THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART October 20, 1950, INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM
To Larry From Jack
As promised, I return wherewith the original lists of the fifty most important objects from each department except paintings which you loaned me. I have had two copies made of each and have added the measurements to each. This means that we have three complete copies of these records, of which you have one as has Bugden, while I have the other. We will attempt to fit this material as far as possible into the wood barrels we have already in stock should it be necessary and arrange other means of packing for objects too large or cumber some to fit into the barrels. 9jl0ill|12|'r THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM
To Mr. Harrison September 19, 1950 From Mrs* Harty
I am returning your "Cream of the Crop" lists with the measurements of the objects penciled in. I have changed the metric into inches. In all cases I have written in the mersurements in the next highest unit, that is, 8-l/S inches appears on the list as 9 inches, ?nd 9 feet 3 inches is put down as 9-1/2 feet.
Objects which will roll, such as rugs, tapestries, and scroll paintings have been given only one dimension, the width of the roll. Host pieces of Arms end Armor, Sculpture, and Ceramics which are actually three-dimensional have been recorded as having only one or two, but I believe in each instance the missing dimensions are smaller than those given.
I trust that the lists are sufficiently complete to furnish the basic figures for your computations. June 12, 1951
Present Status of "A" Lists:
In file: De_ga£tment Date_of List American Wing 7-25-50 (Silver only) Arms & Armor 10-10-50 Far East 10-11-50 Egyptian 10-9-50 Greek & Roman 6-4-51 Medieval 10-10-50 Near East 10-10-50 Ancient Near East 10-11 50 Paintings 12-14-50 Altman & Bache 12-12-50 Ren. & Modern 10-11-50
Not in file: American Paintings Music Prints A THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM
To Mr. Easby From Mr. Andrus July 25, 1950
Attached is the list you requested today of twenty-five pieces of silver in the American Wing of the greatest value. There are other pieces of equal value that could not be included in this list. i tWv (WA^
A.D.2 Silver in the American Wing of Great Value
Accession Number Object Maker
24.109.36 Inkstand H<«5, LsO, & irv * John Coney L 38.7 Monteith ti- 1) &/*<**. . /3.V - " "
41.18^> Tazza j9» 33.120.526 Teapot fi. 91 / i - " tt 38.63 Two handled bowl fOj Cornelius Kierstede f+t'J/aw Co itv • L 39.12 Candlestick f/, a, B*»<-7i«-s?- " " 23.80.21 Snuffer Stand H'< ?'J ^ ' S in,* « « 40.145a,b Teakettle #»///*- « « /5f3. tf.7, <£&,*». \SW. tt.*JL0,'fH\. 33.120.543,544,545,547 Teaset (4 pieces) Paul Revere, Jr.-s ffS.g: 2, Lu. T^ [M7. H,7'>n . ' 46.40.1,2 Pair of sauceboatsJp^^.S"/^-1' v " v 33.120.507 Tankard //.//, &<<**- 6 M . tt n « 53.120.319 Plate P' - . /oi» • Edward Winslow 33.120.221 Chocolate Pot H< to in. n it L 41.43a,b Teapot K ' 7m - Jacob Boelen 33.120.350a,b Porringer and Cover Jan Van Niemkirk H>o~j ^f, /£ 'lf% 33.120.517 Tankard 14. ? i* * Gerrit Oncklebag 46.61 Sugar Box^.^j V>, 7; /^'6 m-. Daniel Greenough L 50.18 Bowl /V 7 iV • Adrian Bancker 23.80.17 Bowl If. 4j 'fcWn?. 9Vn - Jesse Kip 33.120.230 Cup and Cover (V« ^ fehotn ^Samuel Edwards 47.7 Teapot {4, 2 in- Peter van Dyke 33.120.235 Alms Basin &ta-n . I1-/ m. • Samuel Minott < L 38.18.2 Bowl (-(-, if CJKJM.' /'iru- Simeon Soumaine 27.85.1 Tankard H-T, V, 1 /n - Simeon Soumaine 38.83 Tankard (4, ? in- Jacobus van der Spiegel THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM August 7, 1950 To »Mr. Taylor from Mr. Grancsay Herewith is my list of the ten (10) outstanding harnesses and fifty (50) miscellaneous items of arms and armor in the Metropolitan Museum. $UL< l). VnCAttsC/y* fuy^^ o%3. Cs(r f (^i^I:AA^L -&f,wi«JtL- Aasv^ a* fl./!3/• t, ^ %Z JbJaJ /*/J**. 5-/ f *~ ^l August 4, 1950 Ten (10) Outstanding Harnesses and Fifty (50) Miscellaneous Items of Arms and Armor in The Metropolitan Museum of Art s? .^ auoytf/^. n ****> iltiiht J sv ,. jg./, 7 ,A, HARNESSES . \ , _p^ V 39.121 A-N Embossed Armor of Henry II of France\ f a_0 ^£7',^. 32.130.6 A-Y) Armor of George Clifford, third earl of Cumberland, 36.98.1-2 ) with Exchange Pieces o Aucu UTAJ.<*M,*~> 5V X 9-V'*n- 32.130.8 AB ) 10 V '• " /3 X /6 in; I O " ? rk ^.JL I n • 32.130.5 A-M Armor of Henry Herbert, second earl of Pembroke . ' „ *„<• ~J ;<,,-J^U.J 4(O^Aa0 x//• *; Irfi^SA xy 32.130.7 A-K Armor of Anne de Montmorency, Constable of"Trance 1/ IOMAX*,yony/or 23.261 Armor for Man and Horse (Wolf of Landshut) -ntjOUt**" ' 32.69 Armor for Horse (Johann Ernst, Duke of Saxony) /f-^, £> 7/ in- 14.25.718 Gothic Armor /3 rf^-ous I5" ts*. . X /^m.,, e^ M.4*j 49.163.1 Maximilian Armor f HELMETS AMD ELEMENTS OF ARMOR 04.3.217 ) Helmet (Cosimo II de1 Medici) ,s X'S"'*" 22.140 ) Buffe (belongs to Medici helmet 04.3.217) f K ST tn, - 17.190.1720 Helmet (Negroli) )oy,iH In.- 26.53 Helmet (Due de Guise) // x ts in, • 29.150.3 A Helmet (Cock's comb) -no »A. 25.26.1-7 Seven Painted Shields (Behaim) £ (See p. 2) August 4, 1950 Ten (10) Outstanding Harnesses and Fifty (50) Miscellaneous Items -2- FIREARMS 29.151.1 Wheellock Hunting Gun (ivory stock) af, ^/<3 •**•> - 29.158.668 Wheeilock Hunting Gun (Caspar Spat) German (Munich), dated 1668. 14.25.1425 Wheeilock Pistol (Charles V) of. &° fn- 42.50.7 Presentation Fowling-Piece made for Napoleon 14.25.1427AB Ball-Butt Wheeilock Pistols (Pair) tac-U , £o "*- ' 42.50.9-10 Flintlock Pistols (Pair) €<*4~, <£.£.!> Irv , 29.158.671 Breechloading Wheeilock Gun 4f. < 32.75.225 Gothic Sword <£• *ff "° ' 29.150.143 Gothic Sword -^ W >* • 04.3.6 Dress Rapier 45"f7 "* 32.130.4 AB Sword and Chape of Scabbard (Ambrogio di Spinola) jf?. 46 in, 14.25.1204 Sword of Charles V 4 (o x t? tn> • 29.157.6 Cup-hilted Rapier «=*f. 47 in • 04.3.23 Pope Sixtus V Sword $° y 1 '** " 04.3.42 Sword Cane of Don Juan Jose of Austria .5/ tn. 42.50.iS /a- Sword with silver-inlaid hilt V7 X <3s //w>- 14.25.1169 Venetian Sword, 1500 -V2. x to in)- DAGGERS 04.3.130-132 Swiss Dagger with Sheath, Knife and Skewer /6 X 4 it, 29.158.652 Left-Hand Dagger J?. £0 iro- 04.3.158 Hunting Knife with Wheeilock Pistol (Gemlich) I 7 X V ln. 26.145.54 Eared Dagger V! /to Lvu . 29.158.721 Cinquedea cpf. i§> in, - MISCELLANEOUS WEAPONS 25.42 Crossbow of Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary, dated 1489 -30K2.5T,, 04.3.59 Mace of Henry II ly^ ^, 14.25.1574 Crossbow with Winder £•£ X J14 /*»*. - 42.50.11 Partisan, French, 1640 ^ $&, in, . HORSE EQUIPMENT K 04.3.249 Staghorn Saddle I cf Y /T in 04.3.478 AB Bit (Arms of Galeazzo Gonzaga) {& <7/« (See page 3) August 4, 1950 Ten (10l_0utstanding Harnesses and Fifty (50) Miscellaneous Items -3- ORIENTAL 23.232.2 AB Saber with Scabbard (Sultan Amurath V) <£.&£> ^ • 36.25.1624 AB Sword with Scabbard. Indian. Alf.SS /» - 36.25.1625 AB Sword with Scabbard. Indian. •?• 3 ^ ,ru ' 29.100.1375 A-D Japanese Short Sword with Scabbard and Kozuka (Natsuo) 13.112.8 Japanese Helmet (Nobuiye) /3^/OK Co /*> - 02.5.4 Persian Shield %tc»fr\ • /5" irv • THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM To Mr. Taylor July 26, 1950 From Mr. Lansing RECEIVED JUL 27 A5Q Dear Francis, UIKECTOB Herewith the list of Egyptian things for security storage. We have not taken too literally the number of objects from each room as given in tne list you and Preston made up. The total has probably been increased a trifle, but the excess is in small objects which we have considered as groups. Two of the more important recent acquisitions were not on ex hibition when you made your tour. LIPT OF L..?QAAu Qallery P 3, First Floer* 6 otpect.i.-: Ivoi 24 *~y*- •%. " Ve L-«'/i H ., ivory legs ox" furniture .1-2 £**4*t-7 19.2.16 "7/C* „ igars iMluua 07,228.71 U>1 . -,. * I! ... .10 A/ '* £'* , !2t4l/i tt>" P/. Gailer>r 1 1 ' (Listed): tive 10 object: : culpto x piecfct, 11.160 £ACL'1*$* 94) of i )t list 41.2.A1 //*? „ Statuette children 26. . H$ „ Big slebester jar, I ii // '*T r cup, * .AJ //7 a." n in fo " ... trum Gallery L 2 (Thir :>om) fListed)i 2 Meket-Re boats 20.5.1 ] v^" J .-• , -1 • ••....^r.v - - (V.;. at) ^* 6 Hek&r . v„ 11} ^ ^^V . Axovy v. I (Sixth .••J oV .-.XJ. L :,un je**~ (ct. ae) , • 4 »y *** Q " toilet articles mot easkets) Set " »pic L; 45-48 ff */"***/ Wah col 3 Rah • celets 40. S. 12-14 L-H 1 n large silver b*ll necklace .19 L-V* - j&r I • - 26.7.899-901 ft 2. *A/ .nee hi *X4K3* Peasant rest!] .. :,x H %" „ G^mebo ,?.l 9 4D x "> *^ ••'-ise 44.4.75 M'"2." Xepren toilet box I ;'•:.. . P-J / .x . x.... i -±—/* ib H if . 9 Hr3 j> (Sere&t Diorlta -Wosret 111 (iuartsits beed ef status oi Pen- t III .7.1394 IT "J . Ar t III .100.160 /?V' - 5 - GaJAery H 6 (Eighth I (Li ted): Woe t 1 . A / »U» 6 oljec1-. I Gil 14,5.69-70 IOV1 V * -*" r " • « f L, L.76S ioy*) V<£" Wax shew 'I coffin , . A-c &fy3*.3 cup 44.4.4 fcflaA* r bust of . . . H-s Kiddle Kingdom coffi 11.1 ... AiC / C- f%2^x' Gallery H 7 {Hal ptlan ) SO f oi J|Ctsi Gold Aaron ,7.14U trt Silver boy 26.7.1415 H?'' • ,8.95 Vf>o (Hess Taweret jy Teye <*... .±0 ft 10" 11 Ivories, etc. Objects f:• nu 2 vitrines of Princ Jewelry .d.) j Headdresses 2-0 xir* ».T* (»•<«*%» 2 Mirrc I"»xi7* * C*- 5-6 ted jars tone gonV ts ch of I 4>ts-yi 1* JO l Gilver canister i " cup j ewelry i» 1 pair of " sandi- 1 sell • • stalls 1 pair c t -eta A • inlaid • 1 " inscribed Set of 7 finger rin Set of 1 scarabs ir of gold eyes 1 fish girale 1 cowrie " 1 heart scarab - 4 - Gallery H 7 (Ninth Egyptian Koom), cont'o, S. wall case: seers in t v,t g • S&tuvaJr & X *• U.S.. I • telet plaques 26.7.1359 etcV^L-i^xi **/ 1 r'.-.ience collar 40.1.6 i)t.#4* i J- tild .iorus 49.121.2 J 2.* f 1 Tutankhamen gold ring 22.9.3 J> ff* 1 Akhenater. ring 26.7.7671)/A G.-K. i-'vr. laleid pecto: 49.121.1 4x^ 2 Kail c Llveri Inscribe 07. J. ^',l./» _ .ottle Gallery H 9 Court) ihi -.1 * > °-**', r-I s iienet-towy 25.?.182-4 ^v^-^' A Gallery H 1 s) (Lit'tea): ..aopic jar ot .-ka-he (. _only) .54 Hl'^li.l* " Yellow jasper hi Indurated limestone ae&o o lshamen 12 olject. quartzite head of Aknenaten 11 .26 £ v&x^ Fragment of indurat^ jne ft.ce ,7.1596 ^V J»«i J ilnx of Thutmose 111 e of km a III • •* ^fr * ; t j». t' t >.21 fit ribe . .A (Listed): .. Yuny ana wife statue 15.2.1 4 H< stetus " Heac of A 07.228.54 Hty 6 objects: n Pe&d ef 1 II 2 Uxl (to/Jr+aa) n I j-thor cow 19.2.5 H 2./ .ted linen panel 44.2.5 JfrK'4" Group of 3 woods Li (lays sad Thuyu) ^ue falsi • (Listed): ;* ns Ostreeon - ting bu . .27 fl'XO" ' Ga.lie.r;; h 7 (Fourteen' (Listed): aassxt 34 ;* accesi .) Metternicn Stela 3 4 y / 1/ * £ " 7 P. Group o: .ce inl 26.7.991 - \06~l ~S2.%IA\ Y.L * Faience aapho 26.7.920 H-4'V «-»-Wv«rv^^ 26.7.87 H*f* • Thot 0 H-x* " iiorub .7.866 H->TA». Qusxtsite heed of pi (New acce. « Baienci .ua ,99 ft 1/ - 6 - Gallery 1 7. ("ourteentu Be «), t 'c. &(» Bronze statuettes: (some of ff. in proeediag room) A, f V,K 25.2.11 /fo (A L/-Z.' 1 45.2.9 r4^/^» Cat He'/*,' ill it *£*' * iiatnor 08.202.3 H /&/ / * 26.7.345 H •) 3- horut. (opeai • v H**£.• e) 45.2*11 H~ /a * A 55.9.2 If Af 26.7.848 // 4* KISU 4o.97 ^r" „ ep 10.17) . lt 26.7.1417 //'a-'* ,9.1 #6* „ E6.7.844 /*T Lady on staff 40.2.e #^ .. .*• . •• 45.4.1 !(*" N nefort r t .. Gallery 0 5 (fifteen*. (Listeo)j J '-J-A ( Sculptori center ease unaer winaow ortrail l . O^^luf-*' (-fa^*^* > ) 2 on ri^nt oi At * ( ZXyi^" m 109.181. .) ii2- x /v1 2 Faience vases ,7.1015 /fe'' T)f„ .4.46 H^" T)^ 3ul«j •% '^o LIST OF IMPORTANT OBJECTS IS THE TOfrgCIIOM? OF gGXPTIAy MS Gallery D 3. First Floor (First Egyptian Room)t Six historic objects. Gallery E 1 (Second Egyptian Roots): A Foreign Captive. Limestone statue. 47.2 Mitry. Wooden figure. 26.2.2 Ten assorted objects* Gallery E 2 (Third Egyptian Room)t Two Meket-Re boats to be selected. Offering Bearer. Wooden figure. 20.3.7 Gallery H 3 (Middle Kingdom Jewelry)t Fifty items to be selected* Gallery H 6 (Eighth Egyptian Room): King Se*n-Wosret I. Wooden figure. U.3.17 One of three figures in case in southeast corner of gallery to be selected* Six assorted objects* Gallery H 7 (Jewelry. New Kingdom to Graeco-Roman)t Fifty items to be selected. Qallery H 9 (Egyptian Court)t Six mummy coffins to be selected, ndbag all sculpture. - 2 - Gallery H 1 (Tenth Egyptian Room)t Canopic Jar of King Semenkh-Ka-Re*. Alabaster. 07*226.1 and 30,8*54 Fragment of the Head of a Statue. Yellow jasper* 26.7*1396 King Tut-Ankh-Amun (?). Indurated limestone. 50.6 Ten assorted objects. Gallery £ 5 (Eleventh Egyptian Room)t Chief Royal Secretary Yuny and his wife* Limestone group* 15*2*1 The Chief Royal Scribe Yuny* Limestone. 33*2*1 The God Amun* Granite. 07.228.34 Five assorted objects* Gallery E 6 (Twelfth Kgyi^tlan Room)? Fallen Syrians. Painted limestone relief. 13.180*21 V llery E 7 (Fourteenth Egyptian Room): The Hawk God Horus. Basalt. 34.2.1 Fifteen bronzes to be selected. Ten other assorted objects to be selected* Gallery D 5. First Floor (Fifteenth Egyptian >tooao.); tire contents of vitrine containing sculptor1s models. Beneath central window. Three portrait panels from mummies to be selected. Gallery D 4. First Floor: Sandbag tombs. FAR EAST EMERGENCY LIST \^ -f-^' '-** Gallery E 8 Second Floor fo/'IA 17.190.524 a,b Bronze vessel (Morgan) 43.25.4 ii n 24.72.1-14 Tu*i Fang Altar set 'A ^fa^ ) H $ JV^ 49.137.1-10 Bronze grout^Ch'ang Sha JIAG/LUJ- r^ViVy'V L 43.26. a,b Bronze vessel rf |*2.y I— >*i 43.24.2 Bronze bell II, L.I*LtUi ~f "*• 43.24.1 a,b Bronze vessel '( IO (AJ % *+S~ 43.27.1 a,b Bronze vessel " '0 IAJ f **~ 25.20.2 a,b 1 25.214 ti ii ^r-c^ *- ' 38.158.1 a-n Gilt bronze altar vW s\ , 1<0 IS~^ 38-158.2 a-g Gilt bronze altar -,;. .-U ^ ww 42.25.28 Gilt bronze Kuan Yin ' o, L*->,~) 43.24.3 Gilt bronze Buddha 42.25.32 Bronze lion 43.24.4 a,b gilt bronze incense burner H ^ Rl^*- 34.64.1 Burial crown, gold and semi-precious stones * 'K • */ a a a - 2 - Gallery £ 9 Second Floor 34.15.1 Dated Wood Kuan fin H LJ-O !^v 28,123 ftood Bodhisattva 42.103 II 11 U-v^- 42.25.5 Wood Kuan Yin ;OKo Gallery E 10. Second Floor 35.146 Stone relief, Lung Men (sand bagged) • ft. Aril 14.78 S-tJone Figure of Bodhisattva ( • " .) 39.191 Stone Figure of Bodhisattva 48.132.4 Stone Figure of Bodcihisattva Gallery E 11. Second Floor_ 48.162.2 Stone Bodhisattva ( sand bagged) U-'i~^ vLf" 22.134 Stone Bodhisattva (sand bagged) G> ^T ^ ^T.£f 24.27 Stone Stele ( sand bagged J irtC/J^t k) 3 (r 20.99 Stone tomb relief ( sand bagged) \4- $ atf- kJ 14 £f- 30.122 Stone Stele (sand bagged) f-f^ ^f- / - 20.89 Stone tomb relief ( sandbagged) rf$~ ty 42.25.3 Stone Bodhisattva (sand bagged) f 49.136.1* a,b Bronze vessel with cover 49.136.3 Bronze vessel in form of stag ' L vfW^tvv. 49.135.5 a,b Bronze vessel with cover u*\*^ 49.135.9 a,b Bronze vessel with cover IO ^^J 42.25.12 Stone head from Tien Lung q lb lli ? l/v-» - 3 - Gallery E 11 (Continued) 42.25.11 Stone head from Zun Kang 42.25.4 Lacquer figure of Bodhisattva 19.186 Lacquer figure of Buddha r It 1AJ 4i~~] Gallery H 11. Second Floor 44.77.1,2 ) H h UO ") w, f-f-T Wj-^vv 47 .18.27 ~W^ ^o^'SSaco fragm ents 42.45 H y(o UA i1> w-vo 30.82.5 Stucco head of Buddha TT?1 29.19 Wood traveller's shrine f ' '- tvv 32.56 Painting ( fragment) Bodhisattva ( alburn leaf size) l4V~)kK> 47.18.2 Painting - Vimalakirti sutra 2-7 *" w° 21.57 " Buddhist naradise scene ( Needs Box) n 7 * VI 'out4xs^td -v-Kiww . rf 47.18.15 Painting - Landscape W 34 K~ 47.18.124 t\J X o '*- 47.18.16 47.18.10 Fish Gallery H 13. Second floor 41.138 Painting - Tribute Korse ( Needs Boy) 'r\ $?f/f /Ui/ 29.20.1 Painting - Seated scholar H tL wJ /J~ <-">"- 47.18.32 Painting - Album leaf 10^/11^ 30.76.290 -294 Set of Five Paintings - Kings of Hell ( lluudu Bun) Lu i Gallery H 15. cont'd 29.100.514 Painting - Magpie on branch ( album leaf) l^Y/4.^ 38.31.1 " - Taoist scenes IsO "2-0 v-*v( £>Zsu>4JL 19.165 " - Landscape KJ " 18.124.4 " - Hundred Buffalos /\J I J VV^ (^<5cao^t\ 13.100.110 " - album leaf - Fish '' Gallery H 14. Second Floor box Bishop Jades ( 17 Pieces) tr&y. \ - 5 - Gallery H 15. Second Floor 36.100.40, 41, 42 Set of three paintings - Soring, Summer Winter 36.100.79 p . .. . i^Vv H «-3 kJq Fainting —Landscape . i Gallery H 16. Second Floor 15.127 Painted Screen by Koyetsu W U ^ /_ <3 ^ f,^) 49.55.2 . t,0ssd] 41.59.1,2 Pair of painted screens by Soaroi ( have box) W4^ ^ L i^.'Ch Gallery, E 17, Secopd Flopr_ 47.18.7 Painting — Marsh Scene K) ILL. i^ [£(UL<4JL 47.18.149 - -Nightingales ^ / "5 K (SCAJ^JL) 47.18.5 - Bees and Poses Vj I / i^. ( .$»JI^& J 47.18.147 - Sleeping Man ' I V / ^_ ^ 40.148 - Play with Infants (Box_neededl ;?v2oK*. 47.18.154 Painting - Album leaf — Landscape <2 K 47.18.63 - Album Leaf — Landscape KJ l^/Jfeu*) 47.18.8 - Landscape of crows W IUK< (&ZSI*H£) 47.18.6 - The Hundred Birds i\j I a tv. f^cW 47.18.3 - Landscape KJ / 1 vo^/Sc-o^-^L J • • • •/ • i - 6 - QaJLlgay-HJia*-Second PIQPJC 47.18.14 Painting — Landscaue 46.146 Painting — River Landscape 47.18.116 " — Flowers and Butterflies 47.18.46 " — Lohan's Green Dragon and Tiger lt\) >^ ^(& 47.18.4 " —Landscape AJ 1 K^ [/Qcyt-M' 47.18.1 Painting — Ch'ing Ming Festival K> '^ ^ & 21.175.1 Vase, Famille Verte H >? *vv 17.120.199 Vase, Famille Verte - 7 - Gallery H 21. Second Floor 42.25.20 Bronze Buddha, Javanese 33.65.8 Bronze Figure of Parvati, Indian 42.25.25 Bodhisattva Cambodian 48-6e " Buddha, Gandharan 42.25.15 Stone Bodhisattva, Indian ( Sanobag) fof %0 W^ 36.96.2 " Relief Cambodian ( Sandbag) JA&3 lAl7*K 36.96.6 " Lintel Cambodian ( Sandbag) Hloto&t^ 28.105 " Relief ( Life of Buddha) Indian, HAA^^f Amaravati School.( Sandbag) 28*51 Stone Relief (Adoration of Buddha) Indiai , H ^ $r Amaravati School. ( Sandbag). CO"zJi.fif 27.79 Stone Braham ( Sandbag) n MsP—gTP.V p_ pf_2j7Pgrcelain s - 8 - 17 H 14 1 Box of^Bishon Jades ( see list o.4, already mentioned) H 21 27 Porcelains ( see list p.7, already mentioned) H 19 13 Monochromes K 22 30 Porcelains E 115 20 Chinese, Japanese Coats 2 Solander Boxes Pair of Tapestries ( 25.109.1,2) ZG^L> A) Print Study Room 250 Japanese prints- Solander boxes Pages on this list are numbered according to original copy. MlBiB^^H ^^^^H^^M H^ tJouLltM^- He— Art, 1951 Priority Hat of ftbj«cte to be packed for safe keeping in case of emergency Firet Rooa. (L Ik.) Case or pedestfel qtfet y Lc barpiet 47.100.1 ** '* Bronze engraved dagger 1.439 • ^y. Colotifcfii dlpylon vase 14,ISO.16 M-¥3A « , Colotsal dipylon vase 14.150.14 4 i'ifi' 0'-J»> Colossal dioylon vase C.P.1404 -Af.J'fV Coi iipylon vase 24.11,2-H 3'3" w>fV fl.j8.18-^-"^" Gaoit.tfi.ric amohora, chariots * All the gems (quickly packed in small box) Oinochoe 46.11.2- f/'ttV Ivory group 17.190.75 **ur' T.C. Antefixt Gorgonelon s9.11.a- ew * %/*' 7.C. Reliefj mourners 14.I46.5A 9LO*I9 Proto-Attic tmphors Ll.tlO.l tt-f-V w-/t t>acenira kylix 14.50.26 fr 3" 0>-$ •on 47.100.2 * L-6" . t. Greek amphora 48.11.6 H-»**^ BreAse hydrla handle 06.1095 * »-" Bronae horse L.i*- (, "/eV Bron;;e heraldic lions G.R.591 - £"y £ ' Recced KGOB (J g) Object j»cc no, Case or pedest»l •••i statuette of a *&rrior 45 ,1.7 -HS 5 grease Revetment frost chariot (T) £9.141.64 H 1%* 7 revellers 17.130.2087 •*?>*• • MM chariot G.h.471-^-yV *-/'* 11 .11 the gems (quickly packed in smell box) a , .o loop (J 5) 0 blest C;-fce or pedestal «MMMHMM VI.86.16 * 1 Stone bead of a youth 06.1021.69 */5 2 J AmapJ.8 uaphora ' 51.11.11 * •4-J 6 Lydoe krater 17.250.14 H'H 7 Exekias amphora G.R.549-#-tf* ..• 7 Stinger amphora, Hermes and Nymphs 49.11.1 » ^'7 15 Mid.if pellke 14.150.12'"-^ 15 • h—els amphor*, footrace 27.226 * «-J< 16 Loutbophoros 4Ji.ll.56 •» /o"*tl 17 Heed of a youth froa a stele L.48.55.2 -V'.-r" 19 Am* son ..late (Martin) 47.11.5- f*-i*H £5 T&leides amphora 26.49 •-rt-y 26 '•ybilloe, pygmies and cranes - 51.11.4 •»•'* 26 Kleitias k Ergotlaos stand • isportsuit *• Dost important Priority lift of objects to be pecked for ssfe keeping in esse of emergency Fourth lioos (J 4) Object Ace, no Case or peoest-.l Terraeetva janifem alsbmstresi 10.11.1 t/y-/»f' 2 i -it? rati** fciuphora 15.. 0 7 bee* Berlia Ptr. 22.159.52 * 7 Hieron kylix Di. I3 12 T.C. heed of s kore 47.100.5 •»-»-' 15 liesd vaee 50.11.10 -h'X 19 Kle les c ..lyx krater 08,258.58 -/«•' Vcx ^ 20 aore -16.71- ft"9* , Olios leykter io.ao.18 -'J *y/ a a Fifth Kooa (J 5) Object Case or pedest;.,! KitbAroidos, Pan Ptr. taptave 24*-'* ' £ BjMede oinochoe 160.55 2 a volute krater 07. 884.94 8 footbath 56. 11.5 +-8"**? 7 •• Irgiee hydria 50 ** - \1f-lx T.C. ualian relief, Odysseus 50. 11.9 -7'V//" 15 T.C. itoiian relief, Phrixos 12. 229*00-to" x7* „ 18 ilea cslyx krater 07. 286.86-«M"X Sixth ..oom JJULl Obj «ct *cc. no. Cats or yedest&i Bull krater, ugly warrior 07.286.81- 'I .XV 2 Persephone krater SI.67.26 -"-*, . I Oinochoe, Ammxons 06.1021.189 -/v3'x? 5 Lyrist krater, Dense Ptr. I5.160.80 -tf /i."ti 8 Perseus, pelike 45.11.1 * - I*-'J „ 6 PhlyfiX krtter £4.97.104 +-H-I* 6 mayhem** Lyk&on Ptr, 06.i02i.ii6 -av x/-2 6 Bronse hydria 57.11.6 -tofts' 8 Pas chous G.A.1243 - *"x7''t\ 15 Lukythoe, hretria Ptr. 51.11.15 *» ' H 15 «jee (Martin) 1.1.4155-/1-J" 16 , Liadouaenos 17 Gold mH she&th 80.11.1*. »•-^ •"*• 19 Bronze mirror cover 07.256 ** P, - £'' 20 Bronze mirror cover 07.255 - Di.-S" , 20 Bronze mirror cover 25.78.44 -Or.- <>s 20 L.'ni^cwntfragsaent, aarble 50.11.5 • ~**7* , 26 tilver philalai 59.11.4 * -D..-/0 81 47.11.9 - bi. to" 81 * important ** s»oet important Pegs 5 Priority li objects to be packed for safe keeping in case cf emergency Seventh Room (J 7) Object fee, no. v »' Case or ;:?ea<«et?'l Bronse hyuria 44.11.9 4 Marble horeeaen relief 07V:Pf.lll -'?, *'3 15 it*lien krater 50.11.4. P ^» 14 TaatmfV* et.etuet.te 50.117-»-IV , 19 Limestone relief 29.54 -<2 3V.W 28 -ih com (D 10) Object Case or pedestal retime would 19.19S.24 -H / 2 2 Arretine stamps 20.2*7-228-/KJ'> ^ ^ •» 26.81.1-5 -H-3v,ri-i',H-Ji 2 o7.1l.1-H-1" |( I '•prion jug (glass) L.5S47.24 V/~? 24 ;. HUL ., -M.a \ ^J JUKI A.M. P.M. 7|8,9|in.n,l?ti ,,2,3,4,5)6 * LIST OF IMPORTANT OBJECTS IN THE COLLECTION OF GREEK AND ROMAN ART RECEIVED JUL 2 41950 D 12 (First Greek Room) 47.100.1 Marble statuette of harp player /AKvPit. blHbUTOR 21.88.24 26.31.491 H-, 3 ^ • 26.31.492 ^x 3- -Vu-i- 26.51.494 Contents of case 19, south wall, center /4- 3S*L, 35.11.14 4, 4 •***-' 36.11.8 H- g-^ - bronze statuettes 46.111.5 $.%£. t'ru- 42.11.42 4 • & ,, V - 47.11.7 4. V AAAJ ' 17.190.2072 bronze group of Lapith and Centaur j^, 5"Aw - J 3 (Third Greek Room) 42.11.36 Fragment of marble grave stone: head of a youth l/X&> X ¥**->- J 5 (Fifth Greek Room) 27.45 Marble grave stone of a girl with pigeons 3Q~% f (p JOM - 06.1151 Fragment of terracotta statue y(/-( / 2 AM, - D 10 (Eighth Greek Room) sandbag all frescoes K 1 and 2 (Roman Court) no classical heads to be included in first selection K 3 (Gem Room) ? K 4 (Gold Room) to be packed as unit, together with 30.11.12 (gold sword sheath in J 6) AT, AL St AAAJ ' K 6 (Glass Room) to be considered later K 7 (Etruscan Gallery) 15.164 Terracotta statue of Mars or a warrior 7 j*^y~ . hi, s4h. St?, 117 lfiilp," Terracotta head of colossal statue of Mars or warrior 21.195 Terracotta statue of Mars or a warrior H. % fa J^aJf For a selection of twenty five bronzes, twenty five terracottas, and twenty five vases in addition to this list see pages 2 and 3. - 2 - BRONZES TERRACOTTAS VASES S.1093 handle 14.146.3 A relief c2.ex/r? ^J 11.210.1 Proto-Attic vase J 2 f6 tf-44> L*J> > '& - 7^5/.5fcfo 3B 447 dancer yx ?**>, 47.100.2 pigeon V- £>Ant-' M* 14.30.26 Laconian kylix H..5, "Dii^u. g'.MO . 38.11.3 mirror 22.139.57 head f4; 7 **< 48.11.6 East Greek amphora 4-/¥j $>/***« Yin- 17.190.73 ivory group /4,Hf sA, - 13.225.11 duck t^sA J 5 17.190.2070 Centaur H.S^t- 17.230.14 Exekias amphora 20.181 goat 3*y.*V. 27.228 loutrophoros 4,S6. 45.11.7 warrior//, 7^1 49.11.1 Midas pelike//. 14^- 07.286.87 diskpbolokpbolc s 06.1141^ stag GXo~ **, 06.1152 Makrfelryiix ^ J 4 ft. to it M, 7-Vo- 23.69 horse f£*.ta~i«. 30.11.10 head vase 13.233 Herakles & Apollo J4< y* ASIAJ , 28.77 Herakles 36.11.2 seated woman 22.139.32 oinochoe //, >/.?, tu. 7^-1 47.100.3 female head fr , (Q S\AS-J" J 5 17.190.2071 mirror fSx?,^ 20.216 banqueter 07.286.36 judgement of Paris H • o~> & >i™ - t3 **v • 26.50 hydria' 23. Europa on bull 23.160.54 Douris kylix S- X ff V<- - H-, 7-C4J - 50.11.1 Elgin Athena 50.11.9 Melian relief 23.160.55 Ganymede oinochoe J 6 G.R. 42 Adorahs //, £,„.: 10.210.75 woman & child 06.1171 white lekythos //. ;SV*| ft- 7> Cv . (? A i H-*/*4, • 07.256 mirror£W>V<«26.199.67 bust ft, 7 A*- : 31.11.13 Eretria Painter 4\lSL-4vu- 37.11.6 hydria //. /7w. 32.11.2 iadoumenos 45.11.1 Perseus pelike HAyt*, J 7 07.259 mirror 3'V.,7,L 17.190.2064 Tanagra'^type 25.190 Pompe oinochoe H< tC^u. H.&lw.l _ Hi I JT^U, . 12.173 Aphrodite G.R. 1348 « tf£4*,* 44.11.12 Suessula Painter ... . . H <, (s 4* • 44.11.9 hydria [25.78.51 l/./l^l * 49.11.2 silhouette oinochoe 30.117 tt BRONZES 4' >&**>, TERRACOTTAS ^y 4> *to- VASES :&dU&aa*jk. K 7 ri7.190.2066 girl 17.190.2067 amber group G.R. 629 Apulian lekane mirror 22.139.39 head of satyr ,/3 I 24.97.104 &tor^ase ^ 47.11.3 group 23.160.90 satyr antefix 30.11.4 Centuripe vase submitted July 24th, 1950 Mr. Remington: Though you spoke of 25 examples of maiolica and some of the very fine French pieces in D 8 are not strictly speaking maiolica but more properly called faience, they are of such exceptional quality that I have included them in the accompanying list. In a few instances we put on exhibition a piece which made a better balance in our case or was easier to show than a somewhat more interesting example of the same general type which we have left in storage. I have included in my list the better example even though it is at present in a storeroom. Of Spanish maiolica all the pieces which were on exhibition in 1941 are, I believe, in Whitemarsh boxes and have never been unpacked. What is in our storeroom D 113 is of no merit whatever. There are good pieces in the Moore and Altman colls. We still have some 23 Whitemarsh boxes which have never been unpacked — these include some Italian maiolica, a good deal of English porcelain, Spanish mai&liea, Wedgwood, etc. /va*i^, GiVU i "Wk 1? i LIST OF lau-irhiAH'l' sVLV-Li V ihb COLbaC'iiVb C Gallery A 11; Saint Beraaraiao of Siena. Bronae, by Fuivio Bignorini. ,;;.i^j.lHv^ Saint Catherine of Siana. Bronze, by Fuxvio Siguoriui. 33.153*2 n Jo Aipheus an4 Arethuse. M«rbie, by Imttlsta Lorerui. 40.33 H*^ The Bridal Cnamber of Herse. Brusaels ry. 41.190*135 ' < ,l*~a AgXeoro* Being ohaaged to stone by Mercury. Brussels • L*190»134 :< '4 (At present La cold itengei shelf 12) The Asce . ion. Brusaels tapes try. 44*69*5 n ' 0 ft W I O y The Last Supper, Brussels tapestry* 44*63*4 *"' 'O^^f" *^,°^ Gallery A 12: Adam. Hmrftlsi oy Tu_lio Loobmr4o« 36*163 &'% ip mUMjal tram U Annunciation uroup. 1'erra cotta oy Ii i, 11*97 Kv**' Gallery A *3 bt Madame ue ! ^ur. Marble bust oy Pigalle. ».7.49 « H X-* **M" Gallery C ktn The OruoiflxloB* Brussels tapestry. 4l.lvu.i36 Hf-jV *'-»' Fnmcis I. Glaaeo. terraootta bust. 41.100*245 (A) b ni» Gallery C 3b: Tne Bather by houdon. 14.40.673 H ^7 Gallery C i'tt Madonna and Child by Antonio Rosseiauo. 14.40.675 K 2.^ ^ cents of the t*o large vitrines. Gallery C 38: * Triton. Bronze by Adriaen de Vries. 14*40*689 Uli Galxery L> & (Second Floor J: The Hativity. Painted terracotta group. Style of Antonio kos3e,.iino. 11.136.1-5 V / 5t. Sae be Gross, garble relief oy Jeaa Qoctjea* 29*56 Hi« ^ * Chi turnlag . Lepate Rita tae doctors. Marble relief by Agostino di Duccio. 14.45 Hi")* /-%&* Gfallwry L 9 (soco.iu iiuur): Madonna and Child. Terracotta relief by ferroeehio, )9*215 M^/ AJ 2.3 Twenty-five • leee* of majoiica, [SAL S«4*o^v^-Tt. £«*a>-/ Gallery J 8: kiaala Fr-.-i-.iin. Maroie oust oy Houdon. 7*.6 H 2-3'' Wi l^f Gaxi.ery K PI: Marechul du Muy. Maroie oust by Caffieri. 28.19J n • 3"2-" Luuis XV. Marble bust oy LesMjae* 41.100.144 H 3^T ' S toreros 1: Peter Viacher. Bronse oy Peter Vischer. 49.7.74 a b JH—K~ ft* August 23| 1950 LIST 01 OQLUSCTIO is ...... rs BRONZE SiV.n;£,VlES Gallery A 11: Pair of andiroas by Alessandro Vlttoria. 41. r • ab-ylab »a*civ 37 Gallery B 14: tha Baptism of Christ, after Melchiorre Caffa. 34.11 H if* L ' «* Gallery G 32i The Baptia* of Christ. 49.7.60 H >0 * #tA**t *-f fii*^ Gallery D 3. cajj-s B: Su ; ocy, by Andrea gel Verroeeaie. 17.190.1402 n 1 Rearing Horse, after a sodel oy Leonardo da Vi.-.ci. 25*76 H ^ £-" Hercules and CacuG, after a • • Miehe Lo. > . ,185 if ^ * Boy steading on a shell, attributed to Bartol lellaao. 41.100*74 H-l3 Gallery D i. case C^ Atlas supporting a globe, by Andrea Riccic, 26*260*21 H *1 Warrior on Horscoack. 32.100.167 n *y9 (rial. ^ L. Satyr riding a Goat, by Anarsa hiccio. 39*24 H "7 *- / Ink we 1, oy Anarea Riccio. 41.190.45 a-f H 'O * /- // * AJ- ft* Melea^er Seated on a boar. 41.100.77 H $ Gallery D 9. case B: Venus Bathing, possibly by Biovi am* 24*212*16 " '^ Black Venus, by Alessanuro Vittoria. 26.14.15 H lb * Venus Chastening Cupia, by uiovanni Francesco Suslai. - • .90 " *- Saint gebastlaa, ia the manner of Pietro Tacca. 27.224*2 H *•' Term, said to be by Anuibale Poavtaaa. 3 • .4 r 1 2V -2- Gallery D , e Cl Madonna and Child, by Jaco,,u 8 osovino. L0.185 H VJ Man OS and Thetis (Pla.pie), aese Oi .. 39*7i " '" tt Sebastiaaj by Alessunaro Victoria. r\ 7~% roerus, attributec to Jaeopo Sanaovino, /, . .30 rf "2>> , §faa\£ CC Li troer, by Andrea Riccio. 41.100.78 a-d it I** itaad| bgr Qlneeppe de Levi* ^1.100.84 ab n ( yc-iVK/ * Storeroom, F 8. shelf CC 5: Christ at the Column, by Fraagoii . ... .1 ri I a Neptune ... dolphin, aftej tal oy G. L, Bernini* 46.1 3 n *>l at QoHathj by Lao i&. 49*7*76 ab ff fi i... .iu-. _•;:. . _ , L |N ,__.__ . .,_ I MAI „;P...... Igj Arx'au^.ed Accords to Tr.eir Que-, tion. Ju^.v i?50 46. Dish. Kith the anas of trie lia ,v 0 9, Case A Ex coll.: Baron; Mannheim; Morgan; Schiff W-r'J),* 46.85*16 Dish. Emblem of the I i-gforsa family. 1 v, Case A Ex coll.: Bergen; Behlff hi 3" "])(As^ A/" 27*97*23 Dish. tion ui grotei uea and trophies D 9, Case D 27*97*24 Dish. Lastered decoration, portrait of - slla ,277 Plate. Lastered deeor tion, seat of ansa . ,. B 7, Oaat D ftt sell. I B'.roii Ado phe de 8 did. |lftA« // 21.yl.3A Dish. Lustered deeei -tion, pi rtrt.it of ^ woman ^ M D 9, C&3e D 32*100*360 Dish. Lu deration, bust of St. Francis of D 9, Case D Asrisi. Ex coll.: Morgan '^-^w-w-i »"7" .-7.97.33 Dish. Lustered uecor.tion, asms probablj oi the Horaori B I, Case A and Buonaparte I . iest.ro Giorgio. Dl evw> // " 27.97.9 Dish. Lustered decoration, scene of a sacrifice. • A by Maestro Giorgio. H 3* ^v*vrw //* AI.^I.AX Dish, uastered e^oration, ocene irora the Story of A Cephalua ad Procria. Signeu oy Fra Xanto. ,/ Ex coll.: Fc :e; Bernal; Testart "X>f«ww 1^. 41.100.279 Dish. Lustered decoration:Mercury •iu IeiSj iter Rs Case A illustrations for the Ae.ioid, the "Quo* Ego" series. Sig.ied oy Maestro Uiorgio. ^kuax** H" Ex coll.: Baron Adolpho de Botaaohj 41.1 . Dish. Scenes fro;.. ,ory of Amadis of Gaul. *'rom Di, Oaat A service probably ^ade for Inlco d*Avalos , . * Ex coll.: Baron A it• ony ue Rothschild i—2-7 ' ^ *•' 32.100.378 Dish. Ocene illustrating Pliny's story, fie D 8, Case A consumeu 00 .1 >jyre 01 the ^.iuen of Sestoc. Puccl arms. Bigaed oy Era Xa.nto. J)I WW 32*100*366 Cistern. Bacchus in , riot hf'Q" &%j0ut**- •*** St. D 113 Ex coll.: Larl of Exeter; Boraee Belpole; darcness am* Buruett-Coutts. 21t91A22 Bowl. Lustered decoration, St. Nicolas of Tpleatiac t, St. D 113 H7" &-&***• • '^ shelf * 2 27.97.17 Dish. Anas of the Strozzi fagdiy rf^» J> utL*^ /6" St. Dllj 27*97*21 Dish. Lustered decoration, the Death of Dido-P'J^**" /0 • B HJ ;7.v7.29 Jar. Arms poS£.;ioly of Innoceazo CyboX J/fa*** *'V* St. D 13 I shelf T 1 **#***»-*, 17.190.1741 Basin. St. Porchaire, aic-ibth C. /-/£ " l^Le^w,, jT * D 8| Case D Ex coll.: Feuataiaej Mannheim; m\ no tilochild 17.lvO.I740 Ewer. St. Porchaire, mid-ibth C•. ,^u^ ^ // D 8, Cage 0 17.190.1745 Cup and cover, lith the UM of Laval-Mu ^y.^ 'f ab Ex coll.: Le Breton. H +tfc.a~*~tW *9" J^-ua/w*/ &>yg* D 8| Case D 17.1V0.1304 Dish, Joseph Receiving his Br .. In the style Italian naiolioa* XV- • lit" D 3, Caae A Ex coll.: Le Breton ^ 41.4V.V ao Pii^ria-oottie. llth trie arm of Joha ir of ,f - , Case D /iMtf*Mj*r] /S Ex coll.: Baron Gu.tave de Botasehlia; Baron Lambert D 3, Caae D 17*190*2050 Dish. Pierced design J^^LAS^ IO * UJ 17.190.1794 Ewer. with beau <*i - Lllon< rt of Laurent If L 3 Aba.. ..e. sJ4~~loH ix coll.: Le Breton. t 9o-'VV >fc , {, 91 -^.4» V>.V" .' H- s'tlr 4 . 3 ", A * fr ys»yr -v.y" 7>. +4 " V 7 " ^ ' Y " -) * M3VJ"(/ I7t ' 9 0-7-10- Hi "> CO*/" ,74- HA", coy" COPY July U, 1950 ,.„^ EARLY CHRISTIAN. BYZANTINE AND MIGRATION MATERIAL (Gallery D-I4) #*# Cyprus silver plates (seven) T> « ff'••< "'si , yu*v»v » T\ »*o Case B •*#* Albanian Treasure Case C Gold Glass (six piece?) Case A Vermand silver buckle and spear mounts Case G Four Celtic enamels n ti Migration material Case I Migration material Case J #** Romanesque and Byzantine ivories Cases D, E, F ***• Byzantine jewelry Case K #•*# Byzantine enamels Case L ? Roman and Byzantine silver Silver case ENAMELS AND METALWORK (Gallery C-2l) hi 1 Limoges enamel chasse (in center of room) H H L/2. K^' 17.190.514 Reliquary head H. If 17.190.352 Spanish cross H %*•* U/14" * / « * 17.190.1406 ) Case I Reliquary of St. Thomas a Becket W3 W.5 t)-^ 17.190.520 ) Reliquary of Saint Margaret K»f* J-'3 LO 7 ' 17.190.813 Case J Hispano-Moresque jewelry Miniatur Case Flagon, German XV Century r-\ > **• 17.190.610 Case M Candlestick H s* ' 41.100.131 Cross Hf \rV8* 17.190.763 Cross MM" WIO 17.190.760 Case P 17.190.209 Cross tf**vVf* wi M,fl Lltjlif'iWa» Crucifixion group H *f' f^ ^ * l* * * tt%f W* 17.190.768-9) Enamels s LS?^* Enamels N J-* ^^ 17.190.696 t 9*1 IM„ 3>4" 17.190.688 1 f^Case S „ 17.190.689-693' Chasse HV LS^WS* 17.190.401 ) ^17.190.685-695,710.711) Case A Square reliquary H >Tu V» *7 41.100.184 ) .Cir-Hi**-*"* .^^ -1>V (continued) ,a»t6-«a*t^* -^*- H/;WV; -421. ki'L.t -M^Hi 1-* COPY July 14, 1950 page 2 (continued) ENAMELS AND METALWORK (continued) (Gallery C-21, cont.) Annunciation (plaque) W •4'' W I V 41.100.180 Case B Chisse |-f ^* t-. I/* VV*T 17.190.523 Saint James (plaque) Hl^-"' W (* 17.190.123 Case C Reliquary: Virgin and Child n '• i7.i9O.i25 Case D Saint Catherine n -^ tt 17.190.905 Case H Small shrine rath Virgin and Child rf C 17.190.502 IVORIES (Gallery C-20) All ivories in Case A Possibly all ivories in Cases B, D, E TEXTILES (other than tapestries) One box of mediaeval textiles including: Chasuble 17.162.1-3" Altar Cloth -4 -o" st I 3 -O 29.87 .3-2-4/V7* TAPESTRIES Three Rose Tapestries <>«,. 131-1-* - Virgin and Child (Gallery D-15) 16.32.194 Hi|*- H j4maa & Holy Women (Gallery D-13) 41.100.128, 129 Visitation n tt 17.190.724 Hr^"U)t'3Af Blue Virgin and Child 11.190.725 H It** u List of Important Objects in the Department of Near Eastern Art 0l|-# Gallery D 3 x *' Animal medallion rug, Persian, 16th century. (17.120.127) WI \ kI ' V-C/^) <2'/' . Animal rug, Persian, 16th century. (10.61.2) Ajfe 41/2. Sasanian silver dish, 5th century. (34.33) j) I <• ^l' Enameled glass bottle, Syrian, early 14th century. (41.150) //, 4& Sasanian bronze ewer, 6th century. (47.100.90) H ltf Bronze ewer with silver inlay, Persian, early 13th century. (44.15) rl th Gallery D 4 Anhalt carpet, Persian, 16th century. (46.128) wV l¥ +- *•• "*- Compartment rug, Persian, 16th century. (10.61.3) ^V H Emperor's carpet, Persian, 16th century. (43.121.1) //'/ ' *— ^*» Vase rug, Persian, 16th century. (43.121.2) h/ $'/% *~ ^ 7 Gallery E 14 Three Persian manuscripts of the 16th century. (11.134.2, 13.228.5, 13.228.7) Mamluk Koran of the 14th century. (24.146.1) />) Xo " W 1 V* 24 Persian miniatures, 14tb-l6th century. 4 ceramics with polychrome decoration, Persian, 13th century. (13.93.1, " ** D*^ 17.120.44, 17.120.41, 17.120.2041) H t* Bowl with two peacocks, Rakka, 13th century, lent by Horace Havemeyer. (L.42.11.2) Jug with openwork, Persian, dated 1215. (32.52.1) Hi'' yt, *o"/ts 2 large lusteredi dishes with figure subjects, Persian, 13th century. (32.52.2, 32 .52.3) X>' >7 //'* " Gallery E 14 a Persian prayer niche of the 14th century. (39.20) (To be sandbagged) // 2. * ~) W -2- Gallery E 15 2 panels of vail painting from Nishapur. (40.170.177, 40.170.176) 2 8xf$ -iDCyPf- Carved stucco panels from Nishapur. (To be sandbagged) Gallery E 13 19 pieces of enameled glass, Syrian, Mamluk, 13th-14th century. Gallery E 13 b 22 miniature paintings, Indian, Mughal and Rajput, 15th-17th century. Gallery E 12 9 Persian manuscripts, 15th-l6th century. (13.228.8, 13.228.11, 32.131, „ 13.228.4, 13.228.6, 13.228.3, 13.228.9, 13.228.17, 13.228.16) Las^ta,* /Xx^ ->_£ x 0/ * 4 Turkish miniature paintings and calligraphic pages. (38.149.1-2, 25.83.9,//*£ 45.174.5) S X.%" Painted doors, Persian, 17th century. (07.54.1-2) (*«e^ n (a-%. r\J %4 3 Persian enameled tiles with figure scenes, 17th century. (03.9 A-C) Gallery E 12 A c . ^^ j jgj* Carved wooden panel, Arabic, 8th-9th century. (31.63) /_ C* t*J J£>" Koran stand of carved wood, Persian, dated 1360. (10.218) H'cfi* til t*) Z. »/> Stucco head of a prince, Persian, 12th-13th century. (33.111) ff . IQ * Gallery H 10 Silk rug with coat of arms, Persian, 17th century. (45.106) Yr *^/^ /!_ /£ Velvet hanging, Persian, 17th century. (27.115) Kf &/%* U /*T Gallery H 20 2 silk weaves, Syrian, 7th century. (37.53.1-2) CtS^eJ^. // P"1^ Indian court robe, 17th century. (29.135) /-.At-JS Kaftan of gold brocade, Turkish, 16th century. (12.127) L- vfV rV Velvet cope, Persian, 17th century. (14.67) If ,J~3 * t^tfl ' Gallery R 21 Pair of doors with carved ivory panels, Egypto-Arabic, 13th-14th century. 8/3/50 (91.1.2064 A and B) // 6 f * ft ^ * Tt M \tA f /TKJ hi J I •' & <~S- I X 2 *•{, I < tf St 5~, it/. 32* -^ 3 ii?3 , / /A 9 3, LQA h SL. /*»> -3 -14 , sd;bo .37, hi7 An # . -W > U) , To ^ " 3L C T / C O- X 5 o ^ ' f&.ZL/ H-X?, to. 42* ^ 4 /, 3 3 37' IS 3 t/,ji9> oo. AO. LIST OF IMPORTANT OBJECTS IN THE COLLECTIONS OF THE ART OF THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST Gallery D I Front Hall. S. end. (For sandbagging - if floor will stand weight) Two Assyrian winged figures 52.145.1,2 l*'/u,tf., V. /CV/z.^V, B. 3^h rt.foi/^lt.j £. to^t-,t B, 3 i^Jr Gallery D 9 Assyrian and Achaemenian reliefs (For sandbagging) X 155; 84.11; 17.190.2082; 52.72.1; 52.145.5,5,11,15,) fr £1 ,u>.3<44*- ,16,17,18; 52.175.1 /T/TT^T^^^ - ji I T, Co , th V {\ft '1°J U}' 91-4^ • ft, £ij (OJ.AS/'I >U^^^^ J ] 4, t4S, Lu . 3f ^; Gallery D 11 Assyrian Reliefs (For sandbagging) V H' 33^,,a^ **** ' 17.190.2077,2078,2079,2080,2081; 81.72.0|8tdyB|.g; j ft. ?£, U). t 52.145.8,9,10 rHi 2cj ,00,%;^ - (. M .?./, CO. ?£.'* j ft . S(o ", (-to • 3© *U ' t h/ , 5"7j to >Z€> t4s- Gallery D 8 ibvlonian Glazed bricks, (For sandbagging) 51.15.1,2 tmcL ,ff.3'/x ,f,7//% fch 14% • l$5,1 H'SLl) ^ oj-^xHittite and Achaemenian Sculpture (For sandbagging) &. t4,9ZtUs. 57^^5.155.1,2,5,4; 92.21; 91.54.5; 54.158, 59.155, 47.100.85-W3X/#^.| V H.^yo.ts»«j/ SuBierlan stone Sculpt:url e Diorite Head of Gudea 49.26 \4,I0AASJ Alabaster Head of Ur-Ningersu 47.100.86 4 • -6 Steatite Statuette, Gudea Period 49.165 L\, 1AA~- Alabaster Statuette from Mari 50.112.1 y, ix) *s*j - Alabaster statuette from Tell Asmar 40.156 \4, )% *SK> page 2 Gallery D 8. cont'd. Bronzes [These bronzes must be under observation as they require de-hydrating agents] Elamite Head of a Ruler 47.100.80 ft, (4 s*~- Sumerian Head of a Bull 47.100.81 H.b,\t.S S.MJ * Sabaean Bull 47.100.85 H . 7 , V, / 0 ^ Hurrian Bronze Lion 48.180 jf,^«j)V^. Luristan Plaque 41.156 £. ^ U>,bsAu' Luristan Pitcher 47.52.1 14, Gold Babylonian Necklace from Dilbat 47.1 P?f, /<£> -w- Silver Achaemenian Rhyton (horse's head) 47.100.87 ejf, ? ^ ~ n " (antelope's 47.100.82 /y, /&., OJ , Ivories £g7 Phoenician, Bird (57.145. \56.70.6 It. sr £ Us, Figure 52.161.46 $4 I 5 StAAs -, n it 56.70.1,2 H , S As^J ~ tt 56.70.11 3%2 AA^> " Lion (56.70.14 3 x. a. JLASJ - 157.145.4 £)t3 <<*o - EMERGENCY PROTECTION OF WORKS OF ART IN PRIVATE HOUSES INSTRUCTIONS PREPARED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS PRINTED AND OBTAINABLE AT THE MUSEUM PRESS THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART NEW YORK EMERGENCY PROTECTION OF WORKS OF ART IN HOUSES General Cautions More damage may be done by frantic haste than by COMMITTEE bombs. Fire is the principal risk. Henri Marceau, Chairman If works of art are in danger zones, the best precau George L. Stout tion is to remove them to country houses away from such William M. Ivins, Jr. danger and to keep them there under normal conditions, with good air and frequent inspection. Murray Pease A few valuable objects can be removed in an emer gency to that part of a house which the local air-raid warden considers to be safest. Avoid careless handling. Avoid careless packing. Avoid damp, dark, and mold-infested storage. For works of art left in houses that may be danger areas, the following suggestions are made: Put them where they will be dry. Protect them from falling or flying debris with pad ding, wrapping, or boxing. Protect them from fire as far as possible. Keep them out of attics and other exposed, upper parts of houses. Steel barrels such as are used for trash or ashes make good containers; objects can be packed in them with as bestos wool; tops can be covered with metal or sand. Consult the local air-raid warden about the safest Avoid pressing and tight wrapping. places in the house. Avoid fire risk as far as possible. Outer containers of metal will help if they can be had. Paintings (oil or tempera on panels or canvases) Inspect frequently. Remove glass from frames. Bronze, Silver, Copper, Brass, and Pewter Hang or stand pictures in a place away from windows; avoid locations directly opposite windows. Pack in cases with asbestos wool. (Soft, inflammable If pictures are very large, take them down and stand packing can be used, but runs the risk of injurious burn them carefully in the safest part of the house that is \ ing; high temperatures destroy the patina on old bronzes available; stand them on the floor facing against the and may melt metal.) wall and brace them so that they will not fall. Pieces of Fill hollow objects with sand previously baked to clean, firm plywood or other building board standing at make it quite dry. Fine gravel will serve as a filling ma the back of frames will protect canvases. terial. Protect mural paintings (inseparable from walls) Avoid damp storage. with screens of asbestos sheet or of asbestos-cement boards; have these easily removable; do not leave the Stone and Terracotta Sculpture paintings covered constantly. Wrap or pack as for moving and store in a place as far If paintings have been exposed to fire, they should be as possible from the danger of falling masonry or tim inspected by a reliable restorer. Remember that while the bers. picture may seem intact, its structure may have suffered If there are many objects, they can be laid in a bin or from water, chemical fire-fighting agents, or heat. It is box in the cellar and covered over with sand. not wise to attempt remedies unless you are experienced Protect large outdoor works with strongly made bags in such matters. filled with sand or protect them with brick or slag, pref Avoid damp, dark storage. erably held in by a wooden or wire fence. Works on Paper (water colors, drawings, etchings, Wood Sculpture and Paintings on Wooden Panels and prints of all kinds and fine books) Follow directions for paintings. Remove from frames; keep mounted with window Avoid sudden changes of temperature and humidity. mats and tissue-paper slip sheets. Avoid excess heat and dryness—this is nearly as dan Keep loosely packed in clean, dry boxes. A few moth gerous as excessive dampness. Store in a protected place balls in each box will help prevent mold. where normal atmospheric conditions obtain, well away Keep dry and in good air. from any heating equipment. Pottery, Porcelain, and Glass Pack in cases or barrels as for shipping. If few in number, pack in clean sand and store in a dry place. Note: Washed and sterilized sand is sold for children's sand boxes. But since such sand is usually a fine sifting from crushed granite, not sea sand, it may have a ten dency to scratch and is appropriate for use only with ob jects that will stand gentle abrasion. Sea sand should be washed to remove chlorides and thoroughly dried before use. Ivory and Bone Pack in soft, non-abrasive material, such as tissue-paper wrapping in a bed of asbestos and wool. Avoid extremes of temperature and humidity. Fabrics of All Kinds Treat as you would delicate and valuable woolen gar ments. Be sure they are clean. Store in cool, dry, moth-proof container (metal outer container if possible). Put in crystals of paradichlorobenzene as protection against insects and mold. Remember That Rapid and repeated changes in humidity are injurious to most works of art. Let this thought guide you in select ing storage places arid in packing works for storage. Ex cessive dryness and excessive dampness are equally dan gerous and should be avoided. THE WAR-TIME STORAGE IN WALESOF PICTURES FROM THE NATIONAL GALLERY,LONDON l.-THE COURSE OF EVENTS By MARTIN DAVIES 2.-SOME TECHNICAL PROBLEMS By IAN RAWLINS. REPRINTED FROM THE TRANSACTIONS OF THE HONOURABLE SOCIETY OF CYMMRODORION, 1946. THE WAR-TIME STORAGE IN WALES OF PICTURES FROM THE NATIONAL GALLERY, LONDON I. THE COURSE OF EVENTS. by MARTIN DAVIES. Some years before 1939, the National Gallery had had to consider what to do with the pictures in the event of war. We had been advised that the North-West was likely to be the safest area, and had therefore decided to request the hospitality of Wales. Our plans were already workable at the time of Munich; indeed, two loads of pictures were sent from London then, but returned without having been unpacked when the appeasement was announced. Our policy was that to "save" only part of the National Collection would have been a mistake. A selection, even a generous selection, would inevitably have excluded pictures that some admirers of the Gallery think are good; to avoid criticisms that would be hard to prove were unjustified, the removal of all the pictures was planned. This, with the exception of some thirty or forty useless works, and some examples already out of London on loan, was effected. The vast maj ority of the pictures sent away were sent immediately to Wales. The removal was completed a few hours before war was declared; this satisfactory result was due to the arrangements made long in ad vance. Mr. Rawlins is writing on the transport by the Railway Comp anies ; the loading of the containers provided by the Railways was also a problem. The weight and volume of the contents of the National Gallery are considerable, so we tried to reduce both. Most of the larger picture-glasses had been for a long time fitted, not to the picture- frames, but to flats bolted into the frames. This had been done merely to facilitate the cleaning of the glasses; it proved most useful for the journey to Wales in 1939. The larger glasses did not have to be sent away with the pictures, but were taken off and stacked; many of them were sent to be fitted back on to the pictures weeks later, when the safety of the pictures themselves had been settled. An extension of this system had fortunately been carried out in the months preceding the outbreak of war. This was to put the picture itself in a flat bolted into the frame. It was thus possible in August, 1939 to remove all the larger pictures, and to leave their heavy frames hanging where they were; frequent practises in 1938 and 1939 had taught the men on the Gallery staff exactly what to do. This method not only saved much labour and time in bringing the pictures from the exhibition galleries to the railway containers: it also greatly reduced the volume of what was sent, and thus enabled us to use far fewer con- l NATIONAL GALLERY: WAR-TIME STORAGE NATIONAL GALLERY: WAR-TIME STORAGE tainers and get the collection of pictures out of London much more much difficulty; in point of fact, they behaved themselves quite well quickly. after their journey from London and in their new surroundings. It The pictures in their flats are safe for transport, provided that they was even possible to carry on some of the normal activities of the Gallery. are tied up quite securely. The flat projects a little in front of the sur Mr. Holder was at Bangor, and cleaned several of the masterpieces of face of the picture that it surrounds; a projection of even a quarter the collection, with admirable results; and there were occasional visits of an inch is sufficient to prevent any rubbing of the picture surface. from the photographic staff. Nevertheless, on the return of the pictures in 1945, it was decided to take Although many minor problems were occupation for Mr. Rawlins (who extra precautions, since then neither speed nor the volume of the ob was at Bangor a good deal) and for myself, the storage of the National jects sent was of decisive importance. All the shallower flats were for Gallery in North Wales might have become an uneventful task. this return journey surrounded with wooden battens, which made them The Fall of France altered things. It was not the possibility of invasion much deeper; and cross-pieces of wood at the corners were used, that was worrying; if the Germans had overrun any of the National giving greater stability for the tying-up. An example of this arrange Gallery depots, there was nothing very much to do beyond hoping that ment is here illustrated. the pictures would survive. Air-raids were a more practical consider To return to the outbreak of war in 1939. Two centres in Wales ation. After the Fall of France, many aeroplanes passed over Bangor had been chosen, from which if necessary further distributions could on their way to Manchester, Liverpool or Chester. Although Bangor be made. At Aberystwyth, the generosity of Sir William Llewelyn itself was not a target of importance, bombs might well have been Davies, Librarian of the National Library of Wales, had put a con dropped by aircraft chased away from the industrial centres to the East. siderable floor-space at our disposition. Bangor was a double receiving It was therefore quite possible that a bomb would fall near Prichard- centre. The authorities of the University College of North Wales had Hall or Penrhyn Castle; the immediate damage to the pictures might liberally given over to us the Prichard-Jones Hall, the principal Hall of have been small, but the buildings might have been rendered unsuitable, the College, together with some attached corridors and rooms. Lord and fire might have necessitated the removal at once of these works of Penrhyn had granted us a great deal of garage space and the use of the art—to where? principal dining-room at Penrhyn Castle, a mile or two outside the town. The Gallery's first reaction to this new danger—for before the Fall of One of the problems. of housing a collection such as the National France it was negligible in West and North-West Wales—was to dis Gallery is that many of the items are large. Mr. Rawlins is writing on tribute further the risks. The Ministry of Works kindly allowed us the the difficulties of transport caused by this unfortunate fact; I am here use of the lowest floor of the Eagle Tower at Caernarvon Castle ; this concerned merely with the storage. Although there are many buildings place had a high degree of safety, and about twenty pictures of import in Wales sufficient for the largest picture in the Gallery, their doors and ance were put in it. About three miles south of Caernarvon, Mr. O. C. windows are often not sufficient for ingress or egress. Here lay the Roberts allowed us a room in his house at Bontnewydd ; this also was an importance for us of Penrhyn Castle. This building is on a magnificent excellent store-place for about twenty important works. Lord Lisburne scale. The courtyard, originally planned for the reception of numerous granted the use of a large room at Crosswood, about nine miles from carriages, contains at one end a garage with no less than six doors of Aberystwyth; to this after some delay a considerable number of enormous size ; another garage, smaller in itself but with an even larger distinguished pictures were sent. door, was also allotted to the National Gallery. All the outsize pictures These measures, nevertheless, did not seem sufficient. For one thing, in the collection were here safely housed. they were cumbrous; the area under my control had twice as many The pictures in the collection more ordinary in point of size were guards as before and, in order to look after the routine, I had to travel divided between Bangor and Aberystwyth, the former receiving the about 30 miles a day instead of 4 or 5. But above all it was clear that the larger number. The depot in the Library at Aberystwyth was for a proper precaution against bombs as then known was to go underground, short time in the charge of Mr. MacLaren, and then in the charge of Mr. and not to spread oneself over the ground. In July, 1940 Mr. Samuel Pouncey; I have not myself any particular account to give of it. My Courtauld, the Chairman of the Gallery Trustees, asked Mr. Rawlins position in the University of Bangor was made very pleasant by the to find underground storage for the collection; apart from three un courtesy of the staff, and in particular of the late Registrar, Mr. E. H. successful enquiries in various districts, Mr. Rawlins examined a num Jones. It was necessary to obtain enough local guards to look after the ber of slate quarries in Wales, and I accompanied him on these excur building at the College and at Penrhyn Castle; and enough National sions. Gallery men to handle and arrange the pictures. The co-operation of It took a little time to discover Manod Quarry, near Festiniog. I the Ministry of Works was needed to effect some not very drastic adapta must admit that I was particularly attracted by the way in which Mr. J. tions to the buildings. Thereafter, the storage in North Wales was S. Matthews received us ; not that other quarry owners and managers satisfactory. I could inspect the condition of the pictures without had not been most courteous and anxious to help, but Mr. Matthews' NATIONAL GALLERY: WAR-TIME STORAGE NATIONAL GALLERY: WAR-TIME STORAGE than had ever been the case at Trafalgar Square. One building was set attitude promised a particularly cordial relationship. Manod Quarry aside for the library, in which I spent many busy, and possibly useful, was also in one material respect in a class by itself; there was a road to hours. A daylight studio at the entrance to the quarry had been built, it. Access to other quarries we had seen, although perfect for the trans where Mr. Holder and Mr. Ruhemann were able to do some admirable port of slates, had filled Mr. Rawlins and myself with despair when we work of cleaning. thought of the National Gallery pictures. These pictures could, and did, The National Gallery staff stationed at Manod Quarry consisted of reach Aianod Quarry, without being shaken to pieces on jolting trolleys. fourteen men in the charge of the Head Attendant, Mr. E. B. Harrison. It became plain very soon that arrangements for the delivery of die The number seems considerable, but was in fact not excessive. The pictures into the heart of the quarry could be made. Mr. Matthews place had to be guarded night and day; and an extra squad of men was was willing to let the National Gallery have the whole of one floor. The required during the day, to move the pictures as occasion demanded, nearest chamber on this floor was suitable for even the largest pictures and generally to keep the place tidy. Apart from the Quarry itself, of the collection ; if the entrance tunnel were enlarged to take the lorries, there was Pengwern; Mr. W. Gibson, the Keeper of the National it was clear that unloading could be effected under extremely favour Gallery, was good enough to use his influence to obtain this charming able conditions, with the necessity (it is true) of distributing most of the house. I lived in part of it; other rooms served as offices for Mr. pictures to other chambers later. The manager of Manod Quarry was Rawlins, for the Gallery Accountant, Mr. Parsons, and for the Office Air. C. A. Vaughan, and it is with great regret that I have to record his Keeper, Mr. Shorey. Pengwern has several centuries of existence; recent death ; as the first item of a series of labours on behalf of the a erv its builders probably did not foresee that a Government Department Ministry of Works for the National G U > he enlarged the entrance would one day establish a branch in it. tunnel from the usual 6' x 6' to about 13' 6" x 10',and thus enabled the Gallery to deliver the pictures underground in safety. Some difficulties of administration at Festiniog may here be men tioned. The first had been foreseen to be a problem; transport. This considerable labour was in the entrance tunnel itself, and necess Manod Quarry is remote, which indeed was considered an advantage arily delayed any adaptations of the chambers beyond, to make them fit for the safety of the pictures ; it caused nevertheless some mental wear for housing the National pictures. The Ministry of Works had begun, and tear to ensure the transport of the guarding staffs, not to mention as far as was possible under the circumstances, on what was needed; Mr. Rawlins and myself. The spot is at the end of a bad road, over as soon as Mr. Vaughan had finished his tunnel, they carried on with three miles from the nearest village, and 1750 feet above sea level. Four this other work. I desire here to record the gratitude the Gallery feels journeys each way were necessary every day ; in winter some of these for all that the Ministry of Works did on our behalf, under most diffi were in the dark, with war-time headlamps on the cars, snow on the cult conditions, both at this time of preparation, and thereafter in con ground and fog in the air. Although I am here mentioning very few stant maintenance. names of the people who helped to ensure the safety of the National The work required to adapt the quarry was not slight. The floors of Gallery during the war, I cannot resist recording a word of thanks to the most of the chambers had to be levelled; this meant, in some cases, Gallery Attendant, Mr. C. P. Baldwin, who proved himself a most de blasting away tons of rock. Then it was necessary to erect buildings, voted chauffeur. inside which the atmosphere could be controlled. A great deal of elec Another problem was the stability of the rock roofs at the quarry. trical gear was required, including a generator for use whenever the elec It would have been useless to save the pictures from bombs, only to tricity from the North Wales Power Co. might be interrupted. Some crush them in Wales with tons of slate falling on them. Manod Quarry delay at the last moment was caused, because the newly erected buildings roofs are safer than most; nevertheless, the pictures could not walk away had not dried out sufficiently for safety; but the first pictures were like a gang of quarrymen from any doubtful section. The Gallery had delivered at Manod Quarry on August 12, 1941, some eleven months the advantage of advice from Mr. Thomas, of the Mines Inspectorate : after the site had been first seen by Mr. Rawlins and myself. and the Ministry of Works, fully alive to the undesirabilityof an accident, To all intents and purposes, the whole of the National Gallery was employed Mr. Vaughan to keep a constant watch on the roofs. Falls stored at Manod Quarry; this offered a great administrative advantage of rock, but fortunately without any serious results to the pictures, did over the six depots above ground in Wales, not to speak of another in occur. It is worth recording, as a warning to other museums in the Gloucestershire. The amount of rock above the chambers at Manod future, that the presence of our heated buildings in these caves changed was ample protection against any bombs then known, even if the location the conditions of the rocks above; inspection of the rocks was there had been identified and bombarded. The wall-space of the buildings, fore necessary more often than in the case of a quarry operating nor constructed in consultation with me, was sufficient to show most of the mally. So far as the safety of the staff is concerned, it may be men pictures without stacking ; not indeed in a pleasing way, but well enough tioned that there was a secondary exit, for use if the main tunnel for inspecting how they behaved underground. In point of fact, they should have become dangerous. behaved admirably, and gave far less trouble in cracking and blistering 6 NATIONAL GALLERY: WAR-TIME STORAGE II. SOME TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. Another problem was dust. To begin with, there was plenty; and although this was reduced by various methods, a lot continued to be by IAN RAWLINS. brought into the buildings from the tunnels outside, on the men's boots chiefly. Mr. Rawlins kept on reassuring me that the dust was very good dust, and could do no harm settling on the pictures except to render them THE decision to evacuate the collection to Wales having been taken, temporarily invisible. I should explain that most of the glasses had the twin problems of curatorship and the establishment (and main been removed while the pictures were still above ground, for fear of tenance) of an appropriate physical environment presented themselves blast from bombs; it was therefore on the surface itself of the pictures immediately. The former aspect is discussed in the article devoted that the dust did settle. Slate dust is heavy, and the pictures hung near especially to it: here we are concerned more with the purely the floor soon began to present an original appearance; I do not think, technical questions of the war-time exile, together with some account of however, that any damage at all could be discovered on them now. the measures taken to deal with the somewhat formidable matter of trans In general, the storage at Manod Quarry proved highly successful. port. When it is recollected that three major movements took place, It demanded of course attention from considerable numbers of the each involving the carriage of some 2,000 pictures, it will be seen how Trafalgar Square staff, besides local labour and the constant support closely the whole scheme needed to be welded into a coherent policy if of the Ministry of Works. The trouble taken was rewarded. The accidents were to be avoided, and the advantages of storage away from pictures were saved from bombs; the reality of this danger in London danger fully realized. is shown by the illustration of the Raphael Room at Trafalgar Square— From considerations such as these, it became clear some time before after the pictures had been removed. Over and above this immediate the outbreak of hostilities, that when the time came to leave London, achievement, it became abundantly clear that the pictures enjoyed life the authorities would most likely be faced with the task of 'making do' at Manod Quarry far more than they had previously in London. They as best they might with primitive conditions in the surface repositories, were saved from the variations of temperature and humidity inseparable and that measures designed to improve matters could only be expected from a place above ground where the conditions are not controlled— after most, if not all, of the pictures had arrived. Some of these tem and so far the conditions at Trafalgar Square have not been controlled : porary expedients will be described later on. they were saved also from the comings and goings of the public, which Meanwhile it was imperative to make certain that the loads would in are enough to disturb the most careful air-conditioning. Alanod Quarry fact be able to leave London amidst the turmoil inseparable from the seemed therefore likely to preserve the National Collection indefinitely; outset of war. Independently of advice tendered in 1938-9 by the Air except indeed in its function of a picture gallery. This point reasserted Ministry regarding the suitability of Wales for the purpose in view, we itself when Germany was obviously about to collapse. Some weeks were influenced in our choice of the Principality to a considerable before the cessation of hostilities in Europe, a few pictures were selected extent by the needs of transport, the L.M.S.R. for the North, and the by Sir Kenneth Clark, the Director of the Gallery, to be sent back to G.W.R. for Aberystwyth. In close co-operation with both companies, Trafalgar Square. By the end of 1945 everything had returned from schedules were prepared in detail well in advance, so that delay in getting Wales. clear of London should be reduced to a minimum, and further that the time spent en route should not be unduly prolonged. In addition, of course, reasonable times of arrivial had to be planned, to facilitate rapid unloading by daylight. The first container-load left Trafalgar Square on the afternoon of - August 23rd, 1939, and the last on Saturday Sept. 2nd. In this inter val, some 1,800 pictures had been despatched, those to North Wales (Bangor) via Crewe and Chester, and those to Aberystwyth via Severn Tunnel. Responsible railway officials accompanied every consignment throughout, and officers of the Gallery were present at the loading sta tions each night, travelling when possible with the pictures until the train was clear of the main London area. Though at this time war had not been declared, there was of course no reason to assume that the whole evacuation would be completed without attack from the air. Precautions had been taken to guard 7 8 WAR-TIME STORAGE against this hazard as far as possible by reducing the time at entraining points, and by avoiding long periods of waiting or remarshalling at junctions on the way likely to be targets for enemy attention. Delivery to the selected 'sanctuaries' in Wales provided a number of local prob lems, especially at Bangor where the railway engineers had to erect a special sloping ramp to deal with the largest pictures which were assigned there. Broadly, the selection of particular places for storage had been de termined by a number of factors on the spot, such as extent of accommod ation available, accessibility for investigation, size of doors, passages and so on. It was manifestly hopeless to expect such technical desid erata as temperature and humidity conditions to be stabilized in advance, and in any case the pressing needs were for space and general facility, at least at the outset. Nevertheless, considerable anxiety at the scien tific angle was inevitable, since all this was taking place in early Autumn, the most tricky period of the year for damp and rapid changes of dew- point. In addition, there was the immediate prospect of winter, and its associated fuel difficulties. In fact, the winter of 1939-40 was one of the hardest of recent years. PRICHARD-JONES HALL. THE UNIVERSITY, BANGOR. The size of this building made anything approaching an even distri bution of heat very difficult, but the pictures being well spaced out, air circulation was reasonably good. Heat was from coke-fired boilers, suitably lagged. Naturally it was not easy to maintain constant conditions throughout the night, due to shortage of staff for stoking. But the relative humidity (R.H.) seldom fell below 40 % during the win ter months, and in summer approximated to those figures found in any solidly constructed edifice. In spite of some very hot weather in the summer of 1940, it is unlikely that greater stresses were set up in the VTE i] National Gallery, Trafalgar Square; The Raphael Rcom in 1940. pictures than they would have suffered in London at the same period. PENRHYN CASTLE. BANGOR. The repositories placed at our disposition here were the large dining room, and two garages. Between them they provided the least satis factory technical conditions we were to experience, and consequently the maximum of apprehensiveness for the well-being of the contents. There were two major troubles. Firstly as things were originally, it was impossible to prevent the R.H. from varying some 20% at least during any interval of 24 hours, and secondly the air was nearly stag nant, an invitation for moulds to grow, and all biological action to flourish. In the garages too, vertical temperature gradients were severe; ther mometers near ceilings would register at least 5°F higher than at floor level. This would not have mattered so much but for the fact that several of the largest—and most valuable—pictures were stored there. For a picture some 13 feet high those gradients imply that the R.H. may well be about 10% higher at the bottom than at the top, causing PLATE ill] Lower Floor of the E.igle Tower, Caernarvon Castle. PLATE n] Prichard-Jones Hall, University College of North Wales, Bangor. (Negative partial] y defaced). J. PLATE IV] Plas-y-bryn, Bontnewydd, near Caernarvon. PLATE V] A National Gallery picture, with the frame off, and a temporary surround added for safety in transport. 1 -V|M M 8: i ... '• >%* w y if 'LATE VII (Courtesy of L.M.S.R.) 11 1 Loading the "Elephant" Case at Penrhyn Castle, Bangor. 1 *. • § 1 • aWW ? j \ ' s ••^~>a* 4 PLATE vi] Back of the preceding block 2 J lu 60 i3 on 3 Pi 0 60 T3 C c 3 60 C J*. J3 0 J5 3 E 9 0 I I < 3 a § •a 3 o a T3 O C If 60 a a o (J OS **' O B 5 as § 3 3 a •a a o T3 c Q 60 C o T3 5 K s 60 3 60 1 I TP j § c? lu "a X •a 5 I (Courtesy of Keystone Press Agency). PLATE XVI] Manod Quarry, Inside Building No. 3. > 3 K WAR-TIME STORAGE 9 marked strains in the fibres (wood or canvas) forming the picture's sup port. As time went on, these figures were reduced to about half, by appropriate technical means. Lack of proper air-circulation was largely overcome by installing small electric fans (the usual office type) at important points, and only opening up the chambers on fine days. In general, by the use of heavy hangings and stopping up all cracks, the garages were largely sealed off from outside influences. This meant that very little fresh air ever circulated around the pictures, but the mil dew was prevented by the movement of what air there was, the task of the fans. At R.H. values above 68%, the danger of mould growth is a real one, and the risk increases rapidly in still air, and even more with rising temperature. Spores must always be assumed to be present, especially in places where ventilation was always deficient. The pur pose of mentioning these points in some detail is to emphasise the haz ards of leaving valuable material in rooms or cupboards devoid of proper air-circulation, and to state that with the homely precautions indicated, no case of mildew occured. Although the method adopted was to some extent at variance with traditional practice, it was successful, in view of the fact that all pictures were accessible—out of their cases—for inspec tion at any moment. At all our repositories this practice was followed— pictures were always unpacked and readily available. (The traditional method would have allowed large variations in R.H., admittedly provid ing fresh air : in contra-distinction, our plan kept the R.H. nearly con stant, produced little fresh air, but kept what air there was always in movement). N.L.W., ABERYSTWYTH. Several hundred pictures were stored here, mostly on the top floor. Conditions were reasonably good, differing but little from those ob taining in the library section.1 No special equipment was introduced. During the anxious days of mid-1940, it was considered imprudent to keep so large a concentration of valuable pictures in and near Bangor ; invasion from the West could not be wholly discounted, and as it hap pened, some few months later enemy aircraft were frequently in the neighbourhood on their way to and from the Mersey. A greater degree of dispersion seemed desirable, but at the same time it was necessary for a variety of reasons to keep within a few miles of existing head quarters at Bangor and Aberystwyth. So the possibility of setting up branch establishments was explored, a somewhat thankless task, since most accommodation of a suitable character had long since been taken over for other purposes, and the chances of getting any preparatory work done to make premises fit for the reception of the pictures were 1 In 1941, some documents of historical interest, including the Stephenson Contracts, and a number of pictures, all belonging to the L.M.S. Railway, were lodged here in the basement,where they remained until the summer of 1945,when they were returned to Euston. All these were originally received at Bangor, and cared for by the National Gallery, until the move to Manod Quarry. 10 WAR-TIME STORAGE WAR-TIME STORAGE II indeed remote. However, eventually three storages were obtained— viz:— fying plant. This was almost enough to justify an immediate decision to Plas-yr-Bryn, Bontnewydd. accept the place. (It may be interesting to record that a R.H. of 60% Eagle Tower, Caernarvon Castle. at 65°F was taken as possible on our first visit, in view of the physical Crosswood, Aberystwyth. characteristics of the workings : in the event, a R.H. of 58% at 63°F was and to each of the first two a number (about 20) of pictures of supreme achieved in the storage buildings and maintained for 4 years contin importance were transferred as soon as the necessary equipment could uously). This was on Tuesday, September 17th, 1940. On Saturday, be obtained and staffing arrangements completed. Standard electrical September 21st, engineers of the Office of Works (now Ministry of heating was introduced at Bontnewydd and at Caernarvon Castle, and Works) explored the site, and agreed that to make it into a repository conditions at both places were satisfactory. At Crosswood, to which for the National Gallery was a reasonable proposition. But it was about 70 pictures were transferred, circumstances were more awkward, clear to everyone that engineering works of no mean order would be since the library (used for our repository) was heated by an aged system needed. For example, the main adit—some 200 yards long—would of waterpipes beneath the floor, which could not be turned off without have to be more than doubled in cross-sectional area to permit passage affecting the rest of the house. Consequently the dryness was extreme of the containers and cases. In addition, a number of minor widening —a R.H. or 30 % or so. Many yards of old blanket and felt were there works were essential, and last, but not least, the clearance of rubble and fore soaked in a nearby stream, and hung up in the library to raise the boulders from the floors. In all some 5,000 tons of coarse slate rock R.H. to a more reasonable level. It should be mentioned that it is much were removed by blasting. For the most part, this had to be accomp easier to keep the R.H. steady after the pictures have been in a room for lished before any work could begin upon the erection of the brick build some length of time, as a balancing action between these and the sur ings which it was agreed should be provided within the chambers for rounding air sets in and tends to damp out small fluctuations. the reception and storage of the pictures. At this stage, everything was a race against time; the approach of winter on the one hand, and DEEP-LEVEL SHELTER: MANOD QUARRY. on the other the knowledge that the pictures could not be considered wholly safe by any means in their surface quarters near the coast. Later in the summer of 1940, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, From now onwards, the scheme at Manod Quarry can perhaps best addressed a letter to the Scientific Adviser urging that immediate steps be envisaged as a complete model village to serve as a picture sanctuary, might be taken to find underground shelter for the Collection, in view embedded in a Welsh mountain, affording protective cover to the of the increasing threats from the air. At that date, bombing had be extent of some 200-300 ft. of slate and granite over most of the space come practically mmscriminate over much of the Island. Associated available for storage. fire risks were considerable also. Each of the six buildings was self-contained in the sense that a plant Thus, an extended search was started. In all, some half-dozen sites room and plenum system of ventilation—giving a modified form of air- were considered, and some of them inspected. They included quarries, conditioning—were provided, capable of being adjusted to the special deep defiles (capable of being roofed with reinforced concrete), railway needs of the contents, but all fed off the mains of the North Wales Power tunnels, disused caves and so forth. For one reason or another such as Company's Grid system. An appropriate system of transformers difficulty of access, possibility of flooding, instability of roofs, neigh stepped down the high potential (11,000 volts) from the transmission bouring targets for enemy action, all were rejected. A successful issue lines to 400 volts for heating; and 230 volts (or in some cases 100 volts) to the enquiry seemed unlikely. In the end, however, we obtained for fighting. A matter which merited serious attention throughout information relating to Manod Quarry, Blaenau Festiniog, which seemed was the possibility of mould-growth, which as mentioned earlier, is to to offer possibilities. On arriving there—1,700 feet above sea level, be expected at R.H.s exceeding 68%, and particularly in still air. The up some 4 miles of rough mountain road with a maximum gradient of plenum apparatus was constructed to give as many as 4 changes per hour 1 in 6—prospects were none too favourable, especially since there was no in each of the buildings, with a view to reducing this risk. A number of suitable access to the workings themselves, and the main adit was only worthless canvases and panels were exposed to the natural atmosphere 6 ft. high, less than half that needed for our large pictures. Nevertheless,, of the caves as tests, with the result that mould appeared on one of there were several vast chambers, offering adequate accommodation, them in 18 days, and on others within a couple of months. It should electric power, and water available, and from the technical aspect most be noted that the R.H. was about 95% at a temperature of 52°F, and vital of all, the natural temperature was low (47°F) and fairly constant the air was not stagnant, though the movement was slighter than in —according to local tradition—winter and summer. A rough calcu the buildings. Another matter needing attention at the beginning was lation showed that it would be possible to control the atmospheric con to arrange that the pictures were never left in absolute darkness. The ditions of this quarry by temperature heating alone, without de-humidi- tendency of oil and tempera paintings to turn yellow is due to a number of complex physico-chemical actions depending upon the absence of 12 WAR-TIME STORAGE WAR-TIME STORAGE 13 light. (This fact is the prime cause of the darkening of many portraits in country houses, hung in rooms or passages to which little light has and to concentrate them all in the newly prepared sanctuary. It may access). Consequently, a small threshold illumination was always kept be recollected that there were six repositories in Wales, and, as a matter running in every building—useful for help in invigilation as well as for of fact, an additional one in England. So that, instead of spreading the purpose just described. Analytic tests were also made to make outwards, we were now faced with the converse problem of converg certain that no noxious vapours (especially hydrogen sulphide) were ence. In view of the nature of rail communications between the places present which could possibly damage the pictures either in the storage already mentioned, and the district around Festiniog, it was decided buildings or en route through the adits. that road transport should be used (except for the one station outside The situation of Manod Quarry being what it was, high above sea Wales). The L.M.S.R. undertook the work from the Bangor area level, and isolated, it was essential from the very start to provide stand (average distance about 40 miles from the Quarry), and the G.W.R. by emergency generation plant which should come into action immed the Aberystwyth region, some 70 miles distant by road. Containers, iately upon a failure of the normal supply of electricity. A 140 h.p. mounted upon the appropriate road vehicles, were brought into use, as low speed Diesel alternator was therefore installed, capable of carrying being the safest method under the circumstances, of effecting the re the whole load of lights, motors, fans and so on should occasion so re moval. quire. Actually, due to breakdowns on the lines carried across the Welsh The questions to be answered at this stage seem obvious enough in hills, the severity (at times) of the weather, and interruption of supply retrospect, but not altogether easy at the time. Thus, arrangements for repairs, the Diesel plant was not infrequently called into action. had been made at the Quarry for all but the largest loads to be taken Usually only some 2-3 minutes elapsed between a shut-down of supply into one of the storage buildings direct, so that unloading could take and its replacement by the emergency engine. In addition to the place in conditioned air. For this purpose the containers were to be machinery already described, there was a fair quantity of miscellan driven down the main adit, the clearances of which were only a matter eous apparatus such as ventilation-fans, batteries, a wind-recording of inches. Skilful driving was essential, and it is a pleasure to record appliance, hygrometers, still, to be looked after, as well as several miles the admirable work achieved by all concerned in this regard. Inevit of cable and wiring. A staff of seven engineers, were engaged on this ably too, some restriction was placed upon the dimensions of all vehicles task, working eight-hour shifts in pairs, throughout the 24 hours, involved. This reacted upon what types could properly be employed except that special periods had to be arranged at night, so as to at all, in view of the heavy gradients en route, and particularly those alleviate the difficulties of transport. Failures of plant were few, of the last few miles—from Festiniog to the Quarry itself. One physi though towards the end of our occupation definite sings of wear of many cal obstacle needed immediate attention, and that was the G.W.R. moving parts could be discerned. With the end of hostilities obviously bridge near the village. The maximum clearance of this was only some drawing nearer, it was hoped that no major renewals would be necess 11 feet, so that the road needed to be lowered some 2ft. 6 inches to per ary, and so it proved to be. Considering the particularly adverse state mit of the passage of our loads. Special abutments were constructed of national affairs when the whole scheme took shape, and the services to support the superstructure, and these can be seen to this day, a monu originally initiated, it may be said that good value was obtained from the ment to the National Gallery's exile. One of the illustrations shows whole equipment. Experience revealed that it was possible to reduce the largest case (that containing the van Dyck 'Charles I on Horse [he total electrical load appreciably, compared with the original estim back') about to pass under the bridge. A number of rehearsals had ation, the result, of course, of the progressive dying out of all surfaces, been made previously with the empty case (loaded on a Scammel unit), and of the establishment of thermodynamic equilibrium between the and when the day came, the load passed with £ inch to spare. Skid pictures and their surroundings. plates were brought into use to get the vehicle axial, and arrangements As a result of our sojourn, the temperature of the workings them had been made to deflate the tyres if necessary, but this was not called selves rose from 47°F to about 52°F, due partly to heat leakage from the for. The time taken to negotiate this bridge was about J an hour. buildings, and partly to high-wattage lamps in the adits. (It is perhaps interesting to note that on the way home in 1945, and in After various setbacks and delays, mostly due to the increasing war spite of approaching the bridge in the more awkward position, 'King effort and the progressive difficulty of obtaining transport and supplies, Charles' had a much speedier passage—12 minutes—the result of ex the Ministry of Works announced that Manod Quarry was ready for perience some years previously at the same spot). Special arrange occupation during the summer of 1941. Considering that contracts had ments were needed as a matter of fact for all outsize loads (those too only been let in the late Autumn of 1940, it will be seen that to complete big for containers), at this point, but nothing untoward occurred on any the essential services in a matter of some 9 months was commendable. occasion. A major problem of transport was thus posited (for the second time), Another aspect to which special attention was directed was that of the task being now to collect the pictures from their scattered habitats accurate time-schedules. No passing of full and empty vehicles could be allowed on the last 4 miles of the journey, and once inside the quarry 14 WAR-TIME STORAGE WAR-TIME STORAGE 15 only one consignment could be dealt with at a time, and the container As the war in Europe approached its end, plans were laid for the discharged. In the event, three containers per day, six days a week, return home. These plans were started in October 1944, and were just were handled, which meant that pictures were flowing in at a rate of in fact ready when the first two containers left the quarry during VE about 600-700 a week. When it is realized that included in them were week, to form the vanguard of those pictures which the condition of the individual items weighing nearly £ ton, and that there was only one building in London would allow to be on view. Thus, by the Saturday unloading dock which had to be cleared between each load, it will be following VE day, about fifty of the best masterpieces were once more appreciated how much labour was involved, even excluding that of visible to the public. stacking. The move-in started on August 12th, 1941, and occupied For the rest, the general theme was that of no undue haste—one con some 5 weeks, which took in the transfer of the library from Aberyst tainer each day (five days a week), until everything was cleared, including wyth, and a few loads of stores and equipment. Luckily, good weather the library. The largest works had to go first, as otherwise there was prevailed, except for very high winds, when the largest cases were ar no space to load anything else. Naturally, it was prudent to keep a riving, which in those exposed regions gave rise to much anxiety. There watch on the approach of winter, since after November it was not poss was no lifting tackle available for dealing with the cased loads at the ible to say that fog, extreme frost or snow would not hold up transport entrance to the main adit; these therefore had to be rolled off by hand, completely. Broadly, conditions were favourable; though high winds on to the narrow gauge trucks to be described later. A gang of six once again caused considerable anxiety with the largest consignments, L.M.S.R. platelayers reinforced the Gallery staff for this purpose, both at the Quarry, and during the lengthy and intricate operation of but the task was really severe, and the time involved inordinately long— loading on to well-wagons at Blaenau Festiniog Station. By the first some two hours for each case, compared with 15 minutes when we left week in December 1945 however, everything was back at Trafalgar in 1945, with the help of proper lifting gear. These details may seem Square : some 6 J years after the first load of pictures had left London excessive at this period of time, but at the moment the position was to seek sanctuary in Wales. crucial, and they are mentioned as illustrating the conditions which had to be faced, if the Collection was to be duly housed and the whole scheme brought to fruition. Nobody was particularly surprised at the diffi culties, although, had not 'needs must' been paramount in all our minds, one would have thought more than once before taking these treasures some 1,700 above sea level, up gradients of 1 in 6 and through mountain tunnels, even if it were to let them rest in conditions physically nearly perfect. Within the quarry itself, the part occupied by the National Gallery extended over about a quarter of a mile, and the storage build ings, together with the restorer's studio were thus too far apart to con template carrying pictures when a transfer from one place to another was needed. Furthermore, the atmosphere in the workings was decid edly unfavourable in the matter of damp and chill. Therefore three wagons, of the types illustrated two enclosed and one open, were spe cially built to our general designs by the L.M.S.R. at Derby. They were propelled by hand—on standard narrow gauge rails (l'-ll"). The smaller (closed) vehicles were provided with appropriate uprights and crosspieces inside for securing pictures of reasonable size, while "sorbo" mats on the floors did a good deal to reduce vibrations and shock. The larger "bogie"^ 15 ft. in length—was designed to carry the largest cases, up to 17 ft. long in fact, and did yeoman service for this purpose, and additionally for handling large frames, timber and engineering equipment, not to mention general stores and furniture. All these vehicles must have covered many miles during the four years 1941-5. Beyond the unloading dock, the clearances were too small to permit passage of the road trailers, and consequently the narrow gauge trollies comprised the sole method of transport within a large part of the quarry, and its associated buildings. INDUSTRIAL PLANT PROTECTION PLANT PROTECTION SERVICE OPERATIONS MANUAL OM16-1 1953 NEW YORK STATE CIVIL DEFENSE COMMISSION 124 EAST 28th STREET NEW YORK 16, N. Y. INDUSTRIAL PLANT PROTECTION PLANT PROTECTION SERVICE OPERATIONS MANUAL OM 16-1 1953 NEW YORK STATE CIVIL DEFENSE COMMISSION 124 EAST 28th STREET NEW YORK 16, N. Y. CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION 5 I THE ATOMIC BOMB 7 II ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL 9 III FIRE SERVICE 19 IV EMERGENCY MAINTENANCE SERVICE 22 V EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE 25 VI EMERGENCY POLICE SERVICE 32 VII PUBLIC INFORMATION SERVICE 35 VIII RESCUE SERVICE 38 IX WARDEN SERVICE 40 X WELFARE SERVICE 44 APPENDIX 47 Additional copies of this Manual may be obtained without charge upon application to the Plant Protection Service, N. Y. State Civil Defense Commission, 124 E. 28th St., New York 16, N.Y. INTRODUCTION The United States long has enjoyed the economic advantage of tremendous industrial production. Our factories, mills, utilities, foundries and mines are a vital part of the national resources, and because of their dedication to peacetime activities are generally vulnerable to hostile attack. It is entirely reasonable to suppose that a primary objective of any nation with hostile intentions against us will be to attempt to cripple our production by the destruction of our vital industrial centers and their highly skilled workers. War in the form of an atomic bomb may never come to our shores but the international geopolitical situation is such that Civil Defense must be accepted as a factor that will remain as permanently necessary for our country's survival as our Armed P'orces. Civil Defense is a logical result of present-day world condi tions, and cannot be regarded merely as a temporary problem induced by the threat of hostile action by an enemy nation. Civil Defense units maintained by local communities are avail able for general community protective service in case of disaster, but they do not have sufficient personnel nor equipment to administer the special mass requirements of industrial plant protection, except in an advisory capacity. Under these circumstances it is imperative that industrial plants provide their own industrial defense organizations if they are to offer maximum protection and care for themselves and their employees, increase chances of survival, minimize damage, and return to normal production as quickly as possible in the eventuality of an enemy attack. Failure to take such precau tionary measures may well permit our industrial life to suffer a major catastrophe from which the nation itself cannot hope to escape. Fully effective plant protection is planned primarily upon the coordinated administration c*f three basic and inter-related hazard factors: 1. Industrial safety 2. Espionage and sabotage 3. Direct enemy attack (probably atomic) To further the establishment of adequate protective action against these hazards among our industrial plants, the New York State Civil Defense Commission presents in this advisory Manual an outline of approved methods by which the effects of enemy action against our national production program may best be minimized, and the casualties and material damage resulting I from such attacks may be appreciably reduced or eliminated THE ATOMIC BOMB entirely. 1. All Plant Protection projects, as integral parts of local It is realized that a full-scale installation of all the preventive Civil Defense programs, are based on a thorough understanding and remedial operations listed hereafter will not be possible in and appreciation of the prime potential danger to which our every industrial organization, but it is urged that all plants industrial areas will most probably be subjected in the event of thoroughly explore the possibilities of integrating into a plan enemy attack. for defense every appropriate facility, technique and resource 2. That is of course, the Atomic Bomb. Such a bomb may be at their individual command. dropped over or on its target from a hostile airplane, fired from Our present situation is dangerous and the stakes are large. a submarine, or carried to its destination by some form of Should the day ever come when the bombs are down here in the guided missile. It may be exploded in the air, under water, at United States, the pay-off will be in terms of lives saved, pro ground level or beneath it, and would probably be delivered duction maintained, a war won and national security preserved. with little or no warning. 3. The intensity and extent of the havoc caused by an atomic explosion are primarily dependent on the size of the bomb used and the height of its explosion above or below ground or water level. For purposes of general discussion however, the nominal or "Nagasaki-type" bomb may appropriately be considered as C. R. Huebner, Lt. Gen. V. 8. A. (Ret.), a standard of comparison. This is the 20-kiloton bomb which Director, explodes with a force of 20,000 tons of TNT and effects its great New York State CivU Defense Commission est overall destruction when detonated at approximately 2000 feet altitude. The major effects of such an explosion are: a. Complete destruction of all but the heaviest concrete and steel structures and all personnel not in strong under ground shelters, within a i^-mile radius from the point of explosion; this point is officially termed "Ground Zero". Raging and frequently uncontrollable conflagrations will occur simultaneously in built-up sections of this area. b. From 14 mile to 1 mile from Ground Zero, heavy damage will occur. Most utilities will be put out of commission, multi-storied buildings will be badly wrecked and wooden structures will be collapsed. c. Beyond a 2-mile radius, damage to structures will be com paratively minor, except those whose location on high ground or in a valley in line with Ground Zero, may sub ject them to more concentrated exposure to the bomb blast. There are not likely to be many serious personnel casual ties at this distance. 4. Experience to date with atomic bombs indicates that the greatest over-all damage is caused when the bomb is detonated in the air; but all atomic explosions, of whatever type, depend for their effect upon two common factors: blast and radiation. II 5. The tremendous heat at the core of an atomic explosion ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL creates an abrupt rise in the surrounding atmospheric pressure. 1. The theory and practice of Plant Protection is concerned As this expands it produces a shock wave which bursts outward with the organization and training of appropriate personnel from the bomb at an initial velocity of about 1000 miles per within an industrial installation to perform the specialized serv hour, followed by a terrific blast of wind that may have an ini ices necessary to safeguard and salvage the plant and its occu tial velocity of 800 miles per hour; half a mile from the explo pants in the event of a major disaster, and to offer the maximum sion this blast will be moving at 500 miles per hour. degree of assistance which the plant would be able to render to 6. This initial blast lasts about 1 second and is then equalized the Civil Defense forces of the community. by air rushing back to fill the vacuum thus caused. This reverse, or suction blast lasts about 2 seconds, and is approximately 2. Such services are not intended nor expected to replace the half the strength of the first shock wave. All of the combined usual plant personnel and security measures which customarily force of the two blasts is dissipated within 30 seconds. function under peacetime conditions. 7. Radiation in thermal and nuclear form occurs simultane ously with the blast in any atomic explosion. Thermal radiation 3. The general organization and functioning of a Plant Pro can best be understood by comparing it with severe sunburn, tection program parallels, in many respects, that of a community since its effect is in direct proportion to its intensity, duration Civil Defense organization, and consultation with the local and amount of exposure. The atomic explosion will radiate heat Director of Civil Defense in whose jurisdiction the plant is lo sufficient to char and destroy unprotected skin and ignite com cated will prove most valuable at all stages of the project. Every bustible materials at a distance of 1 mile, and to scorch wood 2 opportunity and encouragement should be accorded plant em miles distant. All thermal radiation is completed within 3 sec ployees to enlist in their home community Civil Defense units, onds after the explosion. with the understanding that the primary duty of such employ 8. Following an air burst of an A-bomb, 50 percent of the ees in the event of disaster will be to their employing plants. In nuclear radiation is dissipated one second after the explosion. this connection, it should be borne in mind that the New York Personnel who survive the initial shock of an atomic explosion State Emergency Act provides that in the event of or anticipa and are properly clothed and sheltered, will probably escape tion of attack, local Civil Defense authorities are empowered to serious radiation if they are not afterwards exposed to residual seize properties and impress persons to the extent necessary to contamination of ground and atmosphere. administer general civil defense activities. 9. Because of the tremendous power inherent in atomic 4. One of the first and most important steps in undertaking bombs it is highly unlikely that hostile attackers will use any a plant protection program therefore, should be the establish other form of air-borne weapons such as fragmentation, incen ment of close and continuing liaison with local Civil Defense diary or "block buster" bombs, as in World War II, but it is not authorities. The pooled information and experience thus made wise to discount entirely the possibility of such use if only for mutually available will provide valuable guidance in formulat its anti-morale effect. However, protective measures taken to ing various phases of a plant protection program. Training plans prepare for an atomic attack will serve equally well against and schedules for all branches of plant units should include any other form of air attack or plant disruption, and offer the combined training exercises with appropriate Civil Defense comforting assurance of all-round preparedness. units. The closer a plant program adheres to local Civil Defense plans and recommendations and developments, including where possible the use of standardized and interchangeable equipment, 9 the more efficient will be the common effort in combating the by a Chief of Service, appointed by the Coordinator. These effects of enemy attack. Chiefs of Service, with such administrative assistants as they 5. It is also highly desirable that all neighboring plants de may require, form the staff of the Coordinator, and represent the velop mutual assistance plans, and that these in turn be co Coordinator in directing their respective services. ordinated with and through headquarters of the local Civil De b. The Coordinator, his Deputy and all Chiefs of Services fense Director. Such an arrangement will offer the vital advan will find it to their advantage to become regularly enrolled tages, where conditions permit, of utilizing the protective and members of the Civil Defense organization serving the com rehabilitation services of unharmed installations in behalf of munity in or near which their plant is located, so that the com damaged plants which may require such assistance. munity and plant organizations may be administered on a 6. The need for a special program of plant protection varies mutually cooperative and noncompetitive basis. It is especially according to the size, purpose, location and product of each desirable that the Coordinator be completely familiar with any individual plant concerned, but in every case the responsibility division of the local Civil Defense area into subordinate com for initiating' a plant protection program should rest with the mands inasmuch as it is with them and their Service Chiefs that chief executive of the plant. the Coordinator should arrange for necessary liaison and assistance. 7. Plant Defense Coordinator c. Provision should be made in all personnel assignments for a. The plant executive staff can best begin the implementa selected individuals to serve as replacements or alternates for tion of their Plant Protection Program by the appointment of a key Plant Protection personnel who may become casualties. Simi Plant Defense Coordinator. lar duplication of assignments should be provided in plants em b. The Coordinator should be a top corporate executive who ploying more than one shift of workers. represents, and is directly responsible to, the plant management 10. Plant Protection Unit for developing and administering all Civil Defense activities The protective services are known collectively as the Plant within the plant, and cooperating with local and State Civil Protection Unit, and their individual administration, personnel Defense authorities. He should be familiar with local Civil De and training come under the immediate personal supervision and fense policies and directives. His authority should be complete control of the Chief of Service concerned, as directed by the and unquestioned in all plant protection activities. Plant Coordinator. c. The Coordinator should be selected on the basis of proven qualities of executive and administrative ability, leadership, 11. Protective Services familiarity with the plant and its personnel, and an appreciation a. The complete organization of a Plant Protection Unit of their potentialities. It is considered essential that he possess should contain these individual services: a high degree of physical endurance for possible extended tours (1) Fire of duty in an emergency and that he be of a stable and unemo- (2) Medical tionable temperament. (3) Police 8. A Deputy Plant Defense Coordinator also should be ap (4) Public Information pointed who will assume the command functions of the Plant (5) Emergency Maintenance Coordinator in the event the latter becomes a casualty. (6) Rescue (7) Warden 9. Chiefs of Service (8) Welfare a. It should be the responsibility of the Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator to organize within Ihe plant a system of b. In the case of small plants with limited personnel, two or protective services, as hereinafter listed, in such numbers and of more of the above services may be combined in the interests of such size as may be required. Each such service should be headed greater flexibility and efficiency. However, this does not effect 10 11 any elimination or diminution of the duties and responsibilities the plant is operated from the Control Room, as ordered by the of the services listed. Coordinator. This room should be equipped with cots, blankets, fire extinguishers, reserve stocks of food and fresh water, first 12. Functions of Protective Services aid supplies, and a self-contained auxiliary lighting system. a. In general, the plant protective services are organized and b. The Control Room insofar as possible is established in a trained for the following duties and responsibilities: shelter zone, preferably on a lower floor or in a basement, cen trally situated with respect to communications requirements (1) Pre-Attack with key locatiqns in the plant. (a) Provide and equip shelters c. In general, it may be assumed that existing interior and (b) Direct personnel to shelters or fire exits exterior plant telephone lines will serve as adequate communi (c) Safeguard key personnel, material, and vital rec cation facilities for the Control Room. A messenger service or ords such as blueprints, payrolls, ledgers, formu ganized on a stand-by basis will be of great help for use in case lae, etc. the telephone lines become jammed or are put out of commis (2) Post Attack sion. Bicycle, motorcycle or automobile transportation should be made available for use by messengers if necessary. In some (a) Extinguish fires instances it may be possible to use special sound-powered tele (b) Rescue personnel caught or trapped by wreckage phone lines or "walkie-talkies" as auxiliary communication chan or fire nels, within the plant. (c) Administer first aid and hospitalize casualties (d) Make emergency repairs to broken machinery, d. Where possible, a public address system should be installed water mains, and power and gas lines from the Control Center to all shelters and shelter zones. This (e) Reopen streets within plant property and restore can be utilized for morale purposes by broadcasting spot an communications nouncements and recorded musical selections during the emer (f) Protect lives, property, productive capacity and gency for the information and entertainment of personnel. records, and maintain morale. e. The Control Room should contain a set of maps of each floor of the plant. These maps should show all regular and emer b. To expedite the initiation of protective, repair and salvage gency entrances and exits, routes thereto, fire escapes, doors, operations as quickly as possible after an attack during off-duty windows, valves, switch boxes, water, light and power lines, hours in a plant, it is recommended that the Fire, Police, and fire hose, hydrants, extinguishers, first-aid supplies, and loca Repair Services maintain a roster of skeleton crews or individual tions and names of all departments. The Control Room also representatives who may be immediately available for duty, maintains rosters of key personnel of the plant and the protec pending the arrival of additional personnel. tion unit, with home addresses and telephone numbers, and the number of employees per department. 13. Organization Chart The accompanying chart indicates the usual organization and 15. Attack Warning System chain of command of a complete Plant Protection Unit. (Fig. 1) a. The Attack Warning System may consist of separate or combined sirens, horns, bells or whistles, in addition to existing 14. Plant Control Room plant public address systems or interior fire alarm circuits. The a. Control of the Plant Protection Unit is normally exercised code of alarm signals to be used should correspond with that by the Plant Coordinator through a communications system prescribed for public use by the New York State Civil Defense centered in a Plant Control Room which functions as the com Commission, and should be used in addition thereto, irrespective mand headquarters during any emergency and in training there of the audibility or proximity to the plant of such public signals. fore, and is reserved for the exclusive use of the Plant Coordi b. All alarm signals are transmitted to the plant Control nator and his staff at all times. The Attack Warning System of Room as may be previously arranged with the local Civil De- 12 13 fense organization. The official State code for such signals is their presence of mind in emergencies, and who possess the au as follows: thority and temperament to inspire confidence and to act as advisors and guides to others. Recruitment and appropriate as (1) Yellow Alert Signal—A confidential alert, retained by signment of individuals for plant protection services may be the plant Control Room for the private information of materially expedited if new employees are screened for previous selected key personnel. This signal indicates that hos Civil Defense experience at the time of employment, and the in tile forces are believed to be en route towards the formation thus obtained made available to the Plant Coordinator. North American continent. 18. General Training (2) Red Alert Signal—This alert indicates that a hostile attack is imminent. It is the final warning, for imme a. Service Chiefs are considered directly responsible for or diate dissemination to the entire plant personnel, at the ganizing and training their service units under the supervision direct order of the Plant Coordinator. It activates aU of the Coordinator. Plant Protection agencies, and requires the instant and b. In this connection, the plant management should be pre rigid enforcement of all plant protection procedures pared to supply training courses and required equipment at no and controls. It consists of a signal of 3 minutes' dura expense to the plant personnel concerned, and to absorb all time tion consisting of a fluctuating or warbling signal of expended by personnel in such training, including overtime if varying pitch by a siren, or a succession of intermittent necessary. These provisions may be announced at the organiza blasts by horn or whistle, or intermittent ringing of a tion meeting. bell. c. It is assumed that Plant Coordinators and their service chiefs will desire to promote their value to their organizations (3) White Alert Signal—This alert indicates that the dan by taking basic courses in civil defense procedures and opera ger of an attack is over, and is disseminated to the tions, first-aid training, etc. These can be provided through the entire plant personnel, at the direct order of the Plant local Civil Defense which will also arrange for such specialized Coordinator. This signal consists of a series of three instruction as may be required. Civil Defense publications on I-minute steady blasts by a siren, horn or whistle, or various specialized Civil Defense functions may be obtained steady ringings of a bell separated by 2-minute periods through local Civil Defense headquarters. of silence. 19. Shelters 16. Organization Meeting a. High priority on any plan for the organization of a plant Following the appointment of the Coordinator and his Deputy, protection program should be given to the establishment of it will be found desirable to initiate, without delay, active re Shelters or Shelter Zones for the use of plant personnel in the cruiting for the Plant Protection Unit. This may best be accom event of attack. plished by holding an Organization Meeting of plant personnel b. It is not to be expected that aU plants will find it possible at which a senior plant executive should announce the organiza to construct special atomic bomb shelters to house all personnel. tion of the unit and the reasons for it and present the Coordi Adequate protection may be provided by the adaptation and nator to those assembled. expansion of present plant building facilities for use as shelters 17. Service Duties or shelter zones. Such facilities include basements, cellars, un derground garages and passageways. In structures where base The Coordinator should outline the nature of the various ment conditions are unsuitable for shelters, enclosed interior Services and their duties. If possible, Service Chiefs are ap waUs and lower floors may be so utilized. pointed at this meeting, and begin recruiting for their Services forthwith. To properly discharge their responsibilities, all per c. In the upper floors of tall buildings from which under sonnel accepted for service in the Protection Unit should pref ground shelters cannot easily be reached, shelter zones are es erably be mature persons who may be depended upon to retain tablished. Such shelter zones should be in the interior of the 15 14 buildings, and of easy access by stairways or ramps; elevator (11) Picks, shovels, crowbars, axes, saws, sledges, jacks service cannot be depended upon in the event of an attack, due (12) First aid kit to the probable destruction or shutting off of power supplv during such emergencies. h. Directional signs to all shelters and shelter zones should be posted conspicuously throughout the plant. In the interests d. All such adapted shelters and shelter zones should be of uniformity, it is recommended that these signs conform to located as far as possible from windows and glass-paneled doors, the following official Civil Defense specifications: The words and be free of water, gas, oil or steam pipes, inflammable ma "SHELTER" or "SHELTER ZONE" to be in letters 6 inches terials, and fixtures that may be shaken loose by shock. Win high, on a black background, with a yellow arrow either under dows should be equipped with shields of wood, heavy wire mesh, neath or above the letters, indicating right or left route to be or thick fabric to minimize the effect of flying glass. followed. Thickness of letters and arrow shaft to be 1 inch. e. Shelters are normally provided on the basis of a minimum The designated area itself should be plainly marked by similar of 5 square feet of floor space per occupant, and wherever pos signs without the arrow. sible should be planned to accommodate no more than 50 i. In assessing the adequacy of any shelter program it should persons. be remembered that plants situated in congested areas should insofar as possible, afford emergency shelter for passersby, in f. When necessary to construct special shelters for the spe addition to their own personnel. cific protection of classified documents or key personnel, they should be located underground and constructed of reinforced 20. Community Aid concrete. Sufficient drainage facilities and shut-off valves to a. The first duty of a Plant Protection Unit is to its own protect against flooding from ruptured water pipes and rain plant, but if an attack occurs and the plant is spared or sustains should be provided. Depending on the type, size and construc only light damage, the Coordinator should be prepared to lend tion of the buildings in which they may be located, these shelters aid to the local area or to other plants as requested by the local should be designed for static loads, varying from 200 to 500 Civil Defense Director. pounds per square foot, with the usual design stress to assure b. The Coordinator should also explore with the local Civil an adequate factor of safety. Underground shelters constructed Defense Director the possibilities of expediting the passage out-of-doors should be provided with an earth cover, approxi through restricted areas of key plant personnel, i.e., pipe fitters, mately two feet thick. In all shelters two exits are desirable, electricians, chemists, etc., whose speedy return to duty is vital not adjacent to each other. to the early restoration of operation of damaged or destroyed critical industrial areas, from which they have been absent at g. All shelters and shelter zones should contain the follow ing equipment: the time of attack. (1) Electric flash lights, extra batteries and bulbs 21. Insignia (2) Auxiliary, self-contained lighting equipment Each member of a plant protective organization should carry (3) Battery powered radio, and extra batteries official identification at all times, and wear prescribed insignia (4) Benches or cots when on plant protection duty. Such distinctive items may in (5) Blankets clude complete uniforms when available, but the minimum (6) Emergency rations for 24 hours requirement should be brassards of cloth or heavy paper, easily (7) Bottled drinking water—1 pint per person for each and quickly identifiable. In type, color and markings, all Plant 2 hours of emergency Protection insignia should be based on standards established by (8) Telephone communication with Control Room the Federal Civil Defense Administration. If special changes (9) Ventilation—27 cubic feet of air per person, per hour therein, or additional special designs are desired, to meet spe (10) Toilets, flush or chemical (1 for each sex) cial plant conditions, approval therefore should be obtained from local Civil Defense Directors. 16 17 III FIRE SERVICE 1. Fire is an inevitable result of atomic bombing. Broken gas mains and oil pipes, ruptured gasoline and chemical storage tanks, the wreckage of wooden structures, and dismantled and short-circuited electric power lines caused by such bombing will immediately produce fires which may shortly reach dangerous proportions. This critical situation will naturally occur in con centrated form within any plant which suffers bomb damage. Because of the widespread nature of the holocaust arising from the effects of an atomic explosion, such municipal fire fighting apparatus as may escape the disaster will be concerned with T3 r- rendering aid to the local community in general and cannot be > 2 expected to respond to individual calls for assistance from spe H2 fc> cific installations. The Fire Service of a Plant Protection Unit O therefore is one of its most important agencies, whose degree of O > efficient performance which can be made instantly available in o CD va an emergency may well determine the final survival of the plant u 2m and its employees. z m H ^ 2. Fire Chief O H 3 The plant Fire Service is commanded by the Fire Chief. The Fire Chief should know and understand modern fire prevention and fire-fighting techniques, and preferably have had previous actual experience as a member of a municipal fire department. His physical endurance and stamina will need to be of the high est degree; he should be calm and stable under emergency con ditions of disaster, and available for 24-hour duty. 3. Organization a. The Fire Chief should be made responsible for the organi zation, training, discipline and administration of an efficient plant Fire Service. The size of this Service will depend on the size of the plant and the type of fire risks to which it may be exposed. The Fire Service is normally organized and maintained in full cooperation with the local community fire department and Civil Defense organization. These agencies should be invited to inspect the plant property and make suggestions for fire pre vention and fire fighting. 18 19 b. The basic unit of the Fire Service is the Fire Brigade, types of fire fighting equipment needed, and the training of the whose members are trained in fire fighting and control. operating personnel. c. In addition to the Fire Brigade, the plant Fire Service c. Plants which possess automotive fire fighting equipment should include Fire Guards as auxiliary personnel on each floor such as pumpers, chemical and hose wagons, and ladder trucks, of the plant. should recognize the possibility that such equipment may prop erly be requisitioned by local Civil Defense forces to augment 4. Duties community facilities in the post-disaster period when, and if, a. The plant Fire Service generally responds to all fire alarms such plant apparatus is not needed at the plant. within the plant, or on plant property, but should be specifically concerned with and trained for service following an atomic bomb attack. b. Fire Guards should be appointed and trained in sufficient numbers to properly use all hose lines, emergency fire fighting equipment, different types of extinguishers, sand buckets, etc. They should make periodic inspections of their assigned areas and report all fire hazards and violations of safety rules, such as obstructions in aisles, corridors, and entrances, and collections of trash, oil rags and other combustible debris, to the Fire Chief and the department head concerned. In case of fire, they report to, and are directed by, the Fire Chief. c. It is recommended that fire drills of the entire plant per sonnel be held at least once a month, at varying and previously- unannounced times. In these drills all duties and assignments of personnel concerned would be expected to be performed with dispatch and in strict conformity with existing regulations. Dis regard or disobedience of orders should not be tolerated, and should be promptly reported to appropriate higher authority. 5. Equipment a. Insofar as local conditions permit and warrant, it is de sirable that plant Fire Services be furnished with the following approved items of special equipment: protective clothing for personnel, portable extinguishers of various types, hand pumps, ladders, buckets, sand, electric flash and flood lights, and mis cellaneous fire fighting tools such as axes, crow bars, sledges and shovels. In large installations it would probably be found expe dient to establish several mobile units of such equipment at strategic locations within the property. Consideration also should be given to providing emergency supplies of water in reserve tanks. b. Fire underwriters and municipal fire departments will be found to be willing and cooperative sources of advice and assist ance in the selection, procurement and proper use of the proper 20 21 pended upon to render expert service in the restoration of nor mal plant conditions and production during and after an emer IV gency. This service should have its own headquarters near the Control Room, and with direct contact to it. This headquarters EMERGENCY MAINTENANCE SERVICE should contain plans showing the layout of any equipment, serv 1. Any plant that does not include a fully staffed mainte ice or structure to be maintained or repaired, with locations of nance department in its permanent organization would do well stockpiles of reserve parts needed for the anticipated repairs. to provide an Emergency Maintenance Service in its Plant Pro These locations should be carefully selected to assure quick tection Unit. The operation of such a service as a sub-division accessibility. "Safe havens" should be established to contain of a Rescue Service is proper where limited personnel precludes duplicates of vital plans, documents, tools, and other essential the individual establishment of these two services, whose train items required to reestablish production if the plant is damaged ing and duties are similar in many instances. or destroyed. 2. Maintenance Chief b. Emergency Maintenance units should be organized in dif The responsible head of this section, whether organized sep ferent areas of the plant to care for breaks in piping and utility arately or included in another service, is the Emergency Main lines, to make emergency repairs to buildings, and to restore tenance Chief. He should be a competent all-round engineer, communications. Carpenters and electricians should be included experienced in construction and demolition techniques and in in these units. the operation and maintenance of plant utilities and buildings. c. Demolition and clearance units should reinforce or tear His major responsibility will be to give engineering advice to his down damaged walls and structural framework and unsound unit leaders who, whenever possible, should be the plant tech foundations, and remove debris immediately after an attack. nicians who regularly deal with building construction, repairs, Damage to structures from blast must be repaired quickly so and the various utilities. He should keep an inventory of the that other services can carry out their functions. tools, material, and equipment that each unit will need, includ ing personal protective equipment such as safety helmets and 4. Duties goggles. He will need to know all details of the building plans The Emergency Maintenance Service is assigned the foUowing and the distribution lines of the utilities so that he can restore specific responsibilities: service quickly if a building or structure is knocked out. Also, (1) Assist in the maintenance and control of emergency he should recruit workers from the plant organization and train mechanical services such as elevators, lighting, steam, them for Civil Defense duties. Proven abilities to work with and water, etc. lead subordinates, to remain calm under stress, and to with (2) Make emergency repairs to vital plant services and stand long hours of strenuous duty may be considered prime machinery as needed. requisites for this appointment. The Repair Chief should arrange (3) Keep the gas, light and water on, in the event of an to be always available during normal duty hours and on call at Air Raid Alert. Plants are advised to consult their other times. local utility companies as to when, and under what 3. Organization conditions, main supply valves or switches should be a. It is highly important that the Emergency Maintenance shut off. The local utility companies ordinarily will Service be composed, whenever possible, of personnel whose shut off the mains to any damaged area, but where experience and abilities will permit them to render efficient engi there is a competent engineer on the premises, and he neering service under appropriate guidance. Key positions in the has personal knowledge of a breakage or rupture in Section are properly assigned to skilled craftsmen such as any of the lines inside the plant, he may be author plumbers, pipe fitters, machinists and welders who can be de- ized to turn off that particular utility. In buildings equipped with automatic sprinkler systems, valves on 22 23 piping should be closed only upon direct orders from the Control Room or when directed to do so by the Plant Coordinator. This should be handled by per sonnel assigned to this specific duty. (4) Gas and Electric Steam Service—Main valves should EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE not be shut off except in case of pipe break or other 1. It is essential that a Plant Protection Unit establish an emergency. Emergency Medical Service. The pattern of destruction which (5) High Pressure Boilers—If steam is produced for 1 follows atomic attack is such that the ability of a plant to sur pumps listed in Section (7), or local generating plant, vive may depend upon its preparations to give emergency medi operation should be continued. Otherwise automatic cal care to its personnel. Plants which normally could depend gas or oil burners should be shut off. upon community resources for aid following an industrial dis (6) Low Pressure Boilers—All automatic burners should aster may find themselves completely isolated from the com be shut down. munity for many hours after an atomic attack by such after (7) Automatic Pumps—Steam or electric, sprinkler, fire, effects as rubble blocking the streets, fires, or lack of commu house, etc. Leave in normal operation but stand by nications. It is in these early hours after attack that most lives for quick shut-off. could be saved by adequate emergency medical treatment. (8) Pumps—Boiler feed, vacuum, and return, should be 2. a. The primary purpose of the Emergency Medical Service shut down. should be to give only enough first aid to prevent death or fur (9) Air Conditioning Systems—Should be shut down on ther injury until the wounded can be transported to a proper Red Alert and restarted on All Clear. medical installation for more thorough treatment. (10) Other facilities—Should continue in normal operation b. Many industries use toxic gases, chemicals, or other whenever possible. dangerous substances, which are kept under strict control under (11) All important switch boxes and shut-off valves should normal conditions. Enemy attack could suddenly release these be listed and plainly tagged or otherwise marked; agents through the destruction of protective devices. Study of also all other vulnerable points in plant or equipment these potential hazards and plans to cope with emergencies that requiring prompt attention to minimize weather dam might arise if protective measures fail as a result of attack, age or deterioration in case of disaster. should be an important duty of the plant Medical Service. (12) Plans should be made to clear debris from interior c. While the usual medical facilities of the average plant are and exterior traffic lanes in order of established suitable for ordinary industrial hazards, additional trained per priority. sonnel and special equipment will be needed to provide adequate emergency care after an atomic attack. The nature of an atomic 5. Equipment blast is such that even plants distant from the explosion may a. The Emergency Maintenance Section should be equipped suffer heavy casualties, and it is estimated that plants in target with crash helmets, gas resistant clothing, electric lanterns with areas should be prepared to provide emergency treatment for spare batteries and bulbs, gas masks, safety-glass goggles, and 40% of the total number of persons likely to be present at any tools as required. one time. b. If the plant is large, repair work will be expedited if it is possible to arrange for appropriate tools and spare parts to be 3. Medical Officer kept available on small hand trucks. a. The post of Medical Officer, with responsibility for the organization and training of the plant Medical Service, should be assigned to a physician or registered nurse. Full-time doctors 24 25 3 Nurses or nurses permanently on the staff of industrial organizations 40 Medical Aides (including Medical Clerks for sup offer a natural selection for this post. plies, records and communications) b. Smaller plants, without full-time professional medical per 9 Messengers (including one Messenger Leader). sonnel, should appoint their First Aid chief to this position. Plants without an established first aid program head should call d. It is recognized that many conditions are involved m se upon employees with past experience as armed services hospital lecting location, size of staff, and number of Aid Stations needed corpsmen or advanced first aid training to hold this post. for any individual plant. However, it is recommended that 10% of the plant personnel be assigned to the Medical Service and 4. Organization that a First Aid Station be established for every 500 workers on a. The plant Medical Officer coordinates the plant Medical the largest shift. These should be in addition to the existing plant Service with that of the local Civil Defense organization, super First Aid rooms and should be located in close proximity to the vises the procurement and maintenance of the proper medical general shelter areas. Special provision for the care of casual supplies, develops plans for identifying, transporting, and re ties should be made in those plants which have hospitals or cording casualties and deaths as outlined by the local Chief clinics. These should include plans for increasing bed capacity Medical Officer, and directs all training of the plant Medical and increased storage of plasma and consumable surgical Service personnel. supplies. b. In addition to such doctors and nurses available on a e. Plants that cannot fill the suggested staff requirement full-time or part-time basis, the plant Medical Service should should request the local Civil Defense Director to make as many be staffed with the following special personnel: Medical Aides, assignments as possible from his rolls to provide a full plant aid Clerks, Messengers and Supply Officers. station organization. Local Directors and Chief Medical Officers (1) Medical Aides form the backbone of the group. They will help determine such requirements if requested. are trained in both first aid and stretcher bearing; (2) Clerks keep records of the injured and assist in the 5. Training administration of the service. a. Special training is necessary for personnel of the plant (3) Messengers establish communications when the usual Medical Service. It is highly important that the plant Medical methods fail, and are apt to be the only reliable Officer and his staff learn the channels of communication and method of communication. organization of the local Civil Defense establishment in order to (4) The Supply Officer keeps medical supplies properly know how to request additional help and supplies if needed, maintained and flowing to the medical workers when and where to send litter cases for further treatment. Special methods of treating the victims of atomic attack should also be needed. learned. The established local Civil Defense medical program c. It is recommended that an effort be made to foUow the offers an excellent opportunity for the training of plant medical organization of the local Civil Defense First Aid Station. The personnel. Such items as technical manuals, instructors' plan staff of a First Aid Station is capable of treating about 100 books, guides for volunteers, training films and slides, are avail seriously injured persons over a period of twelve hours. able through the local Civil Defense organization. Arrangements (1) The basic staff of the Civil Defense First Aid Station may be made with the local Director for the instruction of plant includes: personnel. 1 Physician (the plant Medical Services Officer) b. In order that appropriate anticipatory action can be taken, I Executive Officer (may be an administrator or it is highly desirable that industrial physicians and other plant nurse) medical personnel should be enrolled in local Civil Defense or 1 Medical Associate (dentist, medical student or ganizations. Enrollment will permit plant medical personnel to veterinarian) 27 26 become fully familiar with the disaster plans and procedures Sheeting, (unbleached cotton), 1 yard established in the community by the local Civil Defense Director width—on roll 50 yds. and his Chief Medical Officer. Towelling—bath, 1 yd width (white) 200 yds. c. The plant management should also encourage all plant Cotton—1 pound 1 Medical Service personnel to enroll for assignment in their local Pins, safety, large 150 Civil Defense organization. This dual assignment will aid the Splints, basswood, 3V2" x 30" plant in securing additional help after attack from local Civil %-i/2" thick 12 Defense medical services which have been bolstered by off-duty Splints, basswood, Zy2" x 60", plant personnel. %-i/2" thick 12 d. The plant Medical Service should be responsible for the Depressors, tongue, wood V.\ box transportation of the injured to established medical installations Bandages, 2" x 6 yds, 12's 2 for extended treatment. A survey should be made to determine Sponge, surgical, 4" x 4", 200's . ... ' 3 what plant trucks, station wagons, delivery vans or ambulances Plaster, adhesive, 3" x 10 yds may be used and plans prepared for evacuation of the wounded (to be replaced yearly) 2 to the proper medical installations. •Salt 5 lbs. •Sodium Citrate 3 lbs. 6. Equipment Pencils, indelible 4 a. Medical supplies should be stockpiled in plants for imme Cups, paper 25 diate use by the Medical Service in the event of enemy attack. Brush, nail 1 b. Plants in target areas are urged to stock, as a reserve, Soap, hand—bar— 2 medical supplies sufficient to provide treatment for 40% of the Towels, hand, paper—packages— .. 1 total number of persons likely to be present in the plant at any Matches, safety—box— 1 one time. Thus, if the peak load of the establishment is 500 em Pencils, skin 1 ployees on any one shift, the amount of these supplies needed Blankets 16 should be enough to care for an anticipated 200 injured. Basins, approximately 9" x 6" x 2".. 1 c. The following lists show recommended First Aid supplies Applicators, wood—box— 1 based on (1) establishments without a full-time physician and Paper, toilet—roll— 2 (2) establishments with a full-time physician. These recom Cots 4 mendations include minimum quantities of a limited number of Pads, heating, chemical 4 items; additions or changes may be required, depending on the Pads, heating chemical, refills 4 availability of supplies and future developments in the medical Flashlight 2 program. Battery, flashlight (to be replaced (1) Without a full-time physician in attendance; quantities every 6 months) 4 per 100 anticipated injured persons: Battery, lantern 2 Buckets 1 Items Amount Cans, Corrugated, with cover, 10-gals. 1 Stretchers, Army type 8 Scissors, bandage 6 (a). #Salt and Sodium Citrate should be mixed carefully and Alcohol, ethyl, denatured, 1 pint 2 stocked in individual packets according to the following Organic mercurial compound, 1 pint 2 measurements: Sheeting, (unbleached cotton), 1 yard 1 level teaspoonful salt width—cut into strips 36" x 36" .. 50 yds. 1/2 level teaspoonful sodium citrate 28 29 slight or non-existent. Thus arrangements should be made (b). The mixture should be carefully measured. Improper through the local Civil Defense Director for the automatic measurement could cause nauseousness or diarrhea. After attack, movement of any medical supplies stored and not needed for the mixture should be added to one quart of water, stirred to immediate use within a plant to pre-designated medical depots solution, and given to persons in shock from wounds or burns. or hospitals in the local Civil Defense Zone for distribution to Hive as much of the solution as the patient will drink. areas where they may be needed after an attack. For this pur (2) With a full-time physician in attendance; quantities pose, each plant building should have at all times at least one per 100 anticipated injured persons: individual available who has immediate access to stored medical (All of List 1 above and in addition:) supplies. Standing instructions should be given that the stored Items Amount supplies are to be transported to a specified medical installa tion if an attack occurs and plant personnel have suffered no Scissors, surgical, Mayo, 5y2" straight 1 major injuries. If the plant cannot guarantee 24-hour availa Scissors, surgical, Mayo, 5Vi" curved 1 bility and drivers and vehicles for this purpose, the plant Medi Forceps, hemostatic, straight 2 cal Officer should arrange with the local Civil Defense Director Forceps, hemostatic, curved 2 to assign volunteers to perform this function. Vehicles assigned Forceps, tissue, smooth, 5Vk" 1 to this purpose should be furnished with the necessary vehicle Forceps, tissue, rat-toothed, 5y2".... 1 identification placard issued by the local Civil Defense organi Retractor, general operating, nested, zation. one 8y2", one 8y2"—set— 1 Handles, knife, No. 3 1 7. Temporary Morgue Blades, No. 10—package of 6— 2 After arrangements have been made for the evacuation of Forceps, tongue-holding, 7" 1 litter cases and walking injured, the bodies of the dead should Tube, breathing (airway), hard rub be removed to a Temporary Morgue by personnel of the Plant ber or metal (adult) 1 Medical Service. The Morgue area should be selected by the plant Tube, breathing (airway), hard rub Medical Officer at the same time he selects his first aid stations. ber or metal (child) 1 The Medical Officer will also arrange for the final disposition of Procaine and epinephrin, bottle of 100 1 the dead in accordance with local Civil Defense procedure. Detergent, surgical, G-ll, 1 pint ... 4 Phenobarbital, iy2 grain, 100 1 Sutures, No. 1 tubes 4 Silk, 40"—package— 4 Needles, suture, curved 3 Needles, suture, No. 1 3 Syringes, hypodermic, Luer. lOcc ... 2 Syringes, hypodermic, Luer. 2cc .... 4 Needles, hypodermic, 25-gauge, y2".. 12 Needles, hypodermic, 20-gauge, IV2"'• 6 Needles, local anaesthetic, 22-gauge, 3" 3 d. In the event of an atomic attack, medical supplies will be preciotis commodities in an attacked area. It is logical to assume that a majority of plant buildings and facilities in a large city may not suffer damage, and injuries to their personnel may be 31 80 4. Duties a. The following specific functions within the plant are the responsibility of a plant Police Service: VI (1) Traffic Control—Observation and direction of all per EMERGENCY POLICE SERVICE sonnel and vehicular passage through the authorized entrances and exits to plant property and on roads 1. The plant Emergency Police Service is under the com within same, with priority given to plant or outside mand of the plant Police Chief, who is responsible for the organ fire, police, ambulance, rescue and similar emergency ization, training, discipline and administration of the service as services. desired by the plant. (2) Panic Prevention—Immediate and strict enforcement 2. Police Chief of all measures necessary to control mass action, such The Police Chief preferably should be a former police officer as unauthorized evacuation of the plant premises by of a community or industrial facility, qualified for command. irresponsible personnel. It is to be noted that such po It is advisable that he be able-bodied and capable of long hours tential mob hysteria may be induced by pre-attack of strenuous duty, available during all normal work hours, and alarms as well as by post-attack conditions. on call at all other times. (3) Employee and Visitor Identification—Processing all personnel entering and leaving the plant in the inter 3. Organization ests of such security measures as may be determined a. In general, it has been found desirable that an Emer as necessary by the size and location of the installa gency Police Service should be established in the ratio of one tion and the nature of its products. These measures police officer for every 50 employees. Existing plant guard or may take the form of identifying badges, finger prints, detective services may, of course, be continued and expanded as separate entrances and parking spaces for employees necessary to form the police section of a plant protection unit, and visitors, etc. being given extra training to meet the special disaster condi (4) Safeguarding Valuable and Classified Items—These tions of an atomic attack. may include records, formulae, specifications, materi b. Large establishments, spread over a wide area or in many als, and precision or special instruments and machines, buildings, will normally require a more elaborately detailed whose safety would not only be of prime importance organization and chain of command with subordinate units spe in a disaster, but is a continuing responsibility under cifically trained for and assigned to such special duties as traffic normal conditions. control, employee identification, processing of plant visitors, panic control, safeguarding of classified material, etc. In all cases of (5) Plant Guard and Patrol—Regular and spot-check pa emergency, the Police Service functions in close coordination trols and inspections of the entire plant on a 24-hour with the other protective services. basis. These rounds should be arranged to cover the interior and exterior of all important buildings, gates, c. Liaison between plant Police Services and local Police De fences and yards. Roving and fixed-post guards should partments and Civil Defense organizations is highly important in be used as occasion warrants. establishing joint traffic and evacuation procedures to cover Civil Defense emergency contingencies arising from plant or (6) Protection against Looting—The usual protective mea community disasters. In the interests of complete cooperation sures against unlawful entry and the apprehension of it is also desirable that the plant Police Service be afforded, any unauthorized persons found within the plant area insofar as may be practical, opportunity to observe and partici should generally offer adequate protection in the pre- pate in such phases of the training and instruction of the local attack period. The confused conditions which will pre police department as apply to plant duties. vail following any attack, whether or not any local 32 33 damage has resulted, present a much more serious loot ing problem. In such cases, police guards cannot afford to temporize with any person caught looting, and should effect necessary arrests immediately. VII 5. Sabotage PUBLIC INFORMATION SERVICE a. In the pre-attack period generally, it is to be anticipated 1. Plant employees must be kept constantly informed on all that various instances of real or fancied espionage or sabotage matters pertaining to the establishment and maintenance of activities among plant personnel will come to the attention of plant defense, and their parts in it. Similarly, the dissemination the Plant Police, either by report or through direct observation. of selected informative data relative to a plant protection pro All such instances are immediately reported to the Plant Police gram be extended to include plant stockholders and customers, Chief, and in turn to the Plant Coordinator; these reports are and the public officials and residents of the community in which confidential. the plant is located. Only through such educational efforts will b. If there appears to be a sound basis for any report, the it be possible for a Plant Protection Unit to obtain the complete incident is reported immediately for further action to the nearest understanding and cooperation of all concerned in the plant pro field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as required tection program. The preparation and continuing execution of by Presidential Proclamation, July 24, 1950. Should the plant be this information campaign is considered the responsibility of the under contract to the Federal government, the incident is also Public Information Service of the Plant Protection Unit. reported to tho representative of the Armed Forces having juris 2. Public Information Officer diction of the plant. It is recommended that the plant manage ment make no attempt to effect any independent detailed investi The Public Information Service is directed by the Public gation of such incidents. Information Officer. This official preferably should be the plant's regular director of public relations, advertising manager, house c. In cases of post-attack sabotage, the Plant Police Chief organ editor, or a qualified individual holding the nearest equiv should take immediate steps to minimize the damage and as alent position in the plant. If there is no such person in the semble all data concerned with the occurrence, including names, organization, it is the responsibility of the Plant Coordinator to addresses and statements of witnesses, if any. This material ac direct the public information program. companied by a full report of the situation should be forwarded without delay to the local police or F.B.I, representatives. 3. Organization 6. Equipment The Public Information Officer should be provided with a staff Members of the Police Service should, if possible, be furnished of assistants adequate for the proper functioning of the service. with distinctive and functional uniforms and insignia and carry Depending upon the size and character of the plant and the the following equipment: Nightstick, whistle, pencil, notebook number of its personnel, this staff should include one or more and flashlight. In occasional instances it may be necessary or special writers, artists, photographers, and mimeograph and advisable for some or all of the Police Service to carry firearms. multigraph operators. Appropriate office space near the Control Individuals so equipped are thoroughly and continuously trained Room should be reserved for the Public Information Service. in the proper care and use of such weapons. A strict check will 4. Duties naturally be maintained at all times on the issuance, return and storage of the weapons and ammunition. a. The plant Public Information program is usually assigned the following primary objectives: (1) to condition employees to understand, accept and sup port the industrial defense program; (2) to impress employees with the fact that their plant is 34 taking every precaution to protect them from the among its personnel; these reports should be forwarded to the effects of A-bomb attack; local Civil Defense Director for release to news agencies, etc. It (3) to improve community relations through public sup is extremely desirable that there be no independent issuance of port of the Civil Defense program; news releases from plant Information Service directly to public (4) to reassure stockholders that effective steps are being sources of information without prior clearance by the informa taken to protect the corporation's physical assets from tion representatives of the regularly established Civil Defense the effects of atomic attack; authorities. (5) to demonstrate the company's willingness to support d. Another important post-attack responsibility of the plant the national defense effort; Public Information Service could logically include the dissemina (6) to help avert panic during an attack and restore public tion within the plant of such continuing bulletins on the pro morale afterwards. gressive recovery situation as may be calculated to allay the mental distress and anxiety of the surviving plant personnel. b. To most effectively develop public relations in connection with plant protection activities, these specific measures are suggested: (1) keeping employee house organ supplied with informa tion; (2) supplying newsworthy information to local newspapers either by press releases or by informal telephone calls, emphasizing material which can be developed into fea ture stories; (3) posting appropriate notices on bulletin boards; (4) keeping public information officer of the local Civil Defense organization advised of interesting develop ments at the plant and continuing status of plant pro tection program; (5) sending summary copy of defense plans to trade asso ciation ; (6) assisting local Civil Defense program by participating in public meetings, and television and radio programs. c. As quickly as possible after an attack in which a plant escapes unharmed, the plant Public Information Service should obtain, by prearrangement with the local Civil Defense office, all available data on the exact location of Ground Zero, extent of damaged area, casualties, progress of salvage and rescue opera tions, and other information appropriate for dissemination to the local plant personnel. In the event that a plant is damaged, the Public Information Section should be prepared to obtain from the Plant Coordinator when and if possible, continuing re ports of the extent of the damage to the plant and the casualties 37 ft uel should be constant and thorough. It is advised that this training be accomplished with the aid of the local Civil Defense experts in such work, under realistically simulated disaster con VIII ditions. Rescue Service members who can arrange to do so will RESCUE SERVICE find it highly advantageous to enroll in one of the courses given 1. The function of the Rescue Service is to remove personnel at regular intervals by the State Rescue School. For further de from the wreckage of demolished or damaged structures or tailed information on these courses, apply directly to: The Direc vehicles. tor, Rescue Training School, New York State Division of Safety, 17 Elk Street, Albany 7, New York. 2. Rescue Chief b. Following their extrication from confinement, it may safely The Rescue Chief should be thoroughly familiar with the be assumed that many rescued individuals will be in need of theory and practice of excavation, construction, tunneling and immediate treatment for shock, burns, fractures, and open rigging techniques, and be capable of applying them to plant wounds, pending professional attention by the plant medical per rescue operations. A high degree of physical fitness is an essen sonnel, or upon removal to a local Civil Defense. Emergency tial qualification for this position. Hospital. It is therefore recommended that all members of the Rescue Service be qualified in basic first-aid techniques, includ 3. Organization ing the transportation of litter cases and the ambulatory a. The personnel of the Kescue Service usually is formed into wounded. Such training is included in the curriculum of tin- teams of such number, size and versatility of operation as the State Rescue School (see above), but persons unable to attend Chief may direct, dependent upon the size of the plant. Such the school should enroll in one of the regular First Aid courses, teams are considered to be interchangeable in whole or in part as may be arranged through the local Civil Defense headquarters. at the discretion of the Chief. 5. Equipment b. It is desirable that extreme care be exercised to recruit the Rescue Service insofar as possible from individuals possessing Recommended equipment of Rescue Service teams includes: abilities specially applicable to the service, such as equipment ropes, pulleys, chains, hooks, picks, axes, crowbars, wood and operators, welders, cutters, carpenters, riggers, and construction metal saws, acetelyne torches, litters, electric flash and flood and demolition engineers. lights, and other pertinent facilities. Large industrial organiza tions which may possess bulldozers, tractors, cranes or dump c. Rescue work is a technique requiring judgment and skill, trucks, will naturally first make them available for required use and the morale of the plant population is directly affected by the by their own Rescue teams, but thereafter should arrange to adequacy of the Rescue Service. Employees should have every place such equipment (including operating personnel) at the dis confidence that in the event they are caught in damaged build posal of their local Civil Defense organizations. ings or trapped beneath debris, the Rescue Service will get them out. If Rescue Service teams are properly trained and have proper equipment, many uninjured persons or casualties trapped in smashed buildings will be saved. 4. Duties and Training a. As soon as possible after a plant has suffered bomb dam age, it is considered the responsibility of the Rescue Service to undertake the location and liberation of persons trapped in the debris of the explosion. In such work there can be no compro mise with competence, and practical training of Rescue person- 38 39 operational groups: Floor Wardens, Room Wardens, Stair War dens, Shelter Wardens. IX 4. Duties WARDEN SERVICE The personnel of the Warden Service should be charged with the following specific responsibilities: 1. The plant Warden Service is concerned primarily with safe guarding life and property, in that order, and should be organ a. Floor Wardens: ized on the basis of one warden to every 50 to 125 plant (1) Be familiar with layout of floor to which assigned, all employees, depending upon local conditions. Additional wardens vital services thereon, and plans for the orderly move may be needed for groups including or composed of elderly or ment of persons thereon. physically handicapped persons. Wardens may be of either sex (2) Know the number of persons in each room on the floor. and should be selected with great care. To the survivors of a Provide assistance for persons who need special care. disaster, the warden will frequently be the sole remaining physi Be familiar with locations of, and routes to, shelters cal symbol of salvation; as such, it is obviously essential that a and shelter zones, and direct personnel thereto. warden possess mature judgment, a calm temperament, absolute dependability in a crisis, and the faculty to exert a quieting (3) Supervise activities of Room Wardens, Stair Wardens influence on others who may be laboring under intense mental and Messengers assigned to the floor. and bodily distress. Wardens should be on duty during all hours (4) Be instructed in panic control and able to command of plant operation. the respect of all personnel in the area in order to pre vent panic during emergency. 2. Chief Warden (5) Be prepared to shut off vital services when so author The Warden Service operates under the direction of a Chief ized. After Room Wardens have reported that all per Warden, who is responsible for its organization and training. sonnel have left the floor for shelter area, to so inform The desired qualifications for a Chief Warden should include the Plant Coordinator and seek shelter in such places former experience as a plant superintendent, foreman or depart as will not limit or restrict observation. ment head, and ability to set and maintain high standards of (6) In the event of fire, take immediate action to extin leadership and emotional stability. The Chief Warden is always guish it and notify Plant Coordinator. considered available during normal employment hours and on (7) After attack return to floor, survey for damage and call at all other times. report conditions to Control Center. 3. Organization a. The Chief Warden should maintain, in the Control Room, b. Room Wardens: a complete roster of all regular occupants of the plant building (1) Supervise a particular room or several rooms, depend or buildings, including location by department, home address ing upon the number of personnel in each room. and telephone, age, physical handicaps if any, blood type, reli (2) Maintain a roster of personnel in each room. gious preference, and name and address of nearest of kin. Rec (3) See that all room personnel are familiar with the alert ords should also be kept of vehicles owned by the plant or its signals and know the location of their own shelter or personnel which can be made available for evacuation, transpor shelter zone. tation or ambulance service. Floor plans indicating the location (4) On the Red alert the Floor Warden closes the windows of the rooms, exits, elevators, fire-fighting equipment, first-aid and directs all personnel in the room or rooms to their rooms nnd equipment, rescue or similar tools, should be main designated shelter areas. After the last person has left tained in the Control Room. the room, he checks roster to be certain that all are b. A complete Warden Service may include the following 41 40 accounted for, closes the door, and accompanies per (9) Stimulate morale in shelter or shelter zone by com sonnel to the prescribed shelter or shelter zone. munity singing, games, etc. (5) Provide assistance to personnel in need of special care. e. One of the most important advance duties of all branches (6) Prevent panic within each room. of the Warden Service should be to emphasize to plant employ (7) After all personnel have left room for shelter, inform ees the desirability of knowing how to help themselves as much the Floor Warden and proceed to shelter unless as as possible in an emergency, thereby materially expediting post- signed to other duty. attack relief and recovery. c Stair Wardens: 5. Evacuation The Warden Service assumes charge of plant evacuation if (1) Assigned in sufficient number along the routes to shel such action becomes necessary. Evacuation, based on local plant, ter areas, on stairways, and at all exits and entrances. conditions only, is ordered by the Plant Coordinator; in the (2) Keep personnel moving in orderly manner to shelter event that evacuation of the entire area in which the plant is areas. Running, shoving and pushing must be pre located is required, such orders will come through the appropri vented at all costs. ate civil or military authorities to the Plant Coordinator, who (3) Prevent personnel from leaving building or going else forwards them to the Chief Warden for execution. In either in where than to shelter areas. stance the entire Warden Service should exercise guidance and (4) Request assistance of Floor Wardens and Room War control of all plant personnel in transit from their several sta dens, if necessary. tions to the street, where the personnel will be placed in charge (5) After clearing post, notify the Floor Warden and pro of Civil Defense wardens. ceed to shelter. 6. Equipment d. Shelter Wardens: Safety helmets, whistles, heavy gloves, large flashlights and (1) Assigned to every shelter, shelter zone, and other extra batteries, first-aid kits, notebooks and pencils, heavy shoes, previously designated locations. and sturdy outer clothing or coveralls are recommended as (2) Before attack assure that the shelter is properly equipment for all Wardens, and should be readily available to posted and that all essential equipment has been them in such variety and quantity as may be possible. checked. If any of this material is lacking, the Warden should replace it if possible, or should report the lack of such equipment to the Chief Warden. (3) Maintain a roster of all occupants of the shelter or shelter zone. (4) Check shelter exits, to be certain they are usable and clearly marked. (5) Know the location of nearest toilet and of nearest First Aid Station. (6) Maintain order in the shelter or shelter zone. (7) Observe any indication of nervous reaction and take necessary action to prevent panic. (8) Summon assistance when necessary to subdue and re move personnel suffering from panic or hysteria. 42 43 operations. The personnel should preferably consist of individu als whose prior training or present employment is related to the welfare work to be performed under disaster conditions as noted below. WELFARE SERVICE 6. Duties 1. Inevitably, an atomic bomb disaster will immediately im The work of the Plant Welfare Service will include a va pose a serious welfare problem on the stricken area. Individual riety of duties as welfare in civil defense is a many-sided oper survivors will need to be supplied in greater or less degree with ation. Where the size of the organization justifies, the members food, financial aid, lodging, clothing, counsel or advice, infor of the Welfare Division should be organized into subordinate mation about their families, and similar services which are es groups under supervisors who will be responsible for the follow sential for the restoration and maintenance of civil morale in ing operations: critical emergencies. (1) Feeding—This will be a major welfare operation at a 2. It is recommended that every large plant organize a Wel time when employees may not be able to return to their fare Service as an integral part of its Plant Protection unit. This homes or get their meals at the usual places. All plant feed would be headed by a Welfare Director assisted by such selected ing facilities and personnel should be included in a plan that plant personnel as may be required. can operate to feed maximum numbers, around the clock, 3. Small industrial facilities will probably find it impractical under conditions which may require improvisation of equip to establish complete welfare services, but they should appoint ment. Plans should include the feeding of the homeless in special Welfare Representatives who will arrange for the pro the neighborhood of the plant if this becomes necessary. vision of disaster requirements through liaison with the welfare (2) Emergency Lodging—Supervisory staff should be ap divisions of the regular Civil Defense agencies in the local pointed and facilities earmarked for the temporary lodging communities. of the maximum number of employees and other homeless persons. Full use should be made of the plant equipment in 4. Welfare Director the form of tents, shelters, cots, blankets, etc., and plans The qualifications for a plant Welfare Director should include made for the rapid procurement of further requirements. familiarity with normal welfare programs and a knowledge of the welfare potentialities of the plant. An Assistant Welfare (3) Emergency Clothing—The destruction and possible Director should also be appointed to serve as an alternate for contamination of clothing in atomic disaster will require the the Director inasmuch as there should be an executive officer of distribution of minimum essential garments. The Plant Wel this division available or on call at all times. Both of these in fare Service should include this operation in its plan either dividuals should take one of the courses in Defense Welfare by direct action or by arrangement with the local Defense Administration conducted by the local Civil Defense office. Welfare organization. (4) Individual and Family Service—Financial Assistance 5. Organization —Employees will have many complex and disturbing per For assistance in organizing any plant welfare program, the sonal, family and financial problems to face after a disaster. Welfare Director should consult with the Chief of Defense Wel Many will require advice and financial assistance before fare Services of the local office of Civil Defense, and plan to co they will be able to return to effective employment. The operate with him during the emergency, coordinating the plant's Plant Welfare Service should plan to use the resources of welfare activities with those of the community. The size of the the plant and to maintain close liaison with the local Chief Plant Welfare Service should be related to the number of em of Defense Welfare Services who is responsible for providing ployees and to the space and facilities available for welfare these services in the community. 44 45 (5) Registration and Inquiry—A frantic search for infor mation about the fate or location of relatives will follow an attack unless plans are made to supply the information in an orderly way. The local office of Civil Defense has a APPENDIX Registration and Inquiry program that will be linked with Public Buildings and Institutions every locality in the State and with other States. The Plant Welfare Service should include staff who will be familiar 1. Emergency protective measures appropriate to office build with the Civil Defense procedures, will work with the local ings, educational and charitable institutions, churches, hospitals, authorities and will develop plans whereby the plant can theatres, museums, stores, public garages, convention halls, gather and disseminate information regarding its employees hotels, apartment houses, clubs, bus and airline terminals, rail and their families quickly and accurately. The records and road stations and restaurants may be administered on the same facilities of the Personnel Staff of the plant should be used general plan as those advised in behalf of industrial plants, in to the maximum in this Welfare operation. conjunction with the local Civil Defense organization. 2. However, due to the special conditions induced by the transient and fluid population peculiar to such facilities, no overall organization is possible beyond that available through the permanent staffs of the buildings concerned, under the direc tion of the building superintendent or manager. These groups should be assigned and trained in the manner suggested for in dustrial plants, with such revisions, deletions and expansions as may be deemed necessary to suit local individual situations. 3. The most important factor in such arrangements is the pro vision of adequate, properly located and equipped shelters with easy routes of access thereto, plainly marked and staffed with well-drilled employees. 46 47