FORUM Th e politics of aff ect Perspectives on the rise of the far-right and right-wing populism in the West

Sindre Bangstad, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, and Heiko Henkel (eds.) With Douglas Holmes, Don Kalb, Nitzan Shoshan and Cathrine M. Th orleifsson

Abstract: Th is article is based on the transcript of a roundtable on the rise of the far-right and right-wing populism held at the AAA Annual Meeting in 2017. Th e contributors explore this rise in the context of the role of aff ect in politics, ris- ing socio-economic inequalities, racism and neoliberalism, and with reference to their own ethnographic research on these phenomena in Germany, Poland, Italy, France, the UK and Hungary. Keywords: inequality, neoliberalism, politics of aff ect, right-wing populism, the far-right

For the American Anthropological Association Ahmed 2004; Massumi 2015; Mazzarella 2017; (AAA) Annual Meeting in Washington, DC, 29 Navaro 2017; Papacharissi 2014; Skoggard and November to 3 December 2017, we organized Waterston 2015; White 2017). By invoking “the a double panel on anthropological perspectives politics of aff ect” in this context, we have as on the rise of far-right and right-wing populism conveners and editors meant to signal our view in Europ e and the United States. Th e overall aim that the current political tide, which to a var- of organizing these panels was to shed light on iegated extent, but nonetheless signifi cantly what anthropology and ethnography may con- across many nation-states across Europe and the tribute to our understanding of these phenom- Americas, combine the intertwining of neolib- ena. Featuring leading from eralism and right-wing populism, the mediated both sides of the Atlantic, the second of these politics of a Debordian “society of the specta- two panels analyzed the question of what role cle,” and an “outrage industry,” in some pro- inequality have played and continue to play in found senses make a break with the post–World the rise of these social and political formations. War II, liberal illusions (or indeed, delusions) Th e anthropological and other scholarly lit- about rational and deliberative democratic poli- erature on aff ect is by now voluminous (see, e.g., ties. Th is of course raises the perennial question

Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 83 (2019): 98–113 © Stichting Focaal and Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/fcl.2019.830110 Th e politics of aff ect | 99 as to whether it was ever thus, so we also want are as anthropologists of course predisposed to to make it clear that “the politics of aff ect” in think that anthropology and anthropologists do our view has long historical genealogies, that have something unique to contribute to these it has always been central to all kinds of polit- debates, not the least in the form of the detailed ical mobilizations in the name of “the popular knowledge and insight into ordinary people’s will” and “the people” left or right, and that it lives, ideas, and behaviors that other disciplines has even played a central part in providing the may not always provide us with. grounding for the Western liberal politics of the Whatever the reasons for this may be—and post–World War II era which now seem an in- anthropology’s generally liberal, left -of-center creasingly distant memory. orientation and predisposition to study people But we live in an age in which political an- we “like” (Bangstad 2018) comes to mind as pos- ger seem to have returned with a vengeance sible vectors here—we did fi nd a paucity of rele- (Mishra 2017). Across several nation-states in vant anthropological research on these matters. Europe and the United States, right-wing pop- Arlie Russel Hochschild (2016) may be right ulism has recently thrived in the context of ris- to speak of this as a proverbial “empathy wall” ing socioeconomic inequalities within Western that prevents us from engaging in seriousness nation-states, the likes of which the world has with the life-worlds and worldviews of far-right not seen since the Gilded Age of the early twen- and populist right-wing supporters. With a few tieth century (Piketty 2014). But the fact that exceptions (Teitelbaum 2017), anthropologists far-right and right-wing populism have proved across the world generally seem to have reacted perfectly amenable with neoliberalism and cor- with a profound sense of unease or even out- porate-plutocratic elite interests on both sides of right hostility to the rise of far-right and right- the Atlantic should give us pause to refl ect crit- wing populism in Europe and the United States. ically on the widespread liberal political science Th at sense of unease or hostility, which we as notion (see, e.g., Müller 2017 and Mudde and organizers admit to sharing, is no excuse to us Kaltwasser 2017) of an intrinsic link between devoting attention to these phenomena, and right-wing populism and “anti-elitism” and the people attracted to and by them (Shoshan claims to speak for “the interests of ordinary 2016). people.” As any other social and political phenome- non, the rise of far-right and right-wing popu- Sindre Bangstad: Welcome to this second of lism in Europe and the United States must be two roundtables at this year’s AAA Annual analyzed in their particular historical and cul- Meeting that we have organized in order to tural contexts, and requires multicausal and shed light on what anthropology and ethnog- interdisciplinary approaches and explanations. raphy may contribute to our understanding of It must therefore be stated at the outset that we the rise of far-right and right-wing populism in as organizers do tend to think of the diff erent Europe and the United States. We fi rst started emphases of these two roundtables—(1) what’s planning this at last year’s AAA Annual Meet- culture got to do with it? and (2) what’s inequal- ing in Minneapolis, having been struck by the ity got to do with it?—as pragmatically artifi cial inevitable corridor and panel talk in the wake in the sense that we do not subscribe to either/ of ’s presidential election victory or propositions when it comes to exactly where merely a week before this. One year on, there the analytical emphases should be and that we has of course been a virtual torrent of analysis, hope and encourage our participants and you but it is still very much the case that public and in the audience to think of these emphases in academic debates on this have featured political conjunction, rather than in opposition, and to scientists and sociologists in the most promi- conceive of these two roundtables as speaking nent roles, rather than anthropologists. Yet, we to each other. 100 | Sindre Bangstad, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, and Heiko Henkel

As organizers, we will not off er introductory highly educated technocratic elites in many so- textbook defi nitions of what far-right and right- cieties, as well as a sense of being threatened by wing populism is and is not, or off er any intro- demographic decline; loss of status and power ductory analysis of what relationship far-right in the face of immigration, which populist and right-wing populism stand in in particular right-wing leaders across the world have made contexts, but rather leave it to our roundtable sure to link discursively to radical Islamist ter- panelists to hopefully provide specifi city, con- rorism; and feminism. Th ough a proportion textualization, and clarity with regard to some of white voters without college degrees clearly of these matters. Th e documentary fi lmmaker played a decisive role in Trump’s election vic- Michael Moore famously characterized the tory in the swing states (Lamont et al. 2017), election of Trump as the “greatest ‘fuck you’ in we know of course very well from any number US history,” and we would suggest that a uni- of analyses that the idea that the “white work- fying factor in the rise of far-right and right- ing class” explains Trump’s election victory is a wing populism in Europe and the United States myth (Gusterson 2017). But it is of course a con- is a “politics of aff ect” that once more unsettles venient myth, especially in center-liberal circles, ideas about politics being a domain of reasoned since it provides an opportunity for these very democratic deliberation based on facts. From same center-liberal circles to continue to stig- the extensive anthropological literature on af- matize “white working-class” people as “deplor- fect, we also know that aff ect is social through ables” (Isenberg 2017) to defl ect attention from and through (Skoggard and Waterston 2015). the worlds made by neoliberalism since the One of the best anthropological monographs 1980s, and center-liberals’ part in their making, ever written by nonanthropologists is to my and to avoid talking about the fact that the rise own mind James Agee and Walker Evans’s me- in socioeconomic inequality continue to aff ect ticulously detailed and self-refl ective account minorities and immigrants to a much greater of the lives of poor white sharecroppers in De- extent than white working-class people. pression-era Alabama in their 1941 classic Let According to economists, we are now in a Us Now Praise Famous Men. Of George Gudger, “Second Gilded Age,” in which socioeconomic Agee writes: inequalities within Western societies have not been so marked since the age of the Rockefel- Th e only deeply exciting thing to me lers, the Vanderbilts, and the Carnegies in the about Gudger is that he is actual, he is liv- mid-war era. Th is is, as demonstrated by the ing, at this instant. He is not some artist’s work of Th omas Piketty (2014), the result of or journalist’s or propagandist’s invention: conscious decisions made by economic and po- he is a human being: and to what degree litical elites since the time of the “neoliberal rev- I am able it is my business to reproduce olution” (Hall 2012) under Margaret Th atcher him as the human being he is; not just to and Ronald Reagan. For all our knowledge about amalgamate him into some invented, lit- the damage this does to the very social fabric erary imitation of a human being. (Agee of our societies (Desmond 2016; Putnam 2015), and Evans [1941] 2006: 212) and for all our talk about opposing it, this de- velopment shows no sign of abating, even in the Central to many mainstream liberal accounts advanced Scandinavian welfare states in which of the rise of far-right and right-wing populism we as organizers happen to live. Th ere are, not in Europe and the United State have been the the least here, more-than-suffi cient signs to idea of its appeal to the fabled “white working conclude that right-wing populism has become class” marginalized by globalization and dein- yet another useful instrument for an endlessly dustrialization and left with a sense of political adaptive capital (Fassin 2018). Here, there is in disempowerment by the political domination of fact a US-European convergence: though right- Th e politics of aff ect | 101 wing populists represent themselves as the Nitzan Shoshan: Earlier this year, I received an “voices of ordinary people,” the actual practice invitation from the German Academic Exchange of right-wing populists in power, whether in Service (DAAD) to participate in an “election Hungary, Norway, or the United States, is oft en observer tour,” an intensive 10-day journey of a close alignment with corporate and plutocratic expert panels, street campaigning, rallies, and interests (Pierson 2017). Is it the naissance of meetings with candidates, members of parlia- fascism? (Holmes 2016). Our panelists are likely ments, journalists, and party strategists, cul- to disagree on this, but there it at least a demon- minating in election day—a tradition to which, strable historical precursor in that the rise of for many decades, the DAAD has invited inter- fascism in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s was national experts on Germany. Toward the end in fact underpinned by several tactical alliances of the journey, in Berlin’s Prenzlauer Berg, we between corporate elites and an accommoda- visited the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) tion with conservatives (Paxton 2006). house, an extensive space divided into thematic Th e debate about how to understand the re- exhibits that combined audiovisual content, in- lationship between “race” and class, racism and teractive interfaces, and artistic installations to inequality in the rise of far-right and right-wing boast of the party’s achievements and chart its political formations has been particularly hard future path. One dome-shaped room allowed in the United States in the past year. It suffi ces visitors to project their names and what Europe here to note the intense debate on the academic meant for them on a night sky ceiling. Some left over Ta-Nehisi Coates’s (2017) latest book, of my international companions approached for which he has been accused of ignoring class the console, typed their names, and selected a in favor of “race.” With David Roediger (2017), word that, for them, represented Europe: un- we conceive of “race” and class as being co- derstanding, tolerance, integration, hope, and imbricated and mutually constitutive. It is in so on. One of our German escorts, a CDU voter this context of course important to note the in her mid-forties, seemed particularly eager to very diff erent permutations and articulations get to the console and, when her turn came up, of “race” past and present in Europe and the she scrolled down to the word Heimat, home- United States. But it seems quite clear that far- land or home in the sense of belonging. A Hei- right and right-wing populism in both Europe mat constellation of stars fl ashed before us for and the United States draws on an extensive res- a moment, while the console thanked her, as it ervoir of racist and/or discriminatory attitudes did my Indian, Brazilian, Turkish, and Egyp- toward immigrants and marked minorities— tian colleagues before her: “You are a part of and in particular. Europe.” Due to our tight schedule, I could not In this roundtable, we ask what the rise of linger to watch or talk to other visitors. From inequality in particular—but also other fac- the CDU house, we headed to a polling station. tors—has to do with the rise of far-right and It was housed in a school, where three science right-wing populism, and how this might be labs on the ground fl oor hosted polling booths, connected to the “politics of aff ect” reenergized a handful of offi cials, and the fl ags of Berlin, the by the general disillusionment with and despair Federal Republic of Germany, and, again, the over mainstream liberal politics and political EU. and economic elites. Is neoliberalism, globaliza- Together with the politics of aff ect in Eu- tion, outsourcing, and deindustrialization what rope, oft en attributed to right-wing nationalism we should be looking at in trying to understand and populism, I’d like to suggest we must also all of this? And what is the relationship between consider the politics of aff ect of Europe. Th e right-wing populists, corporate and plutocratic notion of Europe itself and the orchestration elites, and the Far Right? I now leave the fl oor to of aff ective attachments of various sorts to its our roundtable participants. imaginary space have been central to political 102 | Sindre Bangstad, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, and Heiko Henkel discourse and electoral rhetoric in Germany Th is is the fi rst point or set of questions I and elsewhere on the continent, not only on the would like to put on the table. Th e second con- right-wing fringes or only in negative, Euro- cerns the question of where, as ethnographers, sceptic terms. It is notable that even a far-right we might fruitfully look for the politics of af- party such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) fect. To begin, I think we should look closely at has presented itself as pro-EU—if anti-euro. several common stories about far-right nation- Furthermore, it goes without saying that the alism that predominate political discourse and notion of Heimat, with which the CDU house academic debates alike in much of Europe, and sought to make available and to induce a certain have served to guide both the public eye and aff ective relation to the EU, has played a key part scholarly interest. Let me pause here on two of both in the rhetoric of established, moderate these in particular. parties and in the dramaturgy of belonging of Th e fi rst we might term “the encroachment the young right-wing extremists I knew in the story.” According to this narrative, right-wing fi eld. In the 2017 federal elections, the trope of extremist arguments penetrate mainstream, re- Heimat was present everywhere but nowhere spectable discourses and introduce malignant more prominently than in AfD propaganda. ideas that fi nd their way into electoral cam- Th us, the CDU deployment of Heimat and other paigns, legislation, policy, and the worldviews signifi ers in order to interpellate positive aff ec- of “ordinary people.” An anthropological per- tive attachments to “Europe,” whatever the lat- spective allows us to question this story. In the ter means (my Ukrainian, Russian, and Turkish fi eld, what gets classifi ed as political extremism colleagues did not appreciate their implied ex- and right-wing populism in fact oft en seems to clusion as “non-European”), allowed our Ger- emerge from ideological (under) currents that man chaperon to trace the continent—more elsewhere pass as innocently moderate. Th e to the point, the EU—as a scale of belonging, young right-wing extremists I knew revealed a home. themselves in their political outlook as not all Heimat serves here as a vortex that pulls in that diff erent from many of their compatriots. scales, slices and mixes them, at the same time At the level of policy, to take just one exam- that it indexes their diff erences. In today’s Eu- ple, we need only consider the British (or, as rope, I suggest, the continued relevance of Sindre oft en reminds us, Norwegian) response Heimat and belonging gets folded into the re- to the refugee crisis of 2015–2016—two Euro- lationship between the politics of aff ect and the pean countries whose governments at the time politics of scale: in the interstices, at the points most would not consider far-right populist— of friction and confl ict, and in projects that or the statements of socialist party boss Oskar seek to reconstitute social and political scales Lafontaine in favor of “processing” refugees in or manufacture new ones. Ethnography is per- northern Africa to see evident resonances with haps especially well equipped for apprehending the rhetoric of Trump or the demands of AfD. the contested production of aff ective scales as In electoral campaigns, the blatant nativism of social facts. Indeed, anthropologists have writ- AfD propaganda posters is purposefully de- ten about the reconfi guration of scales (of gov- signed for shock value. But the election fl ier of ernance, of belonging, etc.) in the process of the Greens candidate with whom I campaigned Europeanization. But how do these politics of for a day on the streets of a Bonn suburb in 2017 scale articulate with the politics of aff ect? And also proclaimed that her family had lived there how do they reshape nationalism in general from time immemorial. What political purpose, and the Far Right more particularly? What ex- we might ask, does this story of encroachment periments in the aff ective politics of scale can serve? How, in our research, might we avoid we observe within nationalisms in Europe and becoming complicit with its political agenda? beyond it? How can we examine the limits and disruptions Th e politics of aff ect | 103 of the commonsensical narrative to rethink our mobilized and linked up with far-right political vocabulary and develop concepts that, rather imaginaries and agendas is an urgent challenge than entailing a separation between the extreme for anthropology. To do so, we should consider and the mainstream, will help us fi nd the former not only perceptions of loss but also expecta- as already in the latter, as emerging from it and tions, hopes, and aspirations—in brief, aff ective rooted in it? attachments to certain futurities—as well as Th e second story will be familiar to most of their correlates, fear and hate. Th e links between the participants in this panel. We might term such futurities and right-wing nationalism are it “the lumpen story.” According to this story, neither direct nor self-evident. It is precisely far-right nationalism is an affl iction of the dan- the sorts of aff ective politics that link the two gerous classes, the disaff ected, the vulnerable, that today demand new explanations. To begin to the lure of its aff ective politics. Th us, we hear to face this challenge, it seems to me that we of the depressed cities in northern France, the will need to attend to broader discourses and stagnant towns of eastern Germany, or the wider national publics in which the state, for deindustrialized landscapes of the Midwestern one, participates and which it propagates and United States as the grounds where all sorts of incites (think here, for example, about the near hate can be harvested with relative ease. Yet, we universality of the political discourse of fear, or, know, too, that the lumpen story is only a par- in many European countries, of the wall-to-wall tial explanation, and only in certain cases, for political mobilization of tropes of autochthony). the emergence of xenophobic nationalisms both today and historically. It was not the poorest Don Kalb: My work on this stems mainly from voters but rather the middle- and upper-middle the early 2000s. We as were classes that handed Trump his triumph (Henley there very early. It is perhaps still useful to re- 2016; Statista 2016). Th e AfD candidate I met mind everybody that this is not a new topic for in Leipzig was the owner of a small hotel, and us: we were early, we saw it very realistically his rhetoric evoked German middle-class con- and clearly, and we projected from there. I re- servatism—Spiessigkeit—rather than underclass fer here to the work of Douglas Holmes (2000), resentment or the revolutionary, national so- Jonathan Friedman (2003), Andre Gingrich and cialist rhetoric of the National Democratic Party Marcus Banks (2006), and me (Kalb 2002, 2009; (NPD) activists I had known in the fi eld. Kalb and Halmai 2011), among others. Th e lumpen story entails several risks. On Last week I was at the Fudan Institute for Ad- the one hand, it is complicit with various other vanced Studies in Social Sciences in Shanghai, commonplace idioms that, especially under and they wanted to know about illiberalism in processes of neoliberalization, have criminal- Europe. I told them: it’s the rise of China, stu- ized the poor and have blamed the socially mar- pid! Of course, if you say something like that, ginalized for all kinds of social ills. On the other it needs a lot of explanation, but you all under- hand, however, the correlate of the criminaliza- stand there must be a basic truth there, that it tion of the poor appears in the lumpen story as may require more specifi cation, but that you the victimization of the Far Right, of xenophobic have a world-level clue there that is relevant for nationalism as a sort of politics of the oppressed. a whole set of correlations. I open with this in Rather than viewing far-right nationalism as a order to make a point about how anthropology straightforward class issue, we could do better, can matter in conversations about the rise of the for example, by speaking of processes of dispos- Right. We usually retreat at once and say: we session, as Don Kalb (Kalb and Halmai 2011) can do fi eldwork and we can bring cases. Th at is and others have done, in which the perception true, and we need to do that, but it cannot be the of loss produces certain political eff ects. Under- whole story, because, if so, we are out of the fur- standing how such processes become aff ectively ther conversation. Now, of course I do not want 104 | Sindre Bangstad, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, and Heiko Henkel to suggest it is all reducible to the rise of China. emergent New Right of a claim for the protec- Th is statement is about modes of theorization, tion of social rights by the state. What I take to which is an important topic for us, also in rela- be the New Right at the moment in Europe are tion to making future projections of what might everywhere national socialist right wings. Th ey happen, of the wider process we are in, and for claim the protection of the welfare state for the sticking out our neck. I am not saying we need national majority and for people of their own to do it exactly like I do, but rather we need to be kind, and they use the invocation of fear of all a little bit bolder about theory and aspirations sorts to establish it. Viktor Orbán and Poland toward theory, daring to universalize our in- are the purest examples. But even, for example, sights and projecting them forward in terms of the Dutch New Right, which started out with process, time, and space; this is certainly some- immigrant assimilation as the key demand in thing we should learn better. We need to rise the early 1990s, began under the racist Geert above the single case. Comparison is useful. But Wilders to make ever more explicit pro-welfare- we should be ready to push beyond that. state claims for autochthonous citizens. Th ey So, in retrospect, it is not surprising at all were actually becoming electorally stronger that, in a period in which capital’s globalized when they emphasized such claims more explic- reach extended tremendously, popular sover- itly than the Th ird Way social democrats were eignty—and in particular, those historical po- willing to do. litical forces, political formations, in which the Now what matters, I think, is that for us as claim for popular sovereignty was most starkly anthropologists, it is of crucial importance that invested, that is, social democracy in the broad we fi nd ways to shift the public conversation. sense of the term, and in all its national variet- First, we should learn to be more historically ies—would necessarily be squeezed. We do not informed and versatile about the notion of the need to be surprised about that. It’s all in the “commons.” Th is is not just a nice, contempo- equation. So, in the end, the rise of the Right rary, left -wing idea but deeply embedded in is really not the issue. In the end, the real issue, European and colonial histories with strong analytically, is the collapse of social democracy, conservative and indeed sometimes viciously and therewith of liberalism, and perhaps the right-wing connotations and possibilities. Th e eclipse of the Left more generally, though we New Right is about the making of a particu- also see important popular eff orts at revitaliza- lar, deeply hierarchical sort of commons, not tion, along with those on the Right (see Kalb an equal and open one, a starkly bounded and and Mollona 2018). I heard a lot about left and ordered one. Th e Right is not just, as some- right yesterday. But we should not overlook the times seems the case in the United States, about fact that the New Right is not the old post-1945 privatization. Second, we should shift the con- European dirty fascism anymore. Th ey have re- versation toward class rather than the mere incorporated the rich left -right amalgamations technical data on inequality—class is a very of earlier pre-1933 fascisms. I am thinking, for complex thing. And class is not just about work- example, of the National Socialism of Ernst ing classes; it is about multilevel power relation- Strasser or the Action Française. I say National ships in the context of capitalist globalization. Socialism very explicitly here. But I do not think Of course, capital is about relationships, but it immediately about the Holocaust: it could also is also about oligopolies, rent-takers, about new be Salazar in Portugal, and it is certainly Mus- forms of hierarchy, et cetera. Since national solini in 1923. states have become overly indebted everywhere, What has happened aft er 1989—or perhaps the state itself has become a rent-taking kind of a little bit earlier, in the case of France, for ex- actor. Our lives are basically drenched with sets ample, where the electoral rise of the National of class-like relational mechanisms (see Kalb Front starts in the 1980s—is the embrace by the 2015). If we talk about class and livelihoods Th e politics of aff ect | 105 and not just the Gini coeffi cient, we talk about about the defense of status, of “traditional” basic social reproduction, on the everyday and rights. Th is deeply anxious status production the longer term, which is exactly what the New of working classes who imagine themselves as Right is doing and what the social democrats, middle classes because they are educated, they beholden to expert economics as they are, fail are homeowners, and they have always done ev- to do. We need to really appropriate that vision: erything the state told them to do, is what we livelihoods, social reproduction. need to get a hold on. Polanyi, again, is useful Is this about ethnography? Well, the answer paradoxically precisely because he was never is yes, in a way. A stimulating example is Kristof clear about the exact mechanisms that produced Szombati’s (2018) deeply informed processual counter-movements. Th e countermovement ethnography of the rise of the anti-gypsy New could be driven by the Right or by the Left , and Right in Hungary. He shows how important it is he couldn’t anticipate or explain which. Th is in a dynamic predicament such as ours to actu- suggests that a renewed conversation between ally see processes over time and space happen- Marx, Weber, and Polanyi could be extremely ing. We want to see changes in livelihoods and helpful for our present purposes. In a context in class-like mechanisms that structure liveli- of the globalization of capital, it becomes ever hoods and territories, the skin-close modes of more impossible for labor and social democracy dispossession that they are fi ghting within and to actually bargain with capital. It is ever less against. Th is is not just about experiences in possible to actually enforce any imagined so- and of life: it is also about how these experi- cial contract. In other words, the movement of ences become publicly signifi ed in the context capital clashes ever harder with acquired status of the rise of the Right and contentious politics. and with expected public promises of protec- Margit Feischmidt told us yesterday that, right tion, as well as with modal, expected livelihood now, if you talk to people in southern Hun- trajectories. And so class is turned into culture, gary close to the border of Serbia, they would and hierarchy comes forcefully on the agenda smoothly reproduce the discourse of fear and again. of being overwhelmed by immigrants that Or- bán has been feeding them. Th is, in a situation Cathrine Th orleifsson: I arrived in Washing- where there are basically no immigrants. Politi- ton, DC, yesterday. I was born in DC and must cal process can be extremely powerful, and it is say I am absolutely astonished that US President not just originating in the local places where we Trump has retweeted a British neo-fascist vigi- do fi eldwork. Spatiotemporal improvisation is lante group just two days ago. I fi rst came across asked for—in methodology and in writing. this paramilitary vigilante group called Britain I want to leave you with this: In terms of the- First during my fi eldwork in the English town orization, we need to creatively reengage with of Doncaster in 2015 where its leader, Jayda the links that connect and separate Marx, We- Fransen, was patrolling the streets searching for ber, and Polanyi. At a deeper level, the things we “criminal Muslims and gypsies.” Leaders from are talking about today are class confrontations the party had claimed that 2015 would be “the in complex muted ways that happen and artic- year of and the United Kingdom ulate diff erently in diff erent spaces, by variable Independent Party (UKIP),” proclaiming “the institutions, based on diff erent prehistories. But UKIP at the ballot box and Britain First on the they do happen to work more or less in sync streets.” While the UKIP leaders I interviewed and are deeply interconnected, diff erent faces strived to disassociate themselves from the fas- of the same phenomenon. In my work, I have cist Right, Trump brought them to the limelight. emphasized Marx, but Weber is also important I will return to the importance of transnational because this is not just about people within and mobilization shortly, but fi rst I will briefl y out- against capital accumulation only; it is as much line my research methodology and questions. 106 | Sindre Bangstad, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, and Heiko Henkel

In 2014, I began a project on comparative eth- the 2004 enlargement of the EU. Th e part of so- nographies of neo-nationalism, entailing fi eld- ciety recovering from its dependence on heavy work among the supporters of politicians of the industry felt fearful and vulnerable in the face of populist radical Right in the United Kingdom a new economic reality where they had to com- and Hungary. Over the course of fi ve months, pete with cheap labor from elsewhere. So, long- I did multisided fi eldwork among leaders and term existential insecurity coupled with rapid supporters of the UKIP and the Hungarian Job- demographic change were conducive to the bik—parties that represent opposite poles or repositioning of identity politics. In Doncaster, diff erent ideological types and “degrees” (Pau- community and self-forming symbols had for wels 2011) of the radical Right. Conducting generations been tied to an industrial culture. In fi eldwork in multiple settings, from party con- the space left by the dissolution of industrialism ferences to the more intimate registers of every- competing scale-making projects over recogni- day life, I explored the local conditions and set tion, resources and belonging played out. of circumstances conducive to the growing sup- Some of my interlocutors, in particular those port for the radical Right. from the older generation, were united in a nos- And to the question we discuss today—as to talgia for the “good old days” and hoped a vote whether inequality matters—well, my short an- for Brexit would bring back the security tradi- swer would be “yes.” For supporters of the rad- tionally aff orded to them by the virtue of their ical Right I got to know in two postindustrial Britishness, Englishness, and invisible white- towns, many were “left behind” by processes of ness. Th ey felt alienated from a Labour Party globalization and experienced deep economic they claimed had embraced a progressive con- insecurity. However, still I suggest that appeal of sensus and the “champagne-socialist” political populist nationalism propagated by the radical elites in and Brussels who had forgot- Right cannot be reduced to one single driving ten the interest of the “ordinary” people. While factor (culture or economy) but must be ana- the average profi le of a UKIP voter is predomi- lyzed in relation to how grievances associated nantly working class, white, male, and over the with actual or perceived economic and cultural age of 55, the party attracted not only voters dislocation are racialized and how diff erentiated from this group. A minority of working-class others are turned into convenient scapegoats for Sikh and Hindu voters supported the party’s an- societal ills. ti-immigration agenda, both as a form of nos- Today, I will focus on the UKIP case study. talgia for the British Empire and to secure their When I embarked on fi eldwork in Doncaster in position within the British class and racialized May 2015, the party had just obtained a quarter hierarchy of belonging. Others were anxious of the votes in traditional Labour Party land, so about the alleged “Islamifi cation” of Europe, a it went from 4 percent to 25 percent. To under- concern they share with supporters of radical- stand why the radical Right could obtain such right parties elsewhere. fi gures in traditional Labour land, one needs Off ering a nationalist solution, the UKIP to look at changes occurring the past three de- eff ectively tapped into the grievances of the cades. In the late 1980s, Doncaster was a town dispossessed communities, addressing the post- of 18,000 people. In the early 1990s, the boom- industrial cultural, economic, and racial anxiet- town turned rapidly into bust as most of the coal ies related to fast change. Moreover, the party mines shut down due to Th atcher’s neoliberal re- structured feelings about one’s future drawn structuring program. And pit closures resulted from a nostalgically remembered industrial and in economic stagnation, deprivation, and spi- imperial past. It promised to restore the great- raling unemployment. In tandem with the pre- ness of the struggling town and to “bring back carization of labor, Doncaster underwent rapid jobs.” At the same time, UKIP politicians ap- diversifi cation processes, particularly following pealed to English nationalism, cultural heritage, Th e politics of aff ect | 107 religion, and civilization to portray migrants, in ing a queue of displaced Syrians accompanied particular from Muslim-majority countries, as with the title “Breaking point: Th e EU has failed existential threats to imagined sameness. us all” and the caption “We must break free of In September 2015, I did fi eldwork at the the EU and take back control of our borders.” UKIP’s annual conference in Doncaster, where Grounded in a nativist logic of a pure and in- they launched the Brexit campaign. UKIP leader nocent civilization in danger, the UKIP Brexit claimed that Labour was “no voice campaign eff ectively nurtured imaginaries of for the workingman,” and to massive applause, hordes of foreigners who would overrun Europe he entered the stage to the Swedish rock band and Britain, among them “rapists” and “ISIS Europe’s “Th e Final Countdown” refl ecting the terrorists.” Moreover, mobilization of violent message of the conference titled: “Out of the imaginaries of refugees and migrants served to EU and into the world.” At the conference, I fol- reinforce the ethno-nationalist boundaries of lowed Raheem Kassam, Farage’s 28-year-old ad- the nation while strengthening the image of the viser. Kassam was headhunted by the far-right UKIP as the solution to the endangered West- editor to run Breit- ern, “Judeo-Christian” civilization. bart’s London offi ce. Kassam introduced me to Th e UKIP racialized and dehumanized mi- a female associate who worked for the Trump grants and minorities in the image of the “crim- campaign in California. A Trump campaigner migrant” other while simultaneously essential- at the UKIP conference is illustrative of the izing the (white) working class as representing close political ties in work across the Atlantic the “real and ordinary.” At the Brexit celebra- leading up to the Brexit victory and the Trump tions, Farage declared in a populist tone “a new presidency. Moreover, these transnational link- dawn and victory for the ordinary people,” ages and contacts were instrumental in terms framing Brexit as a victory for ordinary peo- of both forming issues and action strategies. ple’s fi ght against the establishment. Th e UKIP Bannon and Kassam advised both Trump and leaders moved the less educated working class Farage to focus on Muslim migration and the from the structural margins of the nation to its alleged threat from radical Islam. While local forefront in the image of its ethno-religious and kippers I interviewed in Doncaster primarily civilizational defender. And this seemed like expressed concern over the impact of rapid eco- a powerful draw for parts of the electorate in nomic and demographic change on their wel- Doncaster who struggled to reconstitute iden- fare and way of life, the party leadership ele- tities in a fast-changing world. vated and infl amed these grievances through a politics of fear that enforced ethno-religious Douglas Holmes: In late August 1987, I had stereotypes (Th orleifsson 2018). conversations with two minor political fi gures. Th e 2015 UKIP conference coincided in time Th ese were literally the fi nal interviews of a with the “refugee crisis,” functioning as a criti- proj ect that spanned the previous decade, a cal event the radical Right could exploit to bol- project set in the Friuli region of Northeast ster political support. Several talks consisted of Italy (Holmes 1989). I was very curious about scaremongering on the issue of the allegedly un- these two activists, but I expected little substan- controlled continuing arrival of nonindigenous tive from the conversations. What I overheard people to the United Kingdom. In a discourse were hints of a cultural politics that could not be confl ating displacement with crime, particular aligned along a simple right-left axis: a politics Muslim asylum seekers were framed as threats at odds with central assumptions of political life to the national identity and security. A few days of the late twentieth century. It was an inchoate before the Brexit referendum in 2016, the UKIP politics in which the boundaries between pol- exploited violent imaginaries of Muslim migrant itics and everyday life were blurred. Th at said, men. Farage posed in front of a poster depict- this strange way of knowing and experiencing 108 | Sindre Bangstad, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, and Heiko Henkel had an unsettling trajectory—a trajectory I had craft ed by means of an intricate division of labor not anticipated. that is continental in breadth and scope. Now we can give this activism a name: fas- In the 1980s and 1990s, I searched out idio- cism. It is fascism with distinctive contempo- syncratic and isolated political activisms. Th e rary features that are not fully or necessarily inquiry moved across three sites—again, North- congruent with its historical manifestation: a east Italy, the political and bureaucratic pre- confi guration of fascism with unusual and un- cincts of the European Parliament, and the ur- settling relevance for anthropology. ban districts of inner London—and with each In the late-1980s, I faced the following ques- episode of this research, the accretion of activ- tion: How could political activists who artic- isms toward fascism became increasingly ev- ulated a compelling series of ambitions and ident. What was broached tentatively in Italy aspirations—a politics that in many respects I was given a European cast in Brussels and Stras- admired—lead to something like fascism? Re- bourg and endowed with racist fury in London. stated, how could people who were (absolutely) Th e ethnographic details recapitulated below not fascist espouse a series of agendas that could have signifi cance for the present, for an under- animate something like fascism(s) of and in our standing of the political ecology of fascism. time (Holmes 2016)? I employed the concept of Now these activisms are pervasive; they are in- “integralism” to straddle this contradiction and tricately networked, drawing on shared ideas demonstrate how seemingly prosaic aspirations and practices that resonate across the continent. could metastasize to yield a European fascism From the vantage point of Europe, a continental (Holmes 2000, 2009). If what we are encoun- fascism is in the making, which maps on to key tering is indeed fascism, we must address one elements of historical fascism (Sternhell 1987). overriding question: How and why have the What we are faced with, however, is not a fas- most discredited ideas and sensibilities of the cism that is fully manifest (as yet) in a particular modern era—ideas that yielded the indelible state; rather, it is a radicalism that has a Euro- horrors of the twentieth century—become per- pean provenience (Holmes 2006). suasive, compelling even, in the new century Fascism in our time is emerging not as a (Holmes 2016)? single party or movement within a particular Over the past three decades, I have observed nation-state but as a dispersed or distributed how the fi gure who personifi es these aspirations phenomenon that reverberates across the con- shift ed from the violent, racist thug (and their tinent nested within the political and institu- sympathizers) impelled by fulminating hatred tional contradictions of the EU (Nolte 1966; to the far less obvious political fi gure who in- Stark 2011). Rather than focusing on a partic- creasingly occupies the middle of the political ularly group to determine whether it is “fascist,” landscape whose desires seem, at least initially, we must look at how these factions, movements, unremarkable. Specifi cally, I examined how mar- and parties are linked together, in cross-border ginal, self-limiting activisms were transformed coalitions and alliances (see also the current re- to sustainable popular movements nested in the search by Agnieszka Pasieka). If we do so, the project of European integration. My current aim political ecology of contemporary fascism and is to demonstrate how an ethnographic purview the intricate division of labor that sustains it are can provide a sustainable analytical approach: revealed. one that treats fascism as a heuristic device— Rather than extravagant public spectacles rather than an all-encompassing defi nition— exalting atavistic forms of leadership, what has capturing this phenomenon as it is taking form emerged is a recursive, screen-mediated fas- with all its fugitive features and contradictory cism that orchestrates—with the aid of bots and elements intact (Payne 1995: 3–19). Fascism is trolls—the ways of thinking, feeling, and expe- Th e politics of aff ect | 109 riencing of shadow publics networked in cyber And it looks like—it looks very much like—fas- space (Knorr-Cetina 1999). Via a ubiquitous cism. And it plays—it is able to experiment with technology, the intimate artifi ce of fascism is all these ideas of class, of race, of identity, in a being produced and reproduced at eye level, at- very, very—forgive me—creative way. Which is taining the features of mass movements capable obviously very troubling. So I think this actually of getting into the heads of a broad swath of the goes back to Don’s original work in the Neth- European public. erlands. And my original work in Northeast It- aly—we both stumble on a kind of struggle that Heiko Henkel: Th is provides us with an inter- does not fi t neatly into notions of “class strug- esting move from the fi rst panel to the second. gle.” Right, Don? And if something emerges out In the fi rst panel, I thought the tensions and the of that, if we realize that we both, simultane- diff erent approaches were much clearer, and ously, although we didn’t know each other at the now in the second, where I would have thought time, but something was becoming pervasive we would have much more of a controversy, across Europe—not just across Western Europe people are actually moving together. But I am but also across Eastern Europe—and that it was quite happy you two sort of now agree to talk a curious kind of background struggle that had about a neofascism in this context. I was quite never been fully acknowledged, and I think struck by Douglas saying, “Yes, we should talk some of that is feeding itself, and I think this is about this as fascism,” and clearly fascism is all why we are thinking this across many countries. about cultural identity and diff erence. And I think this is interesting, but I think when Don Don Kalb: Well, that is a very interesting point talked about fascism, he talked about something Doug is making. Let me be very short about maybe related, but also quite diff erent, and that this: so yes, while we were both discovering this is about escalating inequalities of capitalism. highly wired complex of mechanisms—insti- And are we—are you—talking about the same tutional mechanisms and relationships, sets of thing, or is that—can you maybe explain a little processes that are about constructing identities, bit, what you mean here when you say, “Yes, cer- and boundaries around the identities—my pri- tainly we all talk about the rise of fascism.” And mary concern, and that is why I called my book maybe the other panelists can step in and say, is Expanding Class (Kalb 1998), was that this was this the right vocabulary, or what is happening actually developing within an identifi able set of here? class contradictions over time that were unfold- ing; there was a logic there. So, my “expanding Douglas Holmes: I think there is nothing in- class” was about discovering class where you compatible about those two notions at all. Th e normally didn’t think it was. Th at is what I’m couple of other things we should look at, if we still doing. Th at’s also still what I think Doug is look at this: there was a very vigorous historical doing. We have a diff erent approach to the same scholarship that comes out of the 1990s about thing. So yes, I do not think it is diff erent at all the origins of fascism. Th e more you read about in the context of increasing class contradictions, it, the more unsettling it is. Th e more it looks and inequality if you like, but that is a very bleak like the present. And I think the thing that is term with which to talk about this. And again, it diff erent from my perspective is that we expect is about lived processes of a time and relational fascism to emerge and crystallize within one processes of a time, and you see relations can nation-state. I think we have a distributive fas- stretch globally, as you understand. cism that is unfolding across Europe, and if we Th e concern with—well, it is very much ac- look at the various parts of it, we can understand tually Siegfried Kracauer, and you know, the late the picture. Th at something is coming together. 1920s again. Th e concern becomes increasingly 110 | Sindre Bangstad, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, and Heiko Henkel one of redrawing boundaries and creating vis- millions of followers. So, we need to also then ible, institutionalized, state-regulated, state- examine these global fl ows of ideas. And look protected hierarchies, and statuses within these at, you know, the level between lived lives and hierarchies. In order to cope in a self-protective lived experience, and how then people might way with social chains, social change driven by sometimes also attach their lived experience to capital and used capital accumulation in which these global fl ows of ideas. So—is this fascism the control of our lives and the social reproduc- or is it not? I think it is—if you think of fascism tion of territories, of societies, et cetera, increas- in Roger Griffi n’s (1993) terms that a society has ingly slips from your hands, right? So that is the become decadent by the forces of globalization deeply fascist reaction, but it is also, let us say, and need to rise up from the ashes through na- the late Middle Ages, and the middle classes in tional purifi cation and rebirth, then obviously the late Middle Ages, and I mean, the Holy Ro- there are fascist elements in the ideology of man Empire was all about creating these sorts of some of these actors. But I think the interesting mechanisms, and the EU is not so much diff er- part is actually how the mainstream touches the ent from the Holy Roman Empire. extreme and vice versa. But it is happening in a context—and that is what I also wanted to emphasize with the point Don Kalb: What I liked very much about the about China—in a world context. Th is is en- panel yesterday was this move away from talking tirely new. Well, liberalism has not come to be about the extreme right. Because the whole con- the leading global ruling class ideology, right? cept of “the extreme” is a liberal political science Th at is falling apart. Th e post-1945 world is just context concept, and I think we increasingly talk evaporating like this. So it is not just Russia, or about, you know, “protectional majorities” rather just India; it is not just China. No, it is the sys- than “extreme black blocks” or these things. Th at tem as such that is dramatically changing. And is important, and in my own experience, when so, in other words, there are, let us say, very, very I was talking to people in the late 1990s and big global pressures toward the reinstituting of early 2000s in Poland, whom I deeply respected the classic dynamism. as persons, so these are not stone-throwing idiots—what I was when I was 20 years old— Cathrine Th orleifsson: Yes, well, I think that they were very respectable citizens. at the heart of the various nativist and populist formations is a very dystopic view of globaliza- Douglas Holmes: I think we thought of the tion. Fearing the erosion of national identity neo-Nazi in the United Kingdom as the skin- and sovereignty. And that is why it can have head. I think now the fascist is very much a some of these creative actors popping up and normal kind of fi gure that need not have a kind then using that language of neofascism to pro- of extravagant behavior or comportment of the vide us with cultural economic protectionism. fascism we imagined in the past. And again, if But I think we need to be very cautious in this you look at the history of fascism, there are re- sort of terminology because lots of the people spectable intellectual traditions that were feed- I worked with were far from—you know, they ing it. And that were in fact very close to what were not neo-fascists, they were actually artic- informs anthropological work. ulating their concerns related to material con- ditions, job insecurity, too many children and Nitzan Shoshan: Yes, of course, I agree com- grandchildren, and so forth. But then going pletely with this last comment by Douglas, and back to Jayda Fransen, suddenly you have a real I think in Germany it has been a very noticeable vigilante group, and a neo-Nazi one at that. A change of the far-right scene, and for a couple small, tiny group of 53 people, insignifi cant in of decades now, at least, the skinhead is not a every respect, but that gives traction online with prototypical far-right person, and people in the Th e politics of aff ect | 111

United States are recognizing that these people we see that, coming from the economic right, do not dress and walk and talk so diff erently and sort of moving slowly left . How—so again, from others. Th is is something that Germans it brings me to my question, the question for me and Europeans have been struggling with for a is—how economic processes become meaning- bit longer. So, I am not going to talk too much ful? How are they interpreted socially? How are about fascism versus neofascism, which is an- they socially mediated, and how are they polit- other term that might help us maybe capture ically orchestrated? And that is what we need some of the diff erences, too, but these are defi - to focus on—beyond the economic processes nitional issues; we are not going to get into that. themselves, which could result in a whole range I think it is important to think, in relation to of scapegoats, or not. And who the scapegoat fascism, and the rise of fascism historically, that is, that is not a given in advance, so, you know, the roots may have been there, the political cir- I am thinking just in Germany right now, you cumstances played an important part, the eco- cannot compete with this example; it is the nomic circumstances played an important part, most successful, these were the most successful but the other thing that played a huge part is the federal elections for the far-right in a time in a rise of mass media. And I think if we want to Germany that is as prosperous as it has not been think beyond questions of race, class, econom- for decades. So, that is where the economic de- ics, about what is happening in the world today, terminism is problematic. we need to think about what’s happening with mass media today. It has changed. If we want Sindre Bangstad: I would thank all our distin- to think about the dangers of fascism in the guished panelists, not only in this roundtable but United States, for example, we all need to think also in yesterday’s roundtables. Th is is part of an about neutrality and what that means for mass initiative that we hope to develop. On behalf of media nowadays. I think that is an important us as organizers, we’ve done this with every in- point that is usually not talked about too much. tention of using this platform for publications. And the other thing is that I am a bit hesitant So, the fi rst agenda would be a special forum, toward—fascism, to me implies, especially early which we hope to see materialize over the next on, a strong socialist component. I am not sure year. Let me also take the opportunity to thank we are seeing that across the board in Europe all those who have contributed to this discus- today. I think about Germany—it is simply the sion from the audience. We certainly found a lot example I know best—but I think you can fi nd of these discussions, and the interactions with it elsewhere. Th ere has certainly been a move, a the audience, extremely productive. And fi nally, shift , to the socialist left of the far-right in the I think it’s fair to say we never thought we’d get aft ermath of reunifi cation in order to appeal to to a point where we could, sort of, conclude sensibilities of social justice in former German with an absolutely shared consensus, but that Democratic Republic territories. And at the end was never the intention in the fi rst place. So, in of the day, the far-right hasn’t ever really made that respect, I think we must declare this a quite signifi cant political gains; the only gains are at successful event. state level and even that not for long. Th e AfD is a much more liberal-conservative economic party, and it is the third-largest party in Ger- many, with a platform that is relatively econom- Sindre Bangstad is Researcher at KIFO (In- ically liberal and right wing. So it is diffi cult to stitute for Church, Religion, and Worldview generalize about, at least about some of these Research) in Oslo. He has undertaken ethno- things. I am not saying there is not that aspect graphic fi eldwork among Muslims in Cape of it; certainly with the NPD we saw that, and Town and Oslo. Among his recent monographs with maybe the National Front to some extent are Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia 112 | Sindre Bangstad, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, and Heiko Henkel

(2014), Th e Politics of Mediated Presence: Ex- Coates, Ta-Nehisi. 2017. We were eight years in ploring the Voices of Muslims in Norway’s Medi- power: An American tragedy. New York: One ated Public Spheres (2015), and Anthropology of World Publishing. Our Times: An Edited Anthology in Public An- Desmond, Matthew. 2016. Evicted: Poverty and thropology (2017). profi t in the American city. London: Allen Lane. Fassin, Eric. 2018. Populism left and right. Chicago: Email: [email protected] Prickly Paradigm Press. Friedman, Jonathan, ed. 2003. Globalization, the Bjørn Enge Bertelsen is Professor in the De- state, and violence. Boulder, CO: Altamira Press. partment of at the Uni- Gingrich, Andre, and Marcus Banks, eds. 2006. versity of Bergen. His research includes political Neo-nationalism in Western Europe and beyond: anthropology, egalitarianism, cosmology, and Perspectives from social anthropology. New York: urban Africa. Recent books include the mono- Berghahn Books. graph Violent Becomings: , Soci- Griffi n, Roger. 1993. Th e nature of fascism. London: ality, and Power in Mozambique (2016) and the Routledge. edited collections Crisis of the State: War and Gusterson, Hugh. 2017. “From Brexit to Trump: An- Social Upheaval (2012), Violent Reverberations: thropology and the rise of nationalist populism.” Global Modalities of Trauma (2016), Critical American Ethnologist 44 (2): 209–214. Hall, Stuart. 2012. “Th e neo-liberal revolution.” Anthropological Engagements in Human Alterity Cultural Studies 25 (6): 705–728. and Diff erence (2016), and Mozambique on the Henley, Jon. 2016. “White and wealthy voters gave Move: Challenges and Refl ections (2019). victory to Donald Trump, exit polls show.” Th e Email: [email protected] Guardian, 9 November. https://www.theguardian .com/us-news/2016/nov/09/white-voters-victory- Heiko Henkel received his PhD from Princeton donald-trump-exit-polls. University in 2004. His dissertation and sub- Hochschild, Arlie Russel. 2016. Strangers in their sequent work explored elements of the Islamic own land: Anger and mourning on the American tradition, especially the form and signifi cance right. New York: Th e New Press. of formal and informal rituals. He currently Holmes, Douglas R. 1989. Cultural disenchantments: works on the entanglements of national civic Worker peasantries in Northeast Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. traditions, governmental regimes, and religious Holmes, Douglas R. 2000. Integral Europe: Fast- traditions in Denmark and across Europe. As capitalism, multiculturalism, neofascism. Prince- Director of Studies of the Department of An- ton, NJ: Princeton University Press. thropology at the University of Copenhagen, he Holmes, Douglas R. 2006. “Nationalism-integralism- is also interested in curriculum reform and the supranationalism: A schemata for the 21st future of anthropology. century.” In Handbook of Nations and Nation- Email: [email protected] alism, ed. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar, 285–298. London: Sage Publications. Holmes, Douglas R. 2009. “Experimental identities (aft er Maastricht).” In European Identity, ed. References Peter Katzenstein and Jeff ery Checkel, 52–80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Agee, James and Walker Evans. (1941) 2006. Let us Holmes, Douglas R. 2016. “Fascism 2.” Anthropology now praise famous men. London: Penguin. Today 32 (2): 1–3. Ahmed, Sara. 2004. Th e cultural politics of emotion. Isenberg, Nancy. 2017. White trash: Th e 400-year New York: Routledge. untold history of class in America. New York: Bangstad, Sindre. 2018. “Doing fi eldwork among Atlantic Books. people we don’t (necessarily) like.” Anthropology Kalb, Don. 1998. Expanding class: Power and everyday News, 21 February. https://anthrosource.onlineli- politics in industrial communities, the brary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/AN.584. 1850–1950. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Th e politics of aff ect | 113

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