REPORT 12.10.19 U.S.- Negotiations: A Guide for the Perplexed

Gilead Sher, Isaac and Mildred Brochstein Fellow in Middle East Peace and Security in Honor of Yitzhak Rabin Daniel Cohen, Intern, Center for the Middle East

In recent years, Trump and others INTRODUCTION have criticized the terms of the JCPOA for The and Iran are currently offering the Iranians too much sanction locked into an increasingly dangerous relief without strong enough restrictions. conflict in the search for regional and global The strongest criticisms have focused leverage. While both nations are incentivized primarily on (1) the “sunset provisions” to avoid war, there is still a significant risk determining when Iranian restrictions of violent escalation, especially given the expire—the deal’s prohibition on centrifuges unpredictability of President Donald Trump’s is set to end in 2025, while the restriction foreign policy. on uranium enrichment in excess of 3.67% Tensions between Washington and expires in 2030; and (2) the exclusion of Tehran are nothing new. Since the 1979 stipulations regarding Iran’s conventional Revolution overthrew U.S.-backed Iranian armaments and warfare as well as its global Shah , the Republic perpetration of terror. of Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard After unilaterally withdrawing from the Given the unpredictable Corps (IRGC) have waged a campaign to JCPOA in May 2018, Trump began levying and volatile nature shift the balance of power in the Middle intensifying sanctions on Iran. The conflict of the ongoing U.S.- East. After the exposure of Iranian nuclear has further escalated since May 2019, as Iran stalemate, these Trump has waged a “maximum pressure” facilities in 2002 and the election of hardline provocations have set Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad campaign on Iran. On May 13, 2019, Saudi in 2005, the Bush administration, in and United Arab Emirate oil tankers were U.S allies on edge and coordination with the UN and EU, levied attacked in the Strait of Hormuz. A week increased on Iran. later, Trump announced he was sending concerns about a additional troops to the Middle East. In June Following the 2013 election of a regional conflagration. seemingly more moderate Iranian President 2019, two more oil tankers were attacked, Hassan Rouhani, the Obama administration Iran announced that it would soon surpass completed an interim framework agreement JCPOA limits on enriched uranium, and with Iran in 2013. In 2015, the Joint Iranian forces shot down a U.S. military Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)— drone.1 Given the unpredictable and volatile commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal— nature of the ongoing U.S.-Iran stalemate, was officially agreed upon by Iran, , these provocations have set U.S allies on , Russia, the , the U.S., edge and increased international concerns and Germany. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed about a regional conflagration. to reduce its nuclear program in exchange In addition, there have been numerous for the reduction of nuclear-related attacks allegedly conducted by the Israeli . military in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq against Iran’s establishment of a precision-guided BAKER INSTITUTE REPORT // 12.10.19

missile supply line.2 In August 2019, Israel and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. To many launched airstrikes at Iranian-backed Americans (and Israelis), that list remains militants in Syria and Iraq, and two drones valid. However, after months of pressure crashed in Beirut, hitting Hezbollah failed to inch Iran toward a more favorable targets, though Israel has not confirmed deal, Pompeo softened his stance, conceding responsibility. On September 2, 2019, that the sanctions could be lifted without full Hezbollah responded by attacking an Israeli compliance to the list of demands.5 army base and military vehicle, with no Despite U.S. sanctions and secondary casualties reported.3 sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports and Given this situation, the U.S. is now access to international finances, Trump’s faced with three options: rejoin the JCPOA bid to use economic pressure against Iran (with or without negotiated modifications), and build a strong anti-Iran coalition in the create a new U.S.-Iran “Grand Bargain” region is hindered by the president’s often (a long-sought U.S. foreign policy aim unpredictable negotiating tactics. Trump of negotiating a deal with Iran that favors a top-down approach to negotiations incorporates regional Iranian proxies, emphasizing his personal involvement as a conventional arms, and nuclear restrictions ‘master of the deal,’ rather than a bottom- without sunset clauses), or explore up approach that allows for lower-level alternatives to a negotiated agreement. officials to negotiate in the initial stages and Despite Trump’s hopes for a tougher Iran ongoing work to sustain negotiations.6 deal, an examination of his inconsistent For example, Trump displayed a As both sides attempt approach to pressuring Iran reveals personal style lacking in substance during dim prospects for substantive U.S.-Iran his nuclear negotiations with North Korea. to exert leverage for negotiations. In the meantime, Russia seems His 2018 meeting with North Korean leader a better bargaining to have capitalized greatly on the United Kim Jong-un in Singapore—the first meeting position, a shifting States’ gradual retreat from key areas of of a sitting U.S. president and a North regional landscape influence across the Middle East. Korean leader—led to a widely publicized This paper examines the approaches photo op, but little else. Afterwards, affects Trump’s used by the U.S. and Iran during the ongoing Trump flew to Vietnam to meet with attempts to curtail nuclear negotiations. As both sides attempt Kim to initiate negotiations, rather than Iranian influence. to exert leverage for a better bargaining waiting until a framework for a deal was position, a shifting regional landscape in place. The negotiations collapsed after affects Trump’s attempts to curtail disagreements over the extent of North Iranian influence. In particular, the Israeli- Korean denuclearization and U.S. sanction Palestinian Gaza Strip arena and Iran’s relief.7 Disregarding diplomacy norms, the entrenchment in the Syrian-Lebanese areas U.S. president seemed to appeal more to his offer salient cases of competing U.S and electoral base than to broader international Iranian interests in the region. and domestic interests in crafting the administration’s policy decisions.8 Trump has crafted a similarly piecemeal CHARACTERIZING THE NEGOTIATING foreign policy without a coherent long-term PARTIES strategy in his dealings with Iran.9 After Iran shot down a U.S. surveillance drone in An Unpredictable United States June 2019, Washington reportedly decided Soon after Trump’s withdrawal from the to retaliate with a military operation against JCPOA in 2018, Secretary of State Michael Iran, only for Trump to call off the airstrike Pompeo issued 12 demands that would be just 10 minutes prior to the start.10 There is required for a deal with Iran, in exchange for speculation that the operation was intended full diplomatic and commercial ties.4 The list to be a bluff, especially in light of later of demands included abandoning its nuclear reports that Trump warned Tehran about the program, ceasing proliferation of ballistic attack.11 Regardless, this approach severely missiles, and ending support for Middle diminished the already contested credibility East proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, of U.S. threats, and it emboldened Tehran, 2 U.S.-IRAN NEGOTIATIONS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED

perhaps leading to the September 14, 2019, Trump has increasingly cornered a worried attack against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. Tehran with additional U.S. forces stationed After the Iranian strike on Saudi oil in the Gulf, which makes Trump’s decision infrastructure, Trump once again decided to withdraw from northern Syria all the against a retaliatory airstrike and instead more confusing. The severity of U.S. sent a troop detachment to Saudi Arabia pressure on Iran, however, has created along with missile defense systems for unintended consequences. Rather than protection. The White House has continually exploit political fault lines in Iran between struggled to devise effective responses to conservatives and moderates in the Iranian aggression that suitably caution government or increase tensions between Tehran and reassure American allies without the Iranian populace and Islamic leadership, sparking a violent escalation.12 Moreover, the landscape in Iran has fundamentally Trump expressed a willingness in September changed, as Trump’s actions have created a 2019 to meet with Rouhani without any more unified Iran than before.14 preconditions, an offer that seemingly With the ostensible success of the undermined Trump’s negotiating position. JCPOA in 2016, much of the Iranian public Rouhani’s refusal to meet with Trump and moderate government factions became without sanction relief further underscores increasingly supportive of expanding relations Iran’s unwillingness to negotiate from a with the U.S., in direct contradiction to position of desperation. the conservative leadership in Tehran.15 Furthermore, Trump has often tacked Many Iranians criticized the government for There is a growing sharply in negotiations with allies and using proxies for political purposes rather sense that if Iran does enemies alike throughout his presidency. than prioritizing the good of the citizenry. not fight the U.S. in Iraq In particular, Trump has discarded Now, however, more Iranian citizens and and Syria, then the fight conventional U.S. foreign policy in the Middle political moderates feel that Iranian proxies may move to Tehran. East. His staunch pro-Israel stance has in the region have become not only the alienated Palestinians’ trust in the U.S. and extended arm of Iranian interests, but also Thus, Iran’s regional further inflamed Israeli-Palestinian tensions the protectors of Iranian security. There is expansionism and to the detriment of his own foreign policy a growing sense that if Iran does not fight military strength goals. The deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian the U.S. in Iraq and Syria, then the fight are directly and relations renders it more difficult for Israel may move to Tehran. Thus, Iran’s regional to formalize strong strategic ties with anti- expansionism and military strength are indirectly felt far Iranian Sunni Arab states. Additionally, directly and indirectly felt far beyond beyond its borders Trump’s withdrawal from northern Syria its borders. in October 201913 has harmed U.S.-allied Given Trump’s withdrawal from the Kurdish forces and granted a strategic boon JCPOA, Rouhani and other moderates like to Iranian soft power in Syria. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who pushed The U.S. has failed to counter Iranian for greater diplomatic involvement with actions in a measured, systemic, and the U.S., have lost influence in Tehran. methodical manner that calms, rather than With mounting financial pressures on Iran, inflames, Middle East tensions. Trump’s opinions regarding the U.S. threat have inconsistent approach to regional conflicts consolidated, as even Rouhani and Zarif has diminished trust in the eyes of many, have lashed out at Trump. Without a new thereby decreasing U.S. political influence U.S. administration to quickly right the ship, in the region. this opinion of the U.S. may take hold among Iranian moderates as well as conservatives. A Unified and Intentional Iran This feeling of U.S. unreliability is also Despite Trump’s unpredictable foreign one that Iran will exploit for its own political policy, his massive economic sanctions gain. To many Middle East actors, Iran has have successfully placed Iran under branded itself as the only reliable ally in immense financial strain and threatened the the region. In October 2019, Saudi Arabia stability of Iranians’ daily lives. Moreover, reached out to Iran following the September 3 BAKER INSTITUTE REPORT // 12.10.19

14 oil field attack and Trump’s failure to approach with Iran, European intervention respond in a manner that demonstrates is threatening to diminish the impact of his U.S. support for Saudi Arabia.16 Instead, sanctions regime. Iranian announcements the Saudis may believe an independent in July 2019 regarding a new uranium détente with Iran will ensure their security, enrichment program19 were an attempt to a potentially serious blow to any U.S.-Israel- pressure European countries to save the Saudi coalition against Iran. In yet another JCPOA—or else. case of unreliable partnerships, Trump Additionally, most U.S. Democratic announced his endorsement for a Turkish presidential candidates have stated that military operation in northern Syria and the they would return to the Iran deal if withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from elected in 2020, if that is at all possible.20 the area on October 7, 2019, an abdication Democrats are clearly signaling that they of responsibility that left American-allied will be a more favorable negotiating partner Kurdish forces vulnerable to a Turkish for Iran, which may incentivize Tehran to military campaign.17 simply wait to engage with Trump until after In contrast to the lack of a long-term the 2020 election. Given that the rest of the U.S. strategy, Tehran has adhered to a JCPOA signatories remain supportive of the strict negotiation structure designed to deal, and Trump must win re-election in exert pressure on U.S. soft power. It has 2020, there is diminishing leverage for the demonstrated the ability to utilize Trump’s Trump administration to negotiate with Iran. Trump has successfully character as leverage, building internal Meanwhile, Trump’s mercurial nature has demonstrated an ability cohesion among the government factions set potential allies like Saudi Arabia on edge and the Iranian people, and strengthening and reduced any remaining faith in the U.S. to apply economic regional ties with enemies of the U.S. to curb Iranian ambitions. leverage through a and even concerned U.S. allies like Saudi Trump may hope to resume negotiations crippling sanctions Arabia. Nevertheless, Tehran remains with Iran in the coming election year, but it regime. However, cautious in responding to U.S. pressures does not seem likely. Despite the crippling without being overly provocative for fear sanctions on Iran’s economy, Tehran may there is a concern that of initiating a war. find it more advantageous to continue the current U.S.-Iran applying pressure on Washington and the stalemate may diminish international community before agreeing to NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE AND Trump’s leverage. negotiate. Iran may also believe a new U.S. ALTERNATIVES administration will prove easier to deal with, unless Trump is compelled to soften his U.S. Leverage in Negotiations stance and de-escalate tensions. Trump has successfully demonstrated an ability to apply economic leverage through Iranian Strategy and Negotiating Leverage a crippling sanctions regime and command Despite Iran’s much smaller GDP and some level of international cooperation. military, Tehran can apply pressure to However, this success has not brought Washington’s strategic interests through Tehran to the negotiating table as of yet, and its vast network of proxy forces in the there is a concern that the current U.S.-Iran Middle East, terror and conventional stalemate may diminish Trump’s leverage. armaments, and ability to affect global oil European (and other) signatories of transportation.21 Since revolutionary forces the JCPOA remain invested in maintaining took over Iran in 1979, the Islamic regime its terms. At the G7 conference in August has made outsized efforts to establish 2019, France’s President Emmanuel relations throughout the Middle East. Macron offered Iran a bailout package In Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah’s worth $15 billion to keep Iran in the 2015 Hezbollah has gained power and political nuclear deal.18 Germany, Britain, and clout, and it serves as an Iranian proxy France have all attempted to save the on Israel’s northern border. Hezbollah has JCPOA and de-escalate U.S.-Iran tensions. also assisted Shiite groups in Syria, while Unfortunately for Trump’s hardball 4 U.S.-IRAN NEGOTIATIONS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED

the IRGC Quds Force has trained fighters to separate the issues, thereby appeasing in local militias. A recent report claims Europe and much of the international Iranian proxies have built a presence in Syria community without conceding too much near the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, regional influence. establishing a second northern front through which to attack Israel.22 Iran has also Negotiation Options and Alternatives actively supported the terrorist activities of At present, Trump has a few options for Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, on Israel’s his dealings with Iran. One option would 23 southern front. be to return to the JCPOA and improve the In Yemen, the anti-Saudi Houthis have deal from within the agreement. Having strong ties to Iran, and Iran has also helped ditched the deal, it seems unlikely that Shiite forces in Iraq build missile production Trump would re-enter the JCPOA without capabilities and increase Shiite political and concessions, especially given the public economic presence. Establishing the Shiite relations nightmare of backtracking. crescent (Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon) in line Rather, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA with the Shiites’ collective aspirations also with the aim of negotiating a new deal allows Iran to create a supply line of arms that incorporates stronger restrictions 24 and supplies. Iran has also been diligently on the Iranian nuclear program and a working to improve Hezbollah’s precision reduction of Iranian support for Middle East missile arsenal in order to provide more proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and flexibility in case of a military engagement the Houthi rebels in Yemen. If the current with Israel. Iranian-backed proxies in stalemate continues, however, Trump will Iranian announcements Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq further create be forced to explore his options outside of vulnerabilities for the U.S., as American in July 2019 regarding a negotiated agreement and continue to a new uranium forces in Iraq could be a target of retaliatory isolate Iran, perhaps even with the aim of attacks. Similarly, Hezbollah could initiate forcing a regime change in Iran—an unlikely enrichment program an offensive on Israel’s northern border and objective for the foreseeable future. were an attempt to civilian centers beyond the northern region. When Obama negotiated the 2015 Meanwhile, through a series of pressure European JCPOA, he decided that the terms of the deal countries to save the calculated actions, Iran has demonstrated were better than the alternative option of the capability to threaten much of the continued sanctions on Iran, which were not JCPOA—or else. world’s oil shipments. There have already productive. He also decided that the costs of been attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of a military strike were too great and instead Hormuz, through which a fifth of global oil opted for negotiations. Trump has returned 25 production is shipped. Should the U.S. to the position that an extensive sanctions choose to begin a military campaign, the regime and international isolation of Iran IRGC might threaten shipping lanes for global is more damaging to Iran than to the U.S. oil, significantly increasing pressure to end Given Trump’s actions so far, though, he has any U.S. conflict with Iran. seemed to mirror Obama regarding any sort Another critical part of Iranian strategy of direct military action against Iran. vis-à-vis the international community is Trump may believe that his best a remarkable success at differentiating alternative to negotiations is to wait out the nuclear issue from other conventional Iran while sanctions cripple their economy. military issues (e.g., cruise missiles, However, this approach is weakened by precision long-range weaponry, terror, oil Europe’s desire to save the JCPOA, leading warfare) and dealing with them separately. Macron and others to offer Iran a bailout. This is one of the biggest issues that has Iran, on the other hand, is posturing that pushed Trump and Israeli Prime Minister it is comfortable with the alternative to Benjamin Netanyahu to reject the JCPOA negotiations. It will simply return to its and push for harsher isolation. The Iranian past nuclear development and wait out short-term policy is strategic defiance, Trump’s sanctions. This claim is bolstered while its long-term strategy will continue by the interference of Europe, and by the 5 BAKER INSTITUTE REPORT // 12.10.19

upcoming U.S. elections, but there are solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict flaws with this too. It is unclear how far would further isolate Iran’s influence in Europe will go in opposition to American the region and offer Trump much greater sanctions, and Trump might very well be freedom to operate in the region, with re-elected in 2020. fewer obstacles from the EU, UN, and many While the United States and Iran struggle Arab states. for leverage, the ongoing stalemate bears Traction in the Israeli-Palestinian significant risk for regional conflagration arena would offer a strategic advantage and global instability. If Iran follows through and unlock avenues for U.S. influence with its threats of uranium enrichment, with Arab allies. This is why Trump’s long- will the U.S. or Israel seriously consider awaited “Deal of the Century”28 might a military strike? And if Iranian proxies be counterproductive once laid out, as begin a sustained campaign of violence at it would follow a series of pro-Israel and the Israel-Lebanon border, it could spark anti-Palestinian steps taken since 2017 by another Israeli offensive against Hezbollah the Trump administration. By expressly like the summer 2006 campaign, in which supporting Israeli settlement in the West Israel attacked Hezbollah targets and Bank—and eventually partial, gradual, infrastructure after Hezbollah killed and or full annexation—Trump is diminishing abducted Israeli soldiers.26 the prospects for positive developments. Progress in resolving While it is difficult to predict what Moreover, his economic approach to the the Israeli-Palestinian Trump will do in the coming months, conflict will not achieve any meaningful conflict might enable observers believe that he will likely be success, as it cannot replace political a greater Sunni Arab- motivated to seek areas of superficial engagement. progress for domestic political benefit. With As Trump has been working to build Israeli alliance, which regard to Iran, Trump may be enticed to a strong anti-Iran coalition in the Middle has been much make a new deal with minor changes but East—comprised of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, discussed in Israel and major rebranding. There is little evidence and Israel as the principal participants— international circles that Trump’s overhauled Grand Bargain has he has remained stifled in some regards. a chance of succeeding, at least during the While Saudi Arabia’s interests in containing but has a long way to coming year. While Trump will continue to Iran often align with Israel and the U.S., become a firm strategic navigate the alternatives to negotiations, many Sunni U.S. allies continue to formally partnership. it is unlikely he will be able to force a distance themselves from Israel. Among regime change in Iran, especially given the their public constituencies, it is simply too increased unity in Iran created by his foreign unpopular to ally with Israel. Progress in policy decisions. resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might enable a greater Sunni Arab-Israeli alliance, which has been much discussed in HOW THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN Israel and international circles but has a long CONFLICT RELATES TO U.S.-IRAN way to become a firm strategic partnership. NEGOTIATIONS A stronger coalition between Israel, Sunni Arab states, and the United States would The Conflict Hinders U.S. Negotiating be an essential step toward combatting Leverage regional Iranian hegemony. Trump’s outgoing special envoy to the Movement toward establishing a two- Middle East, Jason Greenblatt, has called a state-for-two-people reality might also resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict create a positive strategic cycle for Israel. “Iran’s worst nightmare.”27 Greenblatt’s Good-faith actions with the Palestinian point does highlight an important approach Authority and steps toward active to any American negotiations with Iran. negotiations would support U.S.-Israel- In the interest of creating U.S. leverage, Saudi aims of reducing Iranian influence. In progress toward a negotiated two-state addition, increasing international isolation

6 U.S.-IRAN NEGOTIATIONS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED

of Iran might disrupt Hamas’ partnership approach is needed to bridge the growing with Iran and increase the possibility of an distance between the Palestinians and the eventual Hamas-Fatah reconciliation and U.S., which would eventually subside and further traction in Israeli-Palestinian and perhaps slow Tehran’s regional expansion. regional negotiations; such progress could yield substantive negotiations that would further enable tougher U.S.-Iran negotiations CONCLUSION in line with Israeli security concerns. As the United States and Iran vie over Tehran’s Relationship with Palestine nuclear weapons, oil, and regional influence, Trump seeks to harness economic pressure In Iran, conservative government factions and international isolation, while Iran is have long supported Palestinian resistance relying on the European signatories of and violence as one more avenue for the JCPOA and the upcoming 2020 U.S. disrupting Western influence in the region. presidential elections to simply wait Trump Conservatives in Iran hope to reap the out. Moreover, Iran is threatening to disrupt regional benefits of the Israeli-Palestinian global oil shipments while simultaneously conflict—such as a reduced Israeli combining terror and conventional armed relationship with Sunni Arabs—and Tehran warfare through its use of proxy forces in has funded Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen to Jihad for this very reason. Nevertheless, retaliate. As Trump seeks to negotiate his Iranian-Palestinian connections are not Grand Bargain with Iran, he does not seem set in stone. Some moderates in Iran to have a clear plan for engaging Tehran have historically questioned the value of or obtaining leverage over it, nor is his meddling in Palestinian affairs, though international track record compelling. today there is consensus in Tehran over the use of proxies. On the other hand, while Hamas certainly welcomes Iran’s financial backing, their relationship is not unassailable, particularly when other supporting actors like Qatar and Turkey are involved. In the early months of the Arab Spring, Hamas found itself in the middle of sectarian conflict between Shiite Iran and the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, and its relations with Iran loosened.29 Today, however, the relationship between Hamas and Iran is as strong as ever. Tehran has continually emphasized to the Palestinians that resistance is more valuable than appeasement, and Hamas has recognized Iran as a valuable and steady partner for resistance30—especially as Washington has abandoned the status of ‘honest broker.’31 Perhaps, though, a shuffling of regional fault lines could once again distance Hamas from Iran, especially if the environment for resuming negotiations changes and movement toward Fatah- Hamas reconciliation gets traction. A new

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14. Sune Engel Rasmussen, “A Unified ENDNOTES Iranian Leadership Stands Up to the U.S.,” 1. Jen Kirby, “US-Iran Standoff: A Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2019, https:// Timeline,” Vox, July 5, 2019, http://bit. on.wsj.com/2P6Xp7a. ly/34KSmzT. 15. Max Fisher, “How the Nuclear Deal 2. David M. Halbfinger, Ben Hubbard, Boosted Iran’s Moderates—and Showed and Ronen Bergman, “The Israel-Iran Iranian Elections Can Matter,” Vox, March 2, Shadow War Escalates and Breaks Into the 2016, https://bit.ly/2DDb8x9. Open,” New York Times, August 28, 2019, 16. Farnaz Fassihi and Ben Hubbard, https://nyti.ms/2Li89hS. “Saudi Arabia and Iran Make Quiet Openings 3. Amos Harel, “How Israel, Hezbollah to Head Off War,” New York Times, October and Iran Almost Went to War Last Week,” 4, 2019, https://nyti.ms/37YtEhk. Haaretz, September 8, 2019, http://bit. 17. Nancy A. Youssef and Gordon Lubold, ly/35Z3hpC. “U.S. Military to Withdraw From Northern 4. “Mike Pompeo Speech: What Are the Syria,” Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2019, 12 Demands Given to Iran?” Al Jazeera, May https://on.wsj.com/2DFsOZ5. 21, 2018, http://bit.ly/2P4bDFK. 18. David E. Sanger, Steven Erlanger, and 5. Edward Wong, “Trump Administration Adam Nossiter, “France Dangles $15 Billion Says It Will Negotiate With Iran With ‘No Bailout for Iran in Effort to Save Nuclear Preconditions,’” New York Times, June 2, Deal,” New York Times, September 2, 2019, 2019, https://nyti.ms/34KSKhP. https://nyti.ms/2sGzunq. 6. Alex Ward, “Trump’s Approach With 19. David D. Kirkpatrick and David E. Kim Jong Un Didn’t Work This Time,” Vox, Sanger, “Iran Announces New Breach of February 28, 2019, http://bit.ly/33HxgRl. Nuclear Deal Limits and Threatens Further 7. Edward Wong, “Trump’s Talks With Violations,” New York Times, July 7, 2019, Kim Jong-Un Collapse, and Both Sides Point https://nyti.ms/2PdBURU. Fingers,” New York Times, February 28, 20. Nahal Toosi, “Democrats Want to 2019, https://nyti.ms/2PbJxbt. Rejoin the Iran Nuclear Deal. It’s Not That 8. Aaron D. Miller and Daniel Kurtzer, Simple,” Politico, July 20, 2019, https:// “Let’s Not Pretend Washington Ever Really politi.co/2DI0fdi. Tried to Stop Israeli Settlements,” Carnegie 21. Kersten Knipp, “Iran-US Conflict: Endowment for International Peace, Tehran’s Asymmetrical Approach,” Deutsche November 22, 2019, https://bit.ly/2rTBkRC. Welle, June 23, 2019, https://bit.ly/35ZiLdq. 9. Jack Thompson, “Trump’s Middle East 22. Jonathan Spyer, “Iran Opens a Policy,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy 233 Second Front Along Israel’s Border,” Wall (October 2018): 1–4, https://bit.ly/2rU6d88. Street Journal, October 2, 2019, https:// 10. Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer, on.wsj.com/2P7poUa. “Why Trump Decided Not to Attack Iran,” 23. Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas Member Details Foreign Policy, June 21, 2019, https://bit. Long History of Iranian Financial, Political ly/2ONLIDv. Support,” Jerusalem Post, July 1, 2019, 11. Anthony Halpin, “Did Trump Just https://bit.ly/33Fq9sM. Blink or Bluff in Standoff With Iran?” 24. Seth G. Jones, “War by Proxy: Iran’s Bloomberg, June 21, 2019, https://bloom. Growing Footprint in the Middle East,” bg/2rPhlmT. Center for Strategic and International 12. Frederick Kempe, “Trump’s Iran Studies, September 24, 2019, https://bit. Test: Nerves and Vision,” Atlantic Council, ly/33KrQ8n. September 21, 2019, https://bit.ly/2LjQWo5. 25. Andreas Rostek-Buetti, “Strait of 13. Eric Schmitt, Maggie Haberman, and Hormuz: The World’s Most Important Oil Edward Wong, “President Endorses Turkish Choke Point,” Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2019, Military Operation in Syria, Shifting U.S. https://p.dw.com/p/3KQZB. Policy,” New York Times, October 7, 2019, https://nyti.ms/2OLdMY4.

8 U.S.-IRAN NEGOTIATIONS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED

26. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah AUTHORS ambushed an Israeli patrol, killed three, wounded two, and abducted two Israel Gilead Sher is the Isaac and Mildred Defense Force soldiers, subsequently killing Brochstein Fellow in Middle East Peace and them as well. The campaign, called “The Security in Honor of Yitzhak Rabin at the Second Lebanon War” in Israel, ended on Baker Institute. He is also a senior researcher August 14, 2006. at the Tel Aviv Institute for National Security 27. Jason D. Greenblatt and Brian Studies, where he heads the Center for H. Hook, “Greenblatt and Hook: Israeli- Applied Negotiations. Palestinian Peace Would Be Iran’s Worst Nightmare,” Fox News, July 30, 2019, Daniel Cohen is a research intern in the https://fxn.ws/2DEDneD. Baker Institute Center for the Middle East. 28. Trump has long spoken of an He is an undergraduate at Rice University ultimate deal for Israeli-Palestinian peace. studying linguistics and Jewish studies, with The economic portion of the deal, titled a concentration in Arabic and Islamic texts. “Peace to Prosperity,” was released in June 2019 with a proposal for a $50 billion investment package, primarily for the West Bank and Gaza. The political portion of the deal is yet to be released, but there is strong opposition to the coming political proposals due to Trump’s past boons to Netanyahu, including Pompeo’s November 2019 announcement that the U.S. does not see Jewish settlements in the West Bank as See more Baker Institute Reports at: “inconsistent with international law.” www.bakerinstitute.org/baker-reports 29. Jonathan Schanzer, “How Hamas Lost the Arab Spring,” Atlantic, June 21, This publication was written by a 2013, https://bit.ly/2r8ZNSN. researcher (or researchers) who participated in a Baker Institute project. 30. Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas Pursues ‘Axis Wherever feasible, this research is of Resistance’ Alliance During Tehran Visit,” reviewed by outside experts before it is Jerusalem Post, July 24, 2019, https://bit. released. However, the views expressed ly/2RgspUE. herein are those of the individual 31. Philip Gordon and Prem Kumar, author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s “Jared Kushner’s Middle East Fantasy,” Baker Institute for Public Policy. Atlantic, June 25, 2018, https://bit. ly/34L2CYP. © 2019 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Cite as: Sher, Gilead, and Daniel Cohen. 2019. U.S.-Iran Negotiations: A Guide for the Perplexed. Baker Institute Report no. 12.10.19. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

https://doi.org/10.25613/q68h-6b10

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