Center for European Policy Analysis

POLAND: SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

Dr. Ela Rossmiller September 2018 2 w . c e p a o r g Center for European Policy Analysis

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The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) is a 501(c)(3), non-profit, non-partisan, public policy research institute. Our mission is to promote an economically vibrant, strategically secure, and politically free Europe with close and enduring ties to the United States. Our analytical team consists of the world’s leading experts on Central-East Europe, , and its neighbors. Through cutting- edge research, analysis, and programs we provide fresh insight on energy, security, and defense to government officials and agencies; we help transatlantic businesses navigate changing strategic landscapes; and we build networks of future Atlanticist leaders.

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Cover page: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets with the Prime Minister of in 2018. Photo credit: NATO / Flickr.

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Poland: Security and Foreign Policy Priorities

Dr. Ela Rossmiller 2018 Title VIII CEE Area Studies Fellow

September 2018

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The Issue

n October 2015, the party (PiS) swept the elections and ushered in a new administration. The party Ipromised a new era in which Poland would “rise from its knees” and assert its national interests. While a great deal of attention has been directed at Poland’s controversial domestic reforms, this analysis takes stock of Poland’s foreign policy priorities and its relations with the United States, NATO, the (EU), and the Visegrád group, as well as the role that Polish public opinion has played in shaping the government’s priorities. This analysis addresses the importance that the current government places on NATO, the Polish-U.S. security alliance, European Union (EU) membership and reform, and the Visegrád group by drawing on official open- source government documents, policy analyses published by independent think tanks in Poland, public opinion polls, and semi-structured interviews with experts.

Polish Security and2 Sovereignty, 1 Center for European Policy Analysis A Strong, Cohesive NATO Summit recognizes that “Russia’s recent activities and policies have reduced stability NATO with Active U.S. and security, increased unpredictability, and Engagement changed the security environment.”2

According to Minister of Foreign Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz, ’s top foreign policy priority is strengthening Poland’s national The current independence, sovereignty, and security.1 To this end, the current PiS administration is administration fully committed to a strong, cohesive NATO wants to deepen with active U.S. engagement, as well as close bilateral relations with the U.S. focused on security cooperation security cooperation. Moreover, it seeks a stable U.S. military presence on Polish territory. with the United This foreign policy trajectory has been shaped by key events over the past 25 years. States both

Following the end of the Cold War, NATO drew bilaterally and down troops and signed the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, in the context of and Security, laying the groundwork for a reset with Russia in what was supposed to NATO. be a new era of peaceful coexistence. That era ended in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia to support separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2014, Russia illegally As a frontline NATO state, Poland is concerned annexed Crimea and invaded the Donbas about Russia’s westward creep. Polish region in eastern Ukraine. Moscow regularly Minister of Foreign Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz violates NATO Allied airspace and conducts identified Russia as the main threat to Poland’s frequent, large-scale, no-notice exercises near sovereignty, regional security and stability, its neighbors’ borders—the same kind of snap European unity, and the transatlantic alliance.3 exercises used to mask impending incursions Although Poland has significantly strengthened into Georgia and Ukraine—in violation of its military over the years, it cannot meet this the transparency protocols required by the challenge alone. Thus, it relies on alliances to Vienna Document of the OSCE of which secure its borders. Russia is a signatory. It engages in hybrid and cyber attacks and appears to be responsible Currently, Poland belongs to a number of for using a military-grade nerve agent in security cooperation frameworks. It participates the United Kingdom. It refuses to withdraw in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, Russian troops from Moldova. The Brussels hosting rotational, multinational, combat-ready, Summit Declaration issued during the 2018 battalion-sized battlegroups. It also cooperates

Polish Security and2 Sovereignty, 2 Center for European Policy Analysis

Polish troops in the eFP Battlegroup Latvia at Camp Ādaži in 2018. Photo Credit: Latvijas armija / Flickr. with the Baltic States and Romania on Baltic security cooperation with the United States Air Policing, as well as with the Visegrád both bilaterally and in the context of NATO. Battlegroup and the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukraine Specifically, it wants a greater Allied presence alliance.4 Through bilateral cooperation with in the Eastern Flank with U.S. boots on Polish the United States, it hosts a U.S. Armored soil.6 It would especially like a U.S. military Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) that trains with base much like the one that exists in Germany. Polish soldiers to integrate forces and is in the As policy analyst Artur Kacprzyk explained, process of acquiring the Patriot Air and Missile a base would send a strong signal to Russia Defense system—a new capability that will that Poland and the Baltic States are under increase its interoperability with U.S. forces. the protection of NATO. It would deter Russia Finally, Poland supports NATO-EU security from invading in the first place, rather than cooperation. While the EU cannot replace presenting NATO with a fait accompli to which NATO, it has an important role to play in the it must respond. If Russia did invade, the areas of crisis management, energy security, proximity of U.S. soldiers to a conflict zone the European Neighborhood Policy, regional could decrease NATO’s decision-making time resilience, improved energy, transportation and trigger faster mobilization.7 and communication infrastructure, and improved security cooperation with Germany Today, the stationing of allied forces, and France.5 particularly U.S. troops, in Poland has broad public support. Polish public opinion favors a Poland’s emphasis on alliances means that greater Allied—and U.S.—presence in Poland. the current administration wants to deepen Polish support for membership in NATO was

Polish Security and82 Sovereignty, 3 Center for European Policy Analysis always high, but it spiked after Russia’s illegal a dialogue within the European Union on “The annexation of Crimea in April 2014, jumping Future of Europe.” Indeed, when members of from 62% in February 2014 to 81% in April the Polish public were asked “What should 2014.8 By February 2017, 82% of respondents be the current goals and directions of Polish expressed support of Poland’s membership in foreign policy?” top priority was given to NATO, while only 3% opposed it. Public opinion improving cooperation with the European on stationing NATO troops in Poland, however, Union (66%), followed by maintaining a has historically been low, ranging from 32% to strategic alliance with the United States 40%. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, (45%), and developing regional cooperation however, support jumped to 57% and has been with other Central European countries (31%), trending upward ever since. In February 2017, according to a poll conducted in April 2018 by 65% of Poles favored stationing NATO troops CBOS.11 As Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki in Poland while only 24% were opposed.9 stated earlier this year, Poland is no more likely This may be based on the underlying fear to leave the EU than Germany or France.12 A that NATO may respond slowly or not at all if consistent theme in Warsaw’s approach to the Poland is attacked, unless the United States is EU is not whether to stay or go (as in the case impacted. When asked, “In your opinion, right of Brexit), but how to reform the EU to better now can Poland count on our allies to defend serve Poland’s interests. To this end, the current our borders or not?” only 59% said “yes” while administration supports a vision of the EU as a 28% said “no” and 13% were unsure.10 For the “Europe of Nations.” According to this model, public, stationing troops on Polish territory the EU would retain its original purpose— would signal NATO’s solidarity and cohesion, economic integration—but end further political deterring Russia from realizing Poland’s worst integration, over-regulation, interference in nightmare. the domestic politics of member states, and disciplinary supervision of member states. The United States can anticipate frequent Multiple regional centers of power would requests for a more permanent U.S. military rise to counter the prominence that Germany presence in Poland. Presently, the United exerts in the Visegrád Four, Carpathian region, States is weighing options for establishing just Baltic countries, and Balkans. that. Such a move would signal permanent support by the United States and align with When it comes to public support for the Polish interests and promote a stronger, more EU, Poland’s commitment to the Union is cohesive NATO. firm among both political elites and the electorate. All mainstream parties support Poland’s membership in the European Union. The European Union: Numerous studies over the years agree A Europe of Nations that Eurosceptic rhetoric is mainly a tool of political party competition rather than a deep Poland’s views on EU integration are far ideological commitment or response to social more complex and dynamic. While the cleavages.13 In a context where parties rarely administration and public opinion fully support last longer than a decade, positions are fluid, Poland’s membership in the European Union, and programs overlap, parties distinguish the PiS administration actively participates in themselves from the competition by accusing

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rivals of being either too servile to the EU or headed in a good direction, while 40% think too Eurosceptic and nationalist. However, no it is headed in a bad direction.16 Among Polish party seeking electoral support and political youth ages 15-24, 76% view EU membership legitimacy seriously questions Poland’s positively, but only 21% favor keeping the EU membership in the European Union. Public as it is while 64% favor reforming the EU while opinion polls conducted by the Center for remaining in it, according to a poll conducted Public Opinion Research (CBOS) between 1994 in January-February 2017.17 These results point and 2018 show that public support for Poland’s to a desire for more dialogue about the future membership has never dropped below 53% of the European Union. and has generally remained above 80% since 2006.14 This also holds true across the In its four-year strategic plan, the Polish Ministry political spectrum. Regardless of political party of Foreign Affairs affirmed that Poland supports affiliation, most Poles support EU membership EU integration and unity but also sees its flaws by a wide margin. A poll conducted in January and wants to play an active role in shaping the 2018 by CBOS showed that support for the EU future of EU integration. To this end, it proposes is universal for voters (100%), and the EU return to its roots and bolster the four fundamental freedoms of mobility of persons, capital, goods, and services while respecting the principles of subsidiarity, transparency, national sovereignty, and the democratic Given such process in EU decision-making.18 Poland’s strong support Minister for Foreign Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz “ elaborated: “Poland’s vision of the European for the EU no Union is that of a union of sovereign states— , neither a superstate, nor an amalgam of party can seriously national egoisms. The practical application of the principle of subsidiarity should provide advocate a new impetus to the integration project. Poland will counteract both the process of reversing integration and the splitting of the Union into Polexit. groups of states that would enjoy different rights. Different categories of membership would weaken the EU’s cohesion. Flexibility is justifiable in some EU policies, but Poland very high for Modern” Party voters (90%), Law will not agree to projects that will weaken and Justice voters (86%), and Kukiz’15 voters the integrity of the Schengen area, the 15 (84%). Given such strong support for the EU, common market, and the EU as a whole. Such no party can seriously advocate a Polexit. differentiation would weaken the whole of Europe.”19 Despite strong support for the EU, there is a growing sense among politicians and voters Thus, the current administration wants an alike that the EU is in crisis and needs to be EU that retains its original purpose but ends reformed. Only 34% of Poles think the EU is further European federalism, over-regulation,

Polish Security and82 Sovereignty, 5 Center for European Policy Analysis and disciplinary supervision of member states. Although critics have argued that the group has It would like to see multiple regional centers of no shared interests beyond their opposition power rise in the Visegrád Group, Carpathian to migrants and EU oversight, the Visegrád region, Baltic countries, and Balkans, so that Four do in fact cooperate on a wide range of no single country holds a hegemonic position. interests, including: digitalization, innovation, Still, Poland can expect tough discussions and entrepreneurship; energy security and with Germany and France, who generally sustainability; food quality; migration; security favor deeper political integration. This cooperation; transportation infrastructure; debate is likely to continue for many years, foreign policy vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, if not decades. The United States should not Ukraine, the Eastern Partnership and the United expect sudden, permanent changes but rather Kingdom post-Brexit; and debates on the future increased bilateral and regional cooperation of the European Union. Their cooperation has within the EU. yielded some tangible results in the areas of energy security and food quality. For example, Regional Cooperation: they successfully advocated for an EU-wide Central Europe Rising?

Given its vision for the EU, the current administration places great importance on its The Visegrad relations with regional partners. It values these Four do in fact partnerships not merely for any transactional “ gains that directly benefit Poland, but for their cooperate on a strategic purpose in balancing what it views as Franco-German hegemony. wide range of One example of intensifying regional interests. cooperation is the Visegrád Four (V4). Comprised of the Czech Republic, , Poland, and Slovakia, the V4 was created to help these countries gain accession into the “energy union.” Established in 2017, the energy European Union. After this goal was achieved union negotiates common” energy policy and in 2004, cooperation decreased for several common pricing. It also affirms a policy of years before gaining new momentum in 2015. solidarity should any member state be deprived A driving force was the migration crisis. This of sufficient resources. This was important for served as a concrete policy issue around countries dependent on Russian gas as well which the Visegrád states could agree. The as Poland and the Czech Republic which had strength of the V4 became apparent as they been paying higher prices for gas and stood to banded together to oppose migrant relocation benefit from collective bargaining.21 quotas. They were able to bargain down their quotas and, more significantly, re-orient EU The Visegrád Four also banded together to policy debates toward reducing migrant flows address concerns over food equality. Some V4 into the Schengen zone.20 leaders complained that their consumers pay

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Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz in 2018. Photo Credit: U.S. Department of State / Flickr. more than West European counterparts for never as severe in Poland as it was in Hungary, lower-quality food of the same brand. Research food quality has been excellent thanks to conducted in Slovakia and the Czech Republic domestic production, and Poland’s energy mix confirmed this perception, while research is weighted toward domestically-produced conducted in Hungary was inconclusive. In coal rather than Russian-supplied natural gas. Poland, no research was conducted on the Additionally, countries within the Visegrád issue and Poles do not seem to share this Four hold different attitudes and orientations perception—mainly because Poland produces toward Russia and the West, with Poland being much of its own food—but Poland supported significantly more anti-Russian. Cooperation other V4 countries seeking food equality. could never rise to the level where it could exist Consequently, the V4 advocated for stronger independently of the European Union. Despite EU regulations and consumer protections. In these limitations, the Visegrád Four adds response, the European Commission allocated another layer of cooperation to the European 2 million euro for researching the problem and Union that has the potential to advance strengthening quality control.22 important projects that might otherwise be neglected by the EU’s more powerful member This is not to ignore limitations to cooperation. states. Poland has tended to benefit less from the Visegrád Four than its neighbors due to Going forward, two projects seem especially differences in national experiences with policy promising: transportation infrastructure issues. For example, the migrant crisis was and technology. Improving transportation

Polish Security and82 Sovereignty, 7 Center for European Policy Analysis infrastructure will increase interconnectivity commitment to transatlanticism. The United in the region and improve integration into States must speak with one voice on NATO and European transportation networks. Promoting demonstrate a clear commitment to the Alliance. the European Single Digital Market, innovation, U.S.-Polish relations hinge, to a great degree, and entrepreneurship will advance economic on the robust nature of American security development. If successful, these initiatives have the potential to re-brand the Visegrád Four as progressive, forward-thinking partners in economic integration. U.S.-Polish Relations Poland honored Poland is an important strategic ally for the Article 5 when United States. It has the fifth-largest economy “ in the European Union post-Brexit, and it is the the United States largest country in Central and Eastern Europe. Its membership in the European Union as well was attacked on as regional networks such as the Visegrád Four, the Three Seas Initiative, the Eastern 9/11, and it expects Partnership, and others makes it a potential force-multiplier capable of influencing the the United States region beyond its borders. A trusted ally whose soldiers fought alongside U.S. soldiers to demonstrate in Afghanistan and Iraq, Poland honored Article 5 when the United States was attacked reciprocal on 9/11, and it expects the United States to demonstrate reciprocal solidarity. solidarity.

The United States can strengthen its relationship with Poland, a key frontline ally and regional player, in a number of ways. For Poland, the most valuable area of cooperation guarantees to Poland and” NATO. Without is security. While national security has always solid security guarantees, the relationship falls been particularly important for this oft-invaded apart. The United States should signal that its country, Russian expansionism has stimulated engagement with Central and East European renewed concerns. The United States should allies is permanent. Establishing a permanent also pay attention to developments within U.S. force posture in Poland is a powerful way the European Union and Poland in order to achieve this aim. Likewise, the United States to understand the important processes of can use its soft power to persuade all NATO transformation. member states to view Enhanced Forward Presence as a permanent feature of NATO’s The most vital message that the United States operations, which would strengthen the can send to Poland is one that renews its U.S.-Polish security relationship. The United

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States should continue working together with to strengthening transatlantic and sub- Poland and other Central and East European European regional alliances. While the current countries to voice opposition to Nord Stream government favors integration, it prioritizes 2 in the interest of regional security. It should national sovereignty. It seeks to enhance use its soft power to bring parties to the table national security by strengthening the NATO to discuss win-win solutions that benefit all alliance, preserving active U.S. involvement EU member states rather than creating West in NATO, and expanding Polish-U.S. security European winners and East European losers. cooperation. It also wants to leverage The United States must renew its commitment cooperation with regional allies to gain a to the transatlantic alliance because it is our greater voice in European and international best bet for a durable peace. The United affairs. States and its allies stand to gain when the transatlantic alliance is strong. When the Foreign policy-making is a dynamic process; transatlantic alliance is divided, we expose policies constantly evolve to respond to ourselves to our enemies. domestic and international factors. Some events and developments that may impact Conclusion Polish foreign policy include the upcoming elections of 2019 and changes to Russia’s What emerges from this analysis is that Poland security posture. The United States should under the Law and Justice Party is asserting monitor developments carefully but also keep its national interests and advocating for a them in perspective. While administrations reform of the European Union. In the foreign come and go, and policies may change on a and security policy field, there is strong moment’s notice, the Polish-U.S. alliance must consistency with Poland’s previous approach stand firm.

Polish Security and82 Sovereignty, 9 Center for European Policy Analysis Endnotes

1 Jacek Czaputowicz. “Minister Jacek Czaputowicz on Polish diplomacy priorities in 2018.” Press Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, March 21, 2018. https://www.msz. gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/news/minister_jacek_czaputowicz_on_polish_diplomacy_priorities_in_2018 (Accessed May 19, 2019).

2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Brussels Summit Declaration.” Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on July 11-12, 2018. (July 11, 2018) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm (Accessed on July 16, 2018).

3 Jacek Czaputowicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. “Minister Jacek Czaputowicz on Polish diplomacy priorities in 2018.” Press Office,Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, March 21, 2018.

4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. “Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017- 2021.” Press Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 11, https://www.msz.gov. pl/resource/0c98c3b2-9c5d-4c42-8761-f7827134ee76:JCR (Accessed May 19, 2018).

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, “Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017- 2021,” 10.

6 Jacek Czaputowicz, “Minister Jacek Czaputowicz on Polish diplomacy priorities in 2018,” https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/msz_en/news/minister_jacek_czaputowicz_on_polish_diplomacy_ priorities_in_2018 (Accessed May 19, 2019).

7 Artur Kacprzyk. U.S. Military Presence in Central and Eastern Europe: Consequences for NATO Strategic Adaptation, Deterrence and Allied Solidarity. (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, August 2015), 15.

8 CBOS. “Stosunek do NATO i obecności wojsk sojuszniczych w naszym kraju.” [“Attitude Toward NATO and the Presence of Military Allies in Our Country].” CBOSNews No. 26. Warsaw: CBOS, March 2017, 1-2.

9 Ibid, 6.

10 Ibid.

11 CBOS. “How Do We See Polish-American Relations?” CBOSNews No. 15. Warsaw: CBOS, 2018. https://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/news/2018/14/newsletter.php (Accessed on June 21, 2018)

12 Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Interviewed by Jan Puhl. “Europe Has Run Out of Gas,” Spiegel Online, February 20, 2018, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview- with-polish-prime-minister-mateusz-morawiecki-a-1194264.html (Accessed February 24, 2018)

13 Dorota Dakowska. “Whither Euroscepticism? The Uses of European Integration by Polish Conservative and Radical Parties,” Perspectives on European Politic an Society 11, no. 3, (September 2010), 254-272; Laure Neumayer. (2008) Euroscepticism as a political label: The uses of European Union issues in political competition in the new Member States.” European Journal

Polish Security and82 Sovereignty, 10 Center for European Policy Analysis of Political Research 47, 135-160; Maciej Raś. “Foreign and Security Policy in the Party Discourse in Poland: Main Futures.” UNISCI Journal 43 (2017), 117-141; Peter Vermeersch. “Contesting Europe: Strategies and Legacies in Polish Political Competition,” Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 3 (May 2010), 503 – 522.

14 CBOS. “Attitude to EU Integration” in Trends. Warsaw: CBOS, 2018. http://www.cbos.pl/EN/ trends/trends.php?trend_parametr=stosunek_do_integracji_UE (Accessed March 29, 2018)

15 CBOS. “Reakcje na uruchomienie wobec Polski art. 7 Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej.” [“Reactions to the European Union’s Triggering of Article 7 Against Poland.”] CBOSNews No. 14. Warsaw: CBOS, January 2018, 11.

16 TNS Opinion & Social. “Opinia Publiczna w Unii Europejskiej. Polska.” [“Public Opinion in the European Union: Poland”] Standard Eurobarometer 88 Country Report. Fall 2017, 3.

17 Agnieszka Łada and Łukasz Wenerski. “Poland.” In Exit, Voice or Loyalty? Young People on Europe and Democracy: Case Studies from Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, eds Jacek Kucharczyk, Agnieszka Łada, Gabriele Schöler. Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 2017, 123.

18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, “Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017- 2021,” 13.

19 Ibid, 21.

20 The Visegrád Group: The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Annual Report of the Czech V4 Presidency 2015-2016, 1.

21 Magdalena Wnuk. “Wyszehradzki kwartet gra na wspólny gaz” [“The Visegrád Four plays for common gas”], MamPrawoWiedzieć.pl, October 18, 2017, http://serwis.mamprawowiedziec. pl/2017/10/komu-zalezy-na-wspolnym-gazie.html (Accessed March 29, 2018).

22 Wojciech Gąsior. “Second rate food for second rate citizens?” MamPrawoWiedzieć.pl, January 4, 2018, http://mamprawowiedziec.blogactiv.eu/2018/01/19/second-rate-food-for-second- rate-citizens/ (Accessed March 29, 2018).

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