Global Dialogues 11

Engaging and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Development David Carment and Milana Nikolko (eds.)

1 Global Dialogues 11 Global Dialogues 11

David Carment and Milana Nikolko (eds.). Licence: Creative Commons Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives Attribution CC BY-ND 4.0 on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Attribution Development (Global Dialogues 11). Please cite the work as follows: David Carment Engaging Crimea Duisburg 2015: Käte Hamburger Kolleg / and Milana Nikolko (eds.) 2015. Engaging Crimea Centre for Global Cooperation Research and Beyond: Perspectives on Conflict, Cooperation (KHK / GCR21). and Civil Society Development (Global Dialogues 11). Duisburg: Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for and Beyond: Global Cooperation Research (KHK / GCR21). Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-11. Licence: Creative Global Cooperation Research Commons Attribution CC BY-ND 4.0. Perspectives on Conflict, (KHK / GCR21) Schifferstr. 196 No Derivative Works You may not alter, transform, or build upon this 47059 Duisburg, Germany work. Tel.: +49 (0)203 29861-100 Cooperation and Civil Fax: +49 (0)203 29861-199 Notice E-Mail: [email protected] For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear www.gcr21.org to others the licence terms of this work. The best Society Development way to do this is with a link to this web page: www.gcr21.org/publications. Executive Director David Carment and Milana Nikolko (eds.) Dr. Markus Böckenförde, LL.M.

Board of Directors Prof. Tobias Debiel Prof. Claus Leggewie Global Dialogues are available online. To learn more about the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Prof. Dirk Messner Centre for Global Cooperation Research, please visit www.gcr21.org. Editorial Team Martin Wolf DuEPublico Tina Berntsen Issues are permanently archived at the University of Duisburg-Essen’s open-access repository: Ines Wingenbach (Editorial Design) http://duepublico.uni-duisburg-essen.de.

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6 Introduction Milana Nikolko and David Carment Part I: Engaging Crimea: Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation 11 The Future of Crimea: the Crimean Tatar Per- spective Elmira Muratova 14 Crimea: ‘s Other Chechnya? Ivan Preobrazhenskiy 16 Crimea in Retrospect: Missed Opportunities? David Carment 21 Three Myths for Crimea: Does ’s Version Have a Chance? Pavel Kazarin 25 The Quest for a Political Mythology: Ukraine and the Crimean Tatar Story Serhii Kostynskyi Part II: Constructing ‘the Ukrainian Nation’: the Role of Civil Society in the Nation Building Pro- cess After the Crimean Referendum 29 Symbols, Meanings, and Conflicts: How the Interpretation of History Influences Contemporary Events in Ukraine Oksana Danylenko 34 Anti-corruption Reform in Ukraine: Prospects and Challenges Oksana Huss 38 History and Gender in the Protests Olena Petrenko 43 Phantom Pain Syndrome: The Ukrainian Nation One Year after the Annexation of Crimea Milana Nikolko 47 Information about the Authors and Editors This issue of Global Dialogues draws on a two-day event organized by the Centre for Global Cooperation Research in the spring of 2015. Bringing together academics and policy- makers from Crimea, Russia, Ukraine, Canada, and Germany, the meeting explored the current situation in Crimea, day-to- day life in the region, relations – present and future – between Introduction Ukraine and Russia, and the role of the West in finding a cooperative solution to the conflict. The future of Ukraine remains uncertain. Although the Crimean secession was virtually bloodless, the position of the peninsula’s minority populations is still unclear. One year post-referendum, Crimea is de facto Russian territory, incorporated at both political and societal levels, whilst in Eastern Ukraine, hostilities have significantly intensified. Recent surveys indicate that a substantial majority of the Crimean population support the Russian annexation and feel safe and secure in the territory. At the same time, a survey published by the Kiev-based Democratic Initiative Foundation found that 68 per cent of Ukrainians considered Crimea still to be part of Ukraine.1 Who is right – the majority in Crimea or 1 http://dif.org.ua/ua/events/- the Ukrainians who still see Crimea as part of Ukraine? Given krlitiki--sprijannja-.htm. these divergent perspectives, what does the future of Crimea hold for Ukraine as a whole? Can we expect more sanctions and more conflict in the shorter term – and along with these a wider role for regional organizations? Can a middle ground be found, based on political solutions and regional cooperation? What are the entry-points for engaging Crimea’s minorities? Events in Crimea have, without question, brought an irre- vocable change in the dynamic of Ukraine–Russian relations. They exemplify to some extent a clash of methodological paradigms in international relations. One the one hand, we have the Western approach to conflict-resolution, with its focus on universal values such as the common good, the inviolability of national sovereignty, international justice, and the rule of law. On the other, we have a framework based on geopolitical strategy and characterized by major-power spheres of influence and so-called ‘realpolitik’. This is the path which present-day Russia has chosen to follow. The two disparate approaches have given rise to distinct, parallel discourses, with very few openings for dialogue. When it comes to the situation of ethnic minorities in Crimea, there are concerns about the situation of the Tatar peoples, which has become much more precarious over the last year. Raids of homes and mosques, confiscation of religious literature, arrests of religious activists, and the application of pressure on Tatar media have all become more common during this period. These new realities have brought new challenges: we may see a rise in the number of Tatars leaving the peninsula, or we may see increased radicalization of Crimea’s Tatar community under the banner of Islam.

7 A ‘Caucasus scenario’ for Crimea has wide currency amongst conflict, economic decline, and social and humanitarian those with expert knowledge of the situation of Islam in post- instability, notably in the Donbas region. Despite these Soviet space. difficulties, however, Ukrainian social activism – on the part In Russia, pressure on NGOs has intensified, with political of volunteer and civil-society organizations, for example – activists and opponents of the regime being harassed and continues to shape and influence Kiev’s political structures. intimidated. The most recent and most acutely felt example Meanwhile in Russia, civil society has become somewhat of this was the murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov. polarized over the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s role in it, Meanwhile, the Russian public continues to have very little with the greater part of Russian society, and the majority influence on politics. As far as Crimea is concerned, the of Russian political parties, continuing to support President territory has been fully integrated into Russia as a Federal Putin and his cabinet. District endowed with a unique administrative system and Ukraine still has difficulties with the methodological generous federal funding. As things currently stand, the ma- interpretation of nation-building and with perceptions jority of people in Crimea have good reason to keep up their of ‘the other’. Having lived in the shadow of ‘Big Brother’ robust defence of President Putin. for so long, and having acquiesced to myths about ‘brother It is possible that the situation in Crimea will remain frozen nations’ (‘bratskie narody’), the country continued, even for the foreseeable future. Although military recapture is an after independence in 1991, to be what was, for all intents unthinkable prospect, and – for this and other reasons – a and purposes, a colony, with a political elite conditioned by return of Crimea to Ukraine is unlikely, the peninsula’s legal colonial-style thinking. Now involved in a dramatic conflict and political status is likely to remain uncertain. Economically, and afflicted by various kinds of social, political, and physical Crimea’s star will now rise and fall with Russian fortunes: if trauma, the country is searching for a new national ideal. Talk sanctions are eased and the Russian economy picks up over of ‘the Other’, in the guise of Russia/the , has the next twelve months – as a result of the exploitation become the dominant narrative in political and social circles. of natural resources in the Black Sea region, for example – Some interesting insights can be gained by reconstructing Crimea could well benefit from increased tourism and the the process of transformation undergone by the Ukrainian growth this brings with it. That said, one year post annexation, ‘grand narrative’ at the height of the crisis in Kiev last year Crimea’s status remains uncertain: members of the political and more recently in Eastern Ukraine. Because of the current establishment declare it to be part of Ukraine, but there is configuration of events, with its emphasis on confrontation, little or no investment in policy-processes that would make war, and the pursuit of victory, masculinity has acquired a this assertion a reality. The proposal to create a Ministry of markedly symbolic quality. Opportunities to emulate, and Occupied Territories remains mired in controversy and the share in, the glory attaching to bygone Ukrainian heroes physical control which Ukraine wields over Crimea via services abound and the concept of man as defender and warrior such as electricity and water, internet provision, and telephone is eliciting particular interest and regard in Ukrainian communications has so far not been used as leverage in political discourse. The Euromaidan protests emphasized negotiations with Crimea’s political elite – though Crimeans the continuity of this masculinized national narrative and do have to contend with the continued suspension of rail-links reinforced its standpoints and attitudes. A mythologized and with Ukraine. The policy of the Ukrainian government towards heroic past is evoked, in which women too are portrayed as Ukrainians who prefer to stay in Crimea is also very unclear. warriors of epic stature. Even assuming a scenario – in which, for example, Crimea’s current status is reconciled with international law and Russian occupation is legalized – it will probably take up to a generation, if not longer, for the Russian incorporation of Crimea to be fully accepted. From the European standpoint, it makes sense to monitor the situation on an ongoing basis, always bearing in mind that a simple and speedy solution is unlikely. A complex dynamic typical of modern international relations is at work here, involving a mix of geopolitics and global cooperation. On the broader question of Ukraine’s future: few would have imagined, a little over a year ago, that the country would be facing problems such as loss of territory, ongoing military

8 9 Part I The Future of Crimea: Engaging Crimea: The Crimean Tatar Prospects for Conflict and Perspective Cooperation Elmira Muratova

Any analysis of the situation in Crimea, and of what lies in store for the region, has to take into account the Crimean Tatar perspective. The March 2014 referendum on the peninsula’s status and, following this, the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation have lent urgency to the Tatar question and seen it surface as a topic of wide-ranging debate at various international venues. More than ever before, the leaders of the Crimean Tatar community are looking to the international community to help them safeguard Tatar rights. Anyone familiar with the history of the Crimean Tatars will appreciate the irony of the scenario currently being played out in the region. An indigenous people of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars experienced great suffering during both the Russian and the Soviet regimes. Their attitudes to the so-called ‘Crimean Spring’ have been shaped by the memory of the dramatic events of their history – the annexation of Crimea in the late eighteenth century and the mass deportations of 1944 – which are engraved in their collective consciousness. Recent events elicit in them a sense of déjà vu, a sense of something familiar and poignant. Unsurprisingly, the stance taken by the Crimean Tatars has been actively pro-Ukrainian, based on the hope that the new government in Kiev would bring about positive change across society. One of the changes most sought after by the Tatars was recognition of their status as an indigenous people of Crimea and the restoration of the rights that flow from this. Unfortunately, the long- awaited Ukrainian decision on this came too late – in the spring of 2014, when Crimea was already under Russian rule.

10 11 For some Tatars, the decision was nonetheless a source of incompetence, unemployment, and the late payment of moral satisfaction, signalling as it did acknowledgement of salaries) has become more difficult and effectively limited the their pro-Ukrainian stance; others viewed it as belated and organized protection of rights. purely rhetorical. Recent research on xenophobia in Ukraine during 2014, After 200 years, the Crimean Tatars are once again feeling against the backdrop of revolution and intervention, shows like outcasts in their own homeland, suspecting Crimean that Crimean Tatars are one of the main targets of discrimi- authorities of wanting to drive them completely out of nation by Crimean authorities. For this reason, the involve- the peninsula. The pressure being exerted on the Tatar’s ment of third parties – particularly human-rights missions representative body, the Mejlis, is seen as an attempt to permanently based in Crimea – would be a positive move. weaken the Crimean Tatar national movement and rob it of Missions of this kind should be established under the aegis the leadership that could marshal popular opposition to of the United Nations or the European Union and should be the Russian authorities. The raids on the homes of Crimean tasked with monitoring the protection of human rights in Tatar activists and on the mosques and madrasas (Muslim the peninsula. In April 2015, an unofficial Turkish delegation schools), the confiscation of religious literature, the summons visited Crimea to assess the situation of the Crimean Tatars. to appear before investigative committees – all these are This shows not only that initiatives of this kind are possible perceived as attempts to sow fear and panic among the despite all the diplomatic obstacles but also that they can Tatars and pressurize them into leaving Crimea. Despite have a positive influence. If such missions were international, these difficulties, some Tatars plan to stay in their homeland. they could be even more effective. Others (including members of the intelligentsia, business International organizations can also play a useful part in people, and practising Muslims) fear for their personal safety tackling the isolation currently being experienced by Crimean and have moved to Ukraine or elsewhere. According to figures citizens. Many Crimeans hold pro-Ukrainian and pro-European published by Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy on 18 May 2015, views and feel doubly punished by the Ukrainian government’s of the 20,000 and more Crimean citizens who have moved to obstructive attitude in regard to relocation from Crimea to other parts of Ukraine since the troubles began , about half Ukraine. For many, the door to Ukraine is now closed: they are Crimean Tatars. are unable to resolve problems with their paperwork, cannot A number of worrying trends make it difficult to be optimistic visit their relatives, and are prevented from applying for about Crimea’s future. For one thing, civil-society structures foreign visas. This piles added problems onto an already over- are being destroyed and replaced by ‘quasi’ equivalents. The burdened Crimean population and stirs up anti-Ukrainian Mejlis, for example, formerly a representative body elected feeling even amongst those supportive of Kiev’s cause. by the Council of the Crimean Tatar People (Qurultai), has been forced to change its leadership and register as a regular public organization. Crimean Tatars, who had a long record of excellent organization and an established set of public institutions, now find themselves in the position of having to have every public activity approved by the authorities. Where Crimean Tatar organizations are concerned, only events of a cultural nature, and only those organized by individuals loyal to the authorities, have any chance of being approved. All the activities currently being run within the Crimean Tatar community consist either of courses in the Crimean Tatar language or youth competitions centred on culture or religion. Worrying trends are also emerging in inter-ethnic relations. The events of the ‘Crimean Spring’ have exacerbated ethnic divisions between and Crimean Tatars. This is reflected, for example, in the fall in inter-ethnic marriages and the increase in divorce in this category. Mistrust of people from other ethnic groups has also grown, having almost returned to the levels of the 1990s, when Tatar repatriation had just begun. Bringing people together to tackle increasingly common cross-group problems (such as corruption, official

12 13 driven by ’s desire to find an ally in the fight against the Islamists in the Caucasus, but its negative effects are now making themselves felt in the form of increasing corruption, rising nationalism, and the marginalization of local ethnic Russians, who, in order to retain any influence, have been forced to ally themselves with one of the ethnic clans. Crimea: On the face of it, the situation in the North Caucasus seems to bear little relation to conditions in Crimea, where there is a sizeable Russian majority, a high proportion of Russian- Russia’s Other Chechnya? speaking Ukrainians, and only a small contingent of Crimean Tatars (14 per cent of the total population). Many in Moscow would appear to think otherwise. Besides putting Kozak in Ivan Preobrazhenskiy charge, they have announced a number of initiatives designed to boost the position of the Crimean Tatars at the expense of the rest of the population. In one move, for example, Moscow has called for the recognition of three official languages in the peninsula: Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar. It has also sought, in various ways, to buy the loyalty of the Crimean Tatar nation – or at least of some of its clans. One of the models which experts on the development of Islam Most significantly, Putin himself has spoken of the need for in the post-Soviet space most often discuss in relation to the the matter of the final rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars, emergent situation in Crimea is the ‘Caucasus scenario’. But deported en masse by Stalin, to be resolved. Such a measure exactly what form would this scenario take in the peninsula? will involve providing additional compensation and settling We know of several possible permutations. One – typically the question of land-ownership by regularizing the status of dubbed the ‘Dagestan scenario’ – would involve an unremitting houses constructed illegally on land seized by the Crimean but low-level terrorist-type war between loyalists and (playing Tatars. It will also involve setting aside quotas of seats for the part of the radical Islamists in Dagestan) Tatars. Such a Tatars in the Crimean Republic’s parliament. In short, events scenario is implausible. If anything, Crimea is more likely to in Crimea are likely to follow the same course as those in face a situation similar to that in Chechnya. This is because Kozak’s North Caucasus. This will include the continued de Russia is set on running Crimea in the same way that it runs facto appointment of the head of the region by Russia and the North Caucasus, a stance prompted at least in part by its the forging of alliances between this official and local ‘clans’ – distrust of the local ethnic Russians and its belief that it can more likely the Crimean Tatars than the ethnic Russians, and exploit the Crimean Tatars for its own purposes. certainly not the Ukrainians. In its turn, this balancing-act act Moscow’s distrust of the local ethnic Russian leadership will lead to Moscow’s special economic relations with Crimea is so deep that Crimea’s ethnic Russian population may one being transformed into direct dependence on the centre and day come to view the period of Ukrainian rule as a golden age its oil and gas revenues – in just the same way as has happened during which they were able to manage their affairs largely in North Caucasus, particularly Chechnya. The new system of without outside interference – a situation which Moscow will administration will be fashioned by those who celebrated the not allow to continue. Having annexed the peninsula, the peninsula’s return to Russia; but these same sections of the central Russian government has made it into a new Crimean population risk becoming the chief victims of these changes if Federal District and appointed Sergey Belaventsev, a non- what they get is not a truly popular system of governance but Crimean Russian, to run it. More importantly, the Kremlin has a Crimean satrapy. assigned the task of overseeing the peninsula’s integration into Russia to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, former Pro-consul in the North Caucasus – who, according to those who saw him in action there, has his own distinctive ‘method’ of dealing with things. Under his direction, claim expert observers of this region, Moscow began increasingly to rely on long-established local clans rather than attempt any overhaul of the system. This approach, I would argue, was

14 15 focused most of its efforts on threatening Russia, or punishing it, specifically targeting its leader, . Almost no diplomatic effort was expended in engaging the Crimeans themselves. In the lead-up to the Russian annexation, the world was treated to a steady stream of grave pronouncements from various representatives of the State Department and White Crimea in Retrospect: House, notably John Kerry and Samantha Power, all of them vilifying the Russian leader. Though often skilfully crafted and impressive in their rhetoric, these messages had little impact Missed Opportunities? on their intended target – the Russian government. The almost maniacal enthusiasm with which the media, academics, and policy-makers in the took up the anti- David Carment Putin mantra came as both a surprise and a disappointment. The Russian leader’s every word was dissected and the usual analogies were resorted to, with Putin being variously likened to Hitler or Stalin – a tactic no doubt employed by Western leaders in order to try to impress on their publics just how dire the situation was. To the New Europe and the frontier states bordering on Ukraine, whose populations had lived through When, on 6 March 2014, the Crimean parliament brought Nazi and Soviet occupation, these analogies struck home with forward the date of the proposed referendum on the status particular force. of Crimea to 16 March,1 this left little time or opportunity In sum, Western policy in the lead-up to the Crimean 1 It had initially been scheduled either for a dialogue to be brokered between the conflicting referendum was aimed primarily at punishing Putin or coercing for May and later for 30 March. parties or for Crimeans to ponder the significance of their him into a desired course of action. It made little attempt to choice. At the time, many analysts were asking whether address the factors that persuaded him to send his forces into the Crimean crisis would inevitably lead to armed conflict. Crimea in the first place. John Kerry, for example, repeatedly With war looming, the need for a political, or indeed legal, sought to discredit Putin’s claims that he had intervened at the solution to the dispute was obvious. Although, diplomatically request of the Crimean leadership and that he was concerned speaking, nothing of significance subsequently emerged, the about the safety of the Russian population in the peninsula. The dire warnings and threats from the West regarding Russian only kind of overture made to the Crimean people themselves expansion were unhelpful and unnecessary. consisted in warning them repeatedly that they were being We know that Ukraine’s leaders were taken by surprise at manipulated by Russia for its own interests. Suggestions that the speed of events, but the government seemed, in any case, the referendum was a sham and had succeeded only because unable or unwilling to engage in negotiations with Russia, even it was held at gun-point completely missed the point. The as a way of thwarting the latter in the pursuit of its strategic Americans, it seemed, were not interested in what the people goals. Few, if any, of the politicians in Kiev or the West were of Crimea wanted – and what the majority of them clearly prepared to entertain alternative scenarios for resolving the wanted was to not be part of Ukraine anymore. crisis, refusing even to contemplate the notion of increased In fact, Crimea had long seen popular support for autonomy for Crimea – never mind the possibility of its reunification with Russia. These sentiments were ultimately secession. When proposals of this kind finally made it onto the expressed in the phrasing of the questions posed to the table, it was too late. In hindsight, it is possible to identify a people of Crimea. Two questions were on the table: Should number of reasons for this diplomatic failure. Crimea be part of the Russian Federation and should Crimea restore Crimea’s Constitution of 1992 that gave the region more autonomy and remain as part of Ukraine? The first Blinkered strategies question regarding membership in the Russian Federation is an important one. The Russian Federation was recognised in For one thing, apart from the threat of sanctions, there was international law as the successor state of the Soviet Union. little evidence of any interest in the political and economic In essence, the referendum question was asking Crimeans to situation of the Crimean people. Having chosen to take the decide if they should return to the status quo ante before the diplomatic lead in challenging Moscow, the USA, for example, break-up of the Soviet Union.

16 17 That many Crimeans were ultimately convinced that this first Had there been meaningful negotiations, however, attention choice was reasonable is evident in the second question that might instead have focused on the long-term political and asked for a return to the 1992 Constitution. Consider that economic viability of Crimea’s remaining within Ukraine. In in January 1991, through a referendum, Crimea regained its this connection, it is worth noting that some (but not many) status as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which gave Crimeans now question whether it was ever a good idea extended rights to the peninsula. On 26 February 1992, the to be part of Ukraine: in 2008, despite already being an Verkhovniy Sovet proclaimed self-government as the Republic autonomous republic, Crimea, reliant on Kiev for two-thirds of Crimea (adding a few days later a paragraph ‘as a part of of its (dwindling) regional budget, was particularly hard hit by independent Ukraine’.) the recession. During this period, using the weakness of the central Conversely, the West could have spelled out the costs Ukrainian government and relying on Russian support, the of Crimean absorption into Russia. With a population of Crimean local elite voted for its first Crimean constitution just over two million, a weak, dependent economy, and on May 5 1992 and, within a few months, the position of the poor water and electricity supplies, the peninsula has now was established. In the summer of 1992, an become something of an economic burden to Russia. And yet all Crimea referendum was held and a majority of the population neither the international community nor Kiev spelled out this voted in support of the new Crimean Constitution. This is the possibility. There were bail-outs and aid-packages for Kiev, point of reference the question of March 16 considered. So, but the economic and political benefits that would accrue in essence Crimeans were being asked to turn back the clock to the Crimeans from staying in a unified Ukraine were never to a time when they had previously considered breaking away properly explained to them. from Ukraine. Like today, the 1990s were a period of economic and political uncertainty for Ukraine. It took the then leader, , the better part of a year to muster enough Security concerns disregarded support from the Kiev elite to start the political process of getting the Crimean peninsula reintegrated into Ukraine – a Another reason for the failure in diplomacy was an unwill- process which many Crimeans resisted. In 1995, the Ukrainian ingness to address Russia’s legitimate security concerns. A parliament voted to review the position of Crimea within the compromise might have been possible, for example, whereby Ukraine, scrapping the Crimean constitution and removing the was annexed, but Crimea resumed its 1992 con- then president of Crimea, Yuriy Meshkov, from office for his stitution and remained an autonomous part of Ukraine. Even anti-state activities and his support for integration with Russia. when part of Ukraine, Sevastopol was a ‘city with special Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the status’ and the area in which it was included was a distinct Kiev government should have declared the 2014 referendum municipality, separate from Crimea. The majority (over 70 per illegal – on the grounds that the Ukrainian constitution made cent) of the city’s residents are ethnic Russians. In addition, it no provision for it. John Kerry, meanwhile, argued that the is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (and formerly also to the whole of Ukraine should have been given the opportunity Ukrainian Naval Forces), the naval facilities having previously to vote on the issues involved. Neither of these responses been leased to Russia by Ukraine. An independent Sevastopol was adequate, given the lack of mechanisms for enforcing might have been enough to satisfy Russia’s strategic needs – corresponding solutions on all the parties concerned. Simply and the in fact held a referendum of its put, if the United States was serious about finding an own on accession to Russia. alternative to Russian annexation of Crimea, the conditions Finally, we come to Crimea’s Ukrainian and Tatar minorities, that followed from this should have been clearly laid out by numbering around 25 per cent and 13 per cent respectively its lead diplomats. Apart from the threat of sanctions, no of the region’s overall population. Most members of these meaningful or adequate mechanism of enforcement was minorities live in four sub-regions in the north of Crimea. proposed as a curb on Russian annexation. And in retrospect Historically, they have sought the union of Herson oblast even the sanctions did not produce the intended effect. with the adjoining oblasts in Ukraine proper. A second possible Again, the approach on the Russian side essentially consisted territorial compromise would have been to allow these four in questioning the legitimacy of the Kiev government’s claim oblasts to remain in Ukraine, with the rest of Crimea and the to Crimea, based on precedent, experience, and Crimean city of Sevastopol coming under Russian control. sentiment. The results of recent surveys showing strong None of the solutions mentioned were easy choices, and it may Crimean support for remaining within Russia suggest this was a be that none of them was obvious to the parties in conflict, who strategy that found favour with the majority on the peninsula. were acting under immense pressure to avoid a full-blown crisis.

18 19 Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence to show that ethnic groups can reach negotiated solutions through political and territorial compromise. In addition, history shows that such solutions often only present themselves after years, if not decades, of war. The Crimean crisis was an opportunity to show the world that blood need not be spilled and states need not collapse. Three Myths for Crimea: Had there been greater openness to different kinds of self- government for Crimea before the referendum, complete separation might have been avoided. One option might have Does Ukraine’s Version been a form of self-government and sovereignty of the kind that Canada has negotiated with its native peoples and in which relations between the two entities concerned are based Have a Chance? on treaty obligations rather than on political rights. Even in the absence of meaningful diplomacy, Crimea managed to come away from the crisis virtually without violent Pavel Kazarin incident. Was this simply luck? What would have happened if Putin’s forces had not scrambled into Crimea? There is little doubt that Crimea would have sought independence anyway – and a good chance that it would have done so through force, meaning Crimea could easily now be a bloody battleground. This conclusion is based largely on prior history, notably the occasions in 1991 and 1992 when the Crimean parliament Fighting a myth is no more possible than fighting a dream – voted for autonomy (‘within an independent Ukraine’) – an perhaps because a myth is itself a dream. The only way to endeavour in which they were ultimately thwarted, in 1994, vanquish a myth is with the help of another one. ‘Myth’ is not by the then leader of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma. In addition, simply a synonym for ‘fiction’. In the classical sense, it meant transfer payments from Kiev to have been a framework of ideas through which people made sense shrinking over the last two decades and the prospect of of the world and their place within it. It might be defined remaining part of an economically even weaker Ukraine would as a way of conceiving the architecture of the surrounding have been unappealing. universe, the past and present, values and taboos. Against In retrospect, it is clear that the West underestimated this background, the current conflict in Ukraine can be seen Crimea’s importance to Russia. Putin’s actions now also as a battle between the Russian myth about the country come across as clearly pre-emptive in nature: in the context and the country’s own myth about itself. And seen from of his fear that he was about to lose the peninsula to a pro- this perspective, the nub of the problem lies in Crimea, Western government – and along with it a long-standing because although the peninsula has a Russian myth in place, arrangement for leasing naval facilities – his choices become no Ukrainian counterpart has so far emerged and Ukraine understandable, if only at a strategic level. And understanding instead relies on Crimean Tatar narratives. an adversary’s motives is a vital ingredient of effective crisis- related decision-making and diplomacy. The Russian Myth

The ancient city of Chersonese,1 the ‘Crimean Riviera’ beloved 1 The Ancient City of Tauric Cher- of the early twentieth-century Russian intelligentsia, the sonese and its Chora is a UNESCO southern palaces, Alexander Pushkin’s sojourn in the region, World Heritage Site, http://whc. the heroic defence of Sevastopol during the Crimean War, the unesco.org/en/list/1411. tragedy of the White officers in the 1920s, the second defence of Sevastopol in World War II – all these have long since become part and parcel of the Russian notion of Crimea, in particular the version of it that seeks to justify Russian control over the peninsula. Analysing the ethnic composition of the

20 21 regiments that fought at Sevastopol in 1854–6 and pointing Such a myth could, for example, have been based on the major to their Ukrainian roots will do nothing to alter this situation. role that Kiev has played in rebuilding the peninsula since Unless the Crimean War features prominently in the annals of the transfer of the region to Ukraine in 1954, establishing Ukrainian history, and unless Ukraine claims ownership of it, communication systems and supplying all vital needs. After all, the myths about it will remain lodged in Moscow. amongst the justifications offered at the hand-over sixty-one Simply put, the Russian myth about Crimea succeeds years ago was ‘the commonality of economy, geographical because it is inclusive: in principle anyone can become part proximity and tight domestic and cultural ties between the of it; ethnicity is secondary. Considering the timing of its Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR’. appearance, and the circumstances, some would say the The supply of fresh water to the peninsula via the North Crimean version of the Russian myth is actually the Soviet Crimean Canal, the provision of electricity and goods – the myth. Maybe so, but it exists nevertheless. Ukrainian myth about Crimea could have been built on the routine but vital details of everyday life. Prosaic-sounding, no doubt, and no match for the booming pathos of slogans about The Crimean Tatar Myth ‘Russia’s Jerusalem’. One of those who wanted to inject new meaning into The Crimean Tatars also have a myth about Crimea. This is the the peninsula was the economist Andrey Klimenko. Urging story of the ‘stolen motherland’, of three and a half centuries Ukrainians to look to the present rather than the past, he of autonomous governance as part of the Crimean Khanate. suggested shifting the peninsula’s focus towards cooperation It tells of the deportation of an indigenous people and their within the Black Sea region, with a view to transforming the replacement by newcomers and people shipped in from Russia area into a communications hub and investing it with new and Ukraine. It tells of a pre-war, multi-ethnic Crimea where parameters and dynamics. These ideas would fit in well with the Crimean Tatar language was a vital lingua franca. the Ukrainian myth described above, producing an inclusive The weak point in this myth is its exclusivity. It is, so to story with which all could identify, regardless of nationality. speak, defensive and was originally aimed at preserving, So far, however, no one has paid any attention: inertia has rather than extending, an ethnic group’s boundaries. This was carried the day. natural: on returning from deportation, the Crimean Tatars found themselves in a minority on the peninsula and their prime objective was to re-establish an identity for themselves Who wins? in the region. They therefore worked to stave off dissolution and assimilation, and the Crimean Tatar myth, which enabled Legitimizing as it does the return of the peninsula to Kiev, them to define boundaries between Self and Other, helped the Crimean Tatar myth benefits Ukraine. The Russian myth, them in this task. But therein lies the problem with the myth: meanwhile, naturally strengthens Moscow’s hand – especially it is difficult to be part of it if you are not a Crimean Tatar. since Kiev does not seek to claim ownership of the portion

It is premised on ethnic and territorial autonomy, parliamen- of shared Ukrainian – Russian history that has an imperial tary quotas, and a system of preferences. With its antago- narrative. Significantly, the legislation restoring the rights of nistic overtones, the myth tends to galvanize opponents as people deported on ethnic grounds, kept in abeyance by the well as supporters. Ukrainian parliament for many years, was only adopted on 17 April 2014, just one month after the annexation of Crimea. And Russia made its own attempt at appropriating the Crimean The Ukrainian Myth Tatar cause by according the Crimean Tatar language official status in the peninsula’s constitution – a move undermined by The Crimean Tatar myth is increasingly being embraced by the subsequent closure of the Tatar television channel and Ukraine as its own. This is understandable: twenty years after the regular subjection of activists to interrogation. independence Ukraine still has no conception of its own in To some, the issue of myths may seem of secondary regard to the peninsula. Its authority there is established in importance: what determines the course of politics, they say, law but not yet legitimized in myth: legitimacy of that kind is is economics and military strength. But the modern world not about legality but about popular assent and willingness to is a space inhabited by more than just statistics, energy conform. And yet all the conditions were in place for Ukraine supplies, and firepower: it is also a space of symbols. People’s to forge a Crimean myth of its own – not a militaristic or perceptions generate and shape public demands and these historical or religious one, but something simple and practical. demands in turn shape political action – which, incidentally,

22 23 is why Crimea was designated ‘Russia’s Jerusalem’ and the Donbas, for example, was not.

A fact worth reflecting on. The Quest for a Political Mythology: Ukraine and the Crimean Tatar Story Serhii Kostynskyi

This article was inspired by long discussions with the Ukrainian journalist Pavel Kazarin and by his recent article ‘Three Myths for Crimea’.1 It would be hard to argue with the claim that 1 English version at p. 18 in this vol- Crimea is a land of three competing myths – the Russian, the ume. First published in Ukrayins’ka Ukrainian, and the Crimean Tatar – and there is no doubt that Pravda: http://www.pravda.com. following the Crimean referendum and annexation, Ukraine’s ua/rus/articles/2015/04/24/ 7065788/. political elite have tended to focus on the Crimean Tatar strand of the story. I would, however, like to challenge the commonly held notion that the modern Ukrainian state has given up on the Ukrainian myth of Crimea.

Russian Mythology

Underpinning Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and expansionist policies towards it s neighbour s is the myth of the ‘ S l avic / Russian world’. In the nineteenth century, this myth encompassed Ottoman Porte territory in the Balkans; in the twenty-first century it extends over the former Soviet republics. Russian 2 This idea derives from Dostoevs- historical myths talk of Russians as a ‘God-bearing people’,2 ky’s Brothers Karamazov and has as keepers of ‘traditional values’, or as members of a ‘Russian become a new meme in modern Orthodox civilization’ that is neither European nor Asian but political mythology. follows its own ‘third way’. The Russian political elite draws on this mythology to try to rationalize the cultural, social, and economic backwardness of a country that essentially 3 In reference to the crucial role constitutes the rearguard of Western civilization. Other myths played by the Soviet Union in the evoke the ‘victorious Russian nation’3 that will keep the Western Second World War. powers in their place. In these narratives, ‘the West’ figures as

24 25 an enemy constantly seeking to enslave or destroy ‘the Russian’ True, following the occupation of Crimea, many Crimeans or ‘the Orthodox’. These myths explain Russia’s urge to mobilize nostalgic for Soviet times took delight in reviving Soviet and its isolationism and readiness to keep replaying the Cold practices: ‘young pioneer’ organizations came back to life and War scenario. They also function as ‘millennium programmes’ portraits of Stalin reappeared at parades. But the myth is an for newly emerged states with Russian-speaking minorities. official, ‘top-down’ phenomenon with no connection to those on the ground, and as time goes on and political fatigue and economic decline set in, all this nostalgia will peter out and Crimean Mythologies hatred of Russian officialdom will return. People may talk smugly about the fact that throughout the Crimea is a potential home to three different ethnic myths: years since independence, Ukraine did nothing to encourage the Crimean Tatar, the Russian, and the Ukrainian. In reality, grassroots support for an ‘official Ukrainian myth’ in Crimea, however, the area is crammed full of autochthonous myths but this is to overlook the basic fact that Ukraine is not Russia. relating to one people only – the Crimean Tatars. Rooted in The Ukrainian state is outranked by its Russian counterpart. To this region, this group have gradually fashioned and reinforced put it another way, if the Russian state is ‘sovereign and God’ various myths about their origins, about their significance for (Leviathan), the Ukrainian state is nothing but a collection the peninsula, and about their special role within Ukraine. One of ‘presumptuous servants’. Its political elite has never had such myth presents the Crimean Tatars as issuing from all the total control over the regions and this fact has facilitated different peoples who have inhabited the peninsula, another the emergence of a strong Crimean Tatar myth, issuing not as an indigenous people that has its own unique statehood from the Ukrainian state but from Crimean society itself. In a and is now undergoing a third Russian occupation. Operating longer-term perspective, this myth may serve as a source of at a number of levels – historical, territorial, political, and hope to all Ukrainians that they, in their turn, will find a future national – these myths have more recently also assumed in Europe. For all of us in Ukraine, this is a heartening – if not the colours of Ukrainian patriotism: Crimean Tatars as the immediately realizable – ‘plus’. foremost Ukrainians of Crimea. The ‘black box’4 factor from the behaviourist domain is also of Neither Russians nor Ukrainians – the main beneficiaries of 4 Easton, David (1965), A Frame- relevance in regard to the Ukrainian political system: to get an Soviet and Ukrainian statehood – have been able to develop work for Political Analysis, Engle- output there has to be an input. But – to put it in cycling terms – wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. comparable myths and galvanize social support for them. As a if you want to get from A to B, you need to get on the state result, they have been less successful in mustering themselves bic ycle and do the pedalling yourself. The ‘Just do it!’ sentiment – around their particular political agendas. The Ukrainian myth quintessentially Ukrainian – has been much in evidence in the in Crimea, for example, has remained marginal: the many recent surge in volunteer activity. Clearly, the state’s inertia years of unrelenting Russification undergone by Ukrainian and poor functionality poses risks in terms of its oversight of settlers has resulted in their being largely absorbed into the national security. At the same time, it creates massive scope mass of ‘Russian-speaking Soviet peoples’. Those Ukrainians for societal initiatives and a chance for Ukrainians to rid them- who have preserved their ethnic identity often operate with selves of the kind of paternalism and collective shirking of re- myths that juxtapose Ukraine and Crimea, or Ukrainian history sponsibility that engulfed Russian society for so long. and Crimean history. Such patriots still talk enthusiastically Why, then, should Ukraine’s new policy in regard to Crimea about the Cossack Zaporizhian Sich, symbolically underlining be based on the Crimean Tatar myth? Because it is the only one the fact that they too came to Crimea many years ago, from that has inner strength and the only one that brings Ukraine the mainland. Again, the myth concerning the post-1954 into Crimea’s symbolic space. It is also the only one that has economic revival of Crimea as part of Ukraine, though useful been consistently on offer to Ukrainian politics over a long in bolstering state propaganda in war, largely ignores the period. The Crimean Tatars, who make up 13 per cent of the indissoluble cultural and historical ties that bind the two population of Crimea, have not only created a myth of their neighbouring lands. Meanwhile, the ‘Russian myth’ currently own; they have fed that myth into Ukraine’s political ‘black being promoted by the occupying authorities in Crimea is box’. By lending their support to the national democratic camp, in fact a ‘Russian Soviet myth’ and is being drummed into they have signed up to the Ukrainian nation-building process. Crimean heads artificially, mechanically, ‘from above’. Over It is a stance they reaffirmed with their defiant gestures in the the past twenty-three years, this myth had gradually lost its early phase of the occupation of Crimea – gestures paid for shine and power: no officially imposed myth can perpetuate with the loss of their independent media5 and the enforced itself, or its social base, forever, and without ‘government 5 Notably the ATR television exile of the Mejlis. support’ and active propaganda, belief in it runs into the sand. channel.

26 27 Part II Symbols, Meanings, Constructing and Conflicts: ‘the Ukrainian Nation’: How the Interpretation of the Role of Civil Society History Influences Contem- in the Nation Building porary Events in Ukraine Process After the Crimean Oksana Danylenko Referendum

With conflict ongoing in Ukraine, there is an urgent need for scholarly reflection on the mind-sets that have brought us here – 1 The key findings of my 2005/6 and in particular on the symbolic level that has played such research, and the methodologi- cal approach used, are described a key role in both escalating and attenuating the hostilities. in the book ‘Language of conflict There is a strong dependence between contemporary social in a transforming society: conflicts and conflicts in the interpretation of historical from construction of history events and this has to be taken into account when it comes to social identities formation’ to exploring the differing interpretations of symbols. My (Vilnius, EHU 2007). See also: Danylenko, Конструирование preferred approach is that of lingua-conflict analysis, a истории и конфликтный method involving examination of conflict through text and потенциал социокультурных discourse. With this technique, language of conflict can be идентичностей в Украине used as an indicator of the conflict potential of particular (2005–2006, 2013–2014) // socio-cultural identities.1 Перекрестки, N 1–2, 2014, Журнал исследований The term ‘language of conflict’ is here used to denote восточноевропейского a specific semiotic system capable of demarcating and Пограничья, Вильнюс, Литва, conveying levels of conflict potential on a scale ranging from Европейский гуманитарный ‘conflict’ to ‘consent’. Language of conflict has its own set of университет, С. 24–45. rules, linked directly to the values and norms of a specific social system in relation to which that language is apprehended. The major finding to emerge from my investigations is that current conflicts are closely linked to interpretations of past conflicts, particularly at the symbolic level. In order to show precisely how such interpretations have intersected in Ukraine,

28 29 I propose to give a brief overview of the results of my 2005/62 analysis of various slogans and posters used by Euromaidan 2 The 2005/6 research comprised and 2013/143 research. and Anti-Maidan protesters points up connections with 96 problem-oriented in-depth One key aspect dealt with in the research-interviews was the oral-history themes that divided the Lviv and interviews with experts and broached in the form of the following question: ‘Please interviewees. Take, for example, the responses of Kharkiv with individuals drawn from several generations in Kharkiv, name three historical events that you consider particularly citizens when asked to say what they associated with two key Lviv, and Crimea plus content- significant. Please give a description of the events, providing symbols – the Euromaidan slogan ‘Glory to Ukraine! Honour to analysis of approximately 200 an indication of content, participants, meaning, ‘heroes and the Heroes’ (in Ukrainian: ‘Слава Україні! – Героям слава!’)8 historical textbooks published anti-heroes’, what happened and how, sequence of events, 8  The key slogan of Euromaidan and the Anti-Maidan St George ribbon.9 in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus etc.’ For the 2014 interviews, questions were added about key 2014. Used as a greeting The following is a list of the negative (l.) and positive (r.) between 1924 and 2005. amongst members of Stephan Euromaidan and Anti-Maidan symbols. responses given in regard to the slogan ‘Glory to Ukraine! Bandera’s army (the UPA) during The themes and events that figured most prominently in World War II. Honour to the Heroes!’: the narratives of the citizens of Kharkiv and Lviv respectively 3 The 2014 research comprised (2005/6 interviews) were: 26 problem-oriented in-depth interviews plus analysis of • Nothing good. . • I think the heroes should really be symbols, slogans, and posters featuring in demonstrations in For Kharkiv – (1) honoured because what Ukraine Kharkiv. means more than anything is oneness, • The Great Patriotic War and the Nazi occupation • It’s a purely Banderite slogan. It’s un- an oneness that takes in all these dif- • Collectivization, the extermination of the ‘kulaks’ acceptable to us here in the east. It’s a ferent events. I think most people are 4 All-Union Leninist Young Com- • The 1933 and 1946 famines totally Banderite slogan. (4) united and realize that our Ukraine is a munist League. • Arrests and repression under Stalin united Ukraine. (2) • The construction of factories, railroads, cities • Nationalism … Fascism … nationalism. • Stalin’s death, his personality cult and its debunking (2) • When I hear a slogan like that, I take 5 The NKVD (Народный • Tales of grandparents’ days in the Komsomol4 it positively. I know people who stand комиссариат внутренних дел • Ambivalent … it still has overtones of by this slogan, I’ve seen people stand – People’s Commissariat for the UPA. (2) by it. (2) Internal Affairs) was a Soviet police agency. For Lviv – • I think of the fact that some ‘heroes’ • Patriotic associations, a patriotic at- • Aversion to the communist party – in quotes – have basically split apart titude. (4) 6 Although modern Ukrainian • The 1946 famine (known as the ‘Holodomor’) our great country, our power . . . I don’t historical textbooks depict the • The horrific cruelty of the NKVD5 approve. (1) • Associations with people defending UPA (Українська Повстанська • The people’s reaction to Stalin’s death their country. (1) Армія – ) as fighting both against • War-time tales (‘Grandpa fought in the Great Patriotic the Soviet Army and against War’ – referred to as ‘World War II’ in most other in- the Nazis, doubts continue to terviews) and stories about the UPA6 (‘They were be expressed about this (both our brothers and sisters’) and the Ukrainian ‘Galicia’ in the media and in everyday Division7 Clearly, the slogan evokes very diverse sentiments in regard discourse). 9  A ribbon with three black and to both the past and the present and these differences of two orange stripes. A key Anti- interpretation correlate with those that emerged in relation Maidan symbol, it previously 7 The ‘Galicia’ Division was a From an analysis of the transcripts of this first batch of to the oral-history subject-matter. However, such conflicts had a very different connota- Ukrainian division of the Ger- interviews, two major conclusions can be drawn: firstly, there tion, being worn by veterans on are resolvable through a ‘transformation of meaning’ and a man Waffen SS. are crucial differences of interpretation between eastern Victory Day (9 May) and used to ‘distancing’ from the past. The following additional responses and western Ukrainians in regard to the Great Patriotic War/ decorate wreaths commemorat- from the interviews illustrate the first of these processes – World War II and the Revolution of 1917; secondly, the term ing those killed in World War II. the transformation of meaning: ‘Soviet’ has a predominantly negative connotation in Lviv (‘They enslaved us and decimated us’) and a predominantly ‘I think that over the last while our country has positive one in Kharkiv (‘We were busy building and restoring; sort of come together, become more united, and we had won’). very few people make the connection that this is The 2014 research, using the same methods, indicates that a rallying cry, a slogan – “Hail to the Banderas!”. the above conclusions are still relevant for Kharkiv. In addition, At least that’s how it seems to me and I’m glad.’(3)

30 31 ‘Just taking the slogan by itself. I only recently ‘[It’s] about the war veterans … the Great Pa- found out about it. If you think about the meaning triotic War … well, World War II. Not about the of the words, it’s a great slogan – “Glory to confrontation between Russia and Ukraine or … Ukraine! Honour to the heroes!” What can I say pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian. Only about the about the slogan except that it’s a good slogan. veterans. ‘(2) (3) The transformation of meaning is still going on: the Saint Currently, associations deriving from perceptions of the George ribbon is becoming less and less associated with World past are increasingly shifting to the present-day plane. The War II and increasingly linked to current events taking place in cry ‘Glory to Ukraine! Honour to the Heroes!’ is now often an entirely different context. This shift has been particularly associated with heroes of the present age – the ‘Heavenly marked following various events in 2015 and the ribbon has Hundred’ shot on the Maidan, for example, or the Ukrainian now acquired a ‘separatist’ connotation, having been actively soldiers currently defending the country. Little by little, the promoted by supporters (some armed) of the so-called historical dimension is receding into the background – though Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Re- the existence of this subtext provides ongoing opportuni- public (LNR). All this suggests a significant increase in the ties for linguistic manipulation in the information war negative associations surrounding these symbols in the against Ukraine. present context. As a result, the Saint George ribbon is not a feature of daily life on the streets of Kharkiv in 2015. The symbols discussed here thus come to be interpreted On the ribbon in new ways and acquire new layers of meanings as a result of being placed in new contexts and used in particular social Turning to Kharkiv citizens’ views on the St George ribbon – situations. Through repetition, their new connotations es- a key symbol of the Anti-Maidan in 2014 – I list a range of tablish themselves through typification and are legitimized.10 answers given during the interviews in response to the 10  Numbers in brackets indicate In short, a new process of construction of meaning evolves question ‘Please complete the following sentence: “When I the generation: Generation 1 – based on contemporary everyday practice. present-day students, whose see someone wearing the St George ribbon, I think . . .”.’ Overall, then, my conclusions would be: firstly, that there are, historical knowledge has been acquired mostly through the as might be expected, conf lict s in the ways in which eastern and ‘This person has respect for the past.’ (1) discourse of independent western Ukrainians interpret key historical events – due in part Ukraine; Generation 2 – ‘chil- to differences in biographical context, life experiences, and ‘I used to think “The 9th of May will soon be dren of perestroika’, who were family histories (as explored in my 2005–6 research); secondly, students during the 1990s, here”, but now I think. . . what do you call it? . . . that there is a correlation between attitudes to current events studied USSR history at school “Separatism . . . will soon be here.”’ (3) and got to know Ukrainian his- and perceptions of historical events, including at the symbolic tory at university; level; and thirdly, that the meanings of symbols from the past ‘A symbol of victory.’ (1) Generation 3 – the ‘Soviet gen- change when they are placed in a present-day context but that, eration’, whose school and uni- importantly, the former semantic fields continue to exist. The versity studies were dominated ‘I used to associate it with Victory Day but now [I variety of biographical experience involved produces a multi- by the Soviet discourse; and associate it] with some rather weird people.’ (2) Generation 4 – the elderly, eye- dimensional conflict of interpretations. This means that, as witnesses to events before, far as modern-day Ukraine is concerned, the ascription of Here we see a variety of interpretations associated with both during, and after World War II. historical meaning, even at the symbolic level, is likely to present and past. Next, I would like to show how the conflict exacerbate friction, and that, conversely, to lessen dissension between these is resolved, as in the case of the slogan, and promote resolution of contemporary Ukrainian conflicts, through a ‘transformation of meaning’ or ‘distancing’: historical reference should be kept to a minimum.

‘The initial idea of the St. George ribbon was really good – I mean the idea of respect for people who laid down their lives for their country. But now, for me – and for many others, I think – it’s come to represent something negative because it’s being used as a front by people who are committing senseless brutal acts.’ (2)

32 33 against neo-cultural approaches. Most anti-corruption reforms 5  Grodeland, Å.B. (2010), ‚Elite follow the logic of principal–agent theory and ‘assume that perceptions of anti-corruption the problem of corruption lies exclusively with the agent [and efforts in Ukraine‘,Global Crime that there is always a principal] who will take on the role of 11: 237–60. controlling corruption’.6 A number of major critics, however, point out that this approach cannot work in systemically corrupt Anti-corruption Reform 6  Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell societies, where corruption has become a ‘collective action 2013: 453. problem’7 and the supposed principal is also corrupt. Miller et al.8 coined the term ‘culture of corruption’ to describe the in Ukraine: Prospects and regional particularities of post-Soviet corruption, including the 7  Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell legacy of communist-regime corruption and the effects which 2013: 458. the transformation-process had on corruption in the region Challenges concerned. Based on a study of petty corruption in Ukraine, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, they pointed to the 8  Miller, W.L., Grodeland, Å.B., ‘corruptibility’9 of both regular citizens and officials. However, Oksana Huss and Koshechkina, T.Y. (2001), A in her study The System Made Me Do It, Karklins documents the Culture of Corruption? Coping tendency of citizens to blame ‘the system’ (the term commonly with Government in Post-Commu- nist Europe, Central European used to describe networks of power in post-Soviet space) for University Press. the extent of such ‘corruptibility’ in their countries.10 These approaches to explaining corruption face a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma: if citizens are corruptible, and there is no 9  Described elsewhere by Miller ‘principal’ willing or able to act, there is no way the system When the ‘Global Corruption Barometer’ survey was carried as the readiness to engage in can be changed; but the same applies if ‘the system’ itself bribery in concrete situations 1 Transparency International Glob- out in Ukraine in 2013, 84 per cent of respondents said they promotes the corruptibility of its citizens. despite theoretically con- al Corruption Barometer, http:// believed the government was run ‘by a few big entities acting demning it: Miller, W.L. (2006), Given this problem, it is important to settle on a definition ti-ukraine.org/en/news/2815. in their own interests’1 and one in three declared themselves ‘Corruption and Corruptibility’, of the terms ‘culture of corruption’ and ‘system of corruption’ html, accessed 04.07.2015. ready to engage in active protest against corruption. Likewise, World Development 34: 371–80. when used in relation Ukraine. In what follows, the first will be in a poll of those taking part in the Maidan protests – a used to denote a culture of mutual favours11 tacitly accepted 2 The figures were 75.1 % and movement dubbed a ‘revolution of dignity’ in the Ukrainian both by officials and by regular citizens and involving petty- 49.6 % respectively. The survey, national discourse – three-quarters named the removal of the 10  Karklins, R. (2005), The System level corruption. At issue here is the kind of corruption involving 1,037 Maidan partici- corrupt Yanukovych regime as one of their prime demands, made me do it: Corruption in used mainly in order to bypass bureaucracy and ‘get things pants, was conducted on 7 and post-communist societies, New whilst a little under half wished to see those involved in done’ promptly. The high level of tolerance to corruption 8 December 2013 by the Demo- York: M.E. Sharpe. cratic Initiatives Foundation and political corruption brought to book.2 in transition countries has much to do with the legacy of a the International Institute The revolutionary momentum, combined with strong communist system that was based on non-monetary privileges, of Sociology. See: http://www. pressure from international organizations (anti-corruption 11  Miller, Grodeland, and Ko- daily reliance on mutual favours, and a lack of clear separation dif.org.ua/en/events/gvkrlgka- reforms are a precondition for IMF loans to Ukraine), resulted shechkina 2001: 15. between the public and the private. eths.htm, accessed 07.04.2015. in the adoption of new anti-corruption legislation by the By contrast with this institutionalized petty corruption, Ukrainian parliament on 14 October 2014.3 However, this ‘system of corruption’ will denote widespread, high-level 3 Law ‘On the Fundamentals is not the first time such measures have been introduced in political – in other words grand – corruption. What emerged of Anti-corruption Policy Ukraine: new anti-corruption laws have been adopted during as the dominant feature of political corruption in Ukraine was in Ukraine (Anti-corruption every presidency since independence in 1991 – to no avail. We the close interdependence between the political system and Strategy) To Be Effective within 2014–2017’. therefore have to ask whether these latest reforms will fare oligarchic interests. Although petty and grand corruption any better, in other words what challenges they are likely to can exist in parallel, there is often a ‘pyramid of upward encounter and what prospect they have of success. extraction’,12 in which petty corruption can be reinforced by 4  Persson, A., Rothstein, B., and In addressing these questions, I focus on two theoretical 12  Andvig, J.C. (2001), Corruption: grand corruption. Teorell, J. (2013), ‚Why Anticor- approaches to the persistence of corruption in post-Soviet A Review of Contemporary Re- Under the presidency of , the system ruption Reforms Fail-Systemic search, Report, Chr. Michelsen countries – the culture-based and the system-based. of corruption became highly centralized and a pyramid of Corruption as a Collective Institute, Development Studies Action Problem‘, Governance 26: The major critiques of international anti-corruption reforms and Human Rights, Bergen, 11. extortion was deliberately created in which petty corruption 449–71. in general,4 and of Ukrainian measures in particular,5 have was reinforced and the proceeds of fraudulent activities flowed taken shape in the context of the debate pitting neo-classical upwards, delivering gains to a handful of actors – known as ‘the

34 35 family’ – and resulting in the gradual elimination of political designed to encourage citizens’ rejection of corruption and competition. The claim that ‘the system’ forced citizens to be decrease their ‘corruptibility’. The key role in anti-corruption corrupt is thus justified in this case. Ultimately, however, the education and awareness-raising is entrusted to civil society. bare-faced venality pushed citizen dissatisfaction to a critical Third, the new anti-corruption infrastructure includes level, resulting in a ‘revolution of dignity’ that defied the both a National Anti-Corruption Bureau – an independent widespread culture of corruption. body tasked with investigating high-level corruption – and Political corruption did not disappear with the change of a National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, which, regime: it was its quality rather than its quantity that was amongst other things, will monitor conflicts of interest. A affected by the revolution. Having become decentralized, it number of anti-corruption bodies were already in existence remains systemic but now has no single entity overseeing in Ukraine prior to these reforms, but being part of ‘the it. Several pyramids of corruption exist side by side, thus system’ they could not have functioned effectively and, in a preventing the political leadership from being the sole worst-case scenario, could have been used as a tool against beneficiary of the illicit activities taking place on its watch.13 the opposition. Effective investigation and control is only 13 Stefes, Christoph H. (2006), Against this background, what are the prospects for possible with a politically independent set of structures Understanding Post-Soviet Ukraine’s new national anti-corruption strategy? Although and, in this connection, the chief obstacle to the effective Transitions: Corruption, Collu- it will be some time before the strategy delivers any results, operation of the new anti-corruption infrastructure will be sion and Clientelism, Palgrave Macmillan, 3. it has at least three innovative features that mark it out Ukraine’s continuing lack of an independent judiciary. from previous initiatives of this kind and warrant a degree of optimism. First, the relevant legislation draws a distinction between grand and petty corruption. The strategy for the period 2014–17 focuses on the system of corruption, targeting organized activity rather than individual people and transactions. This focus is reflected in the legislation’s overall approach, which aims at transparency (in party funding and state budget-spending, for instance), accountability (with a view to establishing an independent judiciary, for example), and elimination of corruption schemes (of the kind currently prevalent in public procurement and the management of state-run enterprises14). Although there is a dearth of political 14 On this, see the amendments will to get these measures implemented, the fact that the of 15 April 2014 to the Law on ‘system of corruption’ has been recognized as an urgent Public Procurement. problem, and that its role in encouraging corruption at every other level has been acknowledged, is in itself an achievement. The legislation creates a formal framework that precludes the further centralization of corruption and provides a basis for the development of a transparent political lobby-system, to replace the illicit influence of the oligarchs. Second, the decentralization of corruption, and the concomitant fragmentation of resources, has created the possibility of political competition and bolstered democratic development, producing a situation in which civil society has been able to thrive and begin to play a critical ‘watchdog’ role in the development and implementation of reforms. The national anti-corruption strategy itself was developed by state institutions and civil-society experts working in collaboration, and the involvement of civil-society in the implementation-process is actually enshrined in the strategy. In addition, Chapter 5 of the strategy addresses the problem of the ‘culture of corruption’ and includes a list of measures

36 37 tion against communists and their and discourse. It has become part of the official symbolism families, and anti-Polish pogroms. and imagery of Ukraine, featuring in the national anthem, on This brutality played a crucial Ukrainian banknotes, and in a host of other places.3 part in shaping the ambivalence By contrast, reaction to the idea of UPA fighters as national that currently prevails in regard to the activities of the Ukrainian heroes has been mixed. The change in the political situation in nationalist underground in Volyn Ukraine, and the opening-up of archives in the early 1990s, led and East Galicia from 1929 to the to a boom in the historiography of the OUN and UPA and, as History and Gender in the 1950s. For a detailed treatment of a corollary of this, to a radical revision of the Soviet account this, see: Bruder, Franziska (2007), of these organizations. In the new national ideology, the view “Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen Euromaidan Protests oder sterben!” Die Organisation on the role of these erstwhile ‘traitors’ has undergone a major Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) shift. The pro-independence movement ‘Rukh’, particularly 1929–1948, Berlin: Metropol; Mar- strongly supported in western Ukraine, was one of the first to Olena Petrenko ples, David (2010), ‘Anti-Soviet raise the issue of OUN and UPA rehabilitation.4 Partisans and Ukrainian Memory’, Once the violence escalated, however, the situation changed East European Politics & Societies 24 (1): 26–43; Shkandrij, Myroslav radically. This process began with the forcible dispersal of (2015), Ukrainian Nationalism. student demonstrators and the ratcheting-up of anti-Maidan Politics, Ideology, and Literature, propaganda. Any kind of protest-gathering was portrayed as a 1929–1956, Yale University Press. Fascist horde or a pack of bloodthirsty nationalists. Hundreds

1 Ukrainska Povstanska Armia – of thousands of people who supported the Maidan movement – Ukrainian Insurgent Army, a mili- Despite Ukraine’s twenty-year history of state independence, some of them coming to take part just at the weekend – were tant formation of the Organiza- the Soviet past continues to function as a major point of 2 Yekelchyk, Serhy (2004), baffled to find themselves being branded as ‘nationalists’ or tion of Ukrainian Nationalists reference for the country and has profoundly influenced its Stalin’s Empire of Memory: given labels, such as banderivky (‘female follower of Bandera’), (OUN). The OUN was created in Russian-Ukrainian Relations visions for the future. The dramatic events of Euromaidan, or in general banderivtsi (‘follower of Bandera’), which they Vienna in 1929 with the primary in the Soviet Historical purpose of securing independ- and the subsequent war in the Donbas, have lent added Imaginatio,. Toronto: had never even heard of. ence for Ukraine – a struggle it importance and relevance to the task of revisiting the national University of Toronto Another factor in the popularization of these newly often conducted through sabo- past and identifying heroes – both old and new. Press. The hetman Bohdan revived names from the past – ‘real Cossacks’, banderivky, tage, expropriation, and assas- Of particular interest to me in my research is the way in Khmel’nytskyi was one banderivtsi – has been the search for ‘true’ paradigms of sination. In 1940, the OUN split of those thus heroized which the Euromaidan protesters made use of historical facts, Ukrainian femininity and masculinity in post-Soviet times – into OUN-M (with an older and (Yekelchyk 2004: 20–3). 5 more moderate membership figures, symbols, and meanings to connect with Ukrainian and particularly during the Maidan protests. The rapid and that supported Andrii Mel’nyk) history – indeed, to make themselves part of it – and thus dramatic course of political events in Ukraine in the wake of and OUN-B (with younger and establish their legitimate place in both the past and future 3 Bureychak, Tetyana (2009), Maidan and the subsequent war in the Donbas has raised the more radical members who of the country. I look specifically at the narratives of two ‚Cossacks in Ukrainian profile of militaristic masculinity. Ukrainian men have had backed ). In June Consumer Culture: New groups of ‘heroes’ – the Cossacks and the UPA1 fighters – and an opportunity to live out ‘in the concrete’ a model of the 1941, acting independently of Old Masculinity Model‘, in the Nazi authorities, OUN- consider the gender-related aspects of the current discourse Alp Biricik and Jeff Hearn Ukrainian war-hero initially promoted ‘in the abstract’ as part B declared an independent on national identity and hegemonic masculinity. (eds.), Proceedings from of the new, post-Soviet, national ideology, and this in turn Ukrainian state, to which the Why the choice of Cossacks and UPA fighters? At first sight, GEXcel Theme 2: Decon- has reinforced gender-divisions and the gender-hierarchy Germans responded by arrest- the level of integration of these two groups into the hegemonic structing the Hegemony in Ukraine. For certain sections of society, including many ing the OUN leaders. After this, of Men and Masculinities. national narrative appears to differ. The Cossack era in Ukraine of the male activists of Maidan and Donbas, the continuity the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Conference 27–29 April fought both Nazi Germany and was mostly glossed over in Soviet historical accounts, for fear 2009, Linköping: Institute with the heydays of the OUN, the UPA, and the Cossacks has the Soviet Union – the latter of sparking nationalist or separatist feeling among Ukrainians. of Thematic Gender Stud- endowed the experience of victimhood and bravery with new struggle continuing until the During the 1930s and 1940s, however, selective rehabilitation ies, 215–26; cf. by the same meaning. This nationalist sentiment, in which celebration late 1950s. The Ukrainian rebel of the Cossack legacy took place – prompted, according to author (2013): ‘Zooming In of Cossackhood and the UPA merge into one, is no longer movement became one of the and Out: Historical Icons Serhy Yekelchyk, by a desire to find positive heroic images confined to the ranks of the ‘Svoboda’ party. The events of Soviet regime’s main enemies of Masculinity Within and 2 and the insurgents adopted a amidst the events surrounding the Second World War. In the Across Nations’, in Jeff the moment have invested militaristic masculinity with a ‘deep underground’ strategy post-Soviet period, there has been a new wave of interest in Hearn, Katherine Harrison, particular symbolic meaning, the notion of men as defenders that came to be known as the the Cossacks, in celebrating them as national heroes and and Marina Blagojevic and warriors has elicited particular interest and regard, and ‘bunker war’. The struggle of the promoting this image of them in various ways. Cossackhood (eds.), Rethinking Trans- men have been given an opportunity to emulate, and share in, OUN and UPA was marked by national Men: Beyond, Be- has been incorporated into social activities (notably sport) the glory of Ukraine’s bygone heroes. widely practised violence involv- tween and Within Nations, ing terrorist activities, retalia- and popular and consumer culture. It has permeated both New York and London: The figure of the strong, unconquerable, freedom-loving grass-roots Cossack communities and state-level initiatives Routledge. warrior associated with the Cossacks and the fighters of

38 39 the OUN and UPA featured prominently in the Maidan is to lead, control, and protect; woman’s is to ensure the 4 Shevel, Oksana (2011), ‚The protests, where ordinary men had a chance to live out these nation’s reproduction, physically and symbolically. Beyond Politics of Memory in a Divided fantasies of heroic masculinity. One remarkable illustration this re-traditionalization of gender hierarchies, however, ‘[a] Society: A Comparison of Post- of the way in which the Cossack and OUN/UPA strands came nother important phenomenon to track is the way women Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine‘, Slavic Review 70 (1): together symbolically, visually, and transhistorically was a in the national and volunteer armed forces in Ukraine have 137–64, esp. 148. UPA glorifi- large free-standing poster which was used as a backdrop for been sexualized in images circulating in the press and social cation began in earnest with souvenir photos (Fig. 1). Positioned inside the Kiev City State 7 Philips, Sara (2014), ‚The media’.7 A T-shirt currently available in Ukraine (Fig. 2) fea- Yushchenko’s presidency in Administration building, it depicted a Cossack and a UPA Women’s Squad in Ukraine’s tures a woman with long red hair dressed in tightly fitting 2005, with the title ‘Hero of protests: Feminism, nationalism, fighter standing shoulder to shoulder over the foe they have clothes and carrying a machine-gun. On the woman’s right Ukraine’ being awarded to and militarism on the Maidan‘, Roman Shukhevych, the UPA’s just vanquished – a member of the ‘Berkut’ special police force. American Ethnologist 41 (3): hip a nationalist-style tattoo is visible and on her cheek is Supreme Commander, in 2007, 414–26, this quote 420. a painting of the red-and-black UPA flag. This banderivka and to Stepan Bandera, head of combines battle-hungriness and combat-readiness with OUN-B, in 2010. The possibility what are clearly deemed to be quintessentially Ukrainian of giving OUN and UPA fighters good looks. equal status with Soviet war- veterans was also repeatedly raised in parliament during this period. At a later stage, prior to the Maidan events, the ‘Svo- boda’ party took a leading role in promoting national symbol- ism and tradition as a legitimiz- ing basis for nation-building and cultural renewal. More recently, on 9 Apr. 2015, Rada deputy Fig. 1: Poster ‘Revolutionary Commandant of the Kyiv City Council’, Kiev Yurii Shukhevych (son of UPA City State Administration building, 2 January 2014 (photo: Olena Petrenko). commander Roman Shukhevych) brought a new bill ‘Concerning the Legal Status and Com- Equally indicative here is the case of Mychailo Havryluik, a memorating the Memory of the Maidan activist and member of the Fourth Sotnya6 who Fighters for Ukrainian Independ- attended the protest after learning of the beatings of ence in the 20th Century’ before students on the night of 30 November 2013. Havryluik became Fig. 2 (left): T-shirt on sale in Ukraine, autumn 2014 (photo: Tetiana the Ukrainian parliament. The bill recognized members of the widely known after a video was circulated showing him being Bureychak). OUN and UPA as ‘fighters for stripped naked in the freezing cold and tortured by the Berkut Fig. 3 (right): Black-and-white reproduction of Ihor Pereklita’s painting I Ukrainian independence’ and riot-police. Through social media, his unshakeable ‘Cossack’ Am a Banderivka, 2007 (photo: Carmen Scheide). accorded them various ‘social resolve not only made him into a symbol of protest but also guarantees’. The bill passed into won him the admiration and respect of women as a ‘real Rather more historical is a painting by Ihor Pereklita (Fig. 3), law and was signed by President Poroshenko on 16 May 2015. Cossack’ and a ‘real man’. available at the Maidan protests in the form of black-and- The gender-related expectations that arose in relation to white stickers. Pereklita is actually known for his mockery the Maidan protests were strongly binary and hierarchical: of nationalist stereotypes and this 2007 picture, depicting a 5 Martsenyuk, Tamara (2015), men were seen as the nation’s ‘defenders’ and ‘driving force’; ‘real’ banderivka as she would have appeared at the time the ‚Gender I natsiia v ukrainskomu women were viewed as weak, vulnerable, and in need of male Ukrainian nationalist underground was active, was originally suspilstvi: maskulinnosti ta protection. On the night of 11 December 2013, when police intended as a critique of nationalism. The subject of the Euromaidan 2013–2014‘ (Gender and Nation in the Ukrainian Soci- surrounded the demonstrators and began to force them out painting is a glamorous blonde woman wearing Ukrainian ety: Masculinities and Euromaid- of the square, numerous calls went out over the Internet national dress and armed with a gun. In one hand she holds a an 2013–2014), Ya: gendernyi advising women to stay at home, prompting the formation of grenade, in the other a bunch of snowberries (often used to zhurnal 1 (37): 4–9. a group called ‘Half of Maidan: Women’s Voice of Protest’. This symbolize Ukraine), and at her feet is a skull and a hedgehog group set about subverting the hegemonic masculine warrior with some apples. The picture bears the legend ‘I am a 6 Some Maidan protesters organ- narrative, which had greatly intensified during the Maidan banderivka. I am Ukrainian. Death to the Muscovite Occupiers.’ ized themselves into quasi-mili- protests, with slogans such as ‘We do barricades as well as The image lays bare the disparate notion of femininity at work tary units based on the ‘sotnya’ bread and butter’ and ‘Glory to the heroines!’ here: the protagonist is attractive and well-groomed but the or ‘company of one hundred’. The masculine narrative emphasized male patriotism and identity she projects is primarily one of a woman breaking military prowess and lauded motherhood: man’s mission

40 41 through traditional ‘beauty queen’ perceptions, taking up arms, and raising herself to the status of glamorous and courageous female warrior.8 8 Buryechak, Tetiana and The circulation of these kinds of images amongst the Petrenko, Olena, ‘Kanapky, Maidan protesters prompted a wide range of sometimes Sich ta „Banderivky“‘ (Sand- conflicting comments – from anarcho-nationalist quips to wiches, Sich and „bander- serious observations about the part played by women in the ivky“), Zaxid.net, 8 January Phantom Pain Syndrome: 2014, http://zaxid.net/news/ protests and the way they embodied both militant resolve and showNews.do?kanapki_sich_ta_ quintessential Ukrainian beauty. On the whole, however, the banderivki&objectId=1300428. message was clear: women were allowed to depart from the The Ukrainian Nation One roles traditionally ascribed to them and display ‘masculine’ qualities such as courage but they must remain ultra-‘feminine’ whilst doing so. National historical narratives thus reinforced Year after the Annexation the patriarchal social order by granting women temporary admittance to a militaristic male world whilst perpetuating their sexualization. of Crimea Milana Nikolko

One year ago, or thereabouts, the history of independent Ukraine changed forever. Today, the country is labouring under a long-term military conflict; despite the Minsk agreements, the sound of artillery-fire continues to be part of daily life in the east; and Ukrainian civil society is torn between chaotic public debate and carefully constructed propaganda, between open political confrontation and backstairs oligarchic warfare. More than twelve months after the annexation of Crimea, neither Ukrainian society nor its political leaders are able to agree on a position to the peninsula.1 Some openly reject 1 The only concrete measures annexation, others – implicitly or explicitly – accept it, and yet have been a handful of contro- others simply ignore the issue, focusing instead on Ukraine’s versial laws such as the law of 27 ongoing economic, social, and political problems and the Sept. 2014 ‘On Establishing Free Economic Zone “Crimea” and course of military operations in the east. Despite these Specifics of Economic Activity differences, the annexation and its aftermath are still driving on the Temporarily Occupied and shaping Ukrainian public discourse. To use a medical Territory of Ukraine’. metaphor, Crimea is a phantom limb – ‘a vivid impression that [an amputated] limb is not only still present, but in some cases, painful.2 2 Ramchandran, V.S. and Hirstein, These pressures on Ukrainian society are obscuring one William (1998), ‘The percep- of the main challenges facing Ukraine, namely the lack of tion of phantom limbs’, Brain understanding of the colonial narrative and ‘the Other’, 121 (9): 1603–30, http://brain. oxfordjournals.org/content/ notably as a result of the dearth of academic reflection on brain/121/9/1603.full.pdf, ac- the emergence of the modern Ukrainian political nation. This cessed 21.05.2015. brief account seeks to highlight the methodological problems

42 43 that have to be overcome in reaching an understanding of the ‘culture of memory’ category comprises countries in which nation-building process in Ukraine. the political elite have retained the positions they held in the Having lived in the shadow of ‘Big Brother’ for so long, Soviet nomenklatura and make frequent reference to what and having acquiesced to Soviet myths about ‘brother they perceive as an ‘ancestral’ link with the Soviet order. They nations’ (‘bratskie narody’), the country continued, even may recognize errors and repressive ‘fault lines’ but generally after independence in 1991, to be what was, to all intents assume that the Soviet past was a positive and glorious one. and purposes, a colony, with a political elite conditioned by The countries in question here are Russia and Belarus. colonial-style thinking. Now involved in a dramatic conflict Falling outside this fourfold typology, and unsure where and afflicted by various kinds of social, political, and physical it belongs, is Ukraine. Though working to rid itself of ‘the trauma, the country is searching for a new national ideal. Talk Other’ by embracing Western economic and social ideas, the of ‘the Other’, in the guise of Russia/the Soviet Union, has country still has various ‘phantom limbs’ to grapple with. become the dominant narrative in political and social circles. By relinquishing these, Ukraine will move firmly into the Under the influence of this ‘otherness’, a political nation is Western camp, inexorably severing its links with its Soviet being forged; boundaries of both a physical and a symbolic past. Any move to erase the country’s communist history, will kind are being created, engendering uniqueness and fuelling 4 See e.g. Bershidsky, Leonid only reduce the likelihood of reconciliation with Crimea and differing notions of national sovereignty. Reflection on the (2015), Nazis Triumph Over Eastern Ukraine. One such step is the recent adoption, by Communists in Ukraine, http:// role of ‘Soviet otherness’ has never been carried through to Ukraine’s (Supreme Council), of a package of www.bloombergview.com/ 4 its conclusion and the result has been the emergence of an articles/2015-05-19/nazis- what are commonly dubbed ‘de-communization’ laws. Law no. extraordinary mix of national, Soviet, and global narratives triumph-over-communists-in- 2558, ‘On Condemning the Communist and National Socialist in Ukraine. ukraine; interview with Serhiy (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and Prohibiting the Propagation Of course, Ukraine’s search for a new national narrative is Ekelchik ‘Не можна нав’язати of their Symbols’, is entirely toponymic in content , targeting Україні єдиний погляд на «ге- not unique. Battles as to how the past should be depicted and the symbols of the country’s former communist regime – роїчну УПА» – канадський істо- what images are to be carried forward have been underway рик›, http://www.radiosvoboda. place names, street names, company names evoking political for many years in most post-Soviet countries. In these org/content/article/27024469. figures or parties. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory places, the culture of memory often operates independently html?utm_medium=email; recently issued a list of just under 900 towns and villages of ‘professional’ historical accounts, or uses them only as Volodimir Kulik, Про неякі- earmarked for renaming.5 сні закони та нечутливих occasions for ideological invective.3 Four types of such culture With this package of laws, the government is effectively критиків. http://krytyka. 3 Stefan Trebst [Стефан Требст] are distinguishable, depending on the way in which the com/ua/solutions/opinions/ decreeing what does and does not constitute ‘true knowledge’ (2011), Какой такой ковер? failures and successes of the communist past are processed pro-neyakisni-zakony-ta- about ‘the Ukrainian nation’. Politicians are attempting to Культура памяти в постком- and acknowledged. nechutlyvykh-krytykiv. gain control over political symbolic reality by controlling the мунистических обществах Восточной Европы: попытка The first type is most evident in countries in which the dominant symbols and ideas. This is a struggle that seems to общего описания и категори- former communist regime is considered politically, historically, wax and wane with internal political opposition. The gamble of зации, in Империя и нация в and ethnically alien to the nation’s ‘organic’ history. Such 4 De-Sovietization in Ukraine: 871 rejecting the past in order to embrace an uncertain future may зеркале исторической памяти: countries would include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The cities, towns and villages free- well prove successful for Kiev but will entail squaring up to, or Сборник статей М.: Новое ing their names from the Soviet second type includes countries which, whilst recognizing that indeed denying, Ukraine’s uneasy twentieth-century past. издательство, 142. legacy, 6 the communist regime was something imposed from without, http://euromaidan- According to Oxana Shevel, there are two major problems nonetheless actively engaged with the Soviet past as it relates press.com/2015/06/12/ which these laws will not resolve. The first is Ukraine’s to the national context and reflect on the part played by their de-sovietization-in- adherence to the kind of highly politicized approach to population and elite in constructing that regime. Examples of ukraine-871-cities-towns- history adopted during the Soviet era, when the government and-villages-freeing-their- countries where this type of memory prevails include Poland mandated one correct interpretation of history, decided who names-from-the-soviet-legacy/. and the Czech Republic. The third type of memory, whilst were the heroes and who the villains, and reduced historical acknowledging that communism, having made its entry with complexities to black-and-white notions of the ideologically the Soviet liberators’ tanks at the end of the Second World good ‘Self/ Collective Us’ versus the ideologically bad ‘Other/ War, was unarguably an externally imposed phenomenon, 6 Shevel, Oxana (2015), ‘De- Them ’. The second is the legislation’s failure to match up to moves beyond this and points to the contribution which the Communization Laws’ Need European standards of commemoration, in which civilian to Be Amended to Conform to socialist order made to economic and social modernization. victims of political violence hold centre-stage and the murder European Standards, http:// Remembrance of the victims of communist dictatorship voxukraine.org/2015/05/07/ and brutalization of civilian populations is condemned features only to a very modest extent in this configuration. de-communization-laws-need- regardless of the reasons for it. Countries in which this type of culture of memory prevails to-be-amended-to-conform-to- In sum: Ukraine is evolving in an uncertain, poorly include Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia. The fourth and last european-standards/. coordinated but dramatic way as its present aspirations clash

44 45 with the countervailing influences of the historical ‘Other’. As they put their untried nation-building skills to the test, Ukrainian politicians are clearly hampered by ‘phantom pain’ – reflected, inter alia, in the de-communization legislation. The political ‘exercises’ underway in the area of the culture of memory are aggravating the social trauma occasioned by the ongoing conflict. This is to be expected, given that Crimea, Information about Luhansk, and Donetsk are still, symbolically if not actually, part of the body politic. The proposed treatment may be unreal but the pain is not. the Authors and Editors

David Carment, PhD, was a senior researcher at Centre for Global Cooperation Research in 2015. He is a full Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University and Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (Canada). He is also a NATO Fellow and listed in Who’s Who in International Affairs. In addition Professor Carment serves as the principal investigator for the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project (CIFP). He has edited, authored and co-authored 14 volumes and produced over 50 peer reviewed journal articles and an equal number of book chapters. Publishers include McGill- Queen’s University Press, University of Pittsburgh Press, University of South Carolina Press, Ohio State University Press, Praeger, Lexington and Routledge. His current research focuses on problems of failed states in relation to Diasporas activities.

Oksana Danylenko, PhD, Dr. Hb. (Doctor of Science in Sociology) is Professor at the Department of Political Sociology at Kharkiv V.N. Karasin National University (Ukraine). She is the author of The Language of Conflict in the Transforming Society: from Construction of History to Formation of Socio-Cultural Identities in Ukraine (Vilnius 2007), Sociological dimension of conflict (Kharkiv 2003) and co-author of the handbook Qualitative Research in Sociological Practices (chapter ‘Linguistic Construction of Social conflicts‘, Kyiv 2009) and of about 100 publications. Professor Danylenko has been a DAAD/OSI Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Eastern European Studies, Free University Berlin and at the Institute of Sociology, Erlangen-Nuremberg University. Her main research fields are: conflict analysis, qualitative methods of sociology; sociology of everyday life; sociology of language; visual sociology.

46 47 Oksana Huss is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at politics towards Crimea and problems of the re-integration of the Institute for Development and Peace, University of Ukrainian occupied territories. Duisburg-Essen (Germany). Prior to this, she graduated in Political Science, Law and Anthropology from Ludwig- Elmira Muratova, PhD, Associate Professor at the Department Maximilian-University, Munich (Mag.) and in International of Political Science and International Relations at Vernadsky Relations from State University of Transcarpatia, Ukraine Taurida National University (Crimean Federal University) (M.A.). She has been awarded a scholarship from the Hanns- Simferopol, Crimea. Dr. Muratova was a Fulbright Visiting Seidel-Foundation. During her PhD-research in fall 2014, she Scholar at the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian was working as Petro Jacyk Visiting Young Scholar at the Studies at University of Kansas (2005–2006) and Honorary Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES), Research Assistant at the School of Slavonic and East University of Toronto, Canada. Her academic interests include European Studies at University College London (2007–2008). transformation studies as well as research on corruption. Her research focus revolves generally around Islamic world in The topic of her thesis is ‘Political Corruption in Competitive modern politics and she is specifically interested in Islam in Authoritarian Regimes: The case of Ukraine’. Crimea. She is author of the book Islam in Nowadays Crimea: Indicators and Problems of Revival (Elinio, 2008) and co-author Pavel Kazarin is Ukrainian journalist and analyst. Pavel was of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe where she contributed a born and grew up in Crimea, worked with leading Russian mass chapter on ‘Islam in Ukraine’ (Brill, 2010–2014). media and recently moved to Kiev. Pavel is in close cooperation with the Ukrainian and Russian media ‘Radio Freedom / Radio Milana Nikolko, PhD, is an adjunct professor at the Institute Svoboda’, ‘Ukrainian Truth / Ukrainska Pravda’, ‘Slon.ru’, and of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (EURUS), Carleton the Moscow centre of Carnegie, ‘The New Times’. His area University (Canada). From 2005 to 2014 she was associate of expertise includes: political transformation in post-soviet Professor of Political Science (docent) at V. Vernadsky Taurida countries, Russian internal and foreign policy, Ukraine-Russia National University (Ukraine). In 2008 Nikolko was appointed relations, nation building process and Ukrainian domestic as visiting professor at the Political Science Department, politics, perspectives of Crimea integration. Valdosta State University (USA). Main publications: with E. Grytsay, Ukrainian National Identity: Reflection In The Mirror Serhii Kostinskyi is an expert from ‘Crimean Institute of Of ‘The Other (EHU-Press, Vilnius 2009); with David Carment Strategic Studies’ (Kiev), a NGO. He recently was appointed as and Dacia Douhaibi, ‘Canadian foreign policy and Africa’s adviser for the Ukrainian minister of Information Policy and as Diaspora: slippery slope or opportunity unrealized?’. In: a member of the national council of the Ukraine on questions Rohinton Medhora and Yiagadeesen Samy (eds.), Canada- of television and Radio broadcasting. Kostinskyi was forced Africa Relations. Looking Back, Looking Ahead. Canada to leave the Crimean Autonomic Republic in 2014 after the among nations 2013 (CIGI, Carleton University, 2013); ‘Using occupation of the region. His expertise covers information Discourse-Analysis for political texts interpretation’, Political policy and mass-media analysis, research on Ukrainian Science: Methods of Research (‘Academia’, 2012). Current fields

48 49 of interest include research on Ukraine’s national building and others. Preobrazhenskiy is a regular participant in the process ‘Silent War: the Renaissance of “The Other”’, study Russian-German Forum ‘Petersburger Dialog’ and the Polish- on political narratives of victimization in Ukrainian Canadian Russian forum. He is the coordinator of the Moscow’s PolitClub diaspora, and research on social capital and diaspora networks project and a political observer in Central Europe (Prague) for in comparative perspective. news agency “Rosbalt”. Chief of the international department, Strana.Ru (2004–2007), international observer, “Vedomosti” Olena Petrenko from Ternopil, studied in Kyiv (Ukraine) and newspaper (2007–2008), Political editor, news agency Rosbalt Bochum (Germany) and was a Fellow of the Research School, (2008–2013). Area of expertise: Russia international affairs, Ruhr University Bochum. Currently she is a lecturer at the Post-Soviet countries, Eastern Europe and Russian influence. Department of History, Chair for East European History, Ruhr University Bochum. Olena Petrenko obtained her PhD 2015 at the Ruhr University on the topic of female contribution to the armed Ukrainian nationalistic underground in the 1930s-1950s. She has received scholarships and grants from the Research School of Ruhr University Bochum, Wilhelm and Günter Esser Foundation, GHl in Warsaw, GHI in Moscow, DAAD and Petro Jacyk Foundation. Latest publications: ‘Frauen als “Verräterinnen“. Ukrainische Nationalistinnen im Konflikt mit den kommunistischen Sicherheitsorganen und dem eigenen Geheimdienst’, Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung (Schwerpunkt: Frauen im Kommunismus) 2015: 57–74; with Tetyana Bureychak, ‘Heroic Masculinity in Post-­Soviet Ukraine: Cossacks, UPA and Svoboda”’, East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies 2 (2), 2015: 3–28; ‘Ukrainian Insurgency against the Post-War Sovietization: The Case of the Female Teachers from the East in Western Ukraine’, Kaleidoscope. Journal of History of Culture, Science and Medicine 5 (9), 2014: 169–81. Olena’s research focus includes gender studies, history of nationalism and nation-building, Second World War, memory studies and oral history.

Ivan Preobrazhenskiy, PhD, is a Russian columnist and political analyst. He is cooperating with Russian news agency Rosbalt, the Russian programme of Deutsche Welle, Nowa Europa Wschodnia

50 51 Global Dialogues

ISSN 2198-1957 (Print) ISSN 2198-0403 (Online)

Available issues

11 David Carment, Milana Nikolko (eds.) 5 Claus Leggewie (Hrsg.) Engaging Crimea and Beyond: Perspectives Kooperation ohne Akteure? on Conflict, Cooperation and Civil Society Automatismen in der Globalisierung Development doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-5 doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-11 4 Markus Böckenförde (ed.) 10 Pol Bargués-Pedreny, Kai Koddenbrock, A Multi-disciplinary Mosaic: Jessica Schmidt, Mario Schmidt (eds.) Reflections on International Security Ends of Critique and Global Cooperation doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-10 doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-4

9 Claus Leggewie (Hrsg.) 3 Convivialist Manifesto. Tafeln, teilen, trennen – Nahrung und A declaration of interdependence Essen als Gaben With an introduction by Frank Adloff. doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-9 Translated from the French by Margaret Clarke 8 Jan Aart Scholte (ed.) doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-3 Global Cooperation Through Cultural Diversity: Remaking Democracy? 2 Wren Chadwick, Tobias Debiel, Frank doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-8 Gadinger (eds.) Post- Interventionism? Promises 7 Mathieu Rousselin, Christopher Smith and Pitfalls of Relational Sensibility (eds.) in Peacebuilding The Tunisian Constitutional Process: Main Actors and Key Issues 1 Claus Leggewie, Marcel Siepmann (Hrsg.) doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-7 Provokation über Kreuz – Positionen zur Blasphemiedebatte 6 Noemi Gal-Or, Birgit Schwelling (eds.) Global Cooperation in Transitional Jus- tice: Challenges, Possibilities, and Limits doi: 10.14282/2198-0403-GD-6

52 The Global Dialogues series encapsulates the kind of intel- lectual and inter-disciplinary exchange that is a feature of the Centre and the events it organizes. The ‘dialogues’ in question generally explore a particular theme from a variety of angles and are targeted at a broad-based specialist readership.

The Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK / GCR21) is an interdisciplinary research insti- tute of the University of Duisburg Essen. It is one of ten Käte Hamburger Kollegs (Centres for Advanced Study in the Hu- manities) supported by the German Federal Ministry of Educa- tion and Research. The Centre regards global cooperation as the key to solving urgent transnational problems. It provides a framework within which internationally renowned scholars from different disciplines are able to conduct research on the opportunities and challenges of global cooperation in the con- text of political and cultural difference in world society.

The Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Re- search was co-founded by the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), the Institute for Development and Peace / Institut für Entwicklung und Frie- den (INEF), and the Institute for Advanced Study in the Hu- manities / Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut (KWI). www.gcr21.org