Research Report Determinants of African Perceptions Toward Chinese and American Engagement in Africa

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY

CSIRCENTER FOR STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH VOL. 01–2014 FEBRUARY 2014

Research Report Determinants of African Perceptions toward Chinese and American Engagement in Africa

Kris Inman, Ph.D.

CSIR RESEARCH REPORT 1

Determinants of African Perceptions toward Chinese and American Engagement in Africa*

Africans’ attitudes toward China and the United States are poorly studied and popularly misunderstood. When it comes to relations between nations in Africa and either China or the United States, there is little analytic or scholarly focus on how African populations respond to the activities of these two major pow- ers in their homelands. The purpose of this study is to begin filling this gap. Using a multi-level statistical model that nests Afrobarometer Round 4 survey data and country-level factors, this study provides a sys- tematic and comprehensive examination of African public opinion toward China and the United States. By employing statistical modeling of public opinion data that are nested within country-level factors, it finds that Africans react to what China and the United States do, both in Africa and across the globe, but in sometimes unexpected ways. The findings indicate where U.S. and Chinese efforts in Africa are succeeding and where they are not. Most importantly, the most well-known pillars of Chinese and American engagement in Africa do not appear to impact African attitudes for either country. For China, for example, infrastructure development has no effect on African attitudes toward the Chinese. For the United States, improved access to health care through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) yields no impact on how Africans feel about America. Sources of African attitudes toward China and the United States. When it comes to gauging African opinions toward Construction workers install a new road in Cabo Verde, May 2013. foreign countries, generalizations can be difficult to make The 21st century has seen skyrocketing Chinese investments in Sub- because of the complex, nuanced, and changing ways in Saharan Africa’s infrastructure, energy, and other sectors. which Africans perceive and engage with outsiders. For Axel Lauer/Shutterstock.com example: In Tanzania, the inclusion of Chinese characters on the packaging of medicines is an important marketing device. Although most Tanzanian customers cannot read the characters, their presence validates the authenticity and heralds the efficacy of the medication; the absence of Chinese characters raises suspicions among African consumers. In contrast, recent discord between Angola and China flashed when locomotives provided by China for a newly constructed railroad turned out to be unreliable; Angolan officials reacted with irritation that the labels, manuals, and guidelines for operating the locomotive were available only in Chinese [causing] intense frustration and national humiliation, making viscerally clear the country’s continued reliance on China for intellectual and technical capacity.1

* This research report is the product of independent scholarly investigation and is not finished intelligence. It has not been coor- dinated with U.S. Intelligence Community agencies. The opinions expressed in this report are solely the author’s and are not those of the National Intelligence University, Defense Intelligence Agency, or Department of Defense. An expanded discussion of these findings is available upon request to the author: [email protected]. 2

Popular reactions to Chinese miners in Ghana provide another interesting example of the diversity of opinions even within the same community. In June 2013, the Ghanaian government began expelling illegal Chinese miners. The Western press reported that the government took this action, in part, based on popular “resentment toward the Chinese miners.”2 According to these reports, grievances included “using Ghanaians as fronts to engage in small-scale mining from which foreigners are otherwise barred,”3 taking Ghanaian jobs, using weapons, environmental damage caused by illegal mining practices, and safety issues related to illegal mining.4 On the other hand, in Dunkwa, reports suggested that the expulsion of Chinese miners had negative consequences for the local economy and that Chinese miners were welcomed in Ghana: In Dunkwa . . . sources said the departure of Chinese had drastically affected the local economy. “A very big change has happened in Dunkwa . . . . [The Chinese] were the ones who provided the mining equipment—most of the Ghanaians left behind cannot continue their operations. It has really affected the mining. The local people are complaining because they say the Chinese were good for business. Now everything has slowed down.”5 Similar mixed and complex reactions toward American engagement in Africa are also prevalent, especially with regard to the African response to the United States Africa Command.6 These examples demonstrate that opinions vary widely, both cross-nationally and across individuals within the same country. In other words, both individual-level and country-level factors influence popular opinion. In order to systematically examine the effects of these individual- and country-level influencers of African opinion toward China and the United States, this study employs a multi-level statistical model that nests Afrobarometer Round 4 survey data within country-level facts—regime type, bilateral imports, and the need for international assistance. Determinants of African public opinion toward China. When it comes to involvement in Africa, China has a reputation in the popular Western discourse for behaving as a neocolonial power. Much of this discourse accuses China of being in Africa for purely economic reasons. Moreover, in popular Western discourse, China is accused of perpetuating elite corruption in Africa because China does not attach conditionalities to its projects in Africa. However, this is not the story emanating from much of the academic research on Sino-African relations. Instead, the scholarly research reveals that China is doing far more in Africa than extracting resources. It supplies doctors, helps to develop infrastructure, provides Africa with an alternative development plan, fosters cultural exchanges, and so on.7 At the country level, available survey data reveal that more developed countries have a lower opinion of China, and that citizens living in countries that import more goods from China have lower opinions of China. Citizens living in African democracies are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward China. At the individual level, the more assets people have, the more likely they are to favor China. Also, Africans who identify with the incumbent party in political office are more likely to think positively of China. How- ever, Muslims are less likely to hold positive attitudes toward China, probably due to China’s treatment of Muslims in the Uighur region.8 Contrary to expectations, the findings revealed no significant relationship between citizens with more access to health care or infrastructure and attitudes toward China. Also contrary to expectations, Africans do not appear to associate China with increased elite corruption. Determinants of African public opinion toward the United States. The United States has several programs in Africa that might be expected to lead Africans to feel more positively toward it. PEPFAR, one of President George W. Bush’s flagship programs in Africa (and continued under President Obama), might be expected to generate some good will toward America, since the program brings significant assistance to the health CSIR RESEARCH REPORT 3 sector across the continent. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which normalized trade between the United States and African countries, might also be a way to generate more positive affection toward the United States, since this policy allows African countries to trade with a major international trade partner on an even playing field. The ongoing U.S. grand strategy to spread democracy across the globe may also be expected to generate positive feelings, at least among populations who hold democratic values. However, the story is much more complex than this. At the country level, the same factors that affect attitudes toward China also affect attitudes toward the United States. Citizens in more developed countries and those who live in countries that import more goods from the United States are less likely to view the United States favorably. Citizens living in African democracies are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward the United States. At the individual level, having a job, owning assets, holding democratic values, and identifying with the incumbent in political office increase the likelihood that citizens will view the United States favorably. Africans who view their elites as corrupt are also more likely to view the United States favorably, possibly due to the U.S. role in fighting elite corruption through practices such as applying aid conditionalities. Surprisingly, the findings revealed no relationship between citizens with more access to health care or infrastructure and attitudes toward the United States. Moreover, as they are with China, African Muslims are less likely to hold positive attitudes toward the United States. This is likely due to the ongoing global antiterrorist operations, as many African Muslims have a very negative view of the U.S. treatment of Muslims abroad. Conclusions. This study provides empirical evidence that contradicts much of the popular discourse on Sino-African and U.S.-African relations. For example, this discourse insinuates that the U.S. PEPFAR policy and the vast Chinese infrastructure investments in Africa are contributing to positive foreign relations for each country. While that may be true at the elite level, this study was unable to support this conventional wisdom in the realm of mass public opinion. This suggests that the claims being made in the Western media and at the elite level are flawed and do not reflect the more complex reality. The findings also reveal a perception problem for the United States and China among Africa’s Muslims. This is a considerable difficulty especially for the United States, as it turns its Overseas Contingency Operations toward the Muslim extremist groups—such as al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab—operating on the continent. Finally, A doctor checks a mother and her children for the results indicate where the United States is making a positive impact on HIV/AIDS at a clinic in Nairobi. PEPFAR is African perceptions; namely, in its democratization and anticorruption efforts. a highly successful U.S. humanitarian program that has not translated into positive affection for These areas provide the United States with its strongest opportunities to the United States among many African citizens. influence individual African opinions in an effort to foster more productive Spirit of America/Shutterstock.com and positive relations. 4

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Mali Benin Kenya Ghana Liberia Nigeria Malawi Uganda Zambia Lesotho Namibia Senegal Tanzania Botswana Zimbabwe Cape Verde South Africa Madagascar Mozambique Burkina Faso

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Figure 1: By surveyed country—African attitudes toward China and the United States.9

1 Jamie Monson and Stephanie Rupp, “Africa and China: New Engagements, New Research,” African Studies Review 56, no.1 (April 2013): 31. 2 Adam Nossiter and Yiting Sun, “Chasing the Golden Dream, Chinese Miners Are on the Run in Ghana,” New York Times, June 10, 2013; Liu Dong, “Chinese Miners Lured by Ghana’s Gold Rush Hit Rock Bottom After Crackdown,” Global Times, June 13, 2013. 3 Adam Nossiter and Yiting Sun, “Chasing the Golden Dream.” 4 Afua Hirsch, “Ghana Deports Thousands in Crackdown on Illegal Chinese Goldminers,” Guardian, July 15, 2013. 5 Ibid. 6 A. Carl LeVan, “The Political Economy of African Responses to the U.S. Africa Command,” Africa Today 57, no. 1 (Fall 2010): 3–23. CSIR RESEARCH REPORT 5

7 E.g., Deborah Brautigam, “China’s Foreign Aid in Africa: What Do We Know?,” in China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, ed. R. I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); David Shambaugh, China Goes to Africa: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 8 David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 9 Upon request of the Embassy of Cape Verde in November 2013, the United States now recognizes the name of the country “Cape Verde” to be “Cabo Verde.” However, in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, the country is referred to as “Cape Verde.” NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY