitute of Technology; the Directorate of Intel- lege of Art in 1957 and latcr was an illustrator ligencc, Hq Tactácal Air Command; and the with Boeing Except for a one-year interval. Wing Intelligence Division, 355th TAC Fight- Mr. DePaola has been with the Review since er Wing. Takhli. Thailand. Captain Wheeler 1962 is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.

95 and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Command and Staff College. While a faculty tf' In 1971 he was an instmetor in political member there. 1966-69, he was selected for f Science at the University of Maine. After the Air University Ph.D. program. eaming a degree in goveminent from the University of Manchester (England), Mr. Ghebhardt continued his graduate stndies at Columbia University.

• á*

G eo r c e C. C rews (M.S>. University of Dela- ware) is a career civil Service project engineer. Air Force Armam ent Laboratory. Eglin AFB, Florida- In 1956 he joined the Ballistic Re- search Laboratories, Air Proving Ground, Maryland, where he worked on the generation and analysis of hypervelocity terminal baliistic test data and ordnance velocitv impacts. In his present povition since 1966, he specializes in target vulnerability assessments and munition L iec t en a n t Colonel Laun C. S mith , J r . lethabty evaluations. (USAF. Ret), (M.A., University of Pennsylva- nia). was Associate Editor, Air University Re- view. at the time of his retirement in 1972. He served as Information Officer in Morocco and at Richards-Gebaur .AFB, Missouri; .Assistant Professor of History. USAFA; Deputy .Assistant Dr . W illiam Schneider, J r . (Ph.D.. New for Policy and Programs. SAF-OII: and Re- York University) is an economist with a bark- gional Desk Officer for Central America, ground in nation;d security policy issues. He is Public Affairs Office. U.S. Southern Command. coauthor of Whij ABM? Policy Issues in the In retirement he is engaged in free-Iance writ- Missile Defense Controversy Pergamon. 1969). ing. He is eurrently a consultant to the Hudson Institute and a U.S. Senate staff member.

M ajor James H. C onely. J r . (Ed.D.. Colum- bia University Teachers College) is an aca- demic adviser and writing iastructor in the Academic Instructor Course, Air University. Previously he served two tours at the USAF Academy teaching English and music and as speech wnter at the Space and Missile Sys- tems Organization. He has written on educa- tion, music. and literature in the Instructors Journal, Music Educators Journal. Air Univcr- sity Review, and published 18 Short Pieccs and MtxiuUitions for Organ. He is listed in the Dic- tunuiry o f International Biograjdnj.

C olonel William T. B allard (M.A.. Aubura University) is a Research .Associate, Center for L ie v t e n a n t Colonel Gordos K P ic k l er International Studies. Massachusetts lastitute of (Ph. D.. Florida State University) is Chief, Mil- Technology. After fl>ing duties with SAC in itary Environment Division, Directorate of the B-36 and B-52, he liegan a career in the Curriculum, Air Çommand and Stalf College. USAF Security Service, much of it in the Far Air University. His preceding assignment was East. His next assigninent will be in Intelli- as a navigator, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam. gence, Hq USAF Colonel Ballard Ls a g r a d u - Alexander O. G hebhardt is a consultant on He was a conibat crew member in B-57s and ate of the Air Command and Staff College ar Soviet military affairs for the Hudson Instítute B-47s for twelve years before attending Air Air War College.

AWARD ^

V The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “The Need for Military Offieers as Strategic Thinkers hy Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Besley, USAF, as the out- standing article in the Mareh-April 1973 issue of the Review. EDITORIAL STAFF C olonel Eldon W. Downs, USAF Editor Jac:k H. Mooney Managing Editor L ieu t en a n t Colonel Philip M. F l a mmer , USAF Associate Editor Major Ric h a r d B. C omyns, USAF Associate Editor E dmund O. Barkeh Financial and Administrative Manager J ohn A. W est c o t t , J h . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston Associate Editor. Spanish Language Edition L ia Mid o si May Pattehson Associate Editor, Portuguesa Language Edition

WlLLIAM J. D e P a OLA Art Editor and Illustrator

ADVISERS Colonel John B. Voss Hq Aerospace Defense Command Colonel Arthur G. L ynn Hq Air Force Logistics Command D r , Harold M. Hel fma n Htj Air Force Systems Command

Colonel H. J. Dalton, J r . Hq Air Training Command F rancis W. Jennincs SAF Office o f Information Colonel John W. Walton Hq Strategic Air Command Colonel Boone Rose, Jr . Hq T actical Air Command Colonel Arthur S. Racen Hq United States Air Force Academy

ATTENTION Air University Review is published to stimulate pro- fessional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents reflect the opinions of its authors or the investiga- tions and conclusions of its editors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW