FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP

U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY

WILLIAM J. BURNS • MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY • NANCY E. LINDBORG

September 2016 Destruction in Homs, Syria resulting from the violence that has ravaged the country since 2011, June 3, 2014. CONTENTS

Executive Summary 2

Fragility 7

Principles for Engagement 9

From Principles to Practice 18

Conclusion 27

Notes 28

Appendix I: Senior Advisory Group 30

Appendix II: Chair Bios 31

Appendix III: Credits 32

September 2016

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report is the culmination of the work of the Fragility Study Group, a joint project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie), the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Launched in fall of 2015, the Study Group benefited from wide-ranging interviews with experts within and outside the U.S. government and from the counsel of a Senior Advisory Group comprising scholars, former policymakers, and civil society leaders. The chairs wish to acknowledge the Study Group staff, Alexa Courtney (Executive Director) and Noah Sheinbaum (Special Assistant), along with Matan Chorev (Carnegie), Loren Schulman (CNAS), and Linwood Ham (USIP), whose tireless efforts made this report possible.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

between people and their govern- not—try to fix every fragile state. t the very moment when ment. The challenge is only likely to We can—and should—articulate challenges to the post- become more acute over time as sound and realistic policy prin- World War II U.S.-led A states struggle to keep pace with ciples to determine where and international order are growing rising citizen demands. how to invest scarce resources in number and complexity, Amer- The United States and its and attention to maximum effect. icans are asking hard questions international partners have made And we can—and should—play about the type of global leadership notable progress in coming to a leadership role in shaping the role they want their country to grips with the fragility challenge. global response and strengthening play. After a decade and a half of There is a more nuanced under- the capacity of key institutions and unceasing war and sustained eco- standing of the problem and a partners to do their part. nomic unease in the wake of the growing convergence around the As the chairs of the Fragility worst financial crisis in a genera- essential elements of sound policy. Study Group, the three of us come tion, Americans—and their elected The hard truth, however, is that at this problem from different representatives—are increasingly for all the progress and hard-won professional backgrounds and looking homeward. The temptation experience of the past two de- experiences, but we all agree that to hunker down and wait for this cades, our performance is falling when the defense, development, moment of disorder to pass is short of the mark, handicapped by and diplomacy communities talk understandable, but shortsighted. bureaucratic politics; the pursuit of past one another, U.S. policy We simply do not have that luxury. There is too much at stake—for American interests, for the inter- ests of our allies and partners, and Given the inbox awaiting the next for global peace and security. administration, fragile states may seem like The simultaneity of proliferating challenges and constrained appe- a distant and abstract concern. They are not. tite and resources to address them They are at the center of much of today’s will require the incoming adminis- tration to demonstrate remarkable regional disorder and global upheaval. discipline and imagination in where and how it chooses to deploy American leadership. maximalist objectives on unrealis- suffers. With inputs from a dis- Nowhere is this more urgent tic timelines; the failure to balance tinguished and diverse Senior than in the U.S. response to the short-term imperatives with long- Advisory Group, we suggest four challenge of state fragility. Given term goals; the habit of lurching principles of engagement to guide the inbox awaiting the next admin- from one crisis to the next; missed a more disciplined approach to istration, fragile states may seem opportunities to act preventively; the challenge of fragile states. like a distant and abstract concern. and too much of a focus on how Taken together, we believe these They are not. They are at the our bureaucracy looks, and not principles will position the United center of much of today’s regional enough on how it works. States to make a more meaningful disorder and global upheaval. There is no simple prescription difference at lower cost and with And the driver is the absence—or to address fragility. The United manageable risk. We recommend breakdown—of a social compact States cannot—and should the following Four “S” Framework.

2 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY Translating these principles into STRATEGIC SELECTIVE action will be a formidable test for the next administration. Mutual Concentrate efforts where Ameri- Focus on cases where U.S. inter- responsibility and accountability ca’s interests are greatest, paying ests and leverage are greatest, will be essential to reframing our special attention to states whose where goals are attainable, and engagement with fragile states and fragility could upend regional where those goals also align with with international partners and, order. Work closely with interna- the interests and capacities of local just as importantly, within our own tional organizations and partners partners. Empower international government. Three priorities stand to strengthen their capacity partners and institutions to lead out: to respond effectively where where they have greater stakes their immediate interests are at and influence. When our interests 1. Getting our own house in order stake and where second- and are high, but our leverage is low, by ensuring greater coherence third-order effects of fragility and we should insist that, at minimum, and alignment among executive instability increasingly have global our engagement does not make branch agencies and between repercussions. Prioritize preven- things more fragile, while exploring the executive and legislative tion by addressing the festering and refining available sticks and branches; root causes of fragility before carrots to alter the incentives of 2. Building more effective part- they bubble over into conflict and elites and other key actors. nerships among international instability. Invest in resilience, partners and between them and which will reduce demands on the fragile states; and United States by enhancing the ability of fragile states and societ- SUSTAINED 3. Sharpening the tools to help ies to manage shocks locally and Domestic political support fragile states more meaning- nonviolently. Be vigilant against is essential to achieving desired fully strengthen state-society short-term actions that may outcomes. It takes decades for a relationships. undermine long-term objectives country to transition from fragility We believe these recommenda- and further exacerbate fragility. to health; policy frameworks must tions would allow the administra- acknowledge this reality and invest tion to deliver a more disciplined, patiently and flexibly over time. realistic, sound and ultimately We cannot sustain the present effective approach. This paper will SYSTEMIC pace of reactive and expensive be accompanied over the coming Tackle security, political, crisis response. Nor can we dive months by a series of policy briefs and capacity challenges in rela- headfirst into complex environ- to explore specific policy, political, tionship to one another and not in ments without a shared sense of and bureaucratic aspects of this isolation. It is one thing to bring the what can be achieved and greater challenge in greater depth.1 entire toolkit of statecraft to bear. confidence that it will have the We have no illusions about the It is another thing entirely to make required political backing and complexity of this challenge or sure that toolkit works in concert budgetary resources. We must be about the limits of U.S. influence. toward shared goals. straight with the American people But we are confident about the and our partners about both the continued promise of principled limits of our means, and the costs American leadership to help and consequences of inaction. states and societies write their own future.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 3 Presidents Clinton (above) and Bush (below) meet with advisors in the White House Situation Room.

4 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY FRAGILITY AT A GLANCE STUDY GROUP DEFINITION Fragility is the absence or breakdown of a social contract between people and their government. Fragile states suffer from deficits of institutional capacity and political legitimacy that increase the risk of instability and violent conflict and sap the state of its resilience to disruptive shocks. FOUR “S” FRAMEWORK STRATEGIC SELECTIVE Concentrate efforts where America’s interests are Focus on cases where U.S. interests and leverage are greatest, paying special attention to states whose greatest, where goals are attainable, and where those fragility could upend regional order. goals also align with the interests and capacities of • Prevent or mitigate future crises local partners. • Couple prevention with resilience • Identify the most effective sources of U.S. leverage to incentivize local change • Be rigorous about trade-offs Play to complementary strengths of interna- Strengthen international partnerships that • • tional partners to avoid costly and counter- promote openness and transparency productive duplicative efforts • Align American interests and actions with local aspirations and solutions SYSTEMIC • Work together where interests align, but do Tackle security, political, and capacity challenges in not overlook divergence relationship to one another and not in isolation. • Develop a more proactive, adaptive, and synchronized interagency policy planning and implementation process for fragile states SUSTAINED Domestic political support is essential to achieving Foster an awareness that interventions • desired outcomes. It takes decades for a country to focused on only one dynamic will have unin- transition from fragility to health; policy frameworks tended consequences must acknowledge this reality and invest patiently and • Work toward a shared understanding among flexibly over time. interagency actors about how best to deploy Avoid getting involved too late and leaving America’s foreign policy tools and work with • too early one another • Structure realistic, flexible, and politically feasible plans • Invest in success

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 5 SUPPORTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN FRAGILE STATES: THE COLLECTIVE WISDOM 1. Invest in security and justice for all citizens.

2. Support legitimate government, characterized by inclusive politics, accountable institutions, and reconciliation.

3. Cultivate locally-led and locally-owned solutions where partnership is possible.

4. Create inclusive, equitable economic growth.

5. Sustain engagement. PRIORITY ACTIONS DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL FRAGILE-STATES COMPACT COMPACT COMPACT Ensure that the U.S. govern- Better synchronize efforts Invest in the tools and ap- ment works in a more inte- between the United States proaches for U.S. government grated fashion, rather than at and international partners in use that are needed to help cross purposes, to address and fragile states. fragile states foster legitimate mitigate fragility. state-society relations. 1. Expand the partnership 1. Build strategic foresight into model pioneered by the 1. Broaden the base of infor- the regular decision-making New Deal for Engagement mation used to inform decision- process at the National Security in Fragile States. making by building local knowl- Council (NSC) and schedule edge networks and making 2. Develop partnership regular senior-level discussions them more accessible in real strategies based on shared about fragility that elevate early time to U.S. and international interests in fragile states and warning and preventive action. policymakers. unique sources of expertise and 2. Work with Congress to capability. 2. Develop critical, under- identify specific fragile states resourced capabilities to 3. Build the capacity of key for long-term investment and address the needs of fragile international and regional orga- engagement strategies, and states: security sector engage- nizations to face the challenge resource for success. ment; anti-corruption; civil of fragile states. society support; public-private 3. Reform human capital and partnerships; leadership influ- management strategies to ence and coercion tools; elec- reflect policy needs, promote tions; education and exchanges; unity of purpose, and prioritize learning and evaluation. relationship-building in fragile states.

6 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY FRAGILITY WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS

he next administration will to address public health emergen- have to navigate an inter- cies, as seen with the precipitous T national landscape filled spread of Ebola, and to counter FRAGILITY DEFINED with daunting national security transnational criminal networks challenges: ambitious and revision- that deprive citizens of their dignity This Study Group defines ist states, transnational terrorism, and economies of their potential. fragility as the absence or new cyber threats, and fears In short, in a world that is more breakdown of a social of nuclear proliferation, among complex and interconnected than others. ever, fragility is pushing us closer contract between people Fragile states lie at the root of to a new normal of “unpredictable and their government. today’s global disorder, from chaos instability.”4 Fragile states suffer from in the Arab world to the refugee U.S. efforts to prevent fragility deficits of institutional crisis and from pandemic diseases and mitigate its consequences capacity and political to economic malaise.2 Fragility has continue to fall short. Meeting this contributed to the spike in violent growing challenge head-on will legitimacy that increase conflict since 2010, with a record require a re-imagined approach— the risk of instability and 65 million people displaced from one defined by careful prioritiza- violent conflict and sap 3 their homes at the end of 2015. tion, shared frameworks for action, the state of its resilience to Fragility can make it more difficult and effective partnerships. disruptive shocks.

HISTORICAL POLICY APPROACHES Addressing fragility has been an ethnic groups—events which can interests as strong states.” The evolving bipartisan priority for threaten regional security and U.S. 2006 NSS took the point further, more than two decades. interests.” recognizing that “Weak and impov- In the late 1990s, the Clinton President George W. Bush’s first erished states and ungoverned administration’s National Security National Security Strategy (NSS) areas are not only a threat to their Strategy for a New Century rec- reiterated that warning and listed people and a burden on regional ognized that states “unable to “failed states” as one of six “threats economies, but are also suscepti- provide basic governance, safety to U.S. interests.” After 9/11, the ble to exploitation by terrorists, ty- and security, and opportunities Bush administration prioritized the rants, and international criminals.” for their populations” could poten- need to address the exploitation The Obama administration has tially “generate internal conflict, of weak states by terrorists. As the sustained a focus on state fragility, mass migration, famine, epidemic 2002 NSS explained, “The events of naming it in the 2015 NSS as one diseases, environmental disasters, September 11, 2001, taught us that of “the top strategic risks to our mass killings and aggression weak states, like Afghanistan, can interests” and pledging to prioritize against neighboring states or pose as great a danger to national efforts to address it.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 7 A refugee camp in Rwanda, July 6, 2006. There are 65 million displaced globally in 2016, including 21.3 million refugees.

THE ONGOING CHALLENGE Despite the decades of scholarship understanding of strategies and flexibility, and focus. And efforts and hard-earned experience, goals for fragile states and the ab- to improve our response have too we have yet to come up with an sence of the integrated, sustained often been cosmetic—rethinking effective and sustainable approach effort required to balance short- how our bureaucracy looks, but to fragile states. Conflicts spread term imperatives with longer-term not how it works. and crises continue to catch us objectives. It also is tempting to These problems are not unique by surprise. For all the good work become distracted by emergent to the United States; no state or within and outside government, crises rather than focus where international body has fully cracked there is still no shared under- our interests and opportunities the fragility code, nor organized standing across U.S. government are greatest. We often lurch from and equipped itself to address ef- agencies about the best way to ap- one crisis to the next, limiting our fectively such a complex challenge. proach fragility. Fragility itself lacks a prescriptive element—it does not always help identify where the Across the U.S. government there is no clear or stakes are highest, where or how we should invest scarce resources, shared view of why, how, and when to engage and where we can make the most fragile states. These problems are not unique meaningful difference.5 Further- more, across the U.S. government to the United States; no state or international there is no clear or shared view body has fully cracked the fragility code. of why, how, and when to engage fragile states. Notwithstanding efforts to achieve a more coordinated ability to act preventively, or main- In fact, the growing number and response, different U.S. agencies tain a long-term strategic focus. diversity of stakeholders, national continue the injurious habit of The U.S. policymaking process agendas, technical priorities, talking past one another. Despite has few incentives for early action authorities, and politics have at important progress, security, in response to early warning or times confused as much as clarified development, economic, human- longer-term perspective, and the response. The World Bank and itarian, and political stovepipes much of our prevention toolkit the United Nations have begun persist in every stage of effort, is likewise poorly resourced and to embrace the need for new from assessment to decision-mak- understood. We embark on com- approaches to tackle fragility and ing and lessons learned. The plex endeavors with insufficient build resilience, but these reform result is the lack of a shared understanding, strategy, funding, efforts are still in their early days.

8 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY PRINCIPLES FOR ENGAGEMENT A NEW APPROACH

he new administration, a coming change in leadership at the United Nations, and an emerging global consensus about the fragility challenge make this an opportune moment to recalibrate our approach. T The United States cannot and should not try to “fix” every fragile state. Nor can we ignore this challenge; all fragility has the potential to affect U.S. interests to some extent, especially when left to fester. There is simply too much at stake for our interests, our partners, and the global order. A sound and realistic policy framework is urgently needed to help our policymakers determine where, when, and how to invest scarce resources and attention to maximum effect.

Flags of the world outside of the United Nations headquarters in New York, March 21, 2007.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 9 COLLECTIVE WISDOM: WHAT IS NEEDED IN FRAGILE STATES

There is growing recognition that Cooperation and Development agreed outcomes—can serve at its core, fragility is about the (OECD) published its annual as an effective approach for failure to forge a minimally inclu- fragility report, States of Fragility, making progress toward these sive, legitimate, and accountable underscoring that fragility occurs longer-term aspirations. Compacts compact between the state and on a continuum, and that it occurs have become an established society. not just across states but also method by development actors Previous landmark efforts, within them. to incentivize economic growth including the 2003 report of the Goal 16 of the new Sustainable and poverty alleviation. They have Commission on Post-Conflict Re- Development Goals (SDGs) an- not, however, been designed or construction, have warned against nounced at the 2015 U.N. General managed to explicitly target and pushing for change from the Assembly calls on the interna- address the vulnerabilities most outside when there is insufficient tional community to “promote relevant for counteracting fragility. internal support.6 Developing local peaceful and inclusive societies For example, the Millennium Chal- partnerships and supporting lo- for sustainable development, lenge Corporation (MCC) takes a cally led solutions, and giving such provide access to justice for all, principled approach to offering efforts time to work, is paramount and build effective, accountable, financial and technical assistance for success. and inclusive institutions at all to select partner countries that The World Bank’s 2011 World levels.” 9 Goal 16 recognizes that meet a minimum threshold of Development Report argued that institutional legitimacy is the key to stability and counteracting It is time to think as imaginatively about how what the bank’s leader at the time once called the “witches’ brew of to escape the fragility trap as we have about ineffective government, poverty, how to escape the poverty trap. and conflict” found in fragile states.7 Also in 2011, a landmark global policy agreement, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, identi- global development efforts will development and good gover- fied new mechanisms to coordinate stall absent a more serious effort nance, but many fragile states financial and political investments to tackle pervasive fragility. cannot qualify for MCC assistance. in fragile states. The agreement, These are enormously ambi- And the Partnership for Growth, a between self-identified fragile-state tious and complex aims—far more compact-based alliance between governments, international donors, easily stated than implemented. the United States and “high-per- and civil society organizations, Nevertheless, they are based forming developing countries,” was designed explicitly to create a on accumulated evidence and aims to “accelerate and sustain framework for mutually account- research, and serve as useful broad-based economic growth” able, internationally coordinated guideposts for sound policymak- but does not address deficiencies action, based on the principles of ing and effective structures of in the political compact.10 more locally owned, inclusive, ac- engagement. It is time to think as imagina- countable systems of governance.8 Compact models—or agree- tively about how to escape the More recently, in 2015, the ments among parties designed fragility trap as we have about how Organization for Economic for mutual accountability toward to escape the poverty trap.

10 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY SUPPORTING PEACE AND STABILITY Libyan rebels celebrate IN FRAGILE STATES: THE COLLECTIVE WISDOM after seizing the town of Al Bayda from government 1. Invest in security and justice for all citizens. forces, February 25, 2011.

2. Support legitimate government, characterized by inclusive politics, accountable institutions, and reconciliation.

3. Cultivate locally-led and locally-owned solutions where partnership is possible.

4. Create inclusive, equitable economic growth.

5. Sustain engagement.

The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet in Vienna. The Quartet received a Nobel Peace Prize for their work moving Tunisia towards participatory democracy, February 29, 2016.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 11 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN FRAGILE STATES: TOWARD A MORE DISCIPLINED APPROACH Four principles should inform decisions about when and how to engage fragile states: strategic, systemic, selective, and sustained. This Four “S” framework should help the next administration invest scarce resources and attention to maximum effect. STRATEGIC SYSTEMIC

A strategic approach to addressing fragility begins A systemic approach to fragility would help us make with the recognition that not all fragile states affect sense of complexity and more effectively address U.S. national interests to the same degree. We should fragility in all of its interconnected dimensions. This prioritize action in fragile states where stakes in would include seeing each individual effort as just regional order are greatest. A number of fragile states one piece of a broader puzzle; viewing threats and sit on major geopolitical fault-lines with a real impact opportunities as dynamic, evolving, and interde- on regional order and key U.S. interests like terrorism, pendent; and considering how specific tools and mass displacement, and energy security. This would approaches interact with one another. This means require attention to places like Tunisia, whose future developing strategies and programs that tackle matters for regional order in the Maghreb, just as security, political, and capacity challenges in rela- Nigeria’s matters to West Africa and Ukraine’s to tionship to one another and not in isolation. Such Europe. A strategic approach also would invest in a systems mindset should be supported by new or building the capacity of key partners to meet the strengthened tools, processes, and approaches that fragility challenge. enable policymakers to identify relevant patterns and leverage points against which the United States can Prevent or mitigate future crises by identifying • plan, act, and adapt accordingly. and addressing sources of fragility before they boil over into conflict and instability. • Develop a more proactive, adaptive, and synchronized interagency policy planning Couple prevention with resilience by investing • and implementation process for fragile states, in states and societies with the will and potential to predicated on a locally informed, holistic under- respond to internal or external shocks. standing of the challenges and leverage points for • Be rigorous about trade-offs between long-term U.S. engagement. objectives and short-term actions that risk under- Foster an awareness of unintended conse- cutting strategic aims. • quences caused by interventions that focus on • Strengthen international partnerships that only one dynamic within a broader system.12 promote openness and transparency, which Work toward a shared understanding among are crucial antidotes to fragility (e.g., the Open • interagency actors about how best to deploy Government Partnership).11 America’s foreign policy tools and work with one another: Diplomacy and security must be achieved locally; development and security are political concerns; and diplomacy and development cannot be separated from security and stability.

12 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY SELECTIVE SUSTAINED

A selective approach would calibrate American support A sustained approach requires sound and adapt- to instances where our interests and leverage are able policies based on the realities of the slow and greatest, where goals are achievable, and where those uneven pace of change, as well as the recognition goals also align with the interests and capacities of that broad political support is an indispensable local partners. This means empowering international prerequisite for success. Fleeting engagements can partners and institutions to lead where they have exacerbate fragility, waste resources, and undermine greater stakes and influence. Where the United States our credibility. Different fragile states and different lacks a willing partner, we will need to avoid taking U.S. interests and influence will call for differentiated steps that exacerbate fragility while employing a suite approaches. At times, the most that can be achieved of tools to entice, isolate, or bypass obstinate partners in the near- to medium term is preventing complete and make progress where we can. state breakdown or humanitarian catastrophe (e.g., Burundi). At other times, stakes and potential will Identify the most effective sources of U.S. • call for a significant and comprehensive engagement leverage to incentivize local change. U.S. leverage (e.g., Colombia), or encouraging positive progress can take many forms beyond financial assistance, and selectively filling the gaps (e.g., Tunisia). There including participation in regional or global eco- will also be cases where our main objective will be nomic and security architectures, training and to help build and sustain regional coalitions that can exchanges, diplomatic support, and the enormous take the lead (e.g., Africa’s Great Lakes region). contributions of our private sector and civil society organizations. • Avoid getting involved too late and leaving too early. Complete state failure and descent into Play to complementary strengths of interna- • violence cannot be the only call to action, just as tional partners to avoid costly and counterpro- “free and fair” elections cannot be the sole barome- ductive duplicative efforts—and be transparent ter of success. about weaknesses and gaps. We should also allow partners to take the lead where their influence and • Structure realistic, flexible, and politically fea- interests are greatest. sible plans. Use these plans as a basis for building the bipartisan political consensus necessary to Align American interests and actions with • sustain continued resourcing for the duration of local aspirations and solutions. The goal for the engagement. We should aim to protect key U.S. policy must be to help people write their own foreign policy interests from short-term politics future on their own terms. Local partners define that threaten to undermine financing and support the range of the possible and help determine what for those interests. Engaging Congress early and is “minimally acceptable.” The degree and scope of often is critical. our support—and rhetoric—should ideally reflect the ambition, will, and objectives of a broad base of • Invest in success. Make sure that partners the local population. pursuing reform receive sustained support and assistance. • Work together where interests align, but do not overlook divergence. We must be careful not • Avoid the trap of maximalist goals on unreal- to overestimate alignment with partners, to ensure istic timelines. Building pluralistic, vibrant democ- that our efforts do not inadvertently exacerbate racies can be a generational effort. We must align conflict dynamics in fragile states. expectations around outcomes and time frames to ensure a realistic measure of success and ability to sustain efforts over time.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 13 FOUR “S” ENGAGEMENT TWO CASE STUDIES

Against the backdrop of seemingly intractable challenges posed by fragility, a few examples of notable success stand out.

Secretary Kerry and Ambassador Whitaker meet with Colombian President Santos and Foreign Minister Holguin in Bogota, Colombia, December 12, 2014. PLAN COLOMBIA Colombia’s experience recovering from near state failure serves as a powerful example of what sustained, in- tegrated, and disciplined engagement in a fragile state can achieve. In 2005—the first year of the Fragile States Index—Colombia was listed as the 14th most fragile state, one spot behind North Korea.13 Colombia was beset by violence perpetrated by both a Marxist insurgency and drug kingpins who used cocaine revenues to hollow out the state and capture its security forces. Through decades of engagement, the United States created a strategic, systemic, selective, and sustained partnership with Colombia, resulting in a much more stable and prosperous country that today ranks as the world’s 61st most fragile state.14 Such an engagement is not easily replicable and does not come cheaply. The United States spent over $8 billion on Plan Colombia from 2000 to 2012 to safeguard regional stability.15 Such comprehensive, enduring endeavors are not possible in all cases and must be reserved for those countries of top strategic import. But Colombia is an example of how they can succeed when properly conceived, executed, resourced, and sustained across administrations. Even constructive partnerships such as this one have their share of blemishes, from human rights abuses to ongoing narco-trafficking in Colombia and in other regions driven by market forces resulting from Colombia’s success.16

14 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY STRATEGIC SELECTIVE

In the 1990s, Colombia was awash in narco cash. This The U.S. approach evolved over the years to match money fueled a guerrilla insurgency, imperiling an the will of local partners. At first, the United States elected government. Colombia’s fragility threatened attempted to coerce Colombia to the negotiating regional stability, and the drug trade produced violent table. The U.S. government exerted political pressure spillovers in neighboring states and in the United on President Ernesto Samper, who was beholden to States itself. This posed an unacceptable threat to the traffickers, by revoking his visa privileges in 1996 American security and offered a clear rationale for and cutting off most foreign assistance to Colombia. action. The United States asked itself two critical But the 1998 election of President Andrés Pastrana questions that would frame its approach: “What brought a more willing partner to the table. Colombia was Colombia prepared to do?” (What was the local wanted to rid itself of the “narco-state” label and to appetite for change?); and “In what way could we end the cycles of torturous violence that had plagued organize ourselves to help Colombia reform and rebound it for decades. To build trust and confidence, the successfully? ” (How could the United States be a good United States cooperated to address the highest external partner?) priority counternarcotic and security objectives, and over time expanded the collaboration to the social, economic justice, and rule of law objectives. SYSTEMIC

As a result of effective prioritization and policy develop- SUSTAINED ment, the United States was able to marshal a unified, systematic approach to assisting Colombia to achieve While historically the United States had provided aid shared priorities. In Colombia, deep historical, institu- on a year-by-year basis, under Pastrana it agreed to tional relationships between the U.S. State Department commit funding for programs and personnel for an and the Colombian National Police, as well as between initial three-year period. Furthermore, resources for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Colom- Plan Colombia were provided through a supplemental bian military, laid the groundwork for the partnership. Congressional appropriation, meaning that no depart- The United States possessed an array of foreign ments or agencies had to take funds from elsewhere assistance tools that were of great interest to the within their budgets. Crucially, burden-sharing and Colombian government. The United States was there- Colombian buy-in enabled success. Local commitment fore able to construct a unified plan based on what it ensured that Colombia would carry more than its fair knew the Colombian government was already doing share, making the effort sustainable and expanding it and what the U.S. government could do to strengthen beyond basic security objectives to a shared agenda that effort. Given the long-term, iterative nature of the for transformational change. Remarkably, Plan Colom- task, the United States sought to institutionalize the bia has endured across three administrations with policy by creating a system whereby each participating strong, consistent bipartisan support in Congress and U.S. agency brought its own resources to the table. with billions of dollars in uninterrupted financing. The State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (now the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs) served as the central coordinating body, which ensured that people would not be worn out as they typically were through interagency secondments. The collab- oration worked because of the shared recognition that multidisciplinary efforts were needed to address Colombia’s challenges.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 15 President Barack Obama hosts a town hall in Yangon, Myanmar, on November 14, 2014.

MYANMAR Myanmar, also known as Burma, a reclusive military dictatorship since 1962, offers another example of a strate- gic, systemic, selective, and sustained approach. Today, Myanmar is undergoing a fragile but hopeful transition after the 2015 election of the National League for Democracy (NLD) under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. With U.S. and international support, the future holds promise for meaningful reform and transformation in the long-suffering country.17

STRATEGIC SYSTEMIC

Although not a major power, Myanmar sits at the Beginning with the establishment of a “special repre- geopolitical crossroads of Asia, between India to the sentative and policy coordinator” for Myanmar, and west, China to the north, and fellow Southeast Asian extending into the operations of the U.S. Embassy states to the east and south. Myanmar is a member of after installation of an ambassador in 2012, the the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), United States pursued an integrated, coordinated, a critical body to U.S. regional interests. Myanmar’s systematic approach to Myanmar policy. An coast includes sea lanes that link the Indian Ocean assistance-coordination group was formed in early with the Pacific Ocean. Myanmar is also the epicenter 2012. The group was chaired and directed by the of drug-resistant malaria and tuberculosis, is a major special representative’s office, with extensive guid- global and regional source of opium and metham- ance and support, including detailed staff, from the phetamine, and has been a leading trading partner U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). and arms market for North Korea in the past decade. Later in 2012, Ambassador Derek Mitchell and US- Furthermore, in a region where democratic devel- AID Mission Director Chris Milligan worked closely opment has receded in recent years, the success of together in the field to implement assistance tailored Myanmar’s transition may serve as an important model to Myanmar’s unique local conditions. This work for other regional nations, as democratic failure may proceeded according to an explicit strategic vision bolster the credibility of autocratic narratives. For all developed in part through the Integrated Country these reasons, the United States has a keen interest in Strategy process. The rest of the embassy country the success of Myanmar’s nascent reform effort. team, including the deputy chief of mission, defense

16 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY attaché, public affairs director, and Office of Transition Initiatives representative, among others, also adhered to a disciplined process that included the establish- SUSTAINED ment of a number of internal joint working groups After 50 years of systematic degradation of every to address, inter alia, Rakhine State (Rohingya), inter- institution in the country (except the military), pa- communal conflict, the peace process, and the 2015 tience, persistence, and increased bureaucratic and election. In that way, the embassy remained united financial resources devoted to Myanmar will remain in approach, systematic in implementation, and critical for some time. Myanmar’s government and responsive to new developments. The “one post, one people have demonstrated a clear desire for a long- mission” partnership mindset reinforced by embassy term relationship with the United States, viewing U.S. leadership prevented the kind of sectoral stovepiping public and private investment as important to their that would have undermined policy effectiveness as continued reform and development and to our cred- well as U.S. leadership among international missions ibility as a partner in their time of need. U.S. official in the country. assistance increased substantially after 2011. Priority attention was given to health, rural development, democratic development, humanitarian assistance, peace support, promotion of interreligious tolerance, SELECTIVE and public-private partnerships in the information and communications technology sector and among Although—and in some ways because—the United U.S. universities. Fulbright, Humphrey, and other States pursued a policy of diplomatic and economic educational scholarships expanded, and the Peace isolation of the former military regime for more Corps opened an office with the intention to place than a decade, the people of Myanmar welcomed volunteers on the ground in 2016. However, the level its re-engagement as reform gained momentum of USAID assistance flattened out over time, and after beginning in 2011. Key figures in senior levels of the the historic 2015 elections, the United States did not quasi-military government were open to learning increase funding to assist the new democratic govern- about the Open Government Partnership, signing up ment. (Others, including Japan, the United Kingdom to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the European Union, did increase their assistance (EITI), and accepting workshops (and private advice) support after the election.) Regular visits by the U.S. on a full spectrum of issues geared toward conform- secretary of state, the 2012 appointment of the first ing to international standards. At the same time, the U.S. ambassador to Myanmar in 22 years, and two government released virtually all political prisoners, presidential visits in two years have reflected priority began serious peace talks with ethnic armed groups, interest in Myanmar during the Obama administra- broadened space for civil society, vastly expanded tion. However, in the future, political symbolism will be media freedom, and addressed its illicit arms trade less important than assisting the country’s economic with North Korea. These actions were all confi- development, peace process, military reform, religious dence-building measures that demonstrated serious and ethnic unity, and other urgent needs, to enable interest to reform and work with the United States. Myanmar to successfully transition to a less fragile The exception was military-to-military engagement, and more coherent, peaceful, and democratic nation. which proceeded slowly given the continued civil war and ongoing concerns (raised by both ethnic minority groups and the NLD, the political opposition) about the military’s role in the country’s democratic future.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 17 FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE PRIORITY ACTIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION

ranslating these principles into action will be a formidable task for the next administration. We recom- mend focusing on three principal lines of effort, or compacts, each of which is defined by mutual respon- T sibility and accountability: Domestic Compact: getting our own house in order by ensuring greater coher- ence and alignment among executive branch agencies and between the executive and legislative branches; International Compact: building more effective partnerships among international partners and between the international community and fragile states; and Fragile-States Compact: sharpening the tools to strengthen state-society relationships within fragile states. Taken alone, any one of these recommendations will be insufficient. But taken together, a process of coordi- nated horizon-scanning, prioritization, early warning, early action, strengthened partnerships, and refined tools can significantly improve U.S. engagement in fragile states.

Taken alone, any one of these recommendations will be insufficient. But taken together …they can significantly improve U.S. engagement in fragile states. A case investigation team working to monitor and control Ebola in Liberia, January 31, 2015.

18 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY DOMESTIC COMPACT Ensure the U.S. government works in a more integrated fashion, rather than at cross purposes, to address and mitigate fragility.

RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Build strategic foresight into the regular decision-making process at the National Security Council (NSC) and schedule regular senior-level discussions about fragility that elevate early warning and preventive action. Every NSC faces the challenge of Force (PITF)18 and other indices. • As a part of this process, es- balancing urgent crises with im- tablish a working-level forum, The foresight cell should lead portant long-term considerations. • to coordinate comprehensive regular joint assessments of Early warning and more proactive, assistance and programming to priority countries to determine preventive action is critical to a high-priority fragile states. whether criteria for effective more disciplined and effective engagement are present. Institute regular interagency approach. This will require analysis, • tabletop exercises on priority assessments, and processes at the Develop shared diagnostics for • fragile states focused on most senior levels of government fragile states that bring together both early warning and crisis that incentivize discussions about regional and subject-matter response scenarios, to build a joint strategic, resource, and experts from the interagency deeper shared understanding personnel planning and action. to inform planning and of drivers of crisis and effective decision-making. Illustrative Actions responses. Building on lessons learned Establish a strategic foresight • Ensure that all relevant • from the Atrocities Prevention • cell within the Directorate of agencies are included in such Board, establish a new quarterly Strategic Planning of the Na- meetings and exercises (in- NSC Deputies Committee meet- tional Security Council. Direct cluding USAID as outlined in ing that uses the “fragile-states the foresight cell to identify Presidential Policy Directive-6, watch list” and the work of the top-tier fragile states of concern Treasury, Justice, and others foresight cell to consider policy to U.S. interests (i.e. a “frag- with key expertise and tools)19 implications of new develop- ile-states watch list”), building to develop a shared under- ments in priority watch-list on and integrating the work of standing of the challenge and states and to monitor imple- the USAID Fragile States Alert the available responses. mentation of relevant strategies List, the Political Instability Task and planning.

2. Work with Congress to identify specific fragile states for long-term investment and engagement strategies, and resource for success.

Resetting relations with Congress our confidence in our ability to work with key members to focus is an essential prerequisite for effect progress in such envi- on the most critical fragile states, improving policy effectiveness, ronments. In a time of scarce and to agree on the level, type, and sustaining a level of resourcing that resources and reduced congres- length of funding required for suc- matches what is needed in fragile sional appetite for foreign engage- cess. Just as Congress was able to environments, and strengthening ment, the administration should sustain military and development

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 19 financing for Plan Colombia for the strategic planning effort priority states and on the more than a decade, the future at the NSC and dialogue with authorities that need to be re- Congress can generate sustained members. formed and refined to improve political will for long-term strat- the quality of our engagements. Work with Congress to create a egies when aligned with clear • multiyear, flexible funding mech- Support expanded interagency strategic imperatives, achievable • anism (such as an expanded transfer authorities for joint objectives, and realistic timelines Complex Crises Fund) for these programming for priority fragile outlining incremental steps toward priority fragile states to allow states, taking lessons from past progress. Without this mutual com- for predictable and adaptable efforts such as the 1207 Secu- mitment, well-planned interagency programming. This mechanism rity and Stabilization program. efforts have been hampered by should help increase flexibility A useful model might be an piecemeal funding with serious and responsiveness that is authority considered, but not policy consequences.20 currently hampered by volumi- incorporated, in the FY17 Senate Illustrative Actions nous legislative earmarks on National Defense Authorization assistance budgets. Act (NDAA) that would have Use the Four “S” framework • enabled resource transfers to select a portfolio of priority Organize periodic, multiagency • between DoD and USAID for fragile states for congressional fragile-states briefings before specific challenges. engagement, informed by Congress, focusing on these

President Obama convenes a National Security Council meeting, April 19, 2013.

20 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY 3. Reform human capital and management strategies to reflect policy needs, promote unity of purpose, and prioritize relationship-building in fragile states.

Systemic responses to fragility require a shared understanding of the combined U.S. government toolkit and capabilities. Too few government officials have relevant, cross-functional experience within the interagency that facilitates the shared sense of purpose and un- derstanding needed to achieve the government’s strategic priorities in fragile states. This reality is driven, in part, by interagency promotion criteria and practices that depri- oritize assignments outside home agencies. Finally, finding a balance between embassy security and the inevitable risks that come with local engagement will be crucial to enabling our personnel to develop requisite understanding and access.

Illustrative Actions U.S. Special Operations Task Force provides security for local shura, Uruzgan province, Afghanistan, March 16, 2013. • Learn from past efforts (e.g., the Civilian Response Corps and ongoing DoD efforts to • Increase the shared under- • For priority fragile states, track service member exper- standing of the national security identify assignment practices tise) to develop an interagency workforce by continuing and that will ensure continuity of mechanism to identify and track significantly increasing emphasis critical relationships and exper- personnel expertise in relevant on the National Security Profes- tise, including through incen- functional and regional areas. sional Development (NSPD) 21 tives for extended hardship program, with a particular deployments. Conduct a capabilities audit and • focus on interagency rotations catalog all relevant U.S. gov- Provide civilians serving in as a key component of leader • ernment tools and capabilities high-risk environments with recruitment, development, and available to address fragility, and standardized cross-agency promotion. make the information easily ac- training to conduct mission- cessible across the interagency. critical work.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 21 INTERNATIONAL COMPACT Better synchronize efforts between the United States and international partners in fragile states.

RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Expand the partnership model pioneered by the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The New Deal effectively captures providing Timely and predictable • Apply New Deal “FOCUS princi- the conceptual basis for a sound aid—are essential to the effective ples” for engagement (Fragility approach to fragile states, in functioning of all state systems. assessment; One vision, one support of five Peacebuilding plan; Compact; Use Peacebuild- Illustrative Actions and Statebuilding Goals (PSG): ing and Statebuilding Goals to legitimate politics, security, jus- • Champion support of and monitor country progress; and tice, economic foundations, and engagement on the New Deal Support political dialogue and revenue and services. A common beyond USAID within the U.S. leadership) to countries that criticism of the New Deal is that it government. might not embrace the “fragile” has remained in the sole domain label (such as Nigeria, Myanmar, Incentivize expanded support of finance and planning ministries, • Ukraine and Georgia), but where of the New Deal in fragile states which has undermined its effec- the core approach remains valid. beyond ministries of finance and tiveness. The New Deal “TRUST planning, to include all security, Support mentoring state-to-state principles”—Transparency, Risk • political, and development and society-to-society relation- sharing, Using country systems, departments as well as across ships between fragile states to Strengthening capacities, and civil society. share lessons and ideas.

The Sustainable Development Goals projected on the United Nations building in New York, September 2015.

22 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY 2. Develop partnership strategies based on shared interests in fragile states and unique sources of expertise and capability.

Regardless of U.S. strategic inter- Illustrative Actions for Economic Cooperation and ests, there are instances where we Development. Build upon past and ongoing have limited resources and limited • efforts to track capability Institute a U.S. government- leverage. In other cases, efforts are • and capacity across specific wide commitment to inclusion not coordinated among donors, donors and functional areas, of key civil society stakeholders leading to a cacophony of assis- and organize a comprehensive in ad hoc multilateral mecha- tance that fails to help or may even effort to collate and publicize nisms (like “Friends of” coali- harm fragile states. Based on the a map of the landscape of tions and the Bonn/Chicago/To- principles outlined in the New Deal, actors (including states, non- kyo meetings for Afghanistan22) and countries’ strategic interests, governmental organizations, which are critical for long-term allies and partners should build and the private sector) as well success. on each other’s strengths to make as their respective comparative progress in a greater number of Establish harmonized priorities advantages (e.g., police training, • states than otherwise possible. and reporting systems that mediation, etc.) for building Furthermore, by conceptualizing encourage the participation integrated fragile-state strate- partnerships broadly, the interna- of nongovernmental organiza- gies. While the resource should tional community can allow those tions in such forums, such as be accessible to all parties, it with the greatest interests and the “Grand Bargain” between ultimately should be owned, most relevant capabilities to take donors and aid agencies, managed, and updated by an the lead, resulting in more efficient, announced at the 2016 World international, multilateral entity less expensive, and more effective Humanitarian Summit, to reform such as the United Nations, the strategies. humanitarian assistance.23 World Bank, or the Organization

3. Build the capacity of key international and regional organizations to face the challenge of fragile states.

International bodies such as Illustrative Actions • Work with the United Nations the United Nations and regional and key regional organizations Work with each regional organi- institutions such as the African • (e.g., African Union) to develop zation to establish local capabil- Union (AU), the Association for strategies for increased regional ities for monitoring fragility and Southeast Asian Nations, the peacekeeping and peace-build- developing mitigation plans. Lake Chad Basin Commission ing capacity, and continue (LCBC), and the Central American • Provide active support for efforts to improve the training, Integration System (SICA), among initiatives and partnerships (e.g., equipping, and resourcing of many others, are potentially Community of Democracies, peacekeepers.24 well-positioned to address Open Government Partnership, Encourage United Nations mem- fragility within a regional context. Inter-American Democratic • ber states to direct their invest- As the challenges of fragility are Charter, Sustainable Develop- ments into multilateral funding often transnational, working ment Goal 16 and other norma- streams for counterterrorism, within these international and re- tive, values-based efforts) that governance, rule of law, and resil- gional institutions can help foster offer clear evidence and incen- ience initiatives to support regional more complete regional solutions tives for legitimate and capable capacity-building efforts. to regional problems. governance.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 23 FRAGILE-STATES COMPACT Invest in the tools and approaches for U.S. government use that are needed to help fragile states foster legitimate state-society relations.

RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Broaden the base of information used to inform decision-making by building local knowledge networks and making them more accessible in real time to U.S. and international policymakers.

Non-governmental organizations, opportunities, rather than simply Framework, Conflict Assessment civil society, the humanitarian com- informing crisis response, is critical System Tool, etc.). munity, and the private sector have to policymaking related to fragile Establish formal processes deep roots and local networks in states. • and requisite expectations for all fragile states, but their perspec- Illustrative Actions all agencies to regularly share tives rarely inform or influence fragility-relevant data and policy decisions. Additionally, Adapt formal assessment, • reporting with their interagency non-reporting U.S. government planning, and evaluation tools counterparts, without undue entities, such as USAID, cultivate and processes currently used classification that hampers their unique data in fragile states but across the interagency to be ability to work with non-govern- do not have the institutionalized more responsive to sources of ment partners. mechanisms to systematically fragility and resilience, in line with share it across the interagency. the new proposed “fragile-states • Expand investment in, and Such agencies and departments watch list” and NSC assessments cross-agency access to, big-data should be enabled to provide as (e.g., charge State and USAID to analytics tools to better orga- well as consume fragility-relevant jointly adapt such tools as Con- nize, learn from, and apply data information; likewise, packaging it flict Assessment Framework 2.0, on fragility challenges. to identify long-term trends and Interagency Conflict Assessment

2. Develop critical, under-resourced capabilities to address the needs of fragile states.

The United States has often groundwork for effective and public good, respect for human under-resourced capabilities that evidence-based security sector rights, and access to justice must be have proved essential to effectively engagement has been laid in strengthened in security assistance reverse fragility, mitigate its exter- Presidential Policy Directive 23, but programming. In countries where nalities, or increase willingness or leadership investment is needed such reform is not yet possible, ability of partners to take on these for its implementation. Rather than U.S. policymakers should seriously challenges. Success in assisting starting anew, the next admin- consider whether security assis- fragile states with their transitions istration should build upon this tance programs can be effective. will require rethinking when and progress to ensure that the United To support such decision-making, how such capabilities are applied States has the capacity to engage implementing agencies should but also reconsidering the capabili- effectively not only with partner continue to strengthen still-nascent ties themselves. militaries but also ministries, police, security monitoring and evaluation and judicial systems. In fragile approaches, ensuring such efforts Security Sector Engagement: states in particular, emphasis on are used to inform relevant plan- Much of the conceptual equal provision of security as a ning and policy decisions.25

24 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY A child admires election artwork, Afghanistan, March 2014.

Conflict Mediation: The that erodes the social fabric of the approaches to fragile states more United States urgently needs to state, weakening government legiti- broadly—whether security or strengthen and grow its bench of macy. Therefore, efforts to mitigate economic assistance, trade or trained and tested conflict media- fragility must meaningfully address exchanges—rather than be as- tors within the State Department systemic corruption to give other signed to specialized personnel to prevent and resolve violent con- investments in local capacity and with narrow missions.26 flicts more effectively. The current legitimacy the opportunity to demand for these professionals, succeed. Countering corruption re- Elections: Long considered a both for U.S.-led and international quires a deeper understanding of milestone in democratic reform, efforts, also provides an opportu- the power dynamics, motivations, elections can also have a polarizing nity to reconsider the traditional and means of state and non-state and destabilizing impact in fragile role and profile of mediators, actors, including recognition of environments, particularly when including what role non-traditional both formal and informal power rushed, conducted in the absence mediators might play. Likewise, the structures that govern society. of appropriate political inclusivity, State Department should revisit Comprehensive understanding or when lacking foundational how such mediation efforts are of kleptocratic networks in fragile elements to ensure a secure, safe, stood up, staffed, organized, and states needs to be developed and transparent election. State supported to ensure they have and shared as a matter of course, and USAID should jointly conduct access to the greatest possible starting with strengthening rel- a systemic review of the role and leverage, expertise, flexibility, and evant intelligence requirements impact of elections conducted in expeditionary enablers. supported by technical and expert states across the fragility spec- staff across the U.S. interagency. trum, as well as the effectiveness Anti-Corruption: In fragile states, Likewise, anti-corruption efforts of international assistance in corruption is a corrosive force should figure into U.S. policy setting conditions for safe and

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 25 secure political transitions. These Leadership Influence and Co- Education and Exchanges: In assessments should be used to ercion Tools: In instances where countries with weak institutions inform the portfolio of U.S. and fragile states may have significant and frayed state-society compacts, partner assistance, as well as to impact on U.S. interests but coun- people-to-people exchanges can establish political benchmarks for terparts are unwilling to take diffi- have outsize impact in the long fragile states. cult steps to transcend fragility, we run. Long-term educational and should consider carefully whether exchange programs remain a wise Civil Society Support: The United we have the ability to influence and strategic investment and States needs sharper and more this dynamic, as well as the limits should be fully integrated into our innovative tools and strategies to of our own leverage. Over the last engagement strategies, especially help create and preserve open several years the United States when leverage with existing space for civil society across a has developed a growing toolkit of governments is limited. broad range of issues, including incentives and coercive measures democracy and good governance, to influence the calculus of leaders Learning and Evaluation: The public health, education for girls, worldwide (e.g., targeted financial United States needs a more and equitable service provision. sanctions, asset freezes, and travel robust learning agenda to collect Support for civil society must restrictions). While the authorities data from past fragile-states include effective leverage with underlying these tools have grown engagements and incorporate leaders as well as new tactics increasingly sophisticated, our lessons learned into future for supporting and working with understanding of the specific eco- endeavors.29 Creating a process of organizations under threat.27 nomic and political effects, impact, consistent, strategic re-evaluation and appropriate role in U.S. foreign and capability repositioning, as Public-Private Partnerships: policy is still quite nascent. The close as possible to key deci- Private-sector investments, if not next administration should craft sion-makers, will help ensure that understood and harnessed as a a detailed framework, initiated the United States does not apply powerful incentive for action, may by Treasury, for when and how the wrong tools to the wrong have a pernicious effect in fragile such measures are in our national problems. The next administra- states. In May 2016, the World interest, how to apply more tion should direct the proposed Economic Forum Global Agenda sophisticated measures in part- NSC foresight cell to commission Council on Fragility, Violence, nership with regional bodies, and a series of studies to capture and Conflict published a report, in particular, how to set realistic lessons learned from past U.S. “Responsible Investment in Fragile goals for such efforts when their engagements with fragile states Contexts,” emphasizing the role impacts may reverberate broadly and ensure that key findings and businesses can play beyond typi- throughout society, localized, and recommendations inform U.S. pol- cal corporate social responsibility international markets. icy, approaches, and investment in interventions, to build resources, capabilities going forward. knowledge, capital, and networks to mitigate fragility.28 The United States must take into account the important role of the private sector in fragile states and work with corporations, investors, and financial institutions to support sustainable transformation.

26 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY CONCLUSION

tate fragility is a generational challenge that will remain a central feature of the international landscape for the foreseeable future. Our response, however, can and indeed must evolve. We believe that prior- S itizing engagements that are strategic, systemic, selective, and sustained can help U.S. policymakers make wiser decisions about how to direct U.S. leadership at a moment of ever-mounting demands and ever-growing constraints on resources and public appetite for international engagement. We also recognize that a conceptual policy framework is not enough. Focusing policy changes and institu- tional reforms across three mutually reinforcing compacts can help bring this framework to life. We remain confident that a focused effort to get our own house in order, build more effective international partner- ships, and strengthen key tools in the U.S. toolkit will position the next administration for greater success.

Sunrise over Gammarth, Tunisia, 2005.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 27 NOTES

1. At the time of this publication, the list of policy briefs countries affected by conflict and fragility, donors from and working titles includes: “Gender and Fragility” (Nora OECD countries, and civil society organizations. The pact Dudwick, CNAS and Kathleen Kuehnast, USIP); “Congress’s outlined new modes of operation for donor nations, Role in Addressing Fragility” (Katherine Kidder, CNAS); including a commitment to locally owned and led develop- “First 100 Days Implementation Plan” (Loren Schulman, ment priorities, and and more inclusive planning processes CNAS); “Transparency and Interagency Decision-making” in target countries. This new method of working was (Loren Schulman, CNAS); “Fragility and Security Sector designed to promote five foundational Peacebuilding and Reform” (Rachel Kleinfeld, Carnegie); “Closing Space for Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), five FOCUS principles (Fragility Civil Society and State Fragility” (Thomas Carothers, Assessment; One Vision One Plan; Compact; Use PSGs to Carnegie); “Corruption and State Fragility” (Sarah Chayes, Monitor; and Support political dialogue) and five TRUST Carnegie); “The Fragility Learning Agenda: What Do We principles (Transparency, Risk sharing, Use and strengthen Need to Know?” (Andrew Blum, USIP); “Resilience and country systems, Strengthen capacities, and Timely and Fragility” (Lauren Van Metre, USIP); “Adopting a Movement predictable aid): http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/. Mindset to Address the Challenge of Fragility” (Maria 9. United Nations, “Goal 16: Promote just, peace- Stephan, USIP); “Implementing a Unified Approach to ful, and inclusive societies,” http://www.un.org/ Fragility: Lessons learned from Burma” (Jessica Davey, sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/. Chris Milligan, and Derek Mitchell); ”Preparing for Complex 10. Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Partnership for Conflicts” (Robert D. Lamb and Melissa R. Gregg, Interna- Growth,” https://www.mcc.gov/initiatives/initiative/ tional Peace and Security Institute). For more information, partnership-for-growth. please visit: http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/ 11. Open Government Partnership “is a multilateral initiative senior-study-group-fragility. that aims to secure concrete commitments from govern- 2. Eighty-eight percent of all terrorist attacks in 2015 oc- ments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight curred in countries that were experiencing or involved corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen in armed conflicts. Institute for Economics & Peace, governance. In the spirit of multi-stakeholder collaboration, “Global Terrorism Index 2015” (November 2015), http:// OGP is overseen by a Steering Committee including repre- economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ sentatives of governments and civil society organizations.” Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf. http://www.opengovpartnership.org/about. 3. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “Global Trends: 12. For example, successful counternarcotics programs in Forced Displacement in 2015” (June 20, 2016), https:// Colombia pushed drug trafficking routes into Central Amer- s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2016/2016-06- ica and West Africa, which has helped fuel greater violence 20-global-trends/2016-06-14-Global-Trends-2015.pdf. in Mexico and finance terrorist operations in the Sahel, 4. James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide respectively. Mabel Gonzales Bustelo, “A sense of déjà vu: Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” State- Illegal drugs in West Africa and the Sahel,” TheBrokerOn- ment for the Record to the Committee on Armed Services, line.eu, January 28, 2015, http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/ U.S. Senate, February 2016, http://www.armed-services. Articles/A-sense-of-deja-vu-Illegal-drugs-in-West-Africa- senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-09-16.pdf. and-the-Sahel. 5. For example, countries as disparate as Haiti and Iraq rank 13. Fragile States Index 2005, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ next to each other on the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States rankings-2005-sortable. Index (11th and 12th, respectively, in 2015). 14. Fragile States Index 2015, http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ 6. Center for Strategic and International Studies and the rankings-2015. Association of the U.S. Army, “Play to Win: Final report 15. Michael Shifter, “Plan Colombia: A Retrospective,” Americas of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Recon- Quarterly (Summer 2012). Additionally, Colombia recipro- struction” (January 2003), http://reliefweb.int/sites/ cated, dedicating 1.1 percent of its annual gross domestic reliefweb.int/files/resources/44A3BEDEFCE6DB54C- product to the war on drugs from 2000 to 2008. 1256CD1003449F0-csis-play-jan03.pdf. 16. This case illustration draws from an article by Senior 7. Robert Zoellick, “Securing Development,” delivered at the Advisory Group member Ambassador Tom Pickering: U.S. Institute of Peace “Passing the Baton” Conference, Thomas R. Pickering, “Anatomy of Plan Colombia,” The January 8, 2009. American Interest, 5 no. 2 (November 1, 2009), http:// 8. The New Deal was a product of the International Dialogue www.the-american-interest.com/2009/11/01/ on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, a unique multi­ anatomy-of-plan-colombia/. stakeholder partnership that includes the “g7+” group of 17. Ambassador Derek Mitchell contributed immensely to the

28 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY development of this case illustration, including penning an the way those funds are spent. The deal between 30 repre- initial draft. sentatives of donors and aid agencies includes a commit- 18. The Political Instability Task Force (formerly the State ment to deliver at least 25 percent of humanitarian funding Failure Task Force) was a CIA-sponsored effort to identify to local and national responders, which currently receive factors that increase a state’s vulnerability to political insta- only about 1 percent. Ben Parker, “Is the Grand Bargain a bility over a six-month to two-year period. The task force Big Deal?,” irinnews.org, May 24, 2016, https://www.irin- has identified more than 250 historical instances of acute news.org/analysis/2016/05/24/grand-bargain-big-deal. instability occurring between 1955 and 2002. Jack Gold- 24. President Barack Obama issued a presidential memoran- stone, Robert Bates, and Colin Kahl, “Political Instability dum to federal departments and agencies on September Task Force: New Findings” (February 5, 2004), https://www. 28, 2015, reaffirming the strong support of the United wilsoncenter.org/event/political-instability-task-force- States for U.N. peace operations and directing a wide range new-findings#sthash.lACDazHe.dpuf. of actions to strengthen and modernize U.N. operations 19. Presidential Policy Directive 6 (PPD-6) was issued on for a new era. The memorandum—the first presidential September 22, 2010 by the Obama administration. The guidance on multilateral peace operations in more than first of its kind by a U.S. administration, PPD-6 stated that 20 years—outlines U.S. efforts toward the following: “development is vital to U.S. national security and is a building partner capacity; expanding U.S. contributions; strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United driving reform; increasing U.S. commitments for officer States. It call[ed] for the elevation of development as a core staffing, specialized logistics and equipment support; and pillar of American power and chart[ed] a course for devel- expanding peacekeeper exercises and training. The White opment, diplomacy, and defense to mutually reinforce and House Office of the Press Secretary, Memorandum for the complement one another in an integrated comprehensive Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: United States approach to national security.” It provided clear objectives Support to United Nations Peace Operations (September 28, and an implementation roadmap, including calling for the 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ Administrator of USAID to be included in NSC meetings, as pubs/2015peaceoperations.pdf. appropriate. The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/ 25. For a typology illustrating the improved allocation of PPD-6: U.S. Global Development Policy Fact Sheet (September security sector assistance and detailed recommendations, 22, 2010), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/global-dev.pdf. see policy brief: Kleinfeld, “Fragility and Security Sector 20. For example, in a comprehensive interagency plan for Iraq Reform.” put forth in 2011, Congress decided to fully fund Defense 26. For insight on the corrosive effect of corruption in fragile Department lines of effort while cutting civilian agency states and detailed recommendations on “mainstreaming” funding, despite DOD support. Walter Pincus, “Gates corruption analysis, see policy brief: Chayes, “Corruption pleads for ‘critically urgent’ funds for State Department’s and State Fragility.” work in Iraq,” Washington Post (February 17, 2011), http:// 27. For recommendations to counter the closing space chal- www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti- lenge and engaging autocracies, see policy brief: Carothers, cle/2011/02/17/AR2011021706545.html. “Closing Space for Civil Society and State Fragility,” and 21. The National Security Professional Development program policy brief: Stephan, “Adopting a Movement Mindset to was launched in 2007 by the Bush administration, based Address the Challenge of Fragility.” on the three pillars of education, training, and rotational 28. The report outlines new strategies and offers case studies service. After a “strategic pause,” it was reinvigorated by the that illustrate how businesses can effectively operate Obama administration in 2011. Catherine Dale, “National in fragile settings to support government-led efforts to Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, address inclusive governance, corruption, inequality, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress,” RL34565 and other drivers of fragility. World Economic Forum (Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2011), Global Agenda Council on Fragility, Violence, and Conflict, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34565.pdf. “Responsible Investment in Fragile Contexts” (May 2016), 22. From 2011-2012 the Special Representative for Afghanistan http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC16_Responsible_ and Pakistan team led a diplomatic campaign to connect Investment_Fragile_Context.pdf. the military effort with the instruments of non-military 29. For recommendations on a fragility learning agenda, see power in South and Central Asia, including official develop- policy brief: Blum, “The Fragility Learning Agenda: What Do ment assistance, involvement of the private sector, support We Need to Know?” for civil society, and the use of both bilateral and multilat- eral diplomacy. 23. Signed at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, the Grand Bargain is a commitment to providing more, longer-term funding and less earmarking, in exchange for greater efficiency and transparency from aid agencies in

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 29 APPENDIX I: SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP The members of the Senior Advisory Group listed below provided input and feedback throughout the writing process. The opinions expressed in this report are the authors’ alone.

General John R. Allen, USMC (Ret.) Christopher Kojm Co-Director and Senior Fellow Shapiro Professor of International Affairs Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence George Washington University The Brookings Institution Dr. Stephen D. Krasner Hon. Howard Berman Professor of Political Science and Senior Felllow Senior Advisor, Covington & Burling, LLP Freeman Spogli Institute and Hoover Institution Stanford University Amb. Johnnie Carson Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace Clare Lockhart Director, Institute for State Effectiveness Jared Cohen President, Jigsaw Rt. Hon. David Miliband President and Chief Executive Officer Amb. Elizabeth Cousens International Rescue Committee Deputy Chief Executive Officer United Nations Foundation Amb. George Moose Vice Chairman, U.S. Institute of Peace Dr. David M. Crane Former Chief Prosecutor Michael Morell Special Court for Sierra Leone Former Acting Director and Deputy Director Central Intelligence Agency Amb. Chester A. Crocker James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies Hon. Andrew Natsios Georgetown University Executive Professor and Director The Scowcroft Institute, Texas A&M University Amb. Paula Dobriansky Senior Fellow, The Future of Diplomacy Project Amb. Thomas Pickering JFK Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Vice Chairman, Hills and Company Harvard Kennedy School of Government Emma Sky Diana Farrell Senior Fellow, Jackson Institute for Global Affairs President and Chief Executive Officer Yale University JPMorgan Chase Institute Hon. Vin Weber Stephen J. Hadley Partner, Mercury Chairman, U.S. Institute of Peace Dr. Jeremy M. Weinstein General Carter F. Ham, U.S. Army (Ret.) Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow President, Association of the United States Army Freeman Spogli Institute Stanford University Neal Keny-Guyer Chief Executive Officer, Mercy Corps

30 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY APPENDIX II: CHAIR BIOS WILLIAM J. BURNS Ambassador William J. Burns is President of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter- national Peace. He retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in 2014 after a 33-year diplomatic career. He served as Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014. He previously served as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Ambassador to Russia, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Ambassador to Jordan, and Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council.

MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY Michèle Flournoy is Co-Founder and CEO of the Center for a New American Security. She served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 2009 to 2012. She was principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense in the formulation of na- tional security and defense policy and oversight of military plans and operations. She led the development of DoD’s 2012 Strategic Guidance and represented the department in foreign engagements and before Congress. Prior to confirmation, Ms. Flournoy co-led President Obama’s DoD transition team.

NANCY E. LINDBORG Nancy Lindborg is President of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Prior to joining USIP, Ms. Lindborg served as the assistant administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) at USAID. Ms. Lind- borg led DCHA teams in response to the ongoing conflict in Syria, the droughts in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, the Arab Spring, the Ebola emergency, and numerous other global crises. Prior to joining USAID, Ms. Lindborg was president of Mercy Corps.

REPORT OF THE FRAGILITY STUDY GROUP • 31 APPENDIX III: CREDITS STUDY GROUP STAFF Alexa Courtney, Executive Director Alexa has spent the last 15 years helping organizations and communities thrive in complex environments globally. She is the founder and CEO of Frontier Design Group, a human security focused strategy and design firm committed to helping organizations and communities think differently, engage meaningfully, and accelerate their impact in the world by harnessing the tools of design and systems thinking.

Noah Sheinbaum, Special Assistant Noah is passionate about helping government achieve better results through interdisciplinary approaches and long-term strategic thinking. He is the Director of Strategy and Services at Frontier Design Group. Previously he was a management consultant in the private sector. PHOTO CREDITS Inside front cover/1: Xinhua/Pan Chaoyue 4, top: William J. Clinton Presidential Library 4, bottom: White House photo 8: Elisa Finocchiaro 9: Valarie Public domain/ليبي صح :top ,11 11, bottom: Mahmoud 14: State Department photo/Public domain 16: State Department photo by William Ng 18: Neil Brandvold/USAID 20: White House photo by Pete Souza 21: U.S. Army photo by Spc. Wes Conroy 23: UN Photo/Cia Pak 25: USIP/Casey Johnson 27: Nicholas Gosse Inside back cover: USIP/William Fitz-Patrick

Design by Sensical Design & Communication

32 • U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGE OF STATE FRAGILITY Aerial view of Washington, DC, 2011. www.carnegieendowment.org @CarnegieEndow

www.cnas.org @CNASdc

www.usip.org @USIP