Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

A Fresh Start in Egypt? Actors, Interests, Scenarios

Muriel Asseburg / Stephan Roll Co m ments SWP

President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster is a historical turning point for Egypt. The assump- tion of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces could bring about a political opening of the country, but this is by no means assured. Egypt’s future is not, however, solely dependent on whether the military delivers on its promises in regard to con- stitutional amendments, free elections, and the transfer of power to a civilian govern- ment. The opposition forces must also come forward with concrete visions of what the country’s future political system should look like. They must also organise themselves so as to be able to feed their demands into the process. But which interests are the various actors pursuing? How are they organised and how are power relations shaped among them? And what potential scenarios for Egypt’s future can be derived from this? One thing is already clear: without broad international support, it will be impossible to manage the transition process. This presents German and European policymakers with the opportunity to support genuine democratisation.

The mass demonstrations in Egypt, which headed by Ahmed Shafiq, the Prime Minis- started on 25 January 2011, have dramati- ter installed by Hosni Mubarak in his last cally changed the country’s political land- days in office, and cannot be considered scape. Mubarak was ousted, the Parliament inclusive. For at least the next six months, was dissolved and the leadership of the or until free elections are held, the military ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) col- is to rule Egypt. The military leadership lapsed – a resounding success for the has announced important reforms for the demonstrators, who had been protesting coming months. The state of emergency in living conditions and the old order across effect for the past 30 years shall be lifted – the entire country. On 11 February, the when and if the security situation permits. military assumed power. The government, A constitutional committee created in mid- composed almost solely of politicians from February has been charged with revising the “old regime”, was confirmed in office. controversial articles of the constitution A reshuffle, which took place some 10 days within ten days. These changes shall then later, brought some new faces into the be approved in a referendum. Finally, elec- government – but the new cabinet is still tions shall be held for both chambers of the

Dr Muriel Asseburg is head of the Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 6 Dr Stephan Roll is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division February 2011

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Egyptian parliament as well as the presi- control of the process. There are, however, dency. So far, however, no binding time- clear limitations on its actions. First, the table has been announced for the imple- current leadership in Cairo is heavily mentation of these measures. Still, a com- dependent on the USA, which has been plex process of negotiations has already providing Egypt with around US$1.3 billion begun among all relevant groups of actors. in military aid each year. For the time being But even within the individual groups, at least, the American government seems to political ideas and expectations are neither be pushing for political opening in Egypt. It clearly defined nor uniform. seems unlikely that the US government is prepared to accept a military regime that rules against the will of its people. Second, The Military considerable pressure will also continue to Cairo’s new centre of power, the Supreme come from the Egyptian people. If political Council of the Armed Forces, is by no reforms are delayed or fail to materialise, means a new actor on the scene. The chair- further demonstrations and protests are man of the council, 75-year old Minister of likely. Such protests would then be aimed Defence Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein directly at the military and its leadership. Tantawi, in particular, was considered one of the past president’s closest confidants and a hardliner faithful to the regime. The The Moderate Opposition other members of this body – including Established opposition parties and move- Chief of Staff Sami Annan, the command- ments played only a minor role in the ers of the air force, air defence forces, and protests of the past weeks. Due to their marines, as well as other high-ranking degree of organisation, however, they are officers – were also part of the close circle best equipped to successfully position of power around Mubarak. themselves in the negotiations that have The Supreme Council of the Armed begun over the country’s future political Forces is not dedicated to re-establishing system and have the greatest chances of the old regime, but rather to protecting electoral success. Basically three different, the military’s prominent political and eco- albeit partially overlapping, groups can nomic position. Yet it is doubtful whether be distinguished within the moderate oppo- these efforts could be reconciled with sition, all of which were advocating – to democratic processes. With its 470,000 greater or lesser degrees – for gradual and troops and 480,000 reservists, Egypt has controlled regime change during Muba- the world’s tenth largest army. There are rak’s rule: smaller parties with a secular around 400,000 paramilitaries, largely orientation, the opposition alliance National under the control of the Ministry of In- Association for Change (NAC), and the moder- terior. In addition, the military is an ate political arm of the Egyptian Muslim economic power house with its own busi- Brotherhood. nesses, which also produce civilian goods and which often offer lucrative jobs to long- serving generals. Against the backdrop of Secular Parties the country’s difficult economic situation, In addition to the NDP, which had been a freely elected civilian leadership could ruling the country, there are a total of 23 take steps to rein in at least some of the eco- registered parties in Egypt. The majority nomic activities of the security apparatus. of these parties, however, are unknown It can therefore be assumed that the to large portions of the population. The Supreme Council has a considerable inter- largest approved opposition party is the est in guiding the political reconstruction national liberal New Wafd Party, which to its own advantage rather than losing received a little over 1 percent of the votes

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in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Until Egypt. In addition, there has been growing the 2010 parliamentary elections, however, dissatisfaction within the opposition over it was always seen as a bloc party closely the last years about his limited presence aligned with the regime. In May 2010, the in the country and about his reserved businessman El-Sayyid el-Badawi became behaviour. ElBaradei was thus excluded the head of the party. Under his leadership, from the negotiations held in the second the party is likely to position itself as a week of February between the opposition proponent of liberal economic values. and Mubarak’s Vice President Omar Sulei- Other well known opposition parties man. Furthermore, other prominent in- include the socialist National Progressive dividuals have since emerged, who could Unionist Party (“Tagammu”), the socialist prove attractive candidates for the oppo- Arab Democratic Nasserist Party and the liberal sition. These include the chemist and Nobel Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party. The latter party Prize winner Ahmed Zewail as well as the is led by Ayman Nour, who ran against current Secretary-General of the Arab League Mubarak in the 2005 presidential elections, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amr collected a remarkable 7 percent of the Moussa. The latter, in particular, is afforded votes, and was subsequently imprisoned. good chances at the presidency by many While Nour is known as a prominent oppo- observers. Moussa is seen as a popular sition politician, he has been unable to figure and could also attract former NDP draw broad support since his release in voters. To date, it is unclear what position 2009. This can be traced back to campaigns the Muslim Brotherhood would take vis-à- by the regime to discredit him as well as to vis a Moussa candidacy. Nour’s polarising personality. In any case, Nour is hardly seen as a potential unifying figure for the spectrum of opposition The Muslim Brotherhood groups. The Muslim Brotherhood is currently the largest and best-organised opposition force, though not a legally sanctioned party. In National Association for Change the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood The NAC emerged in early 2010 around renounced violence. It has since made use Mohamed ElBaradei, the former director of the few opportunities for political par- of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It ticipation offered within the existing order. cannot be ruled out that the group may Since the mid 1980s, it has participated fall apart and that its various subgroups in elections and since the mid 1990s it affiliate themselves with other opposition has been committed to party pluralism, parties. The NAC is after all a heterogene- freedom of opinion and the principles of ous alliance of opposition forces; it in- democratic transfer of power. Prior to the cludes, for example, many members of the massive electoral fraud perpetrated in once important opposition movement November/December 2010, representatives “Kifaya!” (Arabic for “enough!”). Agreement of the Muslim Brotherhood formed the was reached on just seven core demands largest opposition group in parliament. on the Mubarak regime. These included, During the 2005-2010 legislative period, among other things, free presidential they controlled around one-fifth of the elections and the lifting of the state of seats, making constructive use of their emergency. presence to strengthen the work and con- It has become unlikely that ElBaradei trol functions of the parliament. will succeed in establishing himself in the At the same time, the group’s political presidential elections as a compromise representatives definitely have a range of candidate for the various opposition forces. different priorities. The conservative wing, For one thing, he is hardly known across which has been represented since January

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2010 by Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie, nation, this concession was vehemently acts in a reserved and cautious manner. criticised by the reformers, who rejected Until now, it has primarily placed emphasis it as helping to stabilise the regime. on cooperation with the regime and the necessity of strengthening work at the In the short term, the individual groups grassroots level. The wing that follows a and parties across the spectrum of the progressive reformist course is also open moderate opposition aspire to effect a to cooperation with other opposition political opening towards a democratic powers – including secular groups – as in system. Among other things, they agree the case of the Kifaya! movement or the on the need for free elections and a lifting NAC. This wing is led by representatives of the state of emergency. In light of the such as Essam el-Erian, the Brotherhood’s fragmented party landscape, it is conceiv- spokesman and chief of its political bureau, able that there will be fusions of smaller and Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a (for- groups or at least joint electoral lists. Over mer) long time member of the Guidance the medium and long term, however, the Council. Mohammed Akif, who acted as objectives of the different actors are likely Supreme Guide from 2004 until 2010, is to be highly divergent. Already at this point also part of this wing. In 2004, he presented it is doubtful whether there is consensus a progressive programme and stimulated within the moderate opposition regarding intense debates about the Brotherhood’s the required constitutional amendments. orientation and focus. This wing aspires This concerns, for example, the contentious to a civilian state with an Islamic frame of question of how to address Article 5 of the reference comparable with Turkey under constitution, which prohibits political the AKP government. involvement based on a religious frame of The power balance between the two reference. In the future, a high degree of wings is currently unclear. On the one variance can also be expected in approaches hand, internal discussions about the draft to economic and social policy. In principle, programme presented in early 2007 showed however, the larger opposition parties are that the conservative wing was unable to proponents of economic liberalisation and assert its ideas. The document included a free market economy – unlike the mili- elements of theocratic order as well as a tary, which will cling to elements of a state- number of extremely conservative positions centred economic structure. – demands were made, for example, to in- troduce corporal punishment, to establish a council of religious scholars with poten- The Revolutionaries tially far-reaching competencies and to bar The revolutionary group of actors has women and Copts from high office. The developed over the past three years. It is draft met with such strong criticism from largely composed of well-educated young reformers within the movement as well as Egyptians organised primarily through experts that its passage was no longer pur- Facebook groups and has been the driving sued. On the other hand, conservative force of the protests against the regime. Six representatives posted gains between 2008 groups joined together in the “Coalition of and 2010 as leadership positions were filled the Youth of the Revolution”, an alliance through internal elections. Different ap- established during the demonstrations: proaches also became apparent in the past  the “April 6 Youth Movement”, a Face- weeks. While the former “party chairman” book group that was created in 2008 to in the People’s Assembly, Saad al-Katatni, support worker protests in the industrial was prepared to enter into negotiations city al-Mahalla al-Kubra; with Vice President Suleiman without the  the Facebook group “We are all Khaled precondition of Mubarak’s immediate resig- Said”, which formed in mid-2010 in pro-

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test to the murder of the young Said aries as it hampered the regime’s efforts in by policemen in Alexandria; taking action against the activists. In the  the Facebook group “Justice and negotiation process that is now starting, Freedom”; however, this advantage will likely become  the youth campaign in support of a disadvantage. For the separate groups Mohamed ElBaradei; must first develop leadership structures  the youth organisation of the Muslim and agree on programmes in order to be Brotherhood; prepared to put forth their interests effec-  the youth organisation of the liberal tively – and achieve electoral success. Democratic Front Party. The coalition agreed on a 14-person rep- resentative body, which includes promi- Two Scenarios nent activists such as engineer Ahmed From today’s perspective, there seem to be Maher, founder of the “April 6 Youth Move- essentially two possible development paths. ment” and the Google marketing manager Either the military will focus on maintain- Wael Ghoneim, who initiated the “We are ing its prominent political and economic all Khaled Said” group. The youth organisa- position, garnished with some of the trap- tion of the Muslim Brotherhood is also pings of a façade democracy – which over part of the revolutionary movement; it the medium term is likely to lead to new took part in the demonstrations on Tahrir protests and uprisings. Or a “moderated Square and has two representatives on the transition” will occur and lead to a sus- representative body. The Brotherhood’s tained and comprehensive political open- youth movement does not have – at least in ing of the country. its overwhelming majority – fundamental- ist views, but rather represents young and modern people with Islamic identity. These Military Regime young people do not search for new ideol- In this scenario, the Supreme Council of ogies. Rather, they aspire to greater free- the Armed Forces attempts to prevent a dom, social justice and a modern, and at genuine opening of the system; it delays the same time appropriate way of life – the announced reforms and safeguards the they envision a political system that unites military’s privileges. At the same time, it democracy, social justice and Islam. allows for the processes and institutions of The revolutionaries therefore have quite a façade democracy. However, even if the diverse political, ideological and religious international community were to support backgrounds. These different contexts, how- the military, it would no longer be able to ever, did not play a decisive role during the rule against the people’s will over the long protests. They all called for a radical break term. Such an approach would after all with the Mubarak era and a completely result in large parts of the opposition – fresh start. During initial negotiations particularly representatives of the NAC, the between the opposition and the regime in Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionar- the second week of February, it became ies, which have a considerable mobilisation clear that the revolutionaries were con- potential – withdrawing their support siderably less ready to accept compromises for the military council. The consequence than the representatives of the moderate would be a new wave of protests and opposition. In contrast to the latter, the strikes, which would dramatically aggra- revolutionaries rejected holding talks prior vate the country’s economic crisis. If the to the resignation of Mubarak. protests were violently suppressed, radicali- To date, the decentralised organisational sation could be expected. This scenario does structure and the lack of leadership figures not promise stability. has been to the advantage of the revolution-

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Far-Reaching Political Opening Regardless of whether the decision ulti- The positive scenario of a thorough open- mately is made in favour of a presidential ing requires that the politically relevant or parliamentary system, the legislative and actors agree on how the transitional pro- judicial branches of government will be cess should be organised and carried out. institutionally strengthened and the office This necessitates the Supreme Council of of the president weakened. the Armed Forces keeping its promises of In any case, a political opening would reform, which is by no means a given. Still, have implications for the real power in light of the limitations on the military’s balance in Egypt – with a shift benefiting room for manoeuvre mentioned above, the moderate opposition. The extent to the Supreme Council could allow for com- which an opposition candidate can assert prehensive opening of the political system himself in the first presidential elections while at the same time attempting to against a representative of the “old regime” champion closely aligned politicians. An will depends primarily on whether or not example of a potential presidential can- the opposition succeeds in agreeing on a didate from the military leadership would candidate. The Muslim Brotherhood is un- be Ahmed Shafiq, the current Prime Minis- likely to enter one of its own candidates ter and a former commander of the Egyp- into the race. In free parliamentary elec- tian Air Force. He could attempt to collect tions, the current regime party, the NDP, the support of the remnants of the NDP and will in all probability suffer severe losses. lead them in elections under a new party At the same time it is by no means a done name. deal that the Muslim Brotherhood will Whether or not a transition is actually automatically emerge victorious. While the being initiated will soon become apparent Brotherhood is currently the largest and based on two important milestones: that best-organised opposition force, there are the state of emergency be lifted and that an two factors which play a role. First, the initial constitutional amendment process Brotherhood’s political arm would have to take place enabling elections for all politi- establish a political party. In mid-February cal offices based on real competition. In 2011, the group’s leadership announced principle, it is now less complicated to that it would take this step as soon as it change the constitution than it was before became legally possible. In this context, it the military took power. However, it is not is quite likely that the movement will split yet assured that the new constitutional over disputes regarding the political pro- committee will succeed in drawing up gramme. Currently, it is unclear which of proposals acceptable to the military, the the Brotherhood’s wings would then end opposition and the revolutionaries. In this up leading the new political party. It is regard it is surely positive that the com- obvious, however, that the party will only mittee embraces independent experts as have chances at electoral success if it offers well as jurists who have close ties to polit- a programme that extends well beyond ical Islam. A constitutional revision that slogans such as “Islam is the solution” and leaves Article 5 untouched would not repre- addresses the concrete needs of the people. sent a real step forward towards establish- Also, the party will only achieve long-term ing a more inclusive system as it would support among voters if it can point to imply that the Muslim Brotherhood would tangible progress in social and economic continue to be barred from forming a spheres as well as in terms of good gover- political party. When the state’s institu- nance. tions have received democratic legitimacy, Second, in a competitive environment a more far-reaching constitutional revision, other forces besides the Muslim Brother- which addresses questions about the future hood will also form or register parties and system of government, will have to follow. develop their potential. In the past, those

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parts of the electorate that wanted to vote Israel will be suspended, that Israel’s against the regime had hardly any other borders will be threatened, or that the choice than supporting the Islamists. It Suez Canal will be sealed off. After all, any is likely that the Brotherhood will now government will work to pursue Egypt’s lose this special status. The protests have national interests – and the revenues that already demonstrated that the Muslim the country collects as a result of tourism, Brotherhood has lost its de facto “mon- the Suez Canal, and its good relations with opoly on opposition”. the West all play a crucial role for the nation’s budget. Not least due to these con- siderations, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Repercussions for Israel leadership made it clear early in the revolt The second scenario raises concerns in that they would abide by all international Israel, in particular, as well as among its agreements, i.e. including the peace treaty Western allies. This is understandable. After with Israel. It holds true for the Muslim all, the peace that has existed between Brotherhood as well as for other opposi- Israel and Egypt since 1979 has remained a tion actors that popularity among voters cold peace. It has never translated into a depends primarily on tangible successes in rapprochement on the grassroots level. the social and economic spheres, not on the This is due, on the one hand, to the lack of anti-Israel tirades that some of its members progress in the peace process between Israel are certainly delivering. In the end, socio- and the Palestinians as well as its other economic progress will prove impossible neighbours, and, on the other hand, to the without a good relationship with the West Egyptian regime’s use of anti-Israel resent- and stability in the region. ment as a valve for releasing pressure. It is therefore clear that the emergence of any government more representative Implications for German and than the Mubarak regime will lead to a European Policymakers cooling of relations between both coun- In principle, the Egyptian revolt carries tries’ leaders. As a result, it can be expected with it a great opportunity for a transition in the mid term that cooperation and trade to a more representative political system, agreements with Israel regarding the sup- which would allow for sustained stability, ply of natural gas and other affairs will be balanced development, and a viable peace re-negotiated. A more representative Egyp- with Israel. For these reasons, German tian government is also unlikely to main- and European policymakers should whole- tain the blockade of the Gaza Strip to the heartedly support the democratisation same extent. But even if a new Egyptian process. government signals more solidarity with Of course Egyptian ownership of the the people of Gaza and the Palestinian process is key. It is currently impossible to Hamas, it will ultimately look to its own foresee, however, whether the military interests and keep its distance. No Egyptian leadership in Cairo is really prepared to government is interested in taking on the pursue fundamental regime change – that responsibilities of the occupying power in is, whether it allows the country a fresh or for Gaza. And a spill-over of the Israeli- start or goes for a continuation of the old Palestinian conflict or increase in Iran’s system in new dressings. German and Euro- influence in Egypt would hardly be con- pean cooperation with the current Egyptian sidered beneficial by decision makers in leadership should for this reason be con- Cairo. ditional. Even if the Muslim Brotherhood were to On the one hand, this means that clear take part in a future government, it is not and attractive incentives should be pro- to be expected that the peace treaty with vided. In this sense, it is exactly right to

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offer Egypt a comprehensive “transforma- text, it is important to continually monitor tion partnership”. In this context, priority the implementation of the announced should not be placed on increasing develop- reforms. This would include, for instance, ment cooperation or expanding the activi- all political and societal forces being repre- ties of the political foundations – even sented in an, as yet unformed, transitional though both will be useful and welcome. government or in a round table dialogue Similarly, the support announced by the with the leadership, a binding and credible German Government in the framework of timetable particularly for constitutional a “North Africa Democratisation Fund” reforms and elections, the lifting of the will be helpful and should benefit efforts state of emergency, and the release of politi- towards judicial reform, support of politi- cal prisoners. cal parties, media training, and the holding of fair and transparent elections. Foremost efforts, however, should be

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und aimed at further opening European mar- Politik, 2011 kets to exports from Egypt (agricultural and All rights reserved fisheries products) and eliminating EU sub-

These Comments reflect sidies for such goods. Furthermore, scholar- solely the authors’ views. ship programmes should be expanded for

SWP Egyptian students and trainees in Germany Stiftung Wissenschaft und and other EU states, as well as in Egypt. A Politik German Institute for marked increase in the number of work International and and residence permits for young Egyptians Security Affairs in Europe is also urgently needed – not Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 least in order to stem irregular migration. 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Only through such drastic measures can Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Egypt be helped to meet the demands that www.swp-berlin.org originally set the protests in motion – offer- [email protected] ing young people professional prospects, ISSN 1861-1761 jobs, affordable foodstuffs, and more social

Translation by Robert Blasiak justice. The hasty steps introduced by the Egyp- (English version of SWP-Aktuell 10/2011) tian government such as a rise across the board in state employees’ salaries and an increase in public sector employment do not address these problems and cannot be financed over the medium term. Rather, comprehensive economic and social reform is needed. This includes not only a restruc- turing of the subsidy and handout systems, the huge bureaucracy and the state enter- prise sector, but also fundamental reform in the educational system. Germany and the EU should accompany these reforms – against the backdrop of their experiences in Eastern Europe – with technical and finan- cial support. On the other hand, such support should only be given if there is tangible progress in the political transition process. In this con-

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