ABS-CBN vs. CA 301 SCRA
Facts: In 1992, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, through its vice president Charo Santos-Concio, requested Viva Production, Inc. to allow ABS-CBN to air at least 14 films produced by Viva. Pursuant to this request, a meeting was held between Viva’s representative (Vicente Del Rosario) and ABS-CBN’s Eugenio Lopez (General Manager) and Santos-Concio was held on April 2, 1992. During the meeting Del Rosario proposed a film package which will allow ABS-CBN to air 104 Viva films for P60 million. Later, Santos-Concio, in a letter to Del Rosario, proposed a counterproposal of 53 films (including the 14 films initially requested) for P35 million. Del Rosario presented the counter offer to Viva’s Board of Directors but the Board rejected the counter offer. Several negotiations were subsequently made but on April 29, 1992, Viva made an agreement with Republic Broadcasting Corporation (referred to as RBS – or GMA 7) which gave exclusive rights to RBS to air 104 Viva films including the 14 films initially requested by ABS- CBN.
ABS-CBN now filed a complaint for specific performance against Viva as it alleged that there is already a perfected contract between Viva and ABS-CBN in the April 2, 1992 meeting. Lopez testified that Del Rosario agreed to the counterproposal and he (Lopez) even put the agreement in a napkin which was signed and given to Del Rosario. ABS-CBN also filed an injunction against RBS to enjoin the latter from airing the films. The injunction was granted. RBS now filed a countersuit with a prayer for moral damages as it claimed that its reputation was debased when they failed to air the shows that they promised to their viewers. RBS relied on the ruling in People vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs PNB which states that a corporation may recover moral damages if it “has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation”. The trial court ruled in favor of Viva and RBS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a contract was perfected in the April 2, 1992 meeting between the representatives of the two corporations. 2. Whether or not a corporation, like RBS, is entitled to an award of moral damages upon grounds of debased reputation.
HELD:
1. No. There is no proof that a contract was perfected in the said meeting. Lopez’ testimony about the contract being written in a napkin is not corroborated because the napkin was never produced in court. Further, there is no meeting of the minds because Del Rosario’s offer was of 104 films for P60 million was not accepted. And that the alleged counter-offer made by Lopez on the same day was not also accepted because there’s no proof of such. The counter offer can only be deemed to have been made days after the April 2 meeting when Santos-Concio sent a letter to Del Rosario containing the counter- offer. Regardless, there was no showing that Del Rosario accepted. But even if he did accept, such acceptance will not bloom into a perfected contract because Del Rosario has no authority to do so. As a rule, corporate powers, such as the power; to enter into contracts; are exercised by the Board of Directors. But this power may be delegated to a corporate committee, a corporate officer or corporate manager. Such a delegation must be clear and specific. In the case at bar, there was no such delegation to Del Rosario. The fact that he has to present the counteroffer to the Board of Directors of Viva is proof that the contract must be accepted first by the Viva’s Board. Hence, even if Del Rosario accepted the counter-offer, it did not result to a contract because it will not bind Viva sans authorization.
2. No. The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. No moral damages can be awarded to a juridical person. The statement in the case of People vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs PNB is a mere obiter dictum hence it is not binding as a jurisprudence.
G.R. No. L-66274 September 30, 1984 BAGUMBAYAN CORPORATIONv IAC
This case is about the customer's claims for moral and exemplary damages due to the alleged negligence of a waiter. The spouses Lelisa Seña and Arturo Seña and their four children went to the Tropical Palace Hotel, Parañaque, Metro Manila in the evening of December 20, 1976 to see the Reycard Duet Show they occupied a table and ordered drinks before the show the hall was crowded and as anyone who attended such show can attest, excitement and confusion prevailed (8, 40-41 tsn, January 19, 1978).
Lelisa's version was that when a waiter named Baez was going to serve the tray containing the drinks was overturned and fell on her. She was drenched. Later, she felt some chill. The drinks and the splinters from the broken glasses allegedly destroyed her dress which, with her handbag and shoes, cost one thousand pesos (32-33 tsn November 29, 1977).
She was shocked. She sensed that some persons were laughing at or pitying her. Lawyer Francisco Gatchalian, who was at the same table, commented that it was one of those unavoidable things (24 tsn November 29, 1977).
A waitress took Lelisa to the ladies' room. She had to remove her dress and underwear which were wet She was not given any towel to cover herself. She remained standing as there was no chair (27-28 tsn). Two of her daughters followed her to the ladies' room (31 tsn). She returned to the hag after about thirty minutes later when the show had started (28, 5152 tsn). The lower court erred in concluding that she missed the show.
Lelisa testified that she was claiming moral damages of P100,000 for herself and her husband due toembarrassment and the fact that the management did not even offer any apology on that night (34-37 tsn). She was claiming exemplary damages in the same amount to teach the management a lesson. The husband, Arturo Seta, testified that the incident infuriated him. There was no apology from the management. Rudy Tanchanco, the food and beverage manager, was one of three persons in charge of the show. He testified that the admission was on a "first come, first served" basis. An the waiters were extras performing under twelve supervisors. In open court, Tanchanco apologized to the plaintiffs in behalf of the management for the inconvenience caused to them, meaning that the management was sorry for what happened to Mrs. Seta (38-39 February 27, 1978).
The Señas sued the corporation, as employer of the waiter, for actual damages of P200,000 plus attorney's fees of P10,000 and such moral and exemplary damages as might be fixed by the court. The action involves a quasi-delict. It was based on articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
In fact, in its answer it apologized to the plaintiffs. It labelled the incident as a fortuitous event. It alleged that it observed diligentissimi patris-familias to prevent the damage. It reiterated that it was sorry for what had happened. It manifested its desire to make the proper amends in any reasonable manner or form.
After hearing, the trial court awarded the Señas P1,540 as actual damages consisting of the value of Mrs. Seña's outfit and P540, the cost of the six tickets used by the Seña family which was considered a loss because of their alleged failure to enjoy the show. It also awarded the Señas P50,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as exemplary damages and P5,000 as attorney's fees.
The corporation appealed. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the judgment with the modification that the moral and exemplary damages were reduced to P15,000 and P5,000, respectively. Hence, this appeal.
While the award for actual damages has some basis, the grant of moral and exemplary damages is devoid of legal justification because it was not predicated upon any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code (Ventanina vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811, 816). The Civil Code provides:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
The instant case is not specifically mentioned in article 2219 which refers to quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. The Appellate Court erred in considering it as analogous to the cases mentioned therein without indicating what specific case the instant case resembles or is analogous to. For example, an unfounded complaint with a baseless imputation of forgery is analogous to defamation mentioned in article 2219 (7). It justified an award of P2,000 as moral damages (Justiva vs. Gustilo, 117 Phil. 71).
Generally, there can be no recovery of moral damages if the case is not mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 (Malonzo vs. Galang, 109 Phil. 16; Ventanilla vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811).
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).
We hold that the "embarrassment" to which Mrs. Seña was exposed by the incident is not the mental anguish contemplated in article 2217 for which moral damages can be recovered.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is modified. The petitioner is ordered to pay Lelisa Seña the sum of P5,000 to cover her actual damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. The award of moral and exemplary damages is eliminated. No costs.
PEOPLE vs. MARIO BASCO
Facts: At around 8:00 in the evening of May 3, 1992, Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. was having a drinking spree with several men outside his home, at Cabangis, Tondo, Manila. Accused-appellant Mario Basco was with the group drinking beer. Emy, a cousin of the deceased arrived from work. Mang Lando, one of the men in the group invited Emy to have a drink, but he refused and told them that he would drink later on. Emy, however, noticed that accused-appellant Mario Basco was playing with a “balisong”, so he warned the latter about it and told him to put it away because it was “nakakailang”. Mario who was obviously a bit intoxicated retorted and said “Pare, gusto mo ba talaga ng biruan” and immediately approached Emy and poked the knife at the latter’s neck. Because of the sudden approach of accused- appellant and the slippery pavement, Mario slipped and Emy avoided the knife.[3] At this instance, the deceased Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. asked his other cousin Edong to help Emy, who was being attacked by accused- appellant. Edong then got a chair and was about to strike Mario when Mario’s wife arrived and pacified them. Mario, however, continued wielding the knife and accidentally hit Rolly, a son of Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. Seeing that his son was seriously injured, Rolando Buenventura, Sr. became angry and he cursed accused-appellant. A heated exchange ensued.[4]
At the height of the argument between the two, Jaime Macanas, a neighbor who was a policeman, came out of his house, just in front of the house of the Buenaventuras and fired two shots in the air to pacify the men. Then, Mario’s wife brought him home. Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. and Emy were left outside the house, but not for long, because Emy went inside the house to sleep.[5]
Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. on the other hand was called by Ednalyn, his daughter and Rolly, his son, to go inside the house and eat supper. When they were about to eat, accused-appellant Mario Basco came calling and cursing Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. Suddenly, accused-appellant was at the door of the Buenaventura house and when Rolando stood up to drink water, accused-appellant immediately shot him, causing him to fall to the ground. Accused-appellant fired another shot at Rolando, then he went nearer and again shot Rolando at close range, hitting him on the chest.[6] He died on the spot.
Held: First, it is an established fact that the deceased Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. sustained three gunshot wounds, as evidenced by the post mortem findings.
We agree with the trial court that if indeed accused-appellant and the deceased grappled for the possession of the gun, and the gun fell and accidentally fired, it is impossible that the deceased would sustain three gunshot wounds. The location and presence of several gunshot wounds on the body of the victim is physical evidence that eloquently refutes accused-appellant’s allegation of accidental firing.[11]
Second, Ednalyn Buenaventura, a daughter of the deceased, testified in a more credible manner than accused-appellant and witness Antonio Galvez for the defense, who conveniently stated that accused- appellant was unarmed when they met on the way to the house of deceased Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. The testimony of Ednalyn was clear and convincing, complete with details that jibed with the medico legal findings and testimony of other witnesses. We have held in many cases that “It is not to be lightly supposed that the relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they know to be innocent thereof.”[12]
Third, the trial court did not err when it found accused-appellant guilty of murder. Although evident premeditation could not be appreciated as attending the commission of the crime, it was evident that accused-appellant was motivated to commit murder when he went to the house of Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. When accused-appellant shot Rolando Buenaventura, Sr. the latter was eating supper with his children; he was unsuspecting and unaware of the intent of the accused. Accused-appellant, without a word suddenly shot the deceased, and almost immediately after the first shot, fired a second shot hitting the victim on the chest. Not satisfied and obviously to make sure that the victim was dead, accused-appellant approached and shot him at close range directly on the chest causing the bullet to pass thru and thru the body of the victim. This is a clear case of treachery employed by accused- appellant to ensure the accomplishment of his intent to kill Rolando Buenaventura, Sr.
Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. “For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted.”[13] Both elements attended the commission of the killing of Rolando Buenaventura, Sr.
Finally, as to the award of damages, we believe that the two species of damages (actual or compensatory and civil indemnity) differ basically in that civil indemnity ex delicto can be awarded without need of further proof other than the commission of the felony itself, while actual or compensatory damages to be recoverable must be additionally established with reasonable degree of certainty.[14]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award for loss of income in the amount of P100,000.00 is deleted.
PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO "TONY" SALONGAD E C I S I O N
For automatic review is the decision 'of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac finding Antonio "Tony" Salonga, Alfredo "Fred" Danganan, and Eduardo "Eddie" Danganan, guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659[1] and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death, in addition to ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, P83,900.00 as actual damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.
Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the judgment of conviction insisting that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution against them is insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They denied the charge and claimed that they could not have committed the crime of rape with homicide and interposed the defense of alibi.
Coming now to the penalty, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death since Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 provides that "when by reason or occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." Being a single indivisible penalty, the Court mandatorily applies the same in the light of Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code[32] and "regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime."[33] Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.
As to damages, the trial court awarded the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages, P83,900.00 as actual damages and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs of suit. In rape with homicide, the death indemnity was increased to P100,000.00 because the prevailing jurisprudence is that P50,000.00 for death and P50,000.00 for rape.[34] However, the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00[35] while the exemplary damages and attorney's fees are deleted for lack of legal basis and the award of actual damages is likewise reduced to P18,000.00.[36]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding the accused-appellant Antonio Salonga alias Tony, Alfredo Danganan alias Fred, and Eduardo Danganan alias Eddie, guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of DEATH and to suffer the accessory penalties provided by law is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused shall indemnify the heirs of the victim, P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P18,000.00 as actual damages.
G.R. No. 72828 January 31, 1989 Monzon v. IAC
This is a petition for review by way of certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court 1 to the end that damages and interests awarded petitioners be restored to their original amounts as adjudicated by the trial court and as originally affirmed in toto by respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in its main decision dated February 28, 1985.
Records disclose that prior to April 8, 1967, the Piper Aztec aircraft PI-C766, owned by Dole Philippines met a slight accident during a landing causing the bending of the blades of its left propeller. The pilot, Jose Quimpo, together with his companions, straightened the bent blades with the use of hammers.
On April 8, 1967, Quimpo brought the plane to the maintenance shop of respondent Theo H. Davies & Co., Far East Ltd. (Davies for short) at the Manila Domestic Airport. Thereupon, Emilio Narvaez, Davies' chief mechanic, repaired the damaged propeller by filing off by about 1/4 of an inch the tips of the blades thereat. After the repair, the plane continued to be used by its owner in the ordinary course of business.
On September 13, 1967, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, the deceased Arturo Monzon, with 5 others, including the pilot, Jose Quimpo, boarded the Piper Aztec PI-C766 at Dole's airfield in Polomolok, Cotabato. Shorthly after being airbone, the plane crashed, killing all the 6 passengers. The accident was caused by the loss while in flight of the plane's right head aileron, an essential part of the plane's control mechanism. As a result of the wrongful death, petitioners (widow and children of Arturo Monzon) filed a complaint on December 26, 1969 before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal against Dole and respondent Davies alleging wanton negligence, in violation of Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations and established aircraft industry practices on the part of private respondent and Dole. Dole entered into a compromise agreement with the petitioners while respondent Davies decided to proceed with the case.
The petition hinges on the propriety of the reduction of the award of damages and the exoneration of private respondent from the payment of interest on compensatory damages or compensation for unearned income.
We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
It is worth noting that Arturo Monzon, at the time of his death, was 40 years old and in good health. He left a widow and 8 children with ages from 5 to 19. He had a flourishing legal practice, specializing in taxation and was retained by a number of large companies. He had a total net income, as formally declared in his tax returns, P213,493.13 for the year 1967. Pursuant to the formula established and repeatedly applied by this Court (Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 511; Davila vs. Philippine Airlines, 49 SCRA 497; Abeto v. Philippine Airlines, 115 SCRA 389; Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 391), the loss of earning capacity (as provided for in Article 2206, New Civil Code) arising from the death of Arturo Monzon was computed by the trial court in the following manner:
Loss of earning capacity equals 2/3 x [80-40] x P 213,493.13 equals P5,691,726.84. (p. 9, Rollo)
Inevitably, We cannot disturb the findings of the lower court as to the amount of compensatory damages recoverable by petitioners for the same were in accordance with the law and jurisprudence. In trying to justify the reduction of damages, respondent court stated in its decision that plaintiffs- appellees (petitioners herein) previously asked for a lower compensation than in their later demand in the lower court However, respondent court failed to point out that the request was made "by way of amicable settlement." (p. 11, Rollo) Obviously, the complaint which was filed with the lower court subsequent to respondent Davies' refusal to enter into an amicable settlement would represent a higher amount.
We agree with respondent court in saying that life expectancy "fluctuates with several factors" (p. 72, Rollo) but it is for that very reason that a generally accepted formula cited earlier was established by this court in a long line of cases. Otherwise stated, while respondent court suggests that Arturo Monzon might have lived for less than 26.4 years more, or until the age of 66, there is also the possibility that he would have lived for much more than 26.4 years. Hence, the need of the formula by way of arriving at a logical and workable average. Furthermore, it would be most unfair and illogical for respondent court to have reduced the compensation due petitioners for the loss of the earning capacity of Arturo Monzon by discarding the well established formula by taking a pessimistic and depressed view of every situation instead of an average standard. Moreover, as a man grows older, and gains more experience, his income generally increases, with each passing year. Respondent court likewise premised the reduction of the amount representing the loss of earning capacity by more than 50 per centum to the fact the petitioners agreed to compromise with Dole where the latter paid One Million (P l,000,000.00) Pesos to the former in effect sustaining the claim of respondent Davies that the amount paid by Dole must be credited to its account. However, such position does not hold water. Respondent Davies and Dole are not joint tortfeasors. There was no evidence whatsoever that Dole was responsible with respondent Davies for quasi-delict, nor did respondent Davies pursue its cross-claim against Dole.
Similarly, respondent court erred in reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages to petitioners. While it is true that the amount of moral and exemplary damages may be discretionary upon the court, the circumstances attendant in the case at bar such as the wanton negligence of respondent Davies; its repeated violations of law and aircraft industry established practice; the social standing of the deceased and his heirs; and the present lack of purchasing power of the peso more than justify the restoration of the damages to the original amounts.
In this light, the pronouncement of the trial court in awarding moral and exemplary damages of P2,250,000.00 and P250,000.00 respectively is of equal importance:
Plaintiff Ramon Monzon estimates the sum of half a million peso for each of the plaintiffs for the extreme mental anguish and sorrow inflicted on them for the death of the deceased on whom they were dependent for support and maintenance and whose death suddenly necessarily deprived plaintiffs of his support and maintenance, consortium and companionship, as well as guidance, protection, care and comfort. Considering, however, that the compensatory damages awarded is already substantial, the Court believes that a reasonable figure for moral damages would be only P250,000.00 for each plaintiff." (p. 21, Rollo)
Thus, the flight of the widow and her eight (8) children resulting from the untimely death of Arturo Monzon present a case deserving of moral and exemplary damages.
Finally, the elimination of the interest on the various damages from the date of the filing of the suit was clearly unwarranted. It must be borne in mind that interest begins to accrue upon demand, extrajudicial or judicial. A complaint is a judicial demand.
WHEREFORE, We hereby REINSTATE the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court with the modification that the death indemnity of P12,000.00 is hereby increased to P30,000.00 conformably with recent jurisprudence (People v. Managquil, 132 SCRA 196).
Mendoza v. PAL
Facts: In the year 1948, appellant Jose Mendoza was the owner of the Cita Theater located in the City of Naga, Camarines Sur, where he used to exhibit movie pictures booked from movie producers or film owners in Manila. The fiesta or town holiday of the City of Naga, held on September 17 and 18, yearly, was usually attended by a great many people, mostly from the Bicol region, especially since the Patron Saint Virgin of Peña Francia was believed by many to be miraculous. As a good businessman, appellant, taking advantage of these circumstances, decided to exhibit a film which would fit the occasion and have a special attraction and significance to the people attending said fiesta. A month before the holiday, that is to say, August 1948, he contracted with the LVN pictures, Inc., a movie producer in Manila for him to show during the town fiesta the Tagalog film entitled "Himala ng Birhen" or Miracle of the Virgin. He made extensive preparations; he had two thousand posters printed and later distributed not only in the City of Naga but also in the neighboring towns. He also advertised in a weekly of general circulation in the province. The posters and advertisement stated that the film would be shown in the Cita theater on the 17th and 18th of September, corresponding to the eve and day of the fiesta itself.
In pursuance of the agreement between the LVN Pictures Inc. and Mendoza, the former on September 17th, 1948, delivered to the defendant Philippine Airlines (PAL) whose planes carried passengers and cargo and made regular trips from Manila to the Pili Air Port near Naga, Camarines Sur, a can containing the film "Himala ng Birhen" consigned to the Cita Theater. For this shipment the defendant issued its Air Way Bill No. 317133 marked Exhibit "1". This can of films was loaded on flight 113 of the defendant, the plane arriving at the Air Port at Pili a little after four o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, September 17th. For reasons not explained by the defendant, but which would appear to be the fault of its employees or agents, this can of film was not unloaded at Pili Air Port and it was brought ba to Manila. Mendoza who had completed all arrangements for the exhibition of the film beginning in the evening of September 17th, to exploit the presence of the big crowd that came to attend the town fiesta, went to the Air Port and inquired from the defendant's station master there about the can of film. Said station master could not explain why the film was not unloaded and sent several radiograms to his principal in Manila making inquiries and asking that the film be sent to Naga immediately. After investigation and search in the Manila office, the film was finally located the following day, September 18th, and then shipped to the Pili Air Port on September 20th. Mendoza received it and exhibited the film but he had missed his opportunity to realize a large profit as he expected for the people after the fiesta had already left for their towns. To recoup his losses, Mendoza brought this action against the PAL. After trial, the lower court found that because of his failure to exhibit the film "Himala ng Birhen" during the town fiesta, Mendoza suffered damages or rather failed to earn profits in the amount of P3,000.00, but finding the PAL not liable for said damages, dismissed the complaint.
To avoid liability, defendant-appellee, called the attention of the trial court to the terms and conditions of paragraph 6 of the Way Bill printed on the back thereof which paragraph reads as follows:
6. The Carrier does not obligate itself to carry the Goods by any specified aircraft or on a specified time. Said Carrier being hereby authorized to deviate from the route of the shipment without any liability therefor.
It claimed that since there was no obligation on its part to carry the film in question on any specified time, it could not be held accountable for the delay of about three days. The trial court, however, found and held that although the defendant was not obligated to load the film on any specified plane or on any particular day, once said can film was loaded and shipped on one of its planes making trip to Camarines, then it assumed the obligation to unload it at its point of destination and deliver it to the consignee, and its unexplained failure to comply with this duty constituted negligence. If however found that fraud was not involved and that the defendant was a debtor in good faith.
The principles which govern carriers by other means, such as by railroad or motor bus, govern carriers by aircraft. 6 Am. Jur., Aviation, Sec. 56, p. 33.
When Aircraft Operator is Common Carrier. — That aircraft and the industry of carriage by aircraft are new is no reason why one in fact employing aircraft as common-carrier vehicles should not be classified as a common carrier and charged with liability as such. There can be no doubt, under the general law of common carriers, that those air lines and aircraft owners engaged in the passenger service on regular schedules on definite routes, who solicit the patronage of the traveling public, advertise schedules for routes, time of leaving, and rates of fare, and make the usual stipulation as to baggage, are common carriers by air. A flying service company which, according to its printed advertising, will take anyone anywhere at any time, though not operating on regular routes or schedules, and basing its charges not on the number of passengers, but on the operating cost of the plane per mile, has been held to be a common carrier. It is not necessary, in order to make one carrying passengers by aircraft a common carrier of passengers that the passengers can be carried from one point to another; the status and the liability as a common carrier may exist notwithstanding the passenger's ticket issued by an airplane carrier of passengers for hire contains a statement that it is not a common carrier, etc., or a stipulation that it is to be held only for its proven negligence. But an airplane owner cannot be classed as a common carrier of passengers unless he undertakes, for hire, to carry all persons who apply for passage indiscriminately as long as there is room and no legal excuse for refusing. . . . 6 Am. Jur., Aviation, Sec. 58, pp. 34-35.
The test of whether one is a common carrier by air is whether he holds out that he will carry for hire, so long as he has room, goods for everyone bringing goods to him for carriage, not whether he is carrying as a public employment or whether he carries to a fixed place. (Ibid., Sec. 39, p. 99.)
Here, the contract of carriage between the LVN Pictures Inc. and the defendant carrier contains the stipulations of the delivery to Mendoza as consignee. His demand for the delivery of the can of film to him at the Pili Air Port may be regarded as a notice of his acceptance of the stipulation of the delivery in his favor contained in the contract of carriage, such demand being one of the fulfillment of the contract of carriage and delivery. In this case he also made himself a party to the contract, or at least has come to court to enforce it. His cause of action must necessarily be founded on its breach.
One can readily sympathize with the appellant herein for his loss of profits which he expected to realize. But he overlooked the legal angle. In situations like the present where failure to exhibit films on a certain day would spell substantial damages or considerable loss of profits, including waste of efforts on preparations and expenses incurred in advertisements, exhibitors, for their security, may either get hold of the films well ahead of the time of exhibition in order to make allowance for any hitch in the delivery, or else enter into a special contract or make a suitable arrangement with the common carrier for the prompt delivery of the films, calling the attention of the carrier to the circumstances surrounding the case and the approximate amount of damages to be suffered in case of delay. Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-11037 December 29, 1960 Cariaga v. LTB
At about 1:00 p.m. on June 18, 1952, Bus No. 133 of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. — hereinafter referred to as the LTB — driven by Alfredo Moncada, left its station at Azcarraga St., Manila, for Lilio, Laguna, with Edgardo Cariaga, a fourth-year medical student of the University of Santo Tomas, as one of its passengers. At about 3:00 p.m., as the bus reached that part of the poblacion of Bay, Laguna, where the national highway crossed a railroad track, it bumped against the engine of a train then passing by with such terrific force that the first six wheels of the latter were derailed, the engine and the front part of the body of the bus was wrecked, the driver of the bus died instantly, while many of its passengers, Edgardo among them, were severely injured. Edgardo was first confined at the San Pablo City Hospital from 5:00 p.m., June 18, 1952, to 8:25 a.m., June 20 of the same year when he was taken to the De los Santos Clinic, Quezon City. He left that clinic on October 14 to be transferred to the University of Santo Tomas Hospital where he stayed up to November 15. On this last date he was taken back to the De los Santos Clinic where he stayed until January 15, 1953. He was unconscious during the first 35 days after the accident; at the De los Santos Clinic Dr. Gustilo removed the fractured bones which lacerated the right frontal lobe of his brain and at the University of Santo Tomas Hospital Dr. Gustilo performed another operation to cover a big hole on the right frontal part of the head with a tantalum plate.
The Cariagas, as appellants, claim that the award of P10,000.00 compensatory damages to Eduardo is inadequate considering the nature and the after effects of the physical injuries suffered by him. From the deposition of Dr. Romeo Gustilo, a neurosurgeon, it appears that, as a result of the injuries suffered by Edgardo, his right forehead was fractured necessitating the removal of practically all of the right frontal lobe of his brain. From the testimony of Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, a psychiatrist, it may be gathered that, because of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo, his mentality has been so reduced that he can no longer finish his studies as a medical student; that he has become completely misfit for any kind of work; that he can hardly walk around without someone helping him, and has to use a brace on his left leg and feet.
Upon the whole evidence on the matter, the lower court found that the removal of the right frontal lobe of the brain of Edgardo reduced his intelligence by about 50%; that due to the replacement of the right frontal bone of his head with a tantalum plate Edgardo has to lead a quite and retired life because "if the tantalum plate is pressed in or dented it would cause his death. The impression one gathers from this evidence is that, as a result of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo Cariaga, he is now in a helpless condition, virtually an invalid, both physically and mentally.
We are of the opinion, however, that the income which Edgardo Cariaga could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB. At that time he was already a fourth-year student in medicine in a reputable university. While his scholastic may not be first rate (Exhibits 4, 4-A to 4-C), it is, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have passed the board test in due time. As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for the LTB, the amount of P300.00 could easily be expected as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he finished his studies. Upon consideration of all the facts mentioned heretofore this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the compensatory damages awarded to Edgardo Cariaga should be increased to P25,000.00.
Edgardo Cariaga's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees was denied by the trial court and is also not entitled to recover for attorney's fees, because this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
We agree with the trial court and, to the reason given above, we add those given by this Court in Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc.(101 Phil., 523, 530, 533):
A mere perusal of plaintiff's complaint will show that this action against the defendant is predicated on an alleged breach of contract of carriage, i.e., the failure of the defendants to bring him "safely and without mishaps" to his destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of defendant's taxicab that plaintiff used when he received the injuries involved herein, Gregorio Mira, has not even made a party defendant to this case.
Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiff's action in this case, is he entitled to compensation for moral damages? Article 2219 of the Civil Code says the following:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. x x x x x x x x x
Of course enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219 only the first two may have any bearing on the case at bar. We find, however, with regard to the first that the defendant herein has not committed in connection with this case any "criminal offense resulting in physical injuries". The one that committed the offense against the plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been already prosecuted and punished therefor. Altho (a) owners and managers of an establishment and enterprise are responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions; (b) employers are likewise liable for damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned task (Article 218 of the Civil Code); and (c) employers and corporations engaged in any kind of industry are subsidiary civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of their duties (Art. 103, Revised Penal Code), plaintiff herein does not maintain this action under the provisions of any of the articles of the codes just mentioned and against all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused, but as a result of an admitted breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does not come within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
The present complaint is not based either on a "quasi-delict causing physical injuries" (Art. 2219, par. 2 of the Civil Code
In the case of Cangco, vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We established the distinction between obligation derived from negligence and obligation as a result of a breach of contract. Thus, we said:
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially in the legal viewpoint from the presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection of supervision. Article 1903 is not applicable to obligations arising EX CONTRACTU, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to CULPA AQUILIANA' and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL.lawphil.net
The claim made by said spouses for actual and compensatory damages is likewise without merits. As held by the trial court, in so far as the LTB is concerned, the present action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage to which said spouses were not a party, and neither can they premise their claim upon the negligence or quasi-delictof the LTB for the simple reason that they were not themselves injured as a result of the collision between the LTB bus and train owned by the Manila Railroad Company.
Wherefore, modified as above indicated, the appealed judgement is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against appellant LTB.