CRITICAL ANALYSIS ON STATE MILITARISM AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN . A CASE STUDY OF LUWERO DISTRICT

BY:

TUMUSIIME GEORGE

LLB/31894/121/DU

A RESEARCH DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF

LAW IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF

BACHELORS DEGREE IN LAWS OF l(AMPALA

INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

AUGUST, 2016 APPROVAL I certify that this dissertation has been submillecl for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

S1gn·~-~ .... ~.-...... : ......

Mr. Sam Ogwal

Supervisor

Date: .. ~\ .::t-.\. .~. 1 .L......

ii DEDICATION This research is dedicated to my family especially my mum and my brother Dn,·ic\ Baknshabn lor the great effort he directed towards the complement and completion of this report and above all to the Almighty God who has enabled me completes this piece of work.

iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

~.1ly warmest thanks go to my supervisor. ('ounsc! Sam Ug\\ala \\IHl lirch.:-.;s!~ helped llh.' ll) accomplish this task.

I would like to thank and acknowledge all my ti·iends and colleagues \\ho st

Also my greatest acknowledgement goes to my lovely parents, Mr. Mwebehire George & Mrs Jovia Mwebehire who have always encouraged me along with providing all kinds of support towards this work.

I would like to acknowledge all those people who have and are still in one way or another fighting for human rights and all those organizations and institutions that willingly provided me with information

May the Almighty God rcwmd you all.

iv TABLE CONTENTS DECLARATION ...... i

APPROVAL ...... il

DEDICATION ...... ,, " .. Ill

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... iv

TABLE CONTENTS ...... ,

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS ...... viii

LIST OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ...... x

ABSTRACT ...... xi

CHAPTER 0 NE ...... I

1.0 Introduction ......

1.2 Statement of the problem ...... ,, ' ...... '.' .. ',

1.3 Objectives of the study ......

1.4 Scope of the study ...... -!

1.5 Signillcance of the study ...... 4

1.6 1-\ypothesis ...... 4

1.7 Methodology ...... 5

1.8 Literature review ...... 6

CHAPTER TWO ...... 9

2.0 The historical development of militarism in the post independence period ...... ' ... l)

2.1 The gro11th ol'thc militar) ...... ! ()

2.2 Foreign military assistance in the 1960s ......

2.3 Law enforcement agencies in the I 960s ......

2.4 Murders and arbitrary deprivation of life in the 1960s ...... 16

2.4.1 The \966 Army Attack on the Kabaka's palace ...... 16

v 2.4.2 The Nakulabye Incident...... 18

2.5 Torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment...... 18

2.6 Arbitrary arrests, detention or imprisonment ...... 19

CHAPTER THREE ...... 2 I

3.0 Human Rights Violations between 1971 and 1979 ...... " .... '.' .. 2 !

3.1 Introduction ......

3.2 Foreign military assistance in the 1970s ...... 22

3.3 The coming of the tyrant ...... 23

3.4 Human rights violations between 1971 and 1979 ...... 24

3.4. I The violation of the right to life ...... 24

3.4.2The Mutukula massacres ...... 25

3.4.3 The State Resemch Centre ...... 2o

3.4 ..1 Murder in the military 13arracks ......

3.4.5 Murder by soldier Chicl's ...... ~~

3.4.6 Murder by the Police (murder squad-the case of the PSU) ......

3.4.7 The right to dignity and physical integrity ...... 29

3.4.8 Torture by the Police ...... 30

3.4.9 Violation of the right to personal liberty ...... 31

3 .4.1 0 Arrests and detentions between 1971-1979 ...... 3 I

3.4.11 Violation of the right to a fair hcaring ...... 32

3.5 Human rights violations bet ween 1981 and 1955 ...... 33

3.5.1 Murder by the Army- (UNEF) I 979-1980 ......

3.5.2 Violation ofthe right to life during the Obote II regime ...... 3)

3.5.3 Murder in the Luwero Triangle ...... 35

3.5.4 Murder during the 'Panda Gari" operations ...... 36

vi 3.5.5 Murder in the Seminary (Namugongo) ...... 37

3.5 .6 Torture during 1981-1985 ...... 3 7

3.5.7 Violation of the right to personal liberty ...... 38

3.5.8 Fair hearing ...... 39

3.6 True rise of the national resistance anny ...... 40

CHAPTER FOUR ...... -P

4.0 Introduction ...... j7

4.1 The salient futures of the 1995 constitution ...... 'l8

4.2 Protection and promotions of fundamental and other human rights and i'reedotlt ...... ··"

4.2.1 The right to lite ...... 51

4.2.2 Freedom ll·om torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment ...... 51

4.2.3 The Right to Personal Liberty, Movement and Security ofthe Person ...... 52

4.2.4 Right to a li:lir hearing ...... 54

4.3 The violation of human rights in the post 1995 era under the NRM government ...... 56

4.3.1 The right to lile and prohibition against its ,\rbitrarl' Dcprivtttiotl

4.3.2 Right to Dignity ancll'hysicallntegrity ......

4.3.3 The right to personal liberty ...... 61

4.3.4 Right to a fair hearing ...... 63

4.4 The present political situation in Uganda ...... 66

CHAPTER FIVE ...... 68

5.1 Recommendations ...... 68

5.2 Law enforcement agents and state security agencies ...... 69

5.3 Conclusion...... 7)

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... '~

vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/AC!WNYi\JS

NRM National Resistance Movement KAR African Rifles UPC Uganda Peoples Congress KY Kabaka Yeka GSU General Service Unit CID Criminal Investigation Department GSD General Service Department SRC State Research Centre SRB Stntc Research 13urcau PSU l'ublic Sal\:ty Unit IJNLF Uganda National Liberation Front NCC National Consultative Council FIJNA Former Uganda National Army UNRF Uganda National Rescue Front UN United Nations ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross AG Attorney General HSM Holy Spirit Movement

NRIVI/A National Rcsistclllcc ~. lovcmenU ;\nm DRC Democratic Republic of Congo LRA Lords Resistance Army UPDM/A Uganda Peoples Democratic fvlovemcJJt,;\rm) UNLA Uganda National Liberation Army NRA National Resistance Army NRA/IVI National Resistance Army/Movement UDHR Universal Declaration of !-Iuman Rights TGCM The General Court Martial LTPDF Uganda Peoples' Defense Force CIVIl Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence

viii I I i

IDP Internally Displaced Persons PGB Presidential Guard Brigade LDU Local Defense Unit vccu Violent Crime Crack Unit ESO External Security Organization ISO Internal Security Organization JATF Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force ILORU International Lobby for Reform in Uganda. KAP Ka I argala Action Plan PIN Peoples' Intelligence Network PPB Presidential Protection Brigade ! I

ix LIST OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

The Constitution of Uganda, 1995.

Police act Cap 303 of2006

The UPDF Act, 2005. (Uganda Peoples' Defense Force).

The UDHR.( Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

The I.C.C.P.R. (International Covenant on Ci\·il and JJolitical Right,).

The CAT. (United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel or Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment.

The AC.H.P.R.( Africa Charter on Human and People's Rights).

X ABSTRACT

This is an exploratory study that sought to analyze the slate or militarisms and violation or human rights in Uganda a case study in Luwero.

To find out the origin militarism in Uganda and its violation of human rights in Uganda.

The study was based on the qualitative method of data collection and analysis. It is also based on secondary data from past literature on the subject and from other sources as well as libraries.

The research focuses on the right to life, personal liberty, right to a fair hearing and freedom fi·om torture and cruel. inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda.

To analyze acts of militarism visa vie infringement on the right to lili..'.JK'r~nnallib,:rt: l'l~_d1ll\' .1 fair hearing, and freedom fi·om torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the different governments in Uganda.

The research focuses on the appropriate remedies available to those whose rights have been violated through acts of the military and Para-military bodies.

It also discusses the problems experienced in dealing with·the militarism and violation of human rights. As it provides possible interventions to streamline solutions to the problem above.

xi CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

The gun rather than the vote has dominated the political change in l i~nnd

In 1964; the army mutinied for higher pay and promotion forcing the government to call Britain 1 for assistance • In 1966 the late president Obote used it to eliminate internal opposition, unseat the Kabaka, change the constitution, and postpone elections. In 1971, the late General A min used the army and security services to seize and retain power through systematic tenor. He was over thrown by the Tanzanian forces and rebel Ugandan forces in 1979 and replaced by Obote in the south and in the northwest which brought the National Resistance Movement NRM) into power in January 1986 after another coup in 1985.

lilly ethnic groups !all into four broad groups. !Oach group speilzs u l~rngu~rgc dilkrcrn Irum '"''I not understandable to the others. Religion. like cthnicitv has also sh:qw .. l rh,· .,,,,·i.tl-r·.,d·t•. behaviors of the people of Uganda and divided them gre~1tl).

Mismanagement of this diversity has lead to serious conflicts, occasionally erupting into civil war. It is imperative to note that Uganda as a nation was not as a result of conscious effort on the part of its indigenous people to come together for common goals and purpose but a product of British conquers in the latter part of the 19'" century.

From the above paragraph 1vc can therefore assert that. traditionally. milit:11·, ruL· :1ri·•··· ,·i!hc·. because a country is faced with external aggression of'\\Hr nr nn illtt..·m;tl "t;tk 111' ~,_·i\ 1i \\,1! \1 of these ~>auld render it impossible lc1r the state to carry on the normal busrness or solcl'lllllCill

1 Holger Bernt Hansen ancl Micheal Twaclclle, fi'om Chaos to Ol·cler, fountain publishers' ltcl p. 78.

1 under civil rule. Inevitably, the rule of martial law is involved, and organs of civilian government suspended.

Militarism cannot be separated tl·om human rights abuses. By nature man 1s entitled to irreducible or unquestionable conditions which are generally known as human rights. Today, after a series of global struggles against injustice, minimum common standards in respect of human rights have emerged. One need not do any thing to qualil\ lor their cnio)ment. Rather

they accrue and belong to one by virtue or bc·ing human. The turning p

Declaration oi'Human Rights in 1948 that the eontrac·ting Jl:n·tic·, :tgrc·c· lc> P'•'ilt•·'•.

The universal respect for a111/ observation of human rights and. fu/11/amenta/ Freedoms/or a// without distinction as to race, say,

language or religion2

The concept of militarism 111 Uganda elates far back in the colonial era. Tensions caused by frequent reshuffling of army officers and dismissal aggravated by politicization of the army 3 ranks and Ciic . Rumors also once circulated that !bingira \\as cuntcmpl:1tins :t "'uLql,! ,~'t.ll ,j1h!

that he had rccei1 cd I million US dollars to oust Obotc. On !·l'im1arl .j' i'lhi> :~t ::\lout ' O'clock when the parliament building for the lirst time in Ugandan history was surrounded by armed troops, purported to be under the orders of the army commander". On the 23 may 1966 the Kabaka's palace was allacked and hundreds of people died. Prominent citizens 1vere imprisoned trial including Shaban Opolot who was the former army commander5

0 - A summary of the report of the Uganda commission of inquiry into the violation of human rights, pearl of Blood, October, 1994-. Uganda.

3 E. Masinde Aseka, Transformational leadership in EA, Fountain publishers r2nO:iJ p. ~ 1 ,, 4 Grace Stuartlbingira & others v. Uganda [ t966] Et\ 30(J

5 [969] East i\fcaLaw Reports 631'

2 In Amin's regime, there was gross violation of human rights. I lis rule len l 1 ~1llld:1 ''"' ::c .. -.1 lawless and bankrupt with a death toll put to about 250,000 people.

Militarism and human rights abuse did not only suffice in Amin's regime but also continued in I 980 when Obote regained power in a disputed elections, plunging Uganda into an anarchic civil , r. His "northern" army was accused by human rights groups of being responsible for 300,000 civilian deaths6

In October 26 111 1986, the new government of the National Resistance Movement took over power. From the time of takeover. the NRM employed a system ol'militarism 11hich c':liN'd ""d

is tiil causing gross violations of' human rights to the llgandllll c·iti;c•ns I he '-I<\ I ,til! ,·111:~· .. , to power up to date.

1.2 Statement of the problem

In spite or the l'undamental rights ol' man that were provided for in the I 962, 1966, 1967 constitution, acts of militarism led to the infringement of these rights. With the NRM's takeover of power in I 986, the government set up a commission of inquiry into the violation of human rights in the country from the time of independence. However the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 1995 constitution have still been infringed by acts of militarism occurring in the NRM regime There is therefore dire need to rclket on the acts of' the military and l)arn military bodies and their respect to l'unclnmental humnn rights ns provided J()r in the l'

1.3 Objectives of the study

I. To find out the origin militarism in Uganda and its violation of human rights in Uganda.

2. To examine the law on the right to life, personal liberty, right to a fair hearing and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the 1995 constitution of Uganda.

6 Martin Meredith, The state of Africa, Free Press. London (2006) p.231

3 3. To analyze acts of militarism visa vie infringement on the right to life, personal liberty, right to a fair hearing, and freedom from tortme, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the diiTerent governments in Uganda.

4. To find out the appropriate recommendations.

5. To find out the appropriate remedies available to those whose rights have been 'I Dialed through acts of the military and Para-military bodies.

1.4 Scope of the study

The study is intended to cover acts of militarism in Uganda from 1971 up to 2008 and its violation of the sight to life, right to personal liberty, right to a fair hearing, and freedom fi·om torture, and cruel or inhuman or degrading treating or punishment as provided lew under the llJCJ'i constitution of Uganda (As Amended).

1.5 Significance of the study

The study focuses on the violation of fundamental human rights especially the right to life, the right to personal liberty, right to a fair hearing, and ti·eedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment through acts of militarism by the military and Para-military authorities. This study is thought necessary because for about four decades, the people of Uganda have suffered diverse forms of violation of human rights in contravention of the previous and the present constitution of Uganda as well as international law. The study is also aim eel at analyzing the rundamental right to lii'c. personal liberty. right\() a ltlir hc·:mng :md l'rc·c·ch>i•l lilllll tr under the i'J'!:i constitution vis-a-vis their infringement by acts or militarism.

1.6 Hypothesis

The 1995 constitution (As amended) provides for under chapter four for the "Promotion and Protection of Fundamental and other human rights and freedoms." and it begins with a

4 profound statement that "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the individual are inherent 7 and not grante4 by the state" •

These rights are entitled to a person by reason of his or her birth and are therefore prior to the state and the law. However certain acts of the military and Para-military organs have Jed to the

infl·ingement on these rights e.g. unlawful and arbitrary killing. unbwCu! an·~.~st\. tortun__ · ,\!lt.l denial of the access to justice by the military and Paru-militrlr) orgrtn,.

1.7 Methodology

This is intended to enable the researcher gather enough information on the area of study.

The researcher will carry out a detailed research on the topic fi·om the following libraries; Kampala International University Library, Uganda Christian University Library, University Library and the Library. The researcher will also look at related literature on the subject of study J'rom the internet and avai !able journals. 1.8 Synopsis

Chapter one; covers the introduction. background ol· study. statc·mcnt or the prohk111. ohjc·,·tl\ ,.,

of the study, hypothesis. scope of' the study. llll'llwclolo~\. "lhlJ'•i•. ""'' lihT<~''". · ·

Chapter two; covers the historical development of militarism in the post inclcpcnclcncc period. It will also look at acts of the military and Para-military organs in relation to respect of the right to life and personal liberty, right to a fair hearing and freedom from torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment in Uganda.

Chapter three; will focus on the period called the "Age of militarism in Uganda" being the period between 1971 and 1996. In this chapter, the study will cover the different governments that were in power ti·om 1971 to 1996, the acts of the military ancl Para-military organ' in government and how such acts or operations led to the in!'i·ingemcnt elf the ri~lll tu lik. "'-':

7 Article 20(1)

5 liberty, right to a fair hearing and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Uganda.

Chapter four; Will cover the aftermath of the age of militarism, specifically the period after 1995. The study here will focus on the National Resistance Movement government and acts of military and Para-military organs in this government which has lead to the breach of fundamental to life, personal liberty, and the right to a fair hearing and freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment provided for under the promulgated 1995 constitution. The chapter will as priority discuss Cundamental rights provided Cor under chapter Cour of the 1995 constitution and neccssat") cxc·cptions to such righto.

Chapter five; Will cover the. remedies available to those 11hosc rights lw~e· iwcn 1 i<>l.ttc··l h lite acts and operations of the military, recommendations and conclusion. It will cover such opinions that will be deemed appropriate and workable for the achievement of a higher degree of respect for the fundamental rights of man provided four under chapter four of the 1995 Constitution.

1.8 Literature review

The study on militarism in Uganda visa vie the violation of human rights is an area which has not, or if researched on, very few researchers have carried out their study along those lines

.Justice G.W. Kanycihamba in his book. Constitutional and Political lliswry oi' l:gHnda ftclm 1894 to the present wrote about the "age of militarism" as being the period between 1971 and 8 1996 He also states how 111 i Iitary rule al'ises i.c. when the state is !I teed 11 ith , .., tc-rt ~:d a~~~, ... ,.,, of war or an internal state of civil war or occupation by a conquering foreign state. He fltrlher goes on to state that three of these occurrences make it impossible lor the state to carry on the normal business of government under civil rule and that inevitably, the rule of martial law is invoked. He also went ahead to give reasons for the first coup in Uganda, some of which is the influence of foreign powers.

8 Justice G.\V. Kanyeillambn., Constitutional and political Histor\' of Ugan(h. Fountn;n publishers. (2002).

6 He also talks of the constitutionalism of the Amin's regime. He rellects on the unconstitutional actions that were taken such as dismissal and appointment ofsom\,.~ public orliL't.:rs. I [tl\\l'\L'r h~..-' did not go ahead to discuss in depth the gross violation or IH!ll1di1 light~. h> l!L' ":II .!i'

Paramilitary groups in Uganda by the different governments, an area which H1lend tu concentrate my research on.

Henry Kyemba, in his book, "A State of Blood"9 talks of the roots of evil in Uganda as being in the past and course of events that offered A min to assert his remarkable personality. He also talks of the emergence of the tyrant, i,e, immediately after the 1971 coup, the tyrant who was at tlrst greeted by the country as a hero who had over thrown an unpopular regime. He also discusses the coming of chaos in the country, where the terror of indiscriminate killing continued unabated in the country as a whole. though was quiet in the government circles. as the c:d1i!1c't was cowed and submissi\c. I k J'urthcr di:-~cw.~,L·s .<\Ill in' ) rl:'i~n oi' ll'JTt~r .uhl ti1:t lh.' \lid 1!! ,, than murder those he considered enemies, subjected them to barbarism even alter they are dead. He further stated that the number of men trained to kill increased at a rate or :1000 per\,.,,. I!·· made an assumption that ir each trained killer was responsible for three murders a )ear, tile· numbers amounted to theoretical 9,000 in the first year, though in actual sense the death toll was higher and in 1977 was at 54,000 deaths. The military and para- military organizations such as the State Research Bureau and the Public Safety Unit based in Naguru Kyemba in his book writes a personal list of more than 100 ambassadors, ministers, Doctors and professors by Amin' s private assassination squad. And further random killing of I 00,000 people. Henry Kycmba looks at the violation of the right to life. personal liberty, fair hearing and l'reedom l'rom torture and inhumane degrading treatment under Amin' s regime in cletuil but docs not pdint tltP !1; .. ' subsequent governments and their violation ol' human rights.

Martin Meredith, in his book "The State of Afl·ica" 111 wrote about the history of !eli A min at thee of independence, his proclivity to violent conduct became a matter of concern, While participating in a military operation in Kenya's northern tl·ontier district, Amin was accused of

"Henery Kyemba, A State of Blood, Fountain publishers lld. (1997)

111 Martin Meredith, The State of Africa, Free press, London (2006).

7 murdering three turkana tribesmen. He also wrote about the acts of militarism in the post independence period e.g. the attack on the kabaka's palace by the army under the command of Amin. He also wrote about Para-military groups created by Obote such as the General Service

Department which had a free hand to arrest and imprison suspected enemies. He also 11 rote about the death squad organized by A min to hunt dU\\11 ;.md ki!! ':!CO!'L''-. or .lrJtly ;Uh.i p~dil.'\..' .~ni~...',,T,, lh.' suspected of opposing him. However he just gave a general oversight of the violation of human rights but does not give detailed information about such violations. l-Ie also neglected the governments that followed alter the Am in regime. My research is intended to look at the dcta1kcl violations of the above foretasted rights in each regime from 1971 to 2008.

"The Pearl of Blood" A pamphlet summary of the report of the Uganda Commission of inquiry into the violations of human rights is credited for a detailed insight of the right to life, personal liberty, fair hearing and freedom from torture and degrading inhumane treatment. However this piece of work only looks at the aftermath of independence up to the year 1985. My study is intended to look at the violation of the right to life and personal liberty. right to 1:1ir hem·in\1. freedom from torture ~mel cruel inhumane trcatmc·nt from 1971 '""I i·. inl•'lt.k.lt••. <~ ·' • National Resistance Movement regime.

Knyeiham in his book, 11 wrote about the causes of military rule, he stated that it arises when a country is faced with external aggression or an internal state of civil war. He also stated that the reasons lor establishing a military government vary from one region to another. Some reasons are honorable, others dubious, and quite a number unjustifiable. In my humble opinion the establishments of military regimes are out of greed for power by top army members. He also goes to write that irrespective of the causes, as soon as the military regime assumes power the civilian constitution or part of it is suspended and that many of those who manned the organs of gm·crnmcnt under ci\'ilian rule arc either :1ssassinatccl or tlm111n into i:1il :md m:tni:d 1:1" ;, dcclart:d. In my opinion, Justice 1\.anycih~lmba r~..·latt'S mi!itar) 1·egi1ll1.:~ \\) 'llll~tti\,!1'- \ll hun!:tll rights which can bejustilied by the numerous murders and arbitmry nrrcsts ol'ci\'ili:ms •,u·

11 Constitutional and political hist01y of Uganda, fountain publishers pg 7

8 CHAPTER TWO

2.0 The historical development of militarism in the post independence period

The period 1966-1971 was characterized by severe oppression. The abrogation of Uganda's independence constitution and subsequent promulgation of the 1967 constitution abolished kingdoms turning Uganda into a republic. The new constitution placed enormous power and

authority in the presidency rendering Milton Obote the sole cc'nkr nl' pollc'r .1nd ···'"'·' 1

political favors UPC, with Milton Obotc as the head of state as '"·II part\ used stale' !11:lcl1:1lc'l' 12 to intim idnte and harass opponents and m i Iitarizecl Ugancla · s politics . General lei i Am in took 13 over power thorough a military coup in 1971 , during his reign the country went through a brutal authoritarian military reign. Constitutional democracy was abolished, multiparty politics buried and the economy destroyed.

The transition li·om Amin to Uganda National Liberation Front was characterized by violence and chaos. During this period lasting 18 months Uganda had 3 presidents, Yusuf Lule Geoffrey Lukongwe Binaisa and Paulo Muwanga. In December 1980 controversial elections gave victory to UPC enabling Obote to return to power for the second time. Anew party. the Uganda patriotic movement (LIPI'vl). headed by Ycllleri Muse1c•ni tried to nwrkct a Jle'll agc•nda that11as Ullilhk tu locus the pluralized count1·y on common national interests. DP the nllegccl clear 11 illlwr of the·

1980 elections opted to accept the results l:\Cil 11 ith a cl:timc•d hill·ci ·.'I iJc·m·e· · •! • 1 .,.,, · ' but Museveni decided to wage a guerilla war against the UPC govemment."

The second UPC government tortured, incal'cerated or murdered membel'S of the opposition, in the case of Uganda commissioner of prisons Ex parte Matovu, 15 the petitioner being an opponent to the UPC govemment, was arrested and detained under the emergency rules and

12 "Constitutionalism and Constitutional Reforms in Uganda since 1962": An Over view of political Trends, Patterns and Implications on NRM's management of political Transition find Constitutional change by David Pukol, 2011 13 Legal Notice number 1 of 1971 14 Constitutionalism and constitutional History in Uganda by Henry Onoria, 2008 pg b5 15 [1966] EA 514

9 deportation ordinance. He was granted bail by the high court but immediately rc'm-rc·stcd b\ :ll'lm ofticials while still in prison premises.

Pluralism and multi-party democracy became a show case in parliament where the opposition had a voice. Outside parliament, in an environment increasingly hostile to multi party democracy discrimination based on ethnic, religious or party affiliations became common place, the army then over threw Obote in 1985. In I 986 Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Al'!ny (NRA) took over power and suspended key political parties activities in order to implement a political transition li·om conflict to stability and to allow deep rooted divisions in the country to heal. A new constitution came into force in 1995 with a detailed preamble, "recalling our history which has been characterized by political and constitutional instability" and struggling against forces of tyranny. oppression and exploitation. l'or the lir:;t time in l 1g:mcb's constitution:tl and political

1 history the constitution institutionalizes all organs and agencies ol'the state including the '.

2.1 The growth of the military

In the first years of independence, the kings African Riffles (R) was again town as the Uganda rifles. The armed forces more than doubled, fi·om 700 to I,500, and the government created the second battalion, stationed at the north eastern town of Moroto. The traditional leader of Buganda became the president of Uganda and commander in chief of the army. Milton Obote, a long time opponent of the autonomy for the southern kingdoms including Buganda, was the prime Minister. Muteesa recognized the seriousness of rank- and- lile demands for Africanizing

ol'llcer corps. but he was more concerned about potential nonhern domination,:· tk llili!iii!_ ,, concern that retlecteclthe power struggle between ivlutccsa and Obutc. Mutees:1 used his pulitic:il power to protect the interests of his Buganda constituency, and he reli·ained to support demands that wet·e being driven by the African spirit or call it love for Afi·ica popularly kno\\n as 17 afHcanisation .

6 t Constitution of the republic of Uganda, commenced on 8th October 1995

t? The growth of the military. http:/ f www.countrv-data.com/cgi-bin/querv/r- 14153.html,(accessecl n 24'" April, 2012)

10 In January 1964, following a mutiny by Tanzanian (then Tanganyika) soldiers in protest over their own africanisation crisis, unrest spread through out the Ugandan armed forces. On 22 January 1964, soldiers in Jinja mutinied to press their demands for a pay rise and killed a

Ugandan officer. They also detained their British officers ~111d sc·vcral non commi"i'"'"d ofl1cers, includng the minister of interior Feli.\ Onarna who had come to represent gm cmmcnt views to the army leadership. The mutiny is said to have been caused by tensions that arose· ~" a result frequent reshuflling of the army oCIIcers and dismissal 11 hll'h grc~>tll "f'l'' :ll.>lc'.l politicization of the army rank and file. The tensions between direct entries, educated ofllccrs, and non commissioned officers increased and this further contributed to 1964 army mutiny 18 which took place on 23'd January .

The mutiny marked a turning point 111 the civil-military relation and reinforced the army's political strength. Within weeks of the mutiny, the president's cabinet also approved a military pay rise retroactive to I January 1964, more than doubling the salary of those in private to staff­ scrgent ranks. Aclclitionally the government raised defense allocations to -10()"·;, Tlw lltllnhct of'ticers increased f't·om eighteen to Jill) ll1e. T11o army ot'licc•t·· 'oi"th:1t1 Upt•lll! :ill.! Li1 \:11:· assumed command positions in the Ugandn Rille and later received promotion to commander in chief and army chief of staff respectively. lowing the 1964 mutiny, the government remained fearful of internal opposition. Obote the army head quarters from Jinja to Kampala, and created a secret police force, the general service unit (GSU) to bolster security and prevail over the internal opposition and disasters.

When the Zairian aircraft bombed the west Nile villages of Paidha and Goh on 13' 11 February 1965, President Obote again increased military recruitment and doubled the army size to 4,500.

18 A sumn1ary of The Report of the Uganda Commission oflnquir) into the Vl(\ln1Ion o! !-!lilll-tll

Rights, pearl of Blood, 1994-r<:ampala. Uga.ndn p.31 J.

11 Further re01·ganization included the creation of the third battalion in ~ luh<:ndc. :1 'iun:1h '•C\11 :d1·

at Jinjn, brigade reconnaissance, an nntiaircraCt detachment, an arm) ordnance (_k•porl ,1 l'ri~-~d'-· signals squadron training vving, a records office, -a pay and pensions office, and a Uganda army workshop, all intended to increase security surveillance of the whole country.

Tensions rose in the power struggle over the control of the government and the army and over the relationship between the army and the Baganda people, on 24 May 1966, Obote ousted Muteesa, assumed his offices of president and commander in chiet: suspended the 1962 constitution, and consolidated his control over the military by eliminating several rivals. Obote

created the military police force under major General !eli .'\min llilcl:t··: c'umm.llhi \'""' '"'

recruited Corces Ct\)111 his home region of \\eSt Nile among Lugb,tr~L kak\\

Throughout most of the 1960s, military expeditions contributed to regional antipathy control. Army patrols in Northenstern Uganda often responded to accusations of cattle rustling and other problems which, in earlier decades, would have been dealt with locally. Then when the government allowed Sudanese rebels of the Anyanya movement to operate from bases in the northwest army detachments deployed to that region to prevent an incursion by Sudanese government troops. Many Ugandans in the area who were of' Sudanese descent remained

skeptical about Uganda's nationhood and viewed the anny's pr~sen.:e 11'' a milit:u·~· uccupation rather than a security measure.

2.2 Foreign military assistance in the 1960s During the years immediately after independence, Ugandan lies with Britain remained strong. Uganda was a member of Commonwealth of Nations and maintained civil service, and education systems organized according to British institutions. A number of British personnel remained in Uganda, inclucling the cnmmander or the Ugandan Army, and each year, two Ugandan students were admitted to the royal military Academy at Sandhurst. In 1964 Uganda called on British troops to help suppress a mutiny staged primarily by Baganda soldiers, but the Ugandans soon objccte.d to the continued British militarv presence. and the troops 11crc 11ithdrr!\\n l111cr tint yc~tr.

12

Although relations with Britain remained important, Uganda broaden~<.! foreign militar) n:!attLms in the 1960s. Israel, China, and the Soviet Union substantially increased military assistance. Israel and Uganda established diplomatic ties in 1962, and the two nations soon concluded agreements to train Ugandan intelligence, police, military and paramilitary personnel. In August 1963, four Ugandans qualified as pilots on a piper super cub in Israel. By 1965 TelAviv was equipping Uganda's security services, supplying small anns, light artillery pieces, and other equipment; and providing Israeli military instructors in Uganda. Israel also helped establish the Ugandan Air Force and equipped it with piper super cub and Piaggio aircraft. After Congolese (Zairian) aircraft a1tacked Uganda, western villages in 1965, Israel furnished Uganda with six armed Fougo Magister jet trainers and three DC-:l Dakota transport aircrall. Tel .1\ viv also established training schools lor Ugandan military pilots. artillery ,,l.liccrs. :111d J':ll·atr•"'i'c't'' I\·.

early 1967. Israel lwd seconded approximate!) lilh instruc·t,,,., I·· 11[·1•··<' :!,,

supplementing non military assistance l(1r agricultural de\elupment and ,, , "' k!> construct:on• 19 proJects.•

The government of China hoped to block Tel Aviv's efforts to gain a foothold because of Israel's pro-western orientation. To neutralize Israeli influence, Beijing supplied a range of economic and military assistance to Kampala but this effort was short lived. Beijing also sent some small arms and military aiel mission to Uganda. In late 1967, after Ugandan officers complained that the Chinese mission was engaging in revolutionary activity" and distributing label buttons

displaying the picture offvlao Zeclong, president Obote asked tile mission to leave tl:c ccllll\11'\ _,.

of Kampala's closest allies. Soviet weapons deliveries in Uganda began alter the two countries signed a military agreement in 1965. Under the terms of this agrec'ment. \·J,,;c·ml lt::itL·d 111 .,

Than 250 army personnel, 20 pilots and 50 air force technicians and mechanics. In addition the Soviet Union supplied a squadron of two MiG-15 and four MiG-17 lighter interceptors, airport support, and militmy maintenance facilities, ground-to-ground and ground-to,-air radio

19 http:/ I www. count1y-data. com/frd/ cs/ ugtoc/ htm;eugO 163. (accessedon14th Januwy, 20 12) 20 Address by Y.K. Museven to dag Hammarskjold foundation conference held at Mweya, Uganda May 13, 1990.

13 communication equipment, artillery pieces, and military tracks. All this material was free ol'the

aim \Vas to entrench its communism ideology. but Ugandn hnd to pay !'or "pnn.~ p

ammunition purchased after that. 13y the end or 1967. l\lcnt\ -li\ ,. ..,,,, i•.'l ;tel\;.,,_.. helping to integrate this equipment into the Ugandan sccurit) set'''"'

2.3 Law enforcement agencies in the 1960s

During this period, the law enforcement agencies retained a degree of professionalism. However, some of the militaristic agencies, such as the Special Force (with its special force unit which was an investigative section) and the General Service Unit (a Para-military force), employed ruthless operational tactics which gave them a generally fearsome reputation in the eyes of the public. ll's important to note that during the 1960s. the l!ganda Police Forc·c comprised ol':tunii(>rm hran,·h.

which \\US assigned main!) to urban duties: Special l.lwnch and criminal imcstigation department (CID) Special Constabulary; Special Force Units; signals Branch; Railway Police

among others. Four regional police commanders clirectecl police' opc·ration' :l!td ,,.,; ,,,.,J ,~-, Inspector General. The police council composed of, the Permanent Secretary or the ministr) ol internal affairs. and lour other members appointed by the minister. By I 968, the police force was multiethnic, nonpolitical, armed constabulary of between 7,000 and 8,000 officers and constables. In addition to regular urban police activities, it undertook extensive paramilitary duties, provided honor guard detachments tor visiting dignitaries, and performed most of the pul ic prosecution in the criminal courts with coercive confessions obtained by torture used as dismissive evidence to secure convictions against the suspects.

During the 1960s. the government increased its usc or the· polk,· .. tnd "' 1· ,,,. ''"' ;,. eliminate political dissent. Some politicians complnined that this cn1plwsis

21 Muwanga and gombya, the pearl of Africa is breeding pg 74.

14 both feared and ridiculed the General Service Department agents dishonesty, whom they 22 described as spies in their midst •

Apollo Milton Obote's regime was characterized by. first. suspicion and mistrust atnun~ the

political leadership or Uganda caused mainly b.\ rear or dotnin;,tiun ell' SOI11\' mbc.s hi uthcr.s. Secondly, conJlict over Buganda and Bunyoro developed over the ·Jost counties" especially

when Buganda lost a reCerendum (vote) on ownership of the counties and decided to npt>••·,,· the· transfer of the two lost counties to Bunyoro. The third major problem was the army 11hich. ai'tct quickly being appeased by Obote instead of being punished when it mutinied in 1964, became an ever present threat to the power of the central government. Fourth, a parliamentary crisis arose after Daudi Ochieng; a member of parliament alleged that Obote and Amin, Felix Onama, and Adoko Nyekon were heavily implicated in gold, coffee, and ivory smuggling in the Congo. Obote reacted to the crisis by, among others, arresting dissident members of his cabinet and announcing suspension of' the 1962 Constitution.

Further crisis 11as precipitatc·d \\'hen. on the· 20th ~l,tl l'l()(, the· i\"''"'' ''

resolution ordering the centra! government lo k~I\C 13uganda b) lilt.." l:!ld u! th~.. JJhdiUL ,__ \..J,jj,;, government reacted forceCully by arresting the main movers of the motion and ordering an army invasion of the Men go Palace of the Kabaka of Buganda. ldi A min affected the attack with tragic results. On 4th February 1966, at about 2 o'clock, when the parliament was clue to convene, parliament building was for the first time in Uganda's history surrounded by heavily armed troops, purportedly on the orders of the army commander. An opposition motion denounced the prime minister- who was out of Kampala at the time as corrupt and of plotting to overthrow his own government. A military unit was sent to bring Obote but the police warned him and the militarv unit was intercepted nnd clisnrmecl by the Police' Speci:d Force''-

22 8-14173.html. (accessed on 14 June 2012) 23 Prof Muhamood Mamdani, "politics and class Formation in Uganda", 1999 P. 314

15 2.4 Murders and arbitrary deprivation of life in the 1960s The exact numbers of Ugandans that have lost their lives at the hands of government agents and agencies since independence is impossible to establish. The murder of individuals, mass murders, and arbitrary deprivation of live or extra judicial executions is a violation of the right to life, one of the most fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual which is stated in the constitution of Uganda and International Human 1\ights lnstruntc'llh I<>'''"''' i ·., '' now but not then. The degree of brutality and cruelty that the 1 ictims \\cr~ oUbJcctcci \\ere t>ilcll unbelievable. The security agencies i.e. the Army, Police, State Security Agencies (such as the State Research Centre), etc, were in the fore-front of committing human rights crimes against the people of Uganda.

Murders and massacres were not continuous during the period between 1960 and 1970. Most human rights abuses relate to the struggle for supremacy between the central government and the Kabaka. The human rights crimes committed during this period therefore have a strong political background. The outstanding incidents of murder during this period relate to the attack on the palace of the Kabaka oCBugancla in 1966 and the Nankulabye incident o!' 196-l among tlthc•rs.

2.4.1 The 1966 Army Attack on the Kabaka's palace.

Neither the suspension. nor the eventual abo Iit ion of the 1962 constitution, immediately affected the existence of monarchism in Uganda. These events reflected the ascendancy of the representatives of the people over the traditional and hereditary rulers. The Obote decree had indicated that the challenge against the wishes of the elected representatives could not be taken lightly. The abolition of the constitution reinforced the idea of the power of politics, warned the rulers, that unless they agreed to abide by the new rules, their days were numbered. The rest of the traditional rulers accepted the changes, albeit reluctantly, and the Kabaka summarily rejected them. There is no doubt that Bugancla was in quandary. Its k'

16 doing nothing about it, these ministers lost control of the situation. The chiefs and the feudal elements assumed leadership and called for a stronger measure against the central government. Without consulting their ministers, the Buganda leadership summoned a meeting of the Lukiiko to stock, as it were. The first thing that the meeting did was to pass a resolution congratulating the members who refused to swear allegiance to the 1966 constitution24 Draft resolution for Buganda' s secession, no-recognition of the Obote regime and evicting of the central government from Bugancla were presented and debated. at length. nnd. ruther th1._•rc \\<,_'l\.' soml' disscntitlg voices. Eventually, the motion, "thnt this Lukiiko resolves not to recognize at all the l •gand" Government whose head quarters must be moved away IJ·om Bugand;t "'il" '""I'"'"'" ·rr,v Ji .. was cast and some of the speeches supporting the motion len littk· doubt r·m the· "''' rt''""'' . , , by Buganda leaders. The county chiefs no longer hid their intensions. They began inciting the Baganda to be ready for war. By the 23 May 1966, the rebellion was so advanced, that the Uganda Government decided to act. Three of the more defiant county chiefs were arrested and detained. The beating of war drums in many parts of Buganda followed these arrests. Many unruly elements in the kingdom dec_idedto take the law into their hands. Roads were blocked or damaged: law and order broke in many parts of Buganda. As if chaos had been let loose, government property was discriminately and wantonly destroyed. Lawlessness was the orclcr nf' the day. The government could no !ongcr· tok•rntc this state u!' ~~lrdlr"' F~:b"·lll\11· lu._! :, :, quelled. To thnt end, the cnbinet mel and decided to send a small detachment t,> invest igall' the· existence or otherwise of arms or ammunition at the palace. Unfortunately, however when the unit arrived at the palace gates, the palace guards opened fire. and the Conner were l'irtualh wiped out in the exchange that followed. Inevitably, the Uganda government found it necessary to dispatch reinforcements, and after a lengthy spasmodic exchange of fire, the palace was surrounded, but miraculously, the kabaka escaped undetected by jumping over the palace wall 25 and, eventually found his way to the United Kingdom . It was however noted that Obote had earlier made a threatening speech while at Soroti in which among other things, he said that:

2·1 Interim Constitution. 25 Henry Onoria, Constitutionalism ancl Constit u tionn.l hJ stnr· · 111 t ~,~ 1, 1· l ~

17 "!warn you people ofS'orvti, .ro1t helwn.' like o t'erfuJn 1nht· yt 111 1\i:t 11 , , ; ·

shall not hesitate at all, I ll'ill send my boys to destroy both you and your property; I repeal, I will send my boys to destroy both you and your property. I say this for God and my couni!Ji ... A good Muganda is a dead one"

Soon after an attack was made on the kabaka's palace at Men go, thousands of people lost their lives during the attack or after. Dead bodies were transferred in lorry full's from the palace to prison cemetery where they were buried in mass graves.

2.4.2 The Nakulabye Incident.

The Nakulabye incident of I 964 is perhaps the earliest post independence of arbitrary deprivation of life of civilians by the state agents. In this incident, the Special Force Unit of the Uganda Police shot at a crowd of people at Nakulabye trading centre near Kampala, killing six people and injuring several others.

At Nakulablye there was a famous I 960's Kampala Night Club called "Suzana Night Club" which had a large patronage. On the day in question, a fight apparently broke out near the club between some Zairians (now Congolese) and some Ugandans over a woman. It developed into a mob incident and the Special Fot'Ce 11as called to disperse the crowd. \\'hen the crowd bccumc unruly, the police fired live bullets. killing six people and injuring others.

The tragic incident illustrated the willingness of the Central (imcmm•:llllu tc•surt I<• l

2.5 Torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment.

An exhaustive definition of torture has not been made. A simple definition of torture would be that it is: 'Any act by which severe pain or suf'lering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for given illegal purposes". The Bill of rights in the Ugandan constitution of I 962 and I 967. prohibited torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment :J['ain:;t

18 any person, Articles 21 and 12 respectively. These :\nicks hrl\l' hl'Cil hotHHl',J mot~_· 111 li1·.· breach than in observance.

The types of tmture were as varied as the methods applied and the reasons or objectives for the torture, if any. Physical or brutal methods used included violent arrest or seizure of victims, terrorization of family members or relatives; beating, assaulting, kicking or stamping on victims during arrest or detention, urinating on prisoners or forcing them to eat inedible objects such as slippers, soap or uncooked food in extremely large quantity, causing victims to drink large quantities of liquor, hitting with hammer or heavy objects, cutting, stabbing, or piercing parts of the body with bayonets. cutting off, severing or maiming limbs or other parts of the body (including suspending heavy objects fi·om men's private parts or cutting o!T 110men's breasts) burning with molten plastic or lire. abduction or rape of women. threats ol' ck:nh or injttn '"tiL· victim or family members. applying soap under the !L·et t)!';.! th:!~illi\.'1...' :tJld \ll\ki l!i.:' · feet against a slippery wall (forcing him to fall on nails placed on the lloor which would pten;e his hands and feet).

There was relatively little torture during the period 1962 and 1967. Much of the torture during this period was concentrated in the period of Central Government conflicts with the king of Buganda. After "the arrest and detention of those who survived the massacre at the palace at Mengo, they were taken to Luzira26 According to a witness before the commission, the wardens urinated on the prisoners, saying that they were giving them a moming shower. Prisoners were counted by being hit with a baton on the head. This was meant to keep the population in lear"' as to maintain their obedience 1~1 dictaturia! and militar) ruk ur pr~..·~id~.-·nt .\J:l!ll

2.6 Arbitrary arrests, detention or imprisonment During this period, Obote's government employed arrest, detention, and imprisonment as a key official and security policy. This tool was so ruthlessly exploited that even senior members or the government such as ministers, were neither safe nor immune as witnessed by the arrest on 22nd February, 1966 of Minister Grace Stuart lbingira, Balaki Kirya, Emmanuel 5, Mathias Ngobi and

"Uganda Commissioner of Prisons Exparte Matovu [19661 EA 516 at 612.

19 John Magezi. The Government relied on the Emergency Powers Act. 1963; Emergency Power (Detention) Regulations, 1966 and the Public Order and Security Act, \967 to effect endless arrests which were fruitlessly challenged in the court.

Being a member of the ruling party, i.e. UPC. did nol guarant~e )Oll \\ould nul he dlt-.·.~tl·d Prominent UPC supporters such as Dan Nabudere, Cuthbert Obwangor, a former Minister, Sir William Nadiope, a former Vice President, Jolly Joe Kiwanuka, a former Member of Parliament, etc. were arrested and detained.

Other party's members were even more vulnerable. The 'Conservative KY party Leaders such as Benedict Lukramuzi, a former member of parliament, Prince Badru Kakungulu, a Moslem leader and uncle of the king of Buganda, and others were also arrested and detained. Massive arrests of political opponents to the sole remaining party followed with leaders of the Democratic Party forming the greatest number of victims. Among the DP leaders arrested and cktnincd '"'rc 2 Benedict to Kiwanuka. Paul. K. Semog.cn.?t\; ;.lhis ct"t..'Hll:d an imprc:)'>idn ot: ~b i!' polilil,li opponents are meant for torture and abuse by military mighty which a serious was set back to Uganda's youngest clemocmcy.

27 Andrew Mwenda then a Kampala radio anchor for, kfm933, 18th April 2006.

20 CHAPTER THREE

3.0 Human Rights Violations between 1971 and 1979

3.1 Introduction

1971 coup was a result of ethnic and power rivalry between the President Milton Obote and his army commander, ldi Am in. One of the primary reasons given by .\min li>r 1lw I •Pi ,.,,,,: that Obote had suppressed multi partyism and imposed a one party dictatorship. Therefore, on the face of It, the Amin military junta was committed to the restoration of multiparty democrac/8 It can to a certain extent be asserted that A min, on 25 111 January 1971, took advantage of the military turmoil in the military, the weakened popular support of the government, and Obote's absence while attending the meeting of Commonwealth Conference of Heads of Government at Singapore to seize control of the government. Claiming to be a professional soldier, not a politician, Am in promoted most of his staunchest supporters. both enlisted personnel and ol'licers. to command positions. Nc·potism rc·c·,·i\l·d '"'"''!." · t-.1 1'"1.',," us a number of laborers. drivt:rs. and body guards hecamt: lli~h rani, in~ lli'!kt:tl, ,:II II.;; _'l1 fl had little or no military training. Army recruiters suspended educational requirements l(x military service, sometimes forcing groups of urban unemployed to volunteer. Aller the army had established control over the civilian population, Am in unleashed a reign of terror against 29 Uganda that lasted almost until the end of the decade .

Amin's coup in January 1971 was carried with remarkably little resistance within the army and

28 Mugaju. J, An Historical Background to Uganda's No-party Democracy, Fountain publishers, (2000) p21.

29 http: //www.countrv-data .cOin/ frd/ csjugtocjhtm#ugO 163(acccssecl l-! 1h .Ju1 )( · :!0 1 )J

21 greeted in many parts of the country with relief and enthusiasm. Throughout Buganda, the news ofObote's clown fall brought rejoicing and popular demonstrations.

The Army changed composition under Amin's rule. By 1977 it had grown to 21,000 personnel, almost twice the 1971 level. Amin killed most of its most experienced officers and imprisoned others for plotting to over throw or weaken his regime. A few fled the country rather than face the mounting danger. A min also increased the number of military recruits !\·om other c·ountries. especially Sudan, Zaire. and Rwanda. 13y I 979 li.>reigners a.:.:uLI!ltc·cl [,, '"''' army, exacerbating problems of communication, training, and discipline. The army bare!) controlled some army units. A few became quasi-independent occupation garrisons, headed be violence-prone warlords who lived off the land by brutalizing the local population.

Amin established powerful internal security forces, including the State Research Bureau (SRB) and the Public Safety Unit (PSU). Both terrorized local populations. By 1979, they had increased to include about I 5000 people, many of whom acted as informers on fellow citizens. The SRB and the PSU were responsible for as many as 250,000 deaths. Their victims included people from all segments of society and were accused of speaking or acting against the regime30

3.2 Foreign military assistance in the 1970s

During the 1970s, the Soviet expanded its inlluence by tncrecrsrng 111ilitar; aooistancc. 111 .ill!.' 1972, a Ugandan military delegation visited Moscow and arranged to take delivery of a variety of weapon systems, including tanks, armored personnel carriers. Missiles, transport aircraft. Helicopters, marine patrol boats, field engineering equipment, MG21s, and radar. The next major Soviet arms delivery were in 1974 and 1975, when Uganda obtained more than US$500 million in equipment. Significant items included 12 MiG-21s, 8 MiG-17s, 60 T-34/T-54 tanks.

30 A summary of The Report of The Uganda Commission of Inquiry into the Violation of Human Rights, Pearl of Blood, 1994-Kampala, Uganda

22 I 00 armored personnel carriers, 50 anti aircraft guns, 200 anti-tank missiles among others. More than .700 Ugandan military personnel received training in the Soviet Union, while more than I 00 Soviet instructors managed a variety of training programmes in Uganda.

Ugandan-Soviet relations cooled in 1975, when Am in expelled the Soviet ambassador because of disagreement over Moscow intervention in Angola. In 1976, Israel launched a raid on the airport at Entebbe that freed passengers who had been taken hostage by Palestinian terrorists. Embarrassed and threatened, Amin improved relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow resumed arms shipment and signed :1 series of technical and cultural protocols 11 ith Kampal:1. Jjul lie's became strained once again as the i\mins regime began to de1criun1k in the' 1:11c· I 97th II hc·n

Tanzania attacked Uganda in 1979, a decline in the Soviet militan a\Sist:lth'c' l·,"·cc··.l \:n:;, : look to Libya for support.

This particularly points out the militaristic nature of the Amin government and with the continued perception of this drift coupled with the ethnic and unqualified system of recruitment. There was going to be gross violation of human rights, which was actually witnessed in the years of Amin's regime. Thus making military rule an easy project for illiterates, incompetent and unqualilied people with no respect to human rights of their ruled population.

3.3 The coming of the tyrant

As earlier noted the country greeted A min as a hero. For weeks celebrations took up most of the towns in Uganda. He was not the kind of man to sit behind the desk and it was pure joy for him to be constantly on the move by helicopter. Whenever he went, his cabinet and senior ul'licie~lc:

Went .l-Ie w

1 Kampala to run the country' •

31 Henry Onoria, "Constitutionalism <1nd constitutional history of Uganda" p.39

23 Amin was greeted with delight since he had ovcrthro\\n an unpopuldr regime. IIO\\l'Yt'r had :II~(~ significantly, released Obote's detainees and among them were the former Prime Minister :111d

leader of the Democratic Party, Beneicto Kiwanuka who was later appl)inted Chh:( .lll">lh.'(...· !;![;..·: murdered, Brig. Shaban Opolot, once Amin's commander and rival. Amin magnanimously granted him all the back pay that had accumulated during his five year stay in prison, this exposed Am in's contradictions of ousting Obote on allegations of human right abuses when he [was behaving worth than him.

3.4 Human rights violations between 1971 and 1979 During this period, violation of people's rights was turned into a merciless art by Am in's agents. especially those li·om his notor·ious State Resenrch C'entre (SRC') :rt NaJ.::rsem. ,\rrm :111.1 1\>1 r, ,. personnel. etc. the violations multiplied 11hcn 1\min gave the at'lll) pu11crs nlarrc"rt urhkrllic· Armed Forces (Powers of Arrest) Decree No.l3 of 1971. The decree required that the powers it gave be exercised only by a military police man in uniform. But arrests and abductions were made at random and without reference to any law since the intention were ollen to rmrrdc·r· the· victim.

Under the pretext of acting under this decree, army personnel extended the power of arrest to include murder, torture looting or extortion, etc, without being bothered. Most of the human rights violations by the army occutTed at Nakaseero headquarters of the State Research Centre and various other barracks, etc.

Once in power. ;\min moved on to consn!ic\ate his position, b) ~u;w;lg otlh.'rs. :ll,h -: nHII\kl -, 11 enemies and then recruiting 1-.:.ak\VH. Nubian. Lugbnra, and \uJ:till·'.·. 111 ; , 11 ,.,_.

Amin's immediate and most serious threat sprung from the Lango and Acholi sections of the army, and he dealt with it in a primitive manner.

3.4. l The violation of the right to life

Soon after the military coup of I 971, many army officers, mainly of Langi and Acholi origin, were massacred. The massacre of soldiers from selected regions continued right up to the end of Amin's regime as part of A min's policy of maintaining power.

24 After the military coup, the country seemed set for a retum l(lr peace. True·. hut. the·re· '' ,.. '"·

early incident that wns shocking. ivlajor Ogwn!. a pro Obok ulrll'1.:r \\i.h cha"~..:d tiH·•nl~dl liP.' centre of Kampala by Amin's soldiers. He took refuge in a doctor's house and was killed in a shootoul. The unsuspecting owner of the house, Dr. Ebine George was later traced to his hospital bed, taken to Military barracks and crashed by a tank. Amin's boys triumphant!) bwugltt 32 Ogwal's license to Amin as proofoftheir success •

3.4.2The Mutukula massacres

In 1971, hundreds of Langi and Acholi soldiers and a few soldiers of other tribes and General Service Personnel were rounded up. clctainccl at Luzira and then taken to Mutukula. The oflicers were then murdered systcmtllically in groups. over a period or time and then burie·d tn mtt" graves dug by other prisoners. On the realization thtll they 11cre· hl'im! llllll\ln,·.l tlh·· : ,,, 1

planning escapes. Those \\·ho tried escaping to . \\'IHl\l' b~.l:ln.kT \\ :1·, .Jht •lll 11 ~· i ~ '' meters away, were clelibemtely shot clown. The massacres or prisoners continued with the method of killing being the use of knives and harmers. Of the soldiers taken to Mutukula only a hand full, mostly non Langi and Acholi survived. The survivors were released by Amin claiming that the rest had escaped to Tanzania.

Obote having taken refuge in Tanzania where he had been offered sanctuary by the Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, was joined by 20,000 Ugandan refugees fleeing Am in. In 1972 they tried an attempted to regain the country through a poorly organized coup attempL I\ ithnut success.

A min retaliated against the attempted invasion by Ugandan exiles in I '-J72 by purging the army

Dr Obote supporters, predominantly those !'rom Acholi and Langi ethnic groups. In .lull I 07 I

,, '-A summary of The Report of The Uganda Commission of Inquiry into the Violation of Human Rights, Pearl of Blood, 1994-Kampala, Uganda

25 Lango and, Acholi soldiers were massacred in Jinja and Mbarara barracks, and by early I 972, some 5000 Acholi and Langi soldiers were, and at least twice as many civilians had disappeared. The victims soon came to include members of other ethnic groups. religious leaders, journalists. senior bueaurocrats, judges. lawyers. students and intellectuals. criminal suspects and lorcign

nationals. In some cases entire villages were wiped out. In this atmosphere· of' iukncc· 111:1111

other people were killed for criminal motives or simply at 11ill. !ludic' tlu"ll'd '"' :_i\,· r: .•. in quantitiesD After the abortive invasion that the Obote supporters launched from Tanzania in I 972, thousands died at the hands of Amin's special squad. No one was immune. The chief justice was dragged away from the high court never to be seen again. The university's vice chancellor disappeared. The bullet reddened the body of the Anglican Archbishop, still in his ecclesiastical robes, and was clumped at the mortuary of a shortly after he had issued out a memorandum speaking out against the 'suspicion, fear and hidden hatred that the 34 civilian population felt towards Am in's forces .

3.4.3 The State H.esearch Centre

The notorious State Research Centre (SRC), with headquarters at Kyagwe Road, Nakascro.

Kampala, next to the president's lodge, accounts for the largest number oi' c,>ld-blu,,,bl iillii !.. '· in Uganda's post independence history. The building housing the SRC had an underground tunnel connecting it to the nearby president's lodge. James Kahigiriza, a former prime minister of Ankole, a witness before a commission that was set to inquire into the violation of human rights by president Museveni in 1986, was arrested and taken to in 1979. While there, he saw, the Archbishop Janan Luwurn. The Archbishop being hit very hard and that was the end he has never been seen again.

33 Kanyeihan1ba 0,\:V .. ';Constitutional and Political Histor.\ of L\;.tndct !-'j() .. Present". Centenary Publishing House Ltd, Kampalct, 2002.

34 A summary of The Report of The Uganda Commission of Inquiry into the Violation of Human Rights, Pearl of Blood, 1994-Kampala, Uganda p.236

26 At this juncture as testified by Kahigiriza that all their fellow in mates were being picked day and night but never returned to see the right of the day knew that those people were already dead. After these killings, about forty soldiers, mainly Acholi and Langi, were shot, after being locked up in a narrow tunnel.

3.4.4 Murder in the military Bnrrncl(s

There were many barracks within or close to large urban population centers \vhich greatly contributed to human rights violations by the military. One of the most notorious barracks 11 hcT: many Ugandans lost their lives at the hands of Am in's soldiers was lvlakinclye. Aller the militclr\ coup the barracks were turned into the headquarters of the Military Police and remained so in Am ins tenure. Marela, a Sudanese, was the first officer-in-charge of the military Police. It was noted that a lot of army men and senior officers were brought into Makindye from all over the country and they would be killed there throughout the day. There was a famous cell called Singapore (named after the country Obote was in when a coup was staged against his government). The moment you landed in there meant that you had no chance of survival, once put in Singapore cell people would be killed between 700pm and 800am ancl trucks come· in and take away the bodies at night. The majority ol'thosc killed at \lcikind\c' 11c·rc "'i-J"'r ,: '• and Langi Origin and their close l!·iends fi·om other tribes. Up to a hundred orl!cers and the men were murdered every day.

Murders occurred virtually in all army and security institutions during this period. A civilian, who was detained in any army barracks, rarely emerged alive there from. Civilian relatives of soldiers under detention or already killed were a frequent target of the murderous army. To investigate the fate or where-about of any army detainee often meant death or torture for the investigator. This probably explains why many Ugandans preferred to quietly mourn when a relative disappem·ed.

27 3.4.5 Murder by soldier Chiefs

Amin's military regime replaced civilian administrative county and sub-county chiefs with soldier chiefs. The replacements were made, allegedly, to stamp out corruption. The soldier chiefs greatly contributed to the extension of terror and death to the rural areas.

The case of James Bagiire Alias Kasalamatu

During the early seventies. a county-chief of 13ugabula in the then llusn~" pro1 :n,·(·. ••llv 1,,:

Bagiire, who had acquired a nick name .. !(asalnmatu"' clue to cutting_ u!f priSl.ln,:r-., '-':n committed various inhuman acts against prisoners in his care. In 1973, he murdered a man suspected of stealing a chicken by forcing the victim to eat the entire bird, raw with all its feathers and organs. The victim was severely beaten in the process and died soon after. Another victim was forced to eat a big basket-frill of raw unpeeled cassava, again on allegations that he lwd stolen the cassava35

Other soldier chiefs were even more inhuman: It came to the knowledge of the commission that a soldier chief called Tukei who had been posted as acting sub-county chief to Toroma, Usuk County, in present Soroti buried two men a live with the assistance or his li:llo11 1\cting suh

county chief or Kapujani. one Al:1i. The' ictims 11crc buried ali~e· :dkgc·dll lwc:tusc· thn "''''" practicing witchcraft.

3.4.6 Murder by the Police (murder squad-the case of the PSU)

The chief murderer and torturer was one corporal Oola. He murdered prisoners by hammering them on the head. It noted that one time a prisoner was brought and handed to Oola. Oola was so annoyed, he never whipped this man, he just took him behind the cell, pulled down tile prisoner's trousers, cut off a piece of his buttocks and gave it to the prisoner to eat. Oola then

35 A sumn1ary of The l~eporr of The Uganc!Ft Commission of lnqu1rr into tl1e \ Jol:ti!\JJi ut i illlll,'ll Rights, Pearl of Rloocl, 1994-Kan1pala, Uganda.

28 took the prisoner in the cell and said the prisoner could not die bel(,re he released all names ol fellow robbers; the prisoner was killed two days later by Oola.

Am in's rule I ef Uganda ravaged, lawless and bankrupt, with a death toll put at 250,000 people. Then exiles were reunited with old fi·iends on the streets of Kampala, they greeted each other in delight with the phrase, 'you still exist' but there was to be no respite36 as in 1980 Obote regained power in disputed elections plunging the country into another anarchic civil war.

3.4.7 The right to dignity and physical integrity

The victims of torture were Langi and Acholi soldiers and their sympnthizers \\ ho were 'impil

slaughtered. Between 1971 to 1979 torture was regarded as a form or mercy to the 1 ldll!l. il~<~>e· who escaped after torture still counted themselves lucky. Apart fi·om soldiers, many civilians were arrested and tortured in army barracks and many other places all over the country. The army, police and various security agencies were in the fore-front in perpetuating the various torture atrocities. Names of senior army, police, and security agency officers became closely associated with torture. These included Au Towelli, (Commander of Public Safety Unit PSU, Naguru); Kassim rviusa Obura (PSU); Faruk rviinawa, (State Research Centre (SRC); Lt. Col. Bukyanagandi llabuka, rvialera (Sudanese); rvialiyarnungu (Zairoi); Lt.

Abdalati f 37

Much of the torture by the army was undertaken by the State Research Centre agent whose personnel all initially came from the army and had infiltrated all its ranks. The murder :md torture of the Centre intensified when Amin's hand-picked recruits were brought into the centre. These recruits, on whom Amin depended for effectiveness, were handpicked from Southern

36 Sowing the Mustered Seed, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, 1996, pg 34 Commentaries on State, law and Politics, G. W Kanyaihamba

37 Commentaries on State, law and politics, G.W l

29 Sudan. Nubians, Zairians. Kakwa and were mainly of the Moslem l'nith. The most notorious t)f these oflicers included Lt. Abdalatil: and Major Fnrouk Mimma 11ho 11ns the Deputy Director ,l[· the State Research Centre.

3.4.8 Tortm·e by the Police

Much of the torture by the police in this period was at the Naguru Public Safety Unit and at most police stations throughout the country. At Naguru, torture-was standard treatment. For a detainee at Naguru, the 'standard reception' treatment was a motor vehicle tyre into which the victim's head was forced. Sometimes the head was shaved with a broken bottle. A man would step on the head of a victim and then such victim would be whipped for ten or more minutes nonstop. The skin on the back of the buttocks would be ripped otT and blood 11otiltl uo/c' uut. !hi·. tmu~tc· ., , uniform throughout those who had just been taken to Nuguru 1\otild lw told It> take otttlie1r shirts off to check whether they had been at Naguru before, this is as per the lindings of the commission that compiled a report known as pearl of blood in 1988.

In the morning, prisoners would be counted by being hit on the head, made to run for about I 0 minutes outside the yard while police men whipped them some times with wires. Torture was always indiscriminate, degrading, brutal and addictive to the torturers who apparently used to settle even domestic quarrels. For example, one day Towelli had a quarrel with his wife in the morning. Towelli ordered his men to arrest her and bring her to the yard. Corporal Oola undressed her and left her in her knickers. Two police men then held her clown by her arms and feet :mel Oola whipped her lor about live minutes. She was then made to sit 111 the ):ml :h :t Prisoner. At midnight. she was released to go back to Towelli's home·'·'

Two Italian professors who were visiting lecturers at Makererc did no escape tile torture at Naguru when they were arrested at 9.00pm as they returned from seeing off their friends at Entebbe Air port. They were tortured by drunken policemen on duty and left unconsciousness.

38 A summary of The Report of The Uganda Commission of Inquiry into the Violation of Human Rights, Pearl of Blood, 1994-Kampala, Uganda.

30 They were then locked up and one failed to gain consciousness by morning. Eventually Obura and ordered they be taken to hospital.

Police orficers were not immune f'rom arbitrnr) arrest and Lortun:. s\..'lliur Pdli ...:~,.· Olfi\...Li Detective Superintendent Esau was arrested and taken to Naguru because he was part of the team which had investigated Towelli's murderous activities on Amin's orders after many complaints had been made to A min. Towelli was then dismissed and then re-instutecl. Esau was tortured :111d part of the torture was to carry the bodies of the dead who had been massacred by Obura in the 'condemned cell'. Esau lifted the bodies and loaded them in a vehicle, alone when failed to lift the last body which was that of a fat man, he had to pull it while he was being beaten. After loading the bodies, he was ordered to board the vehicle. He did not return to Naguru until five in the morning. He was unrecognizable as he was covered in blood and dust and he was out of his senses. This was found out by a commission of inquiry which \\aS instituted by president Museveni aller capture of pm1er in 1986.

3.4.9 Violation of the right to personal liberty.

3.4.10 Arrests and detentions between 1971-1979

During the 1971-1979, little use was made of the various Acts, such as the Security Act 1967; Emergency Powers Act, 1963 or the Emergency Powers (Detention)

Regulation 1966(Whose operation had originally been limited to Buganda), 111 arresting and detaining.

During Am in's ii lethe Public Order nncl Securit) Actthcrellm: rem:lined dormant. :\!all) pet,plc who might have been detained simply disappeared. Amin on assuming power released everybody who had been detained by the Emergency l'o\\er Rcgulati"n'. \1:\il\ ,,1 r!,, .. , ·I· been used to enforce the Emet·gency Powers were hounded, killed or forced into exile. These included B. Bataringaya, Hassan and Wawuyo who were killed and Kanywamusayi who escaped into exile. Immediately after the 25 January, 1971 coup. Amin caused many people to be

31 detained in Luzira, hence creating the new category of detainees called 'Lodgers', a category that has continued to feature ever since.

Arrests were often affected by terror squads of young men in clark glasses and flamboyant clothing. After such a visit by these terror squads. a victim or their l'amily was \'cry lucky if the victim was ever seen again or their where-about located.

3.4.11 Violation of the right to a fair hearing

When the army took over the work of the courts, Amin announced that he was suspending certain provisions of the Constitution and soon instituted an Advisory Defense Council composed of military officers, with him self as the chairman. Amin placed military tribunals above the system of Civil Lmv 39 Economic crime cases and treason cases were taken to Military Tribunals established in 197.3 under the Trial by the Military Tribunals Decree No. 12/1973. These tribunals were manned by military personnel. Several people wet·e tried and arbitrarilY sentenced to death and executed by firing squad or 11erc giwn hc:JI') scntct1ccs. The· mcJjurit'. ul suspects or detainees, in thou:;ands~ ho\\.C'\\:'L nc\ cr got lh!..' chwH.'l' to und~..-·rgP <.Ill) !t1m1 ut'trl~tl

In September 1977 16 male Ugandans were tried by military tribunal chair,·d b1 Coi

Ali Twelve of the accused were sentenced to death, two 11ere imprisonccl. and <>Ill) tllu 1\c'lc' acquitted and discharged The ll·ial was a travesty of justice, the convictions and pleas of guilt were obtained by force fi·om the accused. In the case of the 16 the tribunal picked and chose whom to acquit or convict and who to spare or sentence to death.

The military tribunal which carried out the trial was deemed by the Human Rights Commission as illegal since it was not established in accordance with the 1967 Constitution and the Judicature Act. The Military Tribunals Decree did not guarantee a fair trial as it railed to provide a lilir hearing, rules Of procedure ancJ evidenc~. th\:' burdl'll :.t!ld standard t\1. l'l'\l,)l I'" I' .,,. ''l

39 Deepening Democracy and enhancing Sustainable livelihoods in Uganda, ACODE Policy Research Series, No. 13, 2006

32 counsel etc. The members of the military tribunal were military men who were hand-picked to serve the purpose of the regime. They had no legal knowledge of and experience in handling cases simi Jar to those before them.

3.5 Human rights violations between 1981 and 1955

Yusuf Lule. chairman of the UNLF's political arm, formed the ne11 government. lie ,·,llled I~'' law and order and outlined a strategy to rehabilitate ligand''· I u imprille the 1nilitar) ·, reputation, he set new standards of literacy and political education lor the army and the police recruits. To reduce the army's political role and build a truly nationnl anm. he pwchimc·d hi· .. intension of drawing military recruits from nil ethnic groups in proportion to their population. In achieving his goal, Lule hoped to authorize increased military recruits among the Buganda, Uganda's largest ethnic group Non Baganda government officials opposed his policy. He was later voted out of office by the National Consultative Council, which became the new Parliament, and the Military Commission, which over saw the army's operation, only after sixty 0 days as Prcsident" .

In the late 1979, the NCC elected Godfrey Binaisa. who had served as attorney genernlundn

consolidate support within the military and this allowed senior army officers to operate almost independently of the government. He allowed the then minister of defense Yoweri Museveni to recruit a disproportionate number of volunteers from his home region in the southwest. The use if ethnic aftiliation as a political lever prompted a power struggle with the Chief of Staff David Oyite Ojok, a northerner. Binaisa tried to resolve this issue by dismissing Ojok. The military Commission rejected this action, ousted Binaisa and the NCC, assumed control of the government, and called for national elections in December 1980. Milton Obote, who had been ousted by Amin in 1971 military coup. returned to the presidency" in disputed multiparty

.J-u http: //www.countr\' data. com/ cgi-bin/ query jr44155.html.(acccssecl on 1·'-f\ 11 !\'lrt~·, 20 12J 41 Address by Y. K. Muscvcni to makercrc university students and staff at frePdom sq11<.1n Makerere University, Kampala. ,June 8, 199!.

33 election held on 10 December 1980 organized by a partisan militun c·umnt!,,i<>ll 11,,.. ''"'' of the Military commission, (the ruling military junta), Paulo Muwanga is believed to have rigged the elections for his Party, UPC. The returned of the UPC and Obote to power raised mixed feelings among a cross section of Uganda's population. Once again the hope of a 42 democratic transition to power had been shattered •

Among the groups that were opposing Obote's government were Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its militnry wing, National Resistance Army. both or which attracted members of western Ugandn. the Former Llganlb National \nm· lFI T'\ \: ,,, .. , whose members hnd served under the army ul· ,\min. 1\nd the l ~:lltch \:it""'·'' t(c'" ''· i, (UNRF), which drew members n·om Amin's home territory n·om the northwest In addition, the Uganda Freedom Movement and the Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda, both based primarily in Buganda, opposed Obote.

The UNLF mounted counterinsurgency operations in numerous areas, including Arua and Moyo in the northwest, Karamoja in the North East, and Luwero north of' Kampala. The army, whose ranks were filled by poorly trained, poorly clothed, poorly fed and irregularly paid foot soldiers had almost no ability to sustain counterinsurgency operations. The government inability to maintain discipline over the armed forces allowed many units to degenerate into unrul) gang,. The military perpetuated numerous hum:m righh \ iolatiuns ;md c·nciicd in 'c' n:tl ilkc;tl activities, including theft, looting, and assault and holding civilians l(w r;msom.

3.5.1 Murder by the Army- (UNEF) 1979-1980

During this period, many murders were committed especially in those areas especially associated with Amin's regime. In West Nile, UNLF troops stand heavily implicated in the massive violation of human rights in the region .

.!:! Constitutionalism and constitutioncll history in Ugancln. I !C'!ln ( )rwrid. p:'. ::-);..;

34 In pursuit of the remnants of Amin's army in the· North11est. l'NI I tl"<>

3.5.2 Violation of the right to life during thl' Obok II regiml'

This period represents the second "murder peak". aller Amin's time Man)' ll~all(l,tns lml their lives in the hands of Security Personnel. The Uganda National Libc·rauun lru11i. "' 11. ,·t: .. ::. dislodge guerilla militia of Museveni, Andrew Kayiira, etc, from the Luwero Triangle and other areas ignored national and international of armed conflicts and arrested, tortured, and murdered suspected bandits/guerillas or their alleged collaborators in unknown numbers.

3.5.3 Murder in the Luwcro Triangle

In the Luwero area, untold numbers of people were removed by various government agents. including political activists. Jl·om their homes and !'orccd into 1\ll,tt 1\l'l'c' c·:!lhlrc·,,·l'il"'' ·.· ., of' various sizes. allegedly to protect them !'rom bandits. i\lo't ol· til<>"' 'IITL''ic·d '" I tl\lc'l<> Triangle were killed in cold blood by government agents, the Uganda National Liberation Front and the Military police on the grounds that they were guerillas m· their sympathizers. Despite its many illegal activities, the UNLcs atrocities in Lu11cro Triangle attracted the· '""'I international attention. In 1980, the inhabitants of this region had rejected Obote's rule and welcomed opposition guerillas, including Museveni's NRA. Until the end of Obote regime, waged war against rebels and civilians in the area, and the Luweto Triangle became known for its devastation. Several local officials estimated that the UNLF killed between I 00,000 and 200,000 civilians and it detained, tortured, and assaulted several thousand others.

35 The international Committee of the Reel Cross (ICRC) reported that 150.000 people displaced 1 from Luwero had taken refuge in camps· :1.

3.5.4Murder during the 'Panda Gari" operations

It's important to note that Kampala and its immediate surrounding was one of the areas with high concentration of murders. Worth noting is that during the period 1980-85, the issuing of a blank signed detention orders of the minister of Internal Affairs and other government measures greatly extended the powers of arrest to include non security personnel, e.g. UPC Youth Wingers and Chiefs. The result was a dramatic increase in the number of people arrested and subsequently mw·dered or tortured. It was during this period that the infamous practice of panda Gari' grew and widely flourished. 'Panda Gari are two Swahili words meaning hoard the whick· It""' ' system under \vhich the army or police. in swoops co!k'ctcd p(·opk' in lar~v !ltnl'dlvl-" r·r\ q), ~·~ area forced to board vehicles and transported them else11 here for purposes of identi J)·ing 11hether or not they were anti-government t·ebels or sympathizers.

Many of the people arrested during the Panda Can operations, ended up at a private house known as Argentina House which 118cl been converted into a human slaughtet· house'.

Argentina House was so named because of Argentina's notorious for torture and killings, the origin of the term the disappeared'. The house was said to be kept by a cruel Sergeant whose name no victim who was taken to hat house knew-. It is said that he invited new corners with the phrase.

!-!ere you are brought here. you con coun! 1'1)/fl''>'t'/! ,/edd h,,c·uuv ;,, 1·:·

Do not hove a hook where to HTite rlwt.l'0/1 un· 1he f;l'Ufllt' 1rhu ilill l ')t'• ,, Opposing the government .. , there is one government there is one chair, you all want to sit on that chair"

43 ' !CRC Report, 2010

36 The sergeant would come and open the door, simply look around, and say, 'you come here' which meant the end of whoever had been picked.

3.5.5 Murder in the Seminary (Namugongo)

In 1984, following a radio attack on Mporna Radio Satellite Station, UNLF soldiers invaded Theological Seminary situated at the protestant shrine and church, allegedly. to hunt clown rebels whose training base was apparently not very far away. During the invasion, several civilians were killed and some injured. Many female students at the seminary were also raped.

3.5.6 Torture during 1981-1985

Am in's regime had completely destroyed the rule of law and successive governments failed to restore it save lor the NRM which created semblance or peace. The devastating civil \Vat" therefore, occurred in a legal vacuum. l'cople were being tonurccl as rd1ch or guc·rilhs ·:ts the·\ use to call them largely without any justification.

The period 1980-1985 witnessed the arrest, torture and killings or:

(a) Those suspected of having belonged to Amin's security machinery, religion, and tribe or originating from West Nile, Amin's home region.

(b) Alleged bandits/guerillas of various guerillas groups, mainly those ofYoweri Museveni and Andrew Kayiira.

(c) Alleged collaborators of bandits/guerillas. Cordon and search operations. inliltrati

On arrest, most victims were routinely humiliated and c

37 blood. The brutal soldiers who tortured and killed people were: Sgt. Justo Okot. Sgt. Anywar. Starr Sgt. Odwar, Sgt. Okello, (a big murderer nicknamed the !logger because of his past time of forever noggmg . .mmate )~~ .

3.5.7 Violation of the right to personal liberty

The most notorious places of detention during this period were , Masaka, Bomba, Kubongi, Makindye. Gaddaffi Military Barracks. Katikamu Military Tactical Headquarters. Argentina House, Luwero and Mityana police Stations and Luzira Prison.

During this period, a large number of Ugandans were arrested in masses during the Panda Gari operations and displacement operations which were meant to take civilians away from combat areas during the civil war. Most victims of individual and mass arrests necessarilY came lh>m the·

Luwero Triangle nrt'~L K:unpal<.l and its surroundings <-1!\.':h. :\pplk-;1tinn": \)1' !!~thea\· crJI'jJI!.\ which is a legal procedure for forcing the authorities to bring the arrested person to court. were so many and the high court was unable to deal with them. Most detention orders c'.:amincd h• court were declared illegal. Most detainees were never told the reasons kw their arrest. La"),., Pius Kawere dared to ask Vice President Muwanga the reason for his arrest and was told by rvfuwanga:

"do not ask me why you Jl'ere detained because I do nor know. !fyouwanr to find out wail until we get to God".

Conclusively, ror the period or 1981-I

~ 4 Oloka Onyango, constitutionalism in Africa p. 34.

38 detentions in various places, some of them ungazetted. were condoned. These places included military barracks. police stations turned into military places of confinement and some local

administration prisons. Detainees \\ere not issued'' ith an) detl'ntion papers and on the r~!ease.

thl· proper prLK'I.:dur~...· \\

3.5.X Fair hearing

!eli /\min's government \\'US toppled in a war with Tanzania. in 11hich Liganclnn exiles 11cre lwa1 il1 illlul\c'cl. (iilcn their c·xpericnce ol' the military regime. the courts sought to rc-nsscn themsc·il c's :tgainst :m impusing c.sccutivc. I he judiciar) initial!\ appeared un11 illing tu accept an) kind ol' directives emanating Jl·om the executiw. The cnse that brought out the judiciary's 1 nc" stance was that of Re: Musoke' ; the state sought to nsserl that a mere letter t't·om the prc·side·nt's o!'licc \\;IS sui'licient e\'idcncc ora valid detention. The letter implored the court thus.

"i:t tile· llilc're·st "I' n:lliun:il \l'curit). I shuuld be plc:tse·d lll rc·e·c·i~c· )OUr cu-upcratiun in this ltWllcr." l'rinciplc judge S. ~·lusoke 111 ignuring the states demands lwld that the detention \vas invalid because the order" ... lacked legal validity as it is not made under any knm\ n lm1 or the land:''

lite· s:ttnc ''Jlllliclll 1\ as l'utthcr e·clwed in the cusc· ul' 1-tc·. lilldi't·c) ldtak\\ a llarindd '". INhere the court he·ld that the detention or the applicant on the alleged aullwrit) of the Order 11as clearly il11:tlid and illegal and that were it not for the criminal charges which lwei recently been preferred aguinsl him. court 1\oulcl hav.: ordered his immediate release. The applicant 11as gi,cn the Iibert) to rene'\\ hj, bail applieationtu the court beltH'c 11hieh he ll

'' t 1970 I H\'13 222 .

.,, (!983) HCB 56 ...· 1 1979) hcb 223.

39 reaction to this period. Court did not hesitate to hold the detention order defective in that it 11as too \ag.u~..· to cnJ'orcc ~ls it did not state hu\\ the applicant indu!g.cd themsche<::> in economic

~;_tbOt~tgL'. 01' \\h~lllTUJlUllliL' ~ubotttge the) i!ldUJg\.'d in ">U a:-, to Jll:JI-.L' it dangerOU~ tO the State Of Peace and public order in Uganda.

3.6 True rise of the national resistance arm) On I 7 J),·c,·mbcr l'!H5. :tl\cr more than l(>ur month ol' negotiations. tile NRivl and the military council signed a peace accord in Nairobi. Gut then. on 26 .lanuar) 1986. using S1vedish and Libyan military assistance. the NRfvl abandoned the accord and seized control of the gmemment. The 11c11 regime 11on some popular support b) pkdging it end human rights

1 i,>l:niut". imprull' militarl d"cipline. :tnd rcstmc stabilit1. t\h111 l Is, I. I persunncl retreated imo Sud~tn. rcgroupet.L and reentered Uganda in August llJB(>. and LJganda \\tb once agwn gripped by civil 11ar.

1-rom l'!Kh ll> 1990. till' \lusc'h'ni regime tried to end tile \artoth it>surgencies and to establish c·utttrol,lln the arm). Despite· repeated g01c·rnment claims th:n till' '\RA had dci'cated the I.F and other rebel groups. insurgent active!) continued. especial!) in the northern eastern and

. .j~ \\'estern rcg1ons .

In I ebrue~r1 Jl)g'J. ~'lusneni clc-clared a three month mor:llorium u11 t;lilitar) operations against rebels ncar liulu. Arm) o!'licers sought tu impro1 c political cotntnunication 11 ith the regimes opponc·nts. i\s a result a Jell rebels relinquished their arms. Once the moratorium expired. hlllll'lc·r. till' "'R~I intensilied :1ssaults on rebel bases: and in mid l'!g') the NRfvl imple-mented a

·~l..'urclh.'d ~...·~trlh. f1\>lic) in tilL' ;.~n.·a. I rol)p) mo\ed sc\cral thou:-,~tJJd ~.,_·j, ilians to go\ernment run camps and they burned houses. crops and granaries in these depopulated areas. This c,tunteritburgency by the strategy enabled the NRfvl to establish control some areas. but it also eroded till' go1ernment domestic and internation:li support.lurgcll bc·c·ause oi'thc high numberoi' deuths resuliing i't.,>lll lll:ldc·qu:llc' i'ood. IIUkr. shelter. and mcdic·al care in the camps. By lute 1900. dc·spite or these harsh me

" I 19Cl3J HC8SG

40 rebel groups was the Holy Spirit Movement (HSI'vl) in north centrnl Uganda under the leadership

o/ . .\ I'!l'1..' I ~l\\\l'll~LI ~~ se II' pnK· IaJ!lli.:'C . I !ll)SIJL'. '''

It is impurltlnl to note that the NRiVI on assummg ptmer. inherited all the cleavages and intricacies that had bedeviled Uganda's post-colonial history: ethnicities, north-south divide and militarism. A sense of economic and political sanity. mainly in the southern parts ot' the country 11:1s rc·stcnnl b) the "'1{\1 :1dministration llm1e1er. l(m:c· intolerance. manipulation ol'

ennstitutiunal prm isions. suppression ol' alternati1 c political 1 ie11 s. the reconliguration o!' po11cr on distinell) ethnic political foundations, and the reproduction - or stale power on the basis of cll'linabk n:I\T0\1 ethnic alliance became the hallmark or NRivl. I he result has been the further

Cillrcnchmcnt ol' militarist. ,·tlmic:dl) organiNd slak. tow!!) opp,,c·d to genuine competition l(ll· pollc'r. !'ur example it's alleged that parli:11ncntarians 11erc bribc·d to Iii\ term limits I(Jr presidenc), the electoral processes are militnrized 11ilh some military of'licers like major

l~:d;oo;:~ ~ lut:dc !wading the 1 iolet 11 ing ul' harassing clcctur<~ks opposc·d tu fvluse1 cni's

!'he NRI\'1 hns not transcencleclthe clistincll) regional. ethnic, ami religious political ft)llllciations inheriteclli·omlhe post-colonial dispensation. in that it hns reproduced itself on the basis of' these ull!:l!lt..'l.:-., ! h~..· lu~ ..·r dll thi"' ~.·ntL·rprisl' ha~ bt·~.:.·n d~mot.:rtlt:), I hruu~h milituri~m. constitutional llluni(nli:llruJL n... •giuwdhm und :-:.heer arrogalh.. 'L' oJ'po\.\~:r. pn:~ident :\lt~:->L'\-eni manag~d to impose a one party st:1lc on Uganda. as the 1-iumnn Rights

Watch '"once stated

so Omara-Otunnu. A. The Struggle for De1nocracy in Uganda, rhe ,Journal of Modern African Stud1cs. lol 30, no.3 11992) p.449

41 'Despite the claims /o the contrw:1·. the ideology (~lthe Jlovemenf ·

Uj}Jh'tll"> lo lh' leuding tu 1he rviustutement uf u o!h'-JU.Il'IY rule"

I pose a question. how has the NRfvl tackled the contradictions it inherited in Uganda's political ccllnum) 11 hich ha1 e been obstacles to the democratization process''

I he· pvriud bc'I\\Cc'n i'Jk(> I<> I '1'111 c'all ihcTl'i~>rc' be characteri;,-d tiS thm ol' NRfVI's po11er

colbulidtniun. Sc1eral glll crnmcnt ministers from the oppositiun. 11 lw had been co-opted into the NRrvJ government 1vere arrested and charge with treason. Andre\\ Kayiira.ministcr oJ'energ)

!Iuman 1\ights Watch. I-llNilc to Democracy: The fvlo1 Clllc'nt S1 stem und Political

Rc•prc">e'lli:illc>ll l !2lllldll. \\ ,,,fllll!2tllll. I undc>ll. \ell York. ( Jl)l)l) I p. 1-13

was mm·kecl out and as posing a serious threat to the leadership or the NRfvl. particular!) in 13uganda. He and severn! other cabinet ministers were arrested und charged \\ith treason. but

11crc lutc·r acquitted due tu lack u!' e1 idencc. ')flul'll) al\er his t~cquiltcli. I( a) iirtl 11 us nssnssinatcd

The most important event internally, 111 terms oi' democratizatiun. during this periud 11as the ;;cttin)lUJl oi'a eun;;titutiumtl Cllmmissilln. to collect the vie11s !'rum the citizens lt>r drm1ing up a

Ill...'\\ (Olhtillltion. CJi\~.,.'JJ the b~1ckground to \ioll...'nt non l'dJhlitutionnli~m Dl' th~ post­

imkpcnck-nce pcriud. this ""'a step in the ri!'hi direetilln. I ilel'c' lidS a total embrace llf the NRM regime by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank's structural adjustment pmgnlllllllL'>. Fmm the carl) 1990s on11arch. the ·international eommtlllity' 11ould tolerate the restrictiun un political rights and the 1 iolation ul' human l'ights in l gttnda as lung as the NRIVI gu~ernmcnt pursued and cncot11·aged pri1 ate enterprise. I his il~h been a minus on the clemocratil.ation process of the country. Much as this poliq indisputably lilted Uganua from its cconomicttl death heeL it senlc'IKed its democratic creclentials to death penal!).

\:1{\f's c·faims tu have cfelll)StiJiecf the gun as an instrument of po11er and SCitfing of political

51 Omarn-OnJnnu. t\. The Struggle for Ot·mocTHC) in Ugandn. th<' ,Journal of Mocl{'rn Afriec:-111

Studw<:.. \ uJ .HJ. 110 J ( 1'002! p,--J-Ilj

42 dispu!l'-. dd<..'S not k:nd itsL·Ir 111Lh.:h crL'dt>IH.. 'l'. JJ'unc looks at the

\\~lr i11thc rltlnh~...·rn and \\l'">ll. .-'l'll pi.lrt::. u!'tllc L'UUiltr). 13rell in hi;-. hook~~ states th::.llthe NRf\1 has put an end to the threats Ctlllsecl by civil 11ar. l-lo\Yever lor the last 22 years. 11ar has raged endlessly in the north. Three ingredients have been asserted as being attributed to the conflict:

first. militari"11 by the NRM and the belief' that the e·onllict Cllll onl1 be endcdmilitaril). second. ctn e•thni,· \ltnd-sct c>l.tlll' '\l{\1 re·gimc lcl\~CII\Is the· people ul tile' tH>rth ll'hich borders on a 1cncktta and racism. Third. the uncompromising stand taken h) the Lord's Rcsistnnce Army. (I.RA). a brutal. ruthless rebel army led by Joseph Kony. In its occasional incursions in Uganda !'rom ·its bases in Southem Sudan and the Democratic Republic or Congo !DRC;. it usually kttll'S hl'illnd ektlllh and destruction. It is rc·spciiJSiblc 1\>r llltlldcTs. rape· and ttbduction of' Childrenl(ll· its campaign against the N!Uvl gmernment. Devast:lling ci1il \Iars hale bceni(Jught in the cast and north. the perception of the NRM as a southern' government. and the 11ars it has

J'ought ~~~<.linst the remnants o!· nrmics of its former enemies. hn~ rein/breed regional cleavages.

l'h~.--· ~>.,J\:\1 ll~,..., nut l1idden ih ~.-·~.)nt~.-·mpt Jln ,1 Jll'.t~.-·l·Jltl r~.-· .... o!utiun ,1( till' northern insurgence. fhh kt' he'Cil ~1idcnccd b): the t'CI~ngc uuuck un the il>rmer l'NI.i\.1" the 35 bauuliunoJ'NR.·\ in Kitgum District in 1986-87. This al!ack led to the rise oJ' the liganda Peoples Democrcllic

\·Jmc·mc·nt :\rm). l 11'DM':\. tu resist this humilimion. !let\lcetl I'!X!J and 19'J2. the people ur

I ~,.·...,p ~llhi 1.J1~.-' \c!Joli \\l'l'l' -.,uhi~.-·l·t~..·d l1.1 llliliL.ll'.\ hnn~!lit) \\hi~.·! I dnl\1..' tlh.'!ll into thl' pu~h to \\age l

.·1/thutf.l!,h .\'R:\1 so/diet·' l·ontinued to t'Uilllllil u/!'U!:ith'\·. mcluding thr!

!llt!l'dl'l' u; ch·ilian\,

The brutal treatment of' large numbers

deten/W/1\. then' l!'L'/\' lh'\\'1' l'OIJljhtruhlc 11 I!h u/f'(h'itie" ~.·u;mni!!ed ill

Lllll'L'ro.

··,; 13rett.E.l\. lveutralising 1hc Use of Force in Uganda: The tote of thf' Military in politics, The

JOU!'llHl '.Jl i\lodcm ;\J'ncan S! ud1cs. \'ol 3J, Nu l. ! ! IJlJS) p. l -t-l

43 lhc lcll'l ih<~ilhc <~lrucilics in l.u\\cr\l b) both ihc· /.IN II <~nclihc· Nl

1-Jc <~nd sc'\ era/ other cabinet ministers were arrested and charged 11 ith treason. but were later aL'L]Uitt<..•d dllL' Ill Lt~..:k or l'\ id~.,.'I1L'I.'. '-;hortl) :dh.·r hi'i ~ll'LJllittul. k~t.\ iir:l \\US assthsinatcd under suspiciou:-, circumstances"·'.

The most important event imernally, in terms of democratization. during this period 11as the

'il'Uing up dl' a con-.,titutitlnal L\l!llmi-;sion. tu L'Oikct tht" \ iL'\\" lhl!ll th~.· L'iti1L'l1~ /'or dr~l\\ ing up a

Jll'\\ L'I.IIJ',[!llll!Uil. \)i\L'J1 []I\' ha~.,·k~~Jlllllhi l\1 \ l\J/1..'111 lll.Hl ~·~.))h\Jlllliuna!is!ll or the j)O.':il- independence period. this 11as 11 step in the right direction. /'here· 11as a total embrace or the NRM regime by the International Monetary Fund and World 13ank's structllral adjustment programmes. From the early 1990s onwards. the 'international communil) · IIOUid tolerate the n.''-.triLll\lll u11 polith.:~tl rigllh ;tJld lhL' \ iohttloll 11l human rit_.dlt-.. Ill l ~<.tnJa U:'! lung as the NRfvl gm ernrllc'nl pursued and encouraged privme enterprise. I his has been a minus on the democrrllization process of the country. Much as this policy indisputably lilted Uganda ii·om its economical death bed. it sentenced its demucratic credentials lu death penall).

~/{\/'•, c·/,illlls lu ll

'J.Ukd,.t- ~Jil)dllg.o. \ rlllllll:ll Ju-.lll.. \:! hl' ~tlliJb ~l!ld I !Uillic:tll) criminaL H:t'->ing u11 til~..' lli>t,Jr.'. it i~ e\ident that once n go\ ernment leavt.:s po\\ er. people IJ·om the region \\here th~..· •>LJ'Sll:.~d president comes are subjected to murder, torture and inhuman treatment. I can therefore contend that the war in the north 10da.1 has become a C) nicul pretext l(>r the systemic destrue·tiun of' people. eH· maybe even

The notiun that the NRM govemment is committed to the peace ltd resolution of' the conllict in the north therefore needs qualilicalion in the light of' its practice in the last tllent)-tllu years.

In 1\lure·h IrJlJe·r l'l'i),\. 11lw hc1d been int,·grme·d int,, the Nl<.,\ lle'I'C' arrvsted in .lamwr) 1'!90 and charged 11 1th treasull. ~e·1 ercll t~l the c>l'licers. aJJlung them. l.t.e·ul \ Jchero- Nangai and Major Mark Laji)em died in detention in unexplained circumstances 11hile Major Mike 1\.ilama 11us shot b) NRA while repo1·teclly trying to escape to Kenyn and se1c:ral others. Charles i\lai 11as lc1il'r cli,mi·.sd l'r,>Jll the c'crbinct". Was this. indeed. a l~rir nml1wae·e·!'ul resolution o!'the northem con!lkt' llie'W illlJde·nt> ti>r the') kn011. ullcr the peace Cl[!reement: till') 11 ill k ai'I'Csll'd cJncl kille•d in

13) ll)94. the civil 1\ar had intensified 11ilh the ltlrther loss of trust in the government b) the people of Acholi as UPDA ol'liceJ·s who had been integrated in the NRA. 11011 renamed the llgan(b l'c·oples lkl'ense l·'orces. lii'J)F. di"IPIWUIWI 1\ithoul truce· l·he I R•\ mucle allrition in the fL'gion as the: recei\L'd militar) support !'rom the Sudanes~ (JO\t:rnment. \\hile reacting to the continued support by the 1\!luseveni regime of the Sudanese Peoples Libemtion Arm). SPLA. led by Colonel .John Garang. This is why the govemmenl found it necessary to engage into peace talks 11ith the l..R/1. /Iller long negotiation. a peucc

LR,\ ekmcu>ckd si.\ month to rc-organiLe the'I\Jsell cs in rctur11in~ Irum their bases in Sudan. This

;s AJ Mcilroy of the, Daily Telegraph, London on 16'" August, 1984

45 unn... 'a.\otwblc demand o!'th1.: LR:\ p!U)L'd in t!h.' hands nJ'Pre':-lidL'nl \luseveni \\ho \\as at pains to accept a p~acef'ul resolution of the conflict instead of' his preferred military conquest or the north.

Rather than set a r~nsonnble time period. Sa) one month, for the L.R,\ to return li-om their bases in '>udan. i11 1\'lcirc·h I'!'!-!. prc·sidc'lll 1\luse1 c•ni i"ucd an ultillloillllll to the LR;\ to surrender

11 ithin a 11cck or else tile) \\ould be ·crush~d· lronicall) this lias the clay the !'iRA and I.RA were supposed to sign the ag1·eement. Once again, a peaceful resolution of the conlliet had been shattered. The one 11cek ultimatum has turned into twenty three )ears and the \\ar still continues.

It 1\0U!d sc•cm to lllc' that the present 'lltempts

In conclusion. the NRIVI c·ame into J1011cr 11ith the help ul'thc· '>11cdish and l.il1jan milit~lr) assistcllll'c' and pledged to end the violations of human rights and impose military discipline. With the· inheritance or· all the cleavages and intricacies that lwei bede1ilcd llgancla's p11st- colonial flisttll') hut [)L•L'l' oJ' l{ll'l,'l'. ill!Okni!1Cl' ~!Jh] t!Jl' t..'<.)J1fig_urutiu!l 11! j1l)\\~r l)tl di-;tinctly ethnic political lc1undatiuns. militansm has been entrenched and the gun lie" still been upheld as an instrumcntoi'pcmer and settling of political disputes. This is ~oiliclll evident in the allituck 11ith

11 hich the "'RiVI government is treating the war in Northern llg,mch e~nd this has been coupled

\\ ith tile unco111prnmi~in_:! brut:d ,1nd llll-.,tlk ! R \. \.., ~~ .._.dll'>l'l]th.'!IL'L'. then.. · has been gross

, iulmion ell human rights in l 'g~lllda and partic·ularl) in the 11ar t1>rn /one of' (1ulu. Kitgurn. Pacler and parts of Lim district. A question can theref\1re be posed. hell\ the NRM lws tackled the contradictions it inherited in Uganda's political econom) which hm e be~n obstacles to the dl...'!ll\H.T;\li/;tlill!l [)rt)l't.'"l'>

A further examination ol' the violation of the fundamental rights provided l\11· Ill the 1995 constitutilln of Ugancl8 11 ill be in the next chapter of this research paper.

46 CHAPTER FOUR

-1.0 lntroductiou

!\AT!Oi\,\L RESISTANCE i\lOVEf\lEi\T CO!\lES TO PO\\ ER

~liltlln Obotc's second time in the government came to end 11hen lw 11as removed Ji·om po11er'

the commander oJ' his army. (ieneral Tito l!kello l~utlla in mid Jc;gs. \oVhat J(>lftmcd 11as a

perit>d ol' interregnum and ei1 il strili: in 11hicf> the rebel 1\atJoJul 1\c·siswnce ,\J'Jil) Movement NRA•t\1) occupied unc lwli' ui' the country. 11hilc the coup leaders occupied the capital and the rest. l'e

Muse1cni decided to take the linfiticaJ and CC<>nuJllic rc'COJI\tl'llc'tiun oJ' l'ganci:J 'liudy political. ( cntraf to this pruccos ll

man) trials and tribuiMions. the country's nc11- constitution came into J(>rce at the c·nd or I 1!95;''.

I h1: lll:tkilt':!

rL'I ic'll in~ their pnst experiences. identil)'ing the root cause of' thc'ir problems. learning lessons

Ji"oltl thc·ir past mistakc·s aJhi nwkin~ :1 c·un,·vrlc'd cJ'J(ll·t to pi'<>\ ide· solutions fl>r their better governance and future de1 elopment ;;_

The making oi'the 1995 constitution was an epic process lasting mer seven )cars commencing

in J

~r. ,J. Ulu!w-un~·ango, Cn1nm

"J. Ololw-Onyango. Constitutionalism in Africa, Fountain Publislwrs,(200 l) p.263 :'\ constitution is a long t('rtll national strateg) Cor the social economic tlnd politiculLkvelopment ol'the country. But it must it address both short term and long term 'lllclmedium term objectives. It must bcdance stability and change. idealism and realit). rights cu1d duties and prmers and rL'sponsibilitiL'S. lt must he ]11\.'~.-·i~~...· hut coh'"·!'L'llt. ~...·ump1·~.-·hL'Jbi\ ~..· hut \ iablc and mu~l meet the expectatiun oru !urge majority oi'the people 11itlwut ignoring the intcTc·sts oi'the minoril).

!\s one· ot' the• philosophicul buses l[lr l[mmilating its recommendati<>lb. the commission deduced that the Ill'\\ cc>nstitulida·, [Xlol ami present and respund tu ito aspircttions 1\n tit<: i'uturc ". I he cunstitution 11

4. I The salient ltttures or the 1995 constitution The constitution 11hich is the supreme luw or llgancla commence's 11 ith un imporwnt preambk and u sc'l ,,[' Nutionul objcl'tilc'' lllld llirl'c·ti,,· l'rincipll' ul' ~tlllc· polic1. r·hl' ('ulbtitution is an

~unbulatur~ li\ ing iw~tnJilli...'Jll l~lf· thL' good f.!U\ L'l'll~Hll'L\ lilK·rtJt.''->. \\ ":l!~trc. and prull'L'lion o!' ~til pL'rson~ in l 1 ~unda.

The nwkcr' oi' the constitution did it in the name of' all ligamlltlh rl'call the c·ountry's history 11hich hltd [1cen chltracteri;cd b) pulllic·al lliid l'lllhtitutional instctbilit,

I he) tu<>k i11to consideration the struggles or the Ugandan people ltgainst the lt>rl'es ol' l) rann). oppression and e.\ploitation '''-

One ol'thc lllOSl impOI'lllilt c•liltpll'rs or the· i'N' ( \JilStitution i, li~Ctpter !·our, \lllil'll is the purpose or this research and it contains rigid I) entrenched prll\ Joions li:>r the recognition. protection and promotion or fundamental and other human rights and li"eedoms.'"

'Al UenJHitlll1 Udoki, ":\ seHrch lor a National coitsensus", l\lakmg ui 1lw 1995 constitution, 2006

)') Preambli.? of the 1995 Constitution 1 "' 1995 Constitution of Uganda These rights and freedoms are to be respected. upheld and promolc'd h) all urgans and agencies of" government and all persons. Under Article 2 1(4) (c) of" the constitution. parliament is

cmpO\\L'n.~d to enact Ia\\~. \\hich an; nccc-.;"ar) and to dL'I1lll!blr~lbl) justil~\ in a l!·ee tlnd

dL'IllOL'!'clli<..' \UCid.\. f)ru~tiL~d[.\. U!ldcr r\rtieit .4() (J}. j[ j,_, !11'\)\ idL'd that during. U period Of c'nlergen,·). an /\ct of" Parliament shall not be taken lo contrmene till' prm isions cuntainecluncler chapter /(Jur of the constitution if it authorizes measures that are reasonabl) justifiable for dealing 11 ith a state' of emcrgctK) except th'H such an Act mal nul clc•rogalc' i!·om the absolute

right o! till· .. :un~titutiun pn!l~..Tt..._ ....l tlll.:n.. ·in ~~~~~.l tll'-'"''-' ~li\.' tllL' rl::l!t l1.., ,! Llir hcc.tring. J]·cL·dum /!·om

torture. -.·ntl'l and inhumatlt..' ur ~..kgradin~ tn.:ntmL·nt and punbhnlL'l!l ~n1wng other\.

Chapter 1\Htr of the Constitution has been hailed by e>.perts and c·ommentntors as one of the finest und best structured llilh or Riglm ,tcfuptecl h1 'ln) St"k I he r\rticks and clauses in

( 'hapter l·our are 11orcled eithc·r in the same llll) or drm1 ithpir,ttiun lhtm international lm1

principles and practices. For enforcement purposes. Article 50(1) of the Constitution is

lttndanlettt,tl. It provides that any person. 11 ho claims that the fundamental right or IJ·eedom guar,lltiL'L'd under the c'Otlstitutiun has been inti-ingc·d or thre"tc·ttL'li. is c'tllitled to appl) to a competent cuurt 1\tr rcdt·c·ss 11 hid1 nW) itKiudc· ,·ompcnsation:

Army Representation in Parliament

I Ill' l ~~llhLI h..'\lpl ...:-. J)t.•!'l,.'lh.'l..' I (irl'\.''J (l j>j)j) ; ... \illl' or till· \p\.\:Lil (JrUUJh l'l'Pl'l':-it..'ll[L'd in the Ug,tnda htrliamc111. !he institution or· the "rm; is established under Article 208 or· the Constituticm which states that ... There shall be armed forces to be kno11n ns the llgnnda Peoples Uel"cnce l·orces ... Article 209 provides for the /'unctions of the l '12andn Peoples Defence Forces

~unung \\ hit.·h arL' w [11\.?~~..:n l' ~n1d d~.·r~.·Jltl th~,._· ,,o, L't\:ignty and !l'rritul·i:t! ink·grit~ ur Ligand a and

to lt>slc'r lwrmon) and undc•rstamling bctllc·c·n the [)cfence I ur,·" e~nd ci1-ilians. Article 210 provides for Parliamentary oversight or control or the UPDF. The "'me article makes provisions that mandate Parliament to make laws regulating the management and conduct of the Uganda 01 Peupk·~' JJ~.·!'l'nct...' J·orCt...':-. i"~ th~.· mo-;t iJhl!'Uilll'!lta! in J'l''lPl'l'l lll til\.' arm) r~·prcsL·ntation in Parliament. The armv lms II! :'vii's elected bv thL' clcl'lor,tl culfc-",.' ,·unstituiL'd bv the f\lilitur)

Cottnei I 11 hich is chaired b) tile Commander-in- ( "hief 11 ho is th,· l'rc·sident of l: ganda.

C· Article 781c)

4Y l"he decision to have the army represented in Parliament \\tl~ born ollt or the need to control the

militnr) by civilian leaders and reverse Uganda's political histOJ") 11 here the army has held the .._Jemucratic development hostagL' through ~uc~..·c.':-,~i\ c milit11r) coup~ and militur: ruk· 1 '~. llgandu.

like lllu~t lllht:·r coutltri~:-. in \fricu hus sufk·r~..·d ~LH:cessi\t.' milit:tr> .._·uup':. and ih ~,.·unsequences. It is there•f(m; important to note that under the 1995 constitutio11 of' Uganda there was a realization of the defense and the promotion of the right to life. right to liberty. freedom ihlm lcHlurc. nucl. inhumane or degrading treatment or punishme·nt c111d tlw right to a !Clir hearing. The l'Oilstilution onl: Pl'l'l11ih tkTO~i.ltioll ul' thl':-.l' right~) cn~llrilll'd llil.'l\.'lli ill J~l\0!' ur J'undamentul or human rights or others or the public interest. The expre•ssion ·Public interest· under this provision of'the-lmv does not however permit political persecution detention 11 ithouttrial or an) limitatidtl or the e·njcl) llle'Jll of' the righh and f'reedom i11 the· hill di' righh be·) ond 11 hal is i.IL'Cl'pl~thk· ~~Hd dcllhJ!hll'dh!, iu-.tiJiabk !11 .t Jt\x .t!td t..k-!ltUlr.t!t;.. '>11\.·i~..·t\ or \\hat i .... pro\ ided !'or

1 in the L'unstitutiort .

-1.2 Proteetion and promotions of fundamental and other human rights and freedom

I undcllllc'Jitcil rights and r,·e·e·doms or the indi1 idual arc inherc'lll ""d not gmnted b) the state. Clause mu provides that the rights and ii·eedoms of the individu'd and groups enshrined in chapte'r r·our shed! be respectc'd. upheld and promoted by all organs cllld agencies of' gmernment und b~ .d! Jk'rsuns_ I hL' qu~..".. titJ!l ho\\l'\l'l' i" \\h:tt ~..·un...;titulL''> f'un~IJIIll'JHal right-.; ~tnd J'rccdorns'? I he rights 11 hich are litndcllllCJllcd must deal 11 ith the dignit1 c111d i11kgrit) ol' tlw indi1 idual ami the furemost is the right to life anclthe right to life anclli·ecdom fi·um turturc. cruel and inhumane treatment constitute f'unclamental rights. The concept or htllllcm righh is linked to the suprenwc) ur the Clllhlituliull prlll ickd fur umkr ,\rtklc· 2. In L'i'fc•et. Ia\\ s '"ld c'liSlOlllS II hich I iolate the rights and fi·eedoms uf'the individual 11 ill be declared null and 1 utel.

0 111 .: Interviews with Hon. Miria Matern be on June 25 2012-2:30 pm "' Art1c!e 4 3 so 4.2. I The right to life

The l 'nil er"li Declaration <>I' I Iuman Rights oi' I

lib~..·rt.' :Hld ,,,:curit.\ \)l·p~..·r-.,\lll ..

The right to life as secured under Article 22 ol'the constitution is stated in the negative light non deprivation and in effect it normally poses a question whether there· are positive nttributes to the

ri~hL

I'll<: right to Iiii: as protected under Article 22 is express I) pro1 ided for into instances of the e:o.isting indi1·idual and the unborn such that there is a physical existence of' the living individual

11hich must not be taken~~ \\a) b,1 lt'rminatiun.

l·nder the c·onstitution. the right to lili: is not necessaril) ctbsulutc· gi1e•n thlll the constitution

pcrmib Jl>r the eJtoprivltlion oJ' the right [O JiJC in the C.\CCUtion uJ' a sentence uf dcltlh penal!)

imp

-1.2.2 Frt•cdom from torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment

The f'reedom !'rom torture. inhumane or degrncling treatment or puntshment is guaranteed in the major International Human Rights instruments as 11ell as in themmic' Human Right instruments ,ueh 1ts tile' .\li·ieatJ Clwnc·r. .\rt. 5, ,\merit·an ConH•ntion. art Sib)

Article 565 prm ides that no one shall be subject to torture or to ,Tuel. inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 2-1 of' the· I '!'!5 cunstitution oi' l t'llllda pt\11 ide's that nu per,<>n shall be subject Ill Hll)

!'orm oJ' tortl!l"l'. inhunwn\..'. LTLH.:J or dcg.rading. lrt:~ltment or puni~hllh.:JH.

"'ArtiCle 20( 1) of the 1995 Collllitution of Uganda

51 The importance or this Article is evident in the margin note which states that the provision is to secure respect for human dignity and protection ll·om inhumane treatment.

rhe gu\11-d!llt.'ed Ji·e-:doms th~.;.'!\:Jtxe elllblld) broad and ideo!o~J·,t !ll)tiuns oJ' d1gni!). humanity

and d~..~cenc). Treutment and punishment llllbt therefore be groumk:d in the notions ur dignity and as such. must not degrade. dehumanize or debase an indi1 idual. ,\t the same time it should not inllic·t unnecessctr) ph) sica! and mental suf'li:ring. The prohibition from torture is directed 10\lards the protection ur' the ph)sicul integrit) o!' tlw i11d11 idual 11hik the other

elcmcnt/ll·cccloms m·c more concerned 11 ith the mental and ps) clwlogic~tl integrit) of the indi1 idual.

lhc r'rc·c·dutlb gu~trantL·cd Ull

tb) llw ,clltditiuns ot'thc imprisunnl<'nl l'.>l. deni:il or rood :llld skc·p. (c') ( urpurctl punishment.

-1.2.3 The Right to Personal Liberty, Movement and Security of the Person

l'lw la11s :tpplicuhk 111 tlli' right include's umong 1>thers. \l'ric:tll l'lwrtcr. Art. 6, American Comention. Articlc7 and the European Convention. Art. 4. And in the domestic perspective, the

11!1!) Cc>nstitution or Uganda.

litis c·cttc·~ur) 11!' right IHh lhhip tu till' ~vncral right llttdct lite crimimtl justic-e System since an arrest and detention is ol'ten the initial step to11urJs tl~c· po"ihk prosecution and conviction or acquittal oi' the individual. These personal Iibert) rights and those under the nimin:tl ju·.ticc" ,, stc'lll 11 ill <>lien pro1 ide i'UI' the· suhswntil c· ri~ltts. procedural rights

t\.'lllL'dial ri~hb.

The 1995 constitution has led to the reconceptualisation oi' the pro1 is ions or those rights as 11ell as the introduction or nCI\ guclrantees built into their protection umkr Article 23, 29 (2).

52 The right to personal liberty is secured at the international level in the Universal Declaration of

!Iuman Right (LJDHR)-19-+8 11hich provides that "No one shall be subject to arbitrnr0 arrest detention .. x L'\ilc ('"

/\t the· :\at ion a! le1 cJ the right to personal Iibert; is secured under Article 23 or the constitution and it essentially provides lor this right to be at large. Article 23 (I) is worded in such a 11ay that the right is inhere·nt and thai there lllll.st lw justilic;llion lc>r ih restminl. J"urther more. the

pr01 i"Oll or .-\rtieJc.23. lilllil ihC places to llhle"h a person IIWI he• ,ktaincd or rc·strained llhiJe

also pro\ iding for proc~durcs and n.:mcc!ic~ li.>r purpose~ of' rculJ;ing ur protl'1.. :ting the right to personal liberty. The instances in which the deprivation or the right to liberty ma) occur nre contained in Article 230) (a-g).

In R v Kahdi Ex-part Nasrecm.""

/\n order 11as issued by a Khadi directing the wife to 1·eturn to her husband. the matter came up as

H person cic'tnined or restmincd must be kept in a place authori/c·cl b1 lu11. Detemion 11 ithouttrial is express!) prohibited and the prohibition is ltirther supported b) the requirement to produce a person urrc':>te·d m .lcwinc•d lh:ll>re a court 11 itlli11 -IX hours

The meaning of detention II US discussed in the case or The Queen 1 Therens··". lhe uecused was intoxicated. rammed his car into a tree and 11as subsequenll; upprouched b; a police man to accompany him to the police station lor the purpose ol'carrying out a ·breathsizer' test.lhe test

L'

60 (1973) EA 153 (KENYA) "I198C'I CRC 455 (Canada SCi

53 assumed constraint of the movement of the person b) denwnd and direction 11hich was militaristic and illegal conduct of a professional force.

-1.2.-1 Hight to a fair hearing The right to a lair hearing guaranteed under Article 28 is underpinned by the concepts of naturnl justice' and due process. The right (in its primar)' features and guarantees) is non derogable in light of Article -1-l(d) and pertains lll both C

(b).\ public trial

(c),\ trialllt'fllre Hn independent and impartial e·oul'l

The right to a lt1ir tl'ial is buttressed by several guarantees 11hich are central to criminal procc•edin!''· First is the right to p1·csumptiun

the unu') of- JH\l\ ing guilt o!' ~~n indi\ idual otl lhL· prosL'l'lltiun ~!JH.I 111.:} ~.nlt..l n:~tson<.thk duubl. save

the instaLlCc's 11 here the rc1 ersc onus is admittc•d as under Article 2 H(-1).

Perhaps the most complicated issue in the post- 1995 justice system is the place of the mili!:ir)

11 ithin the \ll er:ill !'r;:rr'll'llurk u( the rc·giillc' ulla\1 One' of' tile· e'Chc'' that rai't•d the i"uc 11 ith 11 1 \j)Ll'ial puign~llll') \\ ~~~ l,:on~titl!l idnul .\ppli~.:~t!iqn l gaud a Lan .\ucil'!) \ A.G '

The application sought inter alia to challenge the constitutionality uf the National Resistance Statute (Nu.3 of' 1'!92) in so J;u· as it prm idee/ for the pnssing Urt. !he c·onstitution:il c·uurt h\'ld that the· I icld.

Court r'vlartial was established under Section 77 of' the National Resistance Army Statute and IHlS meant flH· the tried of' both men and women 11ho commit service ol'lences in a field operation 11herc ii i' impwcticable l(lr the oiTender to he' tric·d b) :1 l n'11 IJisciplirwn Committee' or

68 Although it could be said to extent to administrative Huthunties and boclH-~:-; 8~ stipulated under Article 42 .

.. , Constitution Appi!C!l!Onno 7, .:oo:~

54 Division Court Martial. The court stated that the pnmar; objectives of these courts 11erc to administer instant justice and instill discipline among the men and \\UJm'n at the /i·ont line.

·1 he court was flll"ther of the view that the constitution regarded the Field Court Martial as a special Court which vvas only established to maintain lmv and order and mililllr) discipline in a lidd uJ' upcrcllion. vvherc tu emplu) the nurnwl un1rt structures 11uuld create problems for the field l clllllnamkr.

Lastly. court held that civilian political matters cannot be mixed up 11ith militar) matters and 7 court cannot appl) the same )mel stick for btllh ".

1/d\\C\L'f t/h.. 'f(' \\:1:-, ~l ll1:rjur l'lJ!llJ\)\CJ':-,) ~llrruundillg t!JL• U!'J\:-.,l ;!lid :-,Ub~L'ljl!l'l1{ dl'tCntiOJ1 Of retired Dr. 1\.iua Elesigyc. 11 ho 11as a presidential candidate in the 200 I elections against president tvluseveni und fled into exile fearing his arrest by the authorities tiller militar) vehicles kept trailinl' him lillll\cr the' cuuntJ"). lksig1e re·turned to l't,(Ulld.J in till' late Oduher 2005 11ith tilL' intent tun of J"l.'t,(istcring as ll presickntictl cllndidatc fur e·kctiu11s \l'hcdukd in !\larch 2006. I lo11c1 l'r on I ·NovembeJ' 2005. he was arrested and ° Constitutiunal Application no.7/200] Constitutional Application no.7/2003 chm·gecl vv ith several counts of treason and rape in the civilian \lagistralc' ('out·t und subscque'Jlllv remanded in cktc-nliclll. nwtc•rs became more complicated as he prepared to appear bclcll·e the I ligh Court tllhiclt lmd jurisdil'liun over the case) and apply (or bail. In a bid to pre-empt his release. the gm eTnment slapped charges of terwrism and concealment of terrorism against him and nrrail'ncd him bel(>re ll l\!lilitm) lribunnl I his has c·othidcrahlv IIHJddiccl. I ltv \\liteTs he·cnusc· CJitil"llc.il he· sccure·cl bCJil li'lllll the· high luurt. the I ribunal rc·Jl)CJilckcl him i11 e·u,tud\ until 1'/ !Je·e,'lldk'l llesig)e' relt!S•:d to appl) f'or bail in the Tribunal Court because he denied thcll it has nojurisclic·tic>n to tr) him.

lnthe•c·,tsc oi'Joseph Tumu.11111be J', /i.G'' "'litchi lu auack imcr e~li" tltc' act ui"thc· l)enewl Cuurl iVI"rti,Ji u( the l'gamla l'coplc·s Delense l·oJ'Ce f'or keeping sume· lll'lli\ oflicers in custocl) for a period exceeding 360 clays without entertaining their bail applicatiuns and releasing them on bail

~~ConstitutiOnal Application no. 7/2003 n ConstitutiOnal Petition no 6 of 2004

55 as t'U'trdrllccd h) the Constitutiun. lhc app!i,·,urt "llcged that this cumra,enes Articles 21(1) (2) allll (3) and 23(6) of the cunstittllion. I he constitutional court lle·ld that unless exempted by the constitution itself', all the fundamental and other human rights pro,ided for in the constitution are binding on nil authorities and persons throughout Uganda. The court ltrrther held that the General

Court f\,'J~lrtial ''~h 11ot ~..-'\''mptcd Jl·om tht.· 11!\)\ i-.ions or tht.' l'dll...,titutiun regarding tlwsc rights and l'rL'l'dUill'-1. ! he right tu hdil 1;-, ~~ J'und~l!lh:lltal right Lil b) the l>L'nerul Court 7~ Constitutional Petition N0.6 oi'2004.

~·lartial. I he·rellrre the acts of' the respondent rn keeping them in de·t,·ntion be)und the period

\\Cre Ullcurrstitution,rl. llut the· Lilli) justillc"tiull r'ur the· l'l'e,lliurr c>l.t special lriburral is that the urdinar) c:uuns ur la11 tended tu be slm1 and tlwt the) 11ere also nut .,uited !eli· ecnain categories or pwrc·ssions and uccupntiun. Court Martial's are justified b) the !\ret that the) arc· mure suited tt) lr) milit:u·) sen ll'c ui'IC-rr,·e·, tlr'111 urdin"n ,.,)llf'ls but mure· nnpurtantl1. the'\ "re· e.\pected to l!i">p~):-. ...: ~,1 \.\I'lL') 1.,.'\pcditit.•u-,!_\. Jtt<..:anin~ p~...·r'>\llh .!!'1\.'">l\..'d !'ur 1l1Jiit:lr:~ d!.ll'n~..-·l·'-~ ~huuld ~pend less time un remand th:m their c·m111terparts appe"ring in ci1 il courts .

.J.3 The 1 iolation of human rights in the post ll)l)S ern under tht• ''

-1.3.1 The right to life and prohibition against its Arbitmry Deprhation This is considered the f(Jremost human right. The right. gu:mrllleed under Article 22 or the eonstitutiun. pruhibits the' unl:l\\ful ur arbitr'll') ,kpri1atiun ur pl11,ical fill' ur buth li1ing. and unborn p~..·r .... ulb. In :-.piLL' l)!'llll' ~...·~.m:-,titutional gu~tra!llL'l'. ther\,.' lw:-. h~.,.·~.,.·IJ ,.:untinucd lu':>:-. u!'lil'e as a result uf'arbitmrJ acts o!'statl' agencies (army. police. and security tllh.l intelligen~...·c agl'nL·ies) and at the hands of' third parties [l·ommon criminals. terrorists and insurgcrlls. etc.).

Sine,· I'J'J:i the·rc h:rs bc,·n r,·punirrg ul· killings. ubductitlih 'rrrd ,fisctppcarances uf' individuals in incidents ol' terrorism. ordinnr) crime. mob 1 iolencc. incornrm111ie·"do Lktentiun and most

56 prui(Hintll). in~urgenc) and ~ll"!llcd conlliL·t. I ht..'rt· are \OJ1lc L!1..'1..'!:-, oJ' the re~ponsibilit) of government as regards the protection of the right to life. First!), there is a dut) to not directly inli"inge the right to lile. Secondly. there is a duty to protect the right fmm violation by third partie,. llmdl). thc•rc is a dlll\ to take· pt"itilt' lllt''Nire' to prt>lt'd lilc·lhrough the prewntion of death but under milttar) ruk tl"' right is aiii,!)S tlte liN CcNtnlt)

Fourth I), there is a duty to provide measures and remedies in situations 11 here there has been ckpri1:\lion of lile. Reportc'd incidents of '>tate-inspired killings. "l)(luetion' and di"1ppeamnces ur ind!\ !dUlicc·. arlll). parlnnilitar) outlits

(such'" Uperwion Wcmblc)) :ntd intdli!,!c'nce agencies (such '" l \II). There are a number of complaints that have been liled before the human rights commission 11ith regurd to the violation ol'the ri~htto lile and some• of these complaints include. Nshcmerdrwe Peace,. A.G 72 11hich i!llollc'd dc'"th n!'u brothc·r. l',nrick lvlumencro. killed b)" C\11 "i'''t:llile 11hik• inl'\11 custody.

In Okello Donato Laaka 1 ,\_(;'J 11hc•rc till' 1 lctim '""shot""''" lit .•\\\ere tr:tding centre b) the· l'i'DI.

On the other hand. thc·rc h:ts bc·ctl immense loss of Iiii: to insurgc·m·, c!lhi cunllict. l'"rticularl) in the nun it "nd part I) in tile \lc'slc'l'n pans ul'thc· c'c itic·, be in[! pc'l'jl<.:lratcd b) buth guwrnmcnt and rebel forces. I he response un the part ui' the gu1 crtt!llent has been lllried. i.e. from protectionist measures to forceful action. Thus there has been creation of lntcrnal Displaced l'crsons 1IDI') camps. espc·ciall) in northern ligand a as 'safe hm ens· (bas cspeciull) been in the distric-h or (Julu. I Ira. 1-..itglllll. l'ader in nurthcrn Uganda) the· '•liii!C C"!llJlS \\ere put up in 11estcrn l'ganda in the district uf Katak11i in the 11ake ol· ac·tilitic·s of caltle rustling b) the Karamajong. with occasioned displacement in Teso. Although the camps. as ·protected 1 illagcs·. \\ere intc'!llicd tO uJ'Ier protection against insurgent attacks 'lnd abdul'lions. till'\ hU\C large[\

'·Complaint UHRC N.249/2002 73 Complaint UHR No. g41/2003

57 the incidents in the urban terrorism and armed robberies that plague Kampala city in 1999 and 2002 respectively resulted in loss of life and properly. The enactment of' the Anti- Terrorism Act

and the 'tduption o!' extr,t-le~al a111i-robbery lllc''"~lres such 'b Oper,ttiun Wemblcy 11ere attempt

at l·urhin~ do\\11 tilL' thrL'~lh u!'tL·rrorism and anllL'd thugger) to L!JL' riglltto lilt:. l--lo\\ever. major concerns arose as regards the anti-terror legislation and ·shoot-to-kill policy· of the anti-robbery measures. These were mainly with regard to the observance o!' 'due process' guarantees. The duty ol'thc government to protect the right to lil'c· fwm v·iolatiun hv third P'trtics should be within th~...· par:tlllL'h.:rs ul· n.. \t')Oil~thlvl!L''>··

The J'urur over the anti- robbery measures in 2002 11as in respc•c·t u!' reasonablcnc·ss of the I(H·ce used in 11ltat 11as perceived as a ·shoot-lll-kill' policy. vvith the· act\ of th<-' paramilitary group

L'!lgagL·d ill till' ~mti- rubbL'l') !lJCa'lLJrL''l hurd~...· rill~ 1.!11 '>tl!lllllar) :tnd t..'\!Lt-judicial killing.

Since 1995. the government has continued to use traditional respunse to unlmv !'ul deprivation of' li!C·-that is Crimitwl prusccutiun l'ur u r'tne!c' ol' ol'l'enees. Pre1 iou'lv uho e~i,tin~ liS 11 response llltckr tile'

~.k:~Jtll ~·.. :nt~..·rh.'!..' l'lll1\ il·tioth h\ rllilit~ll-~ ~.:uut·t·~ \\ ith !\:t!~Jrd to 111ili!~l! \ ...:ull\ ktiorb. on 25 !Vlnrch

2002. I\\U lo\\ run king llll'!lllk'r') uJ' tilL' arnh:d l~m:e:-, \\Cre surllfn~tnl_\ l''.\.~cutt'd. b) /iring squad. after trial l'or a triple murder before a Field Court Martial. Almost u )Car later, on 3 i\-'larch 2003 privates 11crc similarl) executed after death convictions handed dcm n b) a Fidel Court fvlarti.

J'hi\ rc'sllllc'd in t\10 pc'titiOih c·hallc•nging the cilll2 C.\CCUtioth !lltd. Ill the 11ah· uJ' ~larch 2tJ()J

L'.\ecution~. ~Ill <.tpplication ~'-·eking a sla) on J'urtlh.T L'.\l'I.'Utiotb in tJl._· military.

On 5 April 2007. UPDF Presidential Guard l3rigade (PGB) private zeplia fvluhumuza killed

Nandagu. Collins Nabcnda and !'vloscs Kiv~:tni in Mbalc tu11 11. \ luhunHwt reported!) kilied

Nand~J~o. a sc.\ \\orker. /(Jr !~tilin[:! to l1ll'L'l hi-., \l'\Ual dL'lll~llhh ~\IJd -..uh\t.:ljlll'lltl) :-.hul Nabenda and 1\.ivvani Jell' trying to intcnene. The third division court nurttcll ':ha1·ged 1Vluhumuza 11i1h three counts of murder on 6' 11 April. A linal ruling vva' pc·nding at the )'Car's end.

On~ I .\pril. lil'l)l· J'(ill lic·utc·twnt l'der r\ltirnbisibvvc· kilkcl l'rc·sickntialul'licc ui'licial Nelson

58 Ssendegc)a in Kampala. The offender \Vas detained in Luzira prison and hi::. triul \\tb pending at 71 )C~n··s end. ['he motive u!'tlw killing rcnHlillt..'d unkno\\11 . .

It has been said that the go\ernment ur ib agenb did JllH cumJnil an: political]) moti\nted killings though no body kno11s the truthfulness or the assertion. !vlost of the killings in the post /VV5 era have been attached to the security forces. including police. UI'DF oi"llcers, and lllL'Inhers c~i"th,· l.ocaiDelc·m,· l 'nih (!l)l 1 or mditi;~s.lt"s hoiiL"Icr important to note that most ui"the killings committed b) the above mentiun,·d groups ha1e ah'"-" not bee inwstig

-1.3.2 Right to Dignit~· and !'hysical lntegrit) T"he respect for human dignity and integrit) is guarameecl under the provisions of Article 2-1 of' the 1995 Constitution. The li·eecloms fi·om torture, cruel. inhuman or degrading treatmem or punishlllL'nl- in II hat is rell:rr,·d to as ·one or lltlwr or the SCI L'll pc:11Jllllalions ,,r Article 2-1 and this rigl11 is non-derugablc as per Article -1-l(a) ..\utabl). l-ganda 1s a phk111. ,.,p,·e·iall) 11 itilullle~ll l"ul detcntilllls. I he practic~ o !'torture· has r~mai n~d the domain o I' agene ies o 1· the• state ~spc,· i;~ II_, those ~llnccrne·d 11 ith Iall and cmler and security- police. prisons. intelligence organi7ations c111d the ar1111. f'hc incidents llf' tc>rtur~ :tl"c' ''''"''·' linked 11 itil 1 ;,,lations uf' pcr,onal !Jb,·m "' tile rL'sllli u!" detentiun

In this particular context we are looking at the perpetrators oi'torture as the arm) and intelligence ugcnc!cs. lk·"lpitl· th~..· !~ll.'t that thl' ~..:uw-,titutloll and 1-t\\ pruhihit \lh.:h pr~t~..til'\.:~: hu\\L'\t:r there \\·ere credible rc:pllrts that securit) I(JI·ces tortured and beat suspects andtlt;ll detainees died as a result of' torture. Torture generally occurred in unregistered cletentiun I~Jcilities and 11 ith int~lllions to

J.; The Bureau of Democracy, llum;:;n rights and labor. 11 march 2008. countryr t·pol h on humdn nght practices (2007!

59 rorcc L'U!'I!~-s~ions. I ht..' l 'g~llld:t I [unwn Right-. ( 'ommi~sion n.~\..'L'i\ ~..:d ! 6-t- (1.1111p!~lints ur torture

duritl':f, the ~L'a!' 2007. J)L'Ill\!lhlr~tto\"-., dil'd ~!' .. ! r<._"·,lJJ[l!( r~)l\_'ihk Jh]h:l'...,iOil o!'d~_.'!llUI1:-.tratiOJl;-, b)

StTurit_\ !()JTes.

Reports li·om human rights organizations. including Human Rights Watch (HR W) and the l·uundatiuns ll>r !Iuman Rights lnitiatilc(IIIRIJ. citc·d e.\amples oi"turturc carried uut b) securit)

!(Jrct.·~. induding administering CUllS. Sl'\ en.: bc:l!!llg: rcmu\ a! u!' Jing"·nwib: hammering needles imo the body: electrocution: usc of snakes: inllicting pain to the genitals. According to report b)

human rights commission the police committed (81 cases) the l!PDI and its intelligence branch

the Chicl"lain,·y ol" .~lilitan inklligenc·e (1.\:i cas,•sJ. :llld the \'i<>klltl'l"ime Cruck l'nit(VCll) or Rapid l'rotL'l'tion lqJit(35 c:"'"i engaged ill tonur,·

7 In the CHSL' or Steven Gidudn \' A.G "- The CtiSC ol' Stelcn (iidudu opitomiscs torture at the

hands ,,rtlw arm1. ·\rr,·st,·d :tnd dct:lined ll>r 9\ d:tys in a miliwn b:11Taeks. th,·,·omplainant \IUS

·~uhjt:l'tl'd l\1 th(' 11\u:-.t grll\..'">\ll!IL' ~tl'l-.. lll' lUI'lllll' .l!td ~,.1\.·hutllc!llilitJ~ tJ~,__·:!lJllt..'tll that th~..· d~..:gn.:e oJ'hi~

inenpueitatiun VI US put ut 5U~'u. In the end the commissiunrellcet,·d '"lthe l~tctuf'tlle arnl) !~tiling in its dilly (to re.IJ>ect human rights.) us envisaled wnler tile pro1'i1ions o(Article 22(1) of the constitution and further observed that: the J!ructice of members of securitr forces torturing

in the t'Oui!II:r.. I !ttn•e 17C1\1l' h

in suhiecring u ji!l/oll' human being ro .vonu! ol rhe mo.\/ grue.\oiJ/1.' .form.\ o( lurlure and

dehumulli:.ulion I \rill t~dd tlhll hurh 1/te gol·,·r!l!lll'IJI und th,· dt ti!J /,',1\lenllf}J 'hould 1uke more

H'l'ioll'l(\. iltc dl'\l'l'ifJ/i!,il ~~; tih' ( I'! )j. w~tlt ,. Artie!I! 208 (l) ,n JlU/rioltt', prole\·siunul. di.lciJ!Iined uml suhordinute to tile ci>·iliun

('PDF liw to their descriJJiion 1111der Article 208 (3) liS 'citcen' of ( 'gund" uj good clwmcter.

TorturL' he~s :tlso been cnrri,·d out in the hnncls ul· intelligen,·,· tlt,!l'IIL'ic·s such as til,· Ci\11 e~nd other

'" Odoko comm·lssion Report 2005 /[) Comp!a!Jlt Ul·IRC No.210/1999

60 (iovemm~.-'!lt !~Jn..:c~ and thl' K:1ram:tjont:!- \\~tJTiur:-, l..'ontinu~..·d tu l,_'!~t~h during the disarmament exercise. 11 ith reports or physical abuse, punishment. and killings. Sccurit) forces continued to usc ext.:e~si \ c Coree on Ol.x:usion. including rape. Ho\\ ever the go\ crnment has b~en criticized ror

·do\\n pl~t) ing· :"-~ll!llL' u!' tht..· ... 1-.::llh'-i and 1-llhL'r hum~m righh \ iuLttions. claiming the) \\ere ll!l<.\\ oidabk· gi\ t'll the cin.·unbt:t!h.'I..'S.

4.3.3 The right to personallibet·ty

The right to per;;onal libcl'l\ Ch prniously lhllcd is guarantc·cd undc·r Article 23 or the 1995 cunstitutiun. Crucially. the· right has. undc'l' the 19'!5 c·unstitutiuiL been rid ol' the \\anton restrictions by 1\lt) or cl

Arl. -13(2) and 23 (9), and the mder or lwlwas c·orpus is guarantc·c·d .ts non-derogablc right 1trl.

23(9) llllci .J-1 (tJ), IIllich s(rc'llgtilc•lls It dS d IL'IIIL'd\.

Nulllithstanding the prm isions ui'thc constitution. violatiuns urtltc right to personal Iibert) have continued since 1995. Most or the incidents or unlmvruJ arrests and detention in 1 iulation or the right It> JlcTsllllltl libcTty hell c' hc•c•n pcrpc·u·,lk'd h1 the· organs. "'c·uritl agencies and crnicials ol' the slate. althuugh there arc incidents ol' 1 ic>lations m the hunds ul pm ate individuals. The police unci the minisll') ol" intemalanl1irs. has the primary responsibility uJ' J,m enl'orcement. l'he UI'DF is the key armed i()rl'e churged with the responsibility for extemul security but has hac/ partiul respolhibilitl JCrr muintainiltt' urder in the IH>rth. 11here it \\liS ,kployed tu protect civilian lntcmul l!isprcssed l'cupks ,·,imps i'rum 'lttul'i". I he Intend \cc·urity Orgunitmion (ISO) and the External Security Orgunization (ESO J. kc) securil) JC>rcc· 11gencies and intelligence gathering entities under the direct authorit) or the presidenl. occasionally detained ci1 iliuns. The ('\II. llllckr I 'Pill 'lutiH>ritv. dc·t,linl'li c'il ili,llh sUSIWL'icd n!' tl'ITUI :sill ,1nd rvbc·l 'ic'lil itics. l.ucal dl'll'llL'I.: Ullit-.. li J)t "! t!ut \\'-'!\,; lllL\Jill tu n.:i11li.d\.'l' tlh: go\l'rHilJ·.·Jil ·, ·,:!'J'ort;-, td pi\llL'l"! civilians rwm LRA attacks in some cases also participated in oJ'Ji.:nsi1c miliury operatiuns and carried out police functions.

S~...·1...·urit~ l~)rct::-. coJ1li1HIL'd t~_l bL" con~tr~lilh.'l..! h.\ limill'd n... ·-..;ou!\.'\.'"- iJh:luding lo\\ pa) and lack o!'

\Cllilk::,. -..'quipmcnl ~tnd tr~tilliJJ:; and as~~ 1\::-,uli 1..:umlllillcd !1UJJ!i...'tul!\ human rights abuses and impunit) 11as and still continues to be a problem.

61 l'lw kn\ n:quires that search \\arrants be issued by a judge or jJro:-,LTULor bef'ore arrests are made, however in practice suspects have always been taken into cusrocl) 11 ithout ~Varrants. Despite the prO\ isiun that suspects lllUSl bt: charged\-\ ithin -1.8 hour:-:. ofarn:sL flHI!l) persons since 1995 have been detained long.~..·r \\ ithuul h('ing chul't..lL'd, ,~-!:h-., ~llT<...'"'h duri11_:! poli~..·e nnd arm) '>\\eeps lws

r~..·main~.:d ~~ probk·m. as ~lre d!TI..'-...1'> bus1..'d on 11\.:a-.,lln clwrgcs I lh: lrc;!'-.Ull suspects \\L'!\.' subjected to numerous abuses. such as detention vvithout chnrge. detention in unregistered and unof'licial locations. •mel mistreatment. including torture. The prison service held JO pre-trial treason suspects during the year ~007 the Uganda llum•m l{ights Commisoion received 107 complaints during the· )car 2007 rrom pc1·,uns claimint( to hmc· bc•cn arbitraril.v arresb. 1-t or vvhich vvere conlirmcd vv ith the Commission itscll'. The government paid 120 billic>n shillings in e'OillJll'n"Ition to v·1ct1ms. . t Itat yc•ar n 11 hich money could hun· bcc·n directed to other p1·essing

:.I\L'J1UL..'s '1l/o..:h ~IS pu\erty l.T:!di .. :~ttiun ~tnd impro\L'!lll..'nt oflllL\.IicuJ l~tL·ilitiL's.

!here vvcrc· no development in tile .Januar) 2U00 cuse oi' !\luvvungu l~ivumbi. the nutionul Coordin:rtor or Popular Resistance Against Life presidenc). arrested and interrogated lor scditii' Yu,ur Nsibwtthi: the· \lurch 200(l case or Private

or ;\zi<~ I uri g) e. I lassan lsigoma. and llashir :\lusta/l1. /he gm c'l'lllllcnt has avc1Tcd that none ol' the above mentioned detainees have remained in custody hovvcver the truthrulness of this awrment still remains unknown to the researcher.

I he 1':1rl~;uncnh Internal .\11:11rs lumnlittcc· diOcu1crcd in tJe·tube·r tl~e11 729 inmates ut the Kigo Prison in K:nnpala had been held on remand longer than one ) cw· 11 itlwut trial.

The e.\pericnces 11 ith the pmlongecl and incommunicado detentions have occasioned the use of another rcmcd)- the urckr ,,r IJ:Ii1L·:rs c·orpu' \/though hi, prin~;1r' rcmcd) to deprivation or

P'-'l'~on~d litK'rL) i:'l ~tccurdcd additional prukdiun under th'-· ClJth!!llll/tHl i .c. it is em in\ iulnble and nun-dcrog:rblc right. Since It granted vll'rc as a resull of nun production or til\.' dcti.li!ll'\.':-, in court.

77 Human fights law journal 2007, ''human rights report"74

62 (her the )t'U!'S. tile practice of government agencies especial!) ~-:curit) ugencie~ is li) defeat an application fOr a \,Hit or habeas corpus by preferring befOre a magi:;,trute court. criminal charges against corpu-:i {\\here d~..:taiJh.. 'l'' arl' nnt pruducL·d hL'I'urc thl' high l'nLJrt) has not b~..·en adequmdy addressed b) coul"ls. This \\as reiterated in the maller ul· '->ile·ik ,\bdu l(arim Ssentamu. constitutional reference No.7 of 199 (CC) 11hcre the accused. 11110 11as the subject of a \Hit issued b) the lligh Court of Kampala. "'b produced 'llld charge·d 11ith the oJ'Icnce of treason b~,.:J{wc :1 :\l~tgistrak';-; court iJl k~hl''l'. ~~~ di·,\.·1~~~r~i11~ upplh.. :~lliuJh til~..· coun:-, :"!Ct.:lll tu Llmcede that the lll'il senes nu purpc>Se 11here the detainees hale' been pruduccd bef(Jre court. albeit not before a I Hit issuing court. The overall effect has been the fi·ustrmic>n of the primar) remedy to infi·ingemcnts of personal Iibert).

-1.3.-1 Right to a fair hearing

The right 10 a 18ir hearing or. to use the term used in the i\mcrican il'gal system. ·due process· is guaranic•e•d under .. \rtic!c 2S c>f the· I '!'!5 l \l!1slituti,>n. [[Jere· .11·,· <>I her illlc'rrelmcd rights. includin~ the right tu cqrul prutcetion L1!1,kr the· la11 (,\rt 2!) a1,,[ tile right Ill lcrirncss in ndministratilc process (Art -ll). Further tile right to a li1ir hc·arin~ is closcl) related 11ith the cc>ncepl DJ'judicial independence of the Cllurh under Article 128 (I) of' the cDnstilutiDn. While article ~H spells out the· Jl-,tturc t>f the· right lu 'I lctir trial in the· impartial court '1nJ the speed) conduct eli' trials. it additionnll\ embodies 1mious rights tlwt hllllre·ss the rights. including the right to legal representation but under military rule this principle finds little or no sympathy. the independence or· court martial's is in doubt there is neither legal representation nor right of appe'tl 11hic·h clllails unlilir trial in lic·ld cuul'l lll'lrti

or respected Since 1995. the right has been impacted upon by actiuns of the stmc (and its organs nnd ag~ncics) ns \\l'/1 ~ts the pro\ isions oJ'vw,ious pieces oJ'kgisl~nro11

It's impurtamtu nutc thm thv nght ttl a lair ilc'atiLlg "ills fur ltllfl'LrtL,illl\ and imlepcndencc of the cuurts in liKt: the impartiality of the Cllurts is closcl) related to the lhirness of a trial. Thus in the incidents imolving military executions in March 2003. the composition of' the Field Court Martittl and the conduct or the trial by assortment oi' miiilllr) personnel- lh>m the prosecutor, legal ol'licer to the court itseli' could not have much promise f(Jr impartiality. While the trial oi' civilians bdtli'C military courts is all oiled under the la11 and is cun!"irmed b) courts. impanialit)

ol· mililar: l'nurh !'L'maill'> IJigJd) duuht!'ul. .\ \,._'~l~l' in point i') tlut \)j' llgund~t Lu\\ Society v.

'\(i ·'. 11hcre the court cmniuusly admitted the· tritli oi'civilians l1ci(lre the court martial ·so tong us the principles or the rules or natural justice and the rules oi' cv idence and procedure were stricti) observed'.

;\nothc•r tTiticaJ puint 1\llrth nllcver there is tl question as to 11hcther the glllv'rlllllc'llt htls rcspcc·ted this vision. J'hc presidv·nt has cxtensin· kgal pLmers oi' judicial appointmc'llt. The president appoints Supreme CuurL lligh Court and ( 'ourt o/' \ppeal judges 11 ith the appro1al ol' parliament. members ol' the judicial Sen icc lommissiun. 11 lw makes rcconlmc·ndtllions on appointments to

the judiciary. With these extensive powers grunted to the presidv'lll and the grip 11 ith 11hich he has held the country is likei)' to Jeopardize the independence or the _judiciary. On the other hand.

the militcrn 'ie!'e oi' the lli~h l'

l'he l~lirness ol'the trial does not only require that the trial should be bell>re an independent' and ·impartial' c·ourt. bui thm it should also be· bci(>rc a ·competent' ,·"urt. In this eorlle>.t therefore.

lh~ lrLll ,)[ Ur l\.i/1~1 lk•,-,J~_.\l' und hh 2~ (\i-~1\..·\,._·u~L-'d J'or tcrrur1~111 bl'I~>I'L' lhL• (j~Jh:ral Court i\1ttrticd collll'lliCnv·d the ri"!hl to a IC1ir hc·anng oincc the anti tcrrurism lm1 onl) allu11Cd the prosecution of acts or terrorism before the High Court. The constitutional court obscTved in the

7 1 Uganda l.a\\ Society case ' that the right to a fair hearing cmbudies the right to be tried b) a

C

\Vonh noting is that the right calls for a ·speed)· triaL What constitutes a ·speed)' trial or. as I usv·d in other jurisdictions. tritli 11 ithin tl ·rccrsortctblc time' i' nut ckllned. What I can certain!)·

sa) is that it docs not impl,l ·twstc' in the cut reluct ol c1 triaL'"'"" the case in the trial of tiiO soldiers bcll1re a Field Court ~·fnrtial in Kutido in t'vlarch 2UU2. I he trial 11 as conducted in less

'' Constttulional pelitton No 18/2005(CC) ''-'Constitution petition No. 07/2005

tA lhan Lince hours and \\US tit th~ expense of guarantees thnl bultre~~ lhc right to a n1ir trial. (e.g. Legal representution). The gmernment cld'cnckd the trial a,; ·speed)· in terms ol'the constitution. 0 although it \\~1~ sub~L'l]LIL'ntl~ uh'->L'r\~..:d: lhe l\\u ~oldiers :-,itnpl~ lk'>L'f\L'd a l~1ir. not quick trialx . In del'cnse or the execution bel'ore Parliament. the then Minister ul' Uetense. ,\rnarna lvlbabazi stated that: "The conslillllion demam/.1' a .spei!dl' !rial. precise(t·ihui is trhaill'e did".

On the uilter hand. the arm) spc>kes man. ~l>e had spentt11o days. lite) 11uuld h:ne said Ill' are lttdinf! "'mething. Let them nul tic· <~ur hard lield cuun martial pnJ(ess is a J'ast one··.

The milit:lr) court S)Slem olkn did no ensure !he right to a lnir !rial. c\llhough the accused might

[U ~~ k·!;!~~~ l'illllhL'I. :-,UI1ll' ilii!itur~ lk'Jl•Jhi..' ,t{[l>i'lli..')'> \\\.'!'!..' ll!I[Lillil'd dl!d C1.HJ!d hL' d\Signed h) militctr) contm~uhl. \\hicll ;.d-.u ~tppoinh tilL' prosecutor ~llld !lh.' ~td_judiL·uting ulftL·er. !'he establisks a court martial appeal process: htmever. a sentence passed b) a militllr) including the death penalty. could be appealed on to the senior leadership ol'the l 'PDF circumswnces deemed e.\igenl. a llc'id court martial could be con1 c'llL'cl at the scene· ul tk crime. The la11 docs not permit appc~tl oi' a con\ ic'llllll under a l·kld l'Utn·tmanial. llcme1 cr. the major probil'm in ensuring the right lo a speedy trial has been the dela]s in prusecuticlll and disposal of c~tses. The dl'iu) s have· been caused 111 'I multitude lilctors or the l~lC(~)j'') oJ' illtt..:\'1..:\t \.1.1 t!Ji~ ri,.'')t,.'UJYh i'-. tilL' ~l..'lll'l'~l] li..'lldL'lll'.\ uJ' ]hJ!dill::! OJ' '-ill'1j)L'l't'o..; (k•t~:ntion

11 ithout production lc>r trial l'ctr kngth) periuch. I his is partic·uLnl\ 11 itlt the dewined and held by intelligence and security agencies such as Cfvll. VCC'U and the· Uperation \\ emble). This general II makes !ell' slm1 administmtion of justice'.

The right lc> be allutdcd ackclll"te time a11d t'"cilllies lcll· prc'P"""t•ull ul a del'ense (Article 28 (c)) 11as also mised as an issue in the Kotido military executions. lii1 c·n the passage· oi' the than 72 hours bct11cen the murders. the trial and subsequent execution. it cannot re,Ntnable ul' the said that the sulci iers 11 ere a l'i'urckd ,tdequatc· l iIll\' and !Ctc'i Ii 1ics l(tr Ihe prc'jJCtrut ion or the de 1\:nse- in

:tn) L'\Vlll. the~ \\ere nut a~..·cul\kd kgal rcpr~..·'),,'nta.ion duri11g tlw [\\u ~!ltd lwl!'tria!. 4A The present political situation in Uganda

SincL' th\..' 2001 pn.. "-.identi:d ~..·h.:~..-·tion-., ''hL·n Ur. Ki;;a J5~,.·...,i!:l;.l· :1lmost 1..'JH.kd President

\\·!u;-.l.'\,:ni':-. tlh.. 'll 1-J )l...'ar llL.ll'~ttlloll ruk. l ~andalw:-. beL'll ill ~t...,t.tll' 1)1 ttll.'t\:u:-.ing :-.t.'L'Lirit) tension allll political uncertain!). That tension ancluneerlainty \IllS 1oiced i11 the House Commons on 22 Ncwember 2002 11 hen Mr. Tony Baldly asked the Secretary for International Development Ms. Clair Short '1boutl 1gand,1·s increased dclcnsc spending.

I he International Lobb) I· or Rel(mn in l ganda (ILORL "'l uut a number or current dc1elopmenls in Uganda 11hich clearly indiente that. rather than focusing on poverty eradication and democruti7ation as a national priority. the movement (no-part) 1 gmernment diverting scarce rl':-,uurL'I..':-. tu ~.::!'lllrh ~ti!lh't..i ~tt ~.·n:-.urin,:: lh~.:!!"- prl''-ll'l"\atiun tllruugh munipuLniun ol' the con~titutiun, ptrsecuting ib political opponenb and lighting :1 ...,'-·rk·..., '>L'l'!llingly L'IH.lll'ss \\ars in the north. cast and 11est of the country. and across its bmmlers d'll'-' the mo1ement government has taken the Iilii oii ing 1\0IT) ing steps that have ensured I u>nsolidation of its 23 year munopol \ .

(a) Refused to engage 11 itil national political partie' and. lws instead pursued peace­ Negotiations 11-ith the tribal vvar lords as a poliC). Thus militarizing the politics of the

country and justil) ing the ever spiraling increase in dc!'ensL' SJk'nding.

tb) Dilcrtc·d ~Y'o ul· tire• hudge'l l.t\llll all ck'partmcnl\ ir>c·luding health and education delc·nsc.

(c) Ordered 12 MIG 26 lighters, combat he! icopters and other hi-tech Ill iIi tar) hardware preparation ror a seeming!) endless 11ar 11 ithin and be)ond the· burders.

(d) I urned l~g~tnda illlo ~~ Jliilitur~-L'lllll-pulil·•. .' '){all' \\hl..'r-.· d;t.\ tu lltty cumtlltlnity policing is

cmried uul b) at lc'"l I U dilkrent pnramilitar) urgnni;,rlrurrs. I hv•sc include the .loint

;\nti- Terrorism Task Force (.IATG), The General Court .~lnrtial (I tiCiVI). a special milit

l'lan tK,\1'). Ull ,ll'lnc·d pulitical mobili;ntilln organ J'llr the· rtlmement S)Stcnl. l'cople Intelligence i\:et\\ork. (I'll\). l'rcsidcntinl l'rotectiun llri,nclc. (1'1'13). under t\luhllo ::'the I 00.000 man reserve army commanded by the presidents brother. (jenera! Salim Saleh. ISO. ICSO and Civil. What is more. the police li>rcc has lwc'l1 upgraded to military status

66 through training. armament and leadership under the command M<\ior General Katumba

\\amnia anJ no\\ Kuk l'..aihuru. all top ...,,_·nior militar) ol'li~.'<..:!''!

Rcsourc...:s lO e!Tons aimed at ensuring itsL·If'- preservation tllrough manipulation of the constitution. persecuting its political opponents and lighting series sc•emingly endless 11ars in the

north. !..'a~t ~111d \\L'~t or· the ~.·uul!tr). ~1nd <.tcro~-., it-.:. boarckr~ dat1..· tlH.: 1110\t.:lllL'Ill gu\-L'rnment ha~

l~lkcn tlh.' J'ullo\\ ing \\~H'!') t!l~ -..;tvp:-; that h;t\ l' L'lhU!'t'd I con:-.ulh.l~!ltull ul' it:-, =:.1 ) car monopoly. (a) Rel'used to engage with national political parties and. has inste

[]lc ever .... pir~!ling incrcas~-.' in d~..·Jl.•ns~..· spt..'nding.

(h) Ui1ertcd 23% or the budget from all depanmcnts including health and education defense.

(C) Ordered 12 MCJ 26 lighters. combat helicopters and clther hi-tech militan harch1are

prc'jl

(~_l) l'unh:d l 1gand

11hvrc' ci1 ilians uppunvnts of' tl~e· re!;!illlc' arc· lric·cl. thv l(alctn~al" \<:tiun l'l~1n tK.\1'). ~Ill armed pclliticul mnbiliSl"l'l' ll~h been up~rackd to milit:tr.~ 'l:ttus thrcn1gh lr~IIIIIIIU.

67 CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 Recommendations

It has been discmered thut man.1 reasons underlie llgnncla's 1 iolcnt and r\'loody post­ indepen"'knn.:· histur:. :'\ccun.lingly .. I L'an nwk~...· thL' !'ullu\\illt! 1\..'l.. :uiJllllt .. :ndmiun:-; to pre\ent the repetition ur continuation oJ' thL' :-..ame hi::,tur>. I he majur of the-,,· ~t...:~..·omm12ndations an; set out belo11. It is ho11e1er important to note that it is impossible to prescribe· a permanent solution lor preventirumote· lwman rights. The researcher therefore recomme•nds that:

(a) .\ e·udc of' human righh ul'li:nccs and appropriate puni·,hnrcnh lclr 1 iul,rt<>rs shuuld be

L'IUL'll'd 111 t!Lll nu /h .. 'r">dll \lHlllld hl· JJJI!lllllll' !'ro111 pru',l'\.. llliun ~1nd impcuchment J'or human rights 1iolations. this 11ill be u deterrent measure· aguinslmilitar·) lllen 1vho take advantage of unarmed civilian population to abuse its rights fl1r example the special high

CLJLirl circuit which has been introclucecl as alternative mea,urc or an extension of an

i!llL'l'!IHtion~ll ._·rilllinal nnlrt to tr~ ~111d prL·-..kh.: U\Cr \\a!' ~rim~...·..., Ill Ugand~1 i~ the right step in the right direcliurL

(b) The arm) representation should be maintained in Parliament under the ne1v Multiparty S)stenl lclr the nC.\llL'Il \Curs to cnabk the· euuntr) adjLht '"the nell slsterlL l'husing LlUt

~tnll) J\.'j)rl''-~L'!1lalion ~~t til~ t:Uillnll'llLl'lllt.:lll u! a Jllult!pttrt.\ -.\ ",l\.:Jll \\ould bL' inlL'rpn.:-tcd as political are examinable and be introduced through other'" enucs of' public e·ducation like the media. seminars. posters, elrama etc.

68 5.2 Lan enforcement agents nnd state security agencies

The military

The structure. composition. nature. functions. and how the various annies committed atrocities a,:ainst the• pe'clpk of llganda during the po>t-independence period. has been diocussed in prior

parts ol' thi, paper. It h thcrel(tre recomnll"nded that l'ganda·, C~rm) sl)l)uld be national in compusitiun and character. thus reflecting the ethnic composition Cind geographical areas of the country as a whole. The army should not be for the perpetuation of a single kuckr or political dt"g_allilcttillll in j1ll\\ ('!'. hl' lh.'Ull'~d ~\Jh.J !Hlt biL\Jor parti:-.~!ll in ptil!!ll.."'> ol' tlh.' L'\llliltl'), J'he tll"tll)

~lluu!d JlL'\•..:r bt...' u:-,l'd Lu ')uppn.. ·._,:-, internal Jhd!liL·~tl di'-1:-,l'IH or di!'krL'IJL'L'\ ur l~ll· :-,ohillg politicnl cunflicts. The army should be subjected to ci1 il authority. ohuuld be professional nncl small "ithin the economic capacity of Uganda. The army of1icers and soldiers should be subject to conqitution and the ltm s nl'thc lnnd. ttnd e·otks of conduct ttnd opeTlltion and other regulations inte·nckd lur di>ciplirll' olwul,l b,· >tril'liy e·nl(tre·nlttl alltillle'>.

The police force

Tlw l'urll'tions ol' the polir,· irll'lucie' prull't'licllt n!' Iii\.• ttnd prupe•rt\ rllttintcnane·r eli' Itt\\ 11nd order. pn.'\L'!Hiul! ct!ld dL·L.'dlull ul crilll1..'. ~..·nloJ\.. L'IIh.:Jit u!' !u\\:-. .tnd 1\..·~ulc~tJ~.JJh. t\ppt\:hcn:-,iun nnd prusenrtiun ctf oi'lenders. and serving as a militlll') 11hcnr1cr Clliircl upur1 to du '"· llo11ever it is apparerrtthat all this 11as nell included in the function of the police at the beginning.

,\J'ter lite• Justice Juliet ~>L'ilUllllde• l'e'purl litlll UiliCJiecl rctlllpdlll culidption in the• police. a nell Inspector General, Major General Katumba Warn ala IItts transi\.-rrcd li"um the ,\rm) to head the e~clusion b) the militar) that may become hostile to it. 1-lo\\L'\e'r. their numbers should b reduced li"om I 0 to :'i ~ll's 11 ith n plan to c1entuall) plwsin~ tlte·m out. In the meantime.

P~lrli~tllll'J1l .... hould ~.k\t..'lop '-·h.:ur :lllid~.:lin~..·'~ whllt..'rm:-.ol'r~k-1\.'JH.'l'\ (or '\rm~ n:.·prcscnt:.Jti\t~S.

Equally important. the electoral process of Army MPs should be made more transparent and open l(lr public scrutin). conducted by <1 non-p

L'fL'l'!il>J! !1<.1\L' dCJllUJhl!'dll:l..l ',.'~tp:t<...'it~ lu \.:.\1..:!'~!:-,\,:' !!ldl'j)l'!Jdl..'llll..' ,[JJd ~llllhorit) hl'\:aLJ:-,(' OJ' the

69 kgitinwc0 that the ckctural process conl'crs upon them. I urthe·r. the ann) 1\'lh should be

!~H.:ilit:.lted ll> illk't'\tl-'t and •..:dlhult t!H.. 'ir l'l;.·l-lllr:tlt.' llll u re~uLtr h.t~l-, tu im.:n.::u~~.· their d'fective

reprt'~l'J1lHtiOll

(e'J •\n 0 pc·r'<>n 11hu i, jli\1\Cd tu hal<: 1 iol:itnl human righh 111 the· past or 11ill have been convicted of' human t·ights oJ'J'ences should be barred !'rom holding an) political, public or civic office /(:>r example remnants of' t·ebels like lords resistance army officers who are captured or 11110 'UITe'nder to be• pardonc·d unckr ctmtll"l) lct\1 should lh>l be· cillu11ed tu huld in trust any publte' oi'lie·.: oi' ih mutt e.

I 1011 e1 cr it's important to note that one of the major causes of' humctn rights violations in Ugandn has been ignorance· ctbuut human right\ b) 1 asl majorit) ui' l'gcmdans cspecictll) the rural population. I lll're•l(trc I lunwn rights cducciliun slll)uld be gi1 e·n tu the· entire population, adults and ) oung people alike. be incorporated in all edueaticln s\ llabi in schouh and training institutions including those oi' armed and securit) lorces and should l(mn part oi' the subjects that police l'orce·. Despite mcctgre re"iOUITCs. Katumba Wamala improved the tainted image and poor ace' c>l' tlte· pul.lc'e' J'or"·· llu11 c·l e·r. during ~OIJ:i. tit~ task and in~et~e· or tlw police 11cre complicated b) the intc·rlitcc bctllccn the stute s political interests versus .:i1il "'e'ie'l) opposition.

While rioting, civil society ollen lost control of some elements tltut either took clpportunit) to loot or \ l'!1\L'd tlwi1· ~lll~cr tiH\lll~h dl''·;tructiull t>l. prdpl'l'l~. tiltl" Jl!'·.til) ing polii..'L' i11ten cntion.

~l)J1L'lht.:k-.,-.,. tflL' puJi1.. .'L' \\~!:-. i11 llhh( L~I\L'"I \I..'Cil ~1:-, \.Ill ill.'>l!"UIIl<..'lll ~~~· prok'L'tin::. );!U\Cr!lt11Clll interests b) suppressing the opposition.

;\ller their siege ol'the 1-Jigh Court. some members oJ'the Militar1 Police Hit Squud lhtit ("Black

Mambas") 11erc I'JICI' picture·d drcssc•d in polie·e• uniltllllll" this sc'e'lilcd 10 conlil'lll allcgaliolb j that st~llL' \I.:'Cllrity ~tgcncic:-, ~omctim~:, di:,guiSL'd a:, regul~1r polk~_· lu ~i\ L' a toul'h ol· kgitimac) to their operutions. Some members of the public. especinlly l'rom the opposition. 11ere increasingly

81 The Dwfy Munitor. NcJ\VJlliwr 25. :2005.

70 unens) ctbout 11 hat they considered the militarization of the police· J'ur 11 hat the') e·onsiclered as political mutiles. In Octubc·r 2iliJ'i. the l'lc·side·llt !llclck n11iitcu·, pru111utions and rcshurlle. in 11hich he nppointed fvlajor (jenera! Kale Ka) ihuru to head the pul1cc· lcll·ce.

During the• Constitutional Commission consultations. consensus c·mergecl about the need for a pnllc'"iunal police J(,·ce' to lw large· I) responsible lt1r inte•rnul sccurit). nnd thnt intelligence agcncic:, :-,hou!d be regult.ll\..'d b) lm\ and i.!Ll'dlllll~tbk J'ur their ~k-tiol!~. /-\ geJH:~ml \ ie\\ \\-as also noted that the police should be under civilian control: had lu dcfe•nd and protect the constitution and democratic institutions c111d thnt it's main responsibility should be to keep lm1 and order".

! lh.' '-'\llllillued appl)intmL'tlt ul' ...,uJdicrs to h1.:ad the policv rai .... ~.·d l'dllce-rn amung opposition i\kmbers or Parliament. I he :\ll's also e.\prcssc·d leurs that the Jniliur1 reslwJ'lle 11as sectarian cmd loyalty biased. 11hich was Museveni's strategy to cnh"nce "personali/ation" ol' the prcpnr"tion ltll' tlw transitional period".

Tilt• n·sL·ardter rhercforl' n.·l'Ulllnlt'Ildt•d !hat:

In the pcrl(mnnnce oi' their duty as law enll.1reement and others. the pulicc should be guided and' inlluenced by ethical principles ol'human rights. T'he police must be stniTeclwith disci I ine

.i 11elltraine·d. and pr<.lil:ssion"l oi'llcers. the lcti\S and rc·gulatiulh that ~ule1'11lhc· operation ol'the police lt1rcc should be consistent with respect ltlr protection and pnllllcltion oJ' human rights and police should as a priorit; be adequately J'unclecl and provided 11 ith adequate J'acilities that enable them to ei'licicntl) ca) out their duties. Cclllstant recits should con1e !'rom school ccrtilicatc st

u; Odoki. Search ror a National Consensu~: The 1\1/along of tl1e 1005 Uyancla Constitution, Kampala: Fountain Pu blishcrs. 2005: pg 17 44 75

71 Arbitnir) arre~h. dl"tentiun

Experience has sho11n thnt, a) pmvisions in the cL>nstitution and uLhcr laws 11hich pcrmil!ed or aulhorizecl detention or imprisonment without trial have been abused. In the circumstances thcrcllJrc. this rese:Jrchcr recommends that:

'\u pCN)II sfluuld be dclclllll'd lH' 1111priv>llc'ci .trbitraril) Clllci slil>Lild be tried b) Cll1d be!'ore independent and imp:Jrlial courts ol' lm1 11hcthcr there is a state ur cmergenc) or not, no person should be arrested detnined or imprisoned in respect of' criminal oi'J'ence not known to the Um. l'crsons

The researcher n011 calls on the ll1·itish Government to recogni/e its pulitical. moml obligations lu the ordinar; people or Uganda :mel usc its considerable bilateral :md multilateral Je,eragc to p~..:r~u~td~,.· til\.' !11U\1.'rll\..'llt g~,l\..,:n1!11L'!ll tu d~l th~..· l~}llo\\illg tL'-> ~~ !lJ~!lh.:r u!'urt!L'llL'~: l\.•instulc po\crty r~,.·ducti~.Hl ~ttH..I ~.klllll\... r~lti/;tllull .~-... tlh.' l\\ in tl~llillJtal priori til'...., r~tt]J<..'J tlutl building un its military strength C~nd 11 ar mongering lluth in and oubide the countr), IJ:nlll u1 er duties ol' comlmlnil) policing to civilian police. introduce laws prohibiting the arm) and other securit) organianions ft'lllll lK·ing '-h..·plo)l'd during l'iL'L'ti\Hb and put iii plncc \Oll'r ~...·duL·:ttilln prugrum:-,.

The researcher further recommends that the LWlure or polie·e tr:~ining 11hich is militaristic in nature should be altered to suit a civilian community and not a military societ). It's also important to note that the police' should be made anS11erable to the ci1 iii an nuthoritics r:~ther thw1 tile milit:~r1 ctutllmitics.

It is also recommended that, t:trget sanctiuns should be issue·d :1g:tinst perpcLraturs ol' human rights violations that later !lee the counli') alter commi!ling hum:~n rights atrocities, and if such pcr>

72 L..

Opcr"tionalizc the PrincipiL' of Scpanttion of Po11ers; l'gcntdc>. like· most African post Cold

\\'ar countries is experiencing constitutil)nal chal!eng~s O\ er the principle of separation or po11crs. l·.xpcrience shows that the executive most times trents the other braches: Parliament and

.ludiciar) as appendnges. This becomes n source or tension ~md impacts nl'gntiYe/y on the pcrllmnnncc o!' thL· l'arlictmcrll. I he· need tu ckctrl.l ope• II out the· rule, and responsibilities of the three arms ol· Government emphnsizing independence, autlwrrtl and autorwm) of these institutions is ver) critical lor the proper functioning of clemocrnc). C'riticnl about the principle u!' sqlCnalrurl Ll( JlLli\LTs is till' 11hule isoue· c>!' interekpe·mkrtcv 1\ hilc the· tltrcc arms uf

(i~l\erJtllh.. 'Jll Jll..'l'd inlk'PL'J:,..J'"·JJt.:~..:. ~tUllwrit.\ ~tnd :tlllll!Jumy. thL') ~d-,u J,,__·~:d to g.o\L'rll together.

5.3 Conclusion

I or m:tll\ I [!:llld:tllS. the· \e'.ll ]()II e·n,kd irt politie·:tl SIISI1L'n'L' ClilLI rear ur the unpredictable tt·cutsitiunctl period. l'he• constitutiLHJal amcrtdment procc:,s. pt ur militar) f'll"l'\l'!ll'\... ' '-'.\h jbj ted j l '> 'il..'] f ~~~ai Jl !!l ll gandall p1.d ll i,_·\.' I

The voter turn up 11as l01vcr than expected clue to among other ntctors voter intimidation b) the he:11 y deplu) mcnt ol' the: :trtm on the :,tre·c:ts and haraS>me·nt u!' \ uters b) ann) ol'licials'; populcrtion hope that i!'the· e·!ectiuns arc lre·e· ~!ltd lctir. the) 11 ill he· :thk IL> choose' leaders that 11 ill bring mc,minglld change in their Ji"e·:. As the )ear prugrL'~~cd, there \\ere cases or unnccounwble leadership and cotTuption: u human rights record 11 ith continued reports ol' abuse: slwttcred liwlihomb o!' the people ol' Northern Uganda: a not so ll·ec press: a harassed opposition. a nwnipui[ttcd e·onstitutiunul

~s Monitor 25 February, :201 1

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!·Iuman Rights Watch. 1-Justi/e 10 Democ·run·: ihe .\lot't:lltelll Srstem and l'u!iticul Recrnenluliot7 in Uganda. !Yushingron. London. New York. ( l'!lJl))

J.Oiuka-Onyango, ('rim ina! Jus/ice: the court and hu11wn ri~;/111 in coJJ/emrJomn· Uuundu, !'vlakercrc l.a11 Joumal. VOL. I NO.I (2006)

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