What after counter-insurgency? Raiding in zones of turmoil

EFRAIM INBAR AND EITAN SHAMIR*

Throughout recorded history, nations have employed military raids in response to border infiltrations and incursions. While such raids have been employed in full-scale wars, they were often used against politically less developed societies and groups, such as nomadic tribes, or bands of bandits or pirates. In contrast to fully fledged states, such entities lack a central government that could serve as a clear ‘strategic address’ for retaliation or coercion. Moreover, such elusive adversaries often do not possess valuable targets and therefore are harder to deter. With the international system since the end of the Cold War increasingly divided between zones of peace and zones of turmoil,1 we witness a growing number of failed states,2 and a growing number of ungoverned regions in which terror groups, guerrillas and criminal bands (at times a combination of all three) operate freely. The UN Fragile States Index (formerly the Failed States Index) includes many countries, among others , , Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, , Syria and , that serve as hubs for transnational terror and crime. Even if not all these regions pose the same degree of security risk, failed states generate terrorism, weapons proliferation, crime, energy insecurity and regional instability that endanger international security.3 For a while the , with support from some of its allies, engaged in occupation and state-building effort in two states, Afghanistan and Iraq, with the aim of bringing about stability, prosperity and even democracy. These efforts have failed, leading the United States and its allies to realize that foreign inter- ventions under similar circumstances, even after the commitment of much blood and treasure, are ineffective. Modern societies on the western model cannot be

* The authors would like to thank Frank Hoffman for his useful comments, Ariel Vishne for his research assis- tance, and the two anonymous reviewers. 1 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The real world order: zones of peace, zones of turmoil (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993). 2 For the trend, list of countries and definition, see the Fund for Peace Fragile State Index 2015, http://fsi. fundforpeace.org/rankings-2015. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 4 Oct. 2016.) The working definition of a failed state we use here, following Max Weber, is a political entity without monopoly over the use of force, unable to enforce its sovereignty over its designed territory and unable to deliver basic services, primarily security, to its population. For this phenomenon in contemporary international relations, see Robert I. Rothberg, ed., When states fail: causes and consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 3 Patrick Stewart, ‘Weak states and global threats: fact or fiction?’,Washington Quarterly 29: 2, 2006, p. 49; James A. Piazza, ‘Incubators of terror: do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism?’, International Studies Quarterly 52: 3, 2008, p. 483.

International Affairs 92: 6 (2016) 1427–1441 © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford ox4 2dq, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir created where the socio-political foundations for them do not exist. As a result, the United States and its allies have lost the appetite for long-term occupation,4 leaving large tracts of land to determine their own fates. This article argues that in the contemporary (and future) strategic environment the military raid is becoming an increasingly relevant option for states concerned about the threats from ungoverned regions identified above.5 Two developments lead to this conclusion: the increase in the number of failed states and conse- quently ‘ungoverned areas’; and the inadequacy of western and international responses in the form of attempts to impose state authority over these areas and to turn them into zones of stability. The two western strategies for counter- insurgency (COIN) which require a heavy footprint (a term discussed below)— ‘winning the war militarily’ and ‘winning hearts and minds’—no longer seem to provide an adequate conceptual framework for dealing with security threats from ungoverned areas.6 The West must adapt its strategic thinking to the new developments. In the absence of a viable political solution to ungoverned areas, the military approach must be tailored accordingly. We suggest patient attrition with raiding as a main component. It can be complemented by economic and diplomatic measures that can never hope to have more than limited effectiveness. The next section explores the meaning of such a strategy. The following section analyses two contemporary cases of its application, by and by the United States, in order to demonstrate the utility and limitations of a raiding- based strategy. Finally, the relevance of a raiding strategy for other states in the contemporary strategic environment is discussed.

The conceptual underpinnings of military raids Military raids, like any use of force, have two main aspects. The first is strategic— how to employ force in the pursuit of political ends. Raiding enables the military to strike effectively in a short space of time and with no intention of capturing territory for strategic gain. While raids do not aim at attaining a political solution, they weaken the opponent, reduce the actual threat and buy important time with a modest investment. The second is the military aspect, a derivative of the strategic imperative, which includes operational and tactical concerns such as organization, tactics, drills, logistics, mobility versus fire, and the use of technology.

4 See e.g. President Obama’s address to West Point cadets: ‘Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony’, US Military Academy West Point, West Point, NY, 28 May 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military- academy-commencement-ceremony. 5 The raids discussed here are military operations conducted in order to weaken and/or deter a non-state actor, at least temporarily. In the absence of diplomatic and economic leverage, the aim is limiting the actor’s ability to harm others. The use of force is designed to degrade the military capabilities of the non-state adversary and to influence its resolve. 6 David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell, Counterinsurgency in crisis: Britain and the challenges of modern warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: exposing the myths of the new way of war (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Colonel Gian Gentile, Wrong turn: America’s deadly embrace of counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2013); Robert J. Bunker, ‘Defeating violent nonstate actors’, Param- eters 43: 4, 2013, pp. 57–65. 1428 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. What after counter-insurgency?

The strategic aspect In his seminal study of the evolution of the art of war in Europe from the period of the Greeks to the twentieth century, historian Archer Jones designated all strategies as being either ‘persistent’, if aimed at capturing and/or holding onto territory, or ‘raiding’, if the occupation of land was transient.7 Raids, then, repre- sent no intention to control land or population for any length of time. Recent western strategic thinking offers two basic schools of thought on coping with non-state violent groups, often referred to as insurgents.8 Both approaches belong to the ‘persistent’ category, where the objective is occupation of the land, either by a foreign government or by a friendly government supported by the foreign invaders. The first approach—enemy-centric—suggests that a COIN campaign is funda- mentally no different from conventional war, where the main effort is neutralizing the armed units by locating and engaging them (‘A war is war is a war,’ as one American officer wrote9). If fought properly it is possible to vanquish the enemy by force and impose the will of the victorious side. The second approach—popula- tion-centric—focuses on gaining the support of the civilian population (‘winning hearts and minds’) in order to deprive the insurgents of their main source of support. The debates over the best route to success for the US-led coalition in Iraq and NATO in Afghanistan were for the most part conducted within the context of these two approaches.10 Yet the evidence for the success of the COIN approach in many arenas of the world is questionable. While supporting a local functioning government using mainly local forces to fight insurgencies by providing material aid, training and advisers (‘light footprint’) could be still a viable option, the idea of sending large numbers of foreign troops to a failing country (‘heavy footprint’) to conduct COIN and state-building, as was attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan, seems to be disappearing from the policy menu. Western leaders increasingly recognize that radical ideologies cannot be defeated on the battlefield and have shown a preference for winning the hearts and minds of the insurgents or the populations in which they operate. Yet the ethno-national, cultural and religious gaps between westerners and radical Muslims, for example, are simply too wide for a strategy aiming to end conflict by persuading the opponents that peaceful coexistence is preferable to be feasible. Strongly rooted, rigid and radical religious ideologies, as well as tribal rivalries and economic disparities, can bar the way to conflict resolution. Unwilling to pay the cost of occupation, and/or realizing its futility, western states are no longer

7 Archer Jones, The art of war in the western world (Urbana and Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2001), pp. 662–716. 8 See Colin Khal, ‘COIN of the realm’, Foreign Affairs 86: 6, 2007, pp. 472–4; John Nagl, Learning to eat soup with a knife: counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 27–8; Mark Moyer, A question of command: counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 2–4. 9 Harry G. Summers, ‘A war is war is a war’, in Loren B. Thompson, ed., Low intensity conflict: the pattern of warfare in the modern world (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 1989). 10 Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington DC, 2006), p. 51. 1429 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir prepared to attempt to hold, rule or occupy ungoverned areas. The West basically wants to be left alone. In such a situation, where diplomatic and/or economic leverage hardly exists, raids are last-resort military measures to degrade enemies’ abilities to create havoc. Moreover, such a raiding activity exhibits very limited political goals, owing to the understanding that ambitious political objectives are not attainable. Raiding also entails patience in so far as it represents an attempt to weaken adversaries over time.11 In his discussion of countering threats from non-state actors, Rupert Smith suggested a measured application of force in the form of ‘a raid at a theater or strategic level rather than a sustained operation’.12 Similarly, we use the term ‘raid’ here to mean more than just a small-scale operation involving a handful of special operations units; it can also cover larger conventional forces invading an area and possibly conducting operations for a period of weeks or even months. The raid could be defined as a strategic raid, if a strategic impact is produced or intended. If US and allied forces had been used to raid Iraq in order to weaken Saddam Hussein, this might have produced better results. Similarly, it is not clear that the total defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which would strengthen both the brutal Assad regime and revisionist , is strategically wise.13 It is noteworthy that narrowly defensive political objectives do not always produce defensive strategies, as ancient history shows. During the first stages of the Peloponnesian Wars, Sparta repeatedly invaded Athenian territory, raiding its agricultural infrastructure in an attempt to deter Athenian expansionism. Similarly, Roman raids into Germania were aimed at deterring or foiling the barbarian incursions into Roman-ruled territory.14 An offensive raiding strategy within a defensive policy was also put into effect by the Byzantines in the Balkans and in the Levant, where they adopted the Roman counter-invasion strategy, retaining a line of fortifications as a fundamental element, along with light cavalry to carry out raids and repel any invading forces.15 More recently, raids were an important tool for the colonial powers against opposing state and non-state rivals. The use of raids was designed to deter and contain adversaries that the colonial powers were not interested in conquering.

11 ‘Wearing down the enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaus- tion of his physical and moral resistance. If we intend to hold out longer than our opponent does we must be content with the smallest possible objects, for obviously a major object requires more effort than a minor one’: Carl von Clausewitz, On war, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, 1st edn), p. 93. 12 Rupert Smith, The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 401. 13 Efraim Inbar, ‘The destruction of Islamic State is a strategic mistake’, Perspectives Paper no. 353, Begin– Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 2 Aug. 2016, http://besacenter.org/ perspectives-papers/destruction-islamic-state-strategic-mistake/. 14 Edward Luttwak, The grand strategy of the Roman Empire: from the first centuryad to the third (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). See also Adrian Goldsworthy, In the name of Rome: the men who won the Roman Empire (London: Orion, 2004), pp. 141–3; James Lacey, ‘Conquering Germania: a province too far’, in Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds, Hybrid warfare: fighting complex opponents from the ancient world to the present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 22–6. 15 Jones, The art of war in the western world, pp. 95–102; Edward Luttwak, The grand strategy of the Byzantine Empire (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 409–18. 1430 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. What after counter-insurgency? Britain, France and the United States—maritime powers—had to protect their trading routes, remote colonies and trading partners. ‘Gunboat diplomacy’ emerged, enabled by technological improvements in the range, accuracy and lethality of cannon fire. On land, the Great Powers resorted to raids to protect frontier settlements, as in the cases of the British on the Indian–Afghan border and the Americans on the western frontier.16 The US resorted to raiding when the Mexican Revolution of 1910–20 led to protracted instability along its southern border: the punitive expedition commanded by John J. Pershing that was sent into Mexico on 15 March 1916 exercised a deterrent effect, stopping Mexican incur- sions into the United States.17 Of course, limited political gains warrant only limited investment in military action. It is politically difficult to sustain large-scale operations that demand much blood and treasure when the benefits reaped are no more than modest. This dictates the limited military nature of raids, which is itself attractive in terms of domestic politics. Raids carry limited risks, reducing the potential for opposition at home. Moreover, they are relatively inexpensive as there is no need to commit large forces, resort to reserve formations or conduct large-scale recruitment. The limited character of such operations, in terms of extent, costs, risks and time, makes it easier to establish domestic legitimacy and avoid international criticism. Raids are different from military intervention aimed at assisting a friendly government in distress, because in those circumstances the intervention is in support of a clear central authority. The French intervention in Mali (January 2012) is such an example.18 In contrast, strategic raids are employed when there is no clear strategic address. One important implication of this development is the refinement of the meaning of victory, which is not a military concept, but a political one. Victory cannot always be measured in concrete terms. The military can measure the destruction inflicted and can tell when an opponent is defeated on the battlefield. However, other variables pertaining to grand strategy and politics affect victory. In addition, the outcome of a conflict can often be assessed only in retrospect. Such an example is the 2006 Lebanon War outcomes, which initially did not look promising from Israel’s point of view, but its current evaluation is more positive.19

16 Gunboats were used in the First and Second Barbary Wars (1801–1805, 1815) by the American Navy as a response to piracy. Some raids, e.g. in the First Barbary War, involved both sea and land forces. A survey by the authors of nineteenth-century military activity by the US, Great Britain and France indicates at least 28 cases of raiding expeditions. 17 See Michael L. Tate, ‘Pershing’s punitive expedition: pursuer of bandits or presidential panacea?’, The Americas 32: 1, 1975, pp. 47–51; James A. Sandos, ‘Pancho Villa and American security: Woodrow Wilson’s Mexican diplomacy reconsidered’, Journal of Latin American Studies 13: 2, 1981, pp. 209–302; Clarence C. Clendenen, ‘The punitive expedition of 1916: a re-evaluation’, Arizona and the West 3: 4, 1961, pp. 315–20. 18 On the characteristics of French interventions, see Michel Martin, ‘From Algiers to N’Djamena: France’s adaptation to low-intensity wars, 1830–1987’, in David Charters and Maurice Tugwell, eds, Armies in low- intensity conflict: a comparative analysis (Washington DC: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1989), pp. 77–138. 19 Initially the war was considered a total failure, but reassessment after a few years almost reversed this perspec- tive. See Martin van Creveld, ‘The Second Lebanon War: a re-assessment’, Infinity Journal 1: 3, 2011, pp. 4–7; Gur Laish, ‘The Second Lebanon War: a strategic reappraisal’, Infinity Journal 1: 4, 2011, pp. 22–5; Itai Brun, ‘The Second Lebanon War, 2006’, in John Andreas, ed., A history of air warfare (Washington DC: Potomac, 2010), pp. 207–324. 1431 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir To call a war victorious usually implies acquisition of territory, control over natural resources, or political and economic subjugation of the defeated entity. Interstate conflict has usually been characterized by a ‘persistent’ strategy, and victory was often measured by the ability of the victorious power to bring about change in the status quo. This was true of the ancient empires of the in Greek and Roman times as well as for the Normans and Crusaders in the Middle Ages, and from the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century to the two world wars of the twentieth. Victory meant that one side could dictate the peace terms in its favour. This definition is not valid in a ‘raiding’ strategy designed to preserve the status quo or minimize threats to the existing order, and which neither aims at nor results in total defeat of the opposing military force or control of its land, despite the offensive nature of the operations. In these types of conflict there are no formal or ceremonial acts of surrender, no victory pictures and no imposition of peace terms. Victory within the framework of a raiding strategy is more elusive. Nevertheless, liberal democracies expect victory from their political and military leaders, in return for the blood and treasure invested in a war. In the absence of a clear victory, it is difficult to sustain legitimacy and support for military action. Therefore, military commanders and politicians have to find ways to ‘market’ their victories at home.20 In conclusion, raids are politically unambitious and limited in time and scope, and they serve a containment policy. There is no attempt to attain a political agreement; to do so would require the opponent’s cooperation, which might be diplomatically costly. Nor is there any attempt to terminate the conflict by annihilation or surrender. In overall cost–benefit terms, raids offer many advan- tages in return for a relatively modest investment. By employing a kinetic force over a short time, the raider is able to destroy significant elements of its opponent’s military capabilities. Also, determination in carrying out the attack instils fear and creates a deterrent effect, at least for a short time.

The military aspect The military aspect of raiding, like its strategic dimension, is also limited. Most of the colonial expeditions were small in scale, consisting of no more than a few hundreds or thousands of men. In contemporary conflicts, when there is a need for ground forces in addition to an aerial offensive, it involves limited deployment of forces for a limited period. These raids are also light on logistics due to the relatively short time-span of the operation.21 Deterrence by denial is achieved by crippling the offensive capabilities of the challenger to the status quo in ungoverned areas. Deterrence by punishment is usually achieved by exacting a high cost when destroying high-value targets.

20 Bruce Collins, ‘Defining victory in Victorian warfare, 1860–1882’, Journal of Military History 77: 3, 2013, pp. 895–929. 21 See Smith, The utility of force, p. 401. 1432 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. What after counter-insurgency? Non-state actors, by definition, offer a limited number of such targets; however, such an organization’s leadership is vulnerable to targeted killings. Targeted killing is not ‘a silver bullet’ solution and its utility has been debated. Yet it is quite clear that under certain conditions decapitation of the leadership could cripple a terror organization, at least for a while.22 A precondition for a successful raid is high-quality intelligence. Without such intelligence, the chances of hitting high-value targets of an elusive enemy are small. In the absence of good intelligence, the military operation might become what analysts call a ‘pounding dusk operation’—that is, one in which technologi- cally advanced and expensive weapons are launched and create an impressive effect in the media, but inflict little damage on the opponent.23 Another condition for successful raiding is the ability to escalate the use of force against non-state groups, particularly when resistance becomes stiff. The potential for inflicting greater pain is important in the opponent’s calculus. Escala- tion dominance is therefore a key requirement.24 If the opponent considers retali- ating, the ability to escalate might persuade him otherwise. Historically, strategic land raids were based on mobile forces supported by fire capabilities. Since the advent of air power, a strategic strike can be executed from the air. However, employing ground forces could dramatically enhance the effectiveness of the expedition, as it signals determination and willingness to take greater risks. ‘Boots on the ground’ facilitate the collection of real-time intel- ligence, exposing hideouts and leaders’ whereabouts. The presence of ground forces, even for a limited time, could be more disruptive and destructive to the non-state actor than air strikes, even with the latest state-of-the-art technology. Implementing a raiding strategy requires military institutions to adapt their force structures. As the scope of military action varies, the military needs to be versatile and capable of conducting a variety of strategic raids, from large-scale ground operations, involving tanks, artillery and air support, to pinpoint counter- terrorism operations that rely mainly on the use of drones, precision air strikes and/or special operations forces.25 While most advanced militaries have perfected

22 For doubts about the utility of leadership decapitation, see Paul Staniland, ‘Defeating transnational insurgen- cies: the best offense is a good fence’,Washington Quarterly 29: 1, Winter 2005–2006, pp. 21–40; Jenna Jordan, ‘When heads roll: assessing the effectiveness of leadership decapitation’,Security Studies 18: 4, December 2009, pp. 719–55. For research that finds targeted killing useful, see Daniel Byman, ‘Do targeted killings work?’, Foreign Affairs 85: 2, April 2006, pp. 95–111; Patrick B. Johnston, ‘Does decapitation work? Assessing the effectiveness of leadership targeting in counter-insurgency campaigns’, International Security 36: 4, 2012, pp. 47–79; Javier Jordan, ‘The effectiveness of the drone campaign against Al-Qaida Central: a case study’,Journal of Strategic Studies 37: 1, 2014, pp. 4–29. 23 For example, on the 1998 American assault against terrorist camps in Afghanistan (Operation Infinite Reach), see The 9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, official government edn (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 22 July, 2004 ), pp. 115–21, http:// fas.org/irp/offdocs/911commission.pdf. On Israeli operations during the 1990s against in Lebanon, Operation Accountability (1993) and Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996), see Itay Brun, ‘Where has the maneu- ver disappeared?’ (in Hebrew), Maarachot, no. 420–412 Sept. 2008, pp. 420–1, p. 9. 24 For the notion of escalation dominance, see Herman Kahn, On escalation: metaphors and scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 66–72. 25 Jordan, ‘The effectiveness of the drone campaign’; Jon R. Lindsay, ‘Reinventing the revolution: technological visions, counterinsurgent criticism, and the rise of special operations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36: 3, 2013, pp. 422–53. 1433 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir their ability to carry out surgical strikes and commando raids, there is a need for similar reorganization and new force structures to enable them to carry out bigger and longer raids with conventional forces. Force design must conform to the needs of raiding operations, that is, of expeditionary and ‘in and out’ missions. The Israeli military has developed advanced intelligence and surveillance and the ability to close in on targets quickly, using precision fire. This requires close cooperation between military and intelligence units. Ground operations require combined arms and heavy brigades capable of conducting fire and manoeuvre with minimal losses in a battlefield saturated with mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps, and advanced anti-tank guided missile systems. The need for heavily protected armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and tanks in order to increase survivability and reduce casualties emerged clearly during the 2014 campaign in Gaza.26 For the United States and its allies, which rely on expeditionary forces, achieving this degree of appropriate force design may pose a challenge. Although the United States has sufficient capability to conduct raiding against current non-state actors that pose threats, in the future it might face more capable foes, better equipped and organized. Looking at future trends and at sophisticated organizations such as Hezbollah suggests a need to organize a lethal force of small or moderate size that can carry out raiding missions around the globe at short notice. Reorganiza- tion of the US military in order to enable it to carry out raids with substantial forces on the ground is discussed in the framework of the ‘Macgregor reforms’. This programme calls for breaking down the walls between services and creating a truly integrated force, ‘scalable and modular that punches above their weight integrating capabilities on the operational level’. It requires army ground forces to be converted into combat groups, each of 5,000–6,000 fighters, equipped with tanks, APCs and artillery organized around capabilities for manoeuvre, strike, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and sustainment, operating under a joint command.27 The reorganization includes a system that aligns army force packages with strategic air and sea lift. Combat groups are ready to surge from a joint readi- ness rotational base and, as required, to ‘conduct punitive military operations to neutralize or destroy unambiguous threats to US national security interests’.28 Forces organized along these lines are better designed to find enemy forces, destroy them and move out.

26 Yossi Yehoshua, ‘Yaalon approves addition of 200 advanced APCs for the IDF’, YNET News, 22 Sept. 2014, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4573814,00.html. 27 The quotes are from Douglas Macgregor, ‘Macgregor Transformation Model MTM: shaping the army for joint warfighting’, slide presentation at the General Billy Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Capitol Hill Club, 19 Nov. 2013, and ‘Statement to the National Commission on the Future of the Army: the reconnais- sance-strike group proposal’, 18 Nov. 2015. For a broader discussion of the reforms, see Douglas A. Macgregor, Transformation under fire: revolutionizing how America fights (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003). 28 Macgregor, ‘Macgregor Transformation Model MTM: shaping the army’. 1434 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. What after counter-insurgency?

Contemporary use of raids As noted, changing international circumstances—more ungoverned areas and increased scepticism about the ability of outsiders to engage in nation-building— create an environment in which, in general, raids are in our view probably the optimal strategic response to emerging threats. At the time of writing this article (summer 2016), the United States and Israel were both engaged in raiding activity. The United States is employing a raiding strategy against ISIS in Syria and Iraq,29 while Israel employed such a strategy during the summer of 2014 against in Gaza. Both ISIS and Hamas were successful in establishing a military presence in the context of failed states—Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian Authority.30 Hamas cannot be eradicated from Palestin- ian society by brute force as it attracts considerable support among Gazans. This is also true of Al-Qaeda, which was the catalyst for an ambitious American campaign to ‘fix’ Afghanistan and Iraq. Just as Al-Qaeda has proved impossible to eliminate outright, so has ISIS. The latter organization embodies a form of Sunni radical- ism that has grown up in reaction to the huge social, economic and political crisis engulfing the Sunni and to the growing Shi’i power of Iran and its proxies. This crisis will endure for decades to come, and any hope of restoring functional statist structures where they have crumbled is baseless. The emergence of ISIS demonstrates forcefully the trend we have pointed out here: that of non- state actors in ungoverned areas becoming significant transnational actors operating within the territory of several failed states (in this case, Syria and Iraq). It is in the Arab world that most statist structures are collapsing. Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria and Yemen can no longer be said to meet the criteria for state- hood, and large tracts of their territories are ungoverned areas. Lebanon has been for years in a similar category, and although it has been able to reach some form of fragile equilibrium, large areas of the country are under the de facto control of Hezbollah—a radical and well-armed Shi’i organization. While there are obviously many important differences between Hezbollah, Hamas and ISIS (as well as other radical Islamic organizations), they all share certain similarities: religious fanaticism, readiness to use force, extreme cruelty, a transnational agenda and intense hostility to the US and the West.

Israel’s raiding strategy During July and August 2014 Israel fought Hamas in Gaza for the third time since it disengaged from the Gaza Strip.31 Like the previous operations, its modest goal

29 Michael R. Gordon and Helene Cooper, ‘US general says raiding Syria is key to halting ISIS’, New York Times, 21 Aug. 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/world/middleeast/isis-believed-to-have-as-many- as-17000-fighters.html?_r=0. 30 Although the Palestinian Authority is not a full member state of the UN but a non-member observer state, it is de facto governed and functions as a state and therefore could be tested against failed states criteria. See Kobi Michael and Yoel Guzansky, ‘The Palestinian Authority: a state failure?’, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Strategic Assessment 19: 1, April 2016, pp. 87–102. 31 Hamas’s seizure of Gaza in 2007 was followed by continued rocket fire towards Israel; Israel responded by conducting three operations designed to impair and deter Hamas, Cast Lead (2008), Pillar of Defense (2012) 1435 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir was to restore calm along its border and to end its limited military operation with a ‘weakened Hamas’. Once again, Israel’s government ‘mowed the grass’ in Gaza,32 refraining from removing Hamas’s grip on Gaza and refusing to give in to populist demands in Israel to reconquer the Strip, which it unilaterally left in 2005. It implemented a patient raiding strategy, primarily from the air, to coerce Hamas into accepting the Egyptian-sponsored ceasefire. It used ground troops only for a limited incursion, to destroy the attack tunnels dug by Hamas to send terrorists into Israel. While some point out that the need for repeated operations in Gaza represents a failure of Israel’s policy, it is in fact congruent with Israel’s notion of ‘cumulative deterrence’.33 The relatively calm border with Gaza since the August 2014 ceasefire is an achievement in such a turbulent region. In the twenty-first century, Israel has no aim of ending the conflict by military means; it realizes that radical Islam cannot be vanquished by superiority on the battlefield. Israel has also refrained from attempting to win the hearts and minds of the Arab insurgents. The cultural and religious gaps between and Arabs are simply too wide to allow for a strategy aimed at ending the conflict by persuading the opponents that peaceful coexistence is preferable. Despite the thirst for regional acceptance, Israel understands that it will be impossible to overcome the hostility and suspicions of Arabs towards Jews. This perspective was reinforced by the failure of the Oslo peace process with the Palestinians that became apparent with the outbreak of hostilities in 2000. Israel shied away from adopting a population-centric approach when it ruled over Arabs in the West Bank, Gaza and southern Lebanon. In essence, it viewed its military presence as a temporary expedient to be continued until a political settlement became available.34 Moreover, Israel, with very few exceptions, did not entertain the illusion that it could generate sympathy among the occupied Arab population. Even so, this did not prevent it from developing a carrot-and-stick system for minimizing violent opposition and for fostering pragmatic cooperation with the local leadership.35 Following its experiences in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, and fully aware of the limited degree of control it could exercise over hostile populations, Israel even pursued a policy of disengagement from territories inhabited by such popu- lations. The Oslo peace process with the Palestinians was fuelled by the desire to depart from territories populated by Arabs. In May 2000, Israel withdrew unilater-

and Protective Edge (2014). 32 Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, ‘Mowing the grass: Israel’s strategy for protracted intractable conflict’,Jour - nal of Strategic Studies 37: 1, 2014, pp. 65–90, and ‘Mowing the grass in Gaza’, Perspectives Paper no. 255, 20 July 2014, Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, http://besacenter. org/perspectives-papers/mowing-grass-gaza/; Moni Chorev, Deterrence campaigns: lessons from IDF operations in Gaza, Mideast Security Policies no. 115 (Ramat Gan: Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, March 2016). 33 Doron Almog, ‘Cumulative deterrence and the war on terrorism’, Parameters 34: 4, 2004, pp. 4–19. 34 Israel has refrained from annexing the West Bank and the political power of the ‘Greater Israel’ ideology has greatly diminished. Every poll shows that over two-thirds of Israelis are ready for partition. Moreover, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 is a de facto partition, albeit a messy one. 35 For example, following the 1967 war, Moshe Dayan promoted the ‘Open Bridges’ policy with Jordan and a degree of economic integration with Israel. See Eitan Shamir, ‘From retaliation to open bridges: Moshe Dayan’s evolving approach toward the population in counter insurgency’, Civil Wars 14: 1, 2012, pp. 63–79. 1436 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. What after counter-insurgency? ally from southern Lebanon; two years later it built a security barrier in the West Bank, signalling disengagement from the main Palestinian population centres and marking a potential future border. In August 2005 it withdrew its civil and military presence from Gaza. However, in the areas that Israel regards as critical for its secu- rity—such as the West Bank—it maintains a thin military presence, while avoid- ing the burden associated with a civilian administration. This approach maintains a separation between Israel proper and the hostile populations beyond its border. Israel has a long history of using raids to deter its opponents. In the 1950s Israel raided Egypt and Jordan in response to border infiltrations by irregular forces sponsored by those states.36 These raids were relatively small, and were aimed at military and government installations of the host states in order to put pressure on the respective governments. In the 1960s and 1970s, Israel conducted raids against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Jordan and Lebanon.37 Most of these raids were short and limited operations. In contrast, contemporary raids in Gaza and Lebanon are much larger in both scope and duration. They are designed to degrade the enemy’s capabilities sufficiently to deter it from renewing hostili- ties for as long as possible. They should not be seen as isolated events but rather as episodes in a protracted, long-term conflict. The 2006 campaign in Lebanon deterred Hezbollah from further provocations, while in Gaza three big raiding operations (in 2008, 2012 and 2014) brought temporary quiet. The Palestinians and Hezbollah in Lebanon are not the only sources of concern for Israel. Israel has also made preparations to cope with a chaotic situation along its northern borders as a result of the civil war in Syria. Similarly, a change in the strategic calculus in Hezbollah, which has so far refrained from attacking Israel, may occur. In fact, the only Israeli border that is under full control of a state is the one with Jordan. Israel fears the destabilization of Jordan, with which it has its longest border, and which is closest to its heartland (the Jerusalem–Tel Aviv–Haifa triangle). The Sinai Peninsula, beyond Israel’s border with Egypt, has also become a safe haven for radical groups. Israel hopes that the determination of Egypt’s President al-Sisi to change this situation will bear fruit.

The US raiding strategy In September 2014, after a long and confused decision-making process, the United States concluded that ISIS was evolving into a significant threat to American interests and ordered its air force to raid ISIS installations and militants in Syria and Iraq.38 Unfortunately, the gap between the stated goals and capabilities of the United States and those of its allies has reinforced ISIS’s message about the weakness of the decadent West and its own invincibility.39 By November 2015, it

36 Ze’ev Drory, Israel’s reprisal policy, 1953–1956: the dynamics of military retaliation (London: Routledge, 2012). 37 Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and conventional deterrence: border warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1988). 38 See Eytan Gilboa, ‘The war against the Islamic State’, Jerusalem Report, 20 Oct. 2014, pp. 8–9. 39 For an astute assessment of the American campaign against ISIS, see Yaroslav Trofimov, ‘Regional discord fuels Islamic State’s rise in Mideast’, Wall Street Journal, 17–18 Oct. 2015, pp. A1, 6. 1437 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir had also become clearer to the United States that it faced daunting political and logistical challenges in organizing proxies to fight ISIS.40 By the end of 2015, the war against ISIS on the main battlefields of Iraq and Syria had reached stalemate, and only in the late spring of 2016 did a reversal of the successes of ISIS come about, with some contraction in the territory under its control. One analysis estimated that a COIN campaign against ISIS in accordance with US Army doctrine would require 160,000 troops, and even then, success would not be assured.41 Yet Washington is reluctant to reinsert ground forces to occupy land, and probably hopes that it can reduce ISIS from a major insurgent force with serious military capabilities to a collection of terrorist cells with limited political or military impact. The hope is that a protracted air campaign could break the group’s momentum while buying time and space for local forces to organize and conduct the ground operations that could contain it. Despite its declarations of intent to destroy ISIS, the United States in fact aims to reduce it to the scale of a manageable problem, rather than to build a regional Pax Americana. The United States places the onus for the ground fighting and the ultimate defeat of ISIS on the states and groups directly affected and on its Arab allies. To this end, President Obama promised to help train and equip the Iraqi Army, the Kurdish peshmerga forces and the moderate secular opposition in Syria. The trouble is that while the US wants the Arab states to fight ISIS, the Arab states want the US to do the job for them. The Turks are unlikely to help the Kurds, while the Saudis are fearful of strengthening Assad and the Shi’i axis no less than they are fearful of ISIS. Without significant and sustained local ground forces, military operations and Arab support, it is difficult to see ISIS being defeated.42 Without the cooperation of capable local forces on the ground, the air campaign may prove insufficient. Recent ISIS-inspired terror attacks in Belgium, France, and the United States have increased the perception of threat. In the United States, Obama addressed the nation articulating a raiding strategy (although not in so many words), calling for patient attrition by air strikes and advocating a very ‘light foot print’.43 Yet what we have seen so far is a very reluctant and hesitant version of raiding by the US military. America’s ruling out the use of ground forces may be understandable from a domestic political perspective, but is problematic in terms of deterrence,44 as it weakens the potential for escalation dominance. Reassuring one’s enemies that

40 Ben Hubbard, ‘New US-backed alliance to counter ISIS in Syria falters’, New York Times, 2 Nov. 2015. 41 Stephen Biddle and Jacob Shapiro, ‘Here’s why we can only contain ISIS’, Washington Post, 3 Dec. 2015. 42 David Stockman, ‘The siege of Kobani: Obama’s Syrian fiasco in motion’,David Stockman’s Contra Corner, 6 Oct. 2014, http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/the-seige-of-kobani-obamas-syrian-fiasco-at-work/. 43 David Ignatius, ‘In fighting the Islamic State, Obama is a tortoise and the GOP is harebrained’,Washington Post, 16 Dec. 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-fighting-the-islamic-state-obama-is-a-tortoise- and-the-gop-is-harebrained/2015/12/16/0acc3ad8-a430-11e5-ad3f-991ce3374e23_story.html. 44 See remarks by Gen. James Mattis on US reluctance to commit ground forces: Dan Lamothe, ‘Gen. James Mattis on Iraq: “You just don’t take anything off the table up front”’,Washington Post, 18 Sept. 2014, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/09/18/gen-james-mattis-on-iraq-you-just-dont-take- anything-off-the-table-up-front/. 1438 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. What after counter-insurgency? they will not see American ‘boots on the ground’ is not wise.45 It seems that effec- tive raids must include at least a small, but lethal, ground component. Therefore, for a United States seeking to avoid any long occupation, the best available strategic option is to develop a consistent and more vigorous raiding strategy. One US analyst advised the adoption of a strategy that might loosely be termed ‘repetitive raiding’.46 Disappointed by the poor strategic results in Afghanistan and Iraq, one US general who commanded forces in both places concluded that: ‘Perhaps the best we can or should do is to keep it [the enemy] busy, “degrade” its forces, harry them or kill them, and seek the long game at the lowest possible cost.’47 By using a raiding strategy, the United States can leverage its relative areas of advantage: technology, firepower, mobility and intelligence. In contrast, when it fought counter-insurgencies, using light forces in great numbers in conducting policing duties against irregular forces, it was waging war on its enemies’ terms. Raiding allows the US to fight wars on its own terms. The United States might face security challenges on other fronts as well. Some areas are not really vital to US interests and their descent into chaos hardly affects America’s fortunes. But distances may become less significant as developing military technologies become more accessible to substate organizations. We may see the emergence of ungoverned areas in the western hemisphere that could become very problematic for US national security. The further deterioration of internal security in Mexico as a result of feuding among the drug barons is not a far-fetched scenario. Such a contingency could have devastating effects on the American side of the border. For example, missiles might be added to narcotics in the trafficking in which Hezbollah is involved.48 Similarly, a radicalization of Venezuela, accompanied by its destabilization, could create an ungoverned area and present new security challenges to the United States. Generally, American influence in Latin America competes with influence from highly motivated powers outside the region. The threat posed by Iran and Hezbollah in the western hemisphere, a key geostrategic interest to the United States and historically a stronghold of American influence, is growing. It is not clear what grand strategy is going to be chosen by the new US president: whether a restrained strategy, often dubbed ‘offshore balancing’, or something more ambitious.49 It is clear, however, that raiding, as discussed here, remains an important tool for achieving US foreign policy goals under any grand strategy chosen.

45 See Michele Richinick, ‘Leon Panetta criticizes Obama, calls for “some boots on the ground”’, MSNBC, 7 Oct. 2014, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/leon-panetta-criticize-obama-boots-the-ground-syria. 46 Bernard I. Finel, ‘An alternative to COIN’, Armed Forces Journal, Feb. 2010, http://armedforcesjournal.com/ an-alternative-to-coin/. 47 Daniel P. Bolger, ‘The truth about the wars’, New York Times, 10 Nov. 2014, http://www.nytimes. com/2014/11/11/opinion/the-truth-about-the-wars-in-iraq-and-afghanistan.html?_r=0. 48 ‘Mexican cartels help Hezbollah infiltrate US’,Judicial Watch, 18 Oct. 2013, http://www.judicialwatch.org/ blog/2013/10/mexican-cartels-help-hezbollah-infiltrate-u-s/. 49 For a criticism of the offshore balancing argument, see Hal Brands, ‘Fools rush out? The flawed logic of offshore balancing’,Washington Quarterly 38: 2, Summer 2015, pp. 7–28. 1439 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir

Conclusion Following the disappointing results of more than a decade of counter-insurgency and attempted state-building, the West is seeking alternative strategies to fight violent and extreme non-state actors. The continued disintegration of states in various regions of conflict provides more safe havens that serve as launching pads for attacking western strategic interests. Raids offer a valid way to curb the threat and contain it at minimum risk and cost. In addition to continuous small raids from the air and by special operations forces, larger raids with heavy ground forces are needed periodically to ‘mow the grass’, that is, to inflict heavy losses and impair the opponents’ capabilities. As noted above, historical experience shows that raids can serve, under the right circumstances, as an effective tool to manage the threat posed from ungov- erned areas. Such military expeditions, consisting of large military deployments, employing state-of-the-art weaponry of the time, with substantial logistical support, were sustained for periods of weeks or even months. In essence, these military campaigns were designed not to conquer territory but to annihilate so far as possible the fighting force of the enemy, kill the leaders and create a modicum of deterrence. Diplomatic means were by and large irrelevant, while complete inaction was not an option. The use of raids did not accomplish total victory, but did reduce problems to a manageable level. In the present-day context, the discussion here has focused on recent American and Israeli raiding experiences and evolving potential threats. Other western states might have to face similar challenges. The Balkans could become again an arena for internal struggle and political instability. Italy, France and Spain are facing ungoverned areas to their south across the Mediterranean.50 Libya, already a failed state, and the rest of North Africa, comprising a number of fragile states, could become a source not only of illegal immigrants, but also of terrorism, missile launches and piracy. The imperial impulses of the European powers are long gone and they have no appetite for reconquering territories in order to impose law and order. However, if some martial qualities still remain in European capitals, a raiding strategy is probably an option they might consider in self-defence. Nor is raiding as a strategic viable alternative limited to the West. For example, fears the implosion of Pakistan and a release of great radical and terrorist energies. Its other neighbour, Bangladesh, beleaguered with demographic and economic problems, is hardly an example of democratic stability. India has displayed a timid strategic culture and is unlikely to be tempted into the conquest of territories inhabited by Muslims. Therefore, raids seem an attractive option also for India in the event of the disintegration of its neighbouring states.51

50 For the new security problems in the East Mediterranean, see Efraim Inbar, ‘Israel’s new challenges in the eastern Mediterranean’, Middle East Quarterly 21: 4, 2014, pp. 1–12, http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/4804. pdf. 51 A few days after writing these lines, on 29 September, India launched a commando raid into Pakistan’s terri- tory, searching and killing terrorists in retaliation for the killing of its own soldiers a few days earlier: see ‘Reversing roles’, The Economist, 8–14 October 2016, p. 54, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21708302- there-still-more-smoke-fire-heated-exchanges-how-long-reversing-roles. 1440 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. What after counter-insurgency? As the evolution of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq shows, America’s war against Islamic extremism is not winnable in the traditional sense of eradicating the enemy or forcing it to a complete surrender in which it eschews the stated political goals that provoked the conflict. The potential repercussions of state failure and the rise of extreme ideologies compels the West and other developed nations to develop a strategy for conducting a protracted and seemingly unwin- nable conflict. Despite the natural tendency to look for political solutions, the West must internalize the thought that conflict management rather than conflict resolution is the best approach for confronting many contemporary strategic problems. Within such an approach, raiding is the appropriate strategic and military response.

1441 International Affairs 92: 6, 2016 Copyright © 2016 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2016 The Royal Institute of International Affairs.