Scoping Study: Tax Incentives Updated May 2021 Fiona Robertson and Lauren Bredar

Summary Tax incentives are a policy tool whose stated policy goals can include attracting greater investment in a particular sector, country, or location with the objective of achieving economic growth, high-wage employment, and efficiency gains.1 They are accredited for contributing to the growth success of Asian countries like China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan under certain circumstances.2 Mauritius in 2006 implemented a range of tax incentives, which was followed by sharp increases in investment and economic growth.3 Several studies suggest that these incentives are on the rise across low- and lower- middle income countries.4, 5, 6, 7 Particularly in low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, there has been an increase in use of tax holidays – a type of tax incentive – from less than 40% of African countries using them in 1980, to over 80% doing so in 2005.8 Despite their increased use, there is evidence that incentives are frequently in place even when an investment would have happened without them. Their size can be significant, over 8% of GDP in some cases, with significant impacts on government tax revenue. Understanding the scope and impact of tax incentives is a necessary condition for the reform of tax incentive systems, enabling citizens to assess whether policymakers are making informed decisions to increase revenue, particularly at a time when many governments face significant financing gaps.

Introduction What we mean by “Tax Incentives”

There are many terms used to convey the broad notion of “tax incentives”, which encompass a range of fiscal measures that aim to attract local or foreign investment capital to specific economic sectors or activities, or different areas of a country.9 Any provision that is applicable to all investments known as a ‘general’ incentive, would not constitute a tax incentive in this paper.10 The term “tax incentive” is used interchangeably with the more technical, and perhaps less intuitive term, “tax expenditure,” as well as “tax break”. The term “tax exemption,” which is a type of tax incentive, is often incorrectly used to refer to a broader range of tax incentives. Tax incentives can broadly be split into several categories, including tax exemptions (special economic zones), tax deductions (allowances, accelerated depreciation), tax deferrals (holidays), tax reliefs (reduced rates), and tax credits (or partial credits).11

Part I: Literature Review Studies looking at tax incentives can be divided into three categories. First, those that look at the potential impact of tax incentives on stimulating investment. Second, those that look at the implementation of tax incentive policy in low- and lower-middle income countries, and third, those that look at the longer-term secondary effects of an increase in the scale and prevalence of tax incentives.

1.1 Tax incentives have not consistently led to increased investment The evidence for the impact on overall growth and revenue generation due to tax incentives is mixed, largely because it is difficult to quantify the amount of revenue generated due to the use of incentives alone, when other industrial policies are often implemented alongside.12 Yet, in generating the initial private sector investment, the overwhelming evidence suggests that tax incentives alone are ineffective.13, 14, 15 At the aggregate level, “tax incentives often result in little or no new investment”16 and thus positive impacts on growth and employment are minimal at best. 17

The IMF, for instance, has assessed multiple studies across 14 low- and lower-middle income countries to look at the “redundancy” rate of incentives, defined as the number of investments that companies reported would have taken place regardless of the presence of an incentive. It found that in 10 of the 14 countries, over 70% of investments would have taken place in the absence of tax incentives. In Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Guinea, over 90% of these investments would have taken place without any tax incentive.18 A study of 7,000 companies in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries revealed that incentives were one of the least important factors in influencing an investment decision.19 Other studies show that the investment decision is not affected by the amount of tax incentive offered; for 12 West African countries, providing more generous exemptions had no impact on FDI.20

Other studies, however, find that, with the right preconditions and supporting policies, tax incentives can be effective in attracting investment. For instance, in a good investment climate, lower tax rates are eight times more effective in attracting FDI.21 Looking at the specific context of Rwanda, one study found a strong, positive relationship between tax incentives and the growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), concluding that tax incentives are essential for the sustainable growth of SMEs in Rwanda.22 As a general point, the IMF, World Bank and OECD, as well as research by Kronfol and Steenbergen (2020), recommend the following to improve the effective use of tax incentives: careful design, a good legal framework and macroeconomic environment, good infrastructure, reasonable transport costs, transparency, and regular review.23, 24 Another study suggests more specific criteria by which to determine if a tax incentive is appropriate and will result in net-positive benefits: “When eligibility conditions are directly linked to tax return data, when it is more important to maximize the number of beneficiaries than to minimize excess claims or when the policy objective is to incentivize a clear and broadly defined activity by reducing its net price,” tax incentives may prove the best option.25 The failure of most low- and lower-middle income countries to realize the benefits of incentives suggests that there is an absence of these conditions.

1.2 Tax incentive implementation has been poor

First, poor coordination of policy both within countries and internationally has been poor, and many country case studies find disorganised and contradictory systems of granting various exemptions, under multiple pieces of legislation and multiple agencies.26 For example, in Ghana there are 10 different government agencies that can grant exemptions, allowing investors to shop around departments.27 The Addis Tax Initiative report also found that Ghana’s tax incentives were extended to third parties, applied to other parties or transactions not covered by the incentive. 28The impact of this is an effective “race to the bottom,” with various agencies competing to offer the best rates. As a result, in any given country, “the ministry responsible for overall macroeconomic management lacks a complete picture of the magnitude of tax concessions in the economy.”29 This “race to the bottom” problem is experienced regionally too, as countries with similar economic conditions compete for investment and collectively gain no additional revenue as a result.30, 31

Second, there is a deliberate lack of clarity of the terms of tax incentive policies, allowing for corruption and an erosion of any tax benefit. Legislation often leaves the wording vague or explicitly allows for the negotiation of an exemption; one study highlights that governments in the Caribbean frequently grant incentive packages on a case-by-case basis, leading to investors fearing unequal treatment.32 The Tax Justice Network points out that Tanzania’s “Strategic Investor Status” allows companies investing over US$20 million to negotiate individual tax breaks. These “special concessions to individual companies … have never formally been made public.”33, 34 Although few studies exist that compare transparency, there is a clear lack of data on both the prevalence and scale of specific incentives, as discussed in the next section.

As an extension of the lack of clarity, several studies acknowledge the lack of formal reporting of tax incentives: simply put, most countries do not keep a comprehensive list of tax exemptions.35 According to Redonda et al. (2021), World Bank data from 2015 indicates that just 33% and 21% of countries in the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively, periodically estimate forgone revenue through tax expenditures.36 Similar findings from the Global Tax Expenditures Database show that only 28 African countries reported their tax expenditures to the public once or more between 2000 and 2019.37 When reporting is done, low quality of reports, including the level of detail, definitions used, and quality of estimation methods used and frequency of reporting, remains an issue.38 Weak institutions, data constraints, and limited human and financial resources pose challenges to improving the frequency and quality of tax expenditure reporting.39

Third, the granting of exemptions is not always economic but political, being used as a reward for loyalty, or in return for other favours.40 In many cases incentives are granted for sectors for which they have limited benefit, including mining and natural resource extraction, which are in a fixed location so there is little competition with other areas, have high upfront costs which the incentive does not impact, and aren’t targeted to the barriers to developing marginal mines.41 While studies of the relationship between politics and tax incentives are few, in Tanzania a relationship was found between increased political competition and increases in the number of tax exemptions.42 The scale of this impact can be huge; in Russia in the 1990s, politically powerful elites secured exemptions through tax expenditures (incentives, concessions, holidays, exemptions) estimated to equal more than two-thirds of taxes collected for the federal budget.43, 44

1.3 Tax incentives can have unintended consequences

While tax incentives may be used in an effort to increase foreign investment in hopes of securing transfers of technology, infrastructure, and high skilled jobs, much of the documented spill-over effects have been negative.45 This is particularly concerning considering the COVID-19 global crisis, which has already squeezed revenues and increased the urgent need for increased domestic resource mobilization.46, 47

Incentives have led to the waste of time and resources by the private sector through several channels. First, investors may engage in rent-seeking behaviour, spending money to lobby for incentives that benefit them. Once in place, they represent a group that has strong vested interest and economic power, making incentives very difficult and costly for governments to remove.48 Ministers from fragile states convened at a Center for Global Development roundtable remarked that “they were confronted with tax exemptions granted by their predecessors and there was little they could do about them in the short run.”49 Relatedly, and particularly relevant for foreign investors, is the time taken to go through the bureaucratic procedure to qualify, before any investment can take place. Of a sample of

10 countries, delays caused from obtaining an incentive ranged from six days in Serbia to 95 in Tunisia.50 A 2014 World Bank paper found that in Canada compliance costs deterred companies from applying for R&D incentives altogether.51 For implementing governments, the increased cost of administration eats into existing tax revenue.52

A second impact of poorly implemented tax incentives is a narrowing of the tax base, which is of particular concern in low- and lower-middle income countries, as their formal, taxable sector is already narrow.53 One study concluded that tax holidays specifically have a net negative impact on sustainable development because they decrease tax revenues and result in significant decreased education spending.54 Using World Bank Data, another report found that globally there is a “strong, negative relationship between the generosity of countries’ corporate tax incentives and their corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP.” This report explains that the overall corporate tax base is eroded because tax incentives go to new, foreign firms in addition to reducing the tax liability of firms that already exist in the country.55

Incentives can also give rise to tax evasion or tax fraud within this already narrow base, as registered companies find a way to be eligible or continue to enjoy the benefits of the incentive, resulting in lower revenue than before the incentive was implemented.56 James (2013) finds evidence that companies that were not eligible for the incentive were willing to incur costs in order to look as though they were, due to the net benefit.57 Moreover, the benefits of the incentive are largely accrued to the upper and middle classes, exacerbating inequality, while forgoing revenue that could be distributed to the poorest.58, 59 Combatting this can be particularly problematic in low- and lower-middle income countries, where the capacity of the government to monitor businesses is lower.60

A third concern is that economic distortions created by tax incentives could be detrimental to existing businesses or incentivise businesses to allocate resources inefficiently (firms in Thailand benefitting from incentives had weaker financial ratios than those that did not), not to mention the administrative cost and price that businesses will pay to adapt to be eligible for incentives. Generally, the ability of an incentive to enhance economic growth is negatively correlated with how footloose an investment is, meaning that it has an ability to pick and change location. Incentives can therefore actually lower the economic growth of a country and – ultimately – the ability to maximise revenue collection.61

Finally, when tax expenditures are consistently under-reported, the legitimacy and perceived fairness of taxation can be undermined, weakening taxpayers’ trust in the tax system, tax compliance, and the government.62, 63

Part II: Tax Incentive Data Studies assessing the impact of tax incentives are often isolated. Due to the broad nature and definition of tax incentives, comparability between studies is problematic, as is the case with many studies about the treatment of taxes. Despite the “lack of systematic and public cross-country databases of tax incentives,”64 there have been a few useful cross-sectional studies, and many informative country level analyses, which provide compelling evidence that more comprehensive and rigorous analysis, as well as transparency, is needed.

First, we can look at the frequency in occurrence of different incentives. The most comprehensive and comparable data here is from a 2015 IMF-G20 report. It makes clear that tax holidays and exemptions are significantly less prevalent in high income groups relative to all others, whilst R&D incentives become increasingly prevalent as income increases. Tax credits are more prevalent in low-income

4 countries. Most notable, however, is that by 2005 over 80% of all low, lower-middle, and upper-middle income countries have at least one type of tax incentive. The report included a broad range of incentives holidays, reduced CIT rate, Investment allowances, export incentives, free zones or investment code.65 There is also evidence to indicate that tax expenditures have been fast growing: One report indicates that nearly half of 107 low- and lower-middle income country studies included in the study (all of which had been granting tax holidays as of 2015) made existing tax incentives more generous or adopted new incentives between 2009 and 2015.66 In Senegal specifically, “Tax expenditure more than doubled between 2010 and 2014, from 18.4 percent of tax revenues and 3.4 percent of GDP to 40 percent of tax revenues and 7.8 percent of GDP.”67

Other studies look at the specific sector in which the incentive is granted. For instance, KPMG looks at incentives in Sub- Saharan Africa, finding that a third grant incentives for manufacturing.68 Ding et al. (2020) finds tax expenditures to be significant in the tourism sector in the Caribbean.69 A 2015 World Bank study has the most comprehensive analysis of this, looking at 22 sectors across 107 countries. They find that Construction and Building Materials have the highest prevalence of incentives, with over 70% of countries offering these. Other prevalent sectors are IT and Electronics and Machinery and Equipment, followed by Air and Spacecraft. Trade and retail and business and financial services have some of the lowest frequencies, although all are prevalent in over 50% of the surveyed countries.70 The World Bank has developed a Developing Country Tax Incentives Database, in which they have this data for 2009- 2015, looking not at the value of corporate tax incentives, but their sector and prevalence. Although they mention extending this to include sub-national data, they do not mention the possibility of quantifying the incentive amount.71

Third, we can look at the magnitude of incentives, which gives an idea of the potential foregone revenue – revenue that the government could have collected. There are a few studies that have been reused by international organisations, think tanks, and civil society. Although not comparable due to the variations in each methodology, year and scope, organisations such as these have used such studies to provide an overall estimate of the cost of tax incentives, both in terms of GDP and as a percentage of total revenue.

A summary of the papers that pull together previous studies is provided below:

Name of Year of Data Sources Number of Years that the Publisher Publication Countries data covers CGD72 2018 Kassim and 34 2004-2016 Mansour 2017, ATAF, ATRN, OECD, IMF, Country Sources ActionAid 2017 IMF/National 11 2012-2015 Sources James, Sebastian, 2013 OECD, World 23 N/a World Bank Bank Reports, IDB Group

CGD attempts to quantify the fiscal impact of tax expenditures, merging a variety of studies conducted by different agencies and authors, which by their own admission are not comparable. Both ActionAid and James (2013) use a mix of sources. Interestingly, there is little overlap in sources, despite their shared objective.

Figure 1: Tax Incentives as % of GDP73

All three studies look at the size of tax incentives as a percentage of GDP. The CGD study estimates range from less than 1% of GDP in Germany, to over 6% of GDP in Ghana, the UK, Costa Rica, Honduras, Canada, and the United States. There is a great deal more data for Latin America than any other region, although it is not recent. Interestingly, both the United States and Canada have estimates dating back to 2004 and 2008, showing that data challenges are not confined to low- and lower-middle income countries.

In the ActionAid study, there was generally a lower level of tax incentives found, with only just under 20% of the sample having over 5% of GDP. The CGD study finds just under a third of countries have incentives greater than 5%, while the James (2013) paper finds this to be almost half.

For ActionAid, the highest percentage of GDP was found in Senegal for 2013, at 7.3% of GDP. Interestingly, CGD also provide an estimate for Senegal, although for 2012, which is less than 4%. We do not know whether this indicates a high volatility in the amount granted in tax expenditures from year to year, or whether this simply demonstrates the impact that differing methodologies can have. It provides evidence that there is a need for annual recording and publication of similar data. The only other country which has an estimate in both studies is Ghana: ActionAid, citing the IMF, put this figure at “perhaps 6 per cent of GDP.”74

8 7 The James (2013) paper finds a tax incentive to GDP range of over 8% in Guatemala to less than 1% of 75 6 GDP in Germany. Interestingly, their estimate for Tanzania is over 6% of GDP, whereas the ActionAid 5 report finds this to be less than 2%, again demonstrating the challenges in comparing these data. 4 3 For the purposes of quantifying foregone tax revenue, most informative is CGD’s figure two below, 2 which shows that four countries give away 40% or more of their revenue in tax expenditures. The only 1 African country in this list is Ghana, although this may be a product of the absence of data. 0 Nonetheless, the US has a rate of over 30% of its total tax revenues.

Figure 2: Action Aid: Tax Expenditures as % of GDP by Country Figure 3: Tax Incentives as % GDP, from James (2013)

Mbaye and Niang (2020) warn that because of data unavailability, “assessment[s] of the fiscal cost of tax expenditures is mostly on the lower bound.”76 The challenge of a lack of available data is distinct

7 from a lack of comparability between different data, which may have varying definitions and methods that would limit the availability of comparable data; another issue altogether.

Recent papers (from 2019 and 2020) have been published about tax expenditures, though most cite existing tax expenditure data (see Annex 1), primarily from 2012-2018. For example, a study by Redonda et al. (2021) summarizes tax expenditure data from numerous African countries for the 2012- 2018 period.77 The IGF created a Mining Tax Incentives Database in 2019, “a collection of files comparing the fiscal regimes of 104 mining projects across 21 countries, and the first large-scale, systematic attempt to compile tax incentives used by low- and lower-middle income country governments to attract mining investment.”78

The Global Tax Expenditure Database, an online repository for tax expenditure data, has data from 97 countries covering more than 20,000 tax expenditure provisions. According to its data, foregone revenues from tax expenditures averaged between 3% and 5% of GDP globally between 1990 and 2019, with the levels for some countries significantly higher: 8% of GDP in Mauritania and more than 6% in Cabo Verde and Senegal.79

Policy Recommendations Most tax incentive reform policy must be implemented by the host government and regional partners. Though vested interests and a lack of trust in government in many countries will pose significant challenges to reforming existing tax expenditures schemes,80, 81 striving for reforms is a worthwhile goal.

The three most frequently cited policy reforms in the literature are:

1. Conduct cost-benefit analyses to eliminate unnecessary tax incentives82

ActionAid recommends that these be assessed dependent on their economic and social impact, as well as benefit to the poor.83 Redonda et al. (2021) emphasize the importance of estimating forgone revenue in any proper cost-benefit analysis, while Mbaye and Niang (2020) emphasize that cost- benefit analyses must be conducted systematically and regularly.

A 2015 background paper to the report prepared for the G20 Development Working Group by the IMF, OECD, UN, and World Bank outlines five different tools that could be implemented by governments in LICs to assess tax incentives, one of which is an application of cost-benefit analysis.84 Additionally, the IMF has published a guide for low- and lower-middle income economies to report tax expenditures, which “provides a step-by-step approach on how tax expenditure accounts can be built, and is concerned primarily with the direct cost of tax expenditures (the revenue forgone because of them).”85

Kronfol and Steenbergen (2020) provide useful, detailed information in measuring costs and benefits. The IGF, with support from the OECD, has developed a toolkit to better assess tax expenditures in the mining sector. The IGF designed the tool to better equip governments of resource-rich countries “to identify, and cost potential behavioural responses by mining investors to tax incentives.”86

2. Increased transparency through the publication of data

Increased transparency of tax incentive data is critical for ensuring that their impacts can be assessed. One mechanism for ensuring the publication of this data is for governments to mandate it through regulation or law, for instance through a requirement in budget laws.87 This data does exist, and

8 evidence suggests that in many cases, are already published. The Global Tax Expenditure Database (forthcoming) has tax expenditure data for 97 countries; however, nearly 60% of low- and lower- middle income countries provide no tax incentive information, and eight provide only aggregated data. And even in many of those instances, the quality of reporting was poor. The benefits of publishing data and increasing transparency include improving the efficacy and fairness of tax systems, holding policymakers accountable, and increasing taxpayer trust and compliance.88

The 2019 IMF paper mentioned above offers a useful guide for LICs to increase transparency through reporting tax expenditures and using that information in fiscal management.89

3. Coordination both within and between governments

Domestically, incentives could all be coordinated through the Ministry of Finance to avoid overlap and competition.90 Regionally, there should be the development of, and agreement to, common standards.91 Progress has been made by some. In December 2012, special tax measures in as many as 17 laws and legislative acts were either abolished or consolidated into the General Tax Code in Senegal, significantly improving transparency of the tax system. The comprehensive tax reform, along with tighter administrative measures, streamlined the tax system and represented a significant rollback of tax incentives and exemptions.92, 93 Jamaica, Egypt, India, and Mauritius have also passed laws that make similar reforms to their tax systems.94 Regionally, reform to harmonise incentives have been prevalent across EAC, SADC, OECS, and ECOWAS, yet have been largely unsuccessful.95 However, the Asia regional integration centre has published tax incentive policies across 19 countries, and 11 categories of tax incentives.96 (See Annex 2 for a case study on Nigeria’s tax reporting).

For international actors, the OECD recommends that there is a role for businesses, civil society, and development partners and donors:

- Businesses should “Refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework related to taxation, financial incentives, or other issues” and comply with the “Spirit” of the law. - Civil society can play a role in exposing and publicising wasteful tax policy, as well as educating taxpayers as to the impact of such policies. - Policymakers and donors can ensure that this remains on the international agenda and provide technical assistance and advice where needed.97 This was reiterated in the 2017 G20 note on Tax expenditures, which called for a halt to their requesting of tax exemption in return for development assistance.98

Annex 1: Recent publications citing country- and region-specific tax expenditure data

Publisher Source Country or Estimated Estimated Estimated TE as Details Region TE as % of Foregone share of total tax GDP Revenue revenue ActionAid Missed SSA US$38.6 Opportunity billion/year report, 2017 or 2.4% of (some data GDP is pulled Sierra Leone 0.1% from IMF, Senegal 7.3% 2015 & IMF, (2013) 2016) Burkina Faso 2.3% (2013)

Other estimate: 5% (no year) Cameroon >1% Cote D’Ivoire 1% DRC 1% Ethiopia 3% (2010) Ghana (2013- 1.8% 2015 average) Other estimate: 6% Mozambique 4% (2013) 3.3% (2014) Niger 1.7% (2014) 4.5% (2015) Tanzania 1.5% Inter-American TE Database Latin 3.5% Center of Tax (TEDLAC) America Administrations (2018) (CIAT) Colombia 0.7% (2018) Bolivia (2018) 1.7% Paraguay 1.7% (2018) Uruguay 6.3% (2018)

Dominican 6.6% Republic (2018) CGD Gupta et al Latin >4% 2020 America (no year provided) Bolivia (no 1.3% year provided) Paraguay (no 1.3% year provided) Colombia (no 8.0% year provided) Africa 2.9% >20% in certain average (no countries year provided) Senegal 7.8% (no year provided) CGD Gupta and Senegal 7.8% 40% Redonda (2014) 2020 Tanzania >4% (2012) Rwanda >4% (2018) Liberia >4% (2016) CGD Mbaye and Senegal 3.4% (2010) 18.4% (2010) Niang, 2020 3.8% (2011) 20% (2011) 3.8% (2011) 20.7% (2011) 7.8% (2014) 40% (2014) CGD Gupta and Africa 5% Plant, 2019 (2011-2014) Latin 4% America (2015-2017) Ghana (2011) 6% ≥40% Senegal 7.8% ≥40% (2014) IMF Ding et al, Caribbean 5.8% 21% 2020 (2010-2018)

IGF Lassourd et Senegal $400-500 al, 2019 million citing (mining Ousmane revenue Cisse, specifically, Director of cumulative, Mines and latest Geology of available Senegal’s year not Ministry of indicated) Mines and Industry Springer Redonda et Benin (2017) 2.4% 18.2% al, 2021 Burkina Faso 1.38% 8.61% (2016) DR Congo 0.65% 10.21% (2016) Ivory Coast 1.32% 9.8% (2017) Gabon (2017) 1.24% 12.10% Guinea 2.63% 21.7% (2017) Lesotho 3.96% 17.6% (2016) Liberia 4.7% 18.89% (2016) Madagascar 1.79% 17.00% (2015) Mali (2017) 2.64% 17.32% Mauritania 58.41% (2013) Mauritius 1.76% 9.22% (2017) Morocco 2.78% 13.01% (2018) Rwanda 4.6% 14.3% (2018) Senegal 7.8% 39.6% (2014) Seychelles 0.34% 1.04% (2019) Sierra Leone 1.2% 8.76% (2017) South Africa 3.90% 14.90% (2017)

Tanzania 4.40% 27.0% (2012) African 2.75% 17.77% Average Redonda et Latin 0.7-6.6% al, 2021 America (Citing data Africa 3.3-7.5% 18.7% of total tax from World 2.9% collected Bank, 2015) (confusing different numbers) Burkina Faso 1.38% <9% Ivory Coast 1.4% Ghana 6.13% 41.67% Mauritania 58% Poland 4.69% 27.8% Senegal 7.8% 39.6%

Notes on this table:

- When dates were shown for the data in the original source, they are included. - As Gupta and Redonda (2020) write, because of lacking transparency and underreporting, these figures should be interpreted cautiously. - As Gupta and Plant (2019) write, “tax expenditures are significant in Senegal, but this is mainly because its statistical coverage of tax concessions is relatively comprehensive.”

Annex 2: Case Study: Nigeria 99, 100

Case Study: Nigeria

A 2018 Tax Justice Network report was highly critical of the tax expenditure landscape in Nigeria, specifically noting the lack of transparency around and reporting of tax incentives that had been granted.

In October 2020, the Nigerian government released its first Tax Expenditure Statement (TES) for the year 2019, a document that “sets out the estimated cost of tax expenditures provided under Nigeria’s revenue and other laws.” This statement establishes that the

Nigerian government will now release a TES annually.

This statement provides preliminary estimates of forgone revenue from Companies Income Tax (CIT), Value Added Tax (VAT), Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) and Customs Duty.

The explicit purpose of the TES is “to provide data on the cost of tax expenditures for the purposes of evaluating the effectiveness of individual tax expenditures in achieving their policy goals. In other words, the Statement facilitates the undertaking of a cost/benefit analysis of tax expenditures.”

Key takeaways and figures from Nigeria’s Tax Expenditure Statement include:

• 2019 revenue forgone from inventoried general CIT incentives and concessions (based on a 30% effective tax rate) is estimated at NGN 1.18 trillion, or nearly USD 3.2 billion – 94% of which can be attributed to banks and financial institutions. (p. 27) • According to preliminary analysis, forgone Nigerian VAT revenue is significant. This figure in 2019 was roughly NGN 1.2 trillion (USD 3.1 billion), whereas the revenue potential was estimated at NGN 4.3 trillion (USD 11.3 billion). (p. 29) • Preliminary analysis also suggests that foregone revenue on imports into Nigeria is substantial. Tax relief on imported supplies in 2019 amounted to nearly NGN 350 billion (USD 919 million), more than 25% of the total realized revenue. (p. 31) • The significant amount of foregone revenue from CIT, VAT, PPT, and customs are worth noting. Non-oil revenue potential for Nigeria is estimated to be at least double the current revenue. (p. 31)

Annex 3: Organizations working on tax expenditure-related work in Africa101

Country Organization Ghana Economic Governance Platform STAR-Ghana Oxfam Ghana Cameroon Afroleadership Régional Africain pour le Développement Endogène et Communautaire (CRADEC) Kenya National Taxpayers Association ActionAid Kenya Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) Oxfam Kenya Development Initiatives Mozambique Centro de Integridade Publica (CIP) ActionAid Mozambique Nigeria Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) Niger Delta Budget Monitoring Group (NDEBUMOG) Oxfam Nigeria Liberia ActionAid Liberia Uganda CSBAG ActionAid Uganda Zambia CUTS International ActionAid Zambia Sierra Leone Budget Advocacy Network (BAN) Movement Against Inequality in Sierra Leone (MAI-SL) ActionAid Sierra Leone Senegal Oxfam Senegal L’association Leadership, Equité, Gouvernance et Stratégie pour l’Afrique (LEGS- AFRICA) Zimbabwe Afrodad Burundi ActionAid Burundi Malawi ActionAid Malawi Tanzania ActionAid Tanzania Policy Forum Sikika Youth for Tax Justice Benin Social Watch South Africa ActionAid International Democratic Republic of Justice et Paix Congo (JPC) the Congo

Annex 4: Data visualizations from various sources included in this literature review

102

103

Table 3. Estimates of Tax Expenditures in Senegal

104

105

106

107

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1 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (p. 8) 2 Wang, Xiao. 2013. The Role of Economic Development Zones in National Development Strategies: The Case of China. Dissertation, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Cited in: Moore, Mick, Wilson Prichard, and Odd-Helge Fjieldstad. 2018. Taxing Africa: Coercion, Reform and Development. London: Zed Books. (p. 134) 3 OECD. n.d. Tax and Development: Principles to Enhance the Transparency and Governance of Tax Incentives for Investment in Developing Countries. Report, Paris: OECD. 4 Abramovsky, L., Alexander Klemm, and David Phillips. 2014. "Corporate Tax in Developing Countries: Current Tredns and Design Issues." Fiscal Studies. 5 Keen, Michael, and Mario Mansour. 2009. Revenue Mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges from Globalization. IMF Working Paper, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 6 Analysis by Moore, Mick, Wilson Prichard, and Odd-Helge Fjieldstad. 2018. Taxing Africa: Coercion, Reform and Development. London: Zed Books. (p. 137) 7 Andersen, Maria R., Benjamin R. Kett, and Erik von Uexkull. 2017. “Corporate Tax Incentives and FDI in Developing Countries. in Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018: Foreign Investor Perspectives and Policy Implications. World Bank. 2018. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/964321508856694021/GICR- 03.pdf. 8 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (p. 8) 9 Bolnick, B. (2004): “Effectiveness and Economic Impact of tax Incentives in the SADC Region.” Technical Report submitted to USAID/RCSA. February.

10 Zee, Howell, Janet G. Stotsky, and Eduardo Ley. 2002. “Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Policy Makers in Developing Countries. World Development, vol 30(9). 11 Zee, Howell, Janet G. Stotsky, and Eduardo Ley. 2002. “Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Policy Makers in Developing Countries. World Development, vol 30(9). 12 James, Sebastian. 2009. Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 13 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 14 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (p. 6) 15 Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 16 Allen, N. J., J. Morisset, N. Pimia, and L.T. Wells. 2001. Using Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreign Investment: Are They Worth the Costs? . Foreign Investment Advisory Service Occasional Paper 15, Washington, D.C.: World Bank; International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund; Klemm, A., and S. Van Parys. 2012. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Tax Incentives. 19 (3): 393-423, International Tax and Public Finance; Van Parys, S. 2012. "The Effectiveness of Tax Incentives in Attracting Investment: Evidence from Developing Countries." Reflets et perspectives de la vie economique 2012/3, 129-41. All Cited in: Kronfol, Hania, and Victor Steenbergen. 2020. Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Corporate Tax Incentives: Methodological Approaches and Policy Considerations. Report, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group. (p. 3). 17Chai, J., and R. Goyal. 2008. Tax Concessions and Foreign Direct Investment in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union . IMF Working Paper, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund ; James, S., and S. Van Parys. 2010. "The Effectiveness of Tax Incentives in Attracting FDI: Evidence from the Tourism Sector in the Caribbean." ; Klemm, A., and S. Van Parys. 2012. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Tax Incentives. 19 (3): 393-423, International Tax and Public Finance. Cited in: Ding, Ding, Samira Kalla, Manuel Rosales Torres, and Abdoul Karim Sidibe. 2020. Coordinating Revenue Incentive Policies in the Caribbean. IMF Working Paper, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund (p. 4). 18 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (p. 12) 19 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (p. 11) 20 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 21 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. (p. v) 22 Twesige, D., F. Gasheja, and J. Barayendema. 2020. "Tax Incentives and Growth of SMEs in Rwanda: A Case Study of Small and Medium Enterprises in Nyarugenge District." In Rwandan Economy at the Crossroads of Development, by G. Das and R. Johnson. Singapore: Springer.

23 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 24 Bellak, C., M. Leibrecht, and J.P Damijan. 2009. "Infrastructure Endowment and Corporate Income Taxes as Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern European Countries." World Economy 32 (2): 267-90 ; Kinda, Tidiane. 2014. The Quest for Non-Resource-Based FDI: Do Taxes Matter? IMF Working Paper, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Cited in: Kronfol, Hania, and Victor Steenbergen. 2020. Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Corporate Tax Incentives: Methodological Approaches and Policy Considerations. Report, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group. 25 Toder, E. 2000. Tax Cuts or Spending -- Does it Make a Difference? National Tax Journal; Cited in Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 26 OECD. n.d. Tax and Development: Principles to Enhance the Transparency and Governance of Tax Incentives for Investment in Developing Countries. Report, Paris: OECD. 27 Moore, Mick, Wilson Prichard, and Odd-Helge Fjieldstad. 2018. Taxing Africa: Coercion, Reform and Development. London: Zed Books. (p. 136) Agencies include the Parliament, Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, Revenue Agencies, Minerals Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, Food and Drugs Board, Ghana Free Zones Board, Ghana Investment Promotion Council, and Ghana National Petroleum Company. 28 Addis Tax Initiative. 2020. “Perspectives from ATI partner countries on design of tax incentive regimes”. Accessed April 2021 https://www.addistaxinitiative.net/sites/default/files/resources/ATI_TaxIncentiveBriefs_2020.pdf 29 Gupta, Sanjeev, and Mark Plant. 2019. Strengthening Revenue Performance in Africa Requires Tough Political Decisions. October 31. Accessed December 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/strengthening-revenue- performance-africa-requires-tough-political-decisions. 30 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (p. 9) 31 Kronfol, Hania, and Victor Steenbergen. 2020. Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Corporate Tax Incentives: Methodological Approaches and Policy Considerations. Report, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group. 32 Ding, Ding, Samira Kalla, Manuel Rosales Torres, and Abdoul Karim Sidibe. 2020. Coordinating Revenue Incentive Policies in the Caribbean. IMF Working Paper, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (p. 5) 33 Tax Justice Network Africa & ActionAid International. 2012. Tax competition in East Africa: A race to the bottom? Nairobi: Tax Justice Network Africa & ActionAid International. 34 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (p. 26) 35 Gupta, Sanjeev, and Mark Plant. 2019. Strengthening Revenue Performance in Africa Requires Tough Political Decisions. October 31. Accessed December 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/strengthening-revenue- performance-africa-requires-tough-political-decisions. 36 Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 37 Global Tax Expenditure Database, accessed May 20, 2021, www.GTED.net. 38 Kassim, L., and M. Mansour. 2018. "Les Rapports sur les Dépenses Fiscales des Pays en Développement : Une Evaluation." Revue d'économie du développement 113-167. 24

Cited in: Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 39 Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 40 Moore, Mick. 2015. Tax and the Governance Dividend. Working Paper 37, Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development. 41 OECD, IGF. 2018. “Tax Incentives in Mining: Minimising Risks to Revenue” p22. 42 Therkildsen, Ole, and Anne Mette Kjaer. 2013. "Elections and landmark policies in Tanzania and Uganda." Democratization 592-614. 43 Easter, Gerald M. 2008. "Capacity, Consent and Tax Collection in Post-communist States." In Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries, by Deborah Brautigam, Mick Moore and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, 64-88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 44 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. (p. 36) 45 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. (p. 24) 46 Mullins, Peter, Sanjeev Gupta, and Jianjong Liu. 2020. Domestic Revenue Mobilization: Where To From Here? Policy Paper 195, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. (p. 1) 47 Gupta, Sanjeev, and Agustin Redonda. 2020. COVID-19 and Seizing the Opportunity for Reforming Tax Expenditures in Africa. July 27. Accessed December 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/covid-19-and-seizing- opportunity-reforming-tax-expenditures-africa#.Xx8fnB-J9EY.twitter. 48 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. (p. 38) 49 Gupta, Sanjeev, and Mark Plant. 2019. Strengthening Revenue Performance in Africa Requires Tough Political Decisions. October 31. Accessed December 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/strengthening-revenue- performance-africa-requires-tough-political-decisions. 50 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. (p. 27-29) 51 Ibid. (p. 31) 52 James, Sebastian. 2009. Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. (p. 19) 53 Gupta, Sanjeev. 2018. "Time to Pay More Attention to Tax Expenditures?" Center for Global Development. August 1. Accessed 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/time-pay-more-attention-tax-expenditures. 54 Stausholm, Saila Naomi. 2018. Rise of Ineffective Incentives: New Empirical Evidence on Tax Holidays in Developing Countries. Copenhagen: SocArXiv Papers. 55 Kronfol, Hania, and Victor Steenbergen. 2020. Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Corporate Tax Incentives: Methodological Approaches and Policy Considerations. Report, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group. (p. 2) 56 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. (p. 27-30); James, Sebastian. 2009. Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. (p. 19) 57 James, Sebastian. 2013. Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. (p. 21) 58 Gupta, Sanjeev. 2018. "Time to Pay More Attention to Tax Expenditures?" Center for Global Development. August 1. Accessed 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/time-pay-more-attention-tax-expenditures. 59 Gupta, Sanjeev, and Agustin Redonda. 2020. COVID-19 and Seizing the Opportunity for Reforming Tax Expenditures in Africa. July 27. Accessed December 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/covid-19-and-seizing- opportunity-reforming-tax-expenditures-africa#.Xx8fnB-J9EY.twitter. 60 OECD. n.d. Tax and Development: Principles to Enhance the Transparency and Governance of Tax Incentives for Investment in Developing Countries. Report, Paris: OECD.

61 James, Sebastian. 2009. Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. (p. 12-19) 62 Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 63 Gupta, Sanjeev, and Agustin Redonda. 2020. COVID-19 and Seizing the Opportunity for Reforming Tax Expenditures in Africa. July 27. Accessed December 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/covid-19-and-seizing- opportunity-reforming-tax-expenditures-africa#.Xx8fnB-J9EY.twitter. 64 Meinzer, Markus, Mustapha Ndajiwo, Rachel Etter-Phoya, and Maïmouna Diakite. 2019. Comparing tax incentives across jurisdictions: a pilot study. Research Report, Chesham: Tax Justice Network. The Global Tax Expenditure Database, launching in June 2021, will signicantly improve ease of access to data on tax expenditures. Available at: www.GTED.net. 65 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 66 Andersen, M., B. Kett, and E. von Uexkull. 2018. Corporate Tax Incentives and FDI in Developing Countries. Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/18, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Cited in: Kronfol, Hania, and Victor Steenbergen. 2020. Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Corporate Tax Incentives: Methodological Approaches and Policy Considerations. Report, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group. (p. 1) 67 Niang, Birahim Bouna, and Ahmadou Aly Mbaye. 2020. Senegal: Making Domestic Resource Mobilization Work to Sustain Growth and Improve Service Delivery. Policy Paper, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. 68 KPMG. 2016. Africa Incentive Survey 2016: "Africa is open for business". Survey Report, Amstelveen: KPMG. 69 Ding, Ding, Samira Kalla, Manuel Rosales Torres, and Abdoul Karim Sidibe. 2020. Coordinating Revenue Incentive Policies in the Caribbean. IMF Working Paper, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 70 Andersen, M., B. Kett, and E. von Uexkull. 2018. Corporate Tax Incentives and FDI in Developing Countries. Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/18, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. (p. 76) 71 Andersen, M., B. Kett, and E. von Uexkull. 2018. Corporate Tax Incentives and FDI in Developing Countries. Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/18, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 72 Gupta, Sanjeev. 2018. "Time to Pay More Attention to Tax Expenditures?" Center for Global Development. August 1. Accessed 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/time-pay-more-attention-tax-expenditures. 73 From previously cited CGD blog post. 74 IMF, Ghana: Request for a Three-year Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility, April 2015, p.16, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ scr/2015/cr15103.pdf (The report cites a 2011 OECD report, Analysis of Tax Expenditures in Ghana, but whose web link (http://www.uscib.org/ index.asp?documentID=3183) does not work). Cited in: ActionAid. 2017. Missed Opportunity: how could funds lost to tax incentives in Africa be used to fill the education finance gap. Policy Brief, Joannesburg: ActionAid. (p. 4) 75 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. (p. 20) 76 Niang, Birahim Bouna, and Ahmadou Aly Mbaye. 2020. Senegal: Making Domestic Resource Mobilization Work to Sustain Growth and Improve Service Delivery. Policy Paper, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. (p. 4) 77 Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 78 Readhead, Alexandra, Jaqueline Terrel, and Thomas Lassourd. 2019. Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) Mining Tax Incentives Database. Ottowa, July 24. 79 Global Tax Expenditure Database, accessed May 20, 2021, www.GTED.net.

80 Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 81 Mullins, Peter, Sanjeev Gupta, and Jianjong Liu. 2020. Domestic Revenue Mobilization: Where To From Here? Policy Paper 195, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. (p. 1) 82 Gupta, Sanjeev. 2018. "Time to Pay More Attention to Tax Expenditures?" Center for Global Development. August 1. Accessed 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/time-pay-more-attention-tax-expenditures. 83 ActionAid. 2017. Missed Opportunity: how could funds lost to tax incentives in Africa be used to fill the education finance gap. Policy Brief, Joannesburg: ActionAid. 84 IMF, EOCD, UN, and World Bank. 2015. Options for Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment. Background Paper, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 85 Mansour, Mario, and Christopher Heady. 2019. Tax Expenditure Reporting and Its Use in Fiscal Management: A Guide for Developing Economies. How To Notes, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 86 IGF and OECD. n.d. The Hidden Cost of Tax Incentives in Mining. Consultation Draft, Geneva: Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development. 87 Gupta, Sanjeev. 2018. "Time to Pay More Attention to Tax Expenditures?" Center for Global Development. August 1. Accessed 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/time-pay-more-attention-tax-expenditures. 88 Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 89 Mansour, Mario, and Christopher Heady. 2019. Tax Expenditure Reporting and Its Use in Fiscal Management: A Guide for Developing Economies. How To Notes, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 90 Gupta, Sanjeev. 2018. "Time to Pay More Attention to Tax Expenditures?" Center for Global Development. August 1. Accessed 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/time-pay-more-attention-tax-expenditures. 91 ActionAid. 2017. Missed Opportunity: how could funds lost to tax incentives in Africa be used to fill the education finance gap. Policy Brief, Joannesburg: ActionAid. 92 Ministere de L'Economie et des Finances. 2012. Journal Officiel du Senegal: Decret n 2012-396 du 27 mars 2012. Dakar: La Republique du Senegal. 93 International Monetary Fund, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, the World Bank Group, and the United Nations. 2015. Options For Low Income Countries' Effective and Efficient Use Of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report To The G-20 Development Working Group, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (p. 26) 94 Ibid. (p. 28-29) 95 James, Sebastian. 2014. Effectiveness of Tax and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications. Paper, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. (p. 25) 96 Asia Regional Integration Center. Tax Incentives Database, https://aric.adb.org/taxincentives. 97 OECD. n.d. Tax and Development: Principles to Enhance the Transparency and Governance of Tax Incentives for Investment in Developing Countries. Report, Paris: OECD. (p. 5) 98 Brosio, Magali, Paddy Carter, Santiago Diaz de Serralde, Mark Hallerberg, Martina Neuwirth, and Song Hong. 2017. Tax Expenditures. Report, G20 Insights. 99 Budget Office of the Federation, Nigeria. 2021. Other Documents Accompanying the Annual Budget to the National Assembly. Annual Budget, Abuja: Nigerian Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget & National Planning. 100 Ndajiwo, Mustapha. 2018. Are tax incentives in Nigeria attracting investment or giving away revenue? August 14. Accessed January 17, 2021. https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/08/14/are-tax-incentives-in-nigeria- attracting-investment-or-giving-away-revenue/. 101 International Budget Partnership, Dataset for global scan of civil society work on taxation, https://www.internationalbudget.org/dataset-for-global-scan-of-civil-society-work-on-taxation/ 102 Redonda, Agustin, Christian von Haldenwang, and Flurim Aliu. 2021. “Tax Expenditure Reporting and Domestic Revenue Mobilization in Africa,” in Mosquera Valderramaet et al., Taxation, International 27

Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. United Nations University Series on Regionalism, vol 19.. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-64857-2_9#DOI. 103 Gupta, Sanjeev, and Agustin Redonda. 2020. COVID-19 and Seizing the Opportunity for Reforming Tax Expenditures in Africa. July 27. Accessed December 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/covid-19-and-seizing- opportunity-reforming-tax-expenditures-africa#.Xx8fnB-J9EY.twitter. 104 Niang, Birahim Bouna, and Ahmadou Aly Mbaye. 2020. Senegal: Making Domestic Resource Mobilization Work to Sustain Growth and Improve Service Delivery. Policy Paper, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. 105 Kronfol, Hania, and Victor Steenbergen. 2020. Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Corporate Tax Incentives: Methodological Approaches and Policy Considerations. Report, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group. 106 Ibid. 107 Gupta, Sanjeev, and Mark Plant. 2019. Strengthening Revenue Performance in Africa Requires Tough Political Decisions. October 31. Accessed December 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/strengthening- revenue-performance-africa-requires-tough-political-decisions.