Fairness and Equality in Electoral Redistributions in Australia
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Fairness and Equality in Electoral Redistributions in Australia Jenni Newton‐Farrelly 2013 1 2 Abstract This thesis is about drawing electoral districts in Australia. Its first task is to make an assessment of the various redistribution structures, process and criteria currently in use around the country, and it finds that Australia’s system for electoral redistributions – or redistricting, in US terminology – generally falls short of what parliaments intended. Australian parliaments have all committed to fair electoral competition and have delegated their redistribution powers to independent authorities to draw districts which will provide them with a level playing field. The thesis finds that the established model of redistributions employs a fair process but cannot provide any assurance that its maps will perform in a fair way. Australia’s redistribution authorities could be asked to complete their task. They have strong independent structures and a process which is transparent and accountable. What they lack is methodology. The second task of the thesis is to provide the core methodology required to draw an unbiased and responsive electoral map: a set of criteria; measures of party support, bias and responsiveness; and a standard to assess when a map is fair enough to be adopted. The thesis has already contributed to South Australia’s methodology and now brings together a generic set of tools for drawing fair electoral district maps. With the exception of several papers by Colin A. Hughes there has been little academic consideration in Australia of electoral redistributions or of the methodology questions which they raise. So the thesis is informed by an understanding of past and current redistributions in Australia and also draws on an understanding of redistricting in the United States where authority structures, process and methodology have been the subject of academic interest, party intrigue and court involvement for 50 years. The inherent challenges in drawing electoral maps are the same in both countries, and the relevance of US experience for Australia is shown by the fact that when South Australia’s authority adjusted its methodology in 2012 it was the state of New Jersey’s experience that was considered. The thesis argues that campaigns will always be important in shaping election outcomes. Therefore a redistribution authority cannot be required to generate a map which will guarantee that the party with majority support will win a majority of seats. But South Australia and New Jersey show that it can, and should, be required to provide a map which will give neither party an advantage going into a subsequent election and which will respond if voters change their support. 3 Acknowledgments This thesis has been copy‐edited by David Hudson in accordance with Swinburne University regulations. I am grateful to many people for their encouragement, willingness to share their knowledge, and practical assistance. I have been honoured to receive academic guidance from my supervisor Professor Brian Costar whose great enthusiasm for electoral matters is matched by his knowledge of the area. At the SA Parliament Research Library, Coral Stanley’s support and practical advice have been enormously appreciated. Financial assistance from the library’s scholarship fund made it possible for me to travel to the US twice, to attend the 2011 NCSL redistricting workshop and later in 2011 to study the New Jersey process. I am indebted to members of the academic community who have willingly shared their practical knowledge and insight, especially Dean Jaensch and Alan Rosenthal. I also thank Larry Bartels, Bruce E. Cain, John C. Courtney, Ron Levy, Geoffrey Lindell, Malcolm Mackerras, Louis Massicotte, Michael P. McDonald, Patrick Murray, Richard Morrill, Richard Niemi, Graeme Orr, David Redlawsk, Ingrid Reed, Ernest Reock and Alan Siaroff for their time and consideration. I acknowledge with gratitude the helpfulness of electoral commissioners and administrators, in particular, Andy Becker, David Gully, Michael Maley, Jane Peace, Paul Thornton‐Smith and Steve Tully. The willingness of those who are affected by redistributions, and those who advise them, to share some of their understanding was unexpected and is sincerely appreciated. I thank particularly Tom Bonier, Bill Castner, Royce Crocker, John Hill, Ian Hunter, Frank Parisi, Stephen Wade, Peter S. Wattson, Mitch Williams and Jay Webber. The kind assistance of many others deserves acknowledgment and I especially thank Sarah John for comments on the thesis, Deborah Mercer at the New Jersey State Library, and Scott Ewing, David Hudson and Grace Lee and her administration staff at the Swinburne Institute. On a personal level, I acknowledge a debt of gratitude to my family and friends, especially my John who believed I should take on this task. Frances, Judith, Peter, Alex and Heidi, Robyn and my colleagues at the SA Parliament Research Library believed that I could manage it, even when I wasn’t sure. Fellow‐student Carol Putland shared the journey. I cannot tell you all how much I appreciate your support. 4 Declaration I declare that this thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award to me of any other degree or diploma. I declare that to the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text. I declare that this thesis is purely my own work. Signed: Date: 5 Table of contents Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………………………..3 Acknowledgments …………………………………………………………………………………..4 Declaration ………………………………………………………………………………………………5 List of tables and figures ………………………………………………………………………….7 Abbreviations and equivalent terms ……………………………………………………..9 Preface ………………………………………………………………………………………………….11 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………….14 Chapter one: Redistribution authority structures ………………………………….30 Chapter two: The redistribution process ……………………………………………….53 Chapter three: Ensuring district equality ……………………………………………….94 Chapter four: The traditional criteria …………………………………………………..133 Chapter five: Performance criteria and standards in New Jersey …………165 Chapter six: Performance criteria and standards in South Australia …….201 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………………..245 Appendix: Australian redistribution legislation ……………………………………248 References ………………………………………………………………………………………….269 6 Tables and figures Table 1: Federal elections and redistributions of federal divisions by cause, 1977 to 2012 Table 2: State and territory redistributions by cause, 1977 to 2012 Table 3: Tolerance at the time of redistribution and actual variation from quota, most recent redistributions Table 4: Equality of enrolments at the time of federal elections: percentage of divisions with electoral enrolments within 5 per cent of the average, 1990 to 2010 Table 5: Equality of enrolments at the time of federal elections: Gini coefficients for electoral enrolments within each jurisdiction, 1990 to 2010 Table 6: Equality of enrolments at the time of state and territory elections: percentage of districts with enrolments within 5 per cent of the average, 1996 to 2012 Table 7: Equality of enrolments at the time of state and territory elections: Gini coefficients for electoral enrolments within each jurisdiction, 1996 to 2012 Table 8: Equality of enrolments at the time of state and territory elections, 1996 to 2012: number of seats with enrolments that were too low or too high, by which party won them Pendulum: Results of the South Australian state election of 20 March 2010 Table 9: Sources of ALP under‐representation, SA House of Assembly, 1944 to 1965 Table 10: Sources of ALP under‐representation, SA House of Assembly elections, 1993 to 2010 Table 11: Assessment of the 2010 map for geographic bias and fairness at 50:50, applying state election results from 1993 to 2010 to the 2010 districts Table 12: Statewide swings at SA House of Assembly elections, 1993 to 2010, by sector Graph 1: Holding the level of support in 1993, 1997, 2002, 2006 and 2010 constant at a statewide two party preferred vote of 50 per cent Table 13: Uniformity of statewide swings at SA House of Assembly elections, 1993 to 2010 Table 14: Swings in marginal districts, SA House of Assembly elections, 1993 to 2010 Table 15: Bias and fairness at 50:50: alternative assessment options applied to the current districts 7 Table 16: Bias and fairness at 50:50: results from the 2010 SA Legislative Council ballot within the House of Assembly districts current in 2010. Table 17: Swings in metropolitan and rural districts, SA House of Assembly, 1977 to 2010 8 Abbreviations 2PP two party preferred AEC Australian Electoral Commission EARC Electoral and Administrative Review Commission EDBC Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission JSCEM Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters JSCER Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform NCSL National Conference of State Legislatures (US) Equivalent Terms Australia United States apportionment apportionment electoral roll register of voters formal vote valid vote redistribution redistricting (New Jersey also uses the term ‘apportionment’) two party preferred vote two party vote 9 10 Preface The thesis focuses firmly on the redistribution of electoral districts, and takes Australia’s political and electoral systems as given. It accepts that Australia’s parliamentary elections are contests between the two major parties for government as much as contests to elect individual representatives to