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Fighting the Mau Mau: the British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency Huw Bennett Index More Information Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02970-5 - Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency Huw Bennett Index More information Index 3 King’s African Rifles (KAR) 17 Lancers, 101 arrival in Kenya, 22 23 King’s African Rifles discipline, 110 beatings, 213 and the Home Guard, 249, 250 and committees, 57 and legal zones, 132 discipline, 110, 179, 205 and the McLean Inquiry, and legal zones, 130 120, 121 officers, 197, 224 officers, 111, 224 operations, 15, 18, 163, 164, 221, 259 and political oversight, 50 rape allegations, 209 and prisoners, 152, 215, 240 shootings, 167, 217 rape allegations, 209 26 King’s African Rifles 4 King’s African Rifles and the and detention camps, 225 McLean Inquiry discipline, 110 operations, 163, 164, 258 and the Home Guard, 248 and vigilantes, 171 looting, 58 5 King’s African Rifles operations, 163, 255 ‘B’ Company, 112, 119, 125, and surrenders, 146 180–93 39 Corps Royal Engineers, 22 and the Home Guard, 248 39 Infantry Brigade officers, 117, 224 and committees, 56, 57, 131, operations, 220, 233, 258 234, 253 and prisoners, 149 deployment, 18, 20, 22, 164, 256 rape allegations, 209 and the Home Guard, 248, 249 shootings, 216 orders on conduct, 114, 123, 133 see also Griffiths, Major Gerald S. planning, 53, 261 6 Division, 101 and settlers, 39, 255, 260 6 King’s African Rifles and Special Branch, 242 beatings, 213 49 Independent Infantry Brigade, 22–3, and detention camps, 225 121, 153, 255, 256 and the Home Guard, 247 70 (East Africa) Infantry Brigade officers, 106, 181 and committees, 56, 233 operations, 163, 164, 255 commander replaced, 115 orders, 118 deployment, 18, 20, 22–3, 261–2 and vigilantes, 171 discipline, 179 7 Armoured Division, 12 and the Home Guard, 248, 249 7 King’s African Rifles intelligence collection, 240, 258 and the Home Guard, 248 orders on conduct, 113, 118 investigations into abuses, 117, 119, security breaches, 58 166, 213 and settlers, 40, 255, 259 mutilation, 122 successes, 25 officers, 106, 197 156 (East African) Heavy Anti-Aircraft operations, 164, 261, 262 Artillery (HAA), 13, 14, 208 296 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02970-5 - Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency Huw Bennett Index More information Index 297 Abdipahaman, Warrant Officer (WO), 152 Barton, Sergeant, 198, 203 Act of Indemnity, 89 basic training, 109 aerial bombing, 49, 129, 236 beatings, 102, 161, 162, 166, 213–15, 233 see also air control Benn, Anthony Wedgwood, 48 Afghanistan, 4 Berman, Bruce, 34, 37, 251 air control, 93 Best, Anthony, 69 see also aerial bombing Beyts, District Officer (DO), 255 Alexander, Earl, 43, 45 Black and Tans, 99, 101 Allen, Sergeant Jeremy, 199–203 Black Watch Amritsar massacre, 87, 97 arrival in Kenya, 22 Anderson, David, 216 experience with the Kenya Regiment, Arab revolt, 103 214 arms and ammunition officers, 106, 121 sale to Mau Mau, 58 operations, 240, 261 Army Act, 63, 110, 178, 201, 209 robberies, 226 Army Council, 67 shot attempting to escape, 218 Army Legal Services, 75, 120, 182, 201, 204 Blacker, John, 192 Army Prosecuting Authority, 204 Blakeslee, Virginia, 216 Army Quarterly, 74 Blundell, Michael Army Staff College and evictions, 172 Charles Gwynn as commandant, 91 on Governor’s Committee, 52 General Lathbury as commandant, 28 and surrender schemes, 137, 143 teaching about Palestine, 66 views on military policy, 40, 44 teaching of law, 62, 73 on War Council, 53, 54, 253 teaching of minimum force, 85–6, Boer War, 71, 87, 95–7 88–9 Bond, Brian, 100 Arnhem, 28 Bore, 188, 197 arrests Bothma, Steve, 152 on declaration of the Emergency, 13, 45 Boxer Rebellion, 102 prior to declaration of Emergency, 12 Bramston, Major John, 216, 226 statistics, 19, 21 Branch, Daniel, 189, 250 see also military operations, Anvil; Brans, Assistant Superintendent, 158 Overdraft Briggs, Group Captain L. R., 39, 260 assaults, 119, 124, 179, 211, 214, 219, 227 British Army of the Rhine, 64 Assistant Chief Secretary, 54 British Army Review, 72, 74, 86 Attlee, Clement, 117 British Command Japan, 79 Auxiliary Division, 99, 100 British Empire, 4 Brockway, Fenner, 49, 119, 207 Bahati, 163 Buffs, The see Royal East Kent Regiment Bailey, Company Sergeant Major (CSM) Buller Camp, Nairobi, 113 J., 151 Burdick, Lieutenant Peter, 111 Baring, Sir Evelyn Burini, Captain Eric, 111 awareness of abuses, 162, 167–9, 204, 233 Burton, Gerald, 259 declares state of Emergency, 12 directives on discipline, 111 Cabinet and evictions, 19, 173, 221 and the Amritsar massacre, 98 introduces Emergency tax, 15 appointment of Erskine, 35 meeting with Kenya Regiment, 41 discussions about the Emergency, reorganisation of government machinery, 42–7 52 and the Geneva Conventions, 67 requests director of operations, 15, 176 and the Irish War of Independence, 100 and surrender schemes, 134, 136, and the McLean Inquiry, 118, 207 141, 144 and surrender schemes, 136, 144 views on military commanders, 47 Cabinet Defence Committee, 44 Barratt, Colonel G., 120, 121 Cabinet Secretary, 39 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02970-5 - Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency Huw Bennett Index More information 298 Index Callwell, Charles, 90, 92, 102 Collins, D. T., 185, 196 Cameron, Lieutenant-General Sir Collins, Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. T., 112, Alexander, 20, 52, 176 176, 197 Campbell, Lieutenant-Colonel Guy, 41, Colonial Office, 48, 80, 88, 167, 168, 177 42, 176, 177, 179, 215 Colonies, Secretary of State for see Lennox- Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 95 Boyd, Alan and Lyttelton, Oliver Carrothers, J. C., 222 Colony Emergency Committee, 18, Carruthers, Susan, 87 24, 51 Carver, Field Marshal Lord, 52–3 command ammunition depot, 38 Cashmore, Thomas, 217 command and control, 17, 18, 20, 39, Cassidy, Ron, 149 51–4, 176–7 Castle, Barbara, 49 command responsibility, 70 casualty statistics, 19, 25, 27, 121, 192, 247 commander-in-chief see Erskine, General see also shot attempting to escape Sir George; Lathbury, Catling, Sir Richard, 155, 156 Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald cattle confiscation, 91, 93, 102–3, 105, Commissioner for Central Province, 46 220–1 Commissioner for Rift Valley Province, Cavendish Bentick, F. W., 52 174, 242 Central Province Emergency Committee Commissioner of Prisons, 147 (CPEC), 39, 131, 242, 248, 249, committee system, 32, 39, 51–4, 56, 253, 255 233, 254 Chief Native Commissioner, 54, 137, 138, see also intelligence committees 197, 221 common law, 1, 70, 84, 87 Chief of Staff, East Africa Command, 137, compensation, 198 138, 142 concentration camps, 96 Chief of the Imperial General Congress of Peoples Against Staff (CIGS) see Harding, Field Imperialism, 49 Marshal Sir John Conservative Party, 48, 94 Chief Secretary, 52, 57, 142 Cooke, Second Lieutenant M., 132 Chief Secretary’s Complaints Co-ordinating Cooke, Sergeant, 124 Committee (CSCCC), 124–5, 209 Cooper, Major N. M. C., 132 Chief Staff Officer to the Governor Cornah, Brigadier Donald, 41, 112 see Hinde, Major-General William Council of Ministers, 23, 54 chiefs, 16 Court of Inquiry, 112, 115, 117, 197, 198 China, General, 23, 46, 135–40, 235–6 courts-martial, 110, 117, 119, 124, 177–9, Christian Council of Kenya, 120 204, 212 Christian Missionary Society, 115 Cowell-Parker, Lieutenant-Colonel R. H., Chui, Major, 27, 142 198, 201, 202 Chuka massacre, 182–9, 196–9 Craigie, Sir Robert, 66, 67 Churchill, Sir Winston, 39, 43, 45–8, 64, Crawford, Frederick, 52, 54, 116, 205 176, 206 Criminal Investigation Department (CID), civilian control, 31, 42, 47, 59, 229, 27, 141, 147, 179–80 244, 263 Cromwell, Oliver, 1 civil-military relations Crossman, Richard, 123 theory, 31–2 Crown Counsel, 209 Clarke, H. G., 156 Crozier, Brigadier-General Frank, 100 Clayton, Anthony, 56, 189 Cullen, A., 78 Clemas, Major H. N., 205 Cumber, John, 200 Cold War, 65 curfew, 221 collective punishment customary international law, 79, 80 in doctrine, 89, 91 in India, 97 Daily Chronicle, 221 in international law, 78 Daily Herald, 119 in Kenya, 194, 220–2, 227, 238, 253 Daily Mail, 50 in Palestine, 103 Daily Mirror, 50 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02970-5 - Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency Huw Bennett Index More information Index 299 Davies, Lieutenant, 58 and political oversight, 125 Day, Major F. W. J., 183, 198, 204 reinforcement of KAR, 198 death penalty, 44, 46, 101 representation on the Emergency Joint decolonisation, 3, 77, 82, 83, 94, 268 Staff, 54 delegated detention orders, 147 and special forces, 154 Denning, R. E. V., 37 staff officers, 1, 120 Department of Information, 145 status, 51, 59 Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal, 209 and surrender schemes, 140, 144 Deputy Commissioner of Police, 166 East Africa Training Centre, 115, 163, Deputy Director of Operations Committee, 203, 233 197 East African Service Corps, 217 Deputy Governor see Crawford, Frederick East Lancashire Regiment, 101 Deputy Public Prosecutor, 209, 219 Easter Rising, 99 detention camps, 39, 146, 147, 223, economic reform, 49, 224 225, 232 Eden, Anthony, 43 detention policy, 49, 56, 144 Edye, Mr, 44 Devonshire Regiment Egypt, 12, 13 arrival in Kenya, 17 Elkins, Caroline, 35, 224, 251 and committees, 259 Ellis, John, 88 deployment, 18 Embu Guard see Home Guard and food denial, 255 Emergency Joint Staff, 54, 245 and the Home Guard, 249 Emergency
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