Paper ID #27371

Education and Building Capacity for Improving Resilience of Coastal Infras- tructure

Prof. Ismael Pagan-Trinidad,´ University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez Campus

Ismael Pagan-Trinidad,´ Professor (1982-date) and Chair (1994-date), Department of Civil Engineering and Surveying, University of Puerto Rico at Mayaguez¨ (UPRM); Principal Investigator/Program Man- ager of the Educational and Research Internship Program (ERIP) under the UPRM-ERDC (US Army Corp of Engineers) Partnership Agreement (1994-date) awarded the ”Examples of Excelencia in Educa- tion” award in Graduate Category-2018 by Excelencia in Education organization; Principal Investigator of the Education for Improving Resilience of Coastal project under the Coastal Resilience Center of Excellence (CRC) sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (2016-2020); Cofounder and Member of the Latin American and Caribbean Consortium of Engineering Education (LACCEI). He earned a BS in Civil Engineering, MS in Civil Engineering (Environmental) at the University of Puerto Rico at Mayaguez,¨ and conducted PhD (ABD) studies in Hydrosystems at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1978-82). His education, research and service interests are in hydrosystems, hydrol- ogy, hydraulics, urban drainage, education, and resilience of built and natural infrastructure. Dr. Ricardo R Lopez P.E., University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez

Dr. Lopez-Rodriguez,´ Professor, Department of Civil Engineering and Surveying, University of Puerto Rico at Mayaguez.¨ He is Associate Director for Graduate Studies and Director of the Civil Infrastructure Research Center. Co-Principal Investigator of the Education for Improving Resiliency of Coastal Infras- tructure project under the Coastal Resilience Center of Excellence (CRC) sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (2016-2020); He received his PhD in Civil Engineering from the University of Illinois- Urbana-Champaign in 1988, his scientific publications include 41 publications in refereed journals and proceedings. He has participated as member of the teams for damage evaluation caused by earthquakes in Mexico City, Mexico; California, USA; Puerto Plata, RD; and Chile. He has conducted research projects supported by National Science Foundation (NSF), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), among others. He is member of the Earthquake Engineer- ing research Institute (EERI), the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), the American Concrete Institute (ACI), and is secretary of the Earthquake Commission of the Engineer’s Professional Association of PR. Ernesto Luis Diaz MEM, Puerto Rico Climate Change Council

Coastal and Marine scientist. Director of the Puerto Rico Coastal Management Program and coordi- nator of the Puerto Rico Climate Change Council. Served as Administrator of the Natural Resources Administration. Specializes in coastal dynamics, coastal hazards mitigation and nearshore environments processess assessments. Served as Regional Lead Author of the US Caribbean chapter of fourth National Climate Assessment Report ( NCAR-Ch:20). Has published extensively on coastal issues, sea level rise, climate vulnerability assessments and adaptation.

c American Society for Engineering Education, 2019

Education and Building Capacity for Improving Resilience of Coastal Infrastructure

Abstract

Coastal environments in the Caribbean and around the World host communities and critical infrastructure that are exposed to extreme risks generated by natural multi hazards, namely, floods (storm surges and swells, tides, waves, rivers, urban drainage, tsunamis), winds (hurricane), earthquakes, instabilities (erosion, sedimentation, liquefaction, ), corrosive environment, and many combinations of those. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established the need to protect and upgrade the state of the nation’s critical infrastructure to a more resilient and sustainable state.

The paper will present the outcomes of the educational project sponsored by the DHS to help improve the resilience of coastal infrastructure by means of education and building capacity. The goal of the project is to educate engineering students, university faculty and staff in principles of resilience for both built and natural coastal infrastructure through formal education. The project also helps educate members of the community by teaching first responders and other professionals through informal education through conferences, workshops, seminars, lectures and short courses in resilient coastal infrastructure. Educators also work with partners who focus on resilience of coastal and island communities. All the island of Puerto Rico is considered coastal environment. Over 400,000 people live within 1 km of coasts and 44 municipalities with over 60% of the island population are at the coast. A tremendous amount of the critical civil infrastructure like airports, seaports, highways, water and wastewater, power, and communication infrastructure are located at the coastal communities. Puerto Rico before and after Hurricanes Irma and María has been the vivid field setting of the project. Billions of dollars of Federal and Commonwealth funds will be invested to enable recovery. As Puerto Rico aims to be resilient recovery efforts’ investment must integrate the best science and knowledge available. Capacity building to all the sectors in resilient infrastructure is achieved through formal and informal education.

The project aims to teach end-users about the effects of natural hazards on coastal infrastructure, conditions of existing structures and rehabilitation alternatives to mitigate future damage and potential risks. Education focuses on infrastructure performance before, during and after hazard events and includes courses on the causes and effects of riverine and coastal flooding, storm surge, ocean waves, tsunami loads, earthquakes and extreme winds. It is expected to create pipelines for students and professionals to move into the coastal infrastructure resilience field.

The paper addresses the needs for the community to better understand the stages of coastal infrastructure hazard prevention, preparedness, response and mitigation. The lessons learned regarding the impact of the hurricane to the island with emphasis on coastal environments and its infrastructure during the past, including the most recent catastrophic Hurricanes Irma and María in 2017, will be addressed.

Introduction

Natural and technological hazards have been the priority for federal and local government for the tremendous physical, economic, social and environmental impacts they bring the community. Climate change, weather modification and technological activities continuously increase the level of risk the community is exposed to. Special interest has been identified at coastal communities including the seashores and inland areas. For Caribbean Islands, like Puerto Rico, the whole Island activities are closely related and correlated to what happens in coastal communities.

Coastal environments in the Caribbean and around the World host communities and critical infrastructure that are exposed to extreme risks generated by natural multi hazards, namely, floods (storm surges and swells, tides, waves, rivers, urban drainage, tsunamis), winds (hurricane), earthquakes, soil instabilities (erosion, sedimentation, liquefaction, landslides), corrosive environment, and many combinations of those. The island of Puerto Rico has approximately 3.6 million of USA citizens who not only experienced Hurricanes Irma and María, but also are continuously exposed to high multi hazard hurricane risks. Figure 1 shows a satellite image of Hurricane María at the moment the eye wall made landfall on the Island.

Figure 1. Hurricane María made landfall over southeastern Puerto Rico as Category 4 Hurricane with 155 MPH. GOES 16 (NOAA)

Vulnerability of Infrastructure Facing Extreme Multi Hazard Events

There are multiple reasons why civil infrastructure fails when they are exposed to extreme events. The following are possible causes that must be taken into consideration for providing appropriate resilience to civil infrastructure.

Why infrastructure is vulnerable and fails? Because one or more of the following:

Construction without appropriate engineering design or inspection (informal construction): This refers to construction out of formal engineering design or inspection which have been a common practice in Puerto Rico in the past. Because these are neither

designed nor supervised, there is a high possibility these constructions do not withstand expected standard design events.

Obsolete or under designed: Appropriate and regulatory design standards are updated based on new knowledge and increase in safety requirements for new constructions. Many existing constructions may be obsolete to the actual standards, although they had been well designed under existing standards at that time. Outdated design codes, regulations or standards may be a source of structural weakness. A new updated construction code has been approved recently for Puerto Rico considering lessons learned from Hurricane María data.

Improper design, operation or construction: There are instances that either the structural design, loading pattern or structure operation are inappropriate or the construction is not done according to plans and specifications.

Lack of appropriate maintenance: Although many constructions are designed and built appropriately, its aging and deterioration of materials with time (e.g., corrosion) and lack of maintenance make the structure obsolete.

Improperly loaded or operated: Structures are analyzed and designed to withstand a particular load distribution. If structures are not loaded as expected, structures are in risk of failure. Overloads with forces and stresses that surpass the design capacity are prone to failure.

Fatigue: The materials in structures exposed to dynamic loads may be exposed fatigue of the material.

The experiences with historical extreme events and their consequences and impacts, must help develop more resilient infrastructure. As a guideline, Figure 2 shows a diagram that helps understand the creative process for developing or restoring resilient infrastructure. The process begins by identifying the expected event which may be a multi-hazard event. The event risk is defined by the probability to potential losses (e.g., loss of life, injuries, damaged infrastructure) caused by the magnitude and exposure of the event as a multi-hazard or individual hazard event on the community or a specific infrastructure element or system. Vulnerability is related to the lack of resistance or resilience of the exposed system. Therefore the risk of the specific infrastructure to the particular magnitude of the event was defined by de Ruiter et al. (2017) as:

Risk = f (hazard, exposure, vulnerability) (1)

The impact of any event will greatly depend on the level of preparedness. The community or individual identifies alternatives to prepare to withstand or avoid the effects of the extreme events. Mitigation alternatives to attenuate, minimize or avoid the impacts of the event are implemented with enough anticipation to face the event. Preparedness and mitigation alternatives include not only what is done before the event, but also what needs to be done during the event. Technologically sound and the state of best practices are expected to be implemented beforehand to provide more resisting and resilient design. Once the event happens, the infrastructure will be exposed to extremes stresses and its capacity is tested. Partial damages or even collapse may occur.

The level and robustness of the response is an essential part of the resilience process. The response state also requires well-orchestrated logistic management. Once the event is over, a strategic and well documented damage assessment is required. This damage assessment will help identify sources of new or different nature of vulnerabilities. The magnitude of the damages will help identify if the level of damages requires a disaster declaration by the government. Alternative recovery efforts should be planned ahead of time and be implemented as soon as possible to minimize amplification of damages. Recovery alternatives must focus on the objectives of reducing the level of risk and improving the level of target vulnerability with higher resilience. The state of engineering practice, codes and regulations, engineering methodologies and standards must be updated to the estate of

knowledge based on most recent events and confident projected risk scenarios in the future to achieve a higher level of resilience. Resiliency must be an objective. That means that seeking resilience is a continuous process which does not end. As the process progresses, resilience increases to a level of exposure to net zero damage target. When new extreme events occur, even if they have the same level of risk (which usually is a non-stationary process), a higher level of protection and a lower level of vulnerability must be achieved defining a new state of resilience. Achieving a net zero damage level might be unsustainable, but it should be the ultimate goal which has to be a tradeoff between resilience and sustainability. A new state of resilience is achieved through education and capacity building to all constitutes involved in the process.

(1) (8) (9) Expected Damages Recovery Event Assessment Process

(2) (10) (7) Risk Improved Response Hazard Resilience

(6) (11) (3) Occurrence Exposure Education of Event Capacity Building

(4) (5) (12) (1) Vulnerabilty Preparedness New State for Assessment Mitigation Expected Event

Figure 2. Creative Cycle for Resilient Design

Perspectives of Risks and Vulnerability Before and After Hurricane María

It is important to understand the level of risk and vulnerability the community or the infrastructure are exposed in order to take mitigation actions that can reduce the level of vulnerability and damages that the community should expect. By 1993 Palm and Hogson (1993) clearly stated the extent of the nature of the natural multi hazards in Puerto Rico as follows: “Puerto Rico faces natural hazards including hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, subsidence, and flooding. Although Puerto Ricans perceive themselves as highly vulnerable to these hazards, few have adopted mitigation measures except for mandatory insurance.” It was evident then, that being aware of the risk and vulnerability of natural events is not enough to be resilient.

With a series of hurricanes, tropical extreme weather events, and other coastal recurrent events,

Puerto Rico significantly improved in preparing contingency plans at different levels of the government, municipalities, and the community. Federal, state, private institutions and universities significantly became involved and improvements were evident. Some of those contingency plans addressed the natural and technological hazards of the community. As an example, the revision of the FEMA FIS studies and the corresponding digitized flood maps, new tsunami maps, and some drainage and flood control projects were among the advances in flood risk management initiatives.

Some other efforts have also been focusing on earthquakes, wind, and coastal community hazards. The Building Code in Puerto Rico (Junta de Planificación, 2015) included earthquake loads for design of buildings since 1968. It was in 1987 that the code was updated to earthquake loads similar to the 1985 Uniform Building Code and requirement for ductility of structural elements were incorporated. Since that date the code has been updated roughly every 10 years until the latest adoption of the 2018 International Building Code this year.

The wind loading in the 1987 code was equivalent to 110 mph wind velocity for working loads, with additional load factors for design of connections. After that the loading from ASCE 7 has been used until 2018 when the loads from the ASCE 7-2016 with additional micro zonation to account for topographic effects has been adopted.

There are two types of coastal construction setbacks in Puerto Rico. One of the setbacks is based on the delineation of the coastal public trust lands known locally as the maritime-terrestrial zone, which is defined at tidally influenced areas as the highest water mark (HWM) or areas subject to storm wave action at non-tidally influenced areas such as cliffs. In Puerto Rico all beaches (1,225) as well as all mangrove systems, coastal lagoons and primary dunes are public, therefore there should not be any non-water dependent private construction. However, there are hundreds of homes built at these hazard prone areas. In addition to the coastal public trust lands (HWM) a conservation easement of 20 meters (60 ft), parallel and adjacent to the maritime terrestrial zone is required for any development project. Puerto Rico’s Island-wide Use and Construction regulations also require a setback of 50 meters (150 ft) to develop a coastal lot. However, regulations allow for variations which in addition to illegal construction and lack of effective enforcement have resulted in higher population exposed to risks at residential and commercial buildings. The Puerto Rico Coastal Zone Management Program using US Census data and 2009 FEMA FIRM maps estimated that 524,469 people live in flood prone areas (14.9 % of the population) while 2.7% of the population (98,063 people) live at storm surge risk areas.

However, the frequent limitations of strict enforcement and implementation of approved mitigation plans, codes and regulations jointly with the financial limitations to implement mitigation plans significantly limits the level of outcomes of these initiatives. More importantly, the level preparedness at the household, municipality or state level for Hurricane Gorges, Irma and María proved to be insufficient.

Prior to Hurricane María, it was apparent that the community had a false sense of security, to the authors’ opinion, due to the frequent events which did constitute catastrophic impacts and were routinely resisted by the community and the infrastructure, with limited hurricane exceptions. Hurricanes Georges and Hortense did not exceed Category 2 and produced moderate damage to the infrastructure. None became near a category V hurricane neither in wind magnitude nor rainfall intensities. The community and the infrastructure resisted other less extreme events without major

problems.

After Hurricane María in 2017, a total change of perspective and priority at all levels of federal, state and municipal government, industry, institutions, communities and individuals was developed due to the catastrophic impact on the natural and built infrastructure. A major sense of urgency, awareness and a clear acknowledgement of the lack of understanding of the magnitude of the risk and vulnerability the Island is exposed ton was achieved at all levels. The University of Puerto Rico at Mayagüez reacted by engaging with participation and leadership in education, research, and service to help the buildup in resilience in the community.

Based on FEMA FIRM Maps 2005 and 2009 and Census 2010, most of the Puerto Rico population (48%) lived in 44 coastal municipalities out of a total of 78, it is logical that most of the economic and productive activity of an estimated GDP $105 billion by the Puerto Rico Planning Board, occurs within these spaces. There was 24% built-up lands to coastline (799 miles) ratio (DNR, 2017). Over half a million (14.8%) people lived in flood prone zones and near 100 thousand (2.7%) people lived in storm surge areas. In terms of infrastructure there was also near a quarter million structures within flood prone areas.

The Puerto Rico Coastal Zone Management Program conducted an analysis of the public infrastructure located within one (1) kilometer of the coast (Table 1).

Table 1. Summary of Relevant Puerto Rico Coastal Uses and Assets within One (1) Kilometer of the Coast.

Coastal Assets at risk Public and private infrastructure

Airports 11

PR Power generation plants 7 (5 Public - 2 Private)

PR Aqueducts and Sewers Authority 200 Km potable water infrastructure 260 Km sanitary infrastructure 28 waste water treatment plants

PR Industrial Development Company 81 Industrial Parks

Puerto Rico is highly vulnerable to coastal hazards and storm risks. Sixty one percent of the population live within one kilometer of the shoreline. Twenty four percent of the 799 miles of coastline are built up.and 60% of the 1,225 beaches experience moderate to severe erosion. Sea level has risen at a rate of 2.04 mm/yr on the North coast and 1.82 mm/yr (NOAA, MARCH 2019).

Figure 3 shows that a 2100 low moderate sea level rise scenario for Puerto Rico is estimated at 3 feet (1 meter) while the extreme scenarios is projected at 9-11 ft. Scenarios' ranges are associated to different global greenhouse gases emissions. The Puerto Rico Climate Change Council and the Puerto Rico Coastal Management Program have assessed social-ecological vulnerabilities for coastal communities, critical infrastructure, habitats and biodiversity under low intermediate and extreme scenarios. Sea level rise will severely exacerbate current erosion trends, floods and wave

attack. These sea level changes scenarios in association to extreme events such as hurricanes Irma and María (2017) two powerful category 5 and 4 hurricanes as well as Winter storm Riley in 2018 have proven to have devastating potential. New regulations as well as building codes need to seriously consider these scenarios. Construction near the shoreline must integrate adaptive and retrofit ready elements in order to be resilient. Professional development and formal education for engineers and architects must invite the use of innovative approaches to address these challenges. FEMA Coastal Construction manuals and USACE Engineering with Nature Atlas are two good places to start.

Figure 3. Sea Level Rise - (top) Observed sea level rise trends in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands reflect an increase in sea level of about 0.08 inches (2.0 mm) per year for the period 1962– 2017 for Puerto Rico and for 1975–2017 for the U.S. Virgin Islands. The bottom panels show a closer look at more recent trends from 2000 to 2017 that measure a rise in sea level of about 0.24 inches (6.0 mm) per year. Projections of sea level rise are shown under three different scenarios of Intermediate-Low (1–2 feet), Intermediate (3–4 feet), and Extreme (9–11 feet) sea level rise. The

scenarios depict the range of future sea level rise based on factors such as global greenhouse gas emissions and the loss of glaciers and ice sheets. Sources: NOAA NCEI and CICS-NC.

There are significant multi hazard challenges to the various sources of disaster risk and vulnerability in Puerto Rico and other Caribbean islands, namely: impacts to freshwater resources (rivers, lakes and aquifers) and associated infrastructure, sea level rise, as well as increased frequency of extreme events such as droughts, and more potent storms and hurricanes, storm surge and winter swells resulting in increased wave attack to coastal areas (Gould W.A. and E.L. Diaz et al., 2018).

There are needs to be satisfied for improving our resiliency for upcoming natural events in the future as follows:

Capacity building: Need for capacity building, education, awareness, and preparedness to not only develop a pipeline of professional but also to retrain professional into the homeland security enterprise to provide sustainable and resilient infrastructure.

Need for more effective response: Coordination and collaboration are essential for prompt and effective response and recovery

Island setting: Being an island presents accessibility and mobility (supply chain) constraints limit in significantly the supply chain of good and services,

Multi-hazard risk site: The Island has recurrent exposure to hurricane winds; storm surges, waves, tides; earthquakes (Martinez-Cruzado et al., 2018) and tsunamis; landslides/ mudflows/ soil subsidence; droughts; extreme rainfall events with subsequent riverine flash floods, urban and nuisance floods, corrosion; and ecological and environmental disturbances.

Other limitations and challenges that worsen the situation for Puerto Rico are the following:

● 1.7M people living in coastal communities, ● communities and municipalities poorly planned in steep/unstable slopes or in flat flood prone areas, ● overpopulated and population is badly distributed with limited planning process - about 1000 people/square mile, ● large number of residences and buildings weakly built with outdated codes or without codes at all (informal constructions), ● Increased level of vulnerability after María (landslides, floods, winds), ● economic hardship – lack of an emergency financial resources to access for recovery/adaptation, ● need for education, awareness and preparedness to mitigate hazards impact, and ● big challenges of coordination and collaboration for more effective response.

Historical extreme event records show that out of 27 major disasters and 8 emergencies declared by FEMA (2019) between 1956 and 2018, all but two (2) were caused by natural hazards related to extreme rainfall and wind events (floods, landslides, hurricanes, droughts, heavy rain).

Figure 4 shows an example of typical coastal communities at risk in Puerto Rico. Figure 5 shows historical hurricane paths within 60 nautical miles from the center of the Island.

Figure 4. Examples-Coastal Cities at Risk in Puerto Rico (adapted from Google Earth (2019))

Figure 5. Hurricane Tracks Nearby Puerto Rico 1899-2011 (Adopted from: http://ecoexploratorio.org/amenazas-naturales/inundaciones/inundaciones-en-puerto-rico/ )

Figure 6 shows all historical hurricane paths which dramatizes the level of opportunity the Island has of being exposed to tropical meteorological events, in this case, hurricanes.

Figure 5. Historical Tropical Storms Tracks (http://2010-2014.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/images/2012/august/noaa-hurricane- tracker.jpg)

The level of economic resilience of the Island has been compromised for a long time. The most recent economic and financial restrictions in the Island tremendously limited the capacity for preparedness, response and recovery of any natural or technological disaster. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) published in its prevention website the Puerto Rico Population and Economic Indicators as shown in Table 2. As of 2014 the Gross Savings and the Total Reserves were in zero. The same source also indicated that the most costly risk has been due to wind related events, namely, hurricanes. Table 2. Population and Economic Indicators 2014 - Puerto Rico (https://www.preventionweb.net/countries/pri/data/ )

Table 3 shows the probabilistic risk for Puerto Rico as the average annual loss by hazard and the probable maximum loss by return period. The most significant loss in Puerto Rico due to natural hazards has been due to extreme winds with an expected average annual loss of near $ 4,000 million and the probable maximum loss (PML) of near $100,000 million for a 100 year return period, a number close to hurricane Maria’s loss estimates of near $94,000 million.

Table 3. Probabilistic Risk-Puerto Rico (http://www.preventionweb.net/countries/pri/data/)

Hurricane María and Impacts on PR Infrastructure

María began as a tropical a depression but developed within an 18 hour period from Category 1 into a Category 5 hurricane on September 18, 2017 while traveling from Windward Islands into Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017. Total losses were estimated in about 94 billion US dollars in damages. The storm winds persisted for over 36 hours and accumulated between 6 inches and up to 37.8 inches of point rainfall in a 48 hours period as shown Figure 7. This torrential rainfall triggered landslides, accelerated surface and channel erosion, and extreme floods in the majority of principal river basins in the Island.

Figure 7. Hurricane María 48-hour Accumulated Spatial Rainfall Distribution as estimated by NOAA (2018a)

Figure 8 shows the maximum wind gusts measured in the weather network in Puerto Rico. Most of the NOAA weather stations during the hurricane did not survive. The National Weather Service

reported the maximum recorded wind gust in various stations before failing. The maximum recorded wind gust speed was 137 mph at Culebra Island station. NOAA (2018b) reported a maximum wind speed based on estimated satellite data of 150 knots (170 mph) and a landfall maximum speed of 135 mph on Puerto Rico near Yabucoa, Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017 as a strong category four hurricane. Considering the Island topography and orographic effects, NOAA has expressed that most certainly Category 5 winds were experienced at elevated locations.

Figure 8. Maximum Wind Gusts Measure in Puerto Rico (NOAA, 2018b) https://www.weather.gov/images/sju/Huracanes/Maria/Winds_HMaria.JPG

Figure 9 shows the maximum storm surge during Hurricane María. According to FEMA (2018b), it was estimated that the storm surge inundation (above ground level) varied between 1-3 feet at the North-West part of the Island from Isabela to Ponce and Vieques and Culebra 3-5 feet at the South and East coasts, and up to 6-9 feet at the South East coast near Naguabo, where the storm made landfall.

Figure 9. Maximum Storm Surge Measure During Hurricane María (NOAA, 2018c)

https://www.weather.gov/images/sju/Huracanes/Maria/Surge_ArcGIS.PNG Lessons Learned from Hurricane María Event Hurricane María left extraordinary damages impacting all dimensions of P.R. This has not only been the worst social nightmare but also an extraordinary opportunity to build up capacity at all levels and reconstruct a more resilient and sustainable Puerto Rico. The following are some of the impacts and lessons learned from the hurricane.

Loss of Lives: Eliza Barclay, et al. (2018) identified extreme situations Puerto never faced before. They identified the worst humanitarian crisis associating 2,975 deaths directly to or by the consequences of the hurricane contrasting significantly with the initial death toll of 64 by the PR Department of Public Health. The interruption of health care services due the inability of hospitals to maintain their operations and the limitation of access to medicines, health supplies, power, food, medical services, and water complicated the scenario.

Economy: The economic impact was assessed to be over $90 billion losses of economic output and and infrastructure damage as reported by Disis, J. (2017).

Public Service: There was a severe shortage and limitation of essential services usually provided by the government and by commercial establishments.

Solid Waste Management and Other Environmental Safety Concerns: A need for solid waste management and disposal (organic and non-organic) due to the huge amount debris coming from vegetation, houses and building partially or totally destroyed. Moreover, hazardous waste, vectors, mosquitos, pathogens and others were encountered with garbage, debris and rotten organic matter.

Coastal Communities: Dr. Maritza Barreto (Diálogo, 2018) from the UPR concluded that after eight months from Hurricane María the coastal geomorphology has evolved in two main ways. At the North- East part of the Island the coast incremented while at South-East, North-Central and North-West the coasts decremented up to 60 meters in horizontal extension in 12 hours during the hurricane at municipalities like Humacao, Yabucoa, Barceloneta, Aguadilla, Rincón, Aguada and Mayagüez. Most of the PR coastal dunes were eroded. This instabilities generated new erosion and deposition patterns, affected the coastal ecosystem, and affected the capacity of the beach to attenuate and dissipate the coastal water energy that produce scouring and destruction to coastal built infrastructure.

It is typical to find built infrastructure (stores, hotels, buildings, homes, roads, ports, parking places, water and power infrastructure, and tourist facilities) alongside the coast line too close to the water line. Much of this infrastructure was scoured, damaged or even collapsed.

Figure 10 presents a series of photos of damages at the West coast of Puerto Rico.

(a) Buildings Collapses due to Persistent Coastal Erosion , Scouring and Wave Actions

(b) Comparison of Coastal Beach Erosion (Before and After)

(c) Example of Coastal Erosion (Before and After)

(d) Example of Houses at the Beach Damage by Coastal Erosion and Scouring

Figure 10. Photos of Damages at the West Coast of Puerto Rico (Courtesy of Ruperto Chaparro, PR Sea Grant Program)

Structures: Aponte Bermudez (2018) studied the structural damages due to hurricane winds. There was significant damage to nonstructural components and roofs of structures which were affected by the strong winds and the rain. Most inland failures were caused by lack of anchorage or clogged drainage in roofs. In the mountains there were many failures caused by landslides which were the result of the extreme rainfall combined with high winds increased due to topographic effects. At the coasts there were failures of houses and buildings built next to the sea and that experienced eroded foundations caused by the storm surge and wave actions.

On the other hand, there were few failures associated with structures designed according to modern codes. Since 1987 Puerto Rico has had adequate codes that resulted in structures resistant to earthquakes and strong winds. Formal construction suffered limited damage, mostly to nonstructural components and to aging or improperly maintained roofs. But there is a considerable amount of construction on the Island that does not comply with code standards. This happens due to many reasons: lack of resources by the owner combined with lack of proper code enforcement, lenient provisions for less expensive or rural construction, and lack of awareness of the importance of compliance, among others. Most of the failures occurred in timber construction with lightweight roofs. It should be mentioned that most construction on the Island is made of reinforced concrete, which is naturally resistant to strong winds because of its weight.

Industrial roofs suffered less damage than residential lightweight roofs. The most common failures of industrial buildings were at the roofs caused by inappropriate anchorage of the roof sealing impermeable liners, inadequate roof drainage systems, or nonstructural elements.

There was a disproportionate amount of failures of the electric power distribution grid. Not only timber and concrete poles failed (Acosta et al., 2018), but also steel towers designed to carry high voltage lines along the countryside. These are engineered structures and further study of the causes of

failure is warranted.

The communication poles and grid suffered a similar fate than the electric grid. The many failures had a direct effect on the lack of available communications for many days and weeks.

The existing wind speed networks proved to be too weak for the near category 5 winds associated with Hurricane María. Most stations stopped recording, many when the speeds were still increasing. It would be worthwhile to strengthen the stations.

There were many failures of commercial boards, traffic signs, traffic lights and illumination poles. Many have been rebuilt the same way they were.

Transportation: The transportation network was severely affected by the strong winds and rain. Trees fell on the roads impeding passage of vehicles. Landslides in the mountains blocked or destroyed roads. Many bridges were damaged because of the floating debris transported by the surging rivers imposed extremely high loads on the bridge columns. Airports were initially closed because of lack of power and lack of communications. The control tower was damaged, and eventually some air traffic resumed but was limited to planes bringing supplies and helpers. Commercial passenger flights were suspended for weeks with very limited exceptions.

After the main roads were cleared and people returned to the streets, traffic lights were not working for months and the initial caution of most drivers eventually gave way to a misplaced sense of security that led to many traffic accidents. Because of the lack of illumination, initially there was a curfew declared by the governor from 6 PM to 6 AM that later was modified and even relaxed.

Communication: The communication network was completely interrupted and recovered slowly because of the following hurricane effects: lack of electric power, structural failure of antenna, and lack of adequate backup systems.

The lack of communication brought a problem with logistics search and rescue, emergency operations, and the supply chain was interrupted because it became almost impossible to communicate with emergency managers, truck drivers, public administrators, and other service providers. It also disarticulated the first responders logistics at all levels to be able to respond timely and effectively.

Power: The hurricane left the worst blackout in US history leaving a complete black-out during first week, 70% of customers without power by October 30, 2018, 15% by February 21, 2018 and it took over a year to achieve again 100 % of the power generation, although not all clients were able to reestablished the power service.

The consequences were many, starting with the lack of power to water treatment plants, hospitals, industry, retail shops, supermarkets and all government offices. Lack of power for refrigeration prevented many people to conserve insulin and other medications adequately, exacerbating already severe health problems that eventually resulted in more deaths than initially estimated. The power grid collapsed in cascade for its overload, link ruptures, and generation plants to operate adequately.

Landslides: Rainfall volumes of up to 38 inches in 48 hours, extreme rainfall intensities in short period of times, and the persistence continuous rain falling on highly steep mountainous land with already unstable slopes, loose alluvial or residual , and already disturbed slopes due to

uncontrolled construction practices in the past created the most extreme event in Puerto Rico’s history. Figure 11 shows the concentration of landslides (contains shallow to deep landslides) as they were scanned in a reconnaissance using satellite data by the USGS in 5km by5km areas represented by pixels in the image. Over 40,000 landslide have been estimated in the whole Island, over 10,000 in the municipality of Utuado (Morales et al., 2018).

Figure 11. Landslide Mapping by the USGS

(NOAA (2018d) https://www.weather.gov/images/sju/Huracanes/Maria/derrumbes.jpg)

Figure 12 shows historical landslides in the Southern part of the Island at Ponce municipality (Mameyes community) where an easterly tropical wave that left a maximum point rainfall of 31.57 inches triggered the worst massive landslide in the history of Puerto Rico killing 130 people. The site was a typical steep slope, densely developed, lacking sewer infrastructure site. About 200,000 m3 of detached material slid from a sandstone hill.

Landslides constitute one of the most challenging potential risks to be addressed in the future of Puerto Rico. Landslide potential has significantly increased for many active landslides with tens of thousands sites already activated and other potential areas that may trigger in the future with each rainstorm, there is a high public priority to find resilient alternatives to deal with the problem. Landslide risk maps are the first step needed. Significant infrastructure (roads, houses, buildings, and water and wastewater infrastructure) was and is located through unstable sites. Regional and site specific geotechnical and geological studies are needed to identify feasible and sustainable solutions.

Figure 13 shows examples of landslides at a local roads and a house buildings.

Figure 12. Historical Landslide at Mameyes Community in 1985 at Ponce Puerto Rico (referencias)

Figure 13. Examples of Landslides after Hurricane María

Water and Wastewater: The potable water supply infrastructure services were interrupted and safe drinking water sources and services were lacking for months. The interruption of sanitary water services due to breakage or inoperative pumping stations for lacking electric power put the population at health risk for outbreaks of water related diseases. The following will help be more resilient in future similar events: diversify potable water sources at various communities, particularly those remotely located; provide redundant energy sources by generators or other sources; provide alternative permanent emergency oasis; new technologies for using grey waters for non-drinking purposes; avoid main lines exposed to due to flooding and landslides; provide accessible treatment alternatives, for example domestic filters; update the aged water distribution network – over 40% water losses; provide redundant pumping stations systems; provide appropriate water storage at all levels (cisterns, tanks, etc.), and ensure water treatment with appropriate water quality to avoid critical health problem.

Likewise, to provide a more resilient wastewater infrastructure, there are needs to provide redundant energy sources with generators or other alternatives; avoid illegal combined sewers – storm sewer overflows and backwater; need to upgrade sewage treatment plants and its infrastructure with more intelligent operating systems; provide emergency treatment infrastructure; aerobic or anaerobic septic systems; and storage – equalization tanks.

Figure 14 shows a typical municipal sanitary sewer treatment plant. Many plants were overflowed; municipal sanitary waste flowed all the way to natural stream due to power shortage and plants malfunction. Figure 15 shows a potable water main crossing a bridge which was broken by floods and debris at bridge.

https://www.elnuevodia.com https://www.fema.gov

Figure 14. (Left) Municipal Sewer Treatment Plant

Figure 15. (Right) Water Pipe Crossing at a Bridge Broken by Stream Flow and Debris

Riverine Floods: Puerto Rico hydrography responds with flash floods due to small basins, steep topography, significant impermeable surface due to urban development, and intense rainfall rates and large rainfall volumes. Historically Puerto Rico has suffered from extreme flash flood. FEMA Flood Insurance rate Maps (FIRM) have been used as regulatory flood maps. Although the existing FIRM maps had been updated in the past, floods during María surpassed the historical flood magnitudes and stages at different basins. Having 44 densely populated municipalities near the coasts, urban storm drains, natural and artificial channels, and rivers floodplains proved inadequate to handle floods

caused by Hurricane María.

Table 4 shows the river stage ranked by their magnitude. Eighteen stream gages at different sites throughout Puerto Rico reported remarkable flood stage heights. Six sites reported their historical records, five reported their second worst, four their third worst, and three their fourth worst flood stage heights. Hurricane María obligated FEMA to rework the flood maps for Puerto Rico which are in the required process for approval.

Figure 16 shows historic and regulated FEMA flood prone zone at flood plains in Puerto Rico. Stream and river flows damaged hundreds of bridges, culvers and water works, many of which were totally destroyed.

The dam infrastructure was stressed to the limit mainly because most old dams in Puerto Rico have surpassed their expected design life, have been silted by sediments and have exceeded their dead storage capacity. One particular case called the national attention at the Guajataca earth dam. Because the emergency spillway was eroded, a scouring front began moving upstream to the dam, and extraordinary measures had to be applied to control and avoid the dam overtopping. An open channel that serves water supply to downstream communities was shut down leaving dozens of communities without their water source. Figure 17 shows the Guajataca emergency spillway damaged section.

Figure 16. Flood Prone Areas in Puerto Rico

Table 4. River Flood Stage with Historical Rank by Magnitude (https://www.weather.gov/images/sju/Huracanes/Maria/Maria_Crest_History.png)

Figure 17. Guajataca Earth Dam Emergency Spillway Failure

Figure 18 (a) shows a bridge site at Road 115 over Rio Grande de Manatí River at Ciales municipality before and after the hurricane. Figure 19 shows typical debris obstructions that helped the collapse of hydraulic structures like bridges and culverts.

Figure 18. Bridge Over Río Grande de Manatí on Road PR-115 at Ciales

Figure 19. Typical Debris Obstructions that Caused Hydraulic Structures Obstructions and Failure

An intensive effort has been developed in the reconstruction of accesses over rivers by the use of temporary and rapid construction of truss bridges as shown in Figure 20.

Figure 20. Reconstruction with Temporary Metal Bridges at Various Sites

Educational and Capacity Building Initiatives of the Project

This project aims to educate and inform students, professor, professionals and the general public on how to improve resilience to coastal and related communities’ hazards of existing and new infrastructure. The methods consist of formal and informal education through courses, seminars, conferences, workshops, internships and student research projects. Students who complete a pre- defined curricular sequence of formal courses will obtain a Certificate in Resilience in Coastal Engineering. All attendants to seminars and conferences are given a Certificate of Participation from the Center.The project has sponsored several formal courses, seminars and conferences. Among the courses some of the most relevant are:

Civil Engineering Capstone Course: Example Seven Coastal Comprehensive Urban Development proposed projects with real constraints were assigned to senior civil engineering students to develop (analyzed and designed) multidisciplinary solutions during two consecutive semesters with the participation of a total of 88 undergraduate students, five faculties, five graduate students, and the participation of various guest speakers and lecturers on coastal engineering, resilient design and sustainability topics. The proposed sites are exposed to multi-hazards, namely: earthquakes; tsunamis; riverine and urban floods; coastal floods caused by storm surge, waves, tides, and winter ocean swells; soil liquefaction; corrosive environment; extreme hurricane winds; and localized tornadoes. Projects required to satisfy multiple objectives in function of economic development, environmental quality and compliance, social wellbeing and social satisfaction, construction sustainability, and resilient design against coastal hazards. Students formed companies, were trained by faculty and external professionals, worked in teams, and developed the whole design process, namely: feasibility analyses, conceptual design, preliminary design, final design, project management, permit requirements, and oral and verbal presentations. This experience exposed our graduating students to mature the concept of coastal resilient systems, motivated some to go to

graduate school, exposed the students to homeland security enterprise opportunities and directed others to participate in reconstruction activities in PR after Hurricanes Irma and María. Figure 21 shows schematically the contents of the Capstone Course. Figure 22 shows example of outcomes from the Capstone course experience.

Online course on Coastal Resilient Structures: A three-credit course was created in modules with emphasis on estimating the reliability of structures subjected to coastal hazards. This course is still on development to be made available online.

Rehabilitation of Coastal Structures: A three-credit course has been offered focused on the structural rehabilitation and improvement of coastal structures that have been affected by aging, corrosion, flooding and extreme winds. The course is offered to graduate and advanced undergraduate civil engineering students. Figure 23 shows the course advertisement.

Resilience of Coastal Transportation Infrastructure: The course focused on assessing the inventory of coastal infrastructure in Puerto Rico, evaluating the nature of exposition to multi-hazards, and identifying resilient alternative for expected catastrophic events.

Resilience of Solid Waste Management in Coastal Communities: A three-credit special undergraduate research course focuses on team building experiences and includes community site visits, evaluation of the current state of solid waste disposition, evaluation of solid waste risk to coastal environment, and recommendations corrective alternatives for improvement.

One of the most beneficial activities has been the Summer Research Internships (called SUMREX) where students from UPRM have been able to participate in research projects in several affiliated universities and laboratories during the summers of 2016, 2017 and 2018. In summary a total of 19 interns have taken advantage of the opportunity to do research while being paid and get to know how other universities and research laboratories operate. The students went to Oregon State University, University of Central Florida, Louisiana State University and the Coastal and Hydraulic Laboratory of the US Army Corps of Engineers. One highlight of the summer research is that one summer intern is now doing his PhD at Louisiana State University under the guidance of Dr. Scott Hagen, who was one of his summer internship advisors in 2016.

The renewed interest in coastal research topics by faculty and students at the department includes coastal erosion, cost estimates of coastal infrastructure rehabilitation, effects of coastal hydrodynamic effects on coastal structures, resilient design of coastal communities, structural analyses of coastal structures to coastal forces, hurricane modeling on tropical environments, solid waste and debris impact on coastal environments, and many others.

Figure 21. Schematic Diagram of the Senior Capstone Course Experience

Figure 22. Example of the Senior Capstone Course Experience

Figure 23. Example of Rehabilitation of Coastal Structures

A major part of the project is to sponsor public seminars and conferences with invited speakers. These are open to the academic community and to the general public. Among the many seminars we can point out the “Conversatories” after María. These half-day conferences with four speakers plus presenters from the community and ample public participation were held at the Civil Engineering Auditorium and were co-organized with the Center for Hemispherical Collaboration in Science and Engineering (CoHemis), the Sea Grant Program, and other partners. They were well attended by the academic community and the general public. Four conferences were held emphasizing impacts on the Coast, on the electrical system, on the Telecommunications system, and on the infrastructure.

Table 4 shows the audience participation in the “Conversatories”. Figure 24 shows the attendance to one of the “Conversatories” about effects on the coast.

Table 4. Distribution of participants in the “Conversatories”

Figure 24. Attendance to one of the “Conversatory” about effects of Hurricane María on the coasts of Puerto Rico

In collaboration with NOAA and PR Sea Grant Program several training courses have been offered. These are related to Coastal Inundation, GIS, and Green infrastructure. A new short course and workshop called “Complex Project Management for Coastal Communities” has been developed by Dr. Carla López del Puerto, a Civil Engineering Faculty. The project researchers have given several presentations on their experience with preparation for natural hazards. Some examples are:

The renewed focus on resilience can be seen on a recently funded NSF Grant “RISE-UP: Resilient Infrastructure and Sustainable Education - Undergraduate Program”, that focuses on increasing retention and graduation of undergraduate engineering and architecture students at UPR. It also aims at a Certificate on Resilient infrastructure.

Conclusions

Hurricane María showed the extreme damage that a Category 4 hurricane can inflict on a highly populated island with diverse topography and multihazard risks. This work shows the efforts made by the authors through one project with help from several collaborators to alert, educate and motivate individuals to promote and build up capacity on resilience in their designs and everyday decisions. The project has helped to bring resilience infrastructure as one of the main strategic initiatives at the Department of Civil Engineering and Surveying at the University of Puerto Rico at Mayagüez. It helped to engage students, faculty and professionals to emerge as leaders in the field. It has also helped to provide new and reengineered professionals into the labor force for risk mitigation.

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Acknowledgement: “This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 2015-ST-061-ND0001-01.”

Disclaimer: “The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S Department of Homeland Security.”