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MIAMI UNIVERSITY The Graduate School

Certificate for Approving the Dissertation

We hereby approve the Dissertation

Caress Rene Schenk

Candidate for the Degree:

Doctor of Philosophy

______Director (Karen Dawisha)

______Reader (Venelin Ganev)

______Reader (Gulnaz Sharafutdinova)

______Graduate School Representative (Carl Dahlman)

ABSTRACT

A TYPICAL COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? THE RUSSIAN IMMIGRATION REGIME IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

by Caress Schenk

This dissertation analyzes entry components of Russia’s immigration regime, which encompasses laws, policies and actual practices (in the informal and formal realms) that regulate immigration flows, entry (immigrant access to border crossing, residence, and entry into the labor market) and incorporation (ultimately citizenship). The analysis places Russia in comparative perspective drawing on the cases of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, and the United States.

The focus of the research is an assessment of policy inputs from society and economic actors that interact with the law and law-making processes to produce formal and informal procedures regulating immigrant populations. Russia’s immigration situation is dominated by informal processes, which arise out of conflict between economic need for migrant labor and xenophobia in society. My hypothesis is that in Russia the state manages conflicting demands from society and economy by creating restrictive control mechanisms that force migrants into the informal sector. Immigration restrictions, primarily the use of a quota system that limits the number of migrants, can be seen as populist because of their broad public appeal. Further, by pushing migrants into the informal sector, both as a result of the quota mechanism itself and the corruption involved in the implementation process, there is an ample pool of cheap (albeit illegal) labor that employers can draw on.

The dissertation proceeds to establish whether Russia fits global patterns by assessing it in comparative context. The nine other countries of immigration are considered in order to ascertain whether Russia’s use of informality is typical throughout the world. The dissertation provides evidence that, while the situation is more extreme in Russia, the presence of xenophobia and the use of informal mechanisms to manage societal and economic demands are not uncommon in countries of immigration.

A TYPICAL COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? THE RUSSIAN IMMIGRATION REGIME IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

A DISSERTATION

submitted to the Faculty of

Miami University in partial

fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Caress Rene Schenk

Miami University

Oxford, Ohio

2010

Dissertation Director: Karen Dawisha

CHAPTER 1: RUSSIA: A TYPICAL COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? ...... 1 State Management of Immigration ...... 1 Immigration Regimes as a Conceptual Framework ...... 2 Push-Pull Factors (Causes of Immigrant Flows) ...... 4 The Russian Case ...... 4 Chapter Outline ...... 7 CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 9 Comparative Methodology: Justifying The Case Selection ...... 9 Research question and hypothesis...... 9 Variables and expectations ...... 9 Delimitations ...... 11 Data and measures ...... 11 Regime Type ...... 11 Openness of Immigration Regime ...... 13 Xenophobia ...... 14 Formal v. Informal Control of Migration ...... 16 CHAPTER 3: THE POST-2007 POLICY SITUATION ...... 19 The Russian Case ...... 19 Historical Context ...... 19 Post-2007 Policies ...... 20 Entry and Stay ...... 20 Citizenship ...... 22 Work Permits and Labor Market Controls ...... 22 Freedom of Movement ...... 24 International Compliance ...... 25 Creating a Comparative Perspective ...... 25 Measuring Openness ...... 25 Literature Connecting Regime Type With State Approaches Toward Immigration...... 26 Comparing Cases ...... 27 Entry Procedures ...... 27 Citizenship ...... 27 Work Permits and Labor Market Tests ...... 28

iii

Freedom of Movement ...... 29 International Compliance ...... 30 Conclusions on the Openness of Immigration Regimes ...... 30 CHAPTER 4: SOCIETY DEMANDS RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICIES ...... 33 Literature Review: Nationalism and Immigration Control ...... 33 Nationalism and Patriotism ...... 33 Translating Nationalism into Anti-Immigration Policy: The Role of Populism ...... 36 Taking it to the Streets: From Parliamentary Discourse to Extremist Violence ...... 37 The Russian Case ...... 37 Nationalism and Populism in the Russian Experience ...... 37 Pre-Soviet Populism ...... 37 Soviet Nationalism ...... 38 Post-Soviet National-Patriotic Populism ...... 38 Institutional Xenophobia ...... 39 Popular Xenophobia ...... 43 Comparative Perspective ...... 45 Institutional Xenophobia ...... 45 Ethnic Profiling ...... 45 Elite Opinion ...... 46 Far Right Parties ...... 47 Media Treatment of Migrants and Minorities ...... 47 Popular Xenophobia ...... 48 Public Opinion ...... 48 Hate Crimes ...... 49 Conclusions on the Relationship between Polity and Immigration ...... 49 CHAPTER 5: DEMAND FOR INFORMAL LABOR ...... 50 Literature on Informal Economies and Corruption ...... 50 The Russian Case ...... 53 Alternative Explanations for the Russian Situation ...... 53 Financial Crisis: a (Socio)-Economic Argument ...... 54 The 2007 Legislation is Working: An Institutional Argument ...... 55 Establishing Demand for Migrant Workers: The Quota System as a Political Instrument ...... 56 Moscow City Government: Elite Interests ...... 59

Middle Management: The Bureaucracy and Police ...... 64 The Everyday Level: Employers and Employment Agencies ...... 66 Going forward: The Future of Russia’s Immigration Regime ...... 70 Russia in Comparative Perspective ...... 70 Revisiting the Immigration Regime ...... 74 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION...... 76 A Note on the 2010 Moscow Metro Bombings ...... 78 Russia: A Typical Country of Immigration? ...... 78 Contributions to the Literature ...... 79 Tasks for Future Research ...... 80 Works Cited ...... 81 Interviews ...... 114 Transliteration key: US Board on Geographic Names ...... 115 Appendix ...... 116 Chart 1. Inputs and outputs of the immigration regime ...... 116 Table 1. Freedom House 2009 ...... 116 Table 2. Transparency International 2009 ...... 117 Table 3. Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide July 2009 ...... 117 Table 4. World Bank rule of law ...... 117 Table 5. Polity VI 2007 ...... 118 Table 6. Aggregate regime score ...... 118 Table 7. Visa requirements ...... 119 Table 8. Maximum Length of Stay (days) ...... 119 Table 9. Citizenship ...... 120 Table 10. Work permits and labor market tests ...... 121 Table 11. Freedom of movement ...... 122 Table 12. Immigration regime and political regime compared ...... 122 Table 13. Ethnic profiling as a measure of institutional xenophobia ...... 123 Table 14. Elite opinion ...... 124 Table 15. Far right political party activity ...... 125 Table 16. Representation of migrants in the national media ...... 125 Table 17. Public opinion regarding immigration ...... 126 Table 18. Hate crimes statistics ...... 126

Table 19. Xenophobia and immigration regime compared ...... 127 Table 20. Immigrants in Russia ...... 127 Table 21. Costs and benefits of legality in Russia ...... 128 Table 22. Migrants in the workforce ...... 128 Table 23. Migrants and the informal economy ...... 129 Table 24. Change in immigration regime due to informal practices ...... 129 Table 25. Overview of the Russian immigration regime: inputs and outputs ...... 130

CHAPTER 1: RUSSIA: A TYPICAL COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION?

Migration in Russia finds itself located in a place of tension between opposing forces. On the one hand, Russia is experiencing a demographic crisis, wherein the population is shrinking. In particular, the population of working age citizens is declining to the point that the period from 2006-2015 is projected to see a decrease in working age population by 10 million, from 90 million to 80 million, or 1% per year (Voronina 2006; Goskomstat 2008). Experts surmise that immigration is the only source of population growth in Russia and estimate one million migrants are needed per year to compensate for the demographic decline in such a way that will continue to produce economic growth (Dmitriyev 2007; Andrienko and Guriev 2005; Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia 2004). On the other hand, the Russian population does not welcome migrant laborers despite their utility. Rather, a pervasive undercurrent of nationalism and xenophobia marks Russian society. Public opinion polls show that a majority (around 57%) of Russians support the slogan “Russia for Russians,” and this sentiment can be seen throughout society and government (Levada Center 2009). Attacks on minorities are common as is activity by ultra- nationalist groups. Political elites themselves encourage xenophobic attitudes by perpetuating nationalist-populist rhetoric in mainstream political discourse. Government policy seems sympathetic to nationalist sentiment and has worked to restrict migration from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus by implementing a quota system as well as a complete ban on foreign workers in retail markets.

State Management of Immigration What tactics does the state use to either solve or maintain and perpetuate tensions between economic and labor market demand for immigrants on one hand and a xenophobic atmosphere among the public and elites on the other? This is the question this study will undertake to answer. The problem is not uncommon among migrant-receiving countries, though the solution currently being employed may be unique to Russia. Scholars argue that on the one hand public opinion at best deems migrant populations as undesirable permanent additions to society (often for reasons tending toward xenophobia), causing public officials to pursue tightening immigration controls. On the other hand, the “demand-pull” that originates from economic and social groups in receiving states is difficult for states to counter; nor can states reduce “supply-push” pressures that stem from foreign assistance and trade liberalization in sending countries, or the cross- border networks that facilitate additional migration. The resulting crisis of immigration control is one in which states make purely symbolic attempts to stem immigration and permanent settlement, for example limiting immigrant access to social services (i.e. health care and education), tightening citizenship controls, or making immigrant integration into society difficult.

These types of informal or symbolic tactics are readily apparent in the Russian case. Yet the gap between policy goals and outcomes does not originate because of a struggle between liberal goals and popular opinion. Most Russian elites have distanced themselves from the liberal ideals associated with Western democracies, despite the fact that basic human rights are guaranteed in the 1993 Russian constitution. Nor is the legitimacy of the government as reliant on public opinion as one would expect from a more democratic system. Thus the gap between Russia’s policy goals and outcomes must find a different explanation. In order to assess the uniqueness of the Russian case, this project will use a comparative approach, drawing on the experience of a

variety of countries of immigration.1 The literature addresses typical approaches of Western cases as immigrant-receiving countries, and thus there is a gap that this study can fill by developing a case that operates according to neither liberal nor democratic principles.

Immigration Regimes as a Conceptual Framework The concept of an immigration regime, or immigration policy regime, was developed in the context of immigration into Europe and was first used to identify different orientations toward immigration policy, from strict (in the Schengen area) to liberal (in Scandinavia) to chaotic (in Southern Europe) (Baldwin-Edwards 1991). An early iteration of immigration regimes uses the definition of “institutional arrangements of national welfare states to regulate admission and integration of newcomers,” (Faist 1995). This formulation is especially useful because it encompasses two important aspects of the immigration process: entry and integration. Other scholars add a third category of treatment of workers to the concept of immigration regime (Solinger 1999).

Sainsbury’s (2006) definition of an immigration regime, building on the concept of incorporation regimes developed by Soysal (1994), skips over entry regulations and focuses specifically on issues of integration, stating “the immigration regime consists of rules and norms that govern immigrants’ possibilities to become a citizen, to acquire residence and work permits, and to participate in economic, cultural and political life.”

While incorporation, with the ultimate goal being citizenship as a measure of full incorporation, is an important aspect of global population movements, it emphasizes long-term and permanent immigration. This research, on the other hand, focuses on migration for the purpose of labor, which is often short-term. Furthermore, it will become clear as the development of the Russian immigration regime is analyzed, there is an overwhelming focus on managing entry (either into the country or into the labor market) that issues of incorporation become almost irrelevant.2

The development of the literature on the EU immigration regime has continued and draws on international relations theories of regimes in general (Baldwin-Edwards 1997; D. Flynn 2005; Messina and Thouez 1999). Specifically, Stephen Krasner’s work on regimes is applied to the immigration context in the following definition: “EU migration regimes are implicit or explicit principles, rules [i.e. policies on visas, border controls, asylum application, and illegal migration], norms, and decision‐making procedures around which European actors' expectations converge in the issue area of migration” (Koslowski 1998).3

1 The other countries to be considered are the US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Singapore. The project will draw on field research completed in Moscow during 2009 as well as secondary sources describing the comparative cases. 2 This is not to say that studies of Russian citizenship policy are irrelevant. There is significant and ground breaking work being done on this topic, most notably by Oxana Shevel. However, whether or not labor migrants want to become Russian citizens (a point that is heavily debated), their energies are often spent on navigating residence and work permits rather than looking toward the long-term process of obtaining citizenship. 3 Krasner’s definition of regimes is as follows: “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision- making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice,” (Krasner 1983).

This definition is useful in the sense that it looks both at concrete laws as well as norms. Another way of stating this is that an immigration regime encompasses laws, policies and actual practices (in the informal and formal realms) that regulate immigration flows, entry (immigrant access to border crossing, residence, and entry into the labor market) and incorporation (ultimately citizenship). It is this conceptualization of an immigration regime that will guide the following research, though the focus herein will be on entry rather than flows or incorporation. The definition of an immigration regime can be applied at the domestic, regional and international levels. The Russian case taps into both the domestic and regional level. The bulk of immigration policy is determined domestically in the Russian case, yet there is a very important component of regionalism in the visa-free agreements between Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, which allow citizens of these countries to travel freely and stay up to 90 days.4

The fundamental question underlying domestic immigration regimes is whether or not the state can control migration flows. Advocates of globalization argue for a decay of, or at least a progressive irrelevance of, state capacity (Sassen 1996; Guibernau 2001). Decreased capacity comes from security threats, or those factors that require defensive maneuvers (i.e. transnational organized crime, trafficking, illegal immigration, separatist movements, nuclear weapons, etc.), and from international regimes, or those constructs that states voluntarily participate in (i.e. regional/transnational trade agreements, human rights mechanisms, etc.). Immigration is an example of increased human mobility associated with globalization, and is perceived by some as weakness of state sovereignty in that the state is unable to control its borders or the populations crossing those borders (Alexseev 2006a, 40; Hollifield 2000, 141; Cohen 2001, 86; Sassen 1996, 60). As national populations move across borders to span multiple states and may make sovereignty claims that threaten existing states (Weiner 1995, 128-129). Migrants are often seen as a threat to law and order, culture and economic security and some scholars argue that the process of international migration will inevitably lead to xenophobic and nationalistic backlash, which in turn act as domestic policy inputs (Weiner 1992-1993).

There are few who would argue that a migration regime is developing at the international level. Some see the EU’s regime as a potential model for the future though it is at best a regional regime and even then it currently remains quite weak and disjointed (Freeman 1992; Hollifield 1992b). It could be argued that the cosmopolitan-liberal perspective, which sees citizenship as post-national, is the basis of an international immigration regime as the rights of global citizens to travel as they wish supersedes the exclusive authority of the state over its borders (Sassen 1996, 89; Sassen 1998; Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996). This international migration regime is thus de facto rather than de jure, meaning is norms-based and praxis-driven rather than overtly legal. Scholars of this literature focus on how international human rights norms penetrate the domestic immigration policy-making agenda and constrain states’ abilities to control immigration (Hollifield 1992a). Whereas rights traditionally originated in the nation-state, some contend they are now of a more universalistic nature based on individual personhood rather than national membership. As international human rights law develops and states subject themselves to it, domestic laws follow suit in a manner that undermines the exclusive authority of the state over those within its borders. Some globalization advocates argue that international human rights

4 CIS citizens, with the exception of those from Georgia and Turkministan, are included in the non-visa regime.

regimes are creating a situation where access to rights is no longer state-imbued, but is available regardless of residence or citizenship in a particular state.

However other scholars focus on the voluntaristic aspect of these international regimes. After all, states still have ultimate discretion over the policies defining who is allowed to enter the country and under what circumstances; they are not required by international law or custom to accept unwanted immigrants. Furthermore, according to some scholars, liberal ideals are most relevant not at the point of border regulation, but rather in regard to how an immigrant will be treated and what rights will be extended upon entry (Joppke 1998a; Faist 1995). How an immigrant is treated upon entry is an issue of domestic policy and ultimately of actual practice and varies according to states’ liberal or illiberal prerogatives. In the end, then, international human rights norms only impact states that embrace human rights norms derived from liberal political philosophies.

Push-Pull Factors (Causes of Immigrant Flows) Before moving on to the Russian case, a word is in order about the causes of immigrant flows, which are a component of immigration regimes that are not the focus of this analysis.5 The causes of migration are typically divided into push factors, or those that cause migrants to leave their countries of origin, and pull factors, or things that attract migrants to a particular host country. Push factors typically are a result of backwardness and poverty that create economic, social and political hardship in poor sending countries (Portes and Borocz 1989). Motivations to migrate are often economic, as migrants seek jobs abroad, though war, violence and repression can act as contributing factors (Weiner 1995; Meyers 2004; Cohen 2001). Pull factors are wage differentials and employment opportunities, often in the secondary (or informal) labor market, which is comprised of jobs native workers no longer want. Population imbalances can create demand for new labor as working age populations in host countries decrease (Stalker 1994). Globalization increases these pull factors as it contributes to the ease of transportation and knowledge about opportunities. Some also argue that migrant networks between sending and receiving countries can act as a pull factor, reducing the costs of new migrants (Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994; Massey 1999; Portes and Borocz 1989). In some cases the policies of receiving countries can act as additional pull factors in the case of temporary worker programs that deliberately seek to attract foreign workers or in the case of countries that are willing to extend liberal rights (either welfare provisions or civil liberties) to migrants (Castles 1995; Hollifield 1992a). Various aspects of an established shadow economy also function as pull factors, including the interest and ability of employers and migrants to bypass formal mechanisms (Reyneri 2003).

The Russian Case Often migration flows follow colonial links (Cohen 2001; Sassen 1996), and this is certainly the case in Russia and its former Soviet republics as the bulk of immigration into Russia originates in CIS countries. It is this specific population, and particularly labor migrants, that will be the focus of this study. Russia receives the second largest number of immigrants in the world. It has recently been suggested that because the majority of this migration originates in former Soviet countries and that the regional rate of migration has not changed significantly since the Soviet period, it is not entirely appropriate to include Russia in the category of typical migrant-receiving

5 Citizenship, the third component of the immigration regime, will be addressed in Chapter 3 within the analysis of current policies.

4 countries (Alexseev 2009). Yet Russia is no longer a part of the Soviet Union. It and the other countries of the CIS are independent sovereign states that must individually deal with migration as an issue of stateness with its social, economic and political ramifications.

In the 1990s, immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the primary push/pull factors was ethnic repatriation, though civil wars and unrest in the newly independent Caucasian states as well as Tajikistan contributed to migrant flows to a lesser degree (M. Flynn 2004). This early population redistribution resulted from both voluntary and forced migrations (Mukomel 2009). Buckley (2008) argues that much of the literature devoted to Eurasian migration sees ethnicity as a driving factor motivating migrants to move. While that may have been true during the initial post-Soviet period, this project takes the stance that it is certainly no longer true now. The 2000s have rather been marked by the push factor of wage differentials between Russia and migrant-sending countries in the CIS and the pull factor of a declining working age population. Scholars also cite common history, geographic proximity and the visa- free regime as pull factors affecting the choices of migrants (Ivakhnyuk 2006).

Some Russian economists believe wage differentials are the single greatest factor driving the current immigration situation (Freidman 2009). The decline of the welfare state, economic crises and rising unemployment have contributed to falling living standards in a number of former Soviet republics, especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Korobkov 2008). As a result, labor migration has become an important strategy for reducing poverty, specifically through migrant remittances (Jones, Black and Skeldon 2007). Remittances sent by the estimated 600,000 labor migrants of Kyrgyzstan (11% of the population) comprise nearly 27% of its GDP at sums of over $1 billion annually (World Bank 2008). Remittances sent through informal channels contribute even more to the Kyrgyz economy (Ivakhnyuk 2009b).

Migrants from CIS countries are able to find gainful employment in Russia because of its recent economic success. Many migrants, for example, find work in the construction industry, which has benefitted from the oil boom of the 2000s (Weinthal and Luong 2006). There are two mutually reinforcing explanations for the labor market situation in Russia. One is the idea that Russia’s economy has become developed to the point that its labor market is now segmented and there are certain service jobs that middle class Russians do not want (Heleniak 2008). The other is that the working age population is declining, opening up employment opportunities at all levels of the economy (Ioffe and Zayonchkovskaya 2010). While the overall population is declining at an alarming rate, the situation is even starker in the working age population because the overall population is ageing and is not being sufficiently replenished by the birthrate (Vishnevsky and Bobylev 2009).

The literature on migration within Russia is quite developed. There are a number of scholars working assiduously both inside and outside policy circles, some of whom informed this project considerably. However, this scholarship has received some criticism because it assumes that the state both can and will manage migration, whereas there is significant Western research that questions the ability of the state to effectively control migration (Buckley 2008). There is certainly some basis for this critique, though while I found many scholars to be publicly optimistic, they were often privately quite cynical about the state’s willingness and ability to address current problems. Nevertheless, Buckley’s statements identify a gap in the literature,

suggesting “a careful examination of the effect of migration control techniques (using registration documents, work permits, and exit visas) can… uncover the unanticipated consequences of state intervention, and delineate the characteristics that enable individuals and groups to circumvent state policies directing migration and population settlement,” (Buckley 2008, 5). This project seeks to fill exactly this gap as it assesses the state’s actions, the motivation for those actions, and how or why legislation does not achieve stated goals.

The hypothesis for this dissertation is that the state manages conflicting demands from society and economy by creating restrictive control mechanisms that force migrants into the informal sector. Immigration restrictions, primarily the use of a quota system that limits the number of migrants from CIS countries, can be seen as populist because of their broad public appeal. Further, by pushing migrants into the informal sector, both because of the quota mechanism itself and the corruption involved in the implementation process, there is an ample pool of cheap (albeit illegal) labor that employers can draw on. This is a short-term solution, however, as it does nothing to alleviate the demographic crisis by integrating migrants into society.

That the Russian government takes a short-term focus for its governance problems has recently been theorized as an outcome of the strategy to maintain political power through overmanaged democracy, which avoids outright authoritarian control (Petrov, Lipman and Hale 2010). Based on the evidence and the admission of top Kremlin leaders, however, there is nothing to indicate Russia is anything but outright authoritarian (Kim 2010).6 The theory of overmanaged democracy contends that in order to adapt to a constantly changing society, the political system requires frequent manual control from the uppermost elites. The hypothesis of this dissertation relies on similar logic as it argues that the quota mechanism places control over migration directly into the hands of the presidential administration and allows immediate responses to public demands. But this is not democracy, overmanaged or otherwise. Sensitivity to public opinion is not in the sole domain of democratic or pseudo-democratic regimes, as many charismatic authoritarian leaders rely on public support for legitimacy. This is readily apparent in the immigration situation, as the Russian government has consistently relied on populist appeals and maneuvers to manage public opinion on the matter as will be discussed in chapter four.

The quota mechanism was introduced as a part of changes in 2007 to the migration legislation, which are often dubbed a liberalization of the immigration regime because they simplified registration and work permit procedures for CIS migrants. Yet despite early liberalizing effect, the quota mechanism has been employed in a persistently restrictive manner. Furthermore, before the 2007 legislation, migration control was seen as strict but it was controlled at the legislative and bureaucratic levels. Thus the 2007 changes have increased central control over the migration process by placing the quota mechanism under the authority of the presidential administration.

This project focuses specifically on the case of Moscow as the primary destination of labor migrants from the CIS. As the largest recipient of immigrants, Moscow represents an intensified picture of immigration relations in Russia. Because of this regionally specific focus, Putin’s

6 Kremlin ideologist Vladislav Surkov is quoted as saying “Consolidated power is the instrument of modernization. Some call it authoritarian modernization. I don’t care what they call it.”

vertical of power, or the efforts to bring the federal units in line with the center through legal uniformity and clear hierarchical relationships, is relevant to the topic at hand. Though Moscow is the federal center, it is a complex mix of Kremlin and municipal power and can therefore serve as a window into the troubles of Russian federalism. In fact, it is not illogical to argue that the federal government would have the greatest opportunity to affect changes in Moscow as the Kremlin is a five minute walk from the mayor’s office giving the federal level ample opportunity for oversight and monitoring. The federal reforms included in Putin’s campaign that are most important for understanding migration policies and politics were the appointment of presidential envoys and governors as a means to exert control over regional leaders, the efforts to compel legal conformity, and the drive to bring the regions under central control. I will draw from relevant examples from other Russian regions in order to create a balanced picture of the immigration regime.

It can be argued that the introduction of new legislation in 2007 is an effort to impose the vertical of power and create legal uniformity. Yet the continued pervasiveness of informal mechanisms and lack of uniform implementation of federal policies owing largely to corruption in the civil service shows either the weakness of the vertical of power or deliberate transfer of immigration regulation to informal mechanisms. In fact, as this study hopes to show, it is both. Central powers give way to municipal elites, who seek to further their interests by shifting the bulk of immigrant populations into the informal labor market by calling for restrictive quotas and perpetuating arbitrary and corrupt civil service procedures.

Chapter Outline There are various inputs and outputs that are important in the creation and maintenance of immigration regimes and that is what this study is concerned with. This dissertation will be divided into six chapters that first deal with research design and then address relevant state-level, society-level and economic-level variables. Exploring the role of the state will establish a baseline for how the immigration regime is intended to function. Society and economy act as policy inputs, which create certain demands on the state in regard to immigration policy outputs. How state, society and economy act together is sure to vary across countries of immigration, and can thus offer valuable insights as to the unique challenges Russia faces as well as what types of policies are useful to navigate demands from society and economic actors in all immigrant- receiving countries. The primary focus for the study is the Russian case though relevant examples from the other cases under investigation will provide a comparative perspective. The concluding chapter will assess whether Russia is a typical country of immigration both according to the evidence from other immigrant-receiving countries and migration theory. The conclusion will further show how this project contributes to various literatures and suggest topics for further research.

Chapter two will outline the research methodologies that will provide the framework for the research project as well as introduce the research question, hypothesis and expectations for the dissertation. It will also define the variables and data and describe how data will be measured.

Chapter three will look at factors specific to the current Russian policy context in an effort to establish how immigration policies are intended to function according to law and whether or not they are accountable to international law. It will go on explore the relationship between regime

7 type and the relative openness of immigration policies (as the first component of immigration regimes) by assessing procedures for legal entry and stay/residence, work permits, and the gap between domestic and international law across cases. This chapter will put forward an initial estimate of the immigration regime, which will be adapted as necessary in Chapter five, which considers the role of actual practices. In general, it is expected that a more liberal immigration regime will provide easier access to entry, residence and work with fewer bureaucratic hurdles toward these goals, will allow greater freedom of movement, and will have a narrower gap between domestic law and international standards.

Chapter four will look at societal impacts on immigration policy. In order to assess the nationalist climate of a society, both popular and institutional xenophobia are considered. Xenophobia in society can be measured through public opinion surveys, media coverage and treatment of migrants, and attacks on migrants as well as other nationalist group activity. Institutional xenophobia will be measured by ethnic profiling, elite statements and legislation and prosecution of hate crimes. Once the level of xenophobia in the Russian case is assessed, a comparative discussion will analyze the relationship between the openness of an immigration regime and the presence of xenophobia in society.

Chapter five will address demands of the labor market and economic actors on the immigration situation and assess the degree to which immigration occurs in the formal or informal sector. This chapter’s focus is the actual practices portion of the immigration regime. At issue in this chapter are the mechanisms used to determine the demand for migrant labor (the quota system), size of illegal versus legal immigrant populations over time and in relation to different legislative frameworks, and the interests of those who benefit from the current immigration regime including elites, civil servants, employers and employment agencies. For a comparative look, the role of corruption and the size of the informal economy are considered as they co-vary with the proportion of the immigrant population that operates outside formal channels.

Chapter six will offer conclusions on the proper location of the Russian migration regime in the context of migration regimes worldwide. By assessing Russia in comparative perspective, using the data from the previous chapters, it will be possible to assert whether Russia is a typical or atypical country of immigration. Additionally, this chapter will draw on migration literature to create a theoretical context for Russia’s immigration regime.

Each chapter will address Russia in comparative perspective, drawing on the experience of the immigrant-receiving countries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates and United States. These cases provide a comprehensive look at immigrant-receiving countries as they vary on important points such as regime type and demographic outlook as will be discussed in chapter two.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter outlines the research methodologies that will provide the framework for the research project as well as introduce the research questions and hypotheses. It will also define the variables and data and describe how data will be measured.

Comparative Methodology: Justifying The Case Selection In order to approach the Russian case objectively, it must be placed in comparative context. Therefore, at every step in the research process, Russia’s immigration regime will be compared to a set of immigrant receiving countries in order to assess whether it is peculiar or whether it is following global trends. The countries that form the data pool for this research include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States. These countries are included because they share a variety of immigration factors with Russia. In the migration literature, the US and Canada are traditional countries of immigration while Germany and France are deemed reluctant recipients of immigration and Italy a new country of immigration (Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994). The US, Russia, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia and Canada are the top six countries when measuring the number of international immigrants. UAE, Singapore, Saudi Arabia and Canada are in the top ten countries with regard to percentage of population made up by migrants (Migration Policy Institute 2007). Canada, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, UAE and the US each have at least one city whose population is comprised of more than 25% immigrants and Canada, France, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, UAE and the US have at least one city with over one million immigrants (Migration Policy Institute 2009). The US and Saudi Arabia are the top two sources of migrant remittances; Germany, Russia and Italy are among the top ten; France is 12th and Norway is 22nd according to 2006 data (World Bank 2008). In regard to demographics, UAE has the highest birth rate in the world, while Singapore, Germany and Italy are in the bottom eight countries with the lowest birth rates making each of these cases interesting for comparison with Russia, whose birth rate is ranked 178th out of 224 countries (Central Intelligence Agency 2009). For each of the three categories, state, society and economy, relevant examples from the non- Russian cases will be highlighted and compared. It is beyond the scope of this paper to present each case in full, and therefore the treatment of each non-Russian case will be limited to providing a context for Russia’s immigration regime.

Research question and hypothesis The driving question of this research project is, “how does the state manage conflicting demands from a xenophobic public and an economy in need of new sources of labor?” The hypothesis is that the state responds by producing populist policies that restrict migrant access to the labor market, which in turn pushes migrants into the informal sector where they become a cheap replacement for a declining work force.

Variables and expectations To revisit the definition introduced in chapter one, an immigration regime encompasses laws, policies and actual practices (in the informal and formal realms) that regulate immigration flows, entry (immigrant access to border crossing, residence, and entry into the labor market) and incorporation (ultimately citizenship). This project is concerned with the laws, policies and practices that regulate entry. In order to analyze these components of the immigration regime, the

research will look at three main types of variables affecting immigration regimes: state-level, society-level and economy-level variables.

At each level, state, society and economy, there are inputs and outputs that shape the immigration regime. The state considers inputs from society (xenophobia) and the economy (demand for labor) and produces outputs in the form of laws and policies. The popular output of xenophobia is a result of inputs from elites, mass media and other attitudinal factors. Economic actors contend with the input of a shrinking labor force due to an ongoing demographic crisis as well as inputs that raise the costs of operation. These inputs come either from laws that are too strict or from corruption and arbitrary enforcement of laws. Economic outputs are twofold: first there is a demand for labor, which the state must consider in the policy making process, and second is the choice of economic actors to operate in the formal or informal realm. This second factor acts as a direct input into the immigration regime in the sense that it is the actual practices that regulate entry. The other major factor in determining actual practices is the degree of corruption present, which is a state-level factor that impacts informal inputs into the policy making process as well as the likelihood that laws and policies will be implemented and enforced. This mix of inputs and outputs at each level creates an iterative process that could prove to be either flexible or unstable.

Chart 1 maps out these inputs and outputs that influence the immigration regime. The most important interactions, and the ones that are considered further in this dissertation, are those that occur on the left side of the diagram.

As an entry point into how the state manages the immigration regime, chapter three will consider the current laws and policies using the state-level variable of openness, which is a measure of how easy it is to gain access to a country (border crossing and visa procedures), to stay or reside (residence permits), and to work (labor permits). In general, it is expected that a more liberal immigration regime will provide easier access to entry, residence and work with fewer bureaucratic hurdles toward these goals, will allow greater freedom of movement, and will have a narrower gap between domestic law and international standards. The expectation that democratic regimes that are premised on a liberal political philosophy will have relatively open immigration policies is based on the idea that individual rights are held in high regard in these countries and that international human rights norms are more likely to be upheld. Further, democratic regimes are expected to have developed civil society, which can advocate for immigrant rights. The Russian state, which operates without the guiding principles of democracy, should therefore have an immigration regime that is more similar to Saudi Arabia, Singapore and UAE than to the Western cases if these expectations are borne out.

Chapter four will focus on the society-level variable of xenophobia, which demands restrictions on immigration. It will measure the level of xenophobia in order to establish the degree of “demand” for or against immigrants. Popular xenophobia demands restrictive immigration policies and produces anti-migrant behavior and rhetoric. Institutional xenophobia originating at the elite level produces strict immigration policies as well as a legal environment that allows nationalist groups to act freely against migrants with impunity. Building on the previous chapter, this discussion proceeds with the expectation that the more xenophobic the society, the more likely a country will have a closed immigration regime.

Finally, chapter five considers the factors that produce informality in the immigration regime. The demand for labor is an economic-level variable. Whether that demand will be for formal labor or informal labor depends on a) level of corruption and b) how burdensome the law is. High levels of corruption lead to a weak and arbitrary enforcement environment that raises the costs of operating in the formal economy because of the necessity of paying bribes in order to complete bureaucratic tasks or avoid punishment. Laws that are overly strict and burdensome also raise costs by creating barriers that make it difficult to operate in the formal sector. Corruption and burdensome laws are mutually reinforcing and produce demand for illegal labor, which in turn demands a closed immigration regime. Thus the quality of laws and policies both creates demand for informality and is a result of that demand, creating a self-reinforcing circle.

Delimitations This project will deal primarily with Russia as a migrant-receiving country, and will limit its treatment of Russia as a migrant-sending country to explanations of emigration as a factor in the demographic crisis. It will focus on immigration from former Soviet states, excluding immigration populations from China, Africa and elsewhere. Immigration populations under consideration will be limited to labor migrants in the service sector (i.e. construction, retail, etc.), which are most typically referred to as economic or low-skilled migrants. The research will not focus on ethnic Russians returning to Russia after migrating to other Soviet states during the USSR. The category of forced migration (i.e. refugees and asylum seekers) will be excluded from analysis except to the extent that it is necessary to elucidate certain relevant aspects of forced labor and migrant smuggling. For each of the three categories, state, society and economy, relevant examples from the non-Russian cases will be highlighted and compared. It is beyond the scope of this paper to present each case in full, and therefore the treatment of each non- Russian case will be limited to providing a context for Russia’s immigration regime.

Data and measures The measures discussed in the following section will provide concrete comparisons among the countries under investigation. These measures will be used for the cross-country comparison portion of each chapter and do not include all the categories of evidence that will be considered for the Russian case.

Regime Type The standard measure for regime type tends to be Freedom House’s categorizations of states by “free,” “partly free,” and “not free.” Freedom House assesses political rights (participation in the political process in a meaningful way through voting, running for elected office, transparency in elections, military or monarch involvement in the political system, etc.) and civil liberties (freedom of conscience, organization and assembly, rule of law, etc.), ranking countries from 1 to 7 with 1 indicating the greatest level of freedom (see table 1). In addition, Freedom House designates countries that qualify with the label of “electoral democracy,” indicating they possess a competitive multiparty political system, universal adult suffrage, regular elections by secret ballot that are free of fraud, and public access of political parties to the electorate through the mass media (Freedom House 2008). Countries are ranked by analysts who use a combination of primary and secondary sources (news reports, academic analysis, expert reports and country visits).

There are several problems with the Freedom House data, however. First, Freedom House is unabashedly pro-democracy. This fact is clearly stated on their website www.freedomhouse.org. For the purposes of advocacy, which Freedom House is also involved in, a normative predisposition is appropriate. However, for the purposes of scientific rigor, such normative biases could potentially skew data. Secondly, some argue that Freedom House has a political bias, favoring “right-wing regimes” and using data that shows similar favoritism, from the US State Department for example (Foweraker and Krznaric 2000). The use of western sources in general introduces systematic bias, reflecting Western ideas and values. In this way, countries that are moving toward democracy, however incrementally, are treated with greater leniency, as are countries that are allied with the US.

However, since one goal of this study is to find a correlation between the openness of immigration and regime type, defined as the degree to which liberal values are upheld in a society, Freedom House’s normative preference for democracy should not skew the results. The Western bias, however, requires attention as it could result in ranking certain Western countries as more democratic than they deserve. To some extent there are bias problems with all democracy and governance measurements. There is a great deal of subjectivity in creating and employing measures, which to some extent reflect cultural biases (Foweraker and Krznaric 2000). Therefore, to reduce biases I will draw on a number of sources to create a unique ranking. I have compiled rankings on governance from a variety of sources and assigned composite scores to each country. In addition to the Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores, I have included corruption perception scores from Transparency International, corruption, law and order, and democratic accountability scores from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), democracy scores from the Polity IV dataset and rule of law scores from the World Bank.

Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index is derived from survey data and expert analysis (see table 2). Country experts, residents and non-residents of each country are involved in the survey and ranking process (Transparency International 2008). Scoring of 180 countries uses a ten point scale, with a ten representing the least corruption.

The ICRG provides political, economic and financial risk assessments of comparative risk of operating in, investing or lending to individual countries. I draw from the disaggregated scores of political risk in three categories, each of which are out of a possible 6 points (see table 3). The corruption score assesses demands for special payments and bribes, patronage, nepotism and ties between government and business. The law and order score assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system and popular observance of the law. Democratic accountability scores are determined by sorting countries into categories of alternating democracy, dominated democracy, de facto one party state, de jure one party state and autarchy. ICRG calculates all categories of political risk based on subjective analysis of available data (Political Risk Services n.d.).

The World Bank rule of law indicator combines data from household and firm surveys with reports from experts in private and public sector agencies as well as NGOs to measure people’s confidence in the rules of society (i.e. property rights, law enforcement, the courts, crime and violence) and the extent to which they abide by these rules (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009). The scores range from 2.5 to -2.5 (see table 4).

Polity IV ranks governing authority on a 21-point scale from +10 to -10, with 10 being a fully institutionalized democracy and -10 being fully institutionalized autocracies, with the midpoint being mixed or incoherent authority (anocracy) (see table 5). It measures executive recruitment (or how executives are chosen, either through selection, election or violence), constraints on executive authority, and political competition. Data is coded by multiple analysts, though it is difficult to ascertain the sources used (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

After converting each of these various measures to a ten point scale and aggregating them, the countries in this study, from most to least democratic, are: Norway (9.5), Canada (9.4), Germany (9.2), US (8.9), France (7.9), Italy (7.4), Singapore (6.4), UAE (4.7), Russia (4.4) and Saudi Arabia (3.7) (see table 6). This comprehensive picture of regime type is helpful because it goes beyond Freedom House’s classification of all of the Western countries in question as free. We can see that there is a marked difference between the democracy in Norway and the democracy in Italy. For the purpose of assessing the covariance of regime type with the openness of immigration policies, I expect that types of immigration policies will follow this categorization of regime type as I will illustrate in chapter three.

Openness of Immigration Regime When considering the policy aspect of an immigration regime, an open regime is simply one that has relatively few barriers to entrance and legal status of residence and work. States with open immigration regimes will allow greater freedom of movement within their country and will have a narrower gap between domestic and international statutes as will be discussed in chapter three.

The first measure of openness is the processes required for visas and residence permits. The second procedure is one that is peripheral to the task at hand because it concerns incorporation rather than entry. This is citizenship and it is considered in order to analyze the full spectrum of entrance to integration is essential. The time, money and requirements such as language proficiency, background checks, medical examinations and proof of income present various degrees of bureaucratic difficulty in the countries being studied.

Third, and central to the task of labor migrants, is the issue of work permits. I will consider various potential barriers to obtaining work permits such as quotas, fees and labor contracts. Certainly some of these barriers can be considered legitimate either for the purposes of national security and/or the protection of migrant rights. For the purpose of measuring openness, however, I will leave normative issues aside and simply assess various encumbrances encountered in the process of obtaining a work permit.

Next, the degree to which immigrants are allowed to freely move within a country, both for the purposes of work and residence, varies considerably. Some countries require a foreigner to register with the government each time they change residence, both within a city and between towns. In some countries work permits are attached to a specific employer, restricting the freedom of movement between places of employment.

Finally, accountability to international law is an indicator of relative openness of an immigration regime. International law can be seen as a benchmark of openness because of its focus on the transnational rights of migrants over and above the national security of receiving countries. Often

international standards are based on ideals and are therefore not manifested in any particular country wholesale. However, these standards can be used to measure how far each country stands from the ideal. First, ratification of international conventions such as UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers and regional agreements such as the European Social Charter are important indicators of a country’s willingness to assent to international legal norms in the sphere of migration. Additionally, recommendations from international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) offer additional benchmarks for domestic policy (Baruah and Cholewinski 2006). Therefore the status of domestic law and how closely it follows these international regulations and recommendations is a measure of whether and how deeply international norms are entrenched in the domestic legal system and consequently an indicator of regime openness. An additional tool for assessing compliance is international enforcement mechanisms such as the European Court of Human Rights, which has jurisdiction over signatories of the Council of Europe and pursues cases of human rights violations that are not legally or adequately tried in domestic courts.

Xenophobia Xenophobia can be defined simply as the fear or hatred of racial and cultural minorities. It has various manifestations from passive to active and from popular to institutional, which will be considered in chapter four. Though xenophobia is not limited to attitudes toward migrants, migrants are often a focal point for xenophobic attitudes and activities because of they are visibly different than the majority in a number of categories including race, class, culture, employment status, etc. Related to xenophobia, nationalism is the political movement that aspires for correspondence of state and national (based on culture and/or ethnicity). For the purposes of this research, the activities of nationalists are those that are based in the desire for a state that allows the dominant ethnic/cultural group to exercise control over all political matters. In this way, nationalism and xenophobia are used synonymously henceforth.

Previous studies have measured xenophobia in various ways. The Sova Center, a xenophobia watch dog in Russia, monitors a number of manifestations of xenophobia including the activity of nationalist groups, hate speech in the media, racist violence, and the use and misuse of anti- extremist legislation. The Moscow Bureau of Human Rights measures the presence of xenophobia by attacks with ethnic or religious motivations, vandalism by far-right groups, xenophobic moods in society and acts of xenophobia prosecuted by law enforcement. The European Union Agency for Human Rights (FRA) measures racism by tracking crime statistics as well as discrimination in the areas of employment, housing, education and health care (Fundamental Rights Agency 2009).7 A recent UN Human Development Research Paper suggests measuring xenophobia through public opinion surveys, attitudes of mainstream and right-wing parties and politicians on issues of immigration in speeches, statements and publications, media depiction of immigration issues, internet sites of anti-immigrant and neo Nazi groups, state responses to right wing groups through anti-extremist legislation, migrant and refugee experiences, hate crimes and violent attacks, state policies on immigration and

7 Though xenophobia is a wider phenomenon than racism (discrimination based solely on race), the FRA includes categories of ethnic origin and religion in their category of racism, making it synonymous with the category of xenophobia used here.

integration, and tolerance toward ethnic minorities (Crush and Ramachandran 2009). Research on xenophobia specific to the Middle East points to labor practices, citizenship possibilities and public displays of disdain toward foreigners (Jureidini 2002).

I will employ a number of these measures in order to target both passive and active manifestations of xenophobia in both popular and institutional categories. Passive popular xenophobia is reflected primarily in public attitudes and media treatment of minorities. Active popular xenophobia can range from voting for radical right parties, participation in nationalist groups, to attacks on minorities. Passive institutional xenophobia includes lack of legislation protecting minorities from xenophobia or lack of enforcement for existing legislation. Active institutional xenophobia includes funding nationalist groups or events, ethnic profiling by the police or other public agents, and racist statements by politicians. It is important to include several measures for each category in order to create a comprehensive picture of xenophobia in each country.

Ethnic profiling as a measure of institutional xenophobia can be defined as disproportionate attention and punishment given to immigrants and minorities in the course of official duties. Data on ethnic profiling is most available from human rights and non-governmental organizations. For example, the Open Society Justice Initiative has as a focus of research and advocacy police profiling in the new and old democracies of Europe. I will consider a number of manifestations of ethnic profiling including over-policing (i.e. discriminatory traffic stops or identification checks), religious discrimination, cases of police brutality, raids and searches targeting migrants and minorities, failure to investigate abuse reported by migrants and minorities, discrimination in courts, and mass detentions, deportations and arrests.

The attitudes of government officials, displayed through public statements and speeches, can be used to measure active xenophobia at the elite level. This data will be obtained primarily from media coverage of statements and official speeches. In order to assess elite xenophobia, I will tabulate racist statements made by officials in various political positions including the executive, ministry positions, legislators, migration officials, justice officials, and local leaders. Racist statements include derogatory speech equating immigrants and/or minorities with "scum," etc., plans to clean the country/city of immigrant populations, or highlighting immigrant criminality.

The popularity of far-right parties is easily reflected in election data and voting records of Western countries. This data is readily available from monitoring organizations such as Manuel Alvarez-Rivera’s Election Resources on the Internet (electionresources.org). Secondary data will be used to explain results and trends where primary data is unavailable. I will consider the degree to which far-right parties are represented in national and local positions, both legislative and executive. There are no political parties in the Middle Eastern cases, and no party competition in Singapore, and therefore they will be omitted from this portion of the analysis.

Systematic analysis of how migrants and minorities are presented in the Russian media requires detailed content analysis of media reporting. I will use the results of a content analysis project I completed in 2007 that looks at how different types of Russian newspapers covered an ethnically charged event. For similarly systematic data, I will look to secondary sources analyzing media reporting in the other country cases. Additionally, I will include observations on national and

international media coverage, drawing relevant examples from major news sources. The mere presence of uncensored and unfiltered anti-migrant rhetoric from mainstream news agencies is an important indicator of the presence of xenophobia in society. The number of reports that are easily found through internet sources as well as the degree of anti-migrant sentiment are powerful comparative measures that will be used to categorize countries according to the level of passive popular xenophobia. To assess xenophobia in the media, I will consider whether the media criminalizes migrants or portrays them as a health risk, whether minorities and migrants are stereotyped and/or underrepresented, whether stories of migrant abuse or the activity of right wing groups are included in coverage, and whether internet racism is prosecuted.

The best measure of mass attitudes is public opinion surveys done at the national and international level. Though national surveys are available in a number of countries, they are not directly comparable because of different methodologies. For the Russian case, I will consider national-level survey data from the Levada Center (Russia). However, for the comparative section, I will rely on the Pew Global Attitudes survey because it directly compares many of the cases under investigation. I will supplement this data with survey results from Norway’s Central Bureau of Statistics as Norway is not included in the Pew survey.

Attacks on minorities are best captured through hate crime statistics, which are available from a number of government and non-government organizations. In Russia, though the government recently started tabulating hate crime statistics, the Sova Center (a Moscow-based NGO) is considered the foremost authority on hate crimes, compiling detailed and comprehensive reports regularly.8 In the US, data is available from the FBI and in Canada from Statistics Canada. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights reports on data from France, Germany and Italy. There is no official data available from Saudi Arabia, Singapore or UAE. An absence of systematic persecution of migrants shows effective protection of the rights of minorities. Migrant attacks and nationalist group activity demonstrates how the lines between state and society are blurred, as society is allowed to act with impunity. It is important to note, however, that hate crimes are defined differently in different countries. For example, Canada, France and the US include crimes on the basis of bias against sexual orientation. The US collapses the categories of hate crimes and domestic terrorism, including activities by environmental and animal rights groups. Therefore, in order to target violent crimes against migrants and minorities, I will only consider the data on murders motivated by ethnic hatred (rather than hatred based on religion or sexual orientation).

Formal v. Informal Control of Migration The primary task of chapter five is to assess the degree to which immigration is regulated by the formal versus the informal realm. To this end a number of measures will be used. The formal realm is defined as laws and policies that originate in the government and legal system and are implemented effectively and enforced consistently. The informal realm consists of patterns of actual practices that lay outside formal channels.

First and foremost, it is essential to consider the demand for migrants in each country. Calculations are often contested, owing to the politically sensitive balance that must be struck

8 The data from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs can be misleading because many crimes that are hate motivated are categorized as “hooliganism,” or other crimes (Borinov 2010).

between allowing sufficient immigrants to fill labor shortages and protecting the domestic labor market for native workers. Simply subtracting native unemployment rates from job vacancies does not produce a reliable estimate of the need for foreign workers as one of the key components driving migrant employment is the social stigma associated with the type of low- skilled labor under investigation in this research.

A common measure of demand is a macro-level projection of the number of immigrants a country requires to maintain its working age population (ages 15-64). The UN Population Division estimates the following annual need for migrants between 2000 and 2050: France 109,000; Germany 487,000; Italy 372,000; Russia 715,000; US 11,000 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division 2001). However, these figures are used only in relation to ageing and declining populations and thus are less relevant when discussing countries with high birth rate countries such as UAE.

From a policy perspective, measuring demand is a process that occurs variously depending on the types of immigration controls a country has in place. Quotas and labor market tests are mechanisms used to assess the demand for immigrant labor in order to admit adequate numbers of migrant workers without flooding the labor market. For those countries with a quota system, demand is calculated annually based on expectations of labor market needs for the following year. Employers, unions and other interested parties provide projections of labor needs to government agencies that then set quotas (International Organization for Migration 2008). Labor market tests require employers to prove on a case-by-case basis that there is no native worker able to fill the vacancy (Papademetriou and O’Neil 2004).

Perhaps the most simple and universal measure of demand is the percentage of the current labor force that is made up of migrant workers. Demand can be seen as a reflection of supply as each is conditioned by the other (Anderson and Ruhs 2008). Demand exists to some extent because migrant workers are a readily available alternative to native workers (Cornelius 1998). Data on migrants in the labor force is available from a number of sources, typically derived from national censuses, and is compiled by the International Labor Organization: Canada 19%; France 5%; Italy 3%; Norway 7%; Russia 2%; Saudi Arabia 51%; Singapore 44%; US 13% (Baruah and Cholewinski 2006; Tyuryukanova 2008; Martin and Widgren 2002).

These figures assessing the demand for migrants do not include estimates of the illegal work force, which must be added for a comprehensive assessment. First I will look at the size of illegal versus legal immigration, relying on estimates by both academics and government agencies in order to show the divergence of formal and informal processes. I will draw on estimates from each country of the number of illegals and their proportion of the total immigrant population. Large numbers of illegal in comparison to legal immigrants displays a predominance of informal methods being used to fulfill labor demand.

Next, I will compare the size of the formal and informal economies in the countries under investigation. There is a clear relationship between the immigrant population and the informal economy as migrants comprise a vulnerable sector of the population that is frequently drawn into underground employment (International Labour Conference 2002). Therefore it is logical that countries with comparatively larger informal economies, both as a percentage of GDP and as a

17 percentage of labor force, will be marked by greater informality of migration regulation. I will rely on secondary sources for estimates of the informal economy, as the computations are quite involved and beyond the scope of this analysis. The data on informal economies is comprehensive and provides an excellent comparative tool (Schneider 2005).

CHAPTER 3: THE POST-2007 POLICY SITUATION

In order to understand how the state manages competing demands from a xenophobic society and economic need for labor migrants, the first order of business is to establish Russia’s current policies in historical and comparative perspective. This chapter will begin with a discussion of the development of immigration policies from the Soviet period to 2010. Then using the measures established in Chapter two for the openness of the policy portion of immigration regimes, the discussion will proceed to the status of Russia’s current policy situation. Next, it will assess Russia in comparative perspective testing whether the openness of immigration policies varies according to regime type. This second section of the chapter will begin with a literature review that establishes expectations for the types of policies various regime types should have before proceeding to a cross-country assessment of regime type and policy openness. The focus of this discussion is the law as it is written, with limited reference to discrepancies in implementation and enforcement, which are discussed at a later point in the dissertation.

The Russian Case Historical Context During the Soviet period, any migration (immigration, emigration, and internal migration) was regulated by the propiska system, which required the registration of each person at a particular address and required permission to settle in large cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg (Chudinovskikh 2006). In order to move residence, a person would first have to obtain a propiska, or permission slip, from the government; without it, a person would not be able to find housing or work and would be unable to register a marriage (Rubins 1998).

In 1993, laws were adapted to reflect the new post-Soviet era, granting the right of free movement, choice of residence and obviating government-approved permits for residence changes (Federal Law #5242-1 1993; Russian Constitution 1993). Further changes in 1995 established two options for registration, either at the place of residence or place of stay (for periods of ten days or longer), each of which required passport identification and proof of legal residence (Government Decision #713 1995; UNHCR 2000).9

Throughout the 1990s, immigration laws were made in an ad hoc manner (mostly by presidential decree) and did not truly dismantle the propiska system (Voronina 2006; Andrienko and Guriev 2005). Rules and laws were at times contradictory (some were deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court) and left wide latitude for administrative discretion, leaving ample room for corruption (Rubins 1998; Katanian 1998).

The Federal Migration Service was created in 1992 to oversee the development and implementation of migration policy (Voronina 2006, Gavrilova 2001, Pilkington 1998). The FMS was primarily concerned with protecting the rights of migrants and refugees yet it failed to attract migrants to regions deemed appropriate for migration and proved ineffective at assisting with housing and employment. Under Vladimir Putin’s presidency the agency shifted focus to combating illegal immigration and regulating labor migration, effectively securitizing the

9 Whereas the place of residence is used to describe a permanent living situation, the place of stay is a more temporary distinction.

19 migration regime. The FMS was created as an independent body of the executive branch, but is now a part of the Ministry of the Interior, is staffed with police officers and acts as a law enforcement agency (Light 2005; Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia 2004).

Though by 1996 the FMS had regional branches in all regions and republics that were to report directly to Moscow, branches had dual loyalties that typically favored regional issues (Pilkington 1998). Thus in the 1990s, regional governments dealt with migration issues depending on their own needs; regions experiencing demographic decline were more open to immigration than were those saturated with immigrants (Voronina 2006).

As late as 2003, several regions had either retained propiska or established new rules to officially restrict registration based on social status, the presence of relatives in the area, age and health regulations (Rubins 1998, Open Society 2006). Ethnic minorities were refused registration on a regular basis (Voronina 2006). The Moscow city government, acting in accordance with public opinion, was adamantly opposed to dismantling restrictive propiska standards fearing a flood of migrants (Schaible 2001). In Moscow and other regions, registration fees were set prohibitively high, a tactic that has been found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, though little was done little to bring the laws into compliance with the court’s rulings (Katanian 1998).

Inflexible and overly bureaucratic registration processes at the regional and national level were often blamed for a rise in illegal immigration. Illegal employment provides a comparative economic advantage for both employers and workers who will work for lower wages (Andrienko and Guriev 2005; Krasinets 2005). Landlords, too, prefer operating in the informal sector, since avoiding a formal leases allows them to evade taxes (UNHCR 2000). Without a lease, however, a person cannot apply for the proper residence or stay paperwork. Furthermore, people who are unable to produce identity and residence documents have difficulty accessing constitutional rights (i.e. voting) or social services (i.e. pensions, education, medical care, etc.) (Desormeau 2005; Katanian 1998; Rubins 1998).

Changes in 2007 corrected some of the previously cumbersome registration and work permit procedures for labor migrants from CIS countries, and in this sense are referred to a liberalization of immigration policy (Federal Law #109 2006; Federal Law #115 2002; Federal Law #189 2006; Government Order #682 2006). However, the package of new rules also focused on protecting the Russian labor market by banning foreigners from working in certain enterprises and instituting quotas for work permits (Itar-Tass 2007).

Post-2007 Policies

Entry and Stay The Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation (Federal Law #115 2002) defines entry and residence procedures for all foreigners traveling to and staying in Russia. Visa requirements fall under two broad categories: those for citizens from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) who do not need a visa to enter Russia, and citizens from all other countries who must have a visa. As this project focuses on labor migrants from the CIS, it is the non-visa category that is most relevant, though certain aspects of the visa regime will be covered for the sake of comparison.

All foreigners receive a migration card upon entry, regardless of whether they are entering on a visa or non-visa basis. For CIS citizens, it is the migration card that becomes the most important document for maintaining legal status. Legal status of foreign citizens falls into three categories: temporary stay, temporary residence and permanent residence. Temporary stay refers to all foreigners in Russia, either on a visa or CIS citizens with no visa, that do not have a temporary or permanent residence permit. The length of legal stay within Russia is determined by the type of visa, or in the case of CIS citizens, is limited to 90 days unless the migrant has an employment contract. Many non-work visas are also limited to a 90 day stay (cumulative within a period of 180 days).

Migrants must register at a place of temporary stay within three days of arriving on the territory of the Russian Federation, which is often too little time to find a place to live and complete the necessary paperwork despite the fact that the registration process can now be completed online or by mail (Vitkovskaya, Platonova and Shkolnikov 2009, 372). Several interviewees cited this as the greatest administrative barrier to the legalization of migrants (Burtina 2009; Strakhova 2009). The problem is primarily that the process requires each migrant to have a host party, which can be an employer, employment agency or landlord. Many potential hosts are reluctant to act in this capacity (Tyuryukanova 2009b, 11). Furthermore, it takes the FMS ten days to complete and deliver the necessary paperwork, leaving migrants without proper documentation in the intervening week (Strakhova 2009).

In most cases, temporary residence permits are subject to a quota, determined yearly by the Ministry of Internal Affairs after taking into account the demographic situation at the regional level (Government Decision #790 2002).10 In the amendments to Federal Law #115 On the Legal Status of Foreigners on July 18, 2006, non-visa CIS citizens were exempted from quotas, but they were again placed under quotas in a January 6, 2007 revision of the same law. The temporary residence permit requires an application, identity documents, migration card and payment (the amount of which is not established by law and is thus left to the discretion of administrative officials). Migrants must submit documents certifying they are free from infectious disease (including HIV) and addictions within 30 days of the application for the temporary residence permit. Additionally, migrants must register with the tax authority within one year of arriving in Russia. The temporary residence permit is to be issued within two months for CIS citizens and six months for citizens of other countries and is valid for 3 years.

In order to get a permanent residence permit, a migrant must hold a temporary residence permit for one year. A permanent residence permit requires that a foreigner have a permanent residence, meaning that if the person does not own their own flat they must have permission to be registered in the flat indefinitely. Foreigners must also prove they have sufficient income to support themselves (Harrison 2009). The permanent residence permit allows travel to and from Russia freely as well as permission to work, is valid for five years and can be renewed limitless times.

10 Exceptions to the quota are made, for example, for foreigners married to Russian citizens.

Citizenship At the end of the Soviet Union, Russian citizenship was extended to all Soviet citizens living within the boundaries of the Russian Federation (Federal Law #1948-1 1991). Under Putin’s administration, however, citizenship processes were made stricter in 2002 in regard to those not born in the Russian Federation, leaving Soviet citizens no special claim to Russian citizenship over and above foreigners from outside the former Soviet space (Shevel 2008). Those not born in Russia are now required to prove language proficiency and source of income as well as relinquish citizenship to any other country (Federal Law #62 2002). The path to citizenship requires first a temporary, then a permanent residency permit as well as medical tests (to verify the applicant does not have HIV, infectious disease or drug addiction) and five years of continued residence within the Russian Federation. Exceptions are only made for refugees and persons of high scientific or cultural achievement and for citizens of former Soviet states who agree to serve in the Russian army for three years.

A multilateral agreement signed in 1999 between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia makes provisions for citizens of these countries to achieve transferred citizenship within a period of 3 months (Eurasian Economic Community 1999; Shokhzoda 2009). There is also a simplified procedure for former Soviet citizens, requiring a shorter period of residence, though many reports indicate administrative barriers prevent them from taking advantage of this option. For example, the period of residence required before citizenship begins only on receipt of a permanent residence permit, a procedure established first in 2002, which left a number of former Soviet citizens without a basis for achieving easy citizenship despite many years on Russian soil (Shevel 2008; Federal Law #115 2002; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2008). These former Soviet citizens then must contend with the procedures, quotas and waiting periods involved in obtaining temporary and then permanent residence.

Work Permits and Labor Market Controls Work permits are subject to quotas, which are set yearly by the government in consultation with employers, the Federal Migration Service and Ministry of Health. Quotas for CIS citizens were instituted in 2007 along with a new package of legislation that brought Russian legislation into closer alignment with Western standards (Federal Law #109 2006; Federal Law #115 2002; Federal Law #189 2006; Government Order #682 2006). Prior to 2007 quotas only regulated workers who were required to have visas. Each year employers are asked to submit estimates of how many foreign workers they will need for the following year along with a justification for why the domestic labor force is insufficient for their needs. The Ministry of Health aggregates these requests and sends them to the government for approval. The process for submitting estimates is both complicated and unfamiliar to many employers, and because failing to submit an estimate does not preclude the hiring of a visa-free worker, many employers simply do not participate in the quota formulation (Tyuryukanova 2009b). Consequently the formulation of quotas does not capture true labor market need.

Quotas are an inherently restrictive method of labor market control in the sense that they place a numerical limit on the flow of immigrants. Yet they are not necessarily a bad mechanism for regulating migrant workers so long as they are formulated in accordance with labor market needs. The initial quota for CIS workers in 2007 was six million. However, subsequent quotas

have been consistently lower than the actual need for foreign labor. The decreased to 1.8 million in 2008 and have been continually lowered since, standing at 1.3 million for 2010 (RIA Novosti 2010a). Considering the number of illegal migrant workers in Russia is estimated to be 5-10 million, which is a telling indicator of true labor market demand, any quota of less than five million will almost certainly ensure there will be an insufficient number of work permits for migrant workers on the Russian Federation territory (Kroschenko and Zibarev 2009).

In order to work in Russia, non-CIS citizens need a work visa and work permit, which can take up to four months to obtain (Ost West Kontaktservice n.d.). For this process, an employer first applies for permission to attract and use foreign labor, which can be done during the process of obtaining an invitation (Federal Law #115 2002). After the invitation, the employer can apply for a work permit for the employee and the employee can apply for a work visa (which can only be obtained in the migrant’s home country).

CIS citizens follow a simplified process for obtaining a work permit, which is not explicitly tied to a specific employer. Migrant workers from the CIS can apply for a work permit directly through migration services and therefore do not need a labor contract (Federal Law #115 2002). Direct applications take as little as ten days to complete and can be done by mail or at a local police office. Applications require a migration card, a passport (or other ID acceptable to the government) and a 1000 ruble fee ($40) (Itar-Tass 2007). A work permit allows the migrant to stay in Russia for up to one year. If the work permit is for more than 90 days, the worker must submit clean bill of health within 30 days. The health certificate must declare that the worker is free of drug-related disease, leprosy, tuberculosis, syphilis, various venereal diseases and HIV. These diseases are typically associated with migrant populations, several being grounds for deportation (Butuzova 2007). The new health checks have been cast as a necessary measure for Russia’s “biological security.” (Itar-Tass 2007) In August 2007, the Moscow city government announced that they would make high-tech identification cards, complete with medical histories, mandatory for migrants at a cost of a 12,200 ruble ($500) deposit to each migrant (Dmitriyev 2007). While on the surface this would seem administratively useful, it would come at great expense to migrants and would likely deter them from registering legally. Furthermore, this proposal is one indicator of the ways in which regional governments can act as barriers to coherent national policy by implementing discriminatory bureaucratic procedures, a topic that will be more fully discussed at a later point in the dissertation.

Foreign citizens who hold a permanent residence permit are not required to have a work permit. In the original 2002 legislation “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens,” those with temporary residence permits were also exempted from work permit requirements though this permission has since been revoked. Now this privilege is only accorded to those with permanent residence, which requires foreign citizens to live as a temporary resident for one year before applying for permanent status. Considering that the process of obtaining temporary residence can take up to a year, while migrants are initially allowed only a 90 day stay in the Russian Federation, completing the process in the time required is difficult, if not impossible (Bonar n.d.).

As a part of the package of 2007 laws, there was a government order banning all foreign workers from certain sectors of the economy including markets. In essence the quotas allocating work permits for these places of work were reduced to zero. Restrictive or cumbersome procedures

like these have the pervasive effect of pushing both employers and migrants to disregard the law and operate in the shadow sector, either with illegally obtained documents or without documents altogether (Tyuryukanova 2009b, Kroschenko and Zibarev 2009). For example, some migrants have gone through the process of temporary residence, which allows them to register as a private entrepreneur instead of as a foreign worker (Bonar n.d.). Others have sought permanent residence permits, which allow foreigners to work on a similar basis as Russian citizens (Tyuryukanova 2009b, 13; Tyuryukanova 2009c). Often, temporary and permanent residence paperwork is obtained from middlemen who either forge documents or illegally procure them from corrupt bureaucrats (Tyuryukanova 2009b, 14).

Freedom of Movement Freedom of movement is guaranteed to Russian citizens in the Constitution and to foreign citizens in Federal Law #115. Though laws have officially dismantled the propiska system, the registration processes described above are often cited as a violation of the principles of freedom of movement (United States Department of State 2009b).

Since the January 2007 laws, registration processes have been streamlined. According to the new rules, a migrant must be recorded at his/her place of stay, whereas a more formal registration process is required for a place of residence. In some cases (in restricted-access areas, ecological disaster areas and other cases specified by federal law) preliminary approval for the registration/recording procedure is necessary (Baker and McKenzie 2006). Registering at a place of residence requires identification, a residence permit and documents proving legal procurement of a dwelling place (Federal Law #109 2006). The migration officials are to record the residence information within one day and any necessary actions associated with the registration procedure is to be completed within a month (though the law does not specify what those actions might be). A person can only be registered at one place of residence within the Russian Federation at any given time.

A foreign citizen who lives in Russia (i.e. is traveling in Russia but is registered in a place of residence elsewhere in Russia) must be recorded at a place of stay within seven working days of arrival. Such person may independently contact migration officials in person or by mail to record their place of stay if they can provide written consent from their host. A foreign citizen visiting Russia must be recorded at the place of stay within three business days of arrival. Someone who has no residence, is in custody for administrative or criminal punishment, or is staying in a place that offers public health, social or hotel services must be registered by their host (i.e. hotel) within one day. Registration at the place of stay typically lasts for 90 days, though under the new rules, the government can either extend the stay for visa-free CIS citizens by up to 180 days, or shorten it as they see fit. Foreign nationals are required to confirm their presence in Russia to the FMS on a yearly basis (Baker and McKenzie 2006). Federal law #115 declares that foreigners without a permanent residence permit are not allowed to change their place of stay at will (Federal Law #115 2002). What this means in reality is that foreigners must re-register each time they move residence.

The idea of freedom of movement has important implications for work as well as residence. Migrants from the CIS are entitled to work permits that are not tied to a specific employer,

24 allowing workers to change their place of employment freely. This is different than non-CIS citizens, who are issued work permits that are only valid with a specific employer.

International Compliance Domestic legislation that is relevant to the migration situation can be divided into two categories: those laws that migrants must comply with in order to be legally on the territory of the Russian Federation, and those that protect the rights of migrants once on that territory. There are no international regulations that fall into the first category and therefore migrant rights are the focus of this section on the gap between domestic and international law.

As for international law, Russia is not a party to the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, or to the ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers. Russia signed the European Social Charter in 2000, which guarantees certain rights to migrants. The Duma and Federation Council signed a federal law on the ratification of the Social Charter in the summer of 2009. Nevertheless, when asked about Russia’s compliance with international law such as this, a representative of an UN-affiliated NGO in Moscow reflected on Russia’s compliance with the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, which it ratified in 2004. She told me that of the CIS countries, Russia is the only country that has not created shelters for trafficking victims, an action plan for implementation of the protocol, or domestic law to support the international standards. In fact, Russia has done nothing to comply with this protocol (Shcharbakova 2009b).

Russia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, which guarantees the children of illegal migrants have the right to attend school. Despite this, after the siege of a hospital in Southern Russia by Chechen rebels, the Moscow city government made school attendance contingent on the legal registration of parents. One local NGO interviewed described how they, along with the General Procurator, undertook a legal case to challenge this decision (Burtina 2009). As a result, both the Moscow city court and Supreme Court agreed that children should be allowed to attend school despite the legal status of their parents. As of 2009, the situation was much improved (Burtina 2009; Interview #26 2009).

As with much of international law, compliance is to some degree voluntary. By ratifying conventions, Russia agrees to abide by the terms of each document and implement complimentary domestic legislation. The enforcing and sanctioning procedures for the types of conventions listed here, however, are often weak.

Creating a Comparative Perspective Measuring Openness An open immigration regime is simply one that has relatively few bureaucratic hurdles for entrance and legal status of residence and work. States with open immigration regimes will allow greater freedom of movement within their country and will have a narrower gap between domestic and international statutes. To measure the openness of immigration regimes, the following analysis considers processes required for visas, residence permits and citizenship, work permits and labor market controls, freedom of movement, and accountability to international law.

Literature Connecting Regime Type With State Approaches Toward Immigration There is good reason to expect that democratic states, premised on liberal political philosophy and its focus on individual rights, will co-vary with open immigration policies. It is generally assumed that democratic countries have relatively more developed civil society and regard for international human rights standards than non-democracies. Drawing on these assumptions, this chapter proceeds with the expectation that a more liberal immigration regime will provide easier access to entry, residence and work with fewer bureaucratic hurdles toward these goals, will allow greater freedom of movement, and will have a narrower gap between domestic law and international standards.

Classical liberalism rests on universal moral equality, individual autonomy, and equal capacity for rationality (Cole 2000; Lichtenberg 1996). In contrast to nationalism, where identity is the basis for rights, liberalism creates a system that attributes rights universally, not allowing for subdivisions based on identity. Democratic states often work to reconcile their chosen policies with liberal theory.11 States less concerned with the processes or appearance of democracy will be freer to justify their policies in terms of preventing security threats (economic, social, etc.) by restricting the immigration of non-nationals. The literature is surprisingly silent on the idea that non-liberal states (i.e. those based on nationalist principles) will have comparatively closed borders and therefore this project will ultimately contribute to the gap in the literature.

A political entity that labels itself liberal must wrestle with this tension between promoting rights and protecting boundaries around the community. Most scholars agree that it is difficult for liberal states to regulate immigration; the rejection of migrants is difficult to justify for states that function according to the rule of law and human rights norms (Hollifield 1992b; Joppke 1998b; Freeman 1995). Many scholars, therefore, cite a gap between policy goals and outcomes in liberal states. On the one hand public opinion at best deems migrant populations an undesirable permanent addition to society (often for reasons tending toward xenophobia). Yet in liberal democratic states, policies are often more liberal than public opinion partly because of anti- populist norms that prevents politicians from mobilizing popular support around issues such as anti-immigrant phobia (Freeman 1995). Furthermore, interest groups (i.e. migrant employers, ethnic groups and human rights groups) as actors in democratic politics, and liberally-based constitutions and legal systems create demand both for admitting migrants and extending rights to them upon entry (Joppke 1998b, 16, 270-271; Freeman 1995, 886-888).

Finally, the link between democracy and compliance with international standards is well established in the literature. Liberal democratic regimes have a greater affinity for the legal processes and institutions used at the international level as well as for the rule of law in general. States that hold to liberal norms of individual rights and allow democratic participation to turn those norms into policy are unlikely to profess one set of norms for domestic policy and another

11 There is certainly debate as to the success of democracy’s ability to embody liberal ideals. Schmitt (1988) argues that democracy in its real-world manifestations and liberalism are not the same. The liberal ideal of equal rights only works where homogeneity exists, because the general will cannot be determined without creating homogeneity. To truly embrace liberalism would be to create a “democracy of mankind” that embodies equality (and homogeneity) of all people everywhere. Yet in a world of states, which is based on small groupings of national homogeneity, this is not realized.

for international policy (Doyle 2005). In fact, the whole of liberal institutional theory in international relations, including such important research agendas such as the democratic peace thesis, is based on the idea that liberal democratic states operate in harmony with international laws based on liberal principles (Slaughter 1995). Though there is debate over whether domestic law influences international norms or vice versa, there is general agreement on the fact that there is a much narrower gap between domestic and international law in democratic countries than in non-democratic countries (Soysal 1994; Sassen 199; Hollifield 1992b; Simmons 1998). Thus there is sufficient scholarship to support the expectation that democratic regimes should have more open immigration regimes that comply with international standards.

Comparing Cases

Entry Procedures That Russia does not require visas from citizens of the countries that are classified as the greatest sending-countries of migration is significant. This situation could be likened to the freedom of movement allowed between EU member countries. Countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (including Saudi Arabia and UAE) enjoy similar freedom of movement across borders. The same is not true for countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement (US, Canada and Mexico), as Mexican citizens must have a visa to enter the US.12 In order to measure the effect of these visa-free agreements on immigration, it is important to consider where the majority of immigrants to each country are coming from and whether or not they are required to have visas to enter the host country (see table 7). Ranking the countries according to the greatest to least proportion of entrants that must have a visa produces the following: Russia, Canada, Germany, France, Norway, Singapore, US, Italy, Saudi Arabia, UAE.

It is also important to consider how long foreigners are allowed to stay in a host country both with and without a visa (see table 8). The most liberal countries in this regard are Canada and the US, followed by the European cases. The Middle Eastern cases apply distinct benefits to countries in the visa-free regime of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Citizenship Russia’s citizenship requirements are not atypical when compared to the other cases under consideration (United States Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service 2001, Weil 2001). Russian citizenship is granted at birth if a child is born to only one Russian citizen parent as long as the other parent is stateless.13 While this is a stricter stipulation than in the US, Canada and France where citizenship is granted to all born within the territory, it is more liberal than Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, all of which do not confer automatic citizenship to those born within its borders.14 Germany also holds a middle position as citizenship by birth is only granted to non-ethnic Germans if one parent has lived in the country for at least eight years.

12 Canadian citizens are not required to have a visa to enter the US. 13 For the purposes of comparison, this renders the Russian system essentially one of citizenship by decent (jus sanguinis) rather than by birth on a particular territory (jus soli). 14 This does not include citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis), or citizenship conferred on the basis of one or both parents’ citizenship when a child is born outside the country. In all of the cases under consideration, there are provisions for children to acquire citizenship by decent.

Russia holds a middle position in regard to residency requirements prior to citizenship as well. France, Saudi Arabia and the US also require a five-year residence period. Norway requires seven years, Germany eight years, Italy and Singapore ten years and the UAE as many as thirty years. Only Canada requires fewer years (three).

Russia is similar to the other countries in other aspects as well. Canada, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the US all require language proficiency for naturalization. France and Germany require proof of sufficient income. Germany requires that naturalized citizens renounce any former citizenship and Singapore requires that a naturalized citizen intend to remain in the country permanently. Saudi Arabia has only recently extended the possibility of gaining citizenship through naturalization. Thus the changes made under Putin serve in many ways to bring Russia more in line with the standards of Western countries’ immigration policies.

Based on the data in table 9, countries that are relatively open in regard to citizenship are France, Canada, US, and Germany, most significantly because citizenship is conferred based on jus soli principles. Norway and Italy fall into a middle category because though they do not allow citizenship to children of parents who are non-nationals, they do not require language proficiency for naturalization. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and UAE can be considered strict citizenship regimes. Though Russia and Saudi Arabia have residency requirements that are less stringent than Norway or Italy in the case of Russia the 6 year minimum is subject to prolongations due to bureaucratic difficulties and in the case of Saudi Arabia there is no guarantee that after the 5 year period citizenship will be granted.

Work Permits and Labor Market Tests Globally, obtaining work permits is an inherently bureaucratic endeavor. In the US there are dozens of different types of temporary work visas. Norway has nearly thirty types of sector- specific work permits from those for ethnic cooks to agricultural workers to market traders (Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 2007). In many cases, as in Canada, a job offer must precede a work permit and the application reviewed by the necessary authorities. Application fees range from $165 (Norway) to $340 (US) and can take up to seven months in Norway (Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 2009).

EU and European Economic Area (EEA) countries (France, Germany, Italy, and Norway) do not require work permits for migrant workers from other member countries yet they have strict regulations for immigrants from outside Europe.15 In most cases an employer must show proof that a job cannot be filled by a worker from the EU/EEA. The procedure for determining the need for foreign labor is called a labor market test and is an instrument that is often used in place of a quota system. While most EU states prefer a labor market test to a quota system, Italy employs the latter (International Organization for Migration 2008). In theory, quotas can be an effective means of regulating the labor market. They are used in several of the countries under investigation, including the US. Gulf States including Saudi Arabia and UAE use quotas differently, requiring a certain number of native workers in various sectors and companies.

15 This does not include EU citizens from newly admitted states of Central and Eastern Europe, which will not be given free access to the EU labor market until 2011.

Like in Russia, work permits in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Germany and Norway are tied to specific employers, meaning a worker cannot switch jobs without applying for a transfer or new work permit (United States Department of State 2009a, 2009c). In both Saudi Arabia and the UAE work permits, like visas, require a worker to have a sponsor and an employment contract. Though employers are legally required to pay the work permit fees, it is not uncommon for worker paychecks to be garnered to cover the costs, which are around $250 (Human Rights Watch 2004, 2006).16

To arrive at an assessment for each country in regard to work permits, I consider whether work permits must be tied to a specific employer, whether or not countries require work permits for all workers, and whether quotas and/or labor market tests are applied (see table 10). France is the least restrictive because it does not limit workers to a single employer, waives work permits in some circumstances, and employs a labor market test (on the whole a less restrictive measure than a quota, where the employer must prove there is no national available to fill the needed position). Italy is similar as far as work permit requirements, but employs a quota that in 2007 granted 170,000 non-EU citizens permission to live and work in Italy (Estruch and Zupi 2008). The European approach, including Germany and Norway as well, is oriented toward openness for EU/EEA citizens while it has moderate to substantial barriers for workers outside the EU/EEA. The US, like Italy and France, has no restriction tying a foreign worker to a specific employer yet limits work permits (nonimmigrant work visas) by sector (Papademetriou and O’Neil 2004). In 2005, 640,000 nonimmigrant work visas were issued and in 2006, 600,000 (Migration News 2006).17 In this light, the Russian case is actually quite open to foreign labor, especially from the CIS. In fact, the Russian system is more open than the US system in regard to CIS citizens, because the quota is comparatively large.

Freedom of Movement In all of the Western countries under consideration, the freedom of movement and residence is protected by law and upheld in reality. For EU countries (France, Italy, Germany), freedom of movement for employment purposes is guaranteed by the Act on the General Freedom of Movement for EU Citizens.18 However, like Russia, Germany and France require that a person register at each place they reside (see table 11). France, and Norway require some type of residence or stay permit for stays of three months or longer. The Italian permit to stay requires a number of documents including proof of residence, medical insurance, family status certificate to prove marital status, criminal record certificate and a declaration from a prospective employer. Though there are various types of permits available in Norway, some are tied to integration, requiring language and history tests (International Organization for Migration 2008; Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 2006).19

16 On the black market, work permits sell for as much as $1250 (Human Rights Watch 2004) 17 Many Mexican immigrants, for example, seek permanent resident visas (green cards) because their options are otherwise limited (Durand, Massey and Malone 2003, 159) 18 Though freedom of movement is guaranteed, Germany maintains a restriction on workers from EU states admitted in 2004. 19 In Italy the permit to stay is an interim step that must be completed before one can obtain a residence permit. France does not require EU citizens to obtain residence permits, whereas Germany and Italy do.

In Singapore, freedom of movement and residence are protected by law though sometimes restricted as many people live in government subsidized housing, which according to law must have ethnic balance (United States Department of State 2009d).

In Saudi Arabia, both entry into and movement within the country is restricted. A residence permit requires a work contract, academic or professional qualifications and results of a medical exam (including HIV test). All those entering the country must have a Saudi sponsor who will vouch for and take responsibility for the actions of the foreigner. Employers who act as sponsor often confiscate passports of foreign workers, an illegal but widespread practice common in UAE as well (United States Department of State 2009a).

International Compliance None of the countries in question have signed the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, and only Italy and Norway have signed the ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers. All of the countries in question have ratified, signed or acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Based on ratification of these treaties, the countries from greatest to least compliance with international law are, the pull of international compliance is less than expected and does not offer significant insight into the immigration regimes at hand.

Conclusions on the Openness of Immigration Regimes Taking all of these factors into consideration, there is a clear trend that democratic countries also have more open immigration regimes (see table 12). This is especially true of France, Norway and Canada, which on the whole tend to be the most open to immigration based on these measures. On the opposite end of the scale, it is unsurprising that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both authoritarian political regimes and fairly closed immigration regimes. What is surprising about the data, however, is that Germany, Italy and the US, while receiving high scores for political openness, have significant barriers such as quotas, restrictive citizenship policies, and/or barriers to freedom of movement while Russia’s immigration regime is substantially more open than its political regime would have us expect.

What does this say about Germany, Italy and the US, as liberal democracies? It is actually quite clear that these liberal polities do not actualize liberal ideals in their immigration policies. That Germany only allowed citizenship by birth to non-ethnic Germans beginning in 2000 is a telling example of its restrictive attitude toward immigration. In fact, Germany has continually claimed it is not a country of immigration, despite its rank as 3rd largest immigrant-receiving country (Howard 2008, Halfmann 1997). Up until changes to the citizenship law in 2000, those born in Germany to non-German parents had to complete the naturalization process in order to attain citizenship, whereas a child born to ethnically German parents outside Germany had claim to immediate citizenship. Until 1990, bureaucrats could deny non-ethnic Germans citizenship regardless of how long they had lived in Germany and thus there were very few naturalized German citizens (Brubaker 1992, 272-273; Howard 2008, 48). Though the 2000 changes, and subsequent changes in 2004, are considered a liberalizing response to domestic and international pressure, restrictions remain (Howard 2008; Checkel 2001). The prohibition on dual citizenship and bureaucratic requirements, such as those for residence permits in the process of

naturalization, are caused by anti-immigrant sentiment in society have the effect of making Germany’s citizenship policies exclusionary (Howard 2008).

The most significant restriction of the US immigration regime is the yearly ceiling of 675,000 for green cards (permanent residence cards, or immigrant visas), and an even stricter limit on temporary worker visas, of which fewer than 100,000 are admitted (Congressional Budget Office 2006; McCabe and Meissner 2010). Receiving a green card often depends on having family already in the US (Congressional Budget Office 2006). Temporary worker visas require a US employer to file the paperwork prior to an immigrant’s entry into the country (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 2009). Seeing as how the US is the number one immigrant receiving country, the fact that its temporary worker quota pales in comparison to the number of work permits Russia allows to CIS citizens, which is established as insufficient for labor market needs, is a significant indicator of its restrictiveness.

Whereas Germany and the US have one primary issue keeping their regime restrictive (citizenship in the former and quotas in the latter), Italy is more restrictive across the board. As in Russia, quotas are a problem in that they consistently do not account for true labor market need and are often used toward political ends (OECD 2006; Estruch and Zupi 2008). There is no shortage of potential immigrants for Italy, both from the EU and Northern Africa, and therefore to have any degree over control over who is admitted legally, procedures must be quite demanding (Sciortino 2009). Ironically, it was because of pressure surrounding the institution of the Schengen area that Italy instituted strict immigration policies, in order to curb illegal entries that would then have free access to a number of European countries (Al-Azar 2010; Veikou and Triandafyllidou 2001). Yet, as in Russia, illegal immigration is a structural problem that is fueled in part by Italy’s large informal economy (Finotelli and Sciortino 2008). Furthermore, a significant problem in the Italian immigration regime is that many aspects of procedures for legal entry are controlled at the administrative level, leading to uneven implementation of laws and arbitrary treatment of immigrants, a point that Italy shares with Russia, as we shall see in due course (Veikou and Triandafyllidou 2001).

Global legal experts at Baker and McKenzie observe that, “Currently, the procedures for obtaining permission to work in Russia for foreign national employees are comparable in their complexity and duration to those in the USA or Western Europe.” (Baker and McKenzie 2008) This gives credence to those, including government officials of the Russian Federation, that claim changes to the immigration regime in 2007 bring policies in line with Western standards. However, one of the greatest contributing factors to Russia’s openness score is the CIS visa-free regime that obviates visas for the largest proportion of labor migrants. The visa-free regime was established long before the 2007 changes, however, meaning it does not contribute to any potential liberalization of policies.20 Furthermore, though the visa-free regime contributes to Russia’s seeming openness, the reality is that control is shifted from entry into the country to entry into the labor market.

The 2007 legal changes to Russia’s immigration regime are dubbed by some a “liberal migration revolution,” because of the reform-oriented intentions of certain bureaucrats (Grafova 2009).

20 The visa-free regime was established by the Agreement on Visa-Free Migration of the CIS Countries Citizens of October 9, 1992. In many ways the visa-free regime can be seen as a Soviet

Most notably is Vyacheslav Postavnin of the FMS, who has since left government service in order to create a research institute in the private sector (Postavnin 2009). Certain aspects of the legislation offer CIS citizens the opportunity to directly obtain work permits that are not bound to specific employers, a privilege vis-à-vis citizens of other countries who are only allowed to work for a single employer during their stay in Russia. This allows CIS migrants to change employers within reasonable limits, protecting themselves from potential abuse and slavery (Mukomel 2006). Migrants can now obtain all of the necessary paperwork themselves with minimal processing time and expense, instead of relying on employers to submit the documents on their behalf (Tyuryukanova 2009c). While these changes to the procedures for work permits can indeed be considered a liberalization of previous policies, other bureaucratic procedures remain cumbersome and restrictive. Furthermore, the fact that liberalization of the work permit procedures was advanced alongside the institution of quotas for CIS citizens and a ban on foreigner workers in certain economic sectors (essentially a quota of zero) indicates the overall direction of immigration regulation is not one of liberalization.

That Russian immigration policy has developed in an incoherent manner reflects a divide between those who look to sustainable reform implemented incrementally (i.e. those behind the liberal immigration revolution) versus bureaucrats and government officials who are focused on short term populist solutions to immigration problems. In the end, though there were some liberal changes included in the 2007 policies, the latter group of elites succeeded in producing a restrictive environment through a ban on foreign workers, difficult administrative processes and the quota mechanism that is unrelated to real labor market needs. Under the guise of nationalism, officials focus on restrictive immigration policies in order to achieve short term gains of public support as we will see in the next chapters (Postavnin 2009; Mukomel 2006). These officials often have economic interests or connection with business and want to exploit the cheap illegal labor that proliferates under a restrictive regime as will be demonstrated in chapter five (Burtina 2009).

Russia’s immigration regime, which in the end is quite closed as we would expect of a non- democratic polity, freely justifies its policies through nationalist rhetoric. Though the basis for regime legitimacy in Russia is non-electoral, leaders rely on charismatic appeal to ensure continued tenure and work quite assiduously to ensure society is at least minimally satisfied. It is this dynamic that we turn to in chapter four.

CHAPTER 4: SOCIETY DEMANDS RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICIES

This chapter argues that in response to growing xenophobia in society, the state has embarked on a labor migration policy agenda that does not reflect the demographic realities present in Russia. Nationalism and xenophobia have a number of manifestations in both the state and society. The state continually reinforces nationalist attitudes through the media and discriminatory policies. These efforts resonate with the public, which passively supports xenophobia, and nationalist actors who actively promote anti-migrant agendas. Pervasive institutional and popular manifestations of xenophobia work together to both demand and justify restrictive immigration policies.

Literature Review: Nationalism and Immigration Control As the last chapter described, liberal states must continually wrestle with balancing rights and security and often admit unwanted migrants because of a commitment to liberal ideology and due to prevailing anti-populist norms that prevent politicians from mobilizing popular support around issues such as anti-immigrant phobia (Freeman 1995). In an illiberal polity, there is no ideological impetus for admitting or extending rights to unwanted migrants, nor are there anti- populist norms. These states are freer to pursue the identity-based policies of nationalism. It is at this point that the current literature does not provide an adequate framework for understanding the Russian approach to immigration policies. Though the literature on nationalism is vast, it does not offer hypotheses on how nationalist ideology acts as an input for immigration policy. Unlike those who call for open borders as a realization of liberalism, one would be hard pressed to find similar scholarly advocacy for closed borders on the basis of nationalism. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw on theoretical accounts of nationalism and apply them to the Russian case in order to understand how nationalism can be used to justify certain immigration orientations.

The following section seeks to establish definitions for important terms such as nationalism, patriotism, xenophobia, populism, and right-wing extremism. It begins with the existing literature, delineating these processes and clarifying categories not only in and of themselves, but vis-à-vis each other both in the Russian context and in general.

Nationalism and Patriotism This analysis takes a modernist approach to the origins of nationalism. Modernism arose in the 1960s and was partially in reaction to the racially-based explanations that had been popular up to and through the World Wars (Smith 1998; Özkirimli 2000). To modernists, a nation is a civic community that grants membership to a territorial political group on the basis of citizenship. Nationalism is a tool used by states to create cohesion and legitimacy. Nations are thus created by elites who seek to control the populations through emotional appeals to belonging.

Nationalism as a modern phenomenon is expressly connected to the state. Literacy, communication and education are the media through which societies are mobilized to seek a shared identity and because education can only be administered by a state pre-modern eras were unable to produce the cultural homogenization necessary for nations to solidify (Gellner 1983). As Armstrong (1982) notes, nationalism has been the “dominant political doctrine” since the 18th century. Political doctrines in this same period are focused on the state as dominate political unit. Regardless of the view of the nation as something that is primordial or modern and the

related differences of opinion regarding whether the nation emerged prior to or because of the state, the process of nationalism is intimately related to state-building in the current era. This is simply a matter of political geography in that territorial legitimacy is contingent on the entity of the state first and foremost, rather than on the nation.

The processes analyzed here can be seen to produce three main thrusts. First, the mobilization of people for the purposes of the state as a territorial entity. Second, the connection of people to one another, and third the definition of who belongs to the political unit and who should benefit from the resources of the state. The first iteration seeks to tie people vertically to a specific territory (the state being the political manifestation of the romantic notion of “the land”) as is best expressed in the word patriotism.21 The second is a horizontal distinction, as focuses on common ties of culture, history, religion and other expressions of solidarity. It can best be expressed in terms of ethnic nationalism, or simply nationalism.22 Nationalism has a less specific relationship to territoriality than does patriotism, which cannot exist apart from a fixed territory. Nationalism can express solidarity between people within state borders or across state borders and can have a number of political manifestations depending on aspirations for territoriality. The third thrust occurs within the domain of the state, encompasses both entry requirements (visa policies) and citizenship, and depends on which of the first two is dominant, patriotism or nationalism. Patriotism places limits on citizenship only insofar as they are detrimental to the healthy function of the state, and can thus range from liberally inclusive citizenship policies to communitarian notions of exclusivity. Nationalism, on the other hand, is premised on exclusivity and restricted access to the benefits of the state and is actualized in xenophobic attitudes, populist political movements, and right wing extremism.

Both patriotism and nationalism can be expressed in terms of “blood ties,” the former being, in the words of Aleksei Tolstoi, the “ties of blood that bind us to our country,” (Dunlop 1983, 20). These are vertical ties and manifest in willingness to die for love of country, to protect the country’s honor, which can be dubbed patriotism. There are also horizontal blood ties. These are ties between members of the nation, who focus on shared blood, culture or religion and who are willing to die (and kill) for each other and for the purpose of attaching the nation to territoriality of a state. Or, in the words of John Lukacs, “patriotism is rooted to the land; nationalism to the mythical image of a people,” (Allensworth 1998, 1). Ties of patriotism and nationalism can manifest concurrently (i.e. patriotism evoking nationalism for the purposes of the state, for the purpose of this analysis termed national-patriotism) or can occur alone.

It is the instrumental use of nationalism by political elites for the purpose of state-building (the creation of patriotism) that attracts a significant portion of scholarly analysis on the subject. Scholars differ, however, on whether this nationalism draws primarily on affective or rational ties. The use of rational ties produces the civic patriotism necessary to bind citizens to the state, whereas affective ties, or the evoking of primordial kinship, produce horizontal bonds of nationalism among the people of the nation.

Ernest Gellner (1964) is decidedly constructivist about nationalism arguing “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.”

21 Patriotism and civic/liberal nationalism are used synonymously. 22 This definition removes patriotism and civic nationalism from under the heading of nationalism

Rogers Brubaker (1996) follows this logic when he argues for a conception of nationalism that is completely separate from the concept of nations as a category of analysis. Rather nations should be conceptualized as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalization of cultural and political goals and nationhood as an event in the sense that it “suddenly crystallizes rather than gradually develops” (Brubaker 1996). Rather than asking what nations are and when they originated, he is concerned with how they are used to appeal to members of a state in order to accomplish an elite goal. “Nationalism is not engendered by nations. It is produced—or better, it is induced—by political fields of particular kinds… nationhood and nationalism flourish today largely because of [a] regime’s policies” (Brubaker 1996).

It is the modern age of nationalism that creates the political conditions which demand a nation, and uses “arbitrary historical inventions” of culture to accomplish its task. Nationalism in this definition is a political aspiration that desires to make political and national boundaries coterminous (Gellner 1983, 1). The use of affective ties toward these aims, however, can encourage separatism or irredentism in the modern period. Geertz (1973) argues that the creation of the state provokes rather than quiets these sentiments because it taps into the only feelings of solidarity the new political community possesses, which are primordial attachments of race, language, religion, custom, etc., despite the fact that these attachments are seen as pathological in the modern era. The civic ties advanced by the modern state conflict with primordial ties as elites push forward toward the practical advantages of larger social groupings. The population, however, prefers primordial ties to poorly understood political concepts.

The great irony of nationalism, thus, is that it imposes a high culture (shared meaning through homogenous education, as described by Gellner) on a society, though it does so in the name of primitive cultural ties. Elites are instrumental in modern movements as state-builders, but their efforts draw on historically rooted territorial and cultural ties because whether the nature of nations is primordial or not, the fact that nationalists believe they are tied by ancient forces is a powerful mobilizer (Smith 1998). Walker Connor (1993) picks up this theme that national bonds are psychological and non-rational. Nationalism is beyond reason, and though it is a modern creation, it cannot be explained by rationality because it taps into affective ties.

Nationalism is a boundary-creating/maintaining process that defines group identity in order to establish how and to whom rights should be conferred (Conversi 2001). Immigration is a violation of the nationalist principle that national and state borders are congruent, as defined by Gellner, because it allows non-nationals to be included within political boundaries that, according to nationalism, should not cut across ethnic boundaries. Gellner argues that “nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones (Gellner 1983, 1).” This means that the state cannot violate the nationalist principle (in this case by allowing immigrants) and remain legitimate.

Immigration confounds nationalist desires to maintain homogeneity of ethnic or cultural identity within physical boundaries. Nationalism reacts to this process by fighting against the unbridled immigration advocated by liberal and open border arguments. Nationalists frequently call for restrictive immigration policies in order to preserve the cultural heritage of a dominant nation or to limit the strain immigrants place on the job market and social welfare services (education, health care, police services etc.) (Smith 1995, 46; Seglow 2005). Nationalist voices argue that

35 jobs and welfare benefits are the right of national members, and should not be extended to those outside the identity boundaries.

Thus it is the horizontal or affective ties produced by nationalism that translate into specific policy demands. When national-patriotism has been evoked in a state it becomes a powerful lobby concerning entry and citizenship/integration policies. It is at this point that the theories of nationalism meet the policies of immigration.

Translating Nationalism into Anti-Immigration Policy: The Role of Populism Populism is the means by which the process of creating affective ties between members of a dominant nation turns vertical in order to make specific policy demands on the state. The rise of neo-populist (Betz and Immerfall 1998) right-wing extremist (Hainsworth 2000) parties in Europe has specifically linked the nationalist impulse to a policy platform. Anti-immigration discourse based on xenophobic definitions of the nation has replaced anti-communism and anti- Semitism as the central theme of fringe parties (Hainsworth 2000, 10). Neo-populism or right- wing populism is a sanitized version of neo-fascist right-wing extremism that often finds its expression in parties that choose to conduct business within political system (Betz 1998). Most typically these parties have a firm anti-immigrant stance expressed either as welfare chauvinism (a distinction concerning citizenship and integration policies) (Hainsworth 2000) or direct calls for decreased immigration (concerning entry policies).

Populism is a diffuse concept and often defies a concise definition that can be applied across cases. Nevertheless, populism can be said to broadly encompass a movement, ideology or mentality that glorifies and speaks for the people against outside forces. In the past these outside forces have been varied: international capitalism, urbanization and/or colonialism and the populist impulses were suffused into larger movements of socialism, nationalism and peasantism (Ionescu and Gellner 1969). Recent manifestations of populism (neo-populism and right-wing extremism) have defined themselves against globalization and immigration (as outside forces) and against mainstream political parties that are not sufficiently protecting the interests of citizens (i.e. the nation).

Populism is most often an anti-establishment impulse. Thus it is strange that neo-populism is made manifest in political parties that are not only quite comfortable within the political establishment but receive a modicum of popular support as legitimate parties. This is clearly the case with the National Front of France, the Northern League of Italy, the Liberal Democratic Party and Communist Party in Russia and to a lesser extent the National Democratic Party in Germany and the Progress Party in Norway. These parties share an emphasis on nationalism, xenophobia and racism as manifestations of ethnic identification and welfare chauvinism as a principle of exclusion of non-citizens. They support a strong state, emphasize law and order and other security concerns and focus on welfare chauvinism (Hainsworth 2000, 9).

In the European context, the rise of neo-populist right-wing parties can be seen as a post-modern phenomenon because party attachment is a result of disaffection from the post-industrial economy (Immerfall 1998). As blue collar workers increasingly feel alienated by a service economy that prefers the low-wage labor of immigrants, they are more likely to support parties outside the political status quo. Whereas these voters in the past would have supported left-wing

parties, as trade unions become increasingly associated with protecting the interests of elites at the top, right-wing parties are able to enfranchise voters with the promise that deregulation will provide new economic opportunities (Immerfall 1998, 252). In this sense neo-populist right-wing parties are successful to the degree that they are able to mobilize the resentment of the public (Betz 1998).

Taking it to the Streets: From Parliamentary Discourse to Extremist Violence Violent manifestations of nationalism occur when the state is not seen as a viable solution to the problem of immigration.23 Whereas both nationalism (ethnic nationalism and patriotic nationalism) and populism are elite driven processes, extremism is most often a popular expression of similar sentiments. It is extreme in its tactics, using violence, vandalism and hate propaganda to both attack minorities and gain sympathizers. As much as it is extreme, however, its pervasiveness should not be overestimated. What can generally be referred to as hate crimes is defined differently in the cases at hand, sometimes referring only to crimes motivated by ethnic or racial bias and at other times including biases of religion and sexual orientation.

States differ in their approaches to acknowledging and regulating hate crimes. In most cases the policy discussions concerning hate crime legislation and immigration legislation are kept separate. This analysis seeks to bring the two policy areas together by showing the relationship between violent manifestations of ethnic nationalism and immigration policy.

The Russian Case Locating the Russian case in a discussion of nationalism and its populist and extremist manifestations is at once an interesting and ironic endeavor. The theories described above are built on notions of modernization that are distinctly Western and democracy-centric. Russia, despite its distinctly non-Western development, has some important points of continuity with existing theory.

Nationalism and Populism in the Russian Experience

Pre-Soviet Populism In the Russian language there are two terms that are translated as “populist” in English. One is the Westernized “populism” (популизм), which has a rather loose definition and the other “narodnichestvo” (народничество), which refers to a specific historical movement that has been called agrarian populism (Canovan 1981). Narodnichestvo as a movement and its adherents the narodniki in the mid to late 19th century were distinctly anti-tsarist and focused first on the emancipation of the serfs and then procuring equal distribution of land among peasants. Narodnichestvo was an elitist movement that sought to bring revolutionary ideals to the peasants, empowering the peasants to rise up by adapting leftist theories to felt needs. The populism of the narodniki differed from Marxism on the point of workers (Marxism) v. peasants (narodnichestvo) as revolutionaries, and on spontaneous (Marxism) v. guided (narodnichestvo) uprising. The narodniki failed where Marxism succeeded in large part due to the absence of a charismatic leader like Lenin. Further, the narodniki were unable to convince the peasants, who

23 Violent manifestations of nationalism also occur in the context of separatist movements (i.e. Chechnya) and ethnic civil wars (i.e. Yugoslavia), both of which are outside the scope of this discussion.

since emancipation had focused on the development of individual enterprise and private property, of the ideas of socialism adopted from Western radical thought (Canovan 1981).

Soviet Nationalism Though the impression of the Soviet Union as an internationalist, rather than nationalist, polity was robustly projected, in many ways the nationalism common in Russia today is only a continuation of the Soviet experience (Laruelle 2009b; Verkhovsky 2009). Ethnic stereotypes were common in Soviet Union and had a distinctly biological component. Nationalism had a complex relationship with communism, but was nevertheless part of the official doctrine (Laruelle 2009b, 21).

Stalin rejected the internationalism of Marxist-Leninist revolution in order to rally the Soviet people around motherland, fatherland and national heroes of Russian history for the purpose of achieving a synergistic mobilization for World War II. As such, Stalin’s use of carefully controlled nationalism was purely tactical and symbolic as a means to ensure the survival of the Soviet project and was abandoned immediately upon the conclusion of the war (Dunlop 1983).

In the wake of Khrushchev’s secret speech, there was a shift among the intellegencia from Marxism-Leninism to other ideologies, including nationalism, leading to a revival of Russian literature and folklore. Politically, republics of the Soviet Union were given certain institutional control for the first time. One result of this new-found autonomy was the publication of the newspaper and publishing house Sovietskaya Rossiya, which were devoted to particularist concerns of those in the Russian republic. Whereas the Stalinist nationalism was a carefully controlled top-down phenomenon, the Khrushchev nationalism was primarily an elitist movement, though it was not overtly political until the Brezhnev rollbacks of intellectual freedom (Dunlop 1983).

Because nationalists were perceived as less of a threat than pro-Western dissidents, and because of nationalist sympathy within the Politburo, they were allowed to continue in their activities. Only once the pro-Western threat had been controlled did the regime turn against the nationalist voices that Brezhnev believed represented a threat to class consciousness. Nationalists during the Brezhnev period came under continual harassment yet either found a voice through samizdat publications or chose to sanitize their rhetoric in order to publish in mainstream journals (called the “official” nationalist because they complied with the regime’s requirement that nationalism be combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology). They were focused on the cultural, religious and symbolic revival/survival of Russia (Dunlop 1983).

Post-Soviet National-Patriotic Populism The question of what would form the basis of Russian national identity became an essential question after the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary internationalism. Since the second half of the 1990s, due to the threat of separatism in Chechnya and the international shame experienced as a result of Kosovo, Russian identity has coalesced around a type of xenophobia that unites the public and allows elites access to political legitimacy (Laruelle 2009a, 6-11).

The state must combat xenophobia to the degree that it threatens social and political stability. Yet at the same time, it must make popular moves in order to remain legitimate. Furthermore,

political elites are a part of society, and thus are subject to the same types of moods and attitudes (Interview #16 2009). This set of factors puts the government in a strange position in regard to nationalism. According to Laruelle (2009a 6, 7, 10, 119, 193), United Russia has come to dominate nationalist rhetoric, pushing it into the mainstream and embracing a “patriotic centrism” that is both ethnic and civic at the same time that it is populist.

Currently, populism (популизм) is used quite loosely in the Russian discourse, without specific definition. In evoking populism (популизм) there is no reference to narodnichestvo, which is limited to a specific historical manifestation of the larger global phenomenon of populism (Baranov 2001). Rather, populism is most often referred to as a tactic of political elites to appeal to the masses. In the 1990s, populism emerged as an anti-Soviet phenomenon (Zaslavsky 1995). It then manifested itself in the party agendas of the CPSU and LDPR and has now become mainstream in United Russia as a national-patriotic phenomenon (Laruelle 2009a, Cox and Shearman 2000).

Nationalism in Russia currently has a number of manifestations, both institutional (imbedded in state structures) and popular, which can be linked to the recent immigration policies specifically and anti-migrant attitudes more generally. Institutionally, the current nationalist climate is continually reinforced by the state-controlled media and government policy. State efforts resonate with the public, as shown through public opinion polls expressing nationalist sentiment, hate crime statistics and nationalist group activity. Both institutional and popular xenophobia work together to create an environment that demands restrictive immigration policies despite the economic and demographic need for migrant labor.

Institutional Xenophobia In order to compensate for the gap between demographic realities and the new immigration laws, the state has employed decidedly nationalist rhetoric. The state continually reinforces nationalist attitudes through the media and discriminatory policies. The state-controlled media is a mouthpiece of the government for what many identify as increasing nationalist ideology. It is both a forum for elites to express political statements and an arena for the creation of an overall anti-migrant narrative (Panfilov 2006; Badyshtova 2005, 22-46; Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia 2004, 501). The media fosters migrantophobia by framing immigration processes and immigrant populations in security terms, focusing on ethnicity as a distinguishing factor of immigrants and highlighting threats to law and order and the economic welfare of Russian citizens.

The state media has consistently cast migration policies in ethnic terms, as in a RIA Novosti report of April 2, 2007: “The ban on foreign market sellers follows an ethnic-related brawl in northern Russia, which left two people dead last year. The law is designed to open the way for Russian agricultural producers and vendors to the markets, which have been controlled mostly by migrants from the Caucasus republics, leading to xenophobic sentiments in society.” Putin himself stated that the immigration changes were made specifically to protect Russian nationals (Moscow Times 2006).

Content analysis of local and national newspaper coverage of 2007 fights between Russian and Chechen youth in Stavropol (in Southern Russia) reveals that the vast proportion of newspapers used ethnic identifiers to describe actors in the conflict and portrayed migrants and minorities in

sensationally negative light.24 Most newspapers reported significantly more about Russian victims of the violence than about Chechen victims, including biographical information, interviews with family members and coverage of funerals. Many of Russia’s newspapers are owned by businessmen with ties to the Kremlin, allowing the state to stay at least partially removed from the most overt nationalist rhetoric. Yet in the case of Stavropol, even state-owned newspapers also directly evoked nationalist explanations for events despite the official account of events, which deemed the disturbances “hooliganism”.25

Events in Stavropol occurred nearly a year after disturbances in Kondopoga, which have become synonymous with interethnic strife.26 Kondopoga is regularly evoked in the media by reporters of various ideological perspectives as an indicator of the volatile ethnic atmosphere in Russia. A speech by President Putin on October 5, 2006 focused on various issues related to protecting the interests of Russian populations. Official media sources rearranged the paragraphs of this speech to locate the comments about protecting Russians nearer the discussion of the Kondopoga events than their original context within a discussion on domestic agriculture, with the effect of making Putin’s speech more ethnically charged (Kozhevnikova 2007). Again, this shows that, while the upper-most positions in the government are at times a step removed from nationalist rhetoric, the overall mechanism of the state-owned media portrays a distinct nationalist tone.

Ethnicity is often a distinction denoted by physical appearance. However, given that Russia is a multinational state, ethnic appearance alone does not provide sufficient evidence of someone’s status as a migrant (Postavnin 2008). Chechens are a particularly apt example because most are Russian citizens, since Chechnya is contained within the borders of the Russian Federation, yet they are the target of a disproportionate amount of xenophobia. Following several terrorist

24 Content analysis by the author looked at 149 articles in 40 Russian language newspapers during a one month period surrounding a series of events in Stavropol in the summer of 2007 that are variously framed as either a mass fight followed by the unassociated murder of two Russian students ten days later, or a prolonged interethnic conflict. The series of events began on May 24 with a large brawl that resulted in the death of a young Chechen student. Some sources claim the mass fight was between Russians and Chechens, while other sources claim there were multiple nationalities on either side and the conflict was merely the result of normal teenage hostilities. Gilani Ataev (Chechen) died in police custody, some suspect from an overuse of force followed by a lack of timely medical treatment. On June 3 Victor Chadin and Pavel Blokin (both Russian) were killed. The official government version of the events claims that the murders were the result of a robbery gone awry and that the perpetrator was of Slavic descent. Others believe the murders were motivated by ethnic retaliation for the death of the Chechen student. Rumors abounded and authorities were slow in making any public statements to quell the gossip that claimed murders were occurring every day and that the city was under lockdown. Unauthorized mass protests accompanied the June 5 funeral of the Russians, ending in a number of arrests that prevented Russian protestors from marching on a Chechen hotel. The authorities anticipated the protests and responded with a large police presence in order to stave off any potential violence that would occur if ultra nationalist groups exploited the deaths as an opportunity to retaliate against Caucasians. A group of Duma representatives was immediately dispatched to the area to analyze the situation and determine the official response. The content analysis looked at how often victims and perpetrators were identified by ethnicity, explanations of the conflict (ethnic or mere “hooliganism”), references to Kondopoga, etc.) 25 See, for example, Vyzhutovich 2007. 26 On August 30, 2006, a bar fight between locals and ethnic Chechens in Kondopoga (a town in the Northern republic of Karelia) ended with the death of two ethnic Russians. Young Russian rioters burned down the Chechen- owned bar, and destroyed a nearby market and several stores owned by Caucasians. Street demonstrations of over 2,000 residents demanded the deportation of immigrants; many Chechens left of their own accord. According to some sources there were 20 arson attacks in and around Kondopoga in the week following the Russians’ deaths and that as many as eight Caucasians were injured in the protests that followed.

attacks carried out by Chechens as well as the wars in Chechnya, minorities of Caucasian appearance have come under more scrutiny and offer a convenient focus for the perpetuation of xenophobic attitudes. What began as specific anti-Chechen sentiment in the 1990s has turned into a homogenized xenophobia that lumps together Chechens with other Caucasians (both within Russia and in the states of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia) and with a general category of “enemies” that includes Central Asians, Chinese and Africans, all of which are commonly referred to as “blacks” (Laruelle 2009a, 40-41).

In addition to ethnic identifiers, the media often highlights threats to law and order posed by migrants. Russian officials often use security language when justifying restrictive immigration policies and ethnic minorities are commonly portrayed as criminals, terrorists or threats to Russian society (Desormeau 2005, 7; Open Society 2006). Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov has repeatedly called for decreased immigrant quotas, arguing that migrant are associated with increased criminality (Polevoi 2008). Luzhkov has, on different occasions, attributed between 36% and 50% of Moscow’s crimes to migrants (Zubchenko 2009). That these messages are transmitted to the public through the media without commentary or analysis allows the rhetoric of criminality a greater degree of authoritativeness.

In the July 6, 2009 edition of Itogi, First Deputy Procurator Alexander Bastrykin wrote a lengthy article associating migrants with illegal businesses, forged documents and organized crime. A full color picture of Bastrykin filled the cover of the issue and advertised the title of the article, “Migration: out of the light, into the shadows.” The opening line of the article says, in bold print, that every third crime in Russia is committed by an illegal immigrant. Data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) shows that in the period 2003-2009 crimes committed by foreigners comprise 2.7-3.6% of total crimes (Ministry of Internal Affairs 2003-2009; Federal Migration Service 2009). However, Bastrykin argues these figures under represent migrant criminality and that his own data is a better indicator of the scale of immigrant crime (Babic 2009). By appealing directly to the public in a self-authored piece, Bastrykin clearly takes advantage of the media as a forum to express his anti-migrant sentiment.

Through the media, the government justified the 2007 ban on foreign workers, saying it would allow Russian nationals economic opportunities that have previously been taken by migrants (Butuzova 2007). The FMS and Duma claimed that the new migration rules were a response to the displeasure many Russians expressed at the disproportionate number of foreign workers in outdoor markets (Nikitenko 2007). Yet Russians rarely work at the outdoor markets in question as these jobs are considered undesirable (Yudina 2005). When Russians are employed in low- skilled jobs such as these, they demand higher wages than their immigrant counterparts (Mukomel 2006, 3). Nevertheless the discourse that focuses on how migrants take jobs is popular and only intensified as a result of the international financial crisis in 2008.

Aside from nationalist rhetoric in the media, institutional xenophobia is displayed through a consistent pattern of ethnic profiling and other discriminatory activities of the government. Routine police discrimination is one way in which government policies and practices exhibit xenophobia (Human Rights Committee 2009). Police have been instrumental in carrying out state discrimination by stopping, fining and detaining those (primarily of Caucasian features) who are suspected to be without proper paperwork, a phenomenon one expert calls “quiet ethnic

cleansing” (Alexseev 1998). The MVD, which houses both the FMS and police forces, coordinates all immigration policies and procedures. Police are given some latitude in enforcing these policies, which displays an institutional structure that securitizes immigration by making it a primarily criminal matter. Under Russian law, police are given wide discretion for random document checks if they suspect some sort of administrative or criminal violation. Ministry officials, despite official rhetoric, have explicitly directed police officers to use ethnic profiling in the course of their work (Open Society 2006, 41-53).

Beyond police activities, ethnic profiling as a manifestation of institutional xenophobia can be seen in wider state policy such as anti-Caucasian crusades initiated by federal and Moscow city government from 1995-2004 (Korobkov & Zaionchkovskaia 2004, 503).27 Caucasian minorities have been the target of mass deportations, including one following the Moscow apartment bombings of 1999 that were instrumental in bringing about the second Chechen war and Putin’s election as president (Open Society 2006, 48).

A more recent example of state-driven ethnic profiling and migration crackdown occurred when a number of Georgians were deported following a deterioration in relations with Georgia in September/October 2006. After several Russian military officers were arrested in Tbilisi on suspicion of espionage, Russia recalled its ambassador, cut off all transportation, and refused visas to Georgian nationals (RIA Novosti 2006; Kozhevnikova 2007; Bigg 2006). Police were explicitly directed to step up actions against Georgians, including identification checks at a number Georgian Orthodox churches (United States Department of State 2007). Inspections of Georgian owned companies and demands by the Moscow police for lists of Georgian students involved not only migrant workers but Russian citizens of Georgian descent (Kozhevnikova 2007). Hundreds of Georgians were deported via government or cargo plane between October 6 and 10, during which 3 died.

Russian officials justified the deportations as a necessary response to longtime immigration and labor law violations (Petriashvili 2007). In the days after the capture of the Russian officers, the state media released many reports on Georgian “rascals”, highlighting criminal activities (Kozhevnikova 2007). These reports, coupled with the statements by FMS and Duma officials, couched their rhetoric in nationalistic terms. FMS spokesman Konstantin Poltoranin explained that Russia had only detained and deported Georgians who had expired visas or no work permits, saying Georgian citizens are the primary offenders of Russia’s migration laws (Interfax 2007).

Vyacheslav Volodin, deputy speaker of the Russian Duma stated that of the 300,000 Georgians working in Russia, only 0.7% of them were legal workers (RIA Novosti 2006). Mikhail Tyurkin, deputy director of the FMS, announced court decisions to expel nearly 500 Georgian citizens, citing figures that 1 out of 100 Georgians violate Russian law whereas as opposed to violations by 1 out of 1000 immigrants from other countries (Alikina 2006).

Though the Georgian crisis began as a political issue, it quickly solidified into “openly racist… ethno-nationalist policies,” (Verkhovsky 2009). Many ethnic Georgians contribute to the Russian economy by starting small businesses such as restaurants and a number of Georgians have

27 In this case Caucasian populations include dark-skinned Georgians, Azeris and Armenians as well as those of similar ethnic appearance living in the areas of the North Caucasus within the Russian Federation.

Russian citizenship. Yet this is not a welcome source of economic or population growth as evidenced by these events. Rather, the government focused on nationalist perspectives in a manner that displays institutional xenophobia.

Popular Xenophobia Institutional xenophobia is a result of elites who perpetuate nationalist sentiment through the media and policies. However, the elites who create policy and contribute to institutional xenophobia are influenced by xenophobic sentiment in society, making the relationship mutually reinforcing. Popular xenophobia is most readily assessed through public opinion polls, hate crime statistics and nationalist group activity. Public opinion comprises a primarily passive form of xenophobia based on popular discourse fostered by the media rather than on personal experience, whereas hate crimes and nationalist activities are active forms of xenophobia. These popular forms of xenophobia combine with and are perpetuated by institutional xenophobia to produce demand for restrictive immigration policies despite demographic need for labor migrants.

Public opinion surveys from the Moscow-based Levada Center show that there is consistent nationalist sentiment in Russian society, as 57% of Russians in 2009 supported the idea of “Russia for Russians,” either wholesale or with reasonable limits (Levada Center 2009). This number has remained at or above 50% since 2001. Similarly, a majority of those surveyed say that the government should restrict the influx of migrants to Russia and that illegal immigrants should be expelled. Yet the same surveys show that in 2008, 65% of those surveyed did not feel ethnic tension in their city or region (a figure that has remained consistently above 60% in yearly surveys since 2005). Similarly over 80% of respondents report that they rarely or practically never feel hostility toward or from ethnic minorities. One explanation for this duality is that on the whole, xenophobia is quite latent in the population. Though people are exposed to xenophobic sentiment regularly through the media, it remains more abstract than if it were a result of personal experience.

Research has established that Russians consistently perceive that there are more immigrants living among them than population statistics show, especially Chinese and Chechen populations (Alexseev 2006b). Most people do not distinguish between legal and illegal migrants, leading to the widespread perception that all migrants are criminals (Kadirova 2009). Survey data shows that 50% of Russians believe migration causes an increase in crime (Yudina 2005). Yet MVD data shows crimes by migrants were only 2.7-3.8% of total crimes for the period of 2003-2009 (around 50,000 crimes per year), meaning it is impossible that 50% of Russians have direct experience with migrant criminality. Rather, the perception of criminality is abstract and delinked in most cases from personal experience. It is logical, thus, that these perceptions are influenced by elite statements and the media’s disproportionate focus on the criminality and economic threats posed by migrants.

Popular xenophobia also includes activity of nationalist groups and attacks on foreigners, both of which are active manifestations of anti-migrant sentiment. According to some estimates, extremist crimes rose over 60% from 2006 to 2007 (Vasileva 2008). Though on the surface, statistics indicate a decrease in hate crimes since the peak in 2007, experts are not optimistic, saying that crimes are simply becoming more difficult to discover and that the level of nationalist

violence remains high even if there are fewer victims killed or injured (Kozhevnikova 2009a; Kozhevnikova 2009b). Furthermore, the victimology has shifted from attacks on members of youth anti-fascist groups and alternative subcultures (i.e. punk, emo, Goth, etc.) they are associated with, to attacks on minorities (Sova Center 2010a; Kozhevnikova 2009a). Central Asians were the most frequent victims of hate crimes in 2008 and 2009. This could indicate a shift in the strategy of extremists from fighting theoretical battles with those of opposing ideology to directly acting out xenophobic impulses.

More significantly of 531 hate crimes in 2008, only 33 guilty verdicts were conferred against 114 people, 28 of whom were given probation or released from punishment altogether (Sova Center 2010a). Police and investigators do not adequately investigate or punish crimes and themselves are associated with anti-migrant attitudes and actions (Human Rights Committee 2009). This shows an element of institutional xenophobia because migrants are not effectively protected and those acting on nationalist intentions operate in an environment of impunity. Thus there is a synergy between nationalist actors who work outside the law and elites who use the law to discriminate against migrants.

While hate crimes are the most radical manifestation of nationalism, nationalist groups are active both at the fringes of politics and in society at large. Some organizations are connected quite closely with the government, while others simply enjoy a wide berth for their activities because there is a lack of consistent legislation and prosecution of nationalist expressions (Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia 2004; Verkhovsky 2008; Verkhovsky and Kozhevnikova 2009).

An example of an organization with government ties is Mestniye. In September 2007, the media reported FMS accolades of nationalist youth group Mestniye, which was responsible for rounding up dozens of illegal workers and delivering them to the authorities. Though the youth group was created as a pro-Kremlin group, it has since shifted its ideology to align with ultra nationalist groups such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration. The leader of Mestniye brags of close ties to the FMS and has assisted the government agency on several occasions (Moscow Times 2007).

The Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) is an example of an organization that has less explicit ties to the government. Though it has made minor forays into politics, it focuses the majority of its energies on mobilizing society towards nationalist goals. DPNI is one of the most important nationalist organizations in Russia today as it has significantly contributed to spreading the slogan “Russia for Russians” through society (Laruelle 2009a, 74). Beyond the deportation of illegal immigrants, the DPNI supports maximally restrictive immigration (especially labor migration) policies, deportation of non-citizens who commit crimes and the abolition of the visa-free regime (Movement Against Illegal Immigration n.d.).

DPNI has been active in capitalizing on situations of real or perceived ethnic conflict such as the 2006 events in Kondopoga and the 2007 events in Stavropol. In Kondopoga DPNI leaders were pivotal in organizing anti-migrant protests through the internet, cell phones (SMS) and leaflets, a move that catapulted the group to national recognition and has become a model for their organizational activity (Kozhevnikova 2007; Belov n.d.; Kolesnichenko 2006). When ethnic tensions flared in Stavropol, the DPNI again traveled to the source of the conflict in order to

44 organize and participate in rallies. DPNI leaders were implicated in organizing Kondopoga protests, but none were arrested because their activities “did not incite ethnic hatred or call people to illegal acts,” (Kolesnichenko 2006). These words from the Procurator’s office are especially interesting because they follow an accusation that the DPNI was involved in organizing “pogroms” in Kondopoga, leaving the reader to wonder what, if not a pogrom, qualifies as ethnic hatred and illegal acts. Though Alexander Belov, the former leader of the DPNI, has been arrested several times, he has never served more than five days jail time for his activities (Vsglyad 2007). He was given a sentence of 18 months in May 2009 for incitement to hatred, which was reduced to 2 years probation for using racist statements in the 2007 Russia Marches (Moscow News 2009; Criminal Code; Article 282 n.d.).

Anti-extremist law in Russia criminalizes inciting others to violence and hatred, the use of extremist propaganda, participating in banned organizations, and hate-motivated propaganda. The legislation is problematic, however because it is vaguely defined in many cases (Verkhovsky and Kozhevnikova 2009). Prosecutions of anti-extremist cases are mostly a result of officials attempting to appear as though they are fighting extremism. Commonly, minor offenders are convicted (for example, someone who writes a racist statement on a web forum), while those with a more clear record of extremism (like Belov) are treated with relative impunity (Kozhevnikova 2009b). Consequently, the legislation and prosecution of hate crimes can be used as a measure of systematic or institutional discrimination, because provocation against migrants and minorities is consistently under prosecuted.

Comparative Perspective Building on the Russian case, where xenophobia presses for policies that restrict immigration, an analysis of xenophobia in the other cases under consideration can help determine whether or not this is a global phenomenon among immigrant-receiving countries.

Institutional Xenophobia

Ethnic Profiling Ethnic profiling is not uncommon in many countries under investigation. In France, identity checks and incidents of police brutality are often targeted at foreigners. Throughout Europe Muslim populations in particular are targeted by police for increased scrutiny (Open Society 2005). In Saudi Arabia, foreigners are disproportionately represented in the number of judicial executions (Human Rights Watch 2004). To measure ethnic profiling, I consider evidence from each country of random or discriminatory ID checks (over-policing minorities), police brutality, religious discrimination (to the extent that religious minorities are not allowed to practice their confessions), immigration searches and raids, labor and wage discrimination, failure of police to investigate cases of abuse and discrimination, discrimination in the courts, and cases of mass arrests, detentions and deportations (see table 13). According to the data, the treatment of migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus in Russia is on par with Saudi Arabia and UAE in regard to forms and severity of profiling. Yet profiling is also quite common in France and Italy. In France, religious services at mosques are routinely monitored and Muslims along with other minorities find themselves subject to discriminatory document checks and abusive police raids (Open Society 2005). In Italy, the police brutality against minorities and immigrants is so severe in Italy that there are regularly documented cases of verbal and physical abuse including a 2003

45 case where an immigrant was shot in his sleep while in police holding (Rivera 2005; Open Society 2005; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2005). In the US and Canada, there is high sensitivity to issues of racial profiling and thus there is documentation of a number of cases of profiling though it rarely reaches the level of severity detailed above.

Elite Opinion As was shown in the first part of this chapter, it is common in the Russian media to hear populist anti-migrant rhetoric from figures such as Luzhkov and Bastrykin. Compare this to the September 2009 outburst from US Representative Joe Wilson during President Obama’s address to the joint session of congress. Wilson is said to represent the “hard-right” in Congress through his “extreme anti-immigrant positions,” and certainly his voting record on issues of illegal immigration solidly supports restrictive policies (Ruiz 2009). Yet despite this position, Wilson’s rhetoric about immigrants is mild in comparison with Bastrykin’s, focusing on policy instead of the wider social implications of illegal immigrants.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric, however, is quite common in France, especially under the presidency of Sarkozy. Sarkozy’s election platform was firmly nationalist and his policies have been quite deliberate, setting up a new ministry for national identity and immigration and expelling a number of illegal immigrants. Sarkozy has been criticized for calling immigrant youth “scum,” yet in a 2009 speech calling for a ban of the burka, he focused on why Islamic garb is a sign of subservience and debasement of women (Bremner 2009; Bernard 2007). The media has not uniformly publicized all of the statements of the speech, focusing disproportionately on the fact that Sarkozy said the burka is not welcome in France.

Thus in the case of both Wilson and Sarkozy, it is important to be careful to separate the statements of politicians from the media coverage, which can be selective or slanted. This is an important point of variation between these cases and the article by Bastrykin, which was a full length article of the op-ed variety authored by the official personally. That these Western politicians that are dubbed anti-immigrant do not go to the level of recording anti-immigrant sentiment in writing is quite telling.

To measure the degree of elite racism in a country, I consider whether or not there are documented cases of national executives, ministers, legislators, bureaucrats and/or local leaders making racist statements including derogatory speech equating immigrants and/or minorities with "scum," etc., plans to clean the country/city of immigrant populations, or highlighting immigrant criminality. As table 14 shows, the case with the greatest elite-level racism is Italy, which is followed closely by Russia. The Italian case has been quite scandalous since Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi included of members the far right Northern League in his cabinet after 2008 elections. Berlusconi himself has been recorded making anti-immigrant statements that Italy should not be a multi-ethnic society and calling Roma “vermin” (Deželić 2008). As the data shows, anti-immigrant statements are a part of the political discourse in most of the liberal democracies under investigation, though the pervasiveness of and reaction to that discourse varies. In France, the ongoing debate over whether to ban burkas has involved a number of anti- immigrant expressions from representatives of a variety of political parties (Lerougetel and Lantier 2009). In Germany, Norway and the US, there is evidence of only isolated racist statements by legislators, which often produce significant peer or public backlash.

Far Right Parties Far right parties as a measure of xenophobia are clearly not relevant in the cases of Saudi Arabia and UAE, and to a lesser extent in Singapore because of the regime structure that does not allow party competition. Though Russia allows for only limited party competition, it is interesting to note that the two main opposition parties in the Duma (the Liberal Democratic and Communist Parties) are considered to be of nationalist orientation in some ways (Laruelle 2009a).

Populism in Russia today differs from that in Western Europe in the degree to which it has become mainstream. In Russia the populist message is not reserved for opposition parties, such as the Communists or Liberal Democrats, but is rather used by the party of power United Russia. Nevertheless, the opposition parties are more deliberate in their anti-immigrant speech than are top United Russia party officials. As we will see shortly, while Putin employs populist techniques he avoids overtly racist statements that are more common among lower level officials. This situation is arguably better than that in France and Italy where not only opposition parties, but the parties of power and their leaders (Sarkozy and Berlusconi) are well-known for outright racist and xenophobic statements.

In order to measure the relevance of far-right parties, I consider their inclusion and popular support in mainstream politics. In each country, the existence of far-right parties, their representation at the national and local level in both parliamentary and government roles shows the degree to which far-right parties are accepted by state and by voters (see table 15). In Italy, there is a pervasive presence of the far-right Northern League at all levels of politics. Italy is the only country under investigation in which members of a far-right party are included in the cabinet. As of the 2008 elections, the Northern League holds 60 of 945 seats in the lower house of parliament and 25 of 315 seats in the Senate (Alvarez-Rivera 2008). In 2009 parliamentary elections Norway’s Progress Party achieved 41 of 169 seats (Alvarez-Rivera 2009). Germany’s National Democratic Party and the US Constitutional Party as of 2010 have only gained representation at the local level. France’s National Front also only has local representation, though since 1988 its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen has won between 10-17% of the national vote in presidential elections, most famously in 2002 when he made it past the first round to a run-off against incumbent Jacques Chirac (Alvarez-Rivera 2010). National Front is also represented in the European parliament, in 2009 receiving 6% of the national vote and 3 seats, down from nearly 10% in 2004 (European Parliament 2009). In Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the Communist Party can be classified as far-right parties (Laruelle 2009a). Though both parties are represented at various levels of politics, their influence has been severely eclipsed since the rise of United Russia.

Media Treatment of Migrants and Minorities Portrayal of immigrants as criminals is common in Italy, where women migrants in particular are frequently shown as maids or prostitutes (Ter Wal 1996; Campani 2001). By contrast the state- controlled media in Singapore is described by one observer as balanced in that it shows the benefits of migration while at the same time addressing the worries of the citizenry (JP 2007). In some countries the media is used to create sympathy for migrants. In the US, the 1999-2000 coverage of the international custody battle over Cuban refugee Elian Gonzalez created spirited

discourse on the issues of immigration (King and Wood 2001). 28 In France the media has been used in the past to create sympathy for migrants to the degree that the government was forced to reconsider anti-migrant policies (Rosello 1998). The head of an advertising agency in Saudi Arabia launched a campaign in 2008 detailing the abuses of workers and calling for people to show mercy, a concept foundational to Islam (Arab News 2008). Some claim a law proposed in 2009 in the UAE may inhibit reporters from covering similar abuses because it criminalizes any reports that knowingly damage the country’s reputation (Migrant Rights 2009).

To measure how the media of each country portrays migrants, I consider both negative and positive aspects of media reporting (see table 16). The negative evidence includes whether migrants are criminalized in the media, whether they are portrayed as a public health risk, and whether they are stereotyped or underrepresented. On the positive side, the data considers whether the media runs stories on abuse of migrants or attacks by right wing groups and whether racist speech on the internet is prosecuted. Taking all of these categories under consideration, the countries are, from worst to best migrant/minority representation are: Italy, Canada, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Norway, UAE, US, Singapore. It is interesting to note that of the countries with state-controlled media (Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and UAE), there are distinctly different results. This owes in part to the government’s orientation toward immigrants and immigration. Whereas Russia, Saudi Arabia and UAE have the position that immigration is currently too high, Singapore deems their level of immigration too low (United Nations 2009). This is reflected in Russia’s persistently poor representation of migrants as opposed to Singapore’s consistently favorable approach. Saudi Arabia and UAE on the other hand, tend to minimize migrant and immigration issues in the media altogether.

Popular Xenophobia

Public Opinion According to a Pew survey in 2007 of over 45,000 people worldwide, a majority of those in most countries surveyed prefer restrictive immigration regimes (Pew Research Center 2007).29 There are a myriad of questions used in opinion polls across cases, making it difficult to compare. For example in Germany 35% of people surveyed support wholesale deportation of immigrants, whereas in Norway 83% of those surveyed believe immigrants should have the same job opportunities as natives (Statistics Norway 2003; Alexseev 2009). The Norway survey data does not include attitudes about illegal immigrants, which in itself is quite telling and could indicate that Norwegians do not associate immigration with illegal processes. In fact, estimates indicate Norway has only 18,000 illegal immigrants, an extremely low number compared to estimates of other migrant-receiving countries (Solholm 2008). Nevertheless, for the sake of continuity, I include only one measure of public opinion: the degree to which the public believes immigration policies should be more restrictive (see table 17) (Pew Research Center 2007). The countries,

28 Elian Gonzalez traveled from Cuba to the US in 1999 via aluminum raft with his mother and others who died during the trip. Elian, six years old at the time, was turned over to US relatives. After several months of public disagreements between Cuban and US relatives, Elian was forcibly taken by US border patrol officers, given to his father and eventually returned to Cuba. 29 Majorities in 44 of the 47 countries surveyed agree with the statement “We should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we do now.”

from least to most tolerant (excluding Saudi Arabia, Singapore and UAE, for which there are no data) are: Italy, US, Russia, France, Germany, Canada, Norway.

Hate Crimes It has recently been suggested that hate crimes in Russia are actually less significant of a problem than in other migrant-receiving countries (Alexseev 2009). This argument compares data from the US, Germany and Russia that shows hate-motivated crime to be highest in US, with Germany and Russia having comparable levels of violence. It should be immediately pointed out, however, that methods of data collection are difficult to compare across cases (see table 18). In a number of countries, hate crimes are recorded by the government (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway and the US), and even still methodologies may differ. Some countries, the US for example, include crimes based on religious or sexual preference intolerance, while other countries do not. Therefore, this categorization only takes into account deaths that occur as a result of crimes motivated by ethnic or racial hatred and produces the following ranking of countries from most to fewest hate crimes: Russia, Italy, US, Germany, France, Norway and Canada. No data were available for Saudi Arabia, Singapore or UAE.

Conclusions on the Relationship between Polity and Immigration The expectations for this study are that the level of xenophobia has an inverse relationship with the openness of a country’s immigration regime. This relationship is strong in several cases. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have high levels of xenophobia according to the available data (i.e. police profiling, and criminalization of migrants in the media) and a relatively closed immigration regime as established in the previous chapter. On the whole, countries with open immigration regimes experience moderate levels of xenophobia (see table 19).

Thus there is a moderately strong relationship between xenophobia and immigration policies. The most interesting finding from this analysis is the relationship between xenophobia and immigration regime in Italy and Russia, both of which have higher levels of xenophobia than expected based on their immigration policies. Italy is on par with Russia, especially in regard to xenophobia at the institutional level. Why are immigration policies in these two countries more open than their levels of xenophobia would have us expect? For an answer to this question, we turn to a discussion in chapter five about how informal practices (practices that do not match up with policy intent) affect the immigration regime.

CHAPTER 5: DEMAND FOR INFORMAL LABOR

This final substantive chapter develops the remaining part of the hypothesis that the state manages dual demands of xenophobic society and economic need for migrants by creating strict migration regulations that are then unevenly enforced. Strict regulations are a populist response to xenophobia, and can themselves increase the costs of participating in the formal economy. Together with increased costs, unevenly enforced regulations force an increasingly large proportion of the foreign labor market into the informal sector.

That the Russian immigration regime is dominated by informal processes hinges on two mechanisms. This chapter will establish how these two mechanisms work together to produce different outcomes. The first is the quota system, which stipulates how many work permits will be issued to labor migrants from the CIS. The second is the presence of a well-established shadow economy that reaches from the disenfranchised labor market up to top government posts. This shadow economy embraces the migrant workers that are driven out of the legal labor market by low quotas. I will look at three groups of actors that drive the shadow economy as it relates to the current migration situation. First I will consider the elite level, which encompasses local and federal government actors and the owners of large corporations that benefit from migrant labor. Second I will address the role of the civil service in the process of determining whether migration will be primarily regulated by legal or illegal mechanisms. Civil servants (both bureaucrats and police) are the link between the law and its implementation, and thus are responsible for whether migration is regulated according to legislation, or whether a porous system of loopholes and corruption exist. Finally, I will look at the employers and middlemen that are in direct day-to-day contact with laborers themselves. Both elites and employers are instrumental in defining yearly quotas and stand to benefit from cheap illegal labor, while civil servants benefit from the corruption involved in the process of legalizing migrants and enforcing (or refraining from penalizing actors for violations).

Literature on Informal Economies and Corruption Of primary interest in this chapter is the literature on the development of informality. There are various views on how the informal economy develops, what drives informality and how corruption is related to these processes. These issues will be considered in this section.

The informal economy specifies the workers and enterprises that are not recognized or regulated by legal processes, bypassing regulations for the employment status of workers or the production of goods (or both) (International Labour Conference 2002). Informality is work done outside of the scope of laws that regulate taxes, social services and labor protection. The role of immigrants in the informal economy is particularly interesting in the literature. There is a literature that maintains because migrants are often from lesser developed countries they bring primitive economic interactions with them to the host country. It has been argued that the informal economy is a result of these migrants applying strategies they learned in their home countries (Sassen 1994). This argument has more recently been displaced by neoliberal and marginalization explanations for informality, which explain the advent of informality not as one of underdevelopment but of one that originates from structural and/or institutional factors.

The neoliberal explanation of the informal economy focuses on the state as the primary institution driving informality, arguing that overregulation of economic actors through high taxes, cumbersome regulations, complicated processes of licensing and permits, etc. leads to a situation where enterprises opt out of the formal economy in order to avoid the associated costs (Schneider 1997; Soto 1989). Given high levels of regulation and/or taxation, actors can either choose the route of corruption or informality, paying bribes to officials in lieu of paying taxes or adhering to other legal regulations, or evading detection altogether by exiting the formal economy (Johnson, et al. 1997, 170). Research shows that as overall regulation increases in, the informal economy contributes a greater portion to the GDP (Loayza, Oviedo and Servén 2005). This relationship also holds true in the area of labor regulation: as labor regulation increases, so does the share of GDP taken up by the informal economy. In general, migrants are not considered a driving factor of the informal economy in the neoliberal explanation. They are given attention only insofar as they are one type of actor contributing to the informal economy (Schneider and Klinglmair 2004).

Nevertheless, the idea of increased regulation producing persistent informality is one that has applications in the realm of immigration policy. Scholars have generally found that increased immigration restrictions do not lead to decreased illegal immigration (Dmitriev and Pyadukhov 2009, 277). In fact, some argue that if it were not for policies that aim to control immigration flows, there would be no illegal immigration, which is an informal market response to the narrowing of legal channels (Samers 2004, 28). In the US case, a tightening of border controls has led migrants to shift their entry points but has not led to a decrease in overall entries (Durand, Malone and Massey 2003; Cornelius 2001).

Marginalization theory drives a body of scholarship that argues the informal economy is a structural component of advanced capitalism. As capitalism leads to uneven development, certain actors are marginalized by the formal economy and enter the informal economy as a cost- cutting tactic in order to survive in a market that would otherwise eliminate their unprofitable economic activities (Jones, Ram and Edwards 2006). While immigrants may be poised to take advantage of the informal economy because of the networks and communities they create with other migrants, immigrants do not create informality (Sassen 1994; International Labour Conference 2002). Though this body of literature has been posed as the critique of the neoliberal explanation, in many cases it is possible that both overregulation and the inequality produced by capitalism contribute to situations of pervasive informality at all levels of the economy. In many ways a well established underground economy capable of absorbing immigrants can act as a pull-factor for labor migration, as in the case of immigration to Southern Europe (particularly Italy) (Baldwin-Edwards 1999, 3; Reyneri 2003).

Perhaps a simpler way to conceptualize the informal sector is as a result of exit or exclusion (Perry, et al. 2007). Exclusion is the situation where workers or firms face barriers to entering the formal sector. This is either as a result of a segmented labor market that prevents workers form transitioning to the formal sector or it is a result of heavy regulations that keep large enterprises partially in the informal sector and small enterprises from entering the formal sector altogether because of high costs. Exit on the other hand describes the situation where workers and firms decide that it is more profitable to operate outside state-sanctioned activities. In this way, exit can be viewed as an indictment on the state’s ability to provide services and enforce regulations.

Exit and exclusion should not be seen as mutually exclusive, however. Rather, they can be conceptualized as two sides of the same coin. While exclusion characterizes the behavior of the state or the market, exit accounts for the actions of workers and enterprises. In a context such as the Russian economy and specifically the sector of the labor market filled with immigrants, these processes are mutually reinforcing. The state erects barriers that raise the costs for workers and employers alike and these actors choose, in turn, to keep profits and earnings from the state by not participating in the formal sector. In addition to requirements that migrants must register, obtain a work permit and that employers must register each migrant’s employment with the tax services and pay up a high tax rate (including 30% income tax rate plus social benefits) (Shcharbakova 2009b; Ivakhnyuk 2009c), the 2007 legislation introduced the quota mechanism which allows the government to decrease the number of migrant workers legally permitted in the labor market at will. These barriers, along with the expectation of paying bribes to corrupt officials in order to complete these processes, act as “exclusion”ary measures. In turn, migrants and employers opt to “exit” the system in order to cut costs and avoid bureaucratic headaches.

A brief word about corruption is appropriate at this point. The relationship between corruption and informality is not immediately clear and therefore must be carefully approached as both are integral to the Russian case. Corruption is generally defined as the use of entrusted (usually public) power for personal gain and can be divided into categories of grand (at the elite level) and petty (at the everyday civil service level) corruption (Transparency International n.d.; Knack 2006). Some scholars combine the cost of corruption into the costs of operating in the formal sector, rendering payments to officials in return for not levying taxes, fines or regulatory requirements as a sort of fee paid for the benefit of remaining in the formal economy (Johnson, et al. 1997). Others see corruption as an issue of the quality of regulation. Though as a general principle, informality increases with the quantity of regulation, it has also been shown that informality decreases as the quality of governance (used as a proxy for the quality of regulation) increases (Loayza, Oviedo and Servén 2005). Thus we can infer that as corruption increases so does the size of the informal economy and conclude that corruption is a means of producing exclusion. In this sense, corruption produces either (and perhaps both) a costly and unpredictable environment where laws are implemented and enforced unevenly and in order to accomplish things through the “legal” route involves direct payments to officials.

It is clear, then, that the literature supports the hypothesis that as legislation becomes increasingly restrictive and is managed arbitrarily by corrupt officials, more migration is managed through informal channels. Generally, the literature supports the idea that illegal immigration is a response to market regulation that imposes too many costs on employers and workers.30 Therefore it is economically advantageous for workers and employers alike to break the laws (Jahn and Straubhaar 1999, 28). For the employer the costs associated with taxes and social benefits are eliminated. For the worker, though wages are below what would be paid to a

30 The literature discusses illegal and irregular status. At times, the distinction is one of fully-illegal versus partially illegal (irregular migrants may have some, but not all of their paperwork completed, or may have legal status but work illegally) (Jandl 2007). Some scholars divide migrants into categories of “compliance,” “non-compliance,” and “semi-compliance,” (Ruhs and Anderson 2006). At other times, it is a semantic choice meant to cast migrants in a particular light, with “irregular” being a choice focusing on the exclusion aspects of their status rather than deliberate choices to exit the formal regime (Paspalanova 2008).

native worker, they are significantly above the earning potential in the country of origin. Society as a whole benefits from cheaper prices for goods and services that result from the use of illegal labor. These economic principles hold true whether workers are foreign or native, and thus there are parallels between the informal economy in general and the economy of illegal immigration. As in the case of Southern Europe, Russia’s large informal sector (comprising 48% of the GDP by some estimates) provides ample economic opportunity to illegal immigrants (Schneider 2004).

The Russian Case The brief historical record of immigration in post-Soviet Russia corroborates the idea that increase regulation (increased exclusion) leads to increased exit and thus a greater portion of immigration that is regulated through informal channels. In the 1990s migration legislation was primarily focused on regulating the return of ethnic Russians from newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (Voronina 2006). The legislation was as much liberal (in the sense of low government regulation) as it was piecemeal and incoherent (Ivakhnyuk 2009c, 33; Mukomel 2009). As return migration slowed, focus shifted to regulating labor migration, which began as early as 1996 and was the dominant form of migration by 2000 (Korobkov 2008). Policy shifts in the first Putin administration focused almost exclusively on combating illegal immigration (Voronina 2006). In 1999-2000, there were an estimated ¾ to 1 million illegal migrants in Russia (Zayonchkovskaya 2000). This shift coincided with the beginning of the second Chechen war, a focus on domestic terrorism and rising levels of xenophobia. In response to these issues 2002 issued in a new era of migration legislation that was markedly more restrictive. As a result the rates of illegal immigration and corruption in the immigration services and police increased (Mikhaelova and Tyuryvkanova 2009; Vitkovskaya 2009; Ivakhnyuk 2009c, 41). Expert estimates between 2002 and 2005 asserted that there were 3-5 million illegal migrants in Russia (Ivakhnyuk 2009c, 42; Mukomel 2005, 196). In 2003, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reported that there were 1.5 million illegal immigrants, though there were an additional 5 million whose status was unclear (Migration News 2003).

The immediate result of the 2007 legislation was a decrease of illegal immigration because of the relative ease of registration and work permit processes, as discussed in chapter three. Yet within the 2007 legislation was the introduction of quotas as a mechanism of restriction that could be controlled at will by the government. This mechanism has been increasingly employed since 2007 and has resulted in increasing shares of illegal immigration as a consequence. In 2010, it is likely that rates of illegal immigration will return to their pre-2007 levels. The pervasiveness of informal mechanisms and lack of uniform implementation of federal policies (even in Moscow, where federal bodies would seemingly have the most oversight of policy implementation), shows either the weakness of the vertical of power or deliberate transfer of immigration regulation to informal mechanisms.

Alternative Explanations for the Russian Situation There are two potential rival hypotheses for the current situation. The first comes in the context of the world-wide economic crisis of 2008, which caused predictions that overall migrant flows would decrease as competition for jobs in migrant-receiving countries increased and focused on preference for native workers. Second, some contend that the 2007 changes have in fact improved the migration situation in Russia. These alternatives will be addressed in turn before

arguing that the 2007 legislative changes introduced mechanisms that ensured migration would be regulated by informal structures.

Financial Crisis: a (Socio)-Economic Argument In the wake of the global financial crisis, many expected global labor migration flows to decrease using the logic that the labor market would tighten, causing demand for migrant workers to shrink (Awad 2009; Ivakhnyuk 2009b). Rising unemployment in the domestic labor market creates pressure on policy makers to reduce competition from low-wage immigrant workers (Ivakhnyuk 2009b). Thus there is often a rise in xenophobia during periods like the 2008 financial crisis. This is quite consistent with the argument at hand, as the populist roots and manifestations of xenophobia explored in the previous chapter often have an economic component. Thus there have been consistent calls from Moscow mayor Luzhkov and the chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions Mikhail Schmakov for lower quotas in order to protect the native labor market.

Protecting the labor market for Russian citizens has been a major consideration in setting quotas. However, the idea that jobs are threatened is not one that has a direct relationship with real labor market need, despite public opinion to the contrary across the world’s migrant receiving countries. Labor market economists have shown that immigrant rarely compete directly with native workers and have a very small impact on wages in large part because they fill jobs that are undesirable to native workers (Somerville and Sumption 2009). For example, if Rostrud (Russia’s Federal Service for Labor and Employment) lists 250,000 job openings in Moscow and there are 250,000 unemployed native workers in Moscow, this does not necessarily mean that the unemployed workers are compatible with the job openings (Shcharbakova 2009b). Nevertheless, migrants’ enduring presence causes the widespread sense that migrants are taking the jobs of local Russians (Interview #12 2009). This is a perception that exists not only for low-skilled positions, but also for professional jobs. Migrants are seen as unscrupulous and willing to undercut local workers for the sake of securing work (Interview #24 2009).

The available data shows that while the economic crisis may have had some impact on immigration to Russia, its effects have been less robust than expected. At the beginning of 2009, the World Bank predicted remittances sent home by migrants would fall by $15 billion due to the financial crisis (World Bank 2009a). Yet as of November 2009, remittances had declined, but by 1.2% less than expected. Though as many as a million Central Asian migrants have returned home, migrant flows remained positive causing experts to speculate that migrants did not decide to return to their home countries en masse, but rather stayed and cut living costs in order to keep sending remittances (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2009; International Crisis Group 2010). Many migrants have chosen not to return to their countries of origin in the period of financial crisis, either because of travel expenses or out of fear that they will not be able to return given tightening legal space and decreasing quotas. This means migrants have remained in Russia and continue to work, often in the shadows (Marat 2009).

That economic crisis produces a shift into the shadows is consistent with the hypothesis of this study (Tyuryukanova 2009c; Shcharbakova 2009b). Economic crisis produces fodder for increases in xenophobia as discussed in the previous chapter, in turn creating public demand for

decreased legal space for migrant flows. In the Russian context, this demand is managed through the quota mechanism, which was introduced in the 2007 package of legislation.

The 2007 Legislation is Working: An Institutional Argument It is very common, when reading about the current migration situation in Russia and especially the legislative changes since 2007, to hear that the situation now is a marked improvement over the previous circumstances and that 2007 brought a liberalization to the migration regime that has increased legal migration (Ivakhnyuk 2009b, 15). There is certain data to substantiate these claims, much of which is based on a joint IOM/FMS/OSCE project that surveyed experts, NGOs, employers, private employment agencies and over 600 migrants that arrived in Russia before and after the 2007 legislation went into force. This data shows that with the new procedures that allowed migrants to register themselves 85% of migrants are now legally registered, whereas only 52% were registered prior to the legislative changes. Whereas 75% of migrants worked without a work permit prior to the legal changes, 75% of migrants now work with a work permit (Zionchkovskaya 2009, 84). Elsewhere, experts report that in 2000, 90-95% of labor migrants were irregular whereas this proportion was reduced to 70-75% in 2007 and further to 65-70% in 2008 (Tyuryukanova 2008; Tyuryukanova 2009a).

Those who argue that the 2007 legislation improved the migration situation in Russia tend to focus on the increase in migrant registrations and work permits and deemphasize the quota mechanism. Furthermore, because work permits have been de-linked from employers, a number of migrants move jobs, regions and get new work permits, and are thus calculated in the work permit statistics several times. Around 50% of migrants in 2008 were counted multiple times in the calculations of foreign labor force, which is based on the number of issued work permits (Shcharbakova 2009b). Of the 6 million migrants in Russia (static), if 50% of the 1.5 million migrants given work permits (750,000) are being counted just twice, this means only 750,000 were allowed to legalize, meaning only 12% of migrants were legally working!31 This is a problem for registration as well, especially for the labor force because people are inherently mobile and they end up registering a number of times in one year (Vendina 2009). Of the 20 million migrants that enter Russia each year, 8,600,000 were registered in 2009. If just 50% of these migrants (4.3 million) were registered twice, only 21% would be legally registered.32

The scholarly rigor of the IOM/FMS/OSCE project should not be minimized and will be a used for this study as it is the most recent concrete data. However, it is perhaps overly optimistic in some respects, despite the fact that the scholars included in the project are candid about some continuing problems. This project, however, did not adequately include migrants in sectors of renovations (household repairs), domestic help (childcare) and other arenas that are traditionally manned by informal workers, and whose employers are interested in keeping in the shadows (Zionchkovskaya 2009, 84; Tyuryukanova 2009c). Domestic labor is a consistently under-

31 Estimates of the total number of migrants in Russia (including legal and illegal) have not changed in recent years. In 2007-2008, there were an estimated 6-7 million migrants and in 2010 5-6 million (Tyuryukanova 2009a; Gritsiuk 2010; Ioffe and Zayonchkovskaya 2010). Furthermore the flow of migrants has not changed. Around 20 million migrants enter Russia every year and this number has remained stable for the last several years (E. Egorova 2009, 52). 32 This is a generous estimate as it includes foreigners from all locations and for all purposes of entry. For example, a Western tourist traveling to Russia may be registered at a number of different hotels during a short stay, each of which is entered into the total number of registrations.

researched area that lies almost completely outside the law (Mukomel 2009). This is true not only in Russia but in a number of countries including Saudi Arabia and Singapore (Human Rights Watch 2005, 2008). Because of the private nature of domestic help, abuses often go unreported. It is difficult for domestic workers to access advocacy groups and difficult for researchers to make contact.

As discussed in Chapter three, the 2007 legislative changes came as a result of calls from experts, NGOs and international organizations. They were spearheaded by liberal reformers in the FMS, led by Vyacheslav Postavnin (Tyuryukanova 2009c). The liberal potential of the legislation, however, has never been reached. Instead, it has led to a situation wherein informal mechanisms continue to dominate. “The law itself is quite good. The implementation of this legislation is much worse, because of the police style of decision-making, because of corruption, because of the weak position of human rights and civil society” (Tyuryukanova 2009c). As it turns out, the management of migration under the 2007 changes is much more difficult than expected, and the state only has an illusion of control leaving as much as 90% of the migration process outside the scope of official regulation (Mikhaelova and Tyuryvkanova 2009).

Thus decreasing quotas, continued bureaucratic hurdles and the pervasiveness of informal processes keep migration processes in the shadows. As quotas continue to tighten, we can expect to see a greater share of migration being forced into the informal sector (Tyuryukanova 2009c). In order to understand the data and the underlying processes, this chapter will proceed to first consider the quota mechanism and the data on legal and illegal migration before and after the 2007 legislation. It will then go on to consider elite, civil service and employer interests and activities in the sphere of migration before evidence from other countries is considered in order to put Russia in comparative perspective.

Establishing Demand for Migrant Workers: The Quota System as a Political Instrument The primary factor driving demand for migrant labor is the fact that Russia’s working age population is declining. Many Russian demographers agree that around 1 million immigrants are needed per year in order to keep the work force stable (Ioffe and Zayonchkovskaya 2010). However, the size of the work force is not a factor in the calculation of quotas stipulating how many labor migrants will be issued work permits in a given year. Work permits are issued for the period of one year and consequently the quota is a reliable predictor of how many legal migrants are present in Russia each year.

Quotas are the primary formal mechanism used to regulate the flow of migrant labor and are arguably the single most important aspect of the 2007 legislation because they locate the power to control the migration situation in the hands of the government. Quotas are determined primarily the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Health and Social Development, though other ministries are involved at various stages in the process. Quotas are political in the sense that they are a product of input from a number of different government bureaus including the FMS, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Economic Development and Rostrud. Each of these ministries has an institutional interest in retaining quotas simply because it allows them a modicum of control over the migration process (Tyuryukanova 2009c).

Quotas are initially calculated based on requests from employers, which are then adjusted based on various considerations by the Ministry of Health and Social Development. The law stipulates that quotas are made after looking specifically at economic, social and national security indicators. Such factors include ensuring sectors of the economy do not become overly dependent on migrant labor, that Russian workers have priority in the labor market, and an assessment of the overall role of migrants in the labor market including their participation in informal enterprises, wages, working conditions and crime rates (Ministry of Health and Social Development 2007; Federal Law #115 2002).

The procedure for formulating the yearly quota is complicated and non-transparent, allowing ample room for political and administrative discretion (Mikhaelova and Tyuryvkanova 2009). Furthermore, many employers do not participate in the quota formulation for a number of reasons. Employers can not often predict what their needs will be for the following year, nor does opting out of the request process bar them from hiring a foreign worker as the quota formulation process is not linked to hiring procedures (Shcharbakova 2009b). Even for employers that can estimate their future need for workers, the application process is quite complicated and difficult. Finally, many employers want to avoid dealing with corrupt administrative officials that require bribes by remaining unofficial, whereas participation in the process of quota formulation would necessarily formalize their enterprises. One employer reported that as a result of participating in the application procedure, inspections from Interior Ministry officials seeking bribes became a regular part of life (Tyuryukanova 2009b, 23).

The initial quota for CIS workers in 2007 was six million. The Federal Migration Service (FMS) set this generous quota, for which they were heavily criticized, as a sort of amnesty program to legalize migrants already on the territory of the Russian Federation (Zayonchkovskaya 2007b). An estimated four million illegal migrants were regularized as a result (Postavnin 2009). The amnesty number of 6 million is consistent with the estimates that there is a stable 6 million migrants in Russia at any given time (Gritsiuk 2010; Tyuryukanova 2009a; Ioffe and Zayonchkovskaya 2010). It is logical, then, that a quota set lower than 6 million will force migrants back into the shadows.33 Furthermore, considering the number of illegal migrant workers in Russia is estimated to be 5-10 million, which is a telling indicator of true labor market demand, any quota of less than five million will almost certainly ensure there will be an insufficient number of work permits for migrant workers on the Russian Federation territory (Kroschenko and Zibarev 2009). Even if the quota met the demand for foreign workers, as it did in 2007 with a 6 million quota, this does not ensure migrants will follow the legal procedure. In 2007 1.7 million migrants (1.1 from CIS) were registered in Russia. This means of the estimated 6 million migrants, less than 1/3 chose to register.

Subsequent quotas have been consistently lower than the actual need for foreign labor and have decreased dramatically since 2007. In 2008 the quota was set for 1.8 million, but in a number of regions including Moscow it was exhausted by May, again showing the quotas allot insufficient permits to meet labor market demand (Federal Migration Service 2008a). The FMS announced in August 2008 that it would allocate additional quotas, though the quota was only officially

33 According to article 5.5 of Federal law 115 (2002), a CIS migrant’s registration may be extended beyond 90 days only if they have a work contract, yet the registration cannot be of a duration longer than one year from the initial date of entry. After the expiry of registration, the law stipulates the foreigner must leave the country (Article 5.2).

increased to 3.4 in October 2008 by government resolution (Federal Migration Service 2008b; Government Decision #737 2008). The quota for 2009 was set at 4 million based on requests by employers, but was later reduced by Prime Minister Putin to 2 million, who cited a need to protect the labor market for Russian citizens in a time of economic crisis (Government Decision #834 2008; Gritsyuk 2008). The quota for 2010 was initially kept at 2 million despite continued lobbying by a number of regions for further reductions quotas.34 It was eventually reduced to 1.3 million in the final days of 2009 at the request of trade unions, who traditionally lobby for lower quotas in order to protect the native labor force (Bratersky 2010; RIA Novosti 2010a).

Low quotas are politically popular given the public disapproval of any large influx of foreign labor. After quotas were increased to 4 million for 2009 the public backlash was immediate, demanding an answer for why the government would increase quotas in a time of financial and demographic crisis (Russkii Obozrevatel 2009). Putin’s decision to decrease the quota to 2 million by decree is therefore widely dubbed as populist by experts (Novaya Politika 2009). Low quotas are also economically advantageous in the sense that they restrict the legal space within which migrants can work, forcing the remainder of migrants into the shadow sphere. As a general principle irregular migrants are much more economical than legal workers because they can be employed for lower wages, do not require social benefits such as health care, and allow evasion of employment and income taxes (Jahn and Straubhaar 1999, 17; Manke 2009).

Given that the migrant population is stable, decreased quotas inevitably cause an increase in illegality. Experts estimate that the number of migrants has remained constant at 1-1.5 million in Moscow (Tyuryukanova 2009c). The quota for Moscow has decreased from 750,000 in 2007 to 200,000 in 2010, ensuring that the majority of migrants (between 80-87%) will remain in the shadows (see table 20). Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov agrees with these figures estimating that there are around 800,000 migrants in Moscow currently working outside the quota system (Interfax 2010). According to the data in Table 1, the proportion of migrant workers who are illegal is rising quickly in Russia and even more quickly in Moscow. If the projection for 2010 holds true, Moscow will have a record rate of illegal workers, at least 4% higher than in 2005 and 15% higher than in 2006.

It must be borne in mind, however, that migrants who hold work permits do not always work legally as many employers do not register with the tax services when hiring foreign workers (Zayonchkovskaya 2007b). In 2007, the FMS reported that a majority (53%) of legal workers worked in shadow jobs. A 2008 survey shows an even larger percentage of illegal immigrants (85%) work in shadow jobs (Tyuryukanova 2009a). Therefore, the estimates of illegal immigrants and their proportion in the migrant population is quite conservative as it takes into account the number of work permits issued rather than the number of migrants who not only have legal registration and work permit but are also registered by their employer with the tax services.

The data clearly shows that as the quota decreases, the number of illegal migrants increases. Based on the literature there are certain economic advantages for actors who can capitalize on this increasing pool of available workers. We will turn to these actors now in order to show that

34 For example, in Volgograd, Krasnoyarsk and Tatarstan (Komsomol’skaya Pravda 2009; Newslab.ru 2009; Regions.ru 2009).

those who benefit from illegal labor occupy positions ranging from top political and economic elites to the everyday small business owner. Actors at the elite level are able to manipulate the quota mechanism in their favor, which benefits both large and small enterprises alike by increasing the number of illegal workers. Assisting this process is the civil service (mid and lower level bureaucrats and police), who selectively implement and enforce regulations. The next section of the chapter will outline the interests and practices of elites, civil servants and employers in order to understand how the underlying processes contribute to the demand for lower quotas and then reap the benefits. The discussion focuses on Moscow as has the largest concentration of migrants in Russia.

Moscow City Government: Elite Interests The Moscow city government is a force that wields disproportionate leverage in Russian politics. Observers call it “more like a state than a city,” and say that the federal government is beholden to it because “when things are going well in Moscow, things are going well in Russia,” (Shcharbakova 2009b; Interview #4 2009). Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is, in some respects, an international figure taking a diplomatic role to advocate for Moscow’s interests (Medvedev 2004).

Luzhkov is a very visible figure in Moscow. His picture is proudly displayed in the museums and walls of his projects such as the reconstruction of Catherine the Great’s Palace just south of Moscow, which is surrounded by an immense nature preserve. Projects like this and the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior have been called “morale-boosting showcase projects,” that focus more on leaving a legacy than developing the city (Colton 1999). Nevertheless, Luzhkov has proved to be a popular mayor, retaining his post since 1992 and often receiving a high percentage of votes in elections (89.6% in 1996 and 71.5% in 1999) (Medvedev 2004). He has been a powerful stabilizing force, ushering in enormous growth and development despite the instability of the 1990s. Luzhkov has defined himself as staunchly anti privatization and anti-oligarchic capitalism. This is ironic in that his wife, Elena Baturina is the richest woman in Russia and embodies the new rich that typifies the Russian oligarchy. Luzhkov has been a lightning rod for criticism of corruption, accusations which he vehemently denies and usually pursues by suing for libel.35 Yet it is widely believed that Luzhkov’s hold on the Moscow economy forces foreign investors to act through joint ventures with the city or its partners, giving them a major voice in projects as well as a portion of the profits (Colton 1999).

Elena Baturina, the wife of Luzhkov, is the owner and president of Inteco, a large construction company based in Moscow, and the richest woman in Russia worth an estimated $2.9 billion (Forbes 2010). While it should not be inferred that all wealthy politicians (or their family members) are necessarily corrupt because they possess personal wealth, it has been established

35 In 1998 Luzhkov sued former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar for libel for his statement that “Economic life in Moscow is terribly bureaucratized and regulated, the result of which is a massive proliferation of corruption, and everyone who has had and has dealings with the Moscow municipal structures knows this very well,” (Colton 1999). Though Luzhkov lost this case, he has won other cases including a slander case against Eduard Limonov in 2008 for claiming that Luzhkov controlled the city courts and a defamation case against newspaper Kommersant in 2009 for calling Luzhkov a “nimble thief,” (Krainova 2009). Luzhkov is currently suing Boris Nemtsov for a 50 page book published in 2009 that makes the case that Luzhkov is at the root of systemic corruption in Moscow. Baturina won a defamation case against Forbes in 2009 for an article published in 2008, forcing them to retract statements that Inteco receives special benefits from the city (Forbes Russia 2009b).

that Luzhkov and Baturina defy anti-corruption legislation that requires public officials to disclose their income and property holdings (Nemtsov 2009). Inteco, founded in 1991, has either directly or through its subsidiaries received a number of government contracts. It has been involved in building projects that cover 1 million square meters of Moscow and environs and now controls around 20% of the housing market in the city (Nemtsov 2009). A January 2010 poll from the Levada Center reports that a majority of Muscovites (65%) believe that Baturina’s success has come only with the help of Luzhkov (Levada Center 2010).

One of the projects listed on the Inteco website is the City Palace, to be built in Moscow City, a construction project initiated by the Moscow City government and to be the new home to the mayor’s office and city Duma (Medvedev 2004; Inteco n.d.). The City Palace will be built on plots 2 and 3 of Moscow City, land that was originally allotted for the city government offices (Lyauv 2005). Though the foundation of the City Palace has been constructed, the project is currently at a standstill due to the financial crisis, listed as an “ongoing” project on the website of its Scottish architects (RMJM n.d.). In March 2010, Inteco attended the most prestigious international real estate exhibition seeking new investors for the City Palace project (MIPIM 2010; E. Egorova 2010). The development of Moscow City has been a pet project of Luzhkov and has involved a host of public works development, including roads and utilities as well as a new subway line. This new branch of the blue line on the Moscow metro consistently runs the newest trains, whereas many other lines only use older trains.

The buildings of Moscow City loom in the skyline. A closer look, however, reveals temporary housing for migrant laborers who are involved in the construction projects. Housing containers are stacked three-high and stretch for blocks along the river. An expat who worked in Moscow City until recently described her daily routine of arriving very early in the morning to work and passing through a sea of Central Asian workers to get to her building (Interview# 27 2009). An unemployed native Muscovite described in unflattering terms how she would see Tajiks lounging outside the housing containers across from Moscow City in the afternoon hours (Interview #24 2009). There are plans to dismantle these dwellings by May 2010 in order to improve the appearance of the area (Moscow City 2010).

The construction industry in Russia is the largest sector of employment for migrant workers, employing 40% of labor migrants (Tyuryukanova 2008). The construction industry employs around 5 million people in Russia of which 13% (as much as 19% in Moscow) are migrant workers (International Labor Organization 2009a; Tyuryukanova 2008).36 Experts estimate that if illegal immigrants are included in these calculations, the construction industry is at least 50% migrant labor (Tyuryukanova 2009c). The majority of these workers are recruited through informal channels such as the informal intermediaries that will be discussed later in this chapter (International Labor Organization 2009a). As a number of construction workers live on-site, there have been a number of reports of forced (unpaid) labor in situations where employers restrict workers freedom of movement and subject them to physical and psychological abuse (Kadirova 2009; Human Rights Watch 2009b). In around 20% of cases employers or middlemen

36 It is immediately clear that these data are derived from official sources. 13% of 5 million is 650,000 migrants employed in the construction sector. If 650,000 migrants are 40%, the total migrant population would be 1.6 million migrants, which is substantially lower than the estimated 6-7 million total migrants currently in Russia (acc to (Tyuryukanova 2009a).

confiscate the passports of migrants in order to limit their ability to leave the premises (International Labor Organization 2009a). Non-payment of wages is also common, and in many cases migrants continue to work hoping that they will eventually be paid (Shokhzoda 2009). In cases where workers do not live on-site, they are often bussed in daily from the outskirts of town (Vendina 2009).

Aside from ties to Baturina and the construction industry, Luzhkov has ties to business elites that are powerful in other sectors that traditionally employ migrants. The recent scandal over the closing of Cherkizovski market has brought one of these relationships to light. Cherkizovski market, the largest open air market in Eastern Europe, was owned by Telman Ismailov until it was closed on account of unsanitary conditions and in connection with contraband goods in July 2009. The events surrounding the closing of the market are relevant to this discussion on two levels. First, Cherkizovski market was manned almost entirely by migrant labor and therefore offers a direct example of one portion of the migrant labor market. Second, Cherkizovski quickly became an issue of political intrigue at the upper-most echelons.

As of 2007, there has been a ban on foreign workers in retail markets and in the sale of alcohol and pharmacy products.37 The ban was instituted as a populist response to public complaints about the presence of migrants in the markets in the run-up to 2007 elections and as a security response to increasing criminality (i.e. violation of labor rights and sanitary norms) and contraband goods (Vitkovskaya 2009; Mikhaelova and Tyuryvkanova 2009).38 Nevertheless, the closing of Cherkizovski market in 2009 is an example that the legislation was not effective as a security measure, in that an estimated $2 billion worth of contraband goods were recovered from the premises, showing persisting criminality after the 2007 ban (Antonova 2009). Neither was the ban effective at eliminating the presence of migrants in retail markets, as Cherkizovski was manned primarily by migrants from the CIS, China and Vietnam. In the weeks following the market closing of the 900 found to be without documents 300 were expelled and 300 fined (Moshkin 2009a).

As discussed in chapter three, some migrants have sought residence permits or registered as individual entrepreneurs as a way to bypass the ban. It is also common practice for migrants to be listed as managers, manual laborers, or wholesale traders on their documents while working in the retail markets (Salikhova 2010). Often, temporary and permanent residence paperwork is obtained from middlemen who either forge documents or illegally procure them from corrupt bureaucrats (Tyuryukanova 2009b, 14). Other migrants moved to the construction sector or to other tasks related to market trading not covered by the ban (i.e. loading, carrying and transporting goods). It is also common for employers to pay police off by giving them alcohol, which the police deliver to higher-ups in the bureaucracy (Interview #25 2009). Overall, a number of experts say the 2007 ban has not caused substantially different employment structures

37 Though the ban was instituted effective April 1, 2007, the category of wholesale and retail trade remains a part of the calculation of FMS and GKS statistics and is growing. The category of wholesale and retail trade as a sphere of employment is combined with auto and general household repair services. According to Goskomstat data, in 2006 270,944 migrants were employed in this sphere, in 2007: 330,000 and in 2008: 411,800. 38 Thus migration policy in this case was formulated in order to justify a “clean sweep” of markets, which had become a haven for counterfeit drugs, alcohol and other goods and for other criminal practices (Vitkovskaya 2009).

61 in the markets, but has led to an increase in the type and degree of shadow methods (Mikhaelova and Tyuryvkanova 2009).

Cherkizovski was continually under threat of being closed by the city government from 2006 on the premise of ending underground trading processes (Grekova 2006; Kalinovskii and Vladimirova 2008). The closing was continually delayed, however, and as late as April 2009 the city announced the closing of the market would be put off until 2010 (Vechernyaya Moskva 2009; Zubrin 2008). In 2008, the federal level became directly involved when the FSB took up a case that investigated police involvement in the smuggling of counterfeit goods to markets throughout Russia including Cherkizovski (Kanev 2008). In May 2009 Ismailov threw a lavish grand opening at his new billion-dollar hotel in Turkey, a party that included a number of Hollywood stars, Luzhkov and Baturina (Pearson 2009). Telman Ismailov was ranked the 61st richest man in Russia in 2009 with a net worth of $600 million (Forbes Russia 2009a). On June 1, in a meeting of the government, Putin spoke sharply against illegal imports as a threat to the federal budget and vowed a crackdown (Putin 2009). Federal agencies closed the market later that month, bypassing any city jurisdiction. Many suspect that the federal government was angered at the fact that Ismailov was spending the fortune he earned in Russia abroad (Franchetti 2009).

Shortly after the market was closed on June 29, 2009 Ismailov’s brother Faisal Izmailov resigned his position as the acting prefect of the northern administrative district of Moscow (Perekrest 2009). The position was offered to Oleg Mitvol, who had previously been the Deputy Head of Rosprirodnadzora, the Federal environmental service that was instrumental in ensuring Cherkizovski remained closed. Mitvol was appointed by Luzhkov, but has a reputation for being an anti-corruption bull dog in the service of the Kremlin (RIA Novosti 2009). Many believe the closing of Cherkizovski is a signal to Luzhkov from the Kremlin that his influence and ability to protect the interests of those around him is waning. Political scientist Vladimir Pribylovskii predicts that Luzhkov will be removed at some point in 2010, to be replaced by Mitvol (Polunin 2009).

Whether or not Luzhkov will be removed remains to be seen, though a recent campaign has placed a number of mayors under fire for corruption as a thinly veiled message that those who fall out of the federal government’s favor will be replaced (Bigg 2007). Nevertheless he remains a vocal part of the quota formulation process. He was a vociferous critic of the 2007 migration legislation, claiming it was too liberal and proposing instead that a new police force especially dedicated to immigration control should be created (Luzhkov 2006). Since then he has continued to speak out against the legislation, consistently demanding lower and lower quotas for Moscow (Vedomosti 2009). Most recently, he has come out in favor of creating legislation that shortens the 90 day period visa-free CIS citizens are allowed to stay to 15 days (Moscow Central Administrative Okrug 2010). Luzhkov couches his arguments in language of protecting labor market and cutting down on crime.

Luzhkov is actively critical of the FMS as well, which has led to very public disagreements played out in the media that parallels the argument concerning migrant criminality described in the previous chapter. Luzhkov has brought a lawsuit against the FMS, which is currently on appeal to the Moscow city courts (Nezavisimaya Gazeta 2010). This is significant in that the city

courts are widely believed to be under Luzhkov’s control (Levada Center 2010). The FMS deems Luzhkov’s continued calls for effective immigration regulation populist, and argues that his rhetoric justifies opaque dealings with migrants (Belenev 2009). When Luzhkov passed an initiative in 2009 requiring all migrants to sign a rental contract with their landlord as a stipulation for registration, the FMS cancelled the procedure saying regional FMS offices did not have the right to add additional requirements to the federal laws (Shirmanova 2009).

The city itself employs a number of migrants, the largest sector of which is involved in municipal services such as street cleaning (Tyuryukanova 2009c). There is a distinct presence of Central Asians in this sector. During the Soviet period these jobs were filled by Tatars, who at that time were seen as outsiders in much the same way as Central Asians are now (Interview #22 2009). Opinions vary about whether these migrants are legal or not. One person interviewed said they were of course legal because they have uniforms (Interview #22 2009)! The prefect of the south eastern district of Moscow estimated in 2008 that 8,220 migrants would be needed in municipal services in 2009 (Pismennaya 2008). Yet official numbers do not tell the whole story, as often as many as ten migrants are represented for every legally documented worker. The undocumented workers are paid with shadow wages (Tyuryukanova 2009c). This situation is curious in that the migration law in 2007 stipulated migrants have no right to work in municipal services (Federal Law #115 2002).

It is common knowledge in Moscow that migrants live in government owned buildings. From a housing bloc on Bryusov pereulok only three blocks from the Kremlin (a property that lists as over $10,000 per square meter), to the building of Government-owned media service Itar-Tass on Tverskoi Bulvar to the buildings surrounding Patriarchy Ponds, migrants of Central Asian appearance live and spend their free time (Interview #24 2009; Petrov 2009).39 Each city district administrative office that employs migrants houses them in areas nearby their work, often in buildings that have been deemed uninhabitable by the government (Vendina 2009). FMS spokesman Konstantin Poltaranin describes the situation as one in which taxpayers are footing the bill for water and electricity services in these abandoned buildings that house mostly illegal migrants (Nezavisimaya Gazeta 2010).

Poltaranin asserts that in Moscow the municipal service sector, along with construction and trade, would not function without migrant labor (Belenev 2009). In 2008, Moscow employed 370,000 migrants in construction and trade alone. The quota for Moscow in 2008 was 300,000, which was exhausted by May. An additional 50,000 work permits were allotted July 1, which were again exhausted, this time within two weeks (Shpigal 2008). Quotas were increased in October, though there were not regional specifications attached to the increases (Government Decision #737 2008). For 2009 the Moscow quota was 250,000 despite requests by employers for over 1 million foreign workers (Shcharbakova 2009b).

That Luzhkov is directly connected with business elites whose enterprises benefit from illegal migrant labor and that the city itself uses illegal migrants casts calls for lower quotas into new light. Luzhkov’s rhetoric of protecting jobs for Russian citizens and decreasing crime rates by ridding the city of migrants is a thin veil for personal economic self-interest. Luzhkov’s tough stance on immigration resonates with the public, and thus contributes to his persona as the care-

39 The value of the building on Bryusov pereulok is listed at http://www.domoway.ru/map/h50110/

taker of Moscow. Yet because there is no evidence that decreased quotas lead to a decreased immigrant population, and because there is ample evidence that increased restriction leads to increased pools of illegal immigrants, one can only conclude that either Luzhkov is a policy maker that has no grasp on the real situation or that he is manipulating the situation to his advantage. Thus at the elite level, we see both exit and exclusion from the formal economy. Efforts by elites to reduce quotas produces exclusion, narrowing the legal space for migrants. At the same time, elites themselves exit the formal realm by choosing to employ illegal migrants.

Middle Management: The Bureaucracy and Police High levels of corruption are associated with a lack of trust in the formal processes of the state and both are linked to increases in the informal economy in post-Soviet countries (Wallace and Latcheva 2006). Public officials and civil servants are deemed the largest arena in Russia affected by corruption and it is generally considered easy to obtain permits or avoid fines through payment of bribes to officials (Transparency International 2009).40 In fact, the size of the average bribe in Russia tripled between 2008 and 2009 despite the weak economic climate from 9000 rubles ($304) to 23,000 rubles ($776) (RIA Novosti 2010b).

It is as at the level of civil servants that legislation (regardless of its quality or intent) will succeed or fail. Bureaucrats in the regional FMS offices who issue migration and work permit documents, bureaucrats in the employment and tax services who register the employment of migrants and the tax liability of employers, inspectors of various offices and police who enforce laws and investigate violations all have a vital role in ensuring legislation is put into practice. It is problems at this most basic level that allow Russia’s migration policy to flounder. If corrupt officials are more interested in taking bribes than applying the law uniformly, any enacted legislation is bound to fail. Knowing this, legislators can pass laws for populist purposes that they can be quite certain will either directly or indirectly (through corruption) cause economic actors to exit the formal economy.

The problems created by the civil service can be divided into categories of capacity and discretion. First, the 2007 legislative changes placed great demands on FMS bureaucrats to register migrants and issue work permits. The lack of capacity of local FMS offices led to certain inefficiencies that pushed migrants to find documents outside legal channels. Second, both police and bureaucrats have a reputation for making arbitrary decisions that lead to uneven implementation. These decisions include creating new procedures and requiring bribes for the delivery of services.

When the 2007 legislation came into force, many law enforcement agencies were not prepared (Vitkovskaya 2009). The FMS in particular was not capable of handling the volume of requests it received. Many migrants (37.4%) and employers (37.5%) reported long lines when going to register, and to a lesser degree problems such as offices not having enough forms (Zionchkovskaya 2009, 107). In a number of cases, when registering at the post office bureaucrats did not know the address of the FMS office to which they should send the registration documents. Consequently, there were long lines and delays in paperwork. Even as of

40 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index rates Russia 146th out of 180 countries (from least to most corrupt) with a score of 2.2 out of a possible 10 (10 being least corrupt).

2009, it took the FMS ten days to process the paperwork for registration (Strakhova 2009).41 This is despite the fact that according to the law, the FMS is to process registrations within one day (Federal Law #109 2006). Migrants arriving after the enactment of the 2007 legislation reported that the process was difficult in greater numbers (27.9%) than did migrants arriving prior to the changes (18.1%) (Zionchkovskaya 2009, 101). Experts believe that problems such as long lines created the opportunity for migrants and employers to seek documents through the shadow economy and/or corruption (Vitkovskaya 2009).

The law stipulates that illegal migrants are subject to fines of 1,000-1,500 rubles ($35-50). Essentially migrants may pay this fine and regularize their status. However, this introduces the opportunity for arbitrary bureaucratic discretion and corruption because there is no specific official amnesty or legalization process (Vitkovskaya 2009). Either because laws are insufficiently specific or because bureaucrats do not implement the laws as written, the result is regulation that varies from region to region and from migrant to migrant.

For example, a number of employers (25-30%) reported that when registering on behalf of migrant workers either at the post office or FMS, officials require the presence of the migrant, despite the laws that stipulate a migrant can have a third party register for them (Zionchkovskaya 2009, 107). In some cases, officials demand documents that are not required by law and in many cases (43-48.5%) the employer fails to register the migrant. Another practice that has arisen in the Moscow area in 2008 is the recording of a specific employer on a migrants work permit despite the legal right of CIS citizens to freely change employers. This practice renders the migrants essentially tied to that employer and no different than migrants from visa regime countries (Tyuryukanova 2009c).

Part of the capacity problem is a result of the fact that there are no clear lines of jurisdiction when it comes to the formulation and implementation of migration policy. Migration policy is an outcome of a process by which many ministries give input, though often agencies are left out of the legislative process and it all comes down to the presidential administration (Shcharbakova 2009b). Though the FMS is tasked with coordinating policy and implementation, there is no one agency that deals with all aspects of migration, as agencies such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Health and Social Development, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Regional Development and the Ministry of Labor all have at least some interest in the migration processes. It is this lack of focal point that allows shadow regulation to arise, which is difficult to displace once the government decides to bring the migration sphere under its control (Smagina 2009).

Capacity problems aside, the larger problem is that bureaucrats and police officials are all too willing to take a bribe in order to solve migration-related issues. A 2008 survey showed that 40% of migrants are forced to pay bribes as a result of arbitrary document checks by police (Tyuryukanova 2009a). Of migrants who are not legally registered, 50.9% report paying bribes to the police, yet only 20.5% have been arrested (Zionchkovskaya 2009, 106). This is compelling evidence that police are more interested in collecting bribes than they are in directing illegal migrants through legal channels to either regularize their status or be deported. Over 40% of

41 Ten days is the maximum time allowed by law for the FMS to process work permit paperwork (Federal Law #115 2002).

migrants and employers report that they solve any problems that arise in the migration process by paying bribes (Zionchkovskaya 2009, 108).

Worse than bribes are the accusations that came as a part of a 2009-2010 whistle blowing campaign uncovering corruption in police. A former OMON (special riot police) officer reported in February 2010 that her fellow officers regularly kidnapped migrant workers and forced them into slave labor. These practices allegedly involved even top-level bureaucrats, as some migrants were dispatched to work on Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev’s dacha (Echo Moskvy 2010). These allegations have not received wide press coverage. Nevertheless, Nurgaliev has since been put on probation of sorts, told by President Medvedev that his job position is in jeopardy if he is unable to clean up the corruption in the Interior Ministry (Topolyanskaya 2010).

The corruption of the civil service produces broad exclusion from the formal economy, forcing migrants to operate outside the law because the law is not predictably or reliably applied. And yet, it could be argued that there is a level of predictability about the current situation in that informal mechanisms (i.e. bribes) are quite reliable and predictable. “Migrants don’t need to know the laws,” one native Muscovite surmised, because they understand the informal ways in which Russia works (Interview #4 2009). Another Muscovite admitted that “In Russia we live not by law but by understanding” (Vendina 2009).

The Everyday Level: Employers and Employment Agencies There are numerous documents detailing the abuses migrant workers suffer in Russia (Human Rights Watch 2009b; International Labor Organization 2009a; International Crisis Group 2010). From trafficking and forced labor to physical abuse, withheld wages, long working hours and psychological abuse, these accounts tell the harrowing experience of migrants in the shadow sector. In a discussion of informality these studies, which are based on interviews with migrants, are integral because they show the inner workings of the migrant labor market.

A 2006 survey showed that 77% of migrants had no work contract and were paid in black cash, and for those migrants who had no migration registration or work permit, 90 % were paid in black cash and only 3% had a work contract (Tyuryukanova 2008). This situation is largely a result of the fact that foreign workers are subject to a 30% income tax rate, whereas native workers are only required to pay 13% (Ivakhnyuk 2009c). When social benefits are included, the tax burden of a foreign worker is 56% (Shcharbakova 2009b). Therefore in many cases, even having a work permit does not ensure formal work. 40% of employers who hire migrants do not report it to Employment Services in order to avoid paying taxes (Zayonchkovskaya 2007a). This leaves migrants outside the reach of labor laws and at risk for potential mistreatment. Many migrants who arrived before (30%) and after (45%) the 2007 changes are aware that there is a potential that they will fall into a situation of forced labor if they do not have a work permit (Ivakhnyuk 2009a, 174). Table 21 shows the costs and benefits of legality versus illegality for both migrants and employers.

One of the major innovations of the 2007 legislation was the de-linking of work permits from a specific employer for CIS citizens. This was intended to prevent circumstances of forced labor and abuse. A 2008 survey showed that 16% of migrants have their documents withheld and have limited freedom of movement (Tyuryukanova 2009a). From the perspective of employers, the

new legislation has resulted in a situation where they have very little control. An employer in the construction industry explains that, “I register the migrant… spend my time and money. And then, when everything is in order, he runs away to work for a private house-owner who pays more. So I have to keep his passport, nothing else works…” (Tyuryukanova 2009b, 21). Even for migrants who aren’t forced to work, 40% are paid irregularly or not at all (Tyuryukanova 2009a).42

Another change in 2007 allowed migrants to register at a place other than their residence (Vitkovskaya 2009). While this may explain the increase of registrations, it does nothing to improve the living conditions of migrants. Many migrants live in condemned buildings that have been vacated, as described earlier. Furthermore, migrants must still find a host to in effect sponsor their presence in Russia. This can be an employer or a landlord, yet many are loath to act in this capacity (Tyuryukanova 2009b).

Perhaps the most important mechanism of informality when it comes to migrants from the CIS is the presence and use of private employment agencies or “middlemen” between workers and employers. These intermediaries offer migrants registration documents, work permits, and medical certificates as well as job placement for a fee. 80% of migrants interviewed in Moscow in 2008 paid an intermediary for their registration (in the average range of 1,000-2,000 rubles, whereas the fees for registration directly with the FMS through the mail are 180 rubles). 55% of employers and 47% of experts (only 45% of migrants after 1/15, though 63% before 1/15) interviewed in Russia are of the opinion that it is necessary for migrants to use an intermediary service in order to receive a work permit. For those that paid for a work permit, the majority paid between 4,000-5,000 rubles (the FMS charges 1,000 rubles). Falsified work permits are cheaper (on average between 1,000-2,000 rubles) (Dmitriev and Pyadukhov 2009).

Private employment agencies are not an inherently bad mechanism and are used successfully in many countries. At the international level, ILO convention 181 gives guidelines for the proper use of private employment agencies (International Labor Organization 1997). Russia has not signed this convention, nor does it regulate or monitor the sphere of private employment agencies. In this legal vacuum various intermediary groups that operate on a shadow basis compete with each other, but are free from competition from job placement and migration document services in the state or formal business sectors (Dmitriev and Pyadukhov 2009; Vitkovskaya 2009). Bureaucratic inefficiencies contribute to the ample market available to intermediary firms.

Many private employment agencies register as individual entrepreneurs (the same classification that migrants use to bypass the ban on foreigners in the market place) and often work with migrants as only one channel of their business. Other intermediaries are not registered at all, but rather function completely in the shadows on the basis of relationship ties between diaspora networks. In fact, the majority of the migration process is negotiated through relationships with

42 Data from a 2006 survey shows similar results: 19% of illegal migrants had their passports kept so that they would not be able to leave the employer, 43% worked without overtime pay, and 21% had either all or part of their wages withheld (Tyuryukanova 2009b, 20).

friends and family (Zionchkovskaya 2009, 102).43 The shifting status and activities of these intermediaries often means they are difficult to find if an employer or migrant is dissatisfied with their placement (Shcharbakova 2009b). For these reason it is impossible to know for certain how many private employment agencies are operating in Russia today, though some estimate their numbers between 2,500-3000 (Moshkin 2009b). In 2007, the estimates were around 1,200 (Kozenko and Nikolaeva 2007).

There is quite a range of agencies, from those that are fairly reliable to those that are completely unscrupulous. There are reputable agencies that are linked up to NGOs, which offer free services to migrants (Strakhova 2009). This is the case with the Western-funded NGO Tajikistan Foundation and its legal consultation service Migration and Law, which offers assistance to migrants who want to legalize their status or who experience difficulties with employers or police (Shokhzoda 2010). Only 1.2% of the migrants surveyed in Moscow who used an intermediary to obtain a work permit used the services of Tajikistan Foundation (Dmitriev and Pyadukhov 2009, 284).

Other agencies, however, have questionable reputations. Many agencies post advertisements in the Moscow metro with only a phone number. Other agencies have established offices and recruit business via the internet.44 One such example is called Slavic Right, whose website warns of unscrupulous middlemen who offer fake documents at cheap prices.45 The company offers a variety of services, including providing new migration cards without the inconvenience of leaving the country (2,500-5,000 rubles), work permits (12,000-16,000 rubles), providing migrant workers to employers (1,000-3,000 rubles per month) and other related services. One of the primary foci of the agency is to help people avoid fines levied by the FMS for migration violations that are a result of laws they view as overly rigid, regardless of whether a violation has actually occurred (15,000-75,000 rubles).46 Though a quick internet search will return many similar services, most migrants in Moscow (61.5%) find an agency through personal acquaintances (Dmitriev and Pyadukhov 2009, 282).

43 58.2% of migrants in Russia rely on family and friends for information about registration, 54.8% used the help of these relationships to find the place they could record on their registration documents, and 59.5% found intermediary services through these informal relationships. A 2005-2006 survey revealed that 66% of migrants used personal relationship to secure employment (Vitkovskaya 2009). 44 My personal experience with one of these private intermediaries was quite pleasant. When my husband could not register his visa through the travel agency that issued the visa, our landlord directed us to a website where we entered in all of our information and 48 hours later picked up our registration at their office. Whereas the travel agent (also an intermediary according to this definition, who apparently registers all foreigners passports at a particular hotel, regardless of the place the foreigner is actually staying) would have charged 1000 rubles, the internet-based company that billed itself as a fiancée visa/legal help agency, charged only 600 rubles. The office was quite basic, with 2 or 3 young women sitting behind desks. We stood in line for a short period of time (less than 15 minutes) and retrieved our paperwork. I showed my husband’s passport and the girl pulled his registration form from a stack, we handed over the 600 rubles and walked out. 45 The company’s primary site is http://www.migraciya.com, with another site devoted to avoiding FMS fines http://www.anti-fms.com/, and another http://www.reg-ooo.biz for registering companies as legal entities. Another Moscow-based company offers migration services as well as the registration of companies and individual entrepreneurs at a single site http://hermansmith.ru/. 46 According to the 2007 legislation, employers can be fined from 250,000-800,000 rubles ($10,000-32,000). In the first half of 2009, almost 430 million rubles were collected as a result of 38,000 violations (Moskovskaya Pravda 2009). This means fines were an average of 11,300 rubles, or less than the minimum charge of the services of Slavic Right.

From the perspective of the ILO, there are two primary problems with private employment agencies in Russia currently. The first is that they charge migrants for their services, whereas the ILO convention stipulates all fees must be paid by employers (International Labor Organization 1997, Shcharbakova 2009b). However, employers are often unable to pay the associated costs or unwilling to risk receiving workers they are not satisfied with only to find the employment agency has vanished with the placement fee. Secondly, the agencies contract migrant labor to large companies who take on no legal relationship with the workers (Shmakov 2008). In these cases, the migrant does not exist to the large company and therefore receives no social benefits or any type of labor rights (Shcharbakova 2009b, Strakhova 2009). It is not uncommon for shadow intermediaries to confiscate migrants’ passports and force workers to repay the cost of transportation from their home countries through unpaid labor, often under threat of physical abuse or being reported to the police (Kadirova 2009).

The majority of migrants, employers and experts in Russia support the legal development of this sphere. Experts believe the only way to marginalize the shadow enterprises is to create legal monitoring and a system of regularized intermediaries that compete (and thus narrow the market) for their shadowy counterparts (Dmitriev and Pyadukhov 2009, 301).

Oleg Neterebsky, director of the Moscow city Department of Labor and Employment and previously the deputy chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, has been critical of how private employment agencies operate in Russia currently. He suggests that the operation of the agencies should be improved but should only be licensed through agreements with labor unions (Itogi 2008). The FMS, too, has come out in support of legalizing private employment agencies, though there have been no public statements since 2007. At that time, they were preparing a bill that would establish licensing practices monitored through the FMS (Kozenko and Nikolaeva 2007). Though the bill was expected to be submitted in 2007, it has not appeared on the agenda of legislative bodies. Nevertheless, it is interesting that a 2008 survey showed that 7.7% of migrants who used intermediary services learned of the intermediary from migration services (Dmitriev and Pyadukhov 2009, 282)

A new draft bill in 2009 put forward by the Federation Council seeks to define the legal status of private employment agencies and require compulsory licensing of all such enterprises (United Russia 2009). The status of this bill is unknown as it is not listed under current or rejected proposals on the Federation Council’s website. United Russia’s website, while not expressing explicit support for the bill, contains an article describing the efforts of the Federation Council in some detail (United Russia 2009).

Though many employers (42.3%) and migrants (43.2%) alike are willing to pay bribes directly to officials in order to solve problems that arise in the migration process, an equal number (43.2% of migrants and 51.9% of employers) use intermediaries to solve problems (Zionchkovskaya 2009, 108). This industry of migrant services is estimated to be around 30 billion rubles, or around 1 billion dollars (United Russia 2009). Experts predict the private employment industry will only get larger and more shadowy as immigration restrictions become more severe (Belenev 2009).

Going forward: The Future of Russia’s Immigration Regime In some ways it could said that the 2007 migration laws formalized the informal. By giving the government a specific mandate to control migration flows through quotas, and in some cases zero-quotas or bans on certain sectors of the labor market, legitimized arbitrary decision-making. Scholars and FMS officials are all too aware that lower quotas will lead to an increase in illegal flows. FMS spokesman Poltoranin asserted directly to the mass media that “any crackdown will lead to an increase in illegal immigration,” (Belenev 2009). This principle is well established in the migration research in Russia (Tyuryukanova 2009a; Vitkovskaya 2009; Ivakhnyuk 2009b). Yet a new ban was instituted January 1, 2010 reducing the quota of foreign taxi drivers to zero (Vedomosti 2009). It is this quota mechanism that has allowed the government leverage over migration politics, which they have used to lower quotas and force migration into the shadows.

The FMS has traditionally been opposed to quotas, and has instead proposed a new mechanism called patents, which allow migrants to purchase a permit month by month to work legally so long as they are legally registered (Gritsiuk 2010). Patents cost 1,000 rubles ($35) per month, have limitless renewals at the same monthly charge, and do not require migrants to pay income tax (Khomchenko 2009; Gritsiuk 2010). Luzhkov and trade unions are against patents because it would allow migrants to bypass the quota and would take away all control of regional governments over the labor market (Khomchenko 2009; Vedomosti 2009; Gritsiuk 2010). The proposal on patents was introduced in January 2010 and has been accepted by the State Duma pending amendments (Selivanova 2010).

Russia in Comparative Perspective How does Russia’s use of informal mechanisms compare to the other countries under investigation? The following section will consider informality in the ten country cases at hand. It will first look at comparative statistics of the labor market and illegal immigrant population, assessing correlations of illegality with corruption and the shadow economy in cross-country perspective. It will then assess the relationship between the severity of legislation and increases in informality before it focuses in on the varying role of private employment agencies in different countries.

The ILO reports that the economically active population in Russia was 75,159,000 in 2007. Statistics received directly from the FMS report 1,717,137 employed migrants in that same year. Of these, 1,152,786 (67%) were from CIS countries. This means that 2.8% of the labor force was comprised of migrants, and 1.5% of the labor force was made up of CIS migrants. Some scholars report a slightly higher percentage (3.2%) for the whole of Russia, adding that in Moscow 7.6% of the labor force is comprised of migrants (Tyuryukanova 2009a). Figures for the other countries in question range from 6.2% of the workforce being comprised of immigrants in France, 13% in the US, 28% in Singapore, 67% in Saudi Arabia to 98% of the private workforce in UAE (see table 22).

It is also important to look at the size of illegal versus legal immigration. Comparing these figures can help show the divergence of formal and informal processes. A large proportion of illegal immigrants displays a predominance of the use of informal methods to fulfill labor demand. As established earlier, in 2009 75% of the Migrant population in Russia was illegal and the proportion of illegals in Moscow could reach 80% by the end of 2010. Table 22 assesses the

proportion of illegals in the population of immigrants for each country where data is available.47 This data is presented alongside other typical measures of informality: Corruption Perception scores by Transparency International and estimates of the size of shadow economies. There is an apparently stronger relationship between corruption scores and immigrants in the informal sector, than with the size of the shadow economy. Russia is the most corrupt of the countries under investigation, and it also has the greatest proportion of migrants in the informal sector. Countries such as Canada and Singapore, which have low corruption scores, also have a low proportion of informal migrants and a relatively small shadow economy. Italy and Saudi Arabia could potentially follow this trend, though the estimates of illegal immigrants in those countries range so widely it is difficult to be certain based on this data.

There is other data to corroborate the covariance of corruption and the informal economy with illegal immigration in the Italian case. In Southern European countries such as Italy, migrants are often only able to find jobs in the underground economy (Reyneri 2003). In fact Italy has the reputation among migrants as being a country where it is easy to enter and work without regard to legal status. Thus many argue that the presence of a well-developed underground economy in Italy is a pull factor drawing illegal immigrants (Zincone 2006). Furthermore, there is great incentive to hire irregular workers because, as in the Russian case, the rate of taxation is very high (50-60% on top of basic wages) (Djajić 1997). Also like the Russian case, in Italy quotas are employed as a political and increasingly restrictive mechanism, which have led to increasing numbers of migrants in the informal economy (Estruch and Zupi 2008, 55)

An interesting case of regulation versus informality is Singapore, where there is a particularly strict system aimed at targeting illegal immigration (Stalker 2000, 30-31). Some contend that strict enforcement of immigration laws have, in fact, led to low rates of irregular migration (Human Rights Watch 2005, 17). Others argue that liberalization of the Singaporean immigration regime in the late 1990s developed alongside increases in rates of foreign workers in the informal sector (Ruppert 1999). This informal sector work is fed by shadow intermediaries who provide forged or illegally obtained work permits (Wong 1997). Statistics of illegal immigrants in Singapore are illusive at best. The only data available is that of discovered violations of immigration law. According to latest available data, in 2001 15,996 immigration offenders were arrested for illegal entry or overstaying visas (Ministry of Home Affairs 2007).

What stands out from the data in table 23 is the US case, which has a fairly low corruption score and a small shadow economy. Yet its proportion of illegal immigrants is 30% of the total immigrant stock. As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, increased border security in the US has not led to decreased illegal immigration. Rather, increasing restriction has led to an increase in informality. In 1994, the US border patrol adopted policies aimed at increasing entry barriers at the border. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act then authorizes a two-fold increase in the size of the border patrol and fences along parts of the border (Andreas 1998-1999). Not only have these efforts served to create permanent migrant

47 This data is pulled from secondary sources and is therefore of admittedly limited direct comparability as statistics are arrived at via a variety of methodological approaches. While some methods rely on border apprehensions, some look at arrests for various immigration violations (i.e. Singapore), and some look at the difference between the legal immigration population and the total foreign-born population (i.e. US), others consider the numbers of migrants legalized in mass amnesties (i.e. Italy).

settlements due to increased costs of border crossing, as opposed to a natural inclination for migrant flows to be temporary, they have not decreased illegal immigration (Durand, Malone and Massey 2003). Rather they have shifted the entry point of illegals to less controlled areas, which are typically more rural and/or dangerous, contributing to increased numbers of deaths during border crossings (Cornelius 2001). Thus the US immigration experience shows that increased regulation not only fails to deter immigrants but has the perverse effect of increasing the severity of consequences borne during the immigration process and pushing more migrants to seek shadow intermediaries (called coyotes) in order to navigate the border crossing. Use of coyotes has increased from 15% to 41% as US borders have become tighter, with the average crossing at a cost of $2000 (Cornelius 2005).

Similar results can be seen in other countries as well. Increased border control in European Union countries has contributed to a situation where it is more dangerous and more expensive to cross illegally. Consequently, illegal entries have shifted to areas where borders are more porous, typically into Southern European countries (Jandl 2007). It has also been suggested that as border control becomes increasingly tougher, migrants and shadow intermediaries (smugglers) become increasingly creative in order to evade detection, for example using forged identity documents and traveling in smaller groups than traditional smuggling operations that transported large numbers of migrants in one crossing. In the period between 1990 and 2003, the use of smugglers increased from 20-25% to 70% of those migrants crossing borders illegally.

There is a range of experience with private employment agencies or middlemen in the countries under investigation. From Kelly Services for skilled professionals to those who act as human traffickers shuttling workers from Southeast Asia to the Middle East and delivering them into forced labor, the category of private employment services is quite diffuse.48 Clearly there is an enormous difference between Kelly Services and human traffickers, yet it is not always one that is clearly a legal issue. Though in the Western cases and Singapore one category is legal and the other is not, in the other cases at hand both “legitimate” organizations and unscrupulous agents operate in a legal grey zone.

Even in a context where employment agencies are regulated, workers still have fewer rights than if they were directly employed by a company. This is because the worker is an employee of the employment agency rather than the firm they are providing labor to, and consequently does not have access to the benefits of overtime pay or sick leave or access to labor union membership (Anderson and Ruhs 2008, 17). This is often the case with temporary job placement services, such as Kelly Services. In these cases, workers are paid by the employment agency, who takes a fee from the employer (International Labor Organization 2009b). In some cases, workers rights can be violated by the agencies themselves. Take the case of Cygate Software & Consulting in New Jersey, a firm that recruits tech workers from abroad and places them in US companies. In 2009, the president of Cygate was arrested on multiple counts of visa violations for collecting up-front payments from foreign workers but not providing them with promised jobs. When workers arrived, they were forced to find jobs on their own (often low-paying service jobs) in order to continue paying Cygate’s placement fees on the threat that their visas would be revoked if they did not comply (Hamm and Herbst 2009).

48 Kelly Services operates in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Russia, Singapore and the US (Kelly Services 2010).

The primary international mechanism regulating private employment agencies is the International Labor Organization Private Employment Agencies Convention 181 of 1997.49 The ILO maintains that no fees should be charged to workers for job placement services. Nevertheless it is common in Saudi Arabia, as it is in Russia and the UAE, for agencies to take fees directly from workers, sometimes in sums of thousands of dollars (Human Rights Watch 2004; Eelens and Speckmann 1990). It is common for workers to be indebted to private employment agencies until these fees are paid. Increasingly, when private employment agencies are involved in placing workers internationally, there are fees associated with placement (International Labor Organization 2009b, 6). Perhaps this is because ILO convention 181 has a low ratification rate and thus there is a legal vacuum at the international level.

The prohibition on charging fees is a result of abuses that occurred in the 1920s (International Labor Organization 2009b). In the US around the turn of the 20th century, private employment agencies regularly charged fees to workers for job placement. It was common practice for agencies to collect fees and then not provide either no work, unsatisfactory work, or work from which the employee is fired after a short period (the agent and employer then split the fee paid by the worker) (Lee 2009). The US response was to create public employment services that operated at no cost to workers. In the 1970s there was a shift back towards the privatization of the industry both in the US and Europe due to a lack of funding for public employment agencies (International Labor Organization 2009b, 5). This is not dissimilar to the post-Soviet context in which public labor agencies, as with many state institutions, suffered a lack of capacity. In this vacuum, (often shadowy) private industries emerged.

The situation of trafficking from Southeast Asia to the Middle East can be categorized with private employment agencies and intermediaries, though it operates almost exclusively outside both domestic and international law. For example, in Saudi Arabia the law is quite stringent in its requirement that foreign workers have a domestic sponsor that will obtain a visa and sign a labor contract. Nevertheless, many sponsors use middlemen to locate workers abroad and bring them to Saudi Arabia and then either release the migrant to find their own job upon arrival (illegal according to Saudi Arabian law) or place them in jobs beneath their qualification and expected pay grade. Sponsors stand to gain from this arrangement as they typically receive payments from both the intermediary and the migrant in exchange for a visa (Human Rights Watch 2004).

The phenomenon of human smuggling is one that is absent in the context of CIS citizens’ immigration to Russia, by nature of the visa free regime. CIS migrants do not need assistance crossing the border into Russia. Nevertheless the presence and use of these different types of shadow intermediaries has distinct parallels regardless of the package of services they provide. In all of these cases, the migrant is vulnerable to human rights abuses of trafficking, which are well documented in the literature.50 Often migrants choose intermediaries as an option of last resort, because economic conditions and job prospects are poor in home countries, because legal entry is difficult or expensive, and because the promise of higher wages outweighs any thoughts of danger. Here again we see the two sides of the exit/exclusion coin. Home economies are poor and give workers little chance to make a decent living, which can act as exclusion. Migrants

49 Of the countries being studied, only Italy has ratified Convention 181. 50 See, for example (United States Department of State 2007).

choose to exit the formal and informal economies of their home country in order to work abroad. Strict regulations act as exclusion, forcing migrants to use shadow intermediaries to secure border crossing and job placement. Once migrants have repeatedly faced exclusion and chosen exit in each of these transactions, it is not unlikely that they will remain in the informal sphere once in the host country.

The current Russian situation has parallels to a number of countries under investigation with respect to the use of unscrupulous intermediaries. If we were to take a lesson from the experience of early 20th century United States, the policy prescription could be a shift from private to public employment agencies. Yet, seeing as how these agencies would fall into the jurisdiction of a corrupt bureaucracy in Russia, there is little chance that a public solution would increase compliance with the law. On the whole, Russia shares the most in common with Italy in regard to immigration context. Both have high levels of corruption and large shadow economies that are willing and able to absorb large numbers of illegal migrants. Both have increased their immigration regulations in recent years and employ restrictive quota mechanisms to control (or look like they are controlling) immigrant flows. Speaking of the restrictive and discriminatory regime in Italy, one scholar notes that “a saving grade is that bureaucratic procedures are generally ineffective, if not corrupt,” (Baldwin-Edwards 1991, 203) meaning that what is discriminatory in intent still allows immigrants ample access to the labor market. This is a curious statement. From a human rights perspective it makes some sense in that migrants are “allowed” entry into a Western country where presumably their rights will be upheld to a higher degree than in their underdeveloped home countries. Yet from another perspective, it is clear that Russia’s “saving grace” is also corrupt and ineffective bureaucratic procedures as it increases the available pool of cheap labor by illegal immigrants.

Revisiting the Immigration Regime Based on the preceding discussion of various forms of informality in the countries under investigation, it is possible to assert that in several cases informal practices significantly impact the openness of immigration regimes. In Italy, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the US, the proportion of the immigrant population that is estimated to be illegal (as much as 31-75%) testifies to informality in these immigration regimes. Even though the numerical data is inconclusive, it is also possible to assert that Singapore and UAE are affected significantly by informal processes, primarily due to the evidence of trafficking in and through these countries. In table 24, I estimate which countries experience downgraded openness because of informality, indicated with a down arrow.

Why are these countries downgraded if, in fact, informal practices are allowing more immigrants into the country? At this point it is necessary to revisit the definition of immigration regime from chapter one, which encompasses laws, policies and actual practices (in the informal and formal realms) that regulate immigration flows, entry (immigrant access to border crossing, residence, and entry into the labor market) and incorporation (ultimately citizenship). In chapter three, openness was defined as an immigration regime that has relatively few bureaucratic hurdles for entrance and legal status of residence and work. The focus of chapter three was on the laws and policies portion of the immigration regime, whereas chapter five adds actual practices (specifically informal practices). It is immediately apparent that in addition to bureaucratic procedures prescribed by law, the actual practices of civil servants can add additional barriers to

74 legal residence and work. In the end, then, an immigration regime can only be open if it allows legal entry into the country and labor market. This is an essential point because only if immigrants have legal status will they be able to access the incorporation portion of the immigration regime.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

It is quite clear that informal processes dominate the immigration regime in Russia. Because future economic viability depends on immigrant labor, it is logical to assert that economic factors create demand for a regime that allows more migrants into the country and labor market. Yet demand created by these factors does not require a formally liberal regime. In fact, an informal regime (i.e. corruption instead of adherence to laws) can benefit employers to a greater degree by allowing them to escape rigorous bureaucratic procedures of a more formal system of immigrant labor.

There is ample evidence that the Russian case fits the hypothesis that the state manages dual demands of xenophobic society and economic need for migrants by creating strict migration regulations that quiet public xenophobia while increasing the costs of participating in the formal economy. Together with increased costs from the regulations themselves, corruption acts as a barrier to legal entry into the labor market through elite manipulation of laws and policies, uneven and arbitrarily enforced legislation and the extraction of bribes by civil servants. The predominance of these mechanisms create increased demand for the labor of illegal immigrants, which in turn reinforces the process of strict laws and corrupt practices, solidifying exit and exclusion from the formal labor market.

Throughout the 1990s, Russian immigration laws were made in an ad hoc manner (mostly by presidential decree) and regional governments dealt with migration issues depending on their own needs (Andrienko and Guriev 2005). For example, regions experiencing demographic decline were more open to immigration than were those saturated with immigrants (Voronina 2006, 73). In 2002 there was a peak of xenophobic public opinion: 58% of Russians agreed with the sentiment “Russia for Russians,” as opposed to 49% the year before and 43% in 1998 (Levada Center 2009). Also in 2002, the FMS was placed under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which organizes law enforcement, and new laws were passed intended to clamp down on illegal migration (Voronina 2006). Hate crimes rose in the mid 2000s and in 2006 an ethnic conflict in Kondopoga, a northern Russian town, acted as a catalyst for new migration policies. The media coverage of the 2007 policies touted them as a liberalization, arguing that it would now be easier for migrants from the CIS to live and work in Russia legally. It is no wonder, then, that there was another spike in “Russia for Russians,” sentiment in 2008 (57% as opposed to 50% two years earlier) (Levada Center 2009). Consequently, quotas decreased dramatically from 6 million in 2007 to 1.3 million in 2010. Yet the overall number of migrants in Russia has not decreased. Therefore, migrants that are not included in the quotas are simply forced into the informal sector.

Table 25 shows how xenophobia and components of Russia’s immigration regime have interacted over time. Preceding legislative changes in 2002 that placed the FMS within the MVD and shifted policy toward combating illegal immigration, there is a spike in popular xenophobia, denoted by a 58% rate of agreement with the statement “Russia for Russians.” This is owing to increasingly heated relations with the minorities of the Caucasus in the wake of the second Chechen war. Beginning in 2006, we again see a ramping up of xenophobia partially in reaction to the events of Kondopoga, with a peak of 707 hate crimes in 2007 and a 57% affinity for the sentiment “Russia for Russians.” Even though the legislative changes in 2007 introduced the

mechanism for increasingly restrictive policy, xenophobia continued to grow in part because the measures were publicized as a liberalization of the immigration regime. It was only later, as quotas decreased dramatically, that the full power of the 2007 legislation was made known. Thus in 2009 we see decreasing quotas co-vary with decreased manifestations of xenophobia.

The 2007 laws formalized the informal (in the sense of arbitrary, personalistic control) by placing the control over the quota system into the hands of top political elite, allowing the government to adapt to public concerns at the same time as it pushes migrants into toward illegality where they can fulfill demands for cheap labor. Yet informality continues at the everyday level, in the bureaucracy, police, private employment agencies and employers. A well established shadow economy embraces the migrant workers that are driven out of the regular labor market by low quotas. Elites, civil servants, employers and employment agencies benefit from this situation. Both elites and employers are instrumental in defining yearly quotas and stand to benefit from cheap illegal labor, while civil servants benefit from the corruption involved in the process of legalizing migrants and enforcing policies (or refraining from penalizing actors for violations). It is only the migrants that lose in this situation. While they continue to endure exploitation at the hands of employers and officials, they press on because the prospects for employment are so poor in their home countries that it is their only choice.

Chapter one suggested that the management of Russia’s immigration regime has profound implications for the vertical of power. Yet chapter five showed how powerful local-level elites are able to manipulate informal processes and create an acute demand for informal labor. Thus several components of the managed democracy initiated by Putin, namely personal presidential (rather than institutional) control and short-term effectiveness (at the expense of long-term efficiency), are shown to be weak in the case of Russia’s immigration regime.51 This weakness justifies placing decision-making directly into the hands of top federal elites so that they may attempt to regain control of the situation. That the quota system is in the hands of Putin directly is evidence of this type of manual manipulation.52 Does this type of direct ability to manipulate the immigration regime allow for greater flexibility or should it cause concern that the system will become unstable? The scholars of overmanaged democracy suggest hyper centralization can lead to inflexibility and instability if someone less competent and charismatic than Putin is in charge of, key decisions (Petrov, Lipman and Hale 2010).

This research contends that the management of immigration is a key policy issue because on it hinges the management of the demographic crisis, society’s xenophobia and many sectors of the economy. That Putin has the ability to set and adapt quotas at will allows him to flexibly adapt to demands from societal and economic actors. However, the fact that he has reacted so decisively to reduce quotas shows that populist concerns sometimes shift the lines of control in the vertical of power. This is especially apparent as leaders like Luzhkov are continually allowed to flex their muscles over immigration issues.

51 This is based on Nicolay Petrov’s definition of managed democracy, which includes: a strong presidency and weak institutions, state control of the media, control over elections that allows elites to legitimize their decisions, visible short-term effectiveness and long-term inefficiency, resulting in an “unstable stability” based on the president’s personality (Petrov and McFaul 2005). 52 Announcements about quota numbers come directly from Putin’s office.

A Note on the 2010 Moscow Metro Bombings Since the fall of the Soviet Union, terrorism has not had an immediate impact on immigration policies (see table 25). Apartment bombings in Moscow in 1999 led to the launch of the second Chechen war, but did not have a direct impact on immigration policies. It was only in July 2002 that restrictive immigration policies were instituted. The siege of a Moscow theatre later that year, and the siege of an elementary school in the Southern Russian city of Beslan in 2004, both attributed to Chechen terrorists, while producing significant political shifts in other areas did not cause an immediate tightening of the immigration regime as it was only in 2007 that quotas were introduced and in the following years that they were restrictively applied.

Therefore it is unlikely that there will be an immediate immigration policy shift in response to the bombing of two Moscow metro stations in March 2010. Many have suspected, however, that there would be increases in xenophobia following the bombings. However, experts have noticed that compared to previous terrorist attacks, there has not been an upsurge in xenophobic sentiment (Schwirtz 2010). It is however too soon to accurately assess trends.

The most likely impact on policy will come in regard to the introduction of patents, discussed in chapter five. It is feasible that in light of the terrorist attacks, patents will be abandoned altogether. However, if they are allowed to go forward, it will likely lead to a spike in xenophobia requiring further policy intervention.

Russia: A Typical Country of Immigration? This research confirms that in the Russian case, strict policies help to assuage xenophobic sentiment while economic demands are met by forcing immigrants into the informal labor market. How does this compare on the whole to other immigrant receiving countries?

There is a clear difference between the Western and non-Western countries this project has investigated. Chapter three showed that there is a substantial relationship between regime type and the openness of a country’s immigration regime. It is important to explore briefly whether there are underlying factor that contribute to this relationship. According to Freedom House, Russia moved from partially free to not free during the Putin years (see table 25), so if the relationship between regime type and immigration regime is robust, we should see a shift in the Russian case. Changes to immigration policies in 2002 preceded the decline of freedom by several years. During the 1990s there was a more open immigration regime that focused on repatriation rather than control that was marked by a relatively more democratic era and relatively more liberal immigration policies. Both changed during the Putin years as the immigration regime shifted to a focus on combating illegal immigration and the political regime became more closed as well. Using the measure of regime type as a predictor, it is not surprising that the 2007 “liberalization” of the immigration regime is not a liberalization at all, but merely a shift in the mechanisms of immigration control to the top political elite. The relationship holds, but is it the whole story?

The migration literature tells us that in liberal states, there is often a gap between policy goals and outcomes (Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994, 3). On the one hand public opinion at best deems migrant populations as undesirable permanent additions to society (often for reasons tending toward xenophobia), causing public officials to pursue tightening immigration controls.

On the other hand, the “demand-pull” that originates from economic and social groups in receiving states, who desire either migrant labor or social goals such as family reunification, is difficult for states to counter. Nor can states reduce “supply-push” pressures that stem from foreign assistance and trade liberalization in sending countries, or the cross-border networks that facilitate additional migration. The resulting situation is one in which states make purely symbolic attempts to stem immigration and permanent settlement, for example limiting immigrant access to social services (i.e. health care and education), tightening citizenship controls, or making immigrant integration into society difficult (Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 1994, 4-5, 8, 34).

These symbolic attempts that serve to give the appearance of government control over the immigration process is in many ways similar to the Russian situation. There is a gap, however, in the literature when it comes to addressing what types of consequences (i.e. the direct relationship between policies and illegal immigration) are involved with these symbolic attempts. The literature addresses the fact that increased immigration controls are political decisions that are popular with citizens but “may or may not be effective,” based on issues of state capacity (Massey 1999, 314). Scholars tend to relegate illegal immigration to categories of unintended consequences or uncontrollable forces if it is linked to policy outcomes (usually policy failures) at all (Elliott, Mayadas and Segal 2010; Hanson 2009). But the Russian case shows that illegal immigration (specifically the illegal status of immigrants) is very much an intended consequence of policy choices. Is this typical for an immigrant-receiving state?

Peter H. Schuck (2008) comments that in the Western context, “the ‘failure’ of immigration enforcement serves an important latent function by sustaining the attractive, reassuring, ennobling myth that the rule of law is a paramount, priceless ideal that we relentlessly pursue. At the same time, it obscures the reality that our actual goal is the less exalted one of enriching ourselves by condoning illegality and then concealing this fact beneath a veil of hypocritical high-mindedness.”

Thus the primary difference between the Russian case and the Western cases is the orientation toward the rule of law, though perhaps not in every case the functioning of the rule of law, as Schuck supposes. Whereas the West has a deep attachment to the law, in Russia it is sometimes no more than a publicity campaign. Peppered throughout Moscow in the summer of 2009 stood a number of billboards declaring, “The law helps!” It was a campaign by the Moscow city legislature to advertise that the law can be useful to people. This is a stark example of how the law in Russia is not something that is internalized, but rather something that must be explained and advertized in the same way as other products from the West. In a non-rule of law context there is nothing inherently appealing about the law and the only thing predictable is arbitrary and uneven enforcement.

Contributions to the Literature That Russia’s immigration regime is a self-reinforcing circle of strict policies, informal practices driven by corruption and demand for illegal labor (see chart 1) is a significant contribution to a number of literatures. To the scholarship on Russian politics, this study offers a case study of how a set of policies that is integral to Russia’s future interacts with the vertical of power and provides evidence that Russia is not a managed (or overmanaged) democracy, but rather an

authoritarian regime. To the migration literature, this study offers a comprehensive definition of the concept of an immigration regime and a fleshing out of one of its primary components, namely the entry procedures, which involve immigrant access to border crossing, residence and entry into the labor market.

The Russian case also shows how domestic factors are predominant in the negotiation of Russia’s immigration regime. This is significant in that much of the migration literature focuses on the transnational factors of globalization as driving forces behind how states can or can’t control migration. External policy inputs, or those that originate outside state borders such as security threats (i.e. trafficking, terrorism) and international norms (i.e. international human rights regimes) are much less a factor in determining policies in Russia than are the internal policy inputs of xenophobia and economic demand for informal labor.53

Tasks for Future Research In chapter four, it was surprising that the Italian and Russian cases did not have a more closed immigration regime based on their level of xenophobia. However, evidence from chapter five showed that a potential “solution,” which confirms the hypothesis of this research, is to allow informal processes to control the immigration regime. There is ample evidence to show this is the case with Russia. The hypothesis of this project could find further corroboration if it were applied to the Italian case.

Finally, it will be important for future research to address the components of the immigration regime that were not the focus of this research. An immigration regime encompasses laws, policies and actual practices (in the informal and formal realms) that regulate immigration flows, entry (immigrant access to border crossing, residence, and entry into the labor market) and incorporation (ultimately citizenship). This research focused on issues of entry, which are clearly impacted by informal processes. Future work must be done to discover how these informal processes impact incorporation as a process of inclusion in education and welfare services, cultural adaptation and ultimately citizenship. Research on how informality affects flows, or whether informality acts as a pull or a deterrent to potential immigrants, would also be a fruitful research agenda.

53 For a further discussion of internal and external policy inputs and how these translate into policy outputs, see (Schenk 2010)

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Interviews

1. Muscovite woman (student), May 28, 2009. 2. Leonid Friedman (professor of Economics, Institute of Asia and Africa at Moscow State University), June 3, 2009. 3. Muscovite woman (teacher), various dates. 4. Muscovite man (teacher), various dates. 5. Zhibek Saparbekovna (professor, Institute of Asia and Africa at Moscow State University), June 5, 2009. 6. Gavhar Djuraeva (head, Tajikistan Foundation), June 10, 2009. 7. Suleyman Shokhzoda (project director, Tajikistan Foundation), June 10, 2009. 8. Olga Vendina (Senior Researcher, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences), June 17, 2009. 9. Afsona Kadirova (Lawyer, Angel Coalition), June 23, 2009. 10. Vladimir Mukomel (Sociologist, Russian Academy of Sciences), June 26, 2009. 11. Alexandra Tyson (Lead Coordinator of the Task Force on Racial Violence and Harassment, Moscow Protestant Chaplaincy), June 30, 2009. 12. Muscovite man, June 30, 2009. 13. Dmitry Babic (Journalist, RIA Novosti), July 3, 2009. 14. Nikolay Petrov (Scholar in Residence, Carnegie Moscow), July 3, 2009. 15. Elena Ryabinina (Head of the Program of Assistance to Political Exiles from Central Asia, Civic Assistance Committee), July 8, 2009. 16. Alexander Verkhovsky (Director, Sova Center), July 15, 2009. 17. Elena Burtina (Head of Labor Migrant Program, Civic Assistance Committee), July 16, 2009. 18. Daria Strakhova (Technical Cooperation Programme Assistant, Development and Implementation of Readmission Agreements in the Russian Federation, International Organization for Migration), July 21, 2009. 19. Marina Manke (Programme Coordinator, Development and Implementation of Readmission Agreements in the Russian Federation, International Organization for Migration), July 21, 2009. 20. Elena Tyuryukanova (Director of Center for Migration Research, Russian Academy of Sciences), July 22, 2009. (Tyuryukanova 2009c) 21. Natalia Shcharbakova (National Officer in the Russian Federation, International Labor Organization), July 26, 2009. (Shcharbakova 2009b) 22. Muscovite man (teacher), various dates. 23. James Brooke (real estate industry), August 13, 2009. 24. Muscovite woman (unemployed), various dates. 25. Muscovite woman (NGO worker). 26. Muscovite man (NGO worker). 27. Expat woman (NGO worker).

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Transliteration key: US Board on Geographic Names

А - a Б - b В - v Д - d Г - g Е - e/ye Ё - ё/yё Ж - zh З - z И - i Й - y К - k Л - l М - m Н - n О - o П - p Р - r С - s Т - t У - u Ф - f Х - kh Ц - ts Ч - ch Ш - sh Щ - shch Ы - y Ь - ‘ Э - e Ю - yu Я - ya

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Appendix

Chart 1. Inputs and outputs of the immigration regime

Table 1. Freedom House 2009 Political rights Civil liberties Freedom Canada 1 1 Free France 1 1 Free Germany 1 1 Free Italy 1 2 Free Norway 1 1 Free Russia 6 5 Not Free Saudi Arabia 7 6 Not Free Singapore 5 4 Partially Free UAE 6 5 Not Free US 1 1 Free Source: Data from Freedom House 2009. Note: Political rights and civil liberties are ranked from 1 to 7, 1 being most free.

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Table 2. Transparency International 2009 Score Rank Canada 8.7 8th France 6.9 24th Germany 8.0 14th Italy 4.3 63rd Norway 8.6 11th Russia 2.2 146th Saudi Arabia 4.3 63rd Singapore 9.2 3rd UAE 6.5 30th US 7.5 19th Source: Data from Transparency International 2009. Note: Scoring of 180 countries uses a ten point scale, with a ten representing the least corruption.

Table 3. Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide July 2009 Corruption Law and Order Democratic Accountability Canada 5 5.5 6 France 5 5 6 Germany 5 5 6 Italy 2.5 4 5.5 Norway 5 6 6 Russia 2 4 2.5 Saudi Arabia 2 5 1 Singapore 4.5 5 2 UAE 2.5 4 2.5 US 4 5 6 Source: Data from Political Risk Services 2009. Note: Scored are out of a possible 6 points, with 6 representing the least amount of political, economic and financial risk operating in, investing or lending in a particular country.

Table 4. World Bank rule of law Score Canada 1.81 France 1.4 Germany 1.72 Italy 0.43 Norway 1.96 Russia -0.91 Saudi Arabia 0.33 Singapore 1.73 UAE 0.75 US 1.65 Source: Data from World Bank 2009b. Note: Scores range from -2.5 to 2.5 based on people’s confidence in the rules of society (i.e. property rights, law enforcement, the courts, crime and violence).

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Table 5. Polity VI 2007 Score Canada 10 France 9 Germany 10 Italy 10 Norway 10 Russia 5 Saudi Arabia -10 Singapore -3 UAE -8 US 10 Source: Data from Marshall and Jaggers 2010. Note: Countries are ranked on a 21-point scale from +10 to -10, with 10 being a fully institutionalized democracy and -10 being fully institutionalized autocracies.

Table 6. Aggregate regime score Score Canada 9.4 France 7.9 Germany 9.2 Italy 7.4 Norway 9.5 Russia 4.4 Saudi Arabia 3.7 Singapore 6.4 UAE 4.7 US 8.9 Note: Countries are given a score of 1 to 10, 10 indicating the most liberal political regime. These scores are based on converting the Freedom House, Transparency International, ICRG, Polity IV and World Bank scores discussed above to a ten-point scale and aggregating them.

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Table 7. Visa requirements Sending countries Top ten Of these, countries whose citizens must have a visa Canada United Kingdom, China, India, Italy, United States, Hong China, India, Philippines Kong (China), Philippines, Germany, Poland, Portugal France Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Tunisia, Germany, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Belgium, Vietnam Turkey, Vietnam Germany Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Italy, Greece, Poland, Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, Portugal Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia Italy Morocco, Albania, Romania, Philippines, China, United Morocco, Albania, Philippines, States, Serbia and Montenegro, Senegal, Germany, Sri Lanka China, Serbia and Montenegro, Senegal, Sri Lanka Norway Sweden, Denmark, United States, Iraq, Pakistan, United Iraq, Pakistan, Serbia and Kingdom, Germany, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vietnam Herzegovina, Vietnam Russia Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Moldova Saudi Arabia India, Egypt, Pakistan, Philippines, Bangladesh, Yemen, All Indonesia, Sudan, Jordan, Sri Lanka Singapore Malaysia, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan, United States, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong (China), Canada Bangladesh, Hong Kong (China) UAE India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Philippines, Jordan, All Bangladesh, Yemen, Iran, Sudan US Mexico, Philippines, Germany, India, China, Vietnam, Mexico, Philippines, India, China, Canada, Cuba, El Salvador, United Kingdom Cuba, El Salvador Sources: Data from World Bank 2008; Kapiszewski 2006; United States Passport and Travel Visa Services 2010.

Table 8. Maximum Length of Stay (days) Foreigners with a visa Foreigners without a visa Canada 180 180 France 90+54 90 Germany 90+ 90 Italy 90+ 90 Norway 90+ 90 Russia 90 90 Saudi Arabia 30 180 Singapore 30 90 UAE 30/9055 180 US 180 90 Source: United States Passport and Travel Visa Services 2010. Note: Maximum stay with a business or tourist visa. Foreigners who do not need a visa for business or tourist purposes usually need visas and/or work permits for longer stays.

54 The four European countries listed here use short stay visas for under 90 days and long stay visas for over 90 days. 55 A short stay visa to the UAE has a maximum 30 day duration, whereas a long stay visa has a 90 day maximum.

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Table 9. Citizenship Naturalization Jus soli citizenship Residency (years) Language requirement Canada Yes56 3 Yes France Yes 557 No Germany Yes58 8 Yes59 Italy No60 1061 No Norway No62 763 No Russia No 664 Yes Saudi Arabia No 565 — Singapore No 1066 Yes UAE No67 3068 — US Yes 569 Yes Sources: Data from United States Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service 2001; Avermaet 2009; Goverment of the Russian Federation 2002. Note: The jus soli principle confers citizenship on anyone born the soil of a particular country, regardless of ethnicity or the citizenship of parents.

56 There are some exceptions: children of diplomatic personnel and those who are illegally residing in Canada are not afforded citizenship. 57 Residency requirements are shortened if a person has a degree from a French university or has rendered important service to the country. Residency requirements are waived for exceptional service including military service, or in certain family circumstances. 58 As long as at least one parent has lived in Germany for at least eight years according to 2000 law. Prior to 2000, Germany did not allow naturalization to non-ethnic Germans. 59 In some lander 60 Exceptions are made for children born in Italy to unknown parents who remain until their 18th birthday at which point they may request citizenship. 61 The residency requirements are abbreviated for those with familial ties (3 years), nationals of the European Community (4 years), and refugees, adopted children and those who have rendered service to Italy (5 years). 62 Rare exceptions are made. An abandoned child receives citizenship automatically. 63 Nationals of Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden are only required 2 years residency. There is also an abbreviated residency period for foreigners who have married a Norwegian citizen. 64 This includes 5 years of permanent residence, which must be preceded by 1 year of temporary residence. 65 This is a minimum requirement and does not guarantee citizenship will be granted. 66 Marriage to a Singapore citizen shortens the residency requirement to 2 years. 67 Exceptions are made for children born to unknown parents. 68 These requirements are reduced for citizens of Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain (3 years) and citizens of Arab descent (7 years). 69 The residency period is reduced to 3 years for those married to a US citizen.

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Table 10. Work permits and labor market tests Work permits70 Required for all Quota or Employer-specific? foreign workers? labor market test? Canada Yes Yes Labor Market Test France Sometimes71 No72 Labor Market Test Germany Yes No Both73 Italy Sometimes74 No Both75 Norway Sometimes76 No Both77 Russia Sometimes78 Yes Quota Saudi Arabia Yes79 —80 Quota81 Singapore Sometimes82 Yes Both UAE Yes — Both US Sometimes83 Yes Both Sources: Baker and McKenzie 2008; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2008; European Migration Network 2008; Fasano and Goyal 2004; Government of the Russian Federation, Federal Law #115 2002; Human Rights Watch 2006; International Organization for Migration 2008, 109; Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 2010; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, International Organization for Migration and International Labour Office 2006; Singapore Ministry of Manpower 2009; Singapore Ministry of Manpower 2010; United States Diplomatic Mission to Italy 2009. Note: Employer-specific work permits do not allow foreigners to change places of employment without first leaving the country. Quotas place numerical caps on foreign workers, whereas labor market tests require employers to prove there is no native worker available to do the job in question.

70 Work permits either as a visa or in addition to a visa (i.e. in the US, the work permit is the work visa, whereas in Russia a work permit is required in addition to a visa). 71 Short term work/residence permits are tied to an employer, though in some circumstances, transfers may occur and in other cases, employees may be contracted to a third party. 10 year residence permits allow freedom of work. 72 Citizens of EEA (European Economic Area) countries are exempted in France, Germany, Italy and Norway. 73 Germany uses a quota for some sectors including IT and contract work. 74 Usually the process of getting a work visa requires an application by the employer, though sometimes foreigners are allowed to enter Italy in order to look for work if they are financially self-sustaining. Self-employment is also allowed. 75 Italy uses a quota system for non-EU citizens. 76 Norway has different rules for foreign workers in each sector of the economy. In most cases, a foreign worker works for a single employer but in some cases work can be divided among several employers. Self employment is also allowed. 77 Norway uses quotas for some skilled workers. 78 Work permits for CIS citizens are not tied to a specific employer. All other foreign workers are given work permits based on an invitation system that only allows employment with the inviting employer. 79 Transfer to a different employer is allowed, but requires a formal process involving consent of the current employer. 80 GCC citizens are exempted from entry visas, though there is nothing to indicate they are exempted from work permit procedures. 81 The quota systems in Saudi Arabia and UAE, rather than putting a specific limit on foreign workers, require that a certain percentage of nationals are employed in various sectors. 82 There are a number of different classifications for foreign workers in Singapore, some of which strictly forbid changing employers, freelancing or self-employment (work permit) and others of which can be transferred (employment pass, personalized employment pass , S pass). 83 Canadian citizens, for example, can obtain a work visa when crossing the border if they are one of a number of skilled professions.

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Table 11. Freedom of movement Residence permits (for temporary Registration at a Freedom of movement status)84 particular address violations documented Canada No85 — — France Yes86 Yes — Germany Yes87 Yes88 — Italy Yes No — Norway Yes89 No — Russia No90 Yes Yes Saudi Arabia Yes — Yes Singapore No — — UAE Yes — Yes US No No91 — Sources: Baker and McKenzie 2008; Bonar n.d.; European Employment Service 2009; Government of Canada 2010; Government of the Arab Emirates 2006; Human Rights Watch 2009a; Polizia di Stato 2008; Singapore Government 2010; United States Department of State 2009c; United States Diplomatic Mission to Germany 2009.

Table 12. Immigration regime and political regime compared Immigration regime Political regime Canada Open 9.4 France Open 7.9 Germany Moderate 9.2 Italy Moderate 7.4 Norway Open 9.5 Russia Moderate 4.4 Saudi Arabia Closed 3.7 Singapore Moderate 6.4 UAE Closed 4.7 US Moderate 8.9 Source: Table 6 in chapter two Note: Political regimes are scored from 1 to 10, 10 indicating the most liberal political regime.

84 Residence permits as a document separate from visas (i.e. the Canadian temporary residence visa is not included here, whereas in Russia there is a temporary residence permit in addition to the visa, which is tabulated as a residence permit). 85 Canada requires a temporary residence permit only in a select few circumstances including criminal and medical inadmissibility. 86 For stays of 3 months or longer, a provisional residence permit is granted, followed by a one or three year permit. 87 Required for non-EEA citizens staying longer that 90 days. 88 For stays of longer than 90 days. 89 For stays of longer than 90 days. 90 Russia has temporary residence permits as an interim step toward permanent residency, though the permits are not required in general. 91 However, foreigners in the US must file changes of address within 10 days of moving residence.

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Table 13. Ethnic profiling as a measure of institutional xenophobia Over- Religious Police Raids and Failure to Discrimination Mass policing92 discrimination brutality searches93 investigate in courts detention abuse and/or deportation Canada Yes — Some Yes Yes Yes Yes France Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes — — Italy Yes — Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Norway — Some — — — — — Russia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Saudi Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Arabia Singapore — No — Yes — — Yes UAE Yes Yes Some Yes Yes Yes Yes US Yes — Yes Yes — — Yes Sources: Data from Bajer 2010; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008; Centre for Research-Action on Race Relations (CRARR) 2009; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009a, 2009b; Gulf News 2003; Hamalengwa 2003; Hari 2009; Human Rights Watch 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009c; Migration News 1998; No One is Illegal 2009; Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants 2005; Open Society 2005, 2006; Open Society 2009; Rashid, Shaali and Kibble 2000; Reuters 1998; Sambidge 2008; Shah 2006; United States Department of State 2009d.

92 This includes a pattern of random or discriminatory id checks of migrants/minorities 93 Raids and searches focused on discovering illegal immigrants

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Table 14. Elite opinion Racist statements President or Cabinet Legislators Migration Justice Local leaders Other Prime Minister member officials officials elite Canada — Yes — — — Yes — France Yes Yes94 Yes Alleged95 — — — Germany — — Yes — — Yes Yes96 Italy Yes Yes Yes — Yes Yes — Norway — — Yes — — — — Russia — — Yes Yes Yes Yes — Saudi — — — — — — — Arabia Singapore — — — — — — — UAE — — — — — — — US — — Yes — — Yes — Sources: Data from Bastrykin 2009; Canadian Islamic Congress 2000; Connolly 2008; Craig and Shear 2006; Deželić 2008; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2005, 2006; Godoy 2009; Ha-Redeye 2009; Institute for Jewish Policy Research 1999; Lafitte 2010; Lerougetel and Lantier 2009; Owen 2009; Polevoi 2008; Rivera 2005; Rosello 1999; Tusiray 2008; Virtanen 2000; Weeks 2008; Whoriskey 2006; Zulueta 2009.

94 In this table, statements by Sarkozy are recorded both as president (2007-present, as of 2010) and cabinet member (2002-2007) opinion. 95 Interior minister Brice Hortefeux, a former migration Minister, was accused in September 2009 of making anti- Arab statements. As of 2010, he is on trial and faces up to a year in prison plus fines if found guilty. 96 In 2009, the director of the Central Bank, a former minister of finance in the Berlin city administration and leading member of the Social Democrat party, made anti-Muslim statements in an interview, saying Muslims in Berlin were only good at "producing more headscarf wearing girls."

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Table 15. Far right political party activity Representation of far right parties (2010) Party Active in Parliament Cabinet Local Local name(s) politics government legislature Canada Canadian No No No No No 97 Alliance France National Yes No No Yes Yes Front Germany National Yes No No No Yes Democratic Party Italy Northern Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes League Norway Progress Yes Yes No Yes Yes Party Russia Liberal Yes Yes No Yes Yes Democratic Party, Communist Party Saudi Arabia — — — — — Singapore No No No No — UAE — — — — — US Constitution Yes No No No No Party Sources: Data from Alvarez-Rivera 2008, 2009, 2010; Chrisafis 2009; Day 2009; The Economist 2009; Laruelle 2009a; Moore 2008; Ruypers 2005; Samuel 2010; Spiegel 2008; Statistics Norway 2009.

Table 16. Representation of migrants in the national media Portrayal of migrants Includes coverage of Criminals Public Stereotyped Migrant Right-wing Prosecution health abuse activities of internet risk racism Canada Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes France Yes — Yes Yes Yes Yes Germany Yes — Yes Yes Yes Yes Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Norway Yes — Yes Yes Yes Yes Russia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Saudi Arabia Yes — — Yes — — Singapore No — — Yes — Yes UAE — — — Yes — — US Yes — Yes Yes Yes Yes Sources: Data from Ali-Kahn 2010; Ansari 2008; Anti Defamation League 2001; Associated Press 2008; Bailey 2005; Bastrykin 2009; Bloomberg 2010; Committee to Protect Bloggers 2008; Crested Journal 2005; Daly 1999; Deutsche Welle 2005; Edwards 2010; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2003, 2004, 2005,

97 The Canadian Alliance Party operated as a far right party until 2003, when it merged with the Conservative Party in order to attract centrist voters.

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2009b; Fleras 2005; Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 2005; Hamalengwa 2003; Henry and Tator 2000; Human Rights Watch 2007; Ibrahim 2005; Ignatova 2008; Laachir 2007; Luzhkov 2006; Moshkin 2009c; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2009; Pulya 2009; Rahman n.d.; Reddy 2010; Rivera 2005; Rühl and Will 2005; Sova Center 2010a; Spiegal 2008; The Vancouver Sun 2010; Vargas and dePyssler 1998; Wilson 2008.

Table 17. Public opinion regarding immigration We should further restrict immigration agree Disagree Canada 62% 35% France 68% 31% Germany 66% 33% Italy 87% 10% Norway 56%98 42%99 Russia 72% 23% Saudi Arabia — — Singapore — — UAE — — US 75% 23% Sources: Data from Pew Research Center 2007; Statistics Norway 2003.

Table 18. Hate crimes statistics Statistics compiled by

Government NGOs Number of deaths (year)100 Canada Yes Yes 1 (2006) France Yes Yes 1 (2002) Germany Yes Yes 3 (2000) Italy Yes Yes 5 (2002-2003) Norway Yes Yes 1 (2001)101 Russia No102 Yes 50-109 (2005-2009) Saudi Arabia No No — Singapore No No — UAE No No — US Yes Yes 2 (2008)103

98 In response to the question “do you believe it should be more difficult to obtain a residence permit?”. 99 37% believe no policy changes should be made. 5% believe policies should be less restrictive. 100 The data relies on a number of secondary sources and thus reports the most recent available data. 101 1st racial killing in history 102 The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) collects statistics on extremist crimes, which include crimes motivated by ethnic or religious hostility (Borinov 2010). However, many ethnically motivated crimes are classified as “hooliganism” by the MVD and therefore the data are skewed. 103 Excludes crimes motivated by religion or sexual orientation

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Sources: Data from BBC 2002; Dauvergne, Scrim and Brennan 2008; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2005; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2008; Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 2005; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2009; Rivera 2005; Rühl and Will 2005; Sova Center 2010a.

Table 19. Xenophobia and immigration regime compared Level of xenophobia Immigration regime Canada Moderate Open France Moderate Open Germany Moderate Moderate Italy High Moderate Norway Moderate Open Russia High Moderate Saudi Arabia High Closed Singapore Low Moderate UAE High Closed US Moderate Moderate Source: Table 12 from chapter 3.

Table 20. Immigrants in Russia Work permits issued Illegal migrants Quota In Russia In Moscow In Russia104 As a portion of the total (Moscow) (to CIS migrants) (to CIS migrants) (in Moscow) migrant population (in Moscow) 2005 — 702,500 239,500 5,297,500 88% (343,700) (68,800) (760,500) (76%) 2006 — 1,014,000 355,500 4,986,000 83% (537,700) (149,000) (644,500) (65%) 2007 6,000,000 1,717,000 482,900 4,283,000 71% (750,000) (1,152,800) (195,000) (517,100) (52%) 2008 3,400,000 2,426,000 623,200 3,574,000 60% (300,000) (1,780,000) (313,000) (376,800) (38%) 2009 2,000,000 1,473,000 327,000 4,527,000 75% (250,000) (1,181,000) (673,000) (67%) 2010 1,300,000 — — 4,700,000105 78% (200,000) (800,000) (80%) Sources: Data from Federal Migration Service 2010; Goskomstat 2009; Ivakhnyuk 2009b; Rosbalt-Moscow 2010.

104 These estimates are calculated based on a static number of 6 million migrants on the Russian Federation territory at any given time and the conservative figure of 1 million migrants in Moscow. 105 This is a projection based on the quotas for 2010

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Table 21. Costs and benefits of legality in Russia Illegal status Process of legalizing Costs Benefits Costs Benefits Migrant Fear of police Avoid taxes Fees (minimum of 1180 Access to labor (harassment, arrest, rubles; up to 7000 rubles rights and deportation, etc.) Bypass bureaucratic if using an intermediary) protection procedures Potential cost of bribes 56% tax

Possibility of forced Does not ensure labor employer will register work/pay taxes Employer Potential fines Cheap labor Taxes Avoid fines

Potential cost of bribes Fines can often be Potential cost of bribes to avoid fines bypassed by offering bribes Enduring bureaucratic procedures Sources: Data from Human Rights Watch 2009b; International Crisis Group 2010; International Labor Organization 2009; Shcharbakova 2009b; Ivakhnyuk 2009a, 2009c; Zayonchkovskaya 2007a.

Table 22. Migrants in the workforce Migrant workers as a portion of total workforce (percent) Canada 19% France 6% Germany — Italy 3% Norway 7% Russia 3% Saudi Arabia 51% Singapore 44% UAE 98% US 13% Sources: Data from LABORSTA; Martin and Widgren 2002; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, International Organization for Migration and International Labour Office 2006; Shah 2008; Tyuryukanova 2008.

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Table 23. Migrants and the informal economy Corruption Shadow Illegal migrants 106 Economy Score Rank As a portion of Estimates As a portion of official GDP (thousands) total immigrant (percent) population (percent)107 Canada 8.7 8th 15.2 35-120 0.5-2% France 6.9 24th 14.5 200-400 3-6% Germany 8.0 14th 16.8 500-1,500 5-15% Italy 4.3 63rd 25.7 200-1,000 8-40% Norway 8.6 11th 18.4 18 5% Russia 2.2 146th 48.7 5,000-10,000 75% Saudi Arabia 4.3 63rd 19.7 400-4,000 6-63% Singapore 9.2 3rd 13.7 6 0.3% UAE 6.5 30th 27.8 250 8% US 7.5 19th 8.4 11,900 31% Sources: Data from Al-Omari 2008; Emirate News Agency 2007; Jandl 2003; Ottawa Citizen 2007; Passel and Cohn 2009; Reid 2007; Rijpma and Pastore 2009; Schneider 2004a; Smol'yakova 2008; Steenstrup n.d.; The Straits Times 2009; Transparency International 2009; Vazhdaeva 2007; World Bank 2008.

Table 24. Change in immigration regime due to informal practices Immigration regime openness Canada Open France Open Germany Moderate Italy Moderate↓ Norway Open Russia Moderate↓ Saudi Arabia Closed↓ Singapore Moderate↓ UAE Closed↓ US Moderate↓ Note: Down arrows are used to indicate countries whose immigration regime openness is negatively impacted because of informal practices.

106 Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index gives countries a score of 1-10 (10 being least corrupt) and ranks 180 countries from least to most corrupt. 107 These figures are based on estimates of illegal immigrants from country specific sources divided by total immigrant population figures provided by the World Bank.

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Table 25. Overview of the Russian immigration regime: inputs and outputs 1990s 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Those who 43% 49% 58% 54% 53% 53% 53% 50% 55% 57% 54% subscribe to the view “Russia for Russians” Victims of 268 468 588 707 575 347 hate crimes Important Moscow Putin Terrorist Moscow Beslan Kondopoga Moscow events apartment elected attacks in theatre school Metro bombing, the US siege by siege by bombing by (September Chechen Chechen Chechen 11) separatists separatists separatists (October) leading to 2nd Chechen war Estimates 95% 5,297,500 4,986,000 4,283,000 3,574,000 4,527,000 4,700,000 of illegals (88%) (83%) (71%) (60%) (75%) (78%) (% of total migrant population) Legislative FMS create FMS FMS New Quotas Quotas Quotas changes as an dissolved recreated migration decrease decrease decrease independent within the legislation (3.4 (2 (1.3 body of the Ministry touted as a million) million) million) executive of Internal liberalization branch Affairs; of (1992); policy procedures policy shifts for CIS Introduction focused on toward citizens of patents (a resettlement combating (initial quota bypass of of ethnic illegal of 6 million) quotas for a Russians migration monthly with fee) debated Federal Law #115 (July) Freedom partly partly free partly partly free partly free partly partly free not free not free not free not free not free House free free free Sources: Data from Sova Center 2010a; Levada Center 2009; Freedom House 2009.

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