NOVEMBER 2020

BERKLEY CENTER FOR , PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS | BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

GEOPOLITICS OF RELIGIOUS SOFT POWER POLICY BRIEF #4 THE CHINESE STATE’S GLOBAL PROMOTION OF By Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The global promotion of Buddhism as a form of soft power by the Chinese state is unprecedented in the modern world. Recent efforts to incorporate Buddhism into Chinese foreign policy build on decades of collaboration between the Communist Party of and Buddhist clerics through the state religious system. Under current President Xi Jinping, the Chinese state is directing more resources for Buddhism to serve the political and economic rise of China through religion and culture. Projecting as soft and sharp—that is, state-controlled and targeted— power ultimately seeks to influence the societies and politics of Buddhist- majority countries, Western states, and Asian competitors to China.

KEY TAKEAWAYS • Under Xi Jinping, the state religious system has become increasingly implicated in efforts to support the growing political and economic power of China abroad by adding religious overtones to China’s existing portfolio of cultural and linguistic diplomacy. This brief is a product • pursues a multifaceted and flexible approach to promoting Chinese Buddhism of the Geopolitics of abroad, with its specific modalities varying depending on whether the target country is a Religious Soft Power Buddhist-majority nation, a Western state, or one of China’s Asian competitors. (GRSP) project, a multi- year, cross-disciplinary • The enduring efficacy of Beijing’s promotion Chinese Buddhism in countries of strategic interest will depend on whether such efforts can remain sufficiently differentiated from effort to systematically perceived political interference from China. study state use of religion in foreign affairs.

The conclusions and recommendations of this Berkley Center publication are solely those of its author(s) and do not reflect the views of the center, its leadership, or its other scholars. INTRODUCTION the operation occurs through the state system of religion to control religion and use it for Since Xi Jinping became leader of the People’s the domestic and international aims of the Republic of China (PRC) in 2012, the CPC.5 This system was created shortly after Chinese state has been globally promoting the 1949 founding of the PRC, and under Xi Chinese Buddhism. The aim is not to spread it has been actively using religion and culture belief in Buddhism as religion but rather to to further the PRC’s recognition as a great further the aspiration of the Communist Party power. of China (CPC) for China to be recognized as a country that has inherited a civilization in It is instructive to point out that the PRC the modern world. This aspiration is expressed is the world’s largest Buddhist country. in the “China Dream,” Xi’s vision of China It contains all three Buddhist traditions: regaining the glory of the (618 Buddhism practiced by Han CE to 907 CE), the time when Buddhism Chinese, Buddhism practiced by from was Sinicized into the Dai people, and Buddhism and flourished. Buddhism also underlies Xi’s practiced by Tibetans and Mongolians. In Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It overlaps 2012, there were 33,000 Buddhist , with the historical passage of Buddhism 240,000 clerics, and 38 Buddhist seminaries 6 from India to China, but now is the time to in the PRC. Now, possibly up to half a billion spread Buddhism from China to other Asian Chinese visit Buddhist temples as a custom to countries and beyond. pray to the Buddha, , and other for health and fortune, although few The global promotion of Buddhism reflects a have taken vows as Buddhist devotees. that the rise of a China as an economic and political power needs to be accompanied This brief has two sections. First, it surveys by cultural and religious power. Xi has the origins and development of the state emphasized that throughout history, the system of religion in the early 1950s until the status and influence of China has depended current global promotion of Buddhism under not on military power or expansion but Xi Jinping. Second, it examines the policies rather on the powerful appeal and attraction and strategies under Xi to promote Chinese of Chinese culture.1 He said, “The excellent Buddhism all over the world, extending Chinese traditional culture is the outstanding beyond Buddhist communities and countries advantage of the Chinese nation and our to Western countries, to influence the societies deepest cultural soft power.”2 and politics of these countries as soft power and sharp power. While Xi sees Buddhism, , and Daoism as foundations of Chinese civilization, he favors Buddhism to convey it BUDDHISM AND THE STATE 3 in the modern world. Buddhism is already RELIGIOUS SYSTEM IN THE PRC a world religion, present as religion in many Asian countries and as religion and culture in Since 1949, the PRC has been ruled by the Western countries. We see the Chinese state’s CPC, an atheist political party that forbids global promotion of Buddhism as analogous its members from believing in religion and to the historical rise of European global power predicts religion’s demise. Nevertheless, the accompanied by Christianity. CPC has recognized the existence of five in the PRC since the founding of the The key claim of this policy brief is that country—Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, the Chinese state’s global promotion of Islam, and Protestantism. This is because the Buddhism operates as both soft power and 4 CPC recognizes that the use of state power to sharp power. We call it sharp power because

2 Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University eliminate religion would be too divisive among Third, is the Buddhist Association of China the population. To control religious belief, the (BAC), composed of influential clerics, that CPC has created a state system of institutions adjusts state religious policies to Buddhism and organizations that mobilizes religions to and ensures the compliance of clerics and work for aims defined by the CPC.7 devotees. The entire system is managed behind the scenes by the UFWD’s control of Aspects of the state religious system predate personnel appointments and communication the founding of the PRC. The scope of channels. “religious freedom” in the PRC constitution began with discussions in the Republic The operation of the system since its founding of China, founded in 1912 as the first can be divided into three periods. Below, we To control religious modern Chinese state.8 The system’s global examine its development in each period propagation of nationalistic forms of Chinese regarding uses of Buddhism for international belief, the CPC Buddhism as universal values and ethics was relations. This examination also illustrates the foreshadowed in the 1920s by Ven. , a growing importance of religion to the CPC. has created a famous advocate for the modern reform of 9 During the first period, from the early state system of Chinese Buddhism. The operation of the 1950s until the (1966), system is part of the CPC's united front, Buddhism was used for diplomacy with institutions and a strategy devised in the 1930s to identify Asian Buddhist countries. The aim, described and co-opt influential persons in non-CPC by Holmes Welch, an expert on Chinese organizations that groups to work for CPC aims.10 Buddhism, was as follows: “In any Asian The current system was founded in the early neighbor, whenever a segment of society like mobilizes religions 1950s. Its key institution is patriotic religion, the came to look to China as a model expressed in the slogan “ country, love or fell under the domination of a pro-Chinese to work for aims religion.”11 This basically means that clerics faction, it slightly increased the internal must obey the CPC and work for its goals. pressure on the government of that country to defined by the CPC. Another institution is the constitutional adopt a pro-Chinese foreign policy.”13 right of “religious freedom.” It protects The UFWD, coordinating with the PRC the “religious belief ” of individuals but not Ministry of Foreign Affairs, devised strategies, collective practices. Religious rituals and while BAC clerics were the visible face of teachings are only allowed within temples, implementation. Strategies included lending while the activities of foreign religious Buddha relics and giving funds to rebuild organizations in China are not permitted. temples in other countries, creating bilateral The system has three key organizational Buddhist friendship associations, and having actors. The most powerful is the United BAC clerics take leadership in international Front Work Department (UFWD), the CPC Buddhist organizations. organ that manages the party’s relations The diplomacy’s effectiveness was limited, with non-party groups, including religious as many countries were anti-communist and communities. It develops the CPC ideological did not recognize the PRC. The BAC formed position towards groups to determine if they friendship associations with only a few are friends or enemies, so as to co-opt the countries, while international organizations former while isolating the latter. resisted BAC efforts to politicize them. For The second actor is the State Administration example, in 1961, the World Fellowship of of Religious Affairs (SARA), an organ of Buddhists meeting in Phnom Penh refused the government that turns CPC ideology the BAC request to expel the into religious policy and supervises delegation, prompting the BAC to walk out.14 implementation.12

Brookings Institution 3 The second period is from 1979 to the early vice president and key global promoter of 2000s. It began with CPC re-recognition of Buddhism. religion after the Cultural Revolution and After the rise to power of Xi Jinping in 2012, new market economy policies, and it ended the PRC religious system began working more when Buddhism had recovered and China’s actively to use religion and culture to support economy was among the world’s largest. The the growing political and economic power of revival of Buddhism helped persuade overseas China as expressed in the “China Dream.” Chinese businesspeople that the CPC was no longer following “leftist” ideology and that they were welcome to come worship and THE GLOBAL PROMOTION OF invest in the PRC. BUDDHISM UNDER XI JINPING Relic visits resumed to improve China’s image in other countries after the violent suppression In 2015, the BAC Ninth National Congress formally recognized the global promotion of the 1989 student movement and unease at 16 China's growing economic influence. A relic of Chinese Buddhism as a key activity. It visit to Taiwan in 2002 stressed the cultural called for Chinese Buddhism to “go out” unity of China, even while underscoring (zou chuqü) of China to other countries that Buddhism on the island came from the in order to “tell the Chinese story well” to mainland. The BAC initiated the China- their peoples so they could realize China’s - Friendship Buddhist Exchange accomplishments and peaceful intentions. Association, showing that PRC was now an These efforts were referred to as “soft power” active center of Buddhism in the world. (ruan shili), “public diplomacy” (gongyi waijiao), and “person-to-person diplomacy” The third period started in the early 2000s as (renjian waijiao) and linked to the BRI.17 the CPC came to see China as a world power and emphasized traditional Chinese culture. The congress determined promotion was Chinese leader Hu Jintao, assuming office in necessary because Chinese Buddhism was 2002, used the Confucian term “harmony” relatively weak around the world in terms to refer to his new approach to reduce of status and influence. This situation was economic inequalities in China and manage attributed to earlier BAC strategies that international relations.15 The BAC embraced focused only on Buddhist communities or “harmony” by emphasizing Buddhism as occurred only inside China, like the World cultural practices, such as tea ceremony and Buddhist Forum. The congress noted that for the people. and Theravada Buddhism were globally recognized “brands,” while In 2006, the BAC reintroduced itself to global Japan and Taiwan had successfully spread by convening the World their Buddhisms to many countries. It called Buddhist Forum, the first major international for new approaches to promote Chinese religious conference in the PRC. Under the Buddhism, including Buddhist cultural theme of “harmonious society,” it furthered activities, joint research with foreign scholars, dialogue among the Theravada, Mahayana, and overseas branches of Buddhist temples and Vajrayana schools. Also, Chinese clerics in China. began establishing branch temples abroad. In 2008 the Zhonghua (China) was We see the BAC emphasizing three founded at , Nepal, the birthplace of discursive forms of Buddhism in its the Buddha, thereby establishing a Chinese promotion. One is “Sinicized Buddhism” presence at this most sacred Buddhist site. Its (Zhongguohua fojiao). has long abbot, Ven. Yinshun, would become a BAC referred to the historical process by which Buddhism from North India adapted to

4 Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University China in the Tang dynasty and flourished. PRC. Below, we identify three categories of Now, the term has been politically adapted to countries according to their attributes and refer to the incorporation of Chinese values, the strategies deployed by the PRC religious such as harmony, into Chinese Buddhism. system for each. A second form is “Chinese Buddhism” First are Asian countries with Buddhist (Zhongguo fojiao). This term previously majorities that are economically dependent referred to the coexistence of the Mahayana, on China, including Cambodia, Myanmar, Theravada, and Vajrayana traditions in China Laos, , and Sri Lanka. Key under the umbrella of BAC, but it now also strategies include: refers to Chinese Buddhism as the center of 1. establishing bilateral Buddhist friendship all Buddhisms in the world. associations; The third is “Buddhist culture.” This refers 2. setting up Buddhist broadcasting to Chinese Buddhist-inspired values and networks; practices that people can pursue as lifestyles and hobbies without questioning matters of 3. organizing joint religious and cultural belief or understanding Buddhist teachings. rituals, such as praying for peoples' health during the coronavirus pandemic The global promotion relies on clerics and commemorating historical Buddhist educated in the state-approved Buddhist ties between the countries; academies in the PRC in the 1980s, after the Cultural Revolution. They understand CPC 4. providing funds to restore temples; discourses and expectations for religion, 5. inviting foreign Buddhists to participate as well as how to cooperate with the state in BAC-initiated regional Buddhist religious system. Some are temple abbots conferences, such as the South Seas and BAC members who actively cooperate Shenzhen Buddhist Round Table; with the CPC, such as the aforementioned Ven. Yinshun. Others go along to obtain 6. undertaking joint Buddhist scholarship resources, including funding for projects and and student exchanges; enhanced recognition in China and overseas. 7. engaging in charity and disaster relief For clerics abroad, cooperating with the projects; and system helps maintain links to the PRC. 8. investing in Buddhist-themed BRI BAC clerics recognize that their promotion infrastructure to appeal to populations in of Chinese Buddhism abroad relies on these countries and enhance the position their greater openness to religion and of their leaders. multiculturalism in other countries. This is evident in the comments of a BAC vice- Second are Western countries with recent president that branch temples are “overseas histories of Buddhism and growing popular bases for the spread of Chinese Buddhism appreciation of Buddhist culture as Asian and Chinese culture, which is beneficial culture in daily life. In these countries, to enhancing the country’s cultural soft we see efforts to build Chinese Buddhist power.”18 He expressed optimism for their temples to further Buddhist cultural establishment because of the different activities. These are especially visible in such ideologies in other countries. countries as Australia and Canada with strong multiculturalism policies and sizable The strategies to promote Chinese Buddhism immigrant communities from the PRC, in a particular country reflect that country’s accounting for at least 3% of the population. , strategic importance to the CPC, and immigration from the

Brookings Institution 5 For Buddhists and Chinese tourists, these governments. This can increase PRC-linked projects are sites for worship and pilgrimage, voices in the public sphere of these countries, while to the general populations of these offsetting those of Buddhists that the CPC countries, they are presented as Chinese considers competitors, such as the Dalai cultural theme parks. Notably, temple- . building and Buddhist culture activities are Thirdly, giving resources to major Buddhist not promoted in Buddhist-majority Asian temples and schools can create dependencies countries, as these would offend populations and pro-China factions in Buddhist-majority that already have their long Buddhist countries. These factions may have influence traditions. in their polities to advance PRC interests, Without Third are strategies for Asian countries— such as acknowledging the authority of India, Japan, Taiwan—that the CPC sees as Chinese Buddhism and silencing Buddhist well-considered geopolitical rivals and that the BAC views as opposition to BRI projects. competing for global status in Buddhism. In The future effectiveness of these strategies 2017, the Nanhai Buddhist Academy opened strategies, the may rest on two tendencies of Chinese state in the PRC, with strong state backing, promotion of Buddhism. One is the degree to compete with India’s recently revived global promotion to which Sino-centric and nationalistic University as the world center of Chinese Buddhism appeals to the Buddhist Buddhist teaching. The academy is a center of Buddhism may and non-Buddhist populations of other for creating Buddhist culture and Sinicized countries. Second is the degree to which the trigger results that Buddhism, as well as Buddhist friendships populations and politicians of other countries by inviting clerics from other Asian countries come to view the promotion as politicizing are contrary to CPC for study. and resist it. Regarding Japan, Chinese clerics and expectations. Most recently, these two aspects are devotees are recovering the Shingon school becoming more pronounced. In 2018, the of the Vajrayana tradition that disappeared CPC announced that the administrative in China but still exists in Japan. This will functions of SARA would be merged create an alternative Chinese Vajrayana into the UFWD. This signals the growing school to Tibetan Buddhism within the importance of religion to the CPC and its PRC. Regarding Taiwan, Buddhist clerics intention to more closely manage Chinese undertake charity and cultural activities in Buddhism in advancing national interests. In other countries that may compete with those 2020, one of these interests has been using of Taiwan-based Buddhist organizations, Buddhism to counter negative impressions such as and the Buddhist of China due to the global COVID-19 Compassion Relief Foundation. 19 pandemic. What is the effectiveness of these strategies? First, many activities—such as conferences, rituals, and inviting people CONCLUSIONS (clerics, politicians, ministers of culture) to The above discussion has shown how the PRC—further the aim of the UFWD the Chinese state’s global promotion of to develop ties with individuals who may Buddhism under Xi Jinping is an accretion become favorably disposed to the PRC. of decades of CPC ideology towards Secondly, temple-building projects in religion and experience of working with other countries may bolster the status of Buddhist clerics through the state religious the Chinese clerics associated with them system designed to use religions for state in the eyes of host country societies and purposes. In 2015, the global promotion of

6 Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University Buddhism was clarified and expressed at a 7. The exception is during the Cultural Revolution when BAC congress, directing more state resources the state encouraged the suppression of religion. 8. Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, eds., Making for Buddhism to serve the political and Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in economic rise of China through religion and Modern China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University culture. Press, 2009). 9. Don A. Pittman, Taixu’s Reforms: Towards a Modern The global promotion of Chinese Buddhism Chinese Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i as soft and sharp power is unprecedented Press, 2001). 10. Lyman Van Slyke, “The United Front in China,” in the modern world. The closest parallel Journal of Contemporary History 5, no. 3 (1970): is the Japanese military government’s use 119–135. of Buddhism in its colonial empire in the 11. After the Cultural Revolution, the foundational early twentieth century. This use sought to document of Chinese religious policy is “Document 19: The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious legitimate Japan’s invasion of Asian Buddhist Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period” countries, but history shows that it caused (CPC Central Committee, 1982). Available at 20 https://is.muni.cz/el/1421/jaro2011/KSCB023/ strong anti-Japanese sentiments. um/24029748/Document_no._19_1982.pdf. The current Chinese state promotion of 12. Until 1997, SARA was called the Religious Affairs Bureau. The name change reflected the heightened Buddhism is operating on a much vaster CPC concern regarding religion after the 1989 scale. An issue that the CPC will have to student movement and the growing wealth of society. face is how Sinicized Buddhism representing 13. Holmes Welch, Buddhism Under Mao (Cambridge, Chinese great civilization will cooperate with MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 169. other locally embedded Buddhist traditions 14. Welch, Buddhism Under Mao, 213–214. 15. In 2008, the CPC launched the Confucius Institutes, in Asian countries, as well as Westernized among China’s first initiatives seen by the leadership Buddhism that seeks ecumenicism. Without as “soft power.” Confucius Institutes have since well-considered strategies, the global become controversial in North America and Europe for interfering with academic freedom. promotion of Buddhism may trigger results 16. For a summary of the congress, see Chen Xingqiao, that are contrary to CPC expectations. “The Significance, Bottlenecks, and Strategic Thinking of Chinese Buddhism Going Out,” [Zhongguo fojiao zou chuqü yiyi, pingjing ji zhanlüe sikao] Foxue yanjiu (2015). Available at NOTES http://www.chinabuddhism.com.cn/yj/2015-07- 21/9189.html. 1. See, for example, Xi Jinping’s speech at the Forum 17. For the introduction of the soft power concept into on Literature and Art Work (October 15, 2104). Chinese policy circles see Hongyi Lai, “Introduction: Available at www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2015- The Soft Power Concept and a Rising China,” in 10/14/c_1116825558.htm [in Chinese]. China’s Soft Power and International Relations, ed. 2. Xi Jinping’s speech at the National Conference on Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu (London: Routledge, 2012), Propaganda and Ideological Work (August 20, 2013). 1–20. Available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0821/ 18. Zhou Fang, “Chinese People’s Political Consultative c64094-22636876.html [in Chinese]. Conference National Committee member Ven. 3. Confucianism’s weak institutional basis and Daoism’s Juexing: Chinese Buddhism Should ‘Go Out,’” character as indigenous Chinese religion are seen [Quanguo zhengxie weiyuan jüexing fashi: zhongguo as limiting their capacity to represent Chinese fojiao ying zou chuqü] Zhongguo Minzu Bao civilization to the world. See, for example, Xi Jinping’s (March 5, 2014). Available at www.cssn.cn/zjx/ speech at UNESCO Headquarters (March 27, 2014). zjx_zjsj/201403/t20140305_1020038.shtml. Available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ 19. Yoshiko Ashiwa and David Wank. “Special wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1142560.shtml. Report: COVID-19 Impacts, Chinese Buddhism, 4. Christopher Walker, “What is ‘Sharp Power’?” Journal State Control, and Soft Power,” Religion and of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018): 9–23. Diplomacy (April 20, 2020). Available at https:// 5. The analysis and insights expressed in this brief religionanddiplomacy.org.uk/2020/04/20/special- draw from an ongoing research project and are, thus, report-impact-of-covid-19-on-chinese-buddhism- tentative. and-soft-power/. 6. Ji Zhe, Gareth Fisher, and André Laliberté, eds., 20. Nam-Lin Hur, “The Sōtō Sect and Japanese Military Buddhism After Mao: Negotiations, Continuities, and Imperialism in Korea,” Japanese Journal of Religious Reinventions (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, Studies 26, no. 1–2 (1999):107–134. 2019).

Brookings Institution 7 ABOUT THE PROJECT

The Geopolitics of Religious Soft Power (GRSP) project represents a multi-year, cross- disciplinary effort to systematically study state use of religion in foreign affairs. Through a global comparison of varying motivations, strategies, and practices associated with the deployment of religious soft power, project research aims to reveal patterns, trends, and outcomes that will enhance our understanding of religion’s role in contemporary geopolitics.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS About the Authors

This policy brief was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The conclusions and recommendations of this Berkley Center publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the center, its leadership, or its other scholars.

Yoshiko Ashiwa is professor of anthropology in the Graduate School of Social Sciences at Hitotsubashi University in Japan. She is co-editor of Making Religion, Making the State: The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and The Politics of Religion in World Affairs at Georgetown University seeks a more just and peaceful world by deepening Modern China (2009, with knowledge and solving problems at the intersection David L. Wank). of religion and global affairs through research, teaching, and engaging multiple publics. Two premises guide the center’s work: that a comprehensive examination of religion and norms is critical to address complex global challenges, and that the open engagement of religious and cultural traditions with one another can promote peace. David L. Wank is professor of sociology at Sophia University in Japan. He is co-editor of Making The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit Religion, Making the State: organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct The Politics of Religion high-quality, independent research and, based in Modern China (2009, on that research, to provide innovative, practical with Yoshiko Ashiwa) and recommendations for policymakers and the public. Dynamics of Global Society: The conclusions and recommendations of any Theory and Prospects Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), (2007, with Yoshinori Murai and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its and Tadashi Anno). management, or its other scholars.