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A Tool for Detecting TLS Certificate Electrical Engineering and Computer Science SSLINT: A Tool for Detecting TLS Certificate Validation Vulnerabilities April 2016 Boyuan He1, Vaibhav Rastogi2, Yinzhi Cao3, Yan Chen4, V.N. Venkatakrishnan5, Chunlin Xiong1, Runqing Yang1, and Zhenrui Zhang1 1Zhejiang University 2University of Wisconsin-Madison 3Leihigh University 4Northwestern University 5University of Illinois, Chicago [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Technical Report NU-EECS-16-07 Abstract Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols have become the security backbone of the Web and Internet today. Many systems including mobile and desktop applications are protected by SSL/TLS protocols against network attacks. However, many vulnerabilities caused by incorrect use of SSL/TLS APIs have been uncovered in recent years. Such vulnerabilities, many of which are caused due to poor API design and inexperience of application developers, often lead to confidential data leakage or man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, to guarantee code quality and logic correctness of SSL/TLS applications, we design and implement SSLINT, a scalable, automated, static analysis system for detecting incorrect use of SSL/TLS APIs. SSLINT is capable of performing automatic logic verification with high efficiency and good accuracy. To demonstrate it, we apply SSLINT to one of the most popular Linux distributions – Ubuntu. We find 29 previously unknown SSL/TLS vulnerabilities in Ubuntu applications, most of which are also distributed with other Linux distributions. 1 SSLINT: A Tool for Detecting TLS Certificate Validation Vulnerabilities Boyuan He1, Vaibhav Rastogi2, Yinzhi Cao3, Yan Chen4, V.N. Venkatakrishnan5, Chunlin Xiong1, Runqing Yang1, and Zhenrui Zhang1 1Zhejiang University 2University of Wisconsin-Madison 3Leihigh University 4Northwestern University 5University of Illinois, Chicago [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols have become the security backbone of the Web and Internet today. Many systems including mobile and desktop applications are protected by SSL/TLS protocols against network attacks. However, many vulnerabilities caused by incorrect use of SSL/TLS APIs have been uncovered in recent years. Such vulnerabilities, many of which are caused due to poor API design and inexperience of application developers, often lead to confidential data leakage or man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, to guarantee code quality and logic correctness of SSL/TLS applications, we design and implement SSLINT, a scalable, automated, static analysis system for detecting incorrect use of SSL/TLS APIs. SSLINT is capable of performing automatic logic verification with high efficiency and good accuracy. To demonstrate it, we apply SSLINT to one of the most popular Linux distributions – Ubuntu. We find 29 previously unknown SSL/TLS vulnerabilities in Ubuntu applications, most of which are also distributed with other Linux distributions. F 1 INTRODUCTION In particular, we ask the following research question: Is it possible to design scalable techniques that detect incorrect Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and its successor Transport use of APIs in applications using SSL/TLS libraries? This Layer Security (TLS) provide end-to-end communication question poses the following challenges: security over the Internet. Based on the model of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and X509 certificates, SSL/TLS • Defining and representing correct use. Given an SSL is designed to guarantee confidentiality, authenticity, library, how do we model correct use of the API to and integrity for communications against Man-In-The- facilitate detection? Middle (MITM) attacks. • Analysis techniques for incorrect usage in software. Given a representation of correct usage, how do we The details of SSL/TLS protocol are complex, involv- design techniques for analyzing programs to detect ing six major steps during the handshaking protocol [1]. incorrect use? To ease the burden of developers, these details are • Identifying candidate programs in a distribution. encapsulated inside open source SSL/TLS libraries such From an OS distribution, how do we identify and as OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS (Network Security Ser- select candidate programs using SSL/TLS libraries? vices). However, recent work [2] has shown that incor- • Precision, Accuracy and Efficiency. How do we de- rect use of such libraries could lead to certificate valida- sign our techniques so that they offer acceptable re- tion problems, making applications vulnerable to MITM sults in terms of precision, accuracy and efficiency? attacks. Their work sheds light on a very important issue for Internet applications, and since then SSL implemen- We address these questions in this paper proposing an tations have received considerable scrutiny and follow- approach and tool called SSLINT– a scalable, automated, up research [3]–[8]. static analysis tool – that is aimed towards automatically In this backdrop, we focus on the problem of large- identifying incorrect use of SSL/TLS APIs in client-side scale detection of SSL certificate validation vulnerabili- applications. ties in client software. By large-scale, we refer to tech- The main enabling technology behind SSLINT is the niques that could check, say, an entire OS distribution for use of graph mining for automated analysis. By repre- the presence of such vulnerabilities. Previous research, senting both the correct API use and SSL/TLS applica- including [2], on finding SSL vulnerabilities in client- tions as program dependence graphs (PDGs), SSLINT server applications, mostly relied on a black-box testing converts the problem of checking correct API use into approach. Such an approach is not suitable for large- a graph query problem. These representations allow for scale vulnerability detection, as it involves activities such the correct use patterns to precisely capture temporal as installation, configuration and testing, some of which sequencing of API calls, data flows between arguments involve a human-in-the-loop. and returns of a procedure, data flows between vari- 2 ous program objects, and path constraints. Using these Global Create SSL_METHOD Start representations we develop rich models of correct API initialization (select protocol version) usage patterns, which are subsequently used by a graph matching procedure for vulnerability detection. To evaluate SSLINT in practice, we applied it to the Configure SSL_CTX Create SSL_CTX source code of 492 software packages from Ubuntu. (set up certificates, keys, etc) (context for SSL) The result shows that SSLINT discovers 29 previously unknown SSL/TLS vulnerabilities. Then, we reported Set up sockets SSL/TLS our findings to all the developers of software with such Create SSL vulnerabilities and received 14 confirmations – out of for SSL handshake which, 5 have already fixed the vulnerability based on our reports. For those we have not received confirma- tions from, we validated them by performing MITM End SSL shutdown FAIL Authentication attacks, and the result shows that they are all vulnerable. To summarize, this paper makes the following contri- butions: Data transmission over SSL PASS • SSL/TLS library signature. We model the correct API usage as SSL/TLS library signatures based on PDGs. • Graph query matching. SSLINT is able to perform Fig. 1. Overview of SSL application with OpenSSL APIs. automated, scalable graph queries to match SS- L/TLS library signatures for all the SSL/TLS APIs, study in this paper as well as the detailed discussion and report a vulnerability if the matching fails. of the techniques incorporated into SSLINT. Section 4 • Automated search of applications relying on SS- discusses the implementation of SSLINT. Section 5 and 6 L/TLS libraries. We leverage on existing package give the evaluation results of SSLINT in Ubuntu software managers in Ubuntu for automatic compiling and packages and discusses the accuracy and limitations. analyzing, and then acquire all the target appli- Section 7 presents related work and Section 8 concludes cations with SSL/TLS libraries as their building the paper. dependences. • Preprocessing analysis to reduce program needed 2 OVERVIEW to be analyzed. We introduce a blacklist based pre- processing on low-accuracy, quickly-computed call 2.1 Overview of SSL/TLS graph of the program to prune code that may not SSL/TLS provides end-to-end communication security lead to vulnerabilities. including confidentiality, message integrity, and site au- • Analysis of libraries Some libraries pose significant thentication between a client and a server, even if the challenge to static analysis as the data flows are network between the client and the server is under con- completed only when they are linked with the client trol of an adversary. The client verifies the authenticity programs. In such cases, we have manually written of the server by validating an X.509 certificate chain from client programs to enable accurate static analysis for the server. libraries. • Automated reachability analysis for vulnerable li- Listing 1. Certificate chain validation with OpenSSL APIs. braries. When our analysis finds vulnerabilities in 1 const SSL_METHOD *method; library, we conduct an automatic reachability analy- 2 SSL_CTX *ctx; sis
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