Informal Northern Thai Group Bulletin November 1, 2013
1. MINUTES OF THE 367TH INTG MEETING: 8 OCTOBER 2013: “A THIRD HAND: THE ROLE OF THE THAI MILITARY IN THAI POLITICS TODAY” - A TALK BY PAUL CHAMBERS. 2. NEXT MEETING: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 2013. “THE ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE D’EXTREME- ORIENT AND ITS LIBRARY IN CHIANG MAI”. A TALK & PRESENTATION BY YVES GOUDINEAU, DIRECTOR OF THE EFEO CHIANG MAI CENTRE, AND LOUIS GABAUDE. Exceptionally, this talk will be held at the EFEO premises, opposite the Alliance Française, between The Chedi Hotel and the Wat Chaimongkhon. Parking for cars at the Alliance Française and in the Soi between the EFEO and the Wat Chaimongkhon. 3. A NON-INTG TALK IN THE SAME WEEK AT THE ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE D'EXTRÊME-ORIENT ON THURSDAY, 14 NOVEMBER, 2013, AT 6:30 PM . "PICTURING REBIRTH IN BUDDHIST TEMPLES" BY DR. STEPHEN F. TEISER. 4. INTG MAILING PROBLEMS. 5. A LETTER FROM ACHAN SHALARDCHAI RAMITANONDH ABOUT VIRADA SOMSAVASDI AND THE CHIANG MAI UNIVERSITY WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTRE. 6. FUTURE INTG MEETINGS. 7. INTG CONTACTS: CONVENOR & SECRETARY.
1. MINUTES OF THE 367TH INTG MEETING: 8 OCTOBER 2013: “A THIRD HAND: THE ROLE OF THE THAI MILITARY IN THAI POLITICS TODAY” - A TALK BY PAUL CHAMBERS.
2.1. PRESENT : Dawitt Abraha, Hans Bänziger, Klaus Berkmüller, John Cadet, Chatcha Thavee, Peter Davey, Pam Duffield, Jack Eisner, Lee Ellis, Louis Gabaude, Jack Gites, Yves Goudineau, Oliver Hargreave, Sjon Hauser, Reinhard Hohler, Horn Prang Chaleckanha, Richard Humphries, Gerry Ivanochko, David James, John Keeble, Warren Kinston, Peter Koliwenberg, David Kulks, Peter Kuntstadter, Walter Meyer, Napisa Waitoolkiat, Jacques Op de Laak, Adrian Pieper, Nicolas Revire, Angelie Sitsch, Horst Sitsch, Sudsiri Pui-ock, Suriya Smutkupt, Thomas van Nes, Edward van Tuyll, Wattana Wattanapun, Rebecca Weldon, Frank Wheby, Christopher Woodman, a total of 39 at least.
2.2. The 367th Talk : 8 October 2013: “A 'Third Hand': The Role of the Thai Military in Thai Politics Today”. A Talk by Dr. Paul Chambers (PhD, Northern Illinois University), Chiang Mai University.
Summary of the Talk The talk is based upon one article and two books:
1) Chambers, Paul, “Military ‘Shadows’ in Thailand since the 2006 coup,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, (Routledge), Vol. 40, Issue 2, 2013.
2) Chambers, Paul, Napisa Waitoolkiat, Hanstaad, Eric, Arisa Ratanapinsiri, Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and Police, Then and Now (edited by Paul Chambers). Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2013.
3) Croissant, Aurel, Kuehn, David, Lorenz, Chambers, Paul W. Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan (Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific, 2013.
1. Establishment of an asymmetrical partnership of power: MONARCHY/MILITARY
Early History of Military 1. Standing Army established in 1874/1887. 2. Sua Pa and three coup attempts
Rama V (r. 1868-1910) - Rama VI (1910-1925)
2. Evolution of Military Absolutism 1932-1944 Towards a Fascist Thailand & Military Monopoly
Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (1897–1964) - Prime Minister: 08/04/1948 –16/09/1957
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3. The Achievement of Elected Civilian Control Thailand’s fullest democracy? 1944-1947
4. The Military Rises Again, with US and monarchical support. 1947-1973; 1976-1988, 1991-2 MILITARY RESURRECTION
5. Deceptive appearances
By the 1990s, it looked as though elected civilian supremacy, albeit with a strong military under the control of the monarch and elected civilians, had finally reached the country. This deceptive appearance owed to six historical legacies: a) a supremely-influential monarch; b) a powerful military subservient to the monarchy which concentrated on internal security; c) a weak, intermittent, elite-dominated democracy; d) an intense divide between rich and poor; e) beginning in 1947, a close alliance with the United States, which guaranteed assistance and external security; and finally f) after 1992 a tarnished image of the military, which diminished its power, allowing elected civilians and the King’s Privy Council to increase their sway. By the late 1990s, security sector reforms seemed to be creating an apolitical military. 3
Historical Background before 2006 Coup The Evolution of a Royalist Military
6. The structure of Thai politics: A tutelary democracy
Thailand’s Political Hierarchy
Palace
Privy Council
Parliament Military Judiciary and + Independent Agencies Navy ARMY Air Force Cabinet/Prime Minister Police
7. 2001-2006: Thaksin Shinawatra's Attempts to personalize his control over Thailand’s security forces
Thaksin Shinawatra, the popular Prime Minister succeeds in influencing most of the police and carving out his own faction in the military.
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8. Reasons for the 2006 Coup 2001-2006 Personalized Control and Coup
Given Thailand’s tradition of multiple coups, the putsch of 2006 was only remarkable in that it overthrew a powerful civilian Prime Minister and was the first coup in 14 years. In the first coup announcement, Thailand’s putschists rationalized their action because Thaksin had: a) “caused society to be fragmented,” a situation which might lead to greater violence;” b) exhibited evidence of “corruption, malfeasance, political interference in government agencies and independent organizations;” c) was “challenging the king’s power.” (Thai Government, 2006).
Two months later, other coup rationales appeared: d) Thaksin had abused power; e) he had engaged in unethical practices; f) he had presided over human rights violations; g) there was an election crisis with Thaksin’s political party unable to form a government; and h) there was a power vacuum with a non-functioning legislature (The Nation, December 12, 2006).
Allegations have emerged that Thaksin had antagonized the king, was hated by Privy Council Chair Prem, and disliked by many armed forces officials for seeking to dominate the military.
The timing of the coup was no accident. Army Commander Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin was soon to be replaced by Thaksin-loyalist Gen. Pornchai Kranlert, as Thaksin sought to promote more partisan military officers. Also, an apparent car bomb assassination plot against Thaksin just before the coup suggested army complicity, and senior officers would not tolerate such insinuations (Thitinan, 2006). Moreover, with anti-Thaksin demonstrators encouraging military action, the Prime Minister was at the time abroad.
As Coup Leader Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin later told US Ambassador Boyce, “Thaksin was at his weakest and we were at our strongest” (Cable 3, 2006).
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9. 2007-2013: Democracy? Following December, 2007 polls, an elected government assumed office in January, 2008. This followed a year and three months of military rule. Though the armed forces had promised that their period of direct control would be brief, democracy only returned following four alterations. 9.1. Enactment of a military-endorsed constitution, which weakened political parties, facilitated the censuring of governments, gerrymandered the electoral system, and instituted a half-elected, half-appointed Senate. 9.2. Judicial decisions, including the 2008 conviction of Thaksin and the dissolution of his Thai Rak Thai party, compelling him to abandon direct participation in Thai politics. 9.3. Assertion of control over the armed forces by the arch-royalist “Eastern Tigers” (and “Queen’s Guards”) military faction as symbolized by Gen. Anupong Paochinda’s appointment as Army Commander in 2007. 9.4. Resurgence in influence for the Thai military back to levels approximating the pre-1992 period.
2007-Present Hollow Civilian Control
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10. UNDERSTANDING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
civil-military continuum in decision- making power : FIVE AREAS
C. Internal Security B. Public Policy
A. Leadership Selection
D. External Defense E. Military Organization
11. RE-DEMOCRATIZATION AMIDST MILITARY CONSOLIDATION (2007-PRESENT)
Cartoons below commented by Paul Chambers & LG:
The stairs to power
In this cartoon (Sia, Thai Rat, June 5, 2007), the Democrat Party’s leader Abhisit Vejjajiva is seen to be ascending the Prime Minister’s chair. Abhisit is represented as a puppet controlled by a mysterious puppeteer from "above". Before getting the Prime Minister's power, he will have to trample on the members of Parliament from the Thai Rak Thai Party, overturned with the help of the Military who hold the chair ready for Abhisit, while a poster of a sad Thaksin lies on the floor. Back on the left, the Chart Thai Party leader, Banharn Silpa- archa, is laughing and sticks his tongue out at all of them. Interestingly, this cartoon was very prescient because the military allegedly coerced several People's Power Party MPs from the Friends of Newin Group to defect to the Democrat coalition, allowing Abhisit to be elected Prime Minister and formally endorsed by King Bhumibol Adulyadej on 17 December 2008. In the meantime, Banharn Silpa-archa, who had previously vowed never to rejoin Thaksin (because of his corrupted politics), will have reinforced his image as a "Slippery Eel" by finally joining the coalition around the People's Power Party, successor to the Thai Rak Thai Party of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
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Whose [battle]field is this? and for whom?
This cartoon, by 'Sia' (Surname of Saksa Sae-ieo), from November 7, 2007, Thai Rat newspaper, pokes fun at the next elections to be held a few weeks later on December 23, 2007. People's Power Party (Phalang Prachachon) prime ministerial candidate and famous chef, (the late) Samak Sundaravej is arm wrestling with then Army Commander Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the leader of the 2006 coup group and of the Council for National Security (CNS). On the General's back a poster reads: "The Military lead politics". Thaksin Shinawatra, then President of Manchester United football team, is seen behind Samak, while, behind Sonthi, supporters appear to be Abhisit Vejjajiva (leader of the Democrat Party), Banharn Silpa- archa, leader of the Chart Thai Party who has vowed before the Emerald Buddha never to rejoin Thaksin because of the corruption scandals, and others.
Clic... Clac... Go out!
In this cartoon (Sia, Thai Rat, October 20, 2008), while on the background Yellow Shirts rattle a hand and Red Shirts a foot, the then Army Commander Gen. Anupong Paochinda rattles a frightened puppet of the Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, brother-in-law of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and head of the People's Power Party (Phalang Prachachon). The Army Commander says: "Clic... Clac.. Clic...Clac... Go out!", reminding the reader of Sondhi Limthongkul's motto "Thaksin, go out!" which ended up with the 2006 coup.
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Flowers and Steel
This cartoon (Sia, Thai Rat, December 16, 2011) depicts incoming Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra standing right in front of an incoming tank and under the shade of the tank gun. Handing out a rose to the tank, she is attempting to sweet-talk or appease the military (traditionally opposed to Thaksin) by telling: "Pleeeeeease do not do to me what you did to Thaksin!".
12. CURRENT STATE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL
“A government... supervises soldiers but their real owners are the country and the King. ” (Privy Council Chair retired Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, quoted in Sutichai, 2006).
Since 2011, the newly-elected Phuea Thai government of Yingluck Shinawatra has pushed for greater civilian control over the military but so far with little success.
The military, as commanded by the Queen’s Guard faction, currently under Army Commander Prayuth and Supreme Commander Tanasak, are effectively insulated from control by the Prime Minister.
Yingluck and Prayuth: Not quite a love story
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13. What factors have facilitated the growth of military power?
Currently, while post-2007 civilian governments appear to once again be in charge of politics, military influence and insulation remain just under the surface. Several factors help to explain this situation. First, the influence of authoritarian legacies is a crucial variable for understanding why the armed forces have remained a powerful actor on the Thai political landscape (Aguero, 1995). Thailand’s military has long been successful in legitimizing itself as the protector of a monarch who is beloved and considered close to being a deity by a far majority of Thais. A post-1957 asymmetrical power-sharing arrangement between the palace and military (with the latter as junior partner), while elections were only loosely rooted, has remained the dominant state of affairs until the present (Chaiyan, 2008; Kobkua, 2003:155). Second, “internal threat environments” and border problems have contributed to enhanced military clout (Desch, 1999:111-112). These relate to military justifications for its involvement on the political stage. Such rationales derive from continuing counter-insurgency operations in Thailand’s far South; threats from “Red Shirts” against the Kingdom; the need to quash any perceived insults or dangers to either the monarchy or the King’s representatives (e.g. Privy Council); and natural disaster relief especially during its popular handling of the 2011 flooding around Bangkok (Taipei Times, 2011). Yet military influence has not only been bolstered because of internal threats. Rather, persistent frontier difficulties mostly with Cambodia—verging on external threats—have also increased military leverage vis-à-vis civilians in border/foreign policy. Third, where the military has been cohesive while civilians have been divided, this has benefited moves by the armed forces to enhance their power (Croissant et al., 2011:92). Thailand’s military currently stands united , specifically at the top, under the “Eastern Tigers” faction. At the same time, Thai civilians, since 2005, have been politically divided. It is a personalistic, semi-authoritarian split—one centered on the populist Thaksin Shinawatra, the other around the King. Such polarization is reflected in “People’s Power” civil society groups—with the anti-Thaksin “Yellow” and “Multi-Colored” Shirts on one side and the pro- Thaksin “Red Shirts” on the other. This continuing disunity in intra-civilian affairs has provided a rationale for the more cohesive military to maintain a central role on the political stage, while appearing to exist under the veneer of civilian control (Chambers, 2010:850-854). Maintaining the appearance of civilian control has proven to be preferable among senior military brass than direct administration. First, in line with contemporary logic, rising economic growth and per capita income strengthen pluralist forces, thus weakening militaries (Alagappa, 2001:63). And indeed, since 1988, no Thai authoritarian regime has lasted longer than one year. Second, members of the international community tend to only dispense aid and carry on unfettered economic intercourse with countries having elected governments. Third, though the armed forces (as an anti-Thaksin institution) remains popular among middle and upper class Thais in much of Bangkok, such urbanites also generally favor a military which ostensibly takes orders from elected civilians. Fourth, the military itself would prefer to stand behind the facade of civilian governance so that if an unpopular measure must be implemented, the civilian coalition will get the blame rather than the military itself (Wassana 4, 2008). Indeed, under the mantra of limited democracy, the armed forces concentrates on internal security and national development, of “…a politicized professionalism, using the state to control civil society” (Stepan, 1973, p.47; Fitch, 1998, p.17). Explaining Post-2007 Military Consolidation under Apparent Civilianization
Parallel Statism under the Palace and Privy Council amidst Diluted Civilianization
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14. PARALLEL STATES IN THAILAND
Thailand’s military stands insulated from most attempts by elected governments to exert civilian control. The Thai military is part of a parallel state with informal set of institutions unchecked by civilian oversight. Such a network is organically connected to the state and exudes formal political authority, but also informally possesses its own institutional interests outside those of civilian leaders. In fact, the elected state leadership can only solidify its position by acquiescing to the autonomy of the informal power structure. The frailty of state control offers an advantage to this shadowy network given that de facto powers can in many cases manipulate and subvert decision-making, through influencing the judiciary, security forces, political parties, parliament, etc. Ultimately, parallel statism can inhibit stability and democracy since it stands out of reach of elected officials and can generate societal disunity (Briscoe, 2008:6-8). But Thailand’s parallel state is not simply a bastion of the military. Rather, it is a vertically integrated informal structure of power which oscillates around the palace and the King’s Privy Council. McCargo (2005) referred to this as “network monarchy”—“active interventions in the political process by the Thai king and his proxies”, which includes Privy Councillors and “trusted military figures” (McCargo, 2005:499-501). Since the 2006 coup, this parallel state has increasingly included the judiciary and Council of State, the appointed members of the Senate, and increasing numbers of army officers. As a subordinate part of the parallel state, the military’s interests are first role-oriented: to protect the monarch over any notions of democracy (TMD, 2008:33); secondly, institutionally venal: to gratify its corporate interests both politically and economically.
Yet Thaksin is not fading away. He has constructed his own informal parallel state which includes Phuea Thai party, the UDD and most of the police.
The formal arena of conflict of these two parallel states is Thailand’s parliament.
Contending Parallel States
Palace and TRANSACTION Privy Thaksin Council ARENA RULING COALITION Democrat Puea Thai Party, LEGISLATURE Party, Yellow Most Red Shirts JUDICIARY Shirts
Military Police Leadership Leadership
15. WHO’S WHO IN THE THAI MILITARY? CURRENT RESHUFFLES OF THE ARMY’S 5 TIGERS
Considerations include a balancing of factions
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2012-2013 GEN DAPONG GEN PRAYUTH GEN UDOMDET RATANASUWAN CHAN-OCHA SITIBUTR Deputy C-in-C ARMY COMMANDER C of Staff (12-23) KG/R (12-23)QG/R (14-24) QG/R
G. SIRICHAI DITSAKUL JIRADET MOKASMIT ASSISTANT CC 13-24/KG/T ASSISTANT CC 13-24/T
16. ARMY’5 TIGERS: 2013-2014
GEN. UDOMDET GEN.PRAYUTH GEN. AKSARA KERDPHOL SITIBUTR CHAN-OCHA CHIEF OF STAFF DEP. C-in-C C-C (12-22) QG /R (14-24) KG/R (14-24) QG/R
(
G.PAIBUN KAMCHAYA GEN CHATCHAI SALIKULYA Ass. C-C (15-25)KG/T Ass. C-C (12-23)/R
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17. ARMY’S 5 TIGERS: 2014-2015 (predictions)
Army Assistant Army Assistant Army Chief of Army Deputy Army to Chief to Chief Staff Commander Commander GEN. WALIT GEN. GEN. GEN. GEN. PAIBUN ROJANAPAKDI PREECHA TEERACHAI UDOMDET KAMCHAYA (retires in 2017) CHAN-OCHA (retires in 2016) (retires in 2015) (retires in 2015) (retires in 2016) (15) (15) (14-24) (14-24) (15-25) Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Pro-Thaksin QG QG QG KG
18. Current Reshuffles the armed forces’ 5 Tigers
2012-2013
Navy Air Force Supreme Army Permanent Commander Commander Commander Defense Minister ADM ACM PRAJIN GEN. GEN. GEN. SURASAK TANASAK PRAYUTH TANONGSAK (13) (12) (12-22) (12-22) (11-21) Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Pro-Thaksin
2013-2014
Navy Air Force Supreme Army Permanent Commander Commander Commander Defense Minister ADM ACM PRAJIN GEN GEN. GEN. NIPAT NARONG (retires in 2014) TANASAK PRAYUTH (retires2017) (retires in 2014) (retires in 2014) (retires in 2014) (14) (12) (12-22) (12-22) (14-24) Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Pro-Thaksin
2014-2015 (Predictions)
Navy Air Force Supreme Army Permanent Commander Commander Commander Defense Minister ADM ACM GEN GEN. GEN. NIPAT TAWIWUT TOTRITOT WORAPOL UDOMDET (retires2017) PONGPIPAT SONJAENG (retires in 2015) (retires in 2015) (retires in 2015) (retires in 2016)
(15) (14) (12-22) (14-24) (14-24) Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Arch-royalist Pro-Thaksin
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18. CONCLUSION
While the military looks set to continue its political influence in Thailand for the foreseeable future, the country appears to be reaching toward two distinct forms of unconsolidated or defective democracy:
More of tutelary democracy? What is tutelary democracy?
Definition: This type of defective democracy is characterized by the existence of reserved domains of undemocratic forces functioning as extrademocratic power centers and veto players, like the military or some traditional oligarchic factions and groups. Apart from the classical case of Atatürk’s Turkey, this type has been more frequent in Latin America (down to its somewhat reduced form in contemporary Chile) and in Southeast Asia, not that much in other parts of the world (Puhle, 2005:12, portal.uam.es/pls/portal/.../0110A5EA9DDF38CAE0440003BA0F80D2).
Bringing in Thaksin’s delegative democracy? What is delegative democracy?
Definition: Delegative democracies are grounded on one basic premise: he [or she] who wins a presidential [or parliamentary] election is enabled to govern the country as he [or she] sees fit, and to the extent that existing power relations allow, for the term to which he has been elected. The President is the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian of the national interest, which it is incumbent upon him to define. What he does in government does not need to bear any resemblance to what he said or promised during the electoral campaign—he has been authorized to govern as he sees fit. Since this paternal figure has to take care of the whole nation, it is almost obvious that his support cannot come from a party; his political basis has to be a movement, the supposedly vibrant overcoming of the factionalism and conflicts that parties bring about. Typically, and consistently, winning [executive] candidates in Delegative Democracies present themselves as above all parties; i.e., both political parties and organized interests. How could it be otherwise for somebody who claims to embody the whole of the nation? In this view other institutions —such as Congress and the Judiciary—are nuisances that come attached to the domestic and international advantages of being a democratically elected President. Accountability to those institutions, or to other private or semi- private organizations, appears as an unnecessary impediment to the full authority that the President has been delegated to exercise (O’Donnell, 1993, kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/172.pdf) .
CONCLUSION: A FUTURE OF TUTELARY DEMOCRACY VERSUS DELEGATIVE DEMOCRACY?
Civilian control is yet unattainable in Thailand because Thailand hosts a parallel state where the military remains mostly unchecked by civilian monitoring.
Squeezed! This cartoon (Sia, Thai Rat, October 10, 2011) depicts four ‘big’ commanders—Supreme Commander, Army Commander, Navy Commander, Air Force Commander—sitting on their own seats but squeezing the poor General Yuthasak Sasiprapha, Minister of Defense since August 2011 in Yingluck Shinawatra's government. A member of Thaksin’s political party ‘Thai Rak Thai’, Yuthasak had been former deputy defence minister in Thaksin Shinawatra's government and was elected as party-list MP in the 'Phuea Thai' Party in 2011. Now, Chiang Rai 'Phuea Thai' MP Surasit Chiamwichak had just said that the law and rules governing the Ministry of Defense should be amended in order to prevent the military to act as a mafia. On October 9, the Minister of Defence had just responded by saying that only minor changes were necessary. The cartoon explains why.
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Stop threatening the people!
This cartoon (by Sia, Thai Rat, January 24, 2012) shows the new Defense Minister Air Chief Marshal Sukamphol Suwannathat twisting back the main gun of a tank so that it should not be dangerous any more, but actually changing it into a loudspeaker spreading threatening news about a (possible) coup.
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2. NEXT MEETING: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 2013. “THE ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE D’EXTREME- ORIENT AND ITS LIBRARY IN CHIANG MAI”. A TALK & PRESENTATION BY YVES GOUDINEAU, DIRECTOR OF THE EFEO CHIANG MAI CENTRE, AND LOUIS GABAUDE. Exceptionally, this talk will be held at the EFEO premises, opposite the Alliance Française, between The Chedi Hotel and the Wat Chaimongkhon. Parking for cars at the Alliance Française and in the Soi between the EFEO and the Wat Chaimongkhon.
The Talk: The École française d'Extrême-Orient is one of the five academic "French Schools" dedicated to the scientific study of a "foreign" field (Greek, Egyptian, Roman, Spanish and Asian worlds) and the only one where members may spend their entire research life. This French School of Asian Studies emphasises training and research in the very field of twelve countries from India to Japan where it administers 18 offices or Centres. From nationalist beginnings in the context of late 19th century colonisation, this institution has evolved into an international pool of academics forming the core of the research infrastructure operated by member institutions of the European Consortium for Asian Field study (ECAF).
The speakers will in turn recall briefly the history of the School before focusing on Thailand and Chiang Mai where a research library hosts now around 50 000 books and several tens of thousands of periodicals. Main books and articles written by researchers stationed in Chiang Mai will be exhibited and their bibliographies available.
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The evening should follow the following steps: 1. Presentation 1.1. The École française d'Extrême-Orient : Creation; Development; the EFEO & Thailand. (YG + LG) 1.2. The Chiang Mai Branch of the École française d'Extrême-Orient: the French Consulate premises; the EFEO members stationed in Chiang Mai and their research; the library and its history. (LG + YG) 1.3. The École française d'Extrême-Orient: the contemporary situation: Administration; Centres; Programs. (YG) 2. Questions & answers. 3. A quick tour of the library. 4. Drinks and Informal conversations around the exhibition of books and articles written by researchers stationed in Chiang Mai.
The Speakers: Yves Goudineau : Dr. Yves Goudineau, with a beackground in philosophy and an enduring interest in the history of orientalism, began his research career in comparative ethnology and sociology within the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) and got missions in Hong Kong and China. He was French Cultural Attaché in Hong Kong from 1978 to 1980. In 1984, he joined the Research Institute for Developpement (IRD). From 1986 to 1989, he was Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. From 1993 to 1999, he conducted ethnographic missions in Southern Laos, in Saravane and Xekong provinces among Austro-Asiatic groups (Ta Oi, Pacoh, Ngkriang and Kantou) questioning, among other topics, sacrificial rites. From 2000 to now, he has taught ethnology first at the École pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE) and then at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris. From 2008 to 2011, he was also Visiting Professor at Oxford University (Oriental Institute, Wolfson college and Maison française d’Oxford). From the French Institute for Development (IRD) Yves hopped into the EFEO in 1999 as a fellow and became full member in 2004. He is currently in charge of the Vientiane and Chiang Mai EFEO Centres.
Louis Gabaude : With a background in philosophy, religion and theology, Dr. Louis Gabaude caught the Asian virus through his civil service in Laos from 1964 to 1966. Back to France, he switched to Asian studies at the the École pratique des Hautes Études (EPHE) taking courses on Pali, Buddhism and Southeast Asian cultures. He came back to Asia in 1970 and has since remained in Laos and Thailand, first teaching French and then doing research on Buddhism within the École française d'Extrême-Orient. His main domain of research has been the history of ideas within contemporary Buddhism with the purpose of analysing how, from a given socio-historical situation, Buddhist interpretations, values, and institutions evolve and why. He has given courses on Buddhism and Buddhist imagery at the Catholic University in Lyon, the Art Institute of the Sorbonne in Paris, Silpakorn University in Nakhon Pathom, and has been Visiting Numata Professor at Hamburg University. In 1982, the EFEO director asked him to buy books for the Paris EFEO library and later to create a library for the Chiang Mai Centre... More on this at the talk.
EFEO Website: http://www.efeo.fr
3. A NON-INTG TALK IN THE SAME WEEK AT THE ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE D'EXTRÊME-ORIENT ON THURSDAY, 14 NOVEMBER, 2013, AT 6:30 PM . "PICTURING REBIRTH IN BUDDHIST TEMPLES" BY DR. STEPHEN F. TEISER
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This is not an INTG lecture but could have been. It will be held at the EFEO Chiang Mai Center, right opposite the Alliance Française, between The Chedi Hotel and the Wat Chaimongkhon, on Thursday, 14 November, 2013, at 6:30 pm.
Title: Picturing Rebirth in Buddhist Temples
Topic: The wheel of saṃsāra is well-known throughout the modern Buddhist world because of its ubiquity near the entrance to Tibetan temples. This lecture explores the early history of this method of representing Buddhist cosmology. It includes texts and paintings from medieval India plus temple-paintings on the Silk Road (Kumtura), northwestern China (Yulin, Gansu), western Tibet (Tabo), and southwestern China (Chongqing).
Speaker: Dr Stephen F. Teiser is D.T. Suzuki Professor in Buddhist Studies at Princeton University. He is a historian of religion focusing on the interaction between Buddhism and local forms of religious life in China. His work utilizes Buddhist texts, Chinese manuscript finds, and art-historical evidence. His 2006 book, Reinventing the Wheel: Paintings of Rebirth in Medieval Buddhist Temples, won the Prix Stanislas Julien.
4. INTG MAILING PROBLEMS
The following e-mail addresses do not work and have been phased out of the INTG mailing list. If you know a proper address for these addressees, please send it to
5. A LETTER FROM ACHAN SHALARDCHAI RAMITANONDH ABOUT VIRADA SOMSAVASDI AND THE CHIANG MAI UNIVERSITY WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTRE
Following Achan Virada Somswasdi's stroke, we have received a letter from Achan Shalardchai requesting help for keeping the Chiang Mai University Women's Studies Centre afloat in a so called "educational" context which does not favors "human" knowledges... I am sure that, among our correspondents from Thailand and abroad, some may have suggestions to offer,
20 sending students to begin with... We wish Achan Virada a prompt recovery and her Centre a continuous development. LG.
ศูนย์สตรีศึกษา Women’s Studies Center คณะสังคมศาสตร์ Faculty of Social Sciences มหาวิทยาลัยเชียงใหม่ Chiang Mai University จังหวัดเชียงใหม่ 50200 Chiang Mai 50200, Thailand โทร (053) 94-3572 Tel. (66 53) 94-3572 แฟกซ์ (053) 219245 Fax. (66 53) 219245 อีเมล: [email protected] Email: [email protected]
http://wsc.soc.cmu.ac.th/index.html
October 29, 2013
To the friends of Virada Somswasdi, and Women’s Studies/Gender Studies,
Twenty-seven years ago, Virada Somswasdi founded the Women’s Studies Center within the Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, and the Foundation for Women, Law and Rural Development (FORWARD). Since then, we have become effective and well known not only throughout Thailand and the Southeast Asian Region but also internationally. Our outstanding characteristic is the integration of academic research with social activities, NGO's women movements as well as grassroots women in order to build a new body of knowledge with the capability of moving forward and creating real change. The Women’s Studies Center is now a Department within the Faculty of Social Sciences. We are currently adjusting and expanding our curriculum for Women’s Studies and Gender Studies with MA. and Ph.D. courses. We are also preparing to offer all of our courses in both Thai and English to cope with the upcoming ASEAN Economic Community.
On the 12th of September 2013, suffering a stroke, Virada entered the hospital. After a successful surgery she has been steadily recovering and is now able to speak, read and write. We hope that her condition will have improved greatly by the end of the year.
Even though she retired last year, Virada still worked as an advisor and had a significant role in networking and finding sponsorships and assistance from both within Thailand and abroad. She is also a committee member of the Law Reform Committee of Thailand.
Unfortunately, her illness, added to inadequate funding from the Faculty of Social Sciences, has put the Women’s Studies Center in a very precarious situation.
As a co-founder of the Women’s Studies Center, I would appreciate any help from any of the numerous friends of Virada and the Women’s Studies/Gender Studies. Any suggestion, advice, or assistance would be of great importance and usefulness for the progress of Women’s/Gender Studies in Thailand and the Asean Economic Community (AEC), both for now and in the future.
With warmest regards,
Mr. Shalardchai Ramitanondh
E-mail : [email protected]
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6. FUTURE INTG MEETINGS
368th Meeting : Tuesday, 12 November, 2013 : “The École française d’Extrême-Orient and its Library in Chiang Mai”. A Talk & Presentation by Yves Goudineau, Director of the EFEO Chiang Mai Centre, and Louis Gabaude. Exceptionally, this talk will be held at the EFEO premises, opposite the Alliance Française, between The Chedi Hotel and the Wat Chaimongkhon.
369th Meeting : Tuesday, 3 December, 2013 : “Land and Livelihoods - Struggles of Small-Scale Farming Communities in Northern Thailand”. A Talk by Jason Lubanski
370th Meeting : Tuesday, 14 January, 2014 : “Paul Doumer and French Indochina, 1897-1902”. A Talk by Amaury Lorin.
371th Meeting : Tuesday, 18 February, 2014 : “Following Buddha’s footprints (Buddhapāda)”. A Talk & Presentation by Jacques de Guerny.
7. INTG CONTACTS : Convenor - Secretary - Website
1) Convenor : Rebecca Weldon : e-mail : < [email protected]>. Mobile : 087 193 67 67.
2) Secretary : Louis Gabaude : e-mail :
3) INTG Website : http ://www.intgcm.thehostserver.com
Thank you for your interest in the INTG Talks In December : 29 years of Meetings!
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Informal Northern Thai Group (INTG) 28 years of Talks! ______The École française d’Extrême-Orient and its Library in Chiang Mai A Presentation and visit by Yves Goudineau & Louis Gabaude Tuesday 12 November 2013 19:30 At the ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE D’EXTRÊME-ORIENT 131, Charoen Prathet Road, Opposite the Alliance Française
Informal Northern Thai Group (INTG) 28 years of Talks! ______Land & Livelihoods: Struggles of Small-Scale Farming Communities in Northern Thailand A Talk by Jason Lubanski Tuesday 3 December 2013 19:30
At the ALLIANCE FRANÇAISE 131, Charoen Prathet Road, Chiang Mai, opposite the EFEO