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Traders, ties and tensions Wubs-Mrozewicz, Justyna Joanna

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Citation for published version (APA): Wubs-Mrozewicz, J. J. (2008). Traders, ties and tensions: the interactions of Lübeckers, Overijsslers and Hollanders in Late Medieval . s.n.

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Download date: 30-09-2021 Conclusions and Beyond: the Bergen Case as a Universe of its Own, or a Microcosm of the Hanse?

Foreign traders in Bergen were entangled in a complex (fish) net of ties and ten- sions. The net was vast and stretched over a long period of time. In some areas and periods it was lucid and fine-meshed, in others it was full of holes or tight knots. In this study, the employment of a larger corpus of source material than has been used in previous research, as well as the application of more specialised tools, has led to the first general conclusion that the relations between Lübeckers, Overijsslers, and Hollanders in Bergen were far more intricate than they appear at first sight. This complexity is both a novel and expected outcome of an extensive analysis which has knit together existing research with new empirical and analytical insights. The first step in this final chapter is thus to summarize the conclusions on the complexity of relations in Bergen. The second endeavour is to draw conclusions which uncover the core of the analysis – that grasp the gist of the relations of traders from Lübeck, Overijssel, and Holland. This approach sheds new light on the situ- ation in Bergen by focusing on this case study as a ‘universe of its own’. The an- nounced aim of this study has been to disentangle some of the ties and tensions which bound these traders into groups. More specifically, the analysis has revolved around the question which factors created or divided these merchants into ingroups and outgroups. Finally, the third stage is an attempt to infer the implications of these conclusions for the larger context. Can the Bergen case add an extra tier to our understanding the in general? This entails situating it within the context of the other Kontore, and examining the possibility of viewing Bergen as a ‘microcosm of the Hanse’.1

Complex Relations in Bergen

In each of the chapters of this study, topic-related and detailed conclusions have been drawn on a number of topics, including: the chronological development of, and changes in, trade-political relations; forms of administration, settlement, and the establishment of rules; particularities of trade with the most important goods on

1 Paraphrasing Dick de Boer on the case, see D.E.H. de Boer, ‘Brügge--Ostseeraum’, in: W. Paravicini e.a. (eds.) Hansekaufleute in Brügge. Teil 4: Beiträge der internationalen Tagung in Brügge April 1996 ( am Main 2000) p. 55. 246 traders, ties and tensions the Bergen market; and the manners and stages of conflict resolution. These chap- ters can be seen as multiple yet interconnected renderings of the past. In essence, the analyses show that the overall picture of relations was quite complex when re- garded from a long-term perspective, and that the view largely depends on the an- gle taken and the lens applied. The analysis in the two chapters on trade-political relations (I and II) reveals that even though these particular relations were the result of a lengthy process, they were rather stable.2 In the very beginning of the period examined, Lübeckers and traders from Kampen and received their rights both jointly and separate- ly. The sources do not suggest that they were competing groups. From about the middle of the fourteenth century, merchants from Lübeck and Deventer enjoyed mercantile liberties together under the vaguely defined ‘Hanseatic’ label, and with- in the Kontor structure. In a wider context, where the ‘Hanseatic’ marker was less pertinent, Kampen traders were also part of the same trade rights interest group at that time. The relations seem to have consisted of co-existence and cooperation in the acquisition and maintenance of trade rights, in the later period as well. In 1441 Kampen was officially (re)admitted to Hanseatic rights, and in the Bergen Kontor, and traders seem to have participated in the privileges there from the 1460s- 1470s at the very latest. In essence, the most important rights involved the exclusive (for foreigners) right of winter residence and royal support for grain import in the so-called credit sys- tem, which allowed Hansards to take the lead in the foreign trade of Bergen. No competition or lasting discord concerning this aspect of their existence in Bergen was recorded in the extant sources concerning the rest of the period analysed here. Therefore the relations can be primarily characterised as ties of co-existence and, at times, even cooperation. Concerning the trade-political relations between Hansards and Hollanders in Bergen, there appears to have been opposition be- tween the two groups from the moment Hollanders arrived in the 1430s. This was predominantly expressed in the Hanseatic sources, particularly regarding issues such as the extent of rights of the smallwares and retail trade, settlement, the num- ber of ships used, and privileges to trade outside of Bergen. Of the groups dis- cussed, it appears that in trade-political questions, both Lübeckers and Overijsslers followed the same policy and presented a united front against the Hollanders. However, it must be noted that the tensions were particularly high-strung from the 1470s to the 1490s (during political unrest in Scandinavia concerning the union of the kingdoms, and especially power in Sweden ), and from the 1540s to the 1560s (during the regalvanisation of the trade of Bergen burghers). For the rest of the pe- riod analysed here, trade-political opposition seems to have been latent. Contrary to some claims in older research, the Norwegian rulers did not methodically and continuously attempt to use Hollanders as a counterbalance to the Hansards, or

2 ‘The Ins and Outs of the Trade Politics of Lübeckers and Overijsslers: Privileges, Rights and Restric- tions’ and ‘Hansards and Hollanders: Rival Groups in Trade Rights?’. conclusions and beyond 247 rekindle competition between these groups by granting more advantageous rights to Hollanders. On the other hand, the analyses in the chapters on the organisation of life and trade in Bergen (III-V) have shown that in particular aspects, the relations between Lübeckers and Overijsslers were characterised by tensions.3 Some of the conflicts were brief. In the 1460s-1470s, frictions between Lübeckers and Overijsslers arose on the issue of participation in the central Kontor administration, which was large- ly dominated by Lübeckers at all times. Yet prior to the conflict and for the rest of the period analysed here, a consensus seems to have existed. There were no flagrant examples of recurrent disagreements concerning the settlement in Bergen between these two groups, ephemeral issues being the 1476 question of separate chambers for smallwares in the houses of Overijsslers, and a Wendish attempt to prevent Overijsslers from reconstructing their houses after a fire during the same year. Kontor debates concerning offences of Overijsslers in the credit system, surrepti- tious trade with Norwegians, the extensive employment of non-Hanseatic ships, and overall disobedience, were also most heated in this period. These instances of disharmony between Lübeckers (usually in their role as Kontor administrators) and Overijsslers have often been portrayed in research as representative for their re- lations in general, yet in fact they must have been exemptions from the rule, because most of the time all Kontor traders sought to co-exist, if not cooperate. Otherwise the foundations of the Kontor would have indeed been shaky and its existence would have been jeopardised, as Kontor traders frequently expressed themselves in the sources. The analysis of other mores and manners of the Kontor, which Over- ijsslers apparently embraced without further ado, strengthens the assumption that organisationally, ties prevailed over tensions. The analyses in the same chapters show that Hollanders in Bergen were organ- ised quite differently as a group with regards to administration, (winter) residence, settlement, and the (wellnigh lack of) rules which governed the group. As long as they did not interfere with Hanseatic business, these differences seem to have been of (almost) no interest to Hansards, and the groups co-existed organisationally. In aspects which were perceived as a threat, however, such as the question of the ex- tent and location of the Hollandish settlement, there was conflict and counteraction from the Kontor merchants. Again, it seems that Lübeckers and Overijsslers usu- ally shared similar views on Hollanders in Bergen, an exception being the matter of joint shipment, which Overijsslers pursued together with Hollanders from the end of 1440s and probably throughout the period analysed here. While for the Lübeck- ers (as Kontor administrators) this shipment was a necessary evil, and the resulting ties with Hollanders were meant to be avoided when possible, Overijsslers saw the practice as part and parcel of their own trade in Bergen. The joint shipment of goods turned out to be a remarkable example of Hanseatic-Hollandish cooperation

3 ‘Group Administrators’, ‘Summertime, Wintertime: Group Settlements’ as well as ‘Making, Breaking, and Bending Group Rules’. 248 traders, ties and tensions in Bergen. Moreover, it shows that the term ‘Hanseatic’ did not mean a uniform block in this respect. The examination of trade relations of the selected groups of merchants in Bergen through the lens of particular commodities, namely dried fish, grain products, tex- tiles and smallwares, has provided some surprising conclusions about their com- plexity (chapter six).4 The net of relations was in fact first and foremost a fish-trade net, as was already hinted at in the first sentence of this concluding chapter, since all groups of traders were at least initially drawn to by their interest in stockfish. The fish trade could provoke conflict and competition between Lübeck- ers and Overijsslers, specifically regarding issues such as the often flouted rule of shipping fish to the Baltic, the manner of fish packing, breaches of the credit sys- tem by Overijsslers, and finally their illegal trade with Norwegian fishermen. Yet there was also cooperation and co-existence. As summer guests in Bergen prior to the 1460s, for example, Overijsslers were clients of winter residents of the Kontor (mostly Lübeckers), and after the resolution of the conflicts in the 1460s and 1470s, it seems that both groups conducted their fish trade side by side. Hollanders, on the other hand, appear in the sources as competitors to Hansards, not in Bergen, but in the Trondheim and Iceland, trade centres which affected commerce in Bergen. This was largely due to the credit system, which bound Norwegian fishermen to their Hanseatic creditors in Bergen, but was less effective outside of the town. The Ice- landic trade proved a cheaper and more attractive alternative, and Hollanders chose to pursue this avenue in the face of their limited possibilities in Bergen. It ought to be noted, however, that Hansards and Hollanders within Bergen co-existed, and in some measure even cooperated in the Bergen fish trade, as Hollanders could be- come clients to the Kontor – on Hanseatic terms. The grain trade was a minor bone of contention between the groups. Overijsslers were certainly at odds with Lübeckers when they imported grain from the Baltic, exchanged it for fish in Bergen, but then refused to export the procured fish back to the Baltic (as Kontor policy dictated). However, it appears that their grain im- ports were insignificant, which probably prevented any major conflict from erupt- ing. The Hollandish share in the grain import to Bergen seems to have been even more marginal, despite the overall burgeoning position of Hollanders as importers of Baltic grain. In this aspect of trade, Lübeckers as well as other Wends were un- questionable leaders and faced little competition. The textile trade, including the commerce of deventer cloth, proved to be the domain of all three groups, but in it- self it did not seem to have caused frictions. Only when it was conducted in retail did the interests of the groups apparently clash. Otherwise relations were charac- terised by co-existence, and in the case of Lübeckers and Overijsslers probably also cooperation. On the other hand, tempers flared on the seemingly inconsiderable is- sue of smallwares trade. In the case of Lübeckers and Overijsslers, tensions con- cerning smallwares mounted particularly during the 1468-1477 conflict, and eased

4 ‘Goods and Groups: Cooperation, Co-Existence, Competition’. conclusions and beyond 249 afterwards. They probably went on trading in smallwares side by side. When re- garded from the Hanseatic-Hollandish perspective, the Hollandish smallwares trade appears to have been of major irritation to the Hansards, as it recurred in complaints and negotiations, and seemed to trouble the Kontor far more than other activities of Hollanders within Bergen. Finally, the analysis in the chapter on conflict resolution (VII) shows that ten- sions could exist on the level of individual traders and also on the group level.5 Overijsslers could quarrel between themselves about property issues, like the three traders from Kampen and Deventer in the first case presented; groups like Wends and Overijsslers could hold heated debates on the breaches of (trade) rules or the fairness of these rules, as well as on the treatment of the Overijssel group within the Kontor in the years 1468-1477; and individual merchants could defy the authority of the Kontor and act against the interests of other Hansards. At the same time, the analysis has indicated that there were strong ties which provided a motivation to re- solve conflicts as either Kontor or Hanseatic matters. This meant addressing the knotty problems within the Kontor and avoiding Norwegian interference; before the council of Lübeck (in the instance of appeal) or Hanseatic Diets when partiali- ty was feared; and in the sixteenth century also in the Hanseatic hometowns of the offenders, though in (reluctant) cooperation with the Kontor and Lübeck. Con- flicts should be evaluated along with much longer periods of concord. In short, the prevailing ties in the Kontor were again apparently stronger than tensions, other- wise Lübeckers and Overijsslers would not have been able to co-exist within this structure for such a long time and in so many aspects. And the opposition Hanseat- ic-Hollandish was not as stark as isolated utterances in the sources – which often depicted Hollanders as the main contributors to the demise of the Kontor – might lead to believe.

Universe of its Own: Understanding the Relations in Bergen

Apart from presenting a more complex picture of relations between traders, the dis- cussion in the preceding chapters has provided a litmus test on the decisive factors in the formation and changes in the ingroups and outgroups in Bergen. What are the most crucial insights? First of all, the salient factor which joined and divided traders into groups in Bergen was the general distinction between Hanseatic and non-Hanseatic. This dis- tinction began to appear within the context of trade rights in Bergen from about the mid-fourteenth century on, but initially the term ‘Hanseatic’ was rather vague and more inclusive than exclusive. From the fifteenth century, especially from the 1430s-1440s, the notion became far more defined. The restrictive element became even stronger from the turn of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. The notion

5 ‘Conflict Resolution within the Kontor: Three Cases’. 250 traders, ties and tensions of ‘Hanseaticness’ gradually turned into a password to the Kontor, a precondition for admission to its structures, the use of royal liberties and the credit system, win- ter residence and the use of Kontor premises, Kontor commensality, conviviality and confraternity. Moreover, it equalled mutual obligations in trade and life in Bergen for those traders who were defined as the Hanseatic, and consequently Kontor ingroup, whether they were residents or guests. In short, Hanseatic versus non-Hanseatic became a distinction between those who were in or out of the Kon- tor group. Traders who were (re)admitted to the Hanse, such as the Kampen traders in 1441, were also (re)admitted to the Kontor and officially allowed to en- joy privileges in Bergen. This distinction created a frame in which from the 1440s at latest, both Lübeck- ers and Overijsslers operated as one defined ingroup. The latter referred to this Hanseatic frame as the basis of their group membership when they felt their rights were being curtailed, be it by other Hansards or the king. It must be noted that par- ticipation in the Hanseatic ingroup did not mean ‘ingroup love’, as expressed by Brewer and presented in the Introduction. Tensions and conflicts did abound, but the vital point was that they were to be resolved as a Hanseatic affair, avoiding in- terference from the king and non-Hansards. On the other hand, merchants who left the ingroup were perceived as ex-Hansards and part of the outgroup of Bergen burghers. Also, other foreign traders in Bergen who had been labelled beforehand as non-Hansards could never become a legitimate part of the Kontor ingroup. This pertained especially to Hollanders, as by the time they appeared in Bergen, that is the 1430s-1440s, they were being treated as non-Hansards: both by envoys of towns gathering at Hanseatic diets, and the Norwegian king. Even though the dis- tinction was made from the Hanseatic point of view, it had bearing on the royal perception of the groups, and the policy the king conducted with regards to trade rights, (winter) residence, and credit issues. Furthermore, Hollanders themselves did not follow Hanseatic principles on trade, restriction to trade in Bergen, or non- integration into the local society. In the Bergen context, Hollanders were very clearly synonymous to non-Hansards. Consequently, they could under no cir- cumstances be included in the Hanseatic Kontor ingroup and benefit from its rights. As non-Hansards, they were members of an outgroup. However, this dis- tinction did not need to result in overt hostility in all aspects of Hanseatic-Holland- ish interaction. Quite the contrary, the relations ranged from competition in trade and settlement rights, through co-existence where interests did not clash, to some degree of Hanseatic-Hollandish cooperation where Hansards, as the stronger par- ty in Bergen, allowed and needed it. Second, it appears that ingroups were being formed by shared interest, and out- groups were traders who were not related to, or who were (perceived as) harmful to, this interest. It was a wider and in practice more flexible notion than the oppo- sition Hanseatic versus non-Hanseatic. For Lübeckers and Overijsslers, this meant primarily the gradual rise of a group which was defined by the acquisition, use, and safeguarding of trade rights. It was a lengthy and two-way process, where both conclusions and beyond 251 growing into and out of the group was possible. The ingroup concerned with the upkeep of these rights became most conspicuous as the Kontor ingroup. Lübeck- ers and merchants from Deventer were part of this group from its onset in the 1360s, and they were active advocates of this mercantile common denominator throughout the period analysed here. Kampen and Zwolle traders were clearly part of this group in the second half of the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centu- ry, thereafter interest in the Bergen trade seems to have waned, and consequently participation in the Bergen Kontor ingroup as well. However, being part of the same Kontor ingroup did not mean that in some periods and issues, there could be no smaller circles of shared interest embedded in, and sometimes transgressing, the boundaries of the Kontor. Lübeckers formed a distinct interest ingroup as the lead- ing group in the Kontor, something which became apparent in their early involve- ment in the Bergen trade, their powerful say in (central) administrative matters, the natural connection with their hometown as the head of the Hanseatic League and the instance of appeal of the Kontor, their powerful Bergenfahrer guild, and along with other Wends, their predominant share in the profitable fish-grain exchange in western Norway. Repeatedly, they asserted their grip on Bergen by safeguarding the shared interest of their particular group. Overijsslers, on the other hand, could be united as a (transient) ingroup within the Kontor in their attempts to defend their position as equals to Wends (and particularly Lübeckers) in matters of ad- ministration and profiting from the credit system; in their pursuit of diverging trade practices like fish packing; or in being the only ones to use the exceptional right to ship goods with non-Hansards. The clear distinction and formation of the ingroup of Overijsslers was a transient and context-specific phenomenon. In these in- stances, the perception of the membership in the Kontor ingroup, and the rights and duties entailed, could be temporarily quite different by both parties. For in- stance Lübeckers could see the Overijssel traders as balancing on the boundary of the Kontor ingroup, while Overijsslers could consider their own activities as in- scribed in the Kontor and Hanseatic framework, yet unfairly not recognised as such. This suggests that group membership in Bergen was not only a matter of clearly laid down rules, but also (self) perception. Still, as long as these specific in- terests of Lübeckers and Overijsslers did not seriously and permanently endanger the shared interest, they seem to have been accepted as part of the Kontor trade in Bergen. In many cases and in most periods of time, Overijsslers seem to have been first and foremost part of the Kontor ingroup; inner divisions were of minor im- portance. It must be noted that from the fifteenth century at the latest, however, when any members (regardless of their background) either left or were expelled from the Kontor, they were treated as a potential or actual threat to the interest of the ingroup and therefore regarded as an outgroup. The driving force was to preserve unity, as this was vital for the maintenance of the dominant position of Kontor traders in the Bergen trade. The analysis of con- flicts suggests that both in cases when disputes between individual traders erupted, and when frictions between groups within the Kontor assumed a more truculent 252 traders, ties and tensions tone, the general endeavour was to restore peace for the sake of the well-being of the whole Kontor ingroup. It must be emphasised again that the shared interest of Lübeckers and Overijsslers with regards to mercantile rights sprang from the shared aim of their presence in Bergen, namely the stockfish trade. They were drawn by the same catch in the Bergen fishing net of relations. The Kontor created a framework which would guarantee stability in the fish trade, both in enjoying royal liberties and taking advantage of the credit system. For the Kontor traders, membership in this ingroup provided the spur for cooperation and co-existence. It gave them the upper hand over those who were not included in the Kontor privi- leges and who did not benefit from the credit system in the fish trade: those who formed an outgroup to the Kontor. In Bergen, it was the Hollanders who were set apart by the kings as the main mercantile group which did not participate in Kontor rights. Even though they at least initially had a similar interest in Bergen as Kontor traders, that is the stockfish trade, it was not perceived as a shared interest. On the contrary, Hollandish activi- ty in Bergen and outside of it, which had an impact on the Bergen trade, was re- peatedly portrayed with broad strokes as contrary to Kontor interest. This was one of the clearest definitions of Hollanders as an outgroup to the Kontor. In other as- pects the ingroup-outgroup lines could be much less marked, like the grain or tex- tile trade, which apparently did not interfere with Kontor interests. These ingroup- outgroup lines could even take a different course than the distinction Hanseatic versus non-Hanseatic. This pertained to instances where Kontor members could benefit from dealings with Hollanders, such as the joint shipment of goods arranged by Overijsslers or the incidental sale of fish from the Kontor stock, turn- ing Hollanders into agents of the Kontor in western Europe. In these cases, (some) Hansards and Hollanders could form transient interest ingroups, sharing a (tem- porary) common goal. Finally, the manner in which traders organised their trade and life in Bergen can be seen as an umbrella for decisive factors which created and distinguished ingroups and outgroups. This aspect was interrelated with, and in part originated from, the distinction Hanseatic versus non-Hanseatic and the notion of shared interests. For Lübeckers and Overijsslers, being part of the Hanseatic Kontor ingroup was tanta- mount to agreeing to conditions which furthered the coherence of the group, and at the same time set them apart from other traders in Bergen. It involved the ac- ceptance of the vertical, and participation in the horizontal, structures; pledging obedience to Kontor administrators and following the decisions of Hanseatic towns; living within the rule-defined (rather than physically defined) boundaries of the Kontor; the observation of Kontor and tenement rules, among them secrecy, trade-related rules such as adherence to the credit system and restriction to trade in Bergen only; non-integration into the local society and obligatory participation in Kontor-integrating activities like admission rites, commensality, conviviality and confraternity; preventing conflicts which could jeopardise the group and resolving them as an internal matter. All Hanseatic traders who adhered to these rules of or- conclusions and beyond 253 ganisation could count on an ‘ingroup badge’, and in converse instances on losing it. Aberration was only accepted in these few cases when bending the rules, for in- stance in contact with Norwegian women, was not to the permanent disadvantage of the Kontor group and its unity. The fact that Overijsslers in most cases seem to have followed the rules, bolsters the assertion that on the whole, they were inte- grated in the Kontor ingroup and were recognised as such both within and outside of the Kontor. Otherwise, they would have either left or been expelled from it. The organisation of life and trade in Bergen also marked Hollanders as a group distinct from the Kontor, be it in the manner of administration, settlement, summer residence, the possibility to integrate into the local society, (lack of) rules of con- duct, or in the expansion of stockfish trade outside of Bergen. In other words, their ingroup was organised differently than the ingroup of Hansards in Bergen. These differences contributed to marking them off as an outgroup to the Kontor, in some issues like settlement and the aforementioned extra-Bergen trade generating group tensions. It appears also from the extant evidence that Hollanders did not intend to follow the example of the Kontor organisation, but seek alternative solutions which could be more advantageous for them within the framework of trade in and outside of Bergen. This was due to the predominant position of the Kontor and the Hanseatic League in Bergen, who stayed at the helm of the Norwegian trade cen- tre through their privileges and the credit system, jealously guarded and nurtured through the Kontor organisation long after the Hanseatic-Holland balance of pow- er tilted elsewhere.

Microcosm of the Hanse

In the preceding sections, emphasis has been put on the particularities of the Bergen case and on the mechanisms of group formation in this setting. How should these findings be contextualised with regards to the other Kontore and the Hanse in gen- eral, and how far can the ingroup-outgroup analogies be extrapolated? The discussion dealing with organisational aspects of the Bergen case has en- compassed a comparison to the other three Kontore, that is concerning adminis- tration, settlement, as well as rules and regulations. This comparison leads to the conclusion that in a number of features, the Bergen Kontor resembled its sister or- ganisations. It was set up to acquire and safeguard trading rights and shared inter- est; through its administration it was intrinsically connected to Hanseatic diets and its members were obliged to adhere to decisions taken there; there was a permanent settlement which hosted Hanseatic traders from various towns; the distinction Hanseatic versus non-Hanseatic had widespread ramifications for the admission to the Kontor, daily life within it, and attitude towards non-Hansards, including women. Like the other Kontore, the Bergen Kontor appeared at first sight as a well- defined organisation, inherently embedded in the ill-defined Hanse. Upon second glance, however, it is clear that imprecise Hanseatic definitions (like the matter of 254 traders, ties and tensions

Kampen traders pre-1441), decisions with little chance of being implemented (like punishment of fleeing defectors), or the at times fragmented involvement of Hansards into larger political strife (like the fight for power in Scandinavia in the second half of the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth centuries) also had repercussions in Bergen, just as in the other Kontore. Then again, the Bergen Kon- tor showed also idiosyncratic traits, or traits which were far more marked there than in the other Kontore. The central administration was dominated by one group, namely Lübeckers, and there was no question of equal representation of groups fre- quenting the Kontor, as was the case in Bruges or London. The settlement was more numerous, and winter residence played a key role in the functioning of the credit system, which was particular to Bergen and local trading conditions. So was the semi-institutionalised use of non-Hanseatic, in practice Hollandish ships, made by Overijsslers. The admission rites of the Kontor in Bergen definitely had a dis- tinct (and pungent) flavour, and the customs surrounding the confraternity were locally-tinted and are exceptional in the context of the Kontore source material. In short, the investigation has confirmed that while the Kontore resembled each other, they were by no means identical, but rather bore marks of adaptation to local sur- roundings and individual development. Consequently, the Bergen Kontor was just as much and as little an own universe as the other Kontore. Was it then a microcosm of the Hanse? In some facets, it did indeed draw to- gether a whole string of Hanseatic features, and represent the Hanseatic League on a small scale. The condition of shared interest as the common denominator of the League, as stipulated by Von Brandt and other researchers, is very well perceptible in the Bergen case. Like in the Hanse in general, this interest was translated in joined efforts to gain and keep mercantile liberties, and eliminate competition. Also, the formation of interest factions, ties and tensions between individual traders and groups of traders gives a rather accurate and representative picture of the ra- tionale of the interest-motivated Hanseatic merchant. The Bergen case offers in- sights into the daily life and dealings of Hanseatic merchants abroad, their struggle to keep or bend rules to local or personal conditions, or resolve disputes. The pieces of history of individual traders or groups of traders in foreign lands are inconspic- uous when ‘the Hanseatic League’ or ‘the Hanseatic merchant’ has to be portrayed, but become vibrant and telling when regarded with a magnified glass of a chosen case. The approach towards the distinction ‘Hanseatic versus non-Hanseatic’ in the Bergen case shows the general Hanseatic policy in a concrete example, in terms of admission to rights, expulsion from the League and treatment of outsiders. When it comes to groups of traders from specific towns, like Overijsslers, the analysis of their participation in the trade on a chosen market from pre-Hanseatic times, through the requirement of being Hanseatic, to gradual retreat from Bergen in the case of Kampen and Zwolle in the sixteenth century, gives an instructive example of what it meant to make use of Hanseatic rights. And in the case of Hollanders, it provides another illustration of what forms of interaction their contacts with Hansards could take in specific conditions, where the dividing wall between the conclusions and beyond 255 groups could be sky-high and expressed in rivalry; or quite the contrary, a low threshold which allowed some degree of cooperation. Also, it shows again that some groups of Hansards, like Lübeckers, perceived Hollanders largely as rivals and tolerated them only when Hollandish trade did not jeopardise Lübeckish or Kontor trade; at the same time other groups, like Overijsslers, were in some aspects, for instance in the shipment of goods from the mid-fifteenth century on, keen to cooperate with Hollanders. In other words, this analysis is another piece of evi- dence that in general, relations between Hansards and Hollanders should not be considered in black and white terms. In all these instances, the Bergen case might be seen as a microcosm or case study of the Hanse. Conversely, one must bear in mind that Bergen as a specific setting for the life and trade of Hansards abroad fostered specific conditions, different from their Hanseatic hometowns and different from other Hanseatic settlements abroad. Issues which were particular to Hansards Bergen were legion: the content of trade rights they acquired, the specific goods they traded and the way they pur- sued this trade, the firm grip on the market through, among other things, the local- ly adapted credit system, the continued dominance over Hollanders in a period when the Hanseatic mercantile power elsewhere was crumbling, or the rites and lifestyle the Hansards developed. These issues can be seen as part of the greater Hanseatic picture, but they were by no means representative of it as a whole. The Hanseatic League consisted of many small universes, which only in some aspects were also its microcosms. Finally, the analytical tool used in the Bergen case should be re-examined in a broader context. The ingroup-outgroup binary has proved a versatile tool to un- cover factors creating and dividing groups in Bergen. Its strength lies in the fact that also transient groups, joined by shared interest, can be considered, that it allows to look both within and outside group boundaries, and that it makes room for change- ability and differences in (self)perceptions. In itself theoretical, it becomes empiri- cal when applied to sources and contexts. Can it be applied to the Hanse as a whole? Yes, although this question must be viewed with circumspection. As stated in the Introduction, the analytical tool has been chosen because it fits well the endeavour to examine relations between traders in the Bergen context. It has not been chosen or employed to explain all dynamics governing the Kontor or the trade in Bergen. In the overall Hanseatic context, the tool might thus uncover some aspects of its richness and complexity. It is more than conceivable that some of the relations within the Hanseatic League can be discussed as ingroup and outgroup formation mechanisms, especially when focusing on the changeability and vague boundaries of the League. This flexible frame might render some features of the Hanseatic League more clearly, and the still fragmented picture of the League might be made more complete.

In retrospect, looking at the Bergen case and beyond it, it is a challenge for a re- searcher not only to know when and where to continue analyses and comparisons, 256 traders, ties and tensions but also when to halt. Turning to my sources for the last inspection, anxious not to omit a vital fact, utterance, or a possible angle of interpretation, I hear an outcry recorded in a letter from the 1460s: ‘nen, nen, nen, dar is alrede mer den to vele ge- screven’.6 This time, in any case.

6 ‘No, no, no, more than enough has already been written on the matter’, NGL 2:2 pp. 694-695 (HR 2:5 nr. 788; LUB 11 nr. 94).