Document of The WorldBank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized ReportNo. 9541

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Public Disclosure Authorized

CHAD

SATEGUI-DERESSIAIRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT489-CD/489-1-CD)

APRIL 22, 1991 Public Disclosure Authorized

Public Disclosure Authorized Agriculture OperationsDivision Sahelian Department Region

This document has a resicted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their offic6l dutes. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed witbout World Bank authoization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

US$ 1.00 - CFPA 280 CFAF 100 - US $ 0.36

WEIGHTSAND MEASURES

The metric system is used throughout the report.

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS

ADF African Development Fund

BIEP Bureau interministerield'Etudes et de Programmation InterminsterialStudies and Planning Office

DP Dans le porimAtre Inside the perimeter

HP Hors p6rimbtre Outside the perimeter

OHVSD Office de la mise en valeur de Sat4gui-Deressia Office for the Developmentof Sat6gui-Deressia

ONDR Office national pour le DeveloppementRural National Office for Rural Development

GR Genie rural Rural Engineering Directorate

UNCDF United Nations Capital DevelopmentFund

UNDP United Nations DevelopmentProgram

WFP World Food Program FOROFFCIAL USE ONLY THEWORLD BANK Washin5ton, D.C.20433 U.S.A.

Officeof 04,tcGw.Cwfa Op.atUhm[hahuulln

April 30, 1991

MEMORANDUMTO THE EXECUTIVEDIRECTORS ND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Sategui-Deressia Project (Credit 489-CD/489-1-CD)

Attached, for information,is a copy of a report entitled *Project Completion Report on Chad Sategui-DeressiaIrrigation Project (Credit489-CD/489-1-CD)" prepared by the FAO/WorldBank Cooperative Programme(FAO-CP) and the AfricaRegional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time.

Attachment

Thisdocument has a restricteddistribudon and may be used by recipientsonly in the porformance of theirofficial duties. Its contents maynot otherwisebe disclosedwithout World Bank authorization. FOROMFCIL USEONLY

SATROUI-DERESSILAIRRI9=TIO PROJECT (CREDIT489-CD/489-1-CD)

Tble of Contont

Pale

BasisData Sheet...... 11 ZvaluatLon Summary ...... LT

1. INTRODUCTION... 9...*9999999 999 99o*ooo*9o9o@9o9ooo I

II. OV uRVIEOr PROJECT'S HISTORY ...... 1

111. PROJECTFORMULATION, DZSCLIPTION AND IHPLDEETATION.... 3

Identification,Preparation, Appraisal...... 3 Negotiationsand Board Approval ...... 3 ThcProject Ar...... 0... 4

Project'sOrganizatione*tMmnagemst...... 5 ProjectComponents and Historyof Revionso*...... 5 Costs andFinncins ...... 9 DLeburs^emets...... 0.0...... 00...... 00...0...... 9 Reporting,Accounting and AudLting...... 2O

IV. IMPLEMENTATIONOF CIVIL WOlES ..99...... 11

rrgationWorks...... 12 mseds ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~13 AgriculturalStation ..... 13 RiLceMi.l 13 Buildingsoo.99 9 9 9 9 999 14

V. PiODUCTION ACTmTIES AND AGRICULTURALIMPACT . 14

Intended p o...... 15 RevLendProductLon Objectlves end Targot Group.... 15 ProductLonServLces... 16 1. AgrlculturalExtension 16. 2. Research and Seed MultplicatLon.o...... 16 3. FTrm Inputs, Equlpment end Credit...... o. 17 4. Water Managementend O&M...... 6... 17 Project's Impact...... 1...... *..*.is8 1. Climatlcend HydrologicConditLons...... 16 2. La" 16i.s 3. Paddy Productlonend Yieldsd...o.oo..e*...... 19 4. Parm Incomes and ProductLonCotn. 19 5. o-t 20 ...

This document hasa restricteddistribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance | of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. EconomicRate of Return...... 20 RLceMarketing ...... s 21 Overall AssessMent of Project's mpaCt...... 22

VI. INSTITUTIONALPERFORMANCE ...... 23

23

UNC -i ncier ...... 26 B nk ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~27

VII. LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE ORIENTATION...... 28

Annex Is Agricultural Development Annex 2: Preliminary Proposals for Upgrading and Expanding the Irrigated Perimeter Annex 3s Draft Term of Reference for Technical Studies Relating to Improvement and Expansion of the Irrigated Perimeter Annex 4: Table 1 - EconomLc k' of Rice Annex 4: Table 2 - Total Investment Costs in Financial Terms by Fiscal Year Hap 1 i Situation of the Project Zone Map 2 s Work Sites - 1.-

PROJECT COMPLET-OZREPOR

SATEGUI-DERESSIAIRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT489-CD/489-1-CD)

This is the Project CompletionReport (PCR) for the Sategui-Deressia IrrigationProject in Chad for which Credit 489-CD in the amount of US$7.5 millionwas approvedon March 26, 1974,and Credit489-1-CD in the amountof US$8.0million was approvedon October7, 1976. Credit489-CD was closedon December 31, 1980,and Credit489-1-CD was closed on June 30, 1987. The last disbursement was made on August 10, 1978,under Credit 489-CD,and on November 30, 1987,under Credit 489-1-CD.

The PCR was preparedby the FAO/WorldBank CooperativeProgramme (FAO-CP) and the SahelianDepartment's Agriculture Division (AF5AG), following a mission to Chad in June 1988. It is basedon reportsand data preparedby the project implementingagency, the Officefor the Developmentof Sategui-Deressia(ONVSD); a reviewof the StaffAppraisal Report No. 145a-CD,dated March 4, 1974; the CreditAgreements of June 28, 1974,October 7, 1976 (Amendment)and May 28, 1985 (Substitution);Bank SupervisionReports; correspondence with the Borrower; internalBank nemorandaon project issues as contained in Bank files; and the interviews with officials both in the Bank and in Chad who have been associated with the project. The report also draws on oths. Bank documents to which the reader is referred.'

This PCR was read by the Operations Evalurtion Department (OED). The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower and the co-financing agencies on March 1. 1991 for coments by April 19, 1991. None were received.'

Chad: Lake Chad Polders Protsets (Credit 592-CD), Project PerformanceAudit Report, November 26, 1986; had: Economic Situationand Priorities,Report No. 6785-CD,October 26, 1987. - Li -

MOJICTC0 N IRT

USC DATASHUT A. Key Prolat Data item hasorsa"l REeiralnUl Actual Total Project Cost (USS1) 12.0 #.0 ".7 Ceedit Amount (LS1) 7.5 15.5 (1) 15.5 Disburse 7.5 15.5 15.5 Co-flnancing b ASP 8.S g. ) e.g UN Ageney Finarcin - UNCOF51 8 - 1N1.4D ) - 0.1 (8) Date of CoWletios of Physical Componeorv. 1wo 1917 Cmloted by apralal target ) - (4) TIMe Overrur ) - U Poj C Orrun () - 147, 19 (5) EconomicR1ateo Rdeure () 14 n.o.(0) ngtve Institutional Peformec - - pee TechnicalPerfornnco - - =edte problems Humobrof Direct eneilarlme 2,400 S.o.2,150

1A suppmmeantary credit ranted on October 7, 1997 InereaW tdteaout tfrem USS Mto USK1&.$ A suppemotary ADf credit Inc -eaeethe amout fom USISS M to UNS.S U )RbAb itttit o program for the 1 500 ha operatlomal In 1270, beglelg U11. 5Se pargrahs 2.1 and 4.4 et mele teat (6,As compred to appraisal atimelat tbe reppraisal estimate ..4 ERMwas caleiated at repraloal, but M for rehabil tlao projecb setimeted at 183.

S.CUMI!sl:$. ve imea Al DI quGMIion) ELu MM aml mm am ELM Mm am MmEM "M U-Z mm

1.5 6.0 7.0 7.4 7.5 t1L7) 5.3 0.5 u.1 14.4 as.. Aeluel o.a s.c 7.5 u. 41.() 1.0 23.0 13.7 1u.0 15.u 14.0 36 1. AoUetl s 4 a U a 1 1 U O * O 0 100 of CredO msm (7) £ .u..l.mm.tmu.vrdit gru.td on 0ubsOi1 7. INS laard f UWF.l3. 11I I 0@) ubu_Dl a se*eore mpmu" in .hlp 1919. C. Prolect Date. Identif icatio Ppratso - 10 APissal 11/71 11171 Nogotiatllo - 0174 Boerd Preentation 5/7 @/26/74 Signing - 0/12/74 Crodit Effectivenes - 01/1/7 Reappraisl _ o6/. Sining of Ameoneent - 10/07/7 SubstitutoeC - 0KA/MS ClosIng 12/81/70 12/80/67 - LU. a

D. Mission Data (1) item MwAYear Wellk' SpeilATiOe() Setlie P b10_ (4) Identiflotion 196647 reparatlon(5) 11U71 Appraisal1 11/72 2 4 :; t,T 1 SupervisionI 11/76 I a 10 1 CC) Spn 2 Preapprol 04/76 1 2 I, As F, T Appraisal 2 06/76 1.5 2 PA) I U Supervision3 12/70 1 S PFA, ) 2 m Supervision4 06o7 2 ( A, i,1) 2 U Supervision6 08/78 1 a A: T 1 - SupervSion 6 12/76 2 2 I) I f Supervision7 0t/79 1 I 8 f, P Super'visonI 01/00 6 4 E, 1, 1 1) 2 F SupervSiion9 02/60 2 S (, 1, a) Pf SupervSiion10 04/68 2 1 * F, p Spn/pepisal 11 02/64 2 a E, S F)f, L Supervision12 10/4 2 6 , 0,F, L, LO) 8 Pr F, M, 0 Supervision i8 01/66 1 2 E,) n F, M Supervision14 10/ 2 2 A,F 2 f, M Supervision 15 02/66 2 2 E, 2 F, m Supervision 16 00/ 6 1 2 (A, I) 2, F Supervision17 02/67 1.5 8 (A, f,I) 2 L, P Supervision 16 10/67 2 1 (A) 2 F, M (1) Co= led from Supervision ReporOt. The figures do not fully reconell- Staff Input (to above). g) A a Agronomlis CC a Division Chief, 00 a Dlsburement Officer, E a Economist, F * FinansiolAnalyst, I Irigratlon Engineer, L a Lawyer, LO a Loan Officer, T a Transportation) F Financial,i M * Managerlo, 0 a Other (severe drought), P a Political, T a Technical (4 1 r No problems, 2 * Misor problems, S aiajor problem (s) feaibilitty otudypreared by consulting firm underUWO financing I. Staff Inmate (6)

FY76 fY 77 fY76 FY70 f7Y !° FY St F FYL4 MM FY J FY6 FY 67 Total Identification 15.7 1I.$ 0.1 8.2 32.8 Preparation Appraisal Neootiations Supervision 5.0 10.7 9.2 0.2 0.1 2.6 0 0.1 10.0 17.6 55.7 Totsl 16.7 16.8 0.1 18.9 9.2 0.2 0.1 2.6 0 0.1 10.0 17.9 88.0 (6) In staffwooks. Thesefigures do noa fullyreoello lwiththe Mission Oate above.

F. Other ProJect Data Borrowrs Republic of Chad Eusiiinc U.A mus Off Ice for the Developmet of Sat6guli eresolo(OMYWS) Fical Year: January 1 to Decombr $1 Currency: CFAF Curr n Exch Rats AppraisIYior (197 Average USS1.00 * CFAU260 (7) Appraisal RNhab(194 Averae USS1.00 * CFAf416 Completion Year (196 Avera USS 1.00 a CFAF260 Follow-onProects Supportedby Agricultral ectorRehabilItation Project (Cr.1775-CD)

(7) Exahng rats as specifled in AppraisalReport, Marbch1974. - iv -

PROJECTCOMPLETION REPO=T

CHOD SATEGUI-DERESSIAIRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT489-CD/489-l-CD)

S2LUTIONSUMMARY Introductionand Obiectives iL . The Sategui-Deressiaproject was the Bank'sthird projectin the agriculturalsector and its firstoperation to promoteitrigated agriculture in Chad The projectis locatedon the Sategui-Deressiaplain which is floodedeach year,allcwing the cultivationof a singlewet-season rice crop. Althoughmillet and sorghumare the tradit4 onal,staple food crops in Chad, rice is the principal crop in this area. The project'skey objectivewas to increaseproductivity of rice production,thereby raising production and farmers'incomes. A broader objectivewas to createt.e capacity--technologicalezpertise, trained personnel, and institutions--forfuture development of irrigatedagricultvre. 2. The projectwas identifiedin 1966 and appraicedin 1972. The project,as originallydesigned, was to constructa gravity-fedirrigated perimeterof 4,000heetares, a ricemill and othersupporting structures, and to provide services to farmers both inside the perimeter and in surrounding areas. A vertically integrated parastatal--OHMVSD--a created to Implement it, handling production support services, maintenance of the irrigation works, and rice marketing.The projectcost was estimatedto be US$12million. Irrigationworks were to be carriedout by a contractor,but the cost provedto be exorbitant. The projectwas reappraisedin 1976 based on a successfullytested construction method using labor and equipment operated under force account; the Bank and ADF provided supplementary credits to cover the project cost which increased to US$25 million. In 1979, when IDA was forced to suspend disbursements due to Chad's civilwar, constructionof thrsepolders serving a net areaof 1,500hectares was nearlycompleted. Farmers continued to cultivate the perimeter during the war, but the hostilitiesresulted in darageand losses. 3. A limltedresumption of IDA financingwas authorizedin April 1983 and permittedurgent maintenance and repairactivities (para 3.13). In 1984 a thirty-month rehabilitation program was preparedby the Bank,UNCDF, FAO and UNDP for the 1,500hectares, costing roughly US$5.7 aillion. 1 It was expectedto start-up in July 1984, but administrativeand logisticalproblems caused a nearly two year delay (para2.2). The physicalrehabilltation of the 1,500hectares and rice mill were completedin 1987. Implementationzxperience

4. The main investmentcomponents of the projectwere civil works.

1 This includesthe balanceof IDA Cr. 489-1 whichamwunted to aboutUS$2.4 mllion. Implementationvas reasonablygood. The new constructionapproach proved well- adapted to Chadianconditions and a small group of Chadian technicianswere trained. Their expertise can be used in future projects In Chad. However, designof the irrigationworks did not take intoaccount sufficiently the risk of low flood levels nor wore water managemnatand maintenanceactitivies sufficientlythought out. A seriousdeterioration in climaticand hydrological conditionshad a severe impacton the irrigatedperimeter's functioning and substantialSyreduced the project'sbenefits. Constructionand rehabilitatLon of the modernrice mill appearin hindsightto have been a mistake. The mill's capacitywas too larg relativeto the iLze of the rice market and it was designedto maximizeproduction of high qualityrice which did not correspondto consumers'taste and cost more. Less expensive, smaller caprcity rice mills which could be privatelymanaged would have been better suLted to Chadian conditions. Results S. The project'sachieve_ents on the agriculturalproduction side are poor comparedto its recordon civilworks. U_il1 recently,extension services were weak and messageswere not beingadopted by farmers,in part due to OMVSD's inabilityto supplythe requiredamount and qualLtyof input.. Yield targets were achieved,but it appearsthat theywere too conservative.However, under present conditions--depressedrice market and high input costs--thereare insufficientincentives for farmer to intensifyrice production(5.21-5.22). Productiontargets for the originalproject (20,000 tons of paddy a yearat full developmnt) and the rehabilltationprograu (9,000 tons of paddy at full development)were not met becauseof the reducedcropping area servedby the projects 1,500 hectares under irrigationand 1,400 hectares outside the perimeter.In 1988,project farmers are expectedto produce5,800 tons of paddy and totalpaddy production in the plain is expectedto be only 1,000tons higher than in 1974. (SeeAnnex 1, Table1 for details.) 6. The creationof OKV$Dwas a specificcondition of effectivenessfor the IDA credlt. The appraisalreport was optimisticabout OKVSD's prospects for becomingself-sufficient by the end of the project'ssix year periodgin fact, the IDA creditwas on-lentto OKVSDby the Government and was to be repaid in full vith revenues from rice salesand fanrers'fees for Inputsand 0K. OKVSD's coamercielactivities faLled, in part due to external factors (para 5.25 and 6.5). Like similar parastatals in Chad (SODELAC,COTONTCHAD) and elsewhere, it was inefficients decision-mking was centralised, overhead costs were high, and financialmnagment and controlswere weak. Under the rehabilitationproject, Bank and UN supervision mLisions provided considerable assistance to OKVSD to help lmprovesmnagement. However, OMVSDfailed to implement the internal reforms beingdiscussed sLace1984. After five years, the only plausible explanationis that OMV8SD' senLor managementdoes not want to implemnt then and that the Chadian Government has not forced them to do so. These reforms aro not sufficientto ensure OKYSD'sviability, a fundamental restructuring is required whilchwould reduce its functions. In view of OMVSD'scontinuing and serious problems,In November 1987 the Kinistry of Planing and IDA agreed that before embarking on expansLon of the irrigated area, operations of the existing 1500 hectares should be Ifpro-id,OKVSD restructured, and rice marketing problems resolved. A joint UNDPI" )PIFAO evaluation mission came to the sam conclusion in itay 1968. 7. Theproject reached a mall numberof fa£rr households--3,250out of 9,300--andachieved a relativelysmll increasein production--1,000 tons morethan in 1974--relativeto its cost of !X$29.7million. Furthermore, under presentconditions. 0MVSD is unviable,requiring a larg annualsubsidy stimated at morethan one milliondollars in 1987. The project'sUR is negative,even if one considersthe projectcost prior to the war (US$21.6million) as sunk cost. In oaly threeout of the lasttwelve years did the projectgenerate incremental output and the amount was mnimal. Sustainabilitv S. At present,this project is not sustabiablefrom Government, OKVSD or the farmrs' point of view. No expansion of the Irrigatedperimeter should be considered until the oxisting 1,300 hectares is being explolted properly and OMNSDhas shown it can be self-financed. In order to achieve this, substantial efficiency gains and a more flexible rice pricing and marketing approach are required. The considerable potential to increase yields through lowering the cost of Inputs, better watermaagement and lmproved husbandry practices must be exploited. Iprovweents arealso needed to ensurebetter water availability and distributions this may require so new lnvestment(see Annex 2). OQKVD's manageentmust be improvedand Its functions xeduceds many can probably be performed more efficiently by farmers, the private sector or otherGovernment agencies. Farmers groups should gradually take on greater responsibilLty for managing the irrigated perimeter. Government took an essential step in this directLon in 1989 when OKVSD'ssenior managementwas replaced. A diagnostic studyof OMVSDfinanced by the IDAtechnical assistance project (Cr.1872-CD) was completedin June 1989 andthe consultants are preparing a rostructuring program to be examined by the Government In mid-1990. Findingsand Lessons 9. In hindsight,the Bank can be criticizedfor desigingan overly complex project which did not takeinto account the country's implementation capacityand logistical problems. In addition, theproject conception had four majorflawas (i)design of the irrigationworks did not suffLcientlytake into accountthe risk of lowrainfall resulting In lowflood levels (IL)the creation of a vertically Integrated parastatal to lmploemntthe project concentrated resourcesIn the public sectors(Lii) farmers' possible role In runningthe schemewas completelyignored; and (iv) the decisionto build an expenslve, modernrice mill reduced OKVSD'scapacity to adapt to the changing rice market; 10. Bankstaff demonstrated perseerance and creativityIn a4aptingthis projectto the difficultiesIn Chad lncludingfailure of the inLtialbidding process,the disruptionof the civilwar, delaysIn the full resumptionof disbursemeats, and late start-upof UN agencies'funding. This PC& finds it Impossibleto judge,even with hindsight, how the Bank should havereacted to OKVSD'sfailure to Improveits management. Fiv yearsof continuous efforts by the Bankand ON agenciesresulted in few concrete c=ages. The dlemma facing Bank staff was that OISD's fieldstaff were motivatedand comittedsthey accomplished the rehabilLtation works as planneddespite numerous hardships . vii - including not gettingpaid. Seeingthese positiveachievowents and farmers apparentmotivation, it was difficultfor Dank staff ;o give up on the project and take drasticaction such as cancellingthe loan.

11. There vroe two criticaldecision-points after the civil war, when, in hindsight,a changein approachmay have been appropriate.First, while it is understandable that the Bank wanted to show goodwill and support of the Chadian government as it took its first steps towardsrecovery, the Bank's decisionin 1983 to partiallyresume disbursements for the Sategui-Deressiaproject may have been a mLstake. It mighthave beenmore appropriateto thoroughlyro-oxamine the projectconception--such as OMVSD'erole--before relaunching its activities. Second,if the Bank had been able to anticipatethe nearlyone-and-a-half year dalayin start-upof the rehabilitationprogram when lt was appraisedin early 1984, it could have cancelledthe balanceunder Cr. 489-1 and presentedthe rehabilitationprogram to the Boardas a new emergencyoperation, which in effect it was. This would have provLdedan opportunityto devotosufficient resources and time to roexamine and modify the project. It alsowould have been possible to establish a formal coordination agreoent with the UNCDFand UNDPwhich might have taken the form of the Bank accepting the role of executing agency for the UNproject agrements. PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT

SATEGUI-DERESSIAIRRICATION PROJECT (CREDIT489-CD/489-1-CD)

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Sategui-Doressiaproject was tho Bank'sthird project in the agriculturalsector and its fLrst operation to promote irrigated agriculturein Chad. A successionof three years of droughtIn the early 1970s provokedGovernment and donor effortsto ldentifyways of reducing Chad's vulnerabilityto climatic forces. Chad has a large irrigation potentialand two areas,the Lake Chad regLonand the area along the Logone river,were identified in the mld-1960sas the most promisingfor irrigation investments.The Sategui-Deressiaproject aimed to Improverice cultivation on about 11,000ha of land in the SateSui-Deressiaflood plain. An irrigation projectfor Lake Chad (Cr. 592-CD)was also developedaround this time and financedby the Bank. Over the subsequentflfteen years, the Bank agreedto finance sLz other projects in the agriculturalsector with IDA credits totalllngabout US$81 mllion. However,all Bank operationsin Chad were suspendedfrom 1979-83because of the civil war; only the Sategui-Deressia and Rural ProjectsFund (Credit664-CD) projects were completedof the tive projectson the books in 1979. Three projectssupported by IDA fundshave been initi.a6d since 1985: EmergencyCotton Progrm (Credit 1716-CD), AgriculturalRehabilitation (Credit 1775-CD), and NationalLivestock (Credit 1912-CD). 1.2 This reportis a combinedPCR for CredLts489-CD and 489-1-CD. It was preparedin conjunctionwith a studyof the irrigationsub-sector and, therefore,attempts to evaluatethis projectin the broadercontext of its lessons for future development of irrigation in Chad. With this broader objective in mind, Annexes 1 and 2 provide addLtional information on the agricultural development aspects of the project and preliminary proposals for improvement and extension of the irrigated perimeter. Draft TermS of Reference for technical studles concenming the recoeendations in Annex 2 are presented in Annex 3.

II. OVERVIEWOF PROJECT'SHISTORY

2.1 The history of this project Ls complicated.The project,as originallydesigned, was to constructan irrigatedperimeter of 4,000 hectares,a rice mill and other supportingstructures, and to provide servicesto farmersboth insidethe perimeter and in surrounding areas. It was approvedby the Board in March 1974. The irrigationworks were to be carriedout by a contractor,but aftertwo successivetounds of bids resulted in offers far exceedingappraisal cost estimates,a pilot schemetesting a combinationof labor-intensivemethods and equipmentoperated under force accountwas undertakenin early1976. It was successfuland In June 1976 the projectwas reappraised,but costs were still much hlgher than appraisal estimates and additLonalfinancing was required. The Board approveda 2- supplemntary IDA credit of US$8.0 Million In 1976 and the African DevelopmentBank also increasedits creditby US$5.0 lillon. In 1979, IDA was forcedto suspenddlsbursemnts due to Chad'scivil wars constructlonof threepolders serving a not area of 1.500hectares (301 of revlsedtarpet of 5,000 ha) was nearly complete.Farmers continued to cultivatethe perimeter durlng the war, but the hostililtlesresulted in dmage and losses.The originalproject (i.e. activitlesundertaken prlor to suspenslon)and the post-1983,rehabilitation program descrlbedbelow can be consideredas two separateprojects.

2.2 A limited resumptlon of IDA financingwa authorizedIn April 1983 and permitted urgent maintenance and repalr activities. In February 1984, a Bank mlssion approved an interimprogram to continue the activities begun ln 1983 and appraisede more comprehenslve,thirty month rehabilltatlon programprepared by the UICDF,FAO and UNDP for the 1,500 hectarescompleted ln 1979.The cost of the two program was estimated at US$5.7 millon and it was expectedto get underwayby July 1984. With the remainingfunds under Credit 489-1, IDA agreedto financethe projectimplmenting agency's--OHVSD- - operatingcosts for the rehabilitationporlod in order to completethe fiLuanclig package for whilch UKCDF,UNDP and WFPwere coverlngthe investment, technicalassistance and other costs.The mlsslonjudged the progrm to be financiallyand economlcallyviable, although lt stressedthat substantlal improvementswere neededln OMVSD'smanagement. The program'sstart-up was delayedby nearlytwo years.There were substantial delays In finaliZing and slgningthe UNCDF and UMDP projectagreoments. Purtherore, thelr financing was contingentupon full resumptlonof IDA's dlsbursements;thie took about one year, becauselt dependedon sigainga new creditagreement and Chad's settlement of payment arrears to IDA. When these matters were finally sorted out in September 1985, there were additlonal delays due to adminlstrative problem of the UNCDFand UNDP projects which seriously delayed the delivery of vehiclesand equlpmentand the arrival of the five person technlcal asistance team. Bank supervlslonmlsslons ldentified stopgap colutions to theseproblems so that rehabilitationwork couldbegin in 1986. The physlcal rehabilltationof the 1500 hectaresand rice mill were completedin 1987.

2.3 IDA Credit489-1 was exhaustedin late 1987. An additlonal $500,000 from IDA Cr. 739-CD was provided to ONVSD to support the program;11 these funds were also fully expendedby the and of 1987. There have been virtually no new funds released for OMVSD's operating expenses sincethen. At a donorsmeeting on the projectin early November 1987, IDA and Government agreed in principle that OMVSD'soperating budget for an 18 month perlod through July 1989 would be financed as a prlority. rehabilitation activity under the Agricultural Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 1775-CD) provided that certain condtilons were met by OMVSDand that the Governmeat prepared a formal request to IDA. OHVSDand the Government appearedto have fulfilledthese conditions six monthslater in May 1988, but due to continuing inadequate response to IDAs questlonsonly an initial tranche of US$80,000(25 million CIAP) out of the totalbudget of one millon dollars (320 million CFA?) was authorized. In December 1988, IDA and

1I Project completlonreport, Sahelian Zone Project (Cr. 739-CD),June 1984. a 3 a

Governmentagreed that the remaining fundswould be releasedin fourtranchee basedon the volume of OHVSD'srice sales. In the meantime, a May 1988 UNCDFIUNDPmission decided to eztendtheir assistance to the projectthrough March 1989, because some project funds remined and ONVSD was in a very fragile. 2.4 The futureof OMVSD and the irrigated perimeteris uncertain, becauseof its seriousmanagement and financialproblems. In 1986,ezpecting that OMVSD'sproblems would be resolved,IDA comissioneda study for the preparationof a secondphase project. It was carriedout by engineering consultantswith ItalianGovernment funding and was presentedto Government and donors in early 1987. Concurrently,the ADV coiaLtteditself in the 1987-89Interim Plan to financea secondphase study and indicatedstrong interest in financing a follow-on project. 21 The torms of reference of both studies were based on the old 1974 objective of a 10,000 ha polder area. In view of OHVSD's contintuing and serious problems, in November 1987 the Ministry of Planning and IDA agreed that before embarking on expansion of the irrigated area,operations on the existing1500 hectaresshould be improved, OMVSD restructured, and rice marketing problems resolved. A joint UNDPIUNCDFIFAOevaluation mission came to the samecoaclualmn in May 1988. A numberof restructuringmeasures have been agreedupon, but it is too early to judge the results. In the meantime,the Bank has undertakena study of the irrigationsub-sector in Chad whichexamines the issuesconceroing OMVSD in the broadercontezt of Chad'srural developmentstrategy. In iddLtion, the IDA Economic and Financial ManagementProject (Cr. 1872-CD) has flinaced a diagnostic study of OVSD, including a restructuring plan submltted to the Government in mid-1990.

III PROJECT FORMULATION.DESCRIPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION Identification, Preparation and Appraisal 3.1 The projectwas identifiedin 1966-67by an TBRDmission, and followingan FAO-CP mission, was prepared to feasibilitystandards by consultantsunder UNDP financing. It was appraised in November1972 by an IDA mission. Negotiationsand BoardApproval 3.2 Duringnegotiations in end 1973 and early 1974 agreementwas reached with Afrlcan Development Fund (ADF) and the government on the following principal points: (i) establishment of ONVSD,a perastatal charged with projectmanagement, by the government:(Li) signing of a subsidiary loan agreementbetween the governmentand OMVSD; (iii)employment of consulting firmsby OVSD to assistin implementations(iv) zexmptionby governmentof project-financedgoods and services from taxes and dutlesland (v) signing of a loan agreement between ADF and the government.

21 This study was put on hold by the Ministryof Planning'sNovember 1987 decision. 4-

3.3 At its meetUng on March 26, 1974, the Board welcomed the project,the Bank Group'sasLstance, includLng flnancing of full project costs,and the cooperatlonbetween IDS and AD?. It asked for clarifLcatLon of threemain poLntes (L) reasonsfor the project'slong gestatLonperlod of elghtyears to reachBoard presentatLoni(LL) arrangementswith Cameroon governLngwater use from the LogonerLvers and (Lii)the high contingencLes used to calculateproject costs. Regardingthe first point, Bank staff explainedthat the projecthad been delayedwhlle cofinancing was sought,but that in order to minimizethe effectsof the delay IDA had asked UNDP to finance addLtLonalhydrologLcal studies and the preparatlonof tender documentsbefore the projectwas approvedso that LnternatLonalcompetLtive biddlng for civll works could begin immedLatelyafter Board approval. Regardingthe secondpoLnt, staff replied that therewas therewas no reason tQocpscu that Cameroon would dlvert water from the Logone rlver, in excess of what was agreed under the terms of the Chad-CameroonLogone Water Agreement. RegardLig point three,staff explained that the hlgh physlcaland price contingenclesof 332 on both local and forelgncosts was intendedto cover: a risk premlum that contractors were expectedto includein thelr bids due to the remoteness of the projectarea, and current trends in price increases. Purthermore, slnce IDA and AD? were financing 1002 of the cost, a conservative provlslon for contingencLes had been made. 3.4 The high contLngency allowance proved to be lnsuffLcLent because of worldwide inflation ln the wake of the 1973 oll crLsis and lack of compotition in the bidding process due in part to the project's remote locationand the uncertalnbusiness climate in Chad. Blds were twLce appraisalestimates. A new constructionapproach was testedand in February 10, 1976,the Board approveda supplementarycredlt of US$8.0millon. The Board commendedthe AssocLatLon'seffort to adapt the projectto conditLons in Chad by combLninglabor-intenulve methods and equLpmentunder force accountas a substitutefor extremelyexpensive foreign contracting. The ProiectArea

3.5 The projectis locatedon the Sategul-Deressiaplain, on the east bank of the Logonerlver (seeMaps 1 and 2). the plain ts usually floodedeach year,allowLag the cultlvatLonof a singlewet-season x. i crop. However,from year to year. the extent of flooding,lts onset, and its duration,can vary greatly:thus on five occasionsduring the last 20 years the riverhas not overflowedits banks. Rlce cultivationwas introducedin the early 19409 and lt is the prlnclpalsubsistence crop ln thLs area of Chad. Non-Lnundatedareas are used for growingother cerealsand for grazingduring the rainyseason. In 1970,the populationof the plainwas estimatedat about 9,300 persons.In general,the populationlives at the subsistencelevel. The health situationLs poor, and malaria, amoebLc dysentary,bllharzla and otherparasitic dLseases are endemic. The plainis connectedto N'Djamenaby the main road, N'Djmna-Bongor (250 km), and an earth road, Bongor-Lal(148 km), whlch is impassableduring the wet season. (Moreinformation on the projectarea is givenin Annex 1.) -5 -

Obiectives 3.6 In the early 1970s, the ChadianGovernment Save cottonand livestock productiontop priority, but irrigationwas also seen as a vitally importantmeans of combatingthe effectsof frequent droughts. Milletand sorghum are the traditional,staple cereal crops in Chad, but rice is consumedby farmersin inundatedareas in the south. The key objectiveof the projectwas to increaseproductivity of rice productionby introducing controlledflooding in the OMVSD irrigatedperimeter and by offering extensionservices and inputs for more intensivecultivation outside the perimeter.ThLs would raise incomes of small farmers and increasethe marketed rice supply to moet the expected rising demand for rice in urban domestic market. A broaderobjective of the Government for thLs projectand the Lake Chad Polders project was to etart developing irrigation 'in spite of its cost because it offered Chad an opportunity to begin to obtain the expertise in irrigation technology, the trained Chadian personnel, and the evolution of institutionsneeded to exploit its irrigationtechnology effectively... 31 Proiect's Organization and Management 3.7 The implementationof the projectwas the responsbiliLtyof OMVSD, initiallyunder the generalsupervision of the Ministryof Public Works and Land Development (MTPAT) and subsequently of the Ministry of Agricultureand Rural Development(MADR). OIVSDwas specifically set up as an etablissement public a caract&re industriel et cosm(rcial. to i) construct, operate and maintain project works; (ii) allocate among farmers land within the polderse (iii) provideextension services to projectarea farmers; (iv) produce and distribute seeds; (v) procure and sell farm inputs; (vi) operate an equipment rental scheme for seeders and threshers; (vii) provide agricultural credit to project participants; (viii) purchase, process and market paddy produced in the project area; and (ix) collect project levies from polder area farmers. 3.8 Substantialresident technical assistance was finaced under the original project. One consulting firm handled engineering and the other provided managementasssLitance and agriculturalproduction experts until 1979-85when OMVSD was on its own. In 1986, ONVSDwas assistedby several expertsfroa the first firm and by the end of 1986 a team of UNDP-financed consultants was in place. ProiectComponents and Historyof Revisions 3.9 OriginalDesign. The projectinvestment activities consisted of (i) construction of two polders irrigated by gravity and serving a net cultivated area of 4,000 hag ($i) construction of 102 km of feeder roads; (iii) rehabilitation of the existing Boumo AgriculturalResearch Station to permit applied research and seed multiplication; (iv) construction of a rice

31 Para 2, Project Completion Report in Chad: Lake Chad Polders Proiect (Cr. 592-CD), Project Performance Audit, April 1987. mill (4 tonsihourcapacity), storge facilities,staff housing and office building.; and (v) feasLbilitystudies for a secondphase project. 3.10 Biddins Process and Pllot Scheme.In August1974 and June 1975, bids were soughtfor irrigatloanworks and buildingrsboth times the bLds receivedezceeded by far the appraisalestimates. Therefore, the government,ADF, and IDA agreed to reformlate the project.and detailed plans for the initialdevelopm_nt of a 300 ha pilot schem, throughforce account and using labor-intensive methods, were prepared by consultants financed under the project. The governnt, In November 1975, offered to provide eartbmoving equipmnt, most of which was not otherwise being used, at no capital cost to the project. It vas acknowledged that the operating costs of this equipmen, would raise the cost of the pilot schemeshowever, It was also clear that the government proposal would mak lt possible to expedite project implementation, Increase the volu_ of earthwork (to bulld a canal that vould meet further requirements tha serve only 300 ha) and construct the polder at a more suLtable location. IplemetatLon of the scheme began in January 1976 and vas coupleted in June 1976. The results deonstrated that zexcuting civil works in the project area by force account, with som heavy equipmnt, and under engineering consultants' oupervision wes a technically feasible solution.

3.11 Reappraisal. Eacouraged by the results of the pilot scheme, ID reappraised the full project in June 1976. The revised project was essentially similar to the original project, but used the new construction methods. It also Involved the following other changes:Ci) an increase In net irrigatedarea from 4,000 ha to 5,000 hag (ii) a reductionIn road constructionfrom 102 km to 70 k1m (LLL) transfer of the program of agricultural research and demonstratLon from Boumo to a more favorable location at Mala in the project area; and (iv) elimination of the study of the second phase. The project was expected to be completedby June 30, 1980. SupplementaryIDA and ADP creditswere approvedto cover the additional cost. Table 1 shows how the credit was reallocated after the reappraisal. - ?.

Table 1: Disbursement Categories

Category Amount of Credlt Amount of Credit Allocated at Avvrissal Allocated at Reappraisal .000000000S.oo . U8' 000. . . 000

Cat. 1s Clvll Works 4,604 8,800 Cat. 2: Management Consultants Services 612 2,600 Cat. St Engineering Consultants Services - 1,800 SecondPhase Study 104 - ONVSD SalarLesand Operating Costs - 1,500 Speclal Account - 250 Unallocated 2,138 550 TOTAL 7,458 15,500

3.12 Interruption durlna the Clvil War. Uhe the clvllmar forced ID to suspend disbursements in 1979, the constructLon of three polders irrLgated by gravLtyand servinga net area of 1,500ha (30Sof the project's revLsed target of 5,000 ha) was nearly completed. ConstructLon of buLldings and installatLon of the rice mill was also practlcally completed. The irrigated perimeter continued to function during the war, but the hostilities resulted in damage and losses involvings (i) looting of equlpment, supplies and furnlture; (LL)deterioration of houses and offLces; (iLL)theft of most cars and destructLon of trucks from the garage at Lais (iv) deterloratLon of lrrlgation works due to a lack of maintenance; and (v) loss of project records. 3013 Partial ResumptLonof Disbursements. A limLted resumptLon of actlvltiesvas authorLzedby IDA on Aprll 12, 1983 (US$ 227,500over a six month perlod) and again on December 28, 1983 (US$ 250,000 over a four month perlod) for well-defined urgent needs. These included decLlting and cleaning out the main canal (20,000 dn), repairs to the rmaining lrrigatlon and drainage networks, the perimeter dikes and the compensatLon basin, upgrading of the 15 km road Sategui-Lai, rehabliLtation of buildings in Lal, and repalr of heavy agrlcultural machinery. The fLrst full Bank missLon to supervLse thLs work was In February 1984. The mission and OWEDBprepared a six-month interimprogram (January-June 1984) for the 1984185agrLcultural soason whilch covered the costs of torrassing(60,000 o3), cilvl works (270 m3 of concrete), procurement of agrlculturalinputs, and OKVSD' essential operating costs. The mission lnformed the Bank's anagement that the cost of roughly US8531,000 could be partLally financed by the December 1983 disbursementceiling, but that full resumptionof disbursementsby Hay 1984 would be requiredin order to successfullycomplete preparation of the 1984/85season. The interimprogram was designedas a precursor to the rehabilitation program which was to start-up in July. Unfortunately, as discussedbelow, disbursements were not fullyresumed until May 1985when the problemof Chad'spayments arrears to IDA was resolved. However, for the most part the urgent repairsof the irrigationnetwork includedin the interim program were completed. 3.14 RehabilitationProgram. In 1983, the PAO, UNCDF,UNDP, and WFP agreedto assistOHVSD in the rehabilitationof irrigationworks for the 1,500ha completedin 1979, including(i) upgrading of 70 km of feederroadsl (1i)repair of the ricemill, stores,buildings and workshops(Uii) purchase of replacementequipment, vehLclesand machinery;(iv) provision of eztension services: (v) applied research and seed productionsand (vi) project administration.An FAO missionhelped prepare the UNDPIFAO(CCD/83/020) and UNCDP (CHD/83IC03)project documents. The February1984 Bank mission appraisedthe thirty-monthprogam and judgedit financiallyand economically viable, but stressed that OMVSD needed to substantiallyimprove its management.The total programcost was estimatedat US$5.7million and IDA agreedto financeOMVSD's operating costs which were not covered by the other donors. 3.15 As explainedln para 2.2, the program'sstart-up was delayed by moze than one year. UNCDF and UNDP condltionedstart-up of their operationto full resumptlonof IDA disbursements,which was delayeduntil May 1985 by slow progresson resolvingthe problem of Chad's arrears to IDA after the war. 4/ Additional delays resulted from adminLstratlve problems. The UNCDFand UNDP designated the FAO as the executing agency for their funds. The flve persontechnical assistance team to be postedIn Lai included a Principal Technical Advisor and Management advisor who were to oversee the day to day management of UNCDFand UNDP funds. The PAO had serious problems recruiting good candidates for these posts and several of the designated candidates dropped out at the lastminute. The tern was not complete until the end of 1986 when the Principal Advisor arrived. Overall project management responsibllity was held by FAO officials in Rom. Cumbersome procedures for procurement, communications difficulties within Chad and between Chad and Rome, and the usual logistical problems in importinggoods to Chad led to long delaysin the delivery of the vehicles and equipmentneeded for the rehabilitationworks. Most arrivedduring 1987, but the last orderswere not delivereduntil early 1988. 3.16 In order to start the programin 1986 desplte these serious problems,the Bank mobilizedsupport from the ItalianTrust Fund to finance the services of an engineer to assist OMNSD in managing the rehabilitation works, the servicesof a mechanicto repair the vehiculesand equipment required for this work, and the purchase of essential spare parts and equipment to enable the mechanic to do his work. With thLs support, 600 hectares were rehabilitated and utilized by farmers during the 1986 growing

41 Thls is documented in ProjectPerformance Audit, Chads Lake Chad Polders Project(Credit 592-CD). -9- season.By late 1986 the technicalassistance tern was in place and in 1987 most of the equipment was delivered. The physical targets of the rehabilitationprogram were achievedin 1987 and the rice mill started operatingin April. Agriculturalextension activities improved and were reorientedto supportthe formationof farmersgroups. Counterbalancing these achievementswere OHVSD'sfailed comercial activitiesand poor management which did not improvedespite repeated efforts by donors (see para 3.24). OMVSD's financialsituation was desperateby mid-1987. IDA monies for operatingexpenses were fullydisbursed by October1987 and employeeshad not been paid for months.At the end of 1987, it was agreed that IDA would support operzatingcosts through mid-1989 tmder the Agricultural RehabilitationCredit, but virtuallyno fundswere releasedin 1988 (seepara 2.3). Costs and inancing 3.17 At appraisal total project costs over the six year implementationperiod were estimatedat US$ 12.0 iillion,with a foreign exchangecontent of US$ 7.4 millionor 621 of total cost. At reappraisalin June 1976, the total costs of the revisedproject were estimatedat US$ 25 million.IDA contributedUS$ 15.5mIllion and ADF US$ 8.9 millionequivalent. ADF funds were virtually fully expended in 1979 when ID disbursemeat were suspended and it did not resume financing the project in 1984. 3.18 The cost of the rehabilitation program vas estimatedto be US$5.7 million in 1984. IDA agreed to finance OHVSD's operating costs from the remaining funds under Cr. 489-1-CD to complemeat URCDF's financing of US$3.1million for capitalinvestment costs and establishmentof revolving funds for lnput and rice purchases,UNDP's financingof $900,000(later increasedto US$1.4million) for technicalassistance, and VFP'scontribution of food for work valuedat $110,000. Due to the problemsdiscussed in para 2.2, the actualperiod of IDA financingwas stretchedout from the original objectiveof threo years (1984-86)to five years. In 1986, IDA mobilized ItalianTrust Fund resourcesof approximatelyUS$200,000 to prV.F-Levital technical support in view of late arrival of UNDPfinanced team. In 1987, IDA transferredUS$ 0.5 millionfrom Credit 739-CDto cover OMVSD'9operating costsfor part of the addLtional year. Another US$1 million of IDA financing (Cr. 1775-CD)was approvedto supportOMVSD's budget through 1989.

3.19 The totalexternal financing to OMVSDunder the rehabilitation program (1984-1989) is estimatedto be US$7.9 million (current prices); in addLtion, the Italian Trust lund financed the second phase study. The total project cost is estimatedto be US$29.7 million (Annex 4, Table 2). Disbursemnts 3.20 Both IDA credits were fully disbursed. It is neitherpossible nor meaningful to analyze expendLtures by project component for the following reasons.With partial resumption of dLsbursements in 1983, no redefinition of disburseAmet categories was made despLtesom substantial changesin the nature of costs to be financed. As a result,after 1983 most expanditures were arbitrarily placed under the Clvil Works Category. Bank staff should - 10 - have modlfled the disbursementcategorLes when the substLtutocredlt agreementwae preparedin 1985. Renorting.Accountins and AudLting

3.21 Reporting. Project reporting was unsatisfactory,another indicator of OMVSD'smanagement problems. OKVSDproduced annual reports, but the reports were often received late by the ank, and tbey vere too long, too detaLled, and oft6a containedunimportant Information. Stnce lts arrlvalIn late 1986, the UNDP fiamnced technlcal assistance team has prepared regular reports on implementation of the rehabltitation program. 3.22 As one of the governamnt's flrst efforts to increase food productLonthrough better utliLzatLon of eListing floodwater r eources, the project should have been carefullymonltored and lts lipact evaluated. However,during project planning and Implementationno specLflc attentLon was givenby the Bank or projectmanagemet to thLs and lt was not done. 3.23 Several specific studies were undertaken prior to 1979 by one of the consultingfirms assisting OMVSD,including a socio-sconoalc study In 1977 and an evaluatLon of tbe future rLce productLonand consumptLon prospects In Chad (1979). The planned health survey In the area was not carrLed out. Other studLes on varlous speclflc topLcs such as the functionLng of private cereals atrketLg channels and a comparLson of returns to raf fed and irrigated rLce productionwould have been useful. 3 24 Accountina and Auditins. Supervison mLssLons repeatedly expressed concern over the lack of proper accouting and financial controls, particularly since 1979 when technLcal assistance was abruptly rooved due to the war before sufficlent Chadians had been trained to take over the work. Numerous efforts were made to help OKVSDbiprove. Supervilion mLssLons drew attention to CMfSD*soverly centralLsed organization and recommded easures to improve project financial controls. In early 1985, a consultant analysed the situation and prepared detailed proposals for new accounting and financial sanagemsntystems and for reorganizatLon of the financial. administratlve departmnt. One year later, he returned to help introduce the new system, Including staff trainLig and recrulint of new staff. Despite considerable efforts and recamaendations by supervislon missLons of both the Bank and UP agencies, the new systm is not operatlonal, because, apparently, of a lack of comitmat by O"VSD's managmnJt. 3 25 Under pressuros of lack of operating funds and rice marketing problems, CSVBDwas as of June 1988 unable tot tl) reconstitute the Ul- financed rv olving accounts for buyfing rice and lputs; (IL) repay its seasonal credit from the ITCD for rlce buying; and CllL)relburse IDA for the funds seized by bTCD from the project acco'nt to repay the seasonal credit. OWSD used funds from thse sourcee to finance operating costs.

3.26 The most recent financial state met and audlt report are for M1935316 and were subh$tted In mid-1987. As of June 1988, the joint UVCDVIUNDPevaluation mission reported that the accountsand balancesheet for 1966 and 1987 had not been prepared. It recOatnded that an *epertbe - 11 - hired for six amoths to prepare the accounting documentss he arrived In Chad in Decmber.

3.27 Caoliance with Covenants. Compliance with the project', legal obligations aader the credit agreement were not fully met in two main areas: (L) article4.01 (c), audit covenant, mad (ii) article4.05, surzvy of healthconditions.

IV. DMPLDNCSTATIONO CIVILWORKS 4.1 The main investmentcomponents of the projectwere civilworks whichaccounted (including engineeringand manage_entsupervision) for around 85Z of the totalIDA creditfor the reappraisedproject. The works consisted of irrigationdevelopment, roads construction, rehabilitatLon and eztensLon of mn ezistingagricultural station, and constructionof a ricemill, storag facilities,housing and officebuildings. Targetsand actualachievements are examinedbelow. Detailsare providedin Anaex 2. IrrigationWorks

4*2 Orisinal Concept. The appraisal report sugested construction of an intake on the Logone River, a 6.2 km main canal, a compeation basin (to control the water supplied to the polders and to provide ma early water supply to rLce-growing areas outside the polders), primary and secondary canal networks to distribute lrripgtion water to independent blocks In the polders, and a drainage system. on a trial basis, a 650 ha block was Intended to be levelled mad equipped with an irrigation layout permitting water depths to be controlled between 10 cm and 20 cm on the fields. No land levlling was proposed for the other polder blocks where water control was Intended to be achieved by contour buds dividing each block into two zones, one within which water depth would not exceed 60 cm, and the other where water depth would not exceed 30 cm. 4.3 Modified hAuroach. The concept of irrigation by controlled flooding was maintained throughout, but levelling of a 650 ha block was dropped in 1976; rather denelopmwit of about 4,400 hectares was planned with blocks where water height was 60 cm for the MI polder and 30 cm for the other polders. Another modLfication was the construction of two lateral irrigation channes and one central drain, instead of a single zanal-drain as planned In 1976. The intake and main canal have a capaelty for an eventual enlargeunt of the polders to 10,000 ha (but only two sluice gates of seven planned were Installed). 4. t-Working Methods. The calls for bids In 1974 and 1975 for the execution of works by contractors had to be cancelled because only a few bids were tendered and bid amounts were much higher than expected. Therefore it was decided in 1975-76 to construct the main canal and dewelop a 300 ha pilot scheme through force account guided by expatriate engineers and using locally available equipmet. Overall this experience vas positive and it vas therefore decided to continua construction this way. Additional equipaent vas ordered using international competitive bidding, but it dl* not arrcve altogether at the same time and therefore construction work did not rcach - 12 - full pace until the end of 1977. Work was finally stopped in may 1979 becauseof the civilwar.

4.5 The plannedand completedearth movement for th. irrigation systemsare shown in Table 2. Use of a suLtablemix of labor and machinery permittedthe projectto consLderablyexceed earth movement targets. If the civllwar had not disruptedthe work, constructionwould probablyhave been completedin 1980, accordingto the Initialtarget. The decisionby IDA and the governmentto carry out the works using labor under force accountand machinery,supervised by engineeringconsultants, thus proved to be the right one, which had the additionalbeneflt of trainingthe local staffand labor force.

CanelS. ela IC { _ X1 n Tm l-w-S. n MD

VW Red 1tguI-Ceteoa 2"7000 146,0 .0oW 011.4 Ni 9in W110.000 64,000 01 KH 1.S ~~~~~lon,080 o =eo,aO OleekI- -110 o Is.000 1m4000 To*al Fold. 2.1 ,6009 177,0W 47,0W Sleg"Du1 9 132.0W 47.0W 106.0W stock 036 476 100,0IW 60oW 111041

Tolal POidgwD S_ufth 1.5,0 n,m moo. 46,000 T14 Poloe D m 1.47 ,oeo Ma0s 46,00

5.51 3.m.000 45o 1,96500

*. mr*h kiapha Cam lat_a *11076.73

1975-76 426.00 140,00W 1U.0 1",on 7 E176000 174.00W 1976-7? 664,0W S,,

Total 4,31100 1,20W8 1.1711l

C. I ll ti. d . Ct balm~ Oak Hi 71,000 16.004 J4,00

TStl 75.0W0 111't06 1U.0"

V Vithe" on" te"l pits for dike.. 2/ beoav"Ile pita Sacd" 4.6 Selection of EauiuLmt and Quality of Execution. Some of the equipment procured under the project was inappropriate. For instance, self-loading motor scrapers would have been more suitable than the backhoes and trucks which were used for excavation and filling. Trucks were chosen that were supposedly also suitable for transporting rice and chemical fertilizer, but this additLonal benefit of multlple uses was probabq, marginal. The earthworks were mell zexcuted, and the dikes were cover6i (couche de roulement) with carefully selected materials. - 13 -

4.7 The largerconcrete works wore builtby localcontractors. However, they were not intereostedin the smallerworks, which OMVSD consequently executedon its own. Constructionof smallconcrete works in the DSI and DS2 polderswas delayeduntil 1986, because the constructionequipment, whlch was orderedin 1978, did not arriveat Lai due to the civilwar. The designof theseworks, using reinforcedconcrete instead of masonry,was not favorable for easy execution. 4.8 Ooeratlonand Maintenance.No writteninstructions for operation and maintenanceof the polderswere issued.According to the engineering consultants,this was the responsibilityof the managementconsultants. It is Impossible to find out which firm was responsiblefor this and why they did not work togetheron this task; as a rulo, they reportedly collaborated well. Due to the lack of specificOSM Instructions, project management was unableto make adequateprovLsion for mainteance of the work'. Roads 4.9 The SAR suggestedconstruction of a 102 km all-weatherearth road networkin the projectarea. The planned70 km of roads on the 3.50 m wide dikesin the polderareas were built satisfactorily,in spiteof the lack of adequatematerials such as lateritefor paving. The engineeringconsultant wisely selectedsoils offeringsufficient CDR, which has kept erosionlow. The existing32 km Lai-Bangaroad was rl.soto be improved. A call for bids was prepared,but becauseof the cost overrunof the irrigationworks this part of the projectwas cancelled. This was an unfortunatedecision. AgriculturalStation 4.10 The SAR suggestedrehabilitation of the 200 ha lrrigationsystem of the BoumoAgricultural Station; renovation and repairof buildingsand the carryingout of a program of applied researchand seed multiplication. However,the stationwas locatudfar, roughly30 km, fromOKVSD's offices in Lai. The outbreakof civilwar preventedthe startupof thiswork. Afterthe war, OMVSDdecided to abandon the Boumo Station and to develop a new stati$n at Mala, which is locatedonly 7 km fro OMVSD. The appliedresearch and rice seedmultiplication programs are discussedin paras 5.8-5.9. Rice Hill 4.11 The ricemill of 12,000tons paddycapacity ffinanced by the ADF was completedas planned in 1979. The buLldingswer constructed by local contractors under the supervision of the engineering consultants. When the projectcame to a stand-stillin 1979, the millwas still being tested and had not yet been officiallyturned over to OMVSDby the supplier.There were long delays in gettingthe mill workingafter the war, in part due to a disputebetween the supplierand OMVSD concerningan outstandingpayment datingfrom thewar period. A UNDP/FAOconsultant mission in 1985 identifLed the repairs required as a resultof damageincurred during the war and some necessary improvements,which were subsequentlycarried out under the rehabilLtationprogram. - 14 -

4.12 The rlce m.ll becam operatLonal in March 1987. Since OMVSD had problems in securing funds for the purchase of paddy from project farmers, purchases began only in March, although harvesting began in December 1986. In the mantime many farmersresorted to sellingpaddy on the local market to private traders and migrant livestockproducers (for transportto the north). About 2,500 tons of paddy from the 1986187 agriculturalseason were callected and 2,200 were illecdln 1987. Mlling yielded 691 of gross paddy, which li a satisfactoryresult. However some technlcalproblems were ncountereds(i) the paddy collected by OKVSD contained many Impurities (3-42 of foreign matter); (11) since the paddy was collected long after the harvest, it was very dry for millings as a result the share of flrst qualLty rice was low (321 of paddy) and that of low-valuebroken grains (which was not likely to cover milling costs) was high (371 of paddy): and (III) the full capacLty of the mi was only obtained with the varlety S. Kong-Pao (4 t/h) but performancewas poor wLth the variety IR 46 (3 t/hour).

4 13 Due to financlal problems stexming in large part from the inabilLty to sell the 1986187 milled rice, only 518 tons of paddy were purchased in 1987188 and 3,000 tons in 1988189. In effect, the rlce mill has only operated for two full seasons and even then it was not under normal condltLonssince the buying and mLlling bogan at the end of the season. From the limited cost data avaLlable, lt appears to be operating at a loss (para 3.26). Buildings

4.14 The offices, workshops, store, staff housing and felld warehouses store were bullt as planned. They were constructed on force account; OKVSD provLded the buLlding materLals to workerswho were paid on a task basis. A servlce statLon for fuel wlth a fuel auge was not installed untll June 1988, therefore large alosses are likely to have occurred In the past.

4.15 Som problems remains (L) the drinking water is pumped from the Logone RLver instead of from a tubewell; and (i1) the powerful 160 HP electrlcLty generators sere both the rlce mall and the resLdentLal area. Generator capacity is therefore excessive when the mall is not working.

V. PRODUCTIONACTiVMTIZS AND AGRICULTURALWHACT

5.1 The project's key objectlve was to lncraso the productivLty of rice productLon and thereby productLon and incomes by litroducing controlled flooding in the Lrriated perimeter and by proiding extension servLces, inputs and equipment to farmers wthin and outside the perimter. OXVSD*s DLrectLon de mLso en valour (Mf) was responsible for production support activities Including applied research, seed production, extenasLon, inputlequip.ent supply and credit, allocation of parcels Ln the polder, and water management. These actlvlties and the project's impact are discussed below. Since there Is a lack of rellable data, the assesmont of the project's Impact Ls based on production statistics compiled by OKVSD (with the exceptLon of 1981 and 1982, for which only estImtes are avallable), the - 15 -

PCX mission's observations and discussions with farmers and project field staff. Intended Impact

5.2 At appraisal, it was *etimted that the project would Increase annual paddy production from 8,000 toans to about 20,000 tons at full development by increasing yields and the area under rice cultivation. Actual yields in the Sategui Deressia plain prior to the project were estimted to be as high as 1.4 to 1.8 t/ha of paddy in favorableyears, with an average yieldof 0.9 tlha. The projectwas expectedto increaseyields to a* average of 2.5 tlha of paddy on the 4,000hectares In the Irrigatedperimeter. 5/ Outsidethe polderarea, the projectwas eopectedto Increaseyielda to an averageof 1.4 tlha - I paddy for an area of 6,860ha based on use of good qualityseed, fertilizer(30 kgihaof urea)and phytosanitarychemlcals. 5.3 The project was ezpectedtc Improve the Incom of 2,400 farm families(11,500 persons). Returns from rice growing were expectedto increase substantiallyt net incomeper Irrigatedhectare was ezpectedto increaseon averageby 67Z from ClAF 14,580to CVAF 24,379. RevisedProduction Objectives and TargetGrouip

5.4 Revised production targets were set In 1984 for the rehabilitation progrm. The yield assumptions did not change significantly(2.5 tlha within the polder and 1.5 tlba outside the polder), but the project area was reduced to 1,500 ha under irrigation and 2.700 ha under rainfed farming which lowered ezxpected incresmntal production at full davelop nt to 4,020 tons of paddy per year,one third the originalproject's objective.

5.5 OKVSD'scriteria for attributingirrigable plots to fanrs was alsomodified. Originally, plots wssr two hectares and farmerswere required to own a draft animal and equipt-ait and to have suffLcient labor. Many farmershad lost their equipmsnt and draft animals during the war and found it dlfficult to cultivate the two hectare plot, so under the rehabilition program the plot size was reduced zo one hectare and the other requirement dropped. This was a positive dci*tanu which modified the project's target group, originally consisting of ai relatively well-off farmers, 6I to include the average smallholder.

5/ The TaiLan and MI11varieties proposed (mainly IR 22) for the irrigated perimeter were epected to yield 2.9 t/ha paddy ith full water control (30 cm depth) and application of 150 kglha of urea, and 2.4 t/ha with partLal water control (30 to 60 cm) and 50 kglha of urea.

6/ A socio-economlc, sample survey of farmers in the project area conducted in 1977178, prior to the war, found that only half of the farmers outside the irrigated perimeter owned a plow and only half owned a draft animl. - 16 -

ProductionServices 1. AgriculturalExtension 5.6 Prior to 1980,the extensionservice was large and theirattitude towards farmers was authoritarian. Due to attrition,its size was substantiallyreduced during the war and it was reorganizedunder the rehabilitationprogram. In 1987over 3,000project farmers were givenadvice by a total of 27 OMVSD extensLonagents (17 inside and 10 outside the polders),giving a farmers/agentratio of 88 to one insidethe polderand 175 to one outside. The total number of farmers benefittingfrom OMVSD's extensionservices was higherthan foreseenat appraisaldue to the fact that startingin 1984 the size of irrigablearea assignedto each farmerwas reducedfrom 2 to 1 ha. In order to facilitateextension, water magnaement and maintenanceactivities, in 1987 OKVSD decidedto encourage formationof farmers groups by reallocatinglrrigated plots. Farmers of the same village/ethnicgroup were placedin the same hydraulicsub-sector. Ninety groupswith 20 to 50 memberseach have been formed.

5.7 Technicalmessages were not wvel definedduring appraisal and oan tue whole they were not widelyadopted. Farmers did adopt higher-yielding rice varieties (IR 46 and I Rong Pao) and a moderately higher planting densLty (from 40 to 70 kg/ha). However,use of Inputs(seed. firtilizer and insecticide) was hindered by OKVSD'sfailure to provide a sufflcient quantity and to deliver them on time. First priority was given to the irrigated plots. and thereforethe objectiveof 2,700hectares being cultivatedwith improved methodsand Inputsoutside the irrigatedperimeter wae not achieved; 1,400 hectares is the revised objective for the 1988 season. Two Important recomendations for the irrlgated plots, respect of the crop calenadr and construction of small earth dams to delimit each plot, were not wldely adopted by farmers. Poor water avaLlabliLty and an uncertain market for rice undoubtedly affected the farmer's assessmentof the desirabilityof adopting the extensionmesages.

2. Research and Seed Multilicaton

5.8 Applied research focussed on (i) selection of suitable rice varietiess (11) seed densityand planting techniques; and (iii)type and dosageof fertilizerapplication. Results obtained conflrmed the validityof varietiesalready largelygrown in nearby Irrigationschemes at Yagoua (Cameroun)and Bongor;the seed rate for row planting was flzed at 70 kg/ha. RPKSB fertilizer at a rate of 50 kg/ha was found effectiveto control frequent chlorosis attributed to sulphur deflciencies and induced by the use of urea. However,research work faLled to lnvestigite important topics like organic manuring, development of appropriate drawn equipmeat for land levelling, earth buanding and weeding, and selection of crops better suited than rice to the non-flooded parts of the plain. 5.9 The sitechosen for the seed farm vas too far from Lai and between 1976-1979390 tons of seed were produced on 100 hectaresin the polder. In 1986, a new seed farm of 70 hectareswas establishedat Mala,but the first production seasonresulted in poor qualityseed, low yields and high costs. Since seed production was insufficLent in most years, OMVSDresorted to - 17 - distributing seed from other sourceswhich was often poor quality and resulted in a mixing of varieties. In 1987, an experiment vith seod multiplicationby a network of 50 specially-trainedfarmers proved successfullthey achievedyields of 3.5 tlha which halfed the production cost. OMVSD intendsto increasinglyrely on fanmersfor multLplicationof certifiedseed while the seed farm would be used for productionof the foundationseed. ONNSD shouldcoordirate its programwith the nationalseed productioncenter at Gassi. As part of Its eventualrestructuring, OKVSD shouldconsider turning over redponsabilityfor foundationseed production to the nationalcenter while continuingto promotemultiplication of certified seed by farmers. 3. Farm Inputs,Eauivment and Credit

5.10 OHVSD was unableto supplythe quantityof Inputsand equipment plannedby the projectand demandedby farmers,primarily because of lts financialproblems. In its firstphase (1976-79),the projectdLitributed 278 tons of seed and 273 tons of fertilizeorin its second (1985-1988),it distributed564 tonsof seed and 814 tons of fertilizer.(See Annez 1, Table 2 for details).Fertilizer use was almost entirelyconfined to the irrigable polder. A totalof 1,087 tonswas distributed,of which 752 was urea and 25X NPKSB. As discussedabove, the seed distrLbutedby the project(713 tons) did not alwaysmoet standards.InsectLclde treatments were not necessaryon a regularbasis and were appliedon less than 10 of the cropped area per year.

5 11 OMVSDprovided short and medium term credit to rice growers. A total of CFAF26.2 million equivalent of farm inputs was dLstributed between 1976-1979, over CIAW 100 million during the war years (1979-1984), and an annual average of CFAF 50 millionin 1986 and 1987. From 1976 to 1985 credit was restricted to farm inputs; beginning in 1986 it also covered farm equipment. A total of 338 plows, 151 ox-drawn carts and 970 sicklers was provided under the project. 71 Weeding implements and mall mechanical threshers were not distributed as foreseen, because weeding implements were not considered necessary by project field staff, and IR 46 is easily threshed by hand and therefore mechanical threshers were not required. Loans were generally recovered after the harvest. with the exception of loans for plows and carts which were given on two to three year ters. Loans for inputs they were generally recovered in kind (paddy valued at official producer price). Terms for fertilizer and seeds were 10 per season,whLie for plows and carts it was 101 per annum. Repayments of loans were high (over 961) during 1976- 1978, almostnil from 1979 to 1985 duringthe periodof unrest,and reached 881 (CIA?67 million)in 1986/87. Part of the repaymentproblem in recent yearsundoubtedly steumed from poor rice harvestsdue to the low flood level and late purchaseof rice by OMVSD.

4 Water Nanaaemnt and O&M

5.12 The appraisalmission and consultingengineers did not appearto give much thought to issuesof watermanagement and ONM (seepara 4.8). The

7/ Including cash and credlt sales. appraisal report Indicates that OKVSDwvii operate and maintain the irrigated perimiter sad farmr. wLii pay a levy of 101 of gross productionto cover O& costs. other than thLs payment, farmor' particiption was not considered. As dLscussed In para 5.14, water supply to the perimter was inadequate in six out of tw-lv years since the project began. The problm was magnifLed by the fact that water distribution within the perimeter was tnadequate, because finishing works on the parcels (levelling, sub-dlvision with earth dam, etc.) was not copleted. This resulted inscrlous disparities in water availabililty, and farmes and OSVSDtook ad hoc measuresto try to get access to water. During the last two seasons,OMVSD has trled to ameliorate the problem by sub-dividing the perimter into 30 hectare blocs and by prowting the formatlon of farmer groups to help manageand maintain them. sowecer, some design improveents are needed to ensure a more reliable water supply and better distribution of water (see Annez 2). 5.13 The lamnr lovy forO&M Is paid In kind or cash at the time of rice marketing.It was reinstLtuted in 1966 and set at about 11,000 CAFW/ha; lt was raisedto 21,600 CVAN/hain 1987. The PCd missionwas unableto get precise informtion on payments,but they are apparentlyfairly good. However, the levy is high relatlveto farera Income (see para 5.21). Furthermore, farmers may resent the Increased level of the levy since serviceshave not improvedappreciably. Several issues will have to be seriouslyexamined in thinkingabout OKVSD's futures does the levycorrespond to the real cost of 01K or is it Inflatedby CKYSD'spoor management,and could the levy be reducedby gLvingfarmers a greaterrole in managingand maintaining the perimeter, Project'sImact

1. Climatic and Hydrologlc Conditions 5.14 The project'simpact on productionwas ad*trselyaffected by unfavorablerainfall and hydrologicconditLons, particularly since 1984. Climatic conditions were generally such drler thau *xpected; average annual rainfall vas about 100 - below the standard level (1,000 m) and flooding of the Logone was of much shorter duration and vLrtually ail in 1964 and 1965. (See Annex 1, Table 3). The scheme's design was based on a reservoirbeing filled by the annual flooding, yet In siz of the past 12 years the reservoir was not properlyfilled (1977, 1980, 1982, 1984,1985, and 1987).

2. Land Use 5.15 The appraisalmLssLon assumed that farers would increasethe area of paddy cultLvationduring the projectfrom an estimated9,000 hectaresin 1974 to 11,000ha. However,the paddy area in the plain graduallydecreased to 6,000 ha in 1988. Rlce productionappears to have becomeless Important, decreasingfrom approprLately80 of the totalcropped area In 1974 to about SO in 1988. The main reasonfor thls is farers adjustingtheir cropping patternto the deteriorationin natural flooding and climtic conditions for rice production.However, rice cultivatLon is still very Importantand rice rmains the staplefood of the localpopulatLon and an Importantsource of cash. - 19 -

3. PaddtProduction and Yields

5.16 Despitethe negativefactors of low rainfall and flooding,and lack of inputs,average paddy yields obtained In the lttigablepolder achieved the target of 2 5 tons/ha. There is considerablevariability among annual averagesdue to dlffercncesin climatic condltionsand input/eztension supply,and among farmers (varyingfrom 1 to over 4 t/ha). The latter differencesare explained by (i) variations of soil qualLty and topography withinthe polders,and (ii) farmers'rates of adoptionof recomendedcrop calendarand culturalpractices. During 1987, a dry year, seed fasers who appliedthe recommendeddose of 150 kg/haof fertilizerproduced on average 3.5 t/ha of paddy;this resultindicates considerable potential to mprove yieldswith good husbandrypractices. 5.17 Informationis less reliablefor plots outsidethe polder,but lt appearsthat the averageyield obtainedby projectfarmwrs under rainfed conditionsalso reachedthe appraisaltarget of 1.5 t/ha. Yieldsvere higher Cup to 2/t/ha)during good rainy seasons.

5.18 The originalproduction targets of 1974 were not met (para 5.2), due to the considerablereduction of croppedarea seved by the project. The rehabilitationprogram's objective was not met either,because the area assistedoutside the polderwas 1,400 hectaresInstead of the targetof 2,700. (Referto Annex 1, Table I for details.) In 1988, projectfarmers are expectedto produce5,880 tons of paddyinstead of the original appraisal objectiveof 7,800. Over fourteenyears, it Is estimted that the project has increased total paddy production in the SateguL-Deressia plain by about 1,000 tons, from 8,000 tons in 1974 to 9,000 tons In 1988, despite a decrease in rice area.

4. Farm Incomes and Production Costs

5.19 Farm budgets have been prepared for rice production on a per hectarebasis since no data were availableon the entireholding. (SeeAnnex 1, tables 4-8.) Four situations were consLdereds (1) traditional rainfed cultivation(or the without project situation);(ii) improved rainfed cultivationoutside the polder (whichbenefitted from projectextension); (III)irrLgated cultivatlon inside the polder;and (iv) Intensiveirrigated cultivation inside the polder (seed farmers). 5.20 If one assume that traditional farmrs sell in the local market at 40 CFAFikgpaddy (marketprices go as low as 10 to 25 CFAP/kg)and project farmerssell theiroutput at the priceof 60 CFA1/kg whlchOKVSD paLd during the last two seasons, net incomes and returnsto labor are two to three times higher for project frmers. However, if one assusis that all farmers receive the lowermarket price then project farers are no better off (see figures in parentheses) due to the high level of productlon costs. Farmrs are likely to face this unfavorable situation in 1988 when innovations in ONVSD's marketing approach Include an Initial payment for paddy based on the past year's market price. - 20 -

Not Incomesiha Returnsmmandav Cultivation m------aa- -CFAI------Traditionalrainfed 27,000 300 Improvedrainfed 59,000(29,000) 590 (290) Irrigated(2.5 t/ha) 80,000(30,000) 670 (250) Intensiveirrigated 114,000(44,000) 800 (310)

5.21 Production costs per ha in the irrigable polder have substantiallyincreased. Assuming the favorable price of 60 CFAF/kg, productioncosts are on average 30S to 45S of farmers'gross revenues.Under theee circumstances,farmers, incentives are insufficientand the yield targetof 2.5 tlha set at appraisalis too low comparedto resultsobtainable outsidethe polder(74? of the incomewith only 442 of the productioncost); they are obviouslyworse at the lower producerprice. 8/ One of the main cost componentsis the projectlevy for O&M set at CVAP 21,600/ha(equivalent to 360 kg of paddy)in 1986/87. The levy appearsto be high comparedto the presentlow yields inside the perimeter,since it amounts to 17S of th, averagegross production obtained by farmrs. If irrigatedrice production is to be remunerative,yields must be increasedand productioncosts reduced. This will requireconsiderable effort by OHVSD to reduce input costs and improve their quality, improve water management, discern actual OUM costs and try to reduce them, and encourage better crop husbandry; new investment may be required to improve water availability and distribution (see Annez 2).

S. Health 5.22 Healthstatistics are not avaLlable,and a plannedsurvey of the healthsituation in the projectarea was not carriedout. However,local healthcenter officials claim that the incidenceof endemicdiseases rose in thoseyears when therewas an increasein the periodof inundation.Health servicesand facilitiesin the area continueto be poor and no specific additionalmeasures were taken to controldiseases as originallyplanned at appraisal.The healthsituation in the relativelydensely populated project area is poor. The lack of healthcare may eventuallybecome a constraintto increasingproduc:ion. A surveyof the situationin the projectarea to providebasic dataneeded for planninghealth servlces and facilitiesshould be carriedout. EconomicRate of Return

5.23 At appraisal the project's economic rate of return(ERR) was estimated at about 14?, taking accountof all projectcapital and recurrent

8I The BIEP's report, *Etudede la filiererizn (Juin1988), came to the same conclusionfor OMVSD. It also comparedthe seven types of rice productionsystems found in Chad and concludedthat under actual circumstancesof low rice prices,the more intensiveproduction systems are the least remuerative to farmers (in termsof both net revenue and returns per manday). - 21 - costswith the exceptionof 402 of road costs thatwere chargedagainst non- projectactivities and of the studLesfor the secondphase project. No ERR was calculatedfor the re-appraisalproject. The ERR of the rehabilitation programwas estimatedto be 132, consideringthe expendituresup to 1984 as sunk costs.The project'sactual EtR is negatlve,even if one makes highly favorableassumptionos project cost prior to the war (21.6million) as a sunkcost, operating costs ($.5million/year), Lvnistment life (20years) and incrementaloutput (3,000tons paddy/year). In only three out of twelve years (1979,1985 and 1988)dld the projectgenerate incremental output and the amountwas minimal. (See Annex 1, Table 1). For both projects,the implementationperiod was much longerthan expectedand the costshigher. The financial rate of return is even les favorable,because of the low market pricesfor rice and OHVSD'ssubsLdizing of the producerprice. Rice Marketing

5.24 The rice marketing problems which arose in 1986 were unforeseeable.but OMVSD'sinability to cope oteme d from its rigidpricing and marketingsystem and to the project'sinvestment in a large,modern rice mill. 'Whenthe projectwas appraised,Chad had a regulatedcereals pricing and marketing system (whic': did not work very well) In which a Governmeat agency set pricesand, in t4e case of rice,parastatals handled milling and marketing.The projectfit this system,but by 1979 lt was abolished.OKVSD continuedto pay an authorizedproducer and sale prlce,but it is not clear whetherit was obligatedto do so. In 1978 when priceswere high due to drought,the officialOHVSD price (25 CFAF/kgpaddy) was below the market price, but in 1986 cereals prices fell sharply and ONVSD's guaranteed producerprice (60 CFAF/kg)was well abovethe market price (35 CFAFIkg) and its ex-mill sale price was above the consumerprice. OMVSD did not adjust its prices to the market forces which admittedlywere beyondits control. They included: (i) the unjudLcious and widespread distribution of food aid; (Li) good rainfed cereal harvestsl (iii) low purchasing power of many consumers,and strongcross elasticityof demand for cereals. Low prices have persistedand for the 1988 marketingseason OMVSD has taken some measures. It has introducedmarketing by farmersgroups (based on the cotton model) in order to reducecosts and has gottenfarmers to agree to recelve only 502 payment for their rice when it is sold, representingroughly the marketprice of 35. This is an improvement,but objectivecriteria must be establishedfor making the secondpayment, so that farmers'interests are defended. 5.25 Constructionof a ricemill was in linewith the conceptionof 0NSD as a vertically integratedparastatal which would operate as a commercialenterprise. The mill was expectedto process12,000 tons of paddy when the projectwas at full development,approzimately one-third of all paddy marketed in Chad in 1979, and produce a large proportionof high qualitywhole-grain rice. However, this did not correspondto the dynamicsof the Chadianmarket. A majorityof Chadianrice consumers prefer to eat dishes preparedwith rice flour: this was pointed out in a 1979 study whlch - 22 - recomanded that a crusher be purchased for the OMVSDmill. 91 They also prefer the flavor of hand-milled rice. Purtherore, consumers treat rice as a substitutefor staple cereals-- *ad sorghum-.and demand for rlce is highlyelastic depending upon relativeprices. liceprices have tendedto be more stabledurlnn drought, due to importedfood aid, than staplecereals prLceswiLch escalatedfor examplefrom 1980-1985,and consequentlyrice consumptiontends to go up. However,once cerealsproduction is back to nonmal,demand for rLce fallsoff and pricesdrop. 10l 5.26 CMVSD'srice mill was not suLtedto the ChadLanmarket. Its capacitywas too larle relativeto the market *lscand lt vas designedto maoimise productionof high quality rice which dld not correspondto consumers'taste and which was more expens_ve.It was a costlylnvestmnt-. more than one milliondollars--which is costlyto operate. A comparisonof rice millingcosts in Chad in 1967 found OKVSD to be the most expensive. This is not surprisingsince In 1987 lt only operatedat 20S capacityand depreciation costs are high,but it lndLcates OKVSD'sdLfficulty in competing with other marketing agents. More serLous attention should have been given during preparation and appraisal to comparing the option of a large, modern rice-mill with smallercapacity husker. (artisinalmills) which are less expensive,suLted for private management, and whose mllled rice would have been more suitedto preferencesof Chadianconsumers In hindsight,both the original1973 and 1984 decisionsto build and rehabilitationthe rice mill were mistakes. OverallAssessment of Proiect'sImoact

5.27 Implemntation of the project's civil works was reasonably good. The new construction approach proved adapted to Chadlan conditions and a small group of ChadiantechnlcLans were trained. Their expertisecan be used ln futureprojects in Chad. However,design of the lrrlgation worksdid not take into account suffLciently the risk of low flood levels nor were water management and maintenance actLtivies sufficlently thought out. As a consequence, the serious deterloration In climatic and hydrological conditLons had a severe impact on the irrigated perimeter's functioning and substantially reduced the project's benefits. Construction and rehabllitation of the moder rice mill appear In hindsight to have been a mistake. 5 28 The project's achievements on the agricultural production side are weak compared to its record on civll works. Until recently, extension services were weak and mssages were not being adopted by famers, in part due to OKYSD'slnablilty to supply the requlred amount and quality inputs. Yield targets were achieved, but lt appears that they were too conservative from a technical point of view. However under the present conditions of a depressed rice market and high input costs, there are lnsufflcient lncentlves for farmrs to adopt the project's recomAndatione. In the past, farmers

91 SATEC, La production de paddy *t la consoumation de ci au Tchad en 1979 (Projections 1985, 1990),Avril 1979. 10, See NI P, 'Etudede la fLilercri,' p. 25. . 23 - were eapr to receiveplots In the perimeterwhich indicatesthat they perceivedsome benefit, but thlimay changein 1966with the lowerguaranteed producerprice. OMVSD's efforts to encouragethe formationof fawrer groups which should eventually take on an actlve role La managementof the perimeter is a very poitive developent. 5.29 The projectreached a smallaumber of farmr households--3,250 out of 9,300)and achLoveda relativelysma 11 Increasein productlon,1,000 tons more than in 1974, in relationto lts cost of US$29.7milion. The economic and financialrates of returnare negative and OKVBD requiresa large annual operating subsLdy estimted at more than one mLilLon dollars in 1987. 1/

VI. INSTITUTIONALP3RIORKANCE

6 1 Thli project was complex from an Institutional point of views (L) modern irrigation was a new activLty in Chad and there were relatively few experLenced ChadLans in thLs field; (Li) a parastatal with multifaceted responsibiltLeswas created to implement the project; 111i)OMVSD was being assistedby two consultingfIrms, but the divisionof labor betweenthem was not always clear; and (iv) both the orLginalproject and rhabiliLtatLon programwere being financedby severaldonors who did not have experience working together in Chad. Problems arLsing from these factors were exacerbated by the clivl war's disruption and the tremendous transportation and communicatLon difficultLes both within Chad and between Chad and other countrles. OMVSD

6.2 The creation of OMVSD was a specific conditLon of effectivenessfor the IDA credit. OMSYD was to handle all operations includingconstructLon and maintenanceof irrigationworks; production supportactlvitLes such as research,extensLon end creditsand the purchase, mlling and sale of project produced rice. Since OMVSDwas new and irrigationwas a new activity in Chad, substantialreiLdent technical assistance for both management/agriculturalproductlon and engineering support was financed under the original project, equlvalent to 28Z of the IDA credit amount. The rebabilitation program provlded for a team of flve experts. On the posLtive slde,ONV8D's technical perforcmnce in constructing and rehabilitating the lrrlgationworks was generally satisfactory. IDA supervisionmLssLons and the PCR mLssLon were Impressedwith the colmitment and performanceof the field staff in LaL who oftenwent for monthswithout gettingpaid. However,most attentLonof the flild staff was concentrated on constructLonactlvitLes, and their interestand expertLseIn agricultural activities was less. 6.3 On the negativesiLd, OMVSD'spoor managementcapacLty has seriouslyimpeded project implementation. This was a Comm= them of supervision reports. The 1984 supervisLonlappraisalmiLsLon of the

11| BICP, Ltudede la filLereriz (JuLn1988). - 24 . rehabliltationprogram found that OHVD's managmentwva weak and grguedthat OMVSD must reduce lts overhead and operatlonalcosts and improve lts commerclalactlvltles Ln order to becomefinancially self-supportLng. Like simLlarparastatals in Chad (SODELAC,COTOKTCHAD) and elsewhereln AfrLca, OMVSD'sinefficiency stems primarlly from Lts largeofflce and centralizatLon of declslon-makingin the capitalcLty, 400 km from the projectslte. Senlor OMVSDmanagement ln N'Djamenafailed to delegateauthorLty to fleldmanagers. AdmlnLstrative and finaneLal matters werehandled in N'DjamenawhLch slowed down project actlvities in the remote SateguL-Deressia area which was inaccessible for seeral months of the year. The 19S4 supervisLon report recommended that the headquarters staff in NIDjamena be substantiallyreduced and that the key adminLitratlve and finan cla functLons and personnel be reassigned to Lai. It was alsorecommended that the management capacity at Lal be strentheneds ln early 1984, there was only one person (trained ln agriculture) who was responsiblefor the divlsLon handling commercLal operations--inputsupply, credit adminiLtratLon and rlcemarketing up to the factorygate (therlce mill was not yet operational).Some improvementswere made in managementat Lai.

6.4 As dLscussedin para 3.24-3.26,OMVSD's financ al management and controls are weak. A new accountingand financialmanagement system was proposed in 1985 along wlth a plan for restructuringthe Finance and AdmlnistratLon Department: assistance was providedin 1986 to implement it. Also, as part of the rehabilitationprogram, a technicalassistant In management joined the project in Aprll 1986, but he proved to be the wrong person for the job and left afterthLrteen months. In May 1987, the FinancLal Department was officially transferred to Lai, but thiswas in fact an on-paper change and the vork continued to be centralizedin N'Djamena. In November 1987, donors and Government agreed to some restructuringmeasures, but OMVSDdragged its feet. Finally, in June 1988, OMVSDagreed to transfer some staff to Lal. In sum, a few of the proposed reforms have been implemented in a half-hearted manner, but after five years of constant discussion there has been no real improvement in OMSD's management. 6.5 The appraisal report was optimLstLc about OMVSD'sprospects for becoming financLallyself-sufficient by the end of the project'ssix-year period. By that time, it estimated that OMVSD'srevenues from the sale of milled rice and the levy paid by farmer for OW would cover its operating costs, working capLtal requirements and funding of short term credlt to farmers OMVSD'sfinancial sLtuation was expectedto be so good that it would be able to fully repay the IDA and ADF credits on-lent to it by the Government. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. 6.6 OaWSD's costs have been high because of mismanagement and inefficiency (para 6.3) and its revenueshave been vlrtually nil most years partly due to factors beyond its control (par, 5.24-5.25). The rice mill did not become fully ope uational until 1987. Due to a drastic drop in cereal prlces, 0VSD faced serious problems selling mllled rice at a prlce which would cover Lts costs and lt was unable to replenlsh its rlce marketing revolving fund untll recently. Due to Lts financial problems, OMNSDstarted each marketing campaign late (para * 13) whlch has limLtedthe quantitLes purchased. As a result, OMVSDsold milled rlce in only four out of the last flfteen years, and milling and transportatLon costs have consumed the - 25 - potentialprofit margin. Concerningthe other sourceof revenues,OKVSD began collectingthe levy for O0M recently(pars 5.13). Since the levywas collectedIn kind (setquantity of rice),the ricemarketing problems delayed the availabilityand reducedthe value of these payments. Furthermore, sincewater resourcesand managementof the perimeterhave been poor because of weather,design and human factors,farmere have often been unable or reluctantto pay the 014 charges. 6.7 ONVSD'sfinancial situation is disastrous. For the period 1983-1986,OMVSD's operating losses ranged from $1.0 to $5.0mlIlion a year. Its long tern debt, guaranteedby the Governamntof Chad, is roughly$23 million,and its assets are valued at only $3 million. Glven its present structureand the vagarLtiesof the rice market in Chad, there is uo hope that OHVSD will become financiallyviable. It prerently requires a Governmentsubsidy of $700,000per year. 6.8 OMVSDhas facedmany problem whichwere outsideits controls poor rainfall, late and inadequate financing of operating costs, deterioration of rice marketing prospects, complicated donor requirements and lack of donor coordination. However, none of these explain why OMVSDhas failed to implement the lnternal reforms being discussed since 1984. After five years, the only plausible explanation is that OKVSD'ssenLor managemnt does not want to lmplement these reforms and that the Chadian Governmnt has not forced them to do so. The dissolution of OKVSDis required and a radlcally dlfferent organization should be conceived. OMVSD's current functionscould be graduallyhanded over to farmers,private contractors and traders,and otherGovernment agencies (ONDi, IICT, Ministry of Agriculture). Consultants 6.9 Two consultingfirms provided resident technical assistance to the project until their departuredue to the civil war in 1979. The performance of the managem_ntlagricultural productLon consultants can not be assessed,because of lack of sufficient information. The eo .sering consultantsconducted the inltialdesign study, provided resident technical assistancethrough 1979 and continuedto be involvedin the projectat varioustimes sincethen. Theirperformance was sizeds(i) the initialstudy was based on topographical surveys at the l:4,000 scale obtained by photogrammetry.This was done at the requestof the Bank, in an attemt to reduce the duration of the study. However, this technlque is not satisfactoryfor a rice irrigatlonscheme, and the surveyhad to be carried out once more which delayed the planning; (l) the initialtopographic surveyswere not refined during project executions(iii) the original hydrological studles were not updated and the concept of the irrigation development was not reviewed, In the light of the 1972-74 drought, when the project was revised in 1976; it would have been appropriate at that stage, for instance, to separate the irrigation and drainage networks in the Ml; (iv) water levels in the polders were not measured, therefore project managment was not in a position to continuously re-ezamlne the a arlier assumotions on water requirements and losses; the lack of gauges in the polders has not allowed comparison between the real outflows and those predicted by the consultants; (vi) the procedures for operation and maintenance of the works were not recorded in manuals and therefore were not - 26 readilyavailable to project field stafft and (vLi) the planners had only seen the occurenceof years of high floods and did not propose ways to reduce the inconvenience of weak floodsI the additionalcosts of deepeningthe main canal and constructing cross regulators would have been low (see Annex 2).

6.10 The ezecution of project works and the 1986 rehabiltation activLties 0 under the supervision of the engineering co:%eultants, was generally satisfactory. However, records on quantities and costs of works and maintenancewere not kept separate,and thereforean opportunitywas lost for project management to base future work programs on actual experience. A large number of expatriate staff (up to 15 in 1977-78) was recruited; thLs was costly and may ha" been excessive.

6.11 The second phase, feasablilty study was carried out by the engineeringconsultants In 1986 under ItalianGovernment fundingand vith IQ staff supervision. The study had a number of weaknesses Ci) the engineering proposals are thoroughly studied; however, In our view, some are not realistic (e.g., construction of a shoulder across the Logone River to raise the water levl at the main intake. generation of power for the mllI by burning rice straw); (IL) the fundamental premLso that total availability of lrrLgation water has deteriorated to unrelLable levels should be reexamined and confirmedg (III) the potential markets for addltional rice production are treated naively and consideration of developents for alternative crops (especially . sorghum and mllet) are almot ignorted(despite both topics being specified In the terns-of-reference); and (v) the financial and economic analyses are weak, especiallywith regard to creating a wholly self- financing operation.

Co-financir ADF

6.12 aIVSD had difficulty coping with the different requirements of IDA and ADl. In particular. ADV s procurement methods and delays in the disbursemat of the ADP credit caused problems.

UN Agencies

6.13 In 1983, the project attracted sizeable grant funds from UPCDV. UNDP and WVP. The PAO was deoigoated as project executing agency for the first two agencies. As discussed In para 3.15, there were substantial delays In signing the project agreements and, subsequently, in the rehabilitation program's start-up due In part to adminstrative problem within the = agencies. 121 OKVSDbecam so alarmd at delays In putting In place the technical assistance toss and procuring needed equipment that In March 1986 it requested IDA to take over responsibilty from PAO for administering the project; Instead, the parties concroed agreed to IDA's recommendation of hiring the engineering consulting firm to get the program started (seepar 3 *16). OVSD' s managementbecame IncreasinglydLssatisfied during 1986 with management of the UN funding, complaining that the CGneral

121 It is difficult to judge to what extent slow decision-making by the ChadLn adminstration may have contributed to this delay. - 27 -

Monager was not involved sufficiently ln decision-asking nor infored of decisions taken by the management expert resident In LaL (finaced by UPDP) and by VAO-Zame. The problm soms to hav leosened when the amnageent expert left the project. 6.14 The rest of the UDP finaced technical assistance toam was well respected and appear to have made a posLtivecontribution. In fact,the decision not to prolong the contract of the agricultural extension expert was unfortunate since some Important new lnitiatlves with farors groupswere just beginning. There was a noticeable decline Lu the qualltyof extension activitles after his departure. 6.15 Coordination amng the UW agencies and betwoen each of them and the Bank was difficult despite the good will of all parties; this created additional strain on OMVSD'smanagement capacLty which was already weak. It would have been useful to have done more missions together and to have established a formal coordination mechanism (see para 6.15). 6.16 All donors underetimated the difflculties of project implemntationin Chad. Good resident technlcal exprts wore difficult to recruit due to continuing uncertainty In 1985 about the polltical and security situation and to difficult living conditions. The delays in acquiring equipment and vehicles was attributable In part to FA0' cumbersome procuremsn't procedures, but also to comnnications difficulties vithin Chad and between Chad and the exterior as vell as logistical problem In lmporting good. Bank 6 17 In hindsight,the Bank can be crlticisedfor designingan overly complex project which did not take Into account the country'. implementation capacity and loglitical problems. In addition, the project conception had four major flaws i (i) design of the irigLation vorks did not sufficiently take into account the risk of low rainfall resulting In low flood levels; (Li) the creation of a vertically Integrated parastatal to implement the project concentrated resources In the public sector; (iii) farmstrs' possible role in running the scheme was completely lgnoreds and (iv) the decision to bulld an epensiv, modern rice mill reduced OWVSD'scapaclty to adapt to the changing rice market. 6.18 Bank staff demonstrated persoverae and creativity In adapting this project to the dlfficulties in Chad Including failure of the initial biddLag process, the disruption of the civil war, delays inthe full r%sumptiom of disbursemnts, and late start-up of ON agencies' fuading. The appr aral mission expected the project to require a lot of supervision, because modern irrigation development In Chad vas new and therefore modifications in the project would be required as experience was gained. The Bank sent 18 supervisionmisslons, an averageof one missionper year from 1975 to 1980, one In 1983, and two per year from 1964 to 1967. It appears that a total of 56 staff-weekswas spent on upervision. The field visits which were budgeted may have been sufficient Initially. However, when project activities were resmd after the war, supervLslon mslsions ewre overburdened. - 28 -

6.19 Since appraisalof the rehabilitatLonprogram in February 1984,Bank staffexpended tremendous effort to coordinatewith other donors, developstopgap measures to cope with the delay La availabliltyof funds. identifyways to rectify OVSD's managementproblems, and to provide implementationassistance to OMVSD (preparationlrevisionof work programsand budgets, technicaladvice). The work of the supervLsion missions was difficult,given their time constraints,and lack of continuityof staffing and of expertiseto deal with som technical issues, e.g., a rural engineer only participatedin two of the last four supervisions.Only major implementationisiueu could be dealt with sufficientlyand given the overwhelming finatal and manage_met problems this worked to the detriment of technlcal super;ision activlties. Despite thesepressures, the supervision mLssionshelped develop a proposal for restructuringOMVSD and making lt more responsiveto farers. 6.20 This PCR finds lt imposible to judge,even wLth hindsight, how the Bank should have reacted to OKVSD's failure to improve its management. Supervision missLons spent an enornous aount of time working with OMVSD to identify ways of Improving accounting, financial controls and overall management.After five years of continuousefforts by the Bank and UN agencies which resulted in few concrete changes, this PC& concludesthat the OKVSDmanagment simply did not want to implement a restructuring progrm. The dilemma facing Bank staff was that OVVSD' field staff were motivated and cisitted; they accomplished the rehabilitation works as planned despite numerous hardships Including not getting paid. Seeing these positive achievements and fanrers *apparent motivation, it was difficult for Bank staff to give up on the project and take drastic actLon such as cancelling the loan. 6.21 There were two critical decision-points after the civil war. when, in hindsight, a change in approach may have been appropriate. First, while it is understandable that the Bank wanted to show good will and support of the Chadian government as lt took its first steps to recovery, the Bank's decision in 1983 to partially reame disbursements for the Sategui-Deressia project may have been a mistake. It might ha*e been more appropriate to thoroughly re-exasine the project conception--such as OISD's role--before relaunching its activities. Second, if the lank had been able to anticipate the nearly one-and-a-half year delay in start-up of the rehabilitation program when it was appraised in early 1984, lt could have cancelled the balance under Cr. 489-1 and presented the rehabilitation program to the Board as a new mrcgency operation, which In effect it vas. This would have provided an opportunLty to devote sufficient resources and time to reexamine and modify the project concept. It also would have presented an opportunLty to establish a formal coordinatLon agreement with the UNCDFand MNDPwhLch mlght have taken the form of the Bank acting as executing agency for the UN project agreements.

VIZ.LESSONS LrARNED AND FUTURU OR3CSATION 7.1 The project'soverall impact has been assessed(paras 5.24- 5.26) and variouscriticisms and recommendationshave been made throughout - 29 - the report. This sectionreiterates several of these points,elaborates on a few and recoamends a futureorientation of the OHVSD.

7.2 Choiceof technology.The chosen technologyfor this project, gravity fed irrigationwith partialwater control, was brieflycompared with two altzrnativesin the appraisal reports (C) no works, but improved extensionservices and use of farm inputs, and (b) less ezpensiveworks designedsolely tn allow earlierflooding of the plain. It was arguedthat the first alternatlveshould be excludedsince vlth uncontrolledflooding inputs would often be wasted, so farmers would not want to intensLfy productlon. In the second, it was argued that a major and expensive network of canals would be requlred to *nsure controlled early flooding but that uncontrolled inundztlon would place a pegmnent coLling on yLelds would would limit farmer income. Theso two alternativesand other intermedlate, less- costly solutionsappear to have been dismissedwithout sufficientstudy; a reconsideration was warranted when lt becaome evLdent in 1975 that the project's cost would be twLce appraisal estimates. At current rice prlces in Chad, intensification of rice production is not profitable for most farmers. Simpler,less costly technlcal changes entailing lower investment costs would probably have been more adapted to the Chadian context. 7.3 DeiLan of IrrLaatLon Works. One of the ratLonales for this project was the need to increase the securLty of the food supply in drought years However, the design of the irriLgatln works failed to sufflcLently take into account low flood levels, resulting in problem In 6 out of the last 12 years Annex 2 suggests measures whLch would improve floodLg of the existing system. 7.4 CreatLon of uarastatal. A major flaw In the project's design was the creatlon of OMVSDto Implement the project, a commonapproach in irrlgationproject deilgn during the 1960aand 1970.. It was a top-down approachwhlch concentratedpower and resourcesin the publicsector; OMVSD was empectedto operate as a coamerclal, self-financing entlty by the end of the project.This approach appears to have failed in Chad and elsewhere in Africa. OKMSDehibLits the problems found in many parastatalst centralized decLsion-making, excessive stakff, and poor financial managemnt. OMVSDstaff lacked the experience and mentality for coinercial activlties and they were hampered by an administered pricing polLcy which they dld not try to change. 7.5 Farmer particivatLon. This project supported the creation of a structure In whlch farmer had practlcally no say In decLslon-making. Thus, there was little way of ensuring that the project really responded to beneficlary demands and needs. Toward the end of the project, OMVSDdld attempt to involve faramrs in allocation of plots, need productLon, paddy coliectLon, and group developmnt actlvLtLes. Ninety farmer groups have been formed, but unfortunately, the technLcal assistant who was helping introduce this new approach left the project prematurely. Alot remains to be done.

7.6 Licemarketinas roblem The dynamics of the ChadLancereals maket should have been studied more carefully to determine whether the inclusLon of an expensive,modern rlce millIn the project was justLfLed. In - 0o - hindsight, it appearsthat small, private rice dill would have been more suitable.

707 Regitonal cooperation. LimLted coordination existed between the projectand the nearbySIHIY project In Cameroon, despite their common objectlvesand strategies.Same cooperation existed after 1984 in addressing technical problems of rice milling, but a regular exchnge of information and experience on subjects such as water managemnt, soil manageamt techniques and rice marketing would have been useful. 7.8 Replicabilivt. The project bonefitted a relatively small number of farmers and created a small irrigted areas US$29.7 million in credits and grants to reach about 1,500 farers cultivating one hectare each under irrigation and 1.750 farers planting 2,700 hectares under rainfed conditions. Furthermore, rice is a minor cereals crop in Chad. accounting for 3S of cultLvated area and 6S of production. This concentration of resources is neither possible nor desirable to extend to otherprojects. 7.9 Sustainability and future orientation. At present, this project is not sustainable 2romGovernmt, OVSD or the farmers'point of view. No expansion of the irrigated perimeter should be considered until the existing 1,500 hectares is being exploited properly and OVSD has shown lt can be self-financed. In order to achiee this, substantial efficiency gains and a move flexible rLce pricing and marketing approach are requrted. the considerable potential l Xo increase yields through lowering the cost of inputs, better water managmnt and Improved husbandry practices must be exploited. Improvements are also needed to ensurebetter vater avaLlability and distributionsthis may require some anw lnwestmet (see Anne 2). OKVSD'smanagemeat must be Improvedand its functionsreduced: many can probablybe performedmore efflcientlyby farmern,the private sector or otherGovenment agencls. Farrs groupsshould gradually take on greater responsibility for managing the lrrigted perimetr.

7.10. Governmnt took an essential step In this dlrection in 1989 when OMk8D'ssenior onagementwas replaced. A diagnostic study of OKVSD financed by the IDA technlcal assistance project(Cr. 1872-CD) was completed in June 1989 and the consultants are preparing a restructuring progr^ato be examined by the GovernmentIn mld-1990. ANNEX1 31: P. 1 of 20

CHAD

SATEGUI-DERESSIAIRRIGATION PROJECT

(Credit 489-CD/489-1-CD)

PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT

AGRICULTURALDEVELOPMENT

r BACKGROUND

1.1 The Sategui-Deressia plain, located in southwest Chad, coversan area of about 50,000 ha on the right bank of the LogoneRiver, in Lai Prefecture. The climate is of the Sudanian type with a wet season (1,000 mm/year)from May to October and a dry season from November to April. From Augustthrough October, the heavy rains and the overflowingof the Logone and its branchesand tributariescause extensiveflooding. The soilsconsist of 50% sandy loamsand sandyclays, and the rest is made up of sands (172) and clays with calcareousnodules (331). Since its introductionin the early 1940s, rice has been the crop most commonlygrown in the region,probably on accountof the frequentand persistentwaterlogging of the soil duringthe wet season.In 1972,when the feasibilitystudy of developmentof the plain was submitted,the area used for rice was put at some 9,000ha (18S)while the rest was dividedamong cropsgrown on seasonallyuncovered land (5S),pasture (71S)and forest(6S). 1.2 Animaltraction quickly became widespread in the plain after the establishmentin 1960 of the SecteurExp6rimental de ModernisationAgricole de Lai K6lo (SENALK);in 1970 therewere nearly1,900 draft oxen, 150 plowsand 700 harrowsand it was estimatedthat over 801 of the productionuntts were using animaltraction. 1.3 Bteorethe project,rice growing was practisedunder widely varying inundationconditions and using threedifferent varieties (farmers receiving extensionassistance):

- Puang Ngeon,which does not requiremuch water,has a 90-daycycle and grows to a heightof 1 m;

- D 52.37,which needs 30-60 cm of water,has a 120-daycycle and grows to 120 cm; ANNEX1 32 P. -2of 20

- BentoubalaB, which can withstand submersion under greater depths and for long periods, has a 140-day cycle and grows to 150 cm.

1.4 Under good conditions the yield could reach 1.4-1.8 t/ha, depending on the variety; however, the average was estimated at 0.9 t/ha in the plain as a whole for a total production of 8,000 tons/year, 40% of which was sold.

II. AGRICULTURALDEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

2.1 The agriculturaldevelopmcnt objectives for the region had been set as follows:

- developmentof 4,000 ha by means of constructionof a dike to protect against early floodingand the possibilityof gravity irrigationusing river flood water stored in a 600-ha reservoir; plot leveling was envisaged for a part of the area togetherwith installationof a drainage system to make it possible to maintain a 30-cm depth (60 cm on the rest of the area);

- popularizationof high-yieldingvarieties of rice used in the Chinese project in Bongor and disseminationof modern farming techniques: applicationof fertilizer and pesticides,weeding, etc.

- rehabilitationof the Boumo research station (100 ha) for seed multiplicationand applied research on double cropping;

- raising of yields from 0.9 t/ha to 2.5 t/ha in the irrigatedarea (2.9 t/ha in the part with total water control), and to 1.4 t/ha outside the irrigatedarea;

- increasingof annual paddy production from 8,000 tons to 20,000 tons in the plain as a whole.

2.2 The institutionalcontext for execution of the project had been set in advance by the establishmentin 1974 of the Office de Mise en Valeur de la Plaine de Sat4sui-Deressia(OMVSD), a public industrial and commercial establishmentwith financialautonomy.

III. AGRICULTURALDEVELOPMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Activities

3.1 OMVSD's Directionde la Mise en Valeur handled the activities connectedwith rice production,in particular plot allocation,extension, seed multiplicationand applied research,while its Direction des Amfnatementstook care of the managementof the irrigationsystem and distribution of inputs and equipment, credit and the collectionand marketing of the paddy. ANNEXI P. 37o 20 - 33 -

AgriculturalExtension

3.2 Extensionwas characterizedby the presenceof two services: one to serve the farmersin the perimeter(DP), and the other for the farmersoutside it (HP). The HP servicewas set up to serve two purposes: (i) to initiate the traditionalrice growersinto the techniquesused in the perimeterin order to reducethe learningtime neededby futurefarmers in the improved areas,and (ii) to increasethe salableoutput to ensurefull utilizationof the plannedrice mill.

The extensionmessages, which were not clearlyspecified at appraisal,focused essentially on:

- doubleplowing, after harvestingand beforesowing, and construction of small earthdams to delimitplots;

- use of seed of selectedvarieties. at 70 kg/ha;

- sowingin rows or in alignedseed holes;

- fertilizerapplication: 50 kg/haNPKSB and 100 kg/haurea;

- pesticidetreatments when needed,and not on a systematicbasis;

- observanceof the crop calendar(sowing between June 15 and July 15, dependingon the block).

Adoptionof the extensionmessages was low, especiallyas regards some essentialitems such as adherenceto the calendarand earth-dam construction;on the other hand, the farmersreadily accepted the selected varietiesand highersowing density, but the reco_m nded fertilizerdoses were not appliedbecause OMVSD's financial difficulties prevented it from procuring the necessaryquantities of fertilizer.

The extensionservice provided was intensiveand authoritarianin approachduring the early years (1976-79),when only farmerswith the requisiteresources (draft oxen and labor)were eligiblefor plots. This causeddifficulties in transmittingthe technicalmessages imposed. Subsequently,during the civilwar years (1980-84),the extensionservice was greatlycut back and the farmerstended to revertto traditionalrice-growing practices(late sowing with low density,without fertilizer). 3.3 In 1985/86,the extensionservice was reorganizedand OMVSD currentlyhas 17 officersin the perimeter(DP) and 10 outsideit (HP), resultingin a densityof 88 and 175 farmersserved per officerDP and HP, respectively. 3.4 Observanceof the crop calendarand preparationof earth dams to delimitplots are two recommendationsthat have not been followedto any great degreeup to the present(as regardsearth dams, 51% of the area in 1987/88). Even in the demonstrationplots set up by the extensionstaff insidethe perimeterthese practices have not been systematicallyfollowed; there were 90 of these plotsin 1987/88totaling 500 ma. ANNEX 1 - 34 - P. 4 of 20

The rice-crowingareas coveredby the extensionservice (Table I) were below the programflgure set at appraisalowing to the scalingback of the improvementworks comparedwith the initialprogram. Between1984 and 1988 the HP target(2,700 ha) was not achievedbecause of lack of inputs(seed and fertilizer),since the availableresources were assignedby priorityto the DP area (1,500ha). The population'sparticipation in the developmentof the perimeter was good,with an occupationrate of the irrigablepart that was alwaysclose to 1002 despitesome problemsof a social(mixing of farmersfrom different villagesand ethnicgroups, distances from villages to area) or economic (suddenincrease in levies,farmer indebtedness, drought) nature. Seed Multiplicationand ApoliedResearch 3.5 These two activitieswere conductedjointly since the priority objectiveof the researchwas selectionof high-yieldingvarieties suited to conditionsin the plain,in order to improvethe homogeneityof the paddy producedand thereforeincrease milling yields. Rowever,the seed production by forceaccount that was plannedat the Boumo stationwas not carriedout owing to irrigationcomplications and communicationsproblems between Lai and Boumo. Nevertheless,between 1976 and 1979 some 390 tons of seed was produced in the perimeter(IR 24, Bentoubala,Puang Ngeon and Cementvarieties, of which 278 tons was distributed(Table 2). It appearsthat at the start of the projectthe emphasiswas ratheron reducingthe numberof varietiescultivated in the plainand the existingblends because the superiorityof the variety introduced(IR 24) comparedwith thosetraditionally grown (Bentoubala, Cement)had not been confirmedin field conditions.

3.6 Upon the resumptionof activitiesin 1984 an attemptwas made to introducethe IRAT 144 varietyfrom BurkinaFaso, which had givengood results in an inundatedrainfed rice projectin Niena Dionkele;this attemptfailed becauseof the bad qualityof the seed imported(5 tons). Subsequently,the short-stemmedIR 46 variety,already widely grown in the SEMRY poldersin Yagoua,Cameroon and in Bongor,showed itself to be well suitedand high yielding(average cycle 120-135days and possibleyields above 6 t/ha). This varietyis presentlythe one grown most in the irrigableareas. For the strictrainfed rice-growing areas, the ChineseI Kong Pao varietyis preferred becauseof its hardiness,its short cycle (90-100days) and its betterdrought resistance.However, since this varietyis shortergrained than IR 46 it createsproblems in milling(milling yield 3 t/ha insteadof 4 t/ha for IR 46) and as regards acceptance by urban consumers. 3.7 Since 1986 a new 72-ha seed farm has been developedat Mala, 7 km from OMVSD,utilizing a mixed irrigationand drainagesystem operated by motor pump. The resultsobtained during the firstyear were disappointingowing to the low yields(1.4 t/ha),the poor qualityof the seed producedand the high productioncosts (CFAF 240/kg). Betterresults have been obtainedwith a networkof 50 speciallytrained farmers who, in 1987,produced an averageof 3.5 t/ha insidethe perimeter. The cost (production,cleaning and treatment) ANNEX 1 - 35 P. S of 20

of the seed prooaced in 1987 (230 t) was CFAF 103/kg. Currently, due to the difficulties encountered because of the poor leveling of the Mala plots and the inadequate capacity of the motor pumps installed, OMVSD is tending increasinglyto rely on farmers for multiplication, while keeping the station for preserving the varieties and producing foundation seed.

3.8 The research done concentrated essentially on mineral fertilizer, density and timing of sowing and variety selection. The most important results were the following:

- the chlorosis frequently observed througuout the polder in the early years and attributed to sulfur deficiencies was corrected by application of NPKSB cotton fertilizer;

- sowing density has been set at 70 kg/ha in rows or seed holes spaced at 200-cm intervals; replanting has not been adopted because of the impossibility of ensuring that the plots will be flooded at the right time; trialp with sowing dates have, however, confirmed the benefits of early sowing: the calendar currently followed calls for staggering in the different blocks (M1, M2, M3) from June 15 to July 15;

- the varietal trials did not lead to any new proposals , -arding the varieties used in the adjoining regions (Bongor, Yagoua); the varieties traditionally cultivated in the plain and suited to the different types of rice growing practised (0; 30; 60-90 cm water) do not appear to have received so much attention from the selectors as the foreign varieties.

3.9 In conclusion, the research conducted in the context of the project was governed by a conventional approach, especially in the initial years; a large number of simple problems, although essential to the development of rice production in the plain, -werenot tackled, among others: development of equipment for making earth dams and leveling plots, sowing and weeding, fertilizer,other crops that would do better than rice in certain above-water or particularly sandy parts of the polder.

Sup1yV and Distribution of Inputs and Equipment

3.10 Altogether, the project distributed 278 t of seed and 273 t of urea during the first phase (1976-79) and 564 51' of seed and 814 t of fertilizer (529 t urea, 285 t NPKSB) from 1985 to 1988 (Table 2). Taking into account the area covered by the extension service within the perimeter in the same period (9,530 ha), it appears that only this area received the recommended quantities of fertilizer (115 kg/ha) and seed (79 kg/ha). In actual fact, especially during the rehabilitation phase, OMVSD's financial difficulties meant that it was only able to supply much smaller quantities of seed and fertilizer than were calculated to be needed. On several occasions, to make up for inadequate seed production at the station, ordinary paddy was distributed instead of good quality seed. Pesticide use was low (less than 10% of the cultivated areas were treated per year); the pests most frequently observed were stem borers and leaf-eating caterpillars.

I/ Of which 129 t to farmers outside the polder. ANNEX1 - 36 - of 20

3.11 OMVSD's ability to meet the farmers' equipment needs was even lower: a total of 338 plows, 151 carts and 970 sickles was provided. Up till 1986 no form of credit was available for equipment. Although included in the appraisalreport, no threshers,seeders or weeding implementswere made available.

3.12 OMVSD's inability to ensure availabilityof inputs and equipment when needed and in adequate quantities and qualities constituteda major obstacle that prevented accomplishmentof better results as regards both yields and total paddy production.

Plot Allcn'ti3 and Credit

3.13 Up till 1984, the land area allocated to each farmer was 2 ha; farmerswere selected from among those who possessed the means, i.e. draft oxen and sufficient labor. During the rehabilitationphase, taking into account the farmers' difficulties in ensuring proper maintenance of the land in the irrigableperimeter (DP), largely on account of oxen losses during the civil war, the area granted was limited to I ha per farmer and possessionof a pair of draft oxen was no longer made a prerequisite. This adjustmentbrought about a change in the project target group, which then became no longer the "best" farmers with above-averageresources, but instead average smallholders who needed credit to purchase equipment. The reduction in the area granted also facilitatedthe introductionof more intensive farming methods.

3.14 As of 1987, the farmers were grouped by village and by quarter hydrauliquein each block (Ml, M2, M3) in order to facilitateextension and collectivemaintenance work on the irrigationand drainage system. Some 90 groups with 20 to 50 members each have been formed. Although late in the day, this step has been beneficial for resolutionof the frequent conflictsbetween farmerswith adjoining plots who are often from different villages and ethnic groups and for helping to encourage the farmers themselves to assume increasingresponsibility for the correct and profitable use of the perimeter.

3.15 The credit granted to the farmers in the years 1976-78 (CFAF 26.2 million) for inputs (seed, fertilixer, insecticidesand jute bags) was repaid almost entirely. The approximatelyCFAF 68.5 million granted in 1979-82,during the period of unrest, has not to date been recovered. However, there is a plan to arrange repayment in installmentsof CFAF 20,000 per year per farmer. The repaymentrate for agriculturalcredit was 882 in 1986/87, for an amount of CFAF 67 million (Table 2).

Collectionand Marketinz of Paddy

3.16 The intentionwas that the DP farmers should sell two thirds of their paddy production to OMVSD. Kowever, the proportion in the irrigable polder did not reach 502 (Table 2). This was because of the delayed start of collection (three to five months behind schedule) due to OMVSD's recurrent financialcrises; another reason was the persistentdrought which particularly affected production outside the-perimeterand therefore increasedthe proportionof the paddy produced inside the perimeter that was consumed by the farmers' own households. ANNEX 1 37 P. 7 of 20

3.17 A furtherconsequence of the chronicdelays in openingthe marketing seasonhas been excessivepaddy moisture loss (moisturecontent 82 insteadof 12-132),which has increasedthe percentageof brokengrains during dehusking. An efficientcollection system, possibly organized by farmergroups, together with promptand regularmarketing, are vital for the futuredevelopment of rice growingin the region. Managementof the IrrigationSystem 3.18 Since the developmentworks were not completedwith plot levelingto removethe worst irregularitiesin microreliefand by divisioninto irrigable blocksby means of contourbunds, distribution of the irrigationwater has alwaysbeen a sourceof seriousproblems. In particular,block Ml, with a grossarea of over 900 ha, was subdividedinto individualparcels of 85 ha with significantvariations in levelof the order of 60 cm; under these conditions,flooding was alwaysa slow and problematicoperation, especially in lightof the lack of earth dams separatingparcels and the farmers'failure to observethe crop calendar. Only duringthe last two crop years has OMVSD resumedsubdivision into parcelsof 30 ha on averagewith separateirrigation and drainagesystems like blocksM2 and M3. 3.19 Since no preciseinstructions were laid down concerningmanagement of irrigationin the differentblocks, and as a resultof the low floodlevels of the Logone,the projectpersonnel and sometimesthe farmersthemselves sometimeshad to take steps to increasethe amountof irrigationwater available(dam downstreamof the intakeon the canal,breach in the compensationbasin dike, etc.).

3.20 Correctmanagement of irrigationwater and complementaritywith the rainfedrice-growing system being key componentsof the Sat6gui-Deressia scheme,it appearsthat much remainsto be done to ensurebetter utilization of the water duringlow river floodlevels.

IV. RESULTS ClimaticConditions 4.1 The resultsof the projectas regardsagricultural production were affectedby unfavorablerainfall and hydrometricconditions; the levels recordedfrom 1976 to 1987 were generallybelow the averagevalues used in designingthe project(Table 3). The shortfallwith respectto the forecasts was more markedfor the numberof days' durationof the Logone'sflood leveLs (above0 on the scale)than for annualrainfall (the 1976-87mean at Lai was above 900 mm/year). The reservoirwas not properlyfilled in six years out of twelve(1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1987).

Area Used 4.2 The irrigablearea is currently1,500 ha (blocksMl, M2 and M3), l.e. 402 less than envisagedat appraisalin 1974. To this must be added some 2,000ha (blocksM4, DSil DS2, DS3) where developmentworks have been started ANNEX1 -38 - P 8 of-20

but which cannot presently be irrigated. The gross area developed exceeds 1,800 ha; however, 300 ha has not yet been cultivatedowing to the following problems: parts above water, presence of vertisols, termite mounds.

Yields

4.;3 The annual yields obtained in the irrigable area (DP) have reached and even slightly exceeded the target of 2.5 t/ha paddy set in the 1974 appraisal (Table 1). However, the average result over 12 seasons is 2.1 t/ha; it should be noted that this result was obtained during times when rainfall and irrigationwater availabilitywere well below forecast levels,while extensionservices and inputs were also no more than sporadicallyavailable during the period. There were significantvariations in yields around the annual averages (from I t/ha to 4 t/ha), due essentially to the locationof the plot in the block (topography,nature of soil) and observance of crop calendar and cultivationpractices.

4.4 With intensive cultivation(application of 150 kg/ha fertilizer)the seed farmers obtained an average yield of 3.5 t/ha (50 one-hectareplots) in 1987, which is a good indication of the potentialyields with good husbandry practices.

4.5 The average yield in the area outside the perimeter (HP) receiving extensionservices is 1.5 t/ha, which matches the appraisal target; this figure,which has often been exceeded in years of good rainfall,was affected by the lack of inputs and equipment.

Productionand Impact at Resion Level

4.6 Because of the appreciable reductionin the irrigablearea and in the areas covered by extension services outside the perimeter, paddy productionwas distinctly below the forecasts from 1974 to 1984; however, recent estimatesbased on samplings made in the context of the project put the plain's total paddy production at about 9,000 tons,1" which is above the estimate made at appraisal in 1974 for the situationwithout the project (7,800 - 8,300 t). According to these estimates, the rice-growingarea shrank from 9,000 ha in 1974 to 6,000 ha in 1988 (including the area with extension services); this is explained by:

- the adjustment of the husbandry system to the low rainfall conditions of the past 15 years;

- the higher yields obtained by means of the intensiflcation techniques which make it possible to obtain the same output from a smaller area;

- contacts with outside groups which have introduced the practice of raising crops on land that is above water (millet, sorghum, peanuts, cowpeas, ).

2/ DP 1,500 ha x 2.5 t/ha a 3,750 t; HP 1,500 ha x 1.5 t/ha a 2,250 t; traditional3,000 ha x I t/ha * 3,000 t6; Total- 9,000 t. ANNEX1 - 39- P. 9 of 20

4.7 The present distributionof the cultivatedareas Ln the Sat6gui-Deressia plain is estimated to be as follows:

Cultivated Areas

Crop NA I

Rice 6,000 49

Sorghum (rainfed + berbere) 2,800 23 Millet 1,500 12 Peanuts + bambara nuts + cowpeas 1,400 11 Maize + fonio 200 2 Cassava 3.300 3

Total 12,200 100

Farmer Incomes

4.8 The operating accounts based on the results obtained during the project (Tables4-8) indicate that the incomes per hectare of the farmers receiving extension services are two or three times higher than those of the traditional farmers; the same applies as regards return per man-day.

Net Income/ha Return/man-day CFAF CFAF

Traditional rainfed 27,000 300 Improved rainfed (HP) 59,000 590 Irrigated (DP 80,000 670 Intensiveirrigated (DP) 114,000 800

4.9 Taking into account the project levy which has been set at CFAF 21,600/hasince 1986/87, the breakeven Point for a better return in the perimeter (DP) with respect to farmers with project services outside it (HP) is 2.5 t/la. It should also be noted that the levy (equivalent to 36 kg paddy) presentlyamounts to 142 of the gross income of the DP farmers, whereas at appraisal-in1974 it had been calculated at 10.

4.10 The cost of paddy does not vary greatly in the four production systems considered; the lowest (CFAF 37/kg) applies to yields of 1.5 t/ha achieved by BP farmers with project services.

4.11 Comparison of the operating costs with those calculated at appraisal indicates that, on average, production cost per hectare (excluding labor) for DP farmers has risen to around 452 of gross income, an increase of 502 compared with 1974 (Tables 7-8). ANNEX 1 40 - p,.0Tof 20

V. PROBLEMSENCOUNTERED DURING EXECUTION

Physical 5.1 The appreciableshortening of the durationof the Logone'sfloods in conjunctionwith the inadequatepreparation of the irrigationblockq have causedserious irrigation problems. This has underscoredthe complementarity of rainfalland irrigationin the Sat6gui-Deressiascheme and the importance of early sawingand interplotearth dams to gain maximumbenefit from limited water resources;unfortunately these recommendationshave not been applied sufficientlyin practice. Agronomic 5.2 The researchand developmentunit was not able to devisequick solutionsto the problemsposed by water availabilityand generalsoil conditionsthat were somewhatdifferent from those expected. Very few usable findingswere producedas regardsvarieties of rice and other cropsbetter suitedto the sandy soilsand the above-waterparts of the perimeter.This led to a chronicshortage of good qualityseed which has, among other things, limitedthe project'simpact outside of the irrigatedperimeter. 5.3 The essentialpoints of the cultivationtechnique were not identifiedin time and disseminatedwith sufficientconviction. Because of thisand also due to the interruptionof extensionwork duringthe periodof unrestand the irrigationdifficulties, the farmersreverted to traditional cultivationin the perimeter,which explainsthe differencebetween average yield over the years (2.1 t/ha)and the averageyield obtainedfrom intensive cultivation(3.5 t/ha).

Socioeconomic 5.4 The changesmade in the selectioncriteria for farmersand in their organizationand distributionin the perimeterhave given rise to a senseof insecuritywhich has not encouragedthem to make the improvementsrecommended for each plot (leveling,earth dams). 5.5 In addition,the significantincrease in productioncost and in the levy in particular,which has not been balancedby an equallyevident improvementin the services(credit, input supply,paddy collection) provided by OMVSD,has createda "somewhatpassive" attitude among the farmerstoward the improvementsmade, the productivepotential of which they do not yet realize.

VI. LESSONSTO BE DRAWN AND DEVELOPMENTPROSPECTS

6.1 The projectas initiallyenvisaged was too ambitiousas regards civilworks; the works executedand the areas improved,though smaller than originallyplanned, have not been properlyutilized for a varietyof reasons: low rainfall,failure to completeworks, civil unrest,etc. ANNEX1 - 41- P. 11 of 20

6.2 Compared with the civil engineeringachievements, the efforts made to improve the cultivationsystem were limited; the agronomicmessages were not clearly defined from the start. The yield targets were set too conservativelyin relation to the potential (su.tabilityof the plain for rice growing) and the proposed improvementand maintenancecosts. The fact that the target set for the unimprovedarea (1.4 - 1.6 t/ha) was reached and even exceeded as of the first crop seasons should have prompted upward revision of the target for the irrigatedarea in order to take into account the margin between traditionaland improved cultivation.

6.3 The suitabilityof the Sat6gui-Daressiaplan for rice growing has been confirmed;however, crop diversificationis necessary for certain above-wateror sandy areas where other grains (sorghum,millet, maize) and legumes (peanuts,bambara nuts, cowpeas) can offer a better return than rice grown on a strict rainfed basis.

6.4 Developmentof rice growing in the plain can be accomplishedat lower cost; simple works to facilitate the spreadingce river flood waters (irrigationcanal) and applicationat plot level (contour bunds) can be constructeddirectly by the farmers with a minimum of technicaldirection. The cost of the paddy produced by the farmers receivingproject services in the unimprovedarea is in fact the lowest (CFAF 37/kg) among those recorded in the project. In the present stage, with a view to subsequentdevelopment of rice production in the plain, priority should be given to the following actions:

(i) In the improved area

- resumptionof intensiveextension work to ensure rapid dissemination of intensivecultivation practices in order to achieve average yields of the order of 3-3.5 t/ha;

- supply and distributionof inputs, implementsand equipment for use with draft animals.

(ii) Outside the improvedarea

- multiplicationand distributionof good quality seed of varieties suitable for milling and marketing in the urban areas;

- establishmentof a marketing system that includesa bonus system for paddy gatbered and delivered to the mill with the right moisture content and meeting the requirements as regards impurities, etc.,

- promotion of farmer groups and technical advice for the construction of simple works, and participationin the establishmentof credit systems for the supply of inputs and equipment. JAALLI TRE I

SATEGUII-BRESSIA IRRIGATION POIIECT (Credit 4E9-COt469-1-CDI PEBiECT COMPLETIONREPORT

AREA CUtTIVATED YIELD Po- cTION 9135 iNS Ji 1308l hocr I74JSIS 132 1457 IS J 1322 ISt 1|1Q 152 1113 2 lSi3 year Project (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) IS) (oppraisal) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (7) (8) (9) (10) (U1) (12) (131 Project year (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) area rultiwated lb&% 4.100 1.500 2/ 1.500 2/ 1.500 2/ 1.500 2/ 1.50 2/ OP (appraisal)1.800 18O 2,170 2,980 3,450 3,730 3.950 4.100 4.100 1,542 1.654 1.200 1.200 1.512 1.512 1.512 61 mf factual) 251 V 623 3/ 1.196 3/ 1.310 1,508 1.526 1W (ara sot 287 A.&. 518 455 0 351 harvested) 190 106 6,850 V/ 2,700 2/ 2.700 U/ 2,700 V 2.700 2 2.700 2J UP (appraisal)6.850 6,850 6,850 6,850 6.850 6,850 6,850 6,850 6.850 3.37" 329 1.401 - 383 '.400 / P (actual) (1,OOO)5/1.153 2.857 2.700 2.212 - -

2.5 2/ 2.5 2/ 2V 2/ i 1.05 1.4 1.7 1.96 2.15 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.0 / 2.2 2/ DP (approisal) 0.9 0.9 2.45 2.0 2.11 2.5 2.5 2.6 1.8 (1.9) I/ 2.3 0.8 1.6 2.6 WP (actual) 0.9 V/ 1.0 2/ 1.15 2/ 1.25 2/ 1.5(2) ta 6.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.15 1.2 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.4 W (apraisall - 1.0 soe 1.6 - 0.95 uP (tetual) 1.4 1.38 1.6 2.1 1.5 - Paddy prodeactl (1)

Vithot project 4,680 2/ 4.380 2 4.080 V 3.780 V 3.780 2/ (apprisa1l 7,785 7.785 7.862 7.941 8.020 8.101 8.102 8.263 8.346 19.840 .5430 2/ 6.000 V/ 6.855 2/ 7.125 2 7.800 2/ (appraisal) 7.785 7.785 8.444 11.022 13.743 15.531 17.398 19.088 with project 2.786 (3.000)5/ 3.850 1.222 2.520 4.066 2.845 3.78D Sctual)DP 515 1.352 2.730 3.27i 3.900 - 2.248 - 378 2.100 factual)-I 1.40 1.4B2 4.670 5.670 3.318 - - 3.377 - 7.227 - 4.768 4.066 3.223 s5am Iotal OP . NP 1.915 2.834 7.400. 8,945 7,218 - Insr-atl praiuLtio t)e 2/ 3.345 2V 4.02 2J 52 3.081 S.723 7,430 9,216 10.825 11.494 750 2/ 1.620 / 2.755 (appraisul) 388 (actual) 844 1/ OP - in tl improved ad irrigAle perimeter 2/ loterre program after reappaisal 1904 / DP area allocated to farws or cultivated by OSISD Al HP - are outside perimeter but receiviog OWSD extension services b/ CHSD estimate t1/ Program begun Jus 19Q88 I/ Obtanvd by dividing total production by cultivated area / WDP HP -- not available 13 ANNEX I TABLE 2

SATEGUI=-ERESSIA IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 489-cD/489-1-CO)

PRO3ECICONPLETION REPORT

SERVICESPROVIDED BY DEVELOPIENTSERVICE (EXTENSIONI

1w im u z a n sna mqB u2 wg 5 sa

600 600 1.324 1,536 OP 124 310 639 731 889 - 808 879 - 412 1.371 1.501 1.581 - - 1.689 219 2.166 - 1.607 w 1.324 3.143 Total 124 722 2.010 2,236 2.476 808 2,568 819 2.766 Aga 2 1.2 1 I DP 1.9 2 1.9 1.8 - - 1.9 1.9 2 1.5 0.6 - 0.23 | uP - 2.8 2 1.8 1.4 - - 2 Inpmtcdistributed 116 82 119 1l8 Se" Mt 13.2 82.7 182.4 Interruption 24.9 84 162.4 158 90 166 400 fertilizer It) 193 (I&V - 700 - of 142 93 lIsecticide 50.5 255 w Seed produced (t) 390 1/ activitics - I

97 (50) Plows 14 24 150 Interruption 3 3 48 50 of - 26 24 Carts 55 Sickles - 815 105 - - - - Seet rs - - 140 activities Jate bs - 246 - - - 136 - Sprayers (ULV) - - -

_antld (CFAF 004s) 1.700 6.700 17,800 68,500 _ _ - 14.100 11.843 15,996 67,000 53.50 CraiiL 47 boppam.t rate (Z) 99 94 91 0 16 0 10 88

- Cas5Sals (CfA 00 s) 512 2,518 2,618 - _- - - - 340 651 3,300 1,618 - - - - - _ 2.000 1.017 *mf-.sgO It) 49 36 Pfrcestag sold () 66 43 44 49

I/ 1976-77-78 2/ OISO property mae available to farmers 3/ DP only - -ot dvailabl* o . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANNEX I TABLE 3

SATEGUI-DERESSIAIRRI6ATION PROJECT (Credit 489-CO/489-1-CO) PR03ECTCOMPLETION REPORT

tlINA TLOGTCAL DATA

Year 9121 i77 isin 121s isna 120l lo82 12E3 I28§ I= ±2f 15827 Average Average Variation * f~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~76-871Used in

932 944 1,075 l1946-70) -I2 RAiniall at Lai (I) 893 1.020 1.496 929 999 1,017 834 882 716 879 736 das ol rainat Lai 46 56 33 - - - 44 47 57 40 38 45

RaWnall at man"e 1_) 892 743 1,098 - 718 - - 682 619 640 838 810 782 *se rain at Nmnde 53 55 - - - - SO 69 42 s.a. 42 52 loeeRver L122d& ft. of dps abowe 4.b aoan Lai missionscale 55 24 45 0 0 - 70 30 0 0 38 32 27 SS (1951-70) -61z

4/1 0/20 (1951-70) 1

C

o * ~~ANNEXI

SATEGUI-DERESSIAIRRIGATION PROIECT (Credit489-CD/489-1-CD) PRO£ECTCOMPLETION REPORT VARIATIONSIN NATNPARAWETERS 0F RICE OPERATINGACCOUNTS farmers with Project farmers with Project Intensive Cultivation WithoutProject ServicesOutside Servicesin Irrigable in Irrigable (TraditionalCultivation) Perimeter Perimeter Perimeter (HP) (DP) (DPI) 1974 1987 VariationX 1974 1987 Variation% 1974 1987 VariationX 1974 1t87 VariationI

0.9 1 + 11 1.4 1.5 + 7 2.4 2.5 + 4 2.9 3.5 * 21 Yield it/ha) + 302 16.200 40.000 t 147 25,200 90.000 + 257 43.200150.000 + 247 52.200 21.000 Gross income(CfAf) 96.000 + 414 (CfAf/ha) 1.700 13.000 t 665 4.975 31.000 + 524 12.700 70.000 * 548 21.600 Expenses 147 30.600114.000 + 240 Net income(CfAr/ha) 14.500 27.000 + 86 20.225 59.00, * 191 30j500 80.000 + 110 142 labor requirement(man-days) 90 90 90 100 lOO 120 287 38.100132.000 * 274 Totalexpenses (including labor) 15.201 35.520 + 134 18,475 56.000 + 117 27.700100.000 + 12 38 * 216 Cost al paddy ICfAF/kg) 19 35 t 87 13 37 + 185 11 40 * 264 18 60 * 233 Purchaseprice of paddy (CFAF/kg) 18 40 + 122 18 60 + 233 18 60 + 233 280 800 + 163 Returnper man-day(CfAF/day) 161 300 + 86 225 590 + 162 305 670 + 106 5.220 21,600 * 314 A UHSO levy - - - - 4,320 21.600 + 400 I/ Value of mam-day: 1974= CFAF 150 1907= CfAF 250

Fh

I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ANZEX I

SATEGUI-DERESSIAIRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit489-CD/489-1-C)D OPERATING ACCOUNT 1 Ht RlCE -

WITHOUT PROJECT ITRADITOlNALCULTIVATION)

i9su/oas -YtAr1914 lAnprainall TotalCost S of Cross 1untPric TotalCosi X of Gross Quantity Unit Price Quantit (CFAF/kg) (CFAf/ba) Incoe (kg/Mh) (fAF/kg) KCFAF/ha) lco" (kg/ha)

50 40 2.000 Seed 40 10 720 _ _ _ _ _ Fertilizer - _ - _ _ _ Pest Castrl 300 400 Ileus.ts (be* sickle) 4 days 1.500 6.000 (plowiaog) 500 Ox-dr"m cult. 100 101product 4.8000 On-drawn tramsp. transported 80 600 nisc. costs (Ss) 33 1.700 to 13.000 Ox. dr. JaiI.al .X5ua5 6.700Manual 17

100 1.000 40 40.000 100 Gca a-i.inS. 900 10 16.2DO 67 14.500 90 27.000Ox-dr. NMtee azd. u 33.000 Manual 83 mimi teem (maN 300 (CfAF/day). Saturs par man-day lx-drame cult.l 161 (CfAF/day) 305 (CFAF/day) keturn per m m-daynnual cult. (oas-ays/ha) (CFAF/man-day) L^K {(man-days/ha) (CAF/man-day) 90 250 22.500 nt (n-draw.cu1t 1 90 150 13.500 Raq.airt 109 250 27.250 *.in..t 1n.tUnSualeu.Lrl 94 35.500 89 Total ennenses Iinel laborlOx-dr. l10 15.200 Hanual ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~34.000 35 (CFAf/kg) eult 1 19 (CFAf/kg) Paddy sr los-dr. (CfAf/kg) CMMNcst t emit.34

0 AS 4

sc,iit 9sser4i|sCD) AATIG ACCOWIT 1 HA- RICE HP

FAfSOUTS!aE ffhINTEER WITH POECTE SEflVICE~

Yaar 1:14 Ia" raisal' _ 1007/1198lActualI Qantit UIJit PriCe Total Cot S of Gross Quantity Unit Price Total Cost S of Gross (kgAba) (CFAF/kg) (CFAF/ha) Incom (kgfha) (CFAf/kg) (CfAF/ha) Income

SeeO" 6 18 1.800 70 75 (1) 5.250 Ferti l izer 36 68.6 2.060 50 165 8.250 Pout control - - - on 201 Im1mawts (hoer sickle) 300 of area 3.200(ha) 660 On-4ra cult. Iplouijg) 1.100 4 days 1,S00 6.,00 Ox-dramntraasp. 200 location 101 product 9.000 transported Misc.csts (SX), 260 te1.500

Jst^1aLeum 5.000 20 31.000 34 6rass.ias_ 1.40 18 25.200 i16 1.S00 GO 90.000 i0o 23.200 60 S9.000 66 ism NU 225 (CFAf/dy) S ICfAIf/da).( Lahes r.q.1r.t (.mn4~~~/hCa) 50 da3 (M00-;/ha (CFAF/oao-da,) - t { S; } lS ri~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~3.501 Ms 250 25)00 Natalaxpaeaaa Iimgl.. lahaeI * 16.500 73 56,060 62 bolj c' 13 (CFAIf/kg) 37 ECfAFAkg)

1/ gase as a Padul rend i1creae by 25S-to takegrading and istert inta accont. ii

C ANX I TABLE

qAjFC111_fFERFSSIAVUOIGAtTta PROJECT (Credit 469-CO/489-1-CD) OPERATING COST I 1A RlCEL p:

FARNERSIN IRRifiBLE PERISETER

Yoar 1974 IA" raisall YVar 1907 UActual) Quantity Unit Price Total Cost S of Gross Quantity Unit Price Tatal Cost S of Gross (kg/) (CVAfE/lig (CFAF/ha) nciso (kg/ha) (CfAfhgk) (CFAF/ha) Income

Lua Seed 80 18 1.440 70 75 5.250 Fertilizer - Ure 50 68.6 3,430 50 165 8.250 Fertilizer - NSB - - - S0 187 9.3N0 Pest control on 20M of area 3.300(ha) 660 lpqle.mts (hoe + sickle) 300 400 4 Ox-dramn cult. (plowing) 1.600 daT/ 1.500 6.000 lucatylon Ox-drawntrinsp. 200 10I produc. 15.000 bchamial d thresher 800 levy 240 18 4.320 10 360 60 21.600 14 misc. costs (15 6.045 3.325

Iota] exposes 12.700 29 70.000 47

Gross inc 2.400 18 43,200 100 2.500 60 150.000

at a 30,500 71 80,000 53

Returnper MdaR . 305(CFAFIday) 670 (CfAf/day)

Labr requiram.t (N-dav/ha) (CfAI'Man-days) (nan-days/ha) (CFAF/nan-day) E 100; 150 15.000 120 250 30.000 lotA1 exemns *jncl.lattgri 27.700 64 100.000 67 Paddy rost I edl 11 (CFAfV/g) 40 (CFAF/kg)

C MKX I

SAEGIUI-ODRESSIA IRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit 489-CO/489-1-CO)

OPERATINGCOST I HA RICE DP:

INTENSIVE CULTIVATIONIN IRRIGABLE PERI#EIER

Year 1974 (Anaraisal) Year 1981 (Actual - seed famar g177188 Quantity Unit Price TotalCost % of Gross Quantity Unit Price Total Cost I of Gross (kg/ha) (CfAF/&g) (CfAFlha) Income (J/ha) (CfAFikg) (CFAF/ha) lncme

Seed 80 18 1.440 70 75 5.250 fertilizer- Ure& 150 68.6 10.290 150 165 24.t50 fertilizer- NPKSU - - - 50 187 9.350 Pest control - - - 3.300 Implements(hoe * sickle) 300 400 Ox-drawncult. (plowing) 2.100 4 days/ 1.500 6.000 location Ox-drwivtr"nsp. 200 IOZproduc. 21.000 Wechanicil thresher 1,000 Levy 290 18 5.220 10 21.660 10 Wisc. costs (52) 1* 50 4.600 Toal eaumnu 21.600 41 96.000 46

61icineane 2.900 I8 52.200 100 3.500 60 210.000 100 Net incM e 30.600 59 114.008 54

Return ger _adiv 280 (CFAF/day) 800 (CEAF/day)

Labor requir _ t (maa-da/ha) (CFAf.adays) l(a-da sAha) (CFAFAma-dav) I11 ISO I6 50 14 250 35 500

tastal gsxen"e lincl-laberl 3B 100 73 132.O00 63

Paddy fast Iseedl 13 (CfAf/kg) 38 (CFAF/lg) IX ~O4 au ~ ~ ~ ~ m

IRRIGATiEmPB=lEt ESIIIOATEOF WM TM ES (IUN-OAVS/Il

OP = Farers with OP 1 = Intessive HP = farrse outside seed Perimeter with Services in Irrigated Celtivatio WithoutProlect Pherlter farmes ITraditioRlCultivation) ProjectService 1987 1974 19A7 1974 1081 1014 Cultiv-tiam Swat 1 9Lanraitali 198tlactuall

8 6 8 6 8 ox-dramn cult. 4 6 4 - - Soil preparation. 25 - - - - Soil preparatios. an"al cult. - Is 6 1l 6 4 6 8 6 Sewing so 35 SO 3? So 35 40 35 4 2 4 Weeding - - 2 2 Fertilizerapplication - S 10 S 16 dons - - - - t'° Preparationearth - - - - Varietalupgrading - - 20 25 25 23 20 23 18 23 Cuttinglbinding 12 20 IS 25 20 20 18 20 __ Ihr.shing/wnaowing .2 2 __3 __3 -A Iransportation 12 .2 1 90 IO 100 120 110 142 IOTALItx-dre"n rulL- 90 90 0 }{eenual eult ~~~109 o

0 -51. - ANNEX 2 '. I of 8

CHAD

SATEGUI-DERESSIAIRRIGATION PROJECT (Credit489-CD/489-1-CD)

ProiectCompletion Report

PreliminaryProposals for Upgradingand Expanding the IrritatedPerimeter

l. introduction

1. Following the project completionmission in this case, a number of observationsand proposals were made by OMVSD division chiefs and the manager of UNDP/FAO project 83/020 in Chad:

- some subdivisionsare too big at over 50 ha and differencesin the levels of the terrainare too pronounced.

- the MD or compensationbasin (3 million m' see map 2) fills only with difficulty,which means a correspondingdelay in the flooding of polder blocks M2 and M3;

- filling was unsatisfactoryin 1987 (202 of surfaceareas lost), but during the 1984 flood season, the lowest on record,no filling occurred at all;

- polder blocks M2 and M3 empty only with difficultybecause the outlet to M4 has not been completed;

- civil engineeringworks on blocks DI South, DS1 and DS2 (811 ha) and M4 (460 ha) should be completed;

- considerationshould be given to using the dead storage capacity of the MD basin (i.e. 3 million m' to grow an out-of-seasoncrop;

- validity of the proposalsto use 1,500 ha for double cropping should be examined.

2. The mission also noted that:

- numerous upgrading operationshad gone ahead but without resumption of the project as a whole (necessarystream flows; plot elevations and sizes);

- intakes are located at the highest points of block subdivisions, making flooding more difficult;

- water-levelmarking scales are no longer to be found on the plain, except for occasional red lines on irrigationstructures to indicate the theoreticalwater elevation in a canal; ANNEX 2 - 52 - P. 2 of 8

- nonsimultaneousinundation of block subdivisionsis not out of the question,but regulatingstructures would have to be installedon pondercanals (sandbag dikes were used for this purposein 1987);

- no instructionsexist for managingavailable water resourcesto best advantagewhen the river floodsonly poorly. 3. The intentionin this Annex is to make a numberof preliminary proposalson the pointsdiscussed below, which would be an essentialpart of any move to improveOMVSD's administration and its rice marketingoperations. Obviously,these proposals would have to be consistentwith whateverstrategy is decidedupon followingcompletion of the irrigationsubsector review now in progress.

rr. Upgradingof ExistingPolders Subdivisionof polderblocks

4. Currently,OMVSD makes furthersubdivisions each year to reducethe size of some polderblock segmentsand the unevennessof theirterrain. This work, over and abovenormal maintenance, is financedfrom OMVSD's"current" budget,so it is impossibleto assessits exactcost. Some plots are also given a "surfacingtreatment" with bulldozer(flattening of termitemounds and bumps, fillingin of holes)which is certainlyneeded but seems to be carried out on a day-by-daybasis only. 5. There is a need for:

- A map (scale:1/10,000) of the finaldivision of the projectarea intounits that are smallerin size and of internallyuniform elevation. It shouldshow waterand surfaceelevations for each subdivision,nonirrigable zones better suited to rainfedcrops or reforestation,and plots that requiresurfacing treatment (a map to a scaleof 1/2,000would be necessaryif a surfacingtreatment projectwere going to be proposed).

- Each year, betweenseasons, a map shouldbe drawn up showingthe civilworks carriedout duringthe year (withquantity surveys) and thoseprogrammed for the comingyear. Betterwater management 6. Once the foregoingmaps are availableand water requirementshave been assessedby readingsof flood-levelscales, it shouldbe possibleto recalculatethe main and secondarysupply canal volumes within the polder blocks,with particularemphasis on two points:

- improvementof systemregulation by means of gate structuresthat enableblocks to be fl6odedon a nonsimulteneousbasis whenever the flood level is low. This would be a way to reduceflow demandand floodhigh-lying subdivisions more easily. -53 _ ANNEX 2 P. 3 cf8

- studyof the possibilityof locatingintake gates at the lowest-lyingpoint in a subdivisionso that it can be flooded"from below"via a canal that would serve as a borrowarea for the associateddike. Althoughperhaps not compatiblewith the configurationof existingmain canals,this would do away with irrigationwater runoffover farmers'plots. 7. It will be essentialin all cases to:

- make sure that there are one or two benchmarksin each subdivision to indicatewhat water levelneeds to be reached;

- use water and land surfaceelevations and hydraulicgrade lines as the basis for instructionson openingof gates undernormal-flood and low-floodconditions.

III. Improvingthe FloodingProcess 8. Whateverdevelopment option is selected(i.e. with or without expansion),the effortmust be made to improveflooding. The ideaof constructinga sill acrossthe Logoneriver can be eliminatedfor the time being (the cost was cstimatedat CFAF 4 billionby the Carlo LottiCompany, not includingaccess dikes, a lock and a fishway). 9. Other coursesof actioncan be proposed:

- reducethe volumeof the MD basin so as to speed fillingof its dead storagecapacity;

- Modifythe designof the intakecanal. Reductionof MD basin 10. The MD basin apparentlyhas dead storagecapacity of 3 millionm' at elevation0.5 m. This has to fill up beforesupply can start to the low-lyingplots in the M3 block, the fillingof which is thereforedelayed. This dead capacitycould be reducedby buildinga dike withinthe basin, providedit did not obstructintakes CS1 and CS2 to polderblocks DS1 and DS2; it wouldneed a crest width of 3 m, a heightof 1.8 m (40 cm above the water surface),a side slopeof 2/3 or, better,1/2, which would mean minimal scrapingof 8.5 mz/lm,and a volumeof 11.8 m3/lm. 11. For a 2,000-lidike, this would mean 17,000m4 of scrapingand 22,000ma of fill - withoutallowing for resumptionof the outlet regulatingstructure. 12. Beforesuch a project(with an estimatedcost of CFAF 40-50million) is begun,it shouldbe verifiedhow much time could be saved (by monitoring the fillingprocess on a water-levelmarking scale at the outletstructure). In actualfact, the modificationin main canal designnow proposedbelow shouldhave a much greaterimpact on block floodingthan reductionof basin capacity. ANNEX 2 - 54 _ P. 4 of 8

Modificationof the main canal

13. As things stand at present,the whole irrigationperimeter suffers a water shortagein any low-floodyear, although:

- In all years except 1984 the level of the Logone river has exceeded elevation351.1 at the canal intake point for over 1.5 months;

- the requiredelevations are 350.75at the MI block intakeand roughly350.18 at the M2 and M3 intakes(according to the Carlo Lotti Company).

14. Insteadof planning for a pumpingsystem that would not be cost-effective,it would be better to look into changing the dimensionsof the intake canal as a means of ensuring that floodingof the poldersmeets water flow and elevationrequirements. Since the three lowest floods recorded occurredin 1984, 1972 and 1987, the correctcourse would be to calculate floodingrequirements for those three occasions. Such a study shouldexamine a range of variants:

- polderblocks DSI and DS2 (and possiblyM4) are incorporatedinto the irrigatedperimeter;

- the MD basin is reduced'insize or retainedas is;

- the plots on block MI that are locatedtoo high are abandonedof retained;

- blocks DS3 and D North form part of the developmentscheme.

15. Although t;e calculationshere obviouslyneed to be made on a PC, an initialestimate indicates that a canal with bottom width 6 m, longitudinal slope of 10 cm/km, side slopes of 2/3 and an initialelevation of 349.65would ensure the necessaryflow to existing polderblocks under 1987 flood conditions(12 m of bottom width with the DSI, DS2 and M4 extensions). The only way to ensure flow requirementsunder 1984 flood conditionswould appear to be to change the alignmentof the canal: its existingslope is 10 cm/km while that of the Logone is 22 cm/km, so that relocationof its intake5 km up river would increasestream head by 60 cm.

16. Eliminatingrelocation of the canal (undoubtedlytoo costly to be justified),tht cost of improvingfilling would be:

Existing With Items polderblocks expansion

Excavationof canal: earth removal,volume 40,000m 3 70,000ml earth removal,cost CFAF 40 M CFAF 70 M Small intakestructure 30 M 45 M Design studies 51M 5 M Contingencies(201) L5 M 25 M

Total CFAF 90 million CFAF 145 million ANNEX 2 3_ _ T-ofsP.

17. Underthese conditions, reducing the MD basinwould no longerbe necessaryas it wouldfill very rapidly in the initlalphase of the flood.

18. The servicesof an expertwould be needed to confirmthat no problemswould be createdby sandingup of the intakefrom the Logone. Returnon iMirovements

19. Since 1981,areas put under crops and harvestedhave been as follows: 1981 1982 1983 1984 198S 1986 1987 Averase Item

Area sown (withinperimeter) 1,526 1,542 1,654 1,200 1,200 1,512 1,512 1,449 Areaharvested 1,420 1,255 682 745 1,512 1,161 1,129 Losses 106 287 518 455 0 351 286 Gains becauseof canal 106 287 518 455 A 351 286

20. If averageyield is assumedto be 2.5 t/ha/year,thq average annual losswould be 715 tons or, at CFAF 60/kg paddy,a totalof CFAF 42.9 million annually. 21. Incrementalproduction costs (fertilizer,harvesting, threshing) becauseof the additionalareas would be very low, less than CFAF 40,000/ba, or CFAF 11.4 mlIlion/annually.Quite apart from any gains on processing, annualgains would amount to CFAF 31.5million as againstinitial expenditure of CFAF 90 million,figures which amply justifythe project.

IV. PolderExpansions

22. Under presentconditions, several expansions are possible: - DSI and DS2 (811ha gross): The designstudy is almostcompleted; it only remainsto cut block subdivisionsize back to 25-30 ha. Approximatelytwo thirdsof basic infrastructurealready exists and can be restoredto workingorder with minimalrehabilitation.

- M4 (460 ha gross): The designstudy is completed,but with block subdivisions that are too large. Almost no infrastructure investments have been made. Execution of plans for block M4 would improve drainage of blocks M2 and M3. - Sector DS3 (695 ha gross): The design study is ready, but again with subdivisons that are too big. Execution has not begun.

- Sector D North (1.475 gross): Topographic surveyshave been completed,but the projectstudy has not been started.

- Diressiaexoansion (5.000"ha): Except for some incomplete topographicmaps a start has not been made on a study for the project.

- Boumo aericulturalresearch station (200 ha): Establishedon very lightsoils, this stationwas much too remoteand.improvement by pump irrigationwas too costly. It has thereforebeen abandonedfor a sitecloser to tie Irr satedperimetar. 56- ANNEX 2 P. 6 of8

k3. There would appear to be little point in developing any of the polder blocks other than DSI and DS2 (811 ha gross) and M4 (460 ha gross) initially,but the option to go ahead by completing the .- lies on blocks DS3 and D North (a total of 2,174 ha gross) should be kept open. In 1986, the Carlo Lotti Company estimated the cost of the DSI and DS2 projects as follows:

CFAF millions

Overhaul of plant and purchase of equipment 137.0 Site operatingcosts 188.8 Civil engineeringworks (by contractor) 189.2 Civil engineeringworks (by force account) 45.4 Contingenciesand design studies (151) 83.6

Total 644.0

24. To this estimate should be added the cost of a mechanic and perhaps a projectmanager for two years: CFAF 140 million (with vehicles, housing, supervisionby design chief). According to the Lotti figures, the total would be about CFAF 784 million, or a gross per-hectarecost of CFAF 967,000.

If the technicalassistance arrangementswere less ambitious, their cost could be cut to CFAF 100 million: the mechanic for 13 months (first crop season and start-up of the second) and the project manager for three months of supervisionvisits. Total project cost would then drop to CFAF 744 million, or per-hectaregross CFAF 917,000.

26. Extendingblock M4 by 460 ha gross would cost CFAF 263 million (excludingpurchase of equipment) plus technicalassistance at CFAP 30 million, for a total of CFAF 293 million, or CFAF 637,000/ha. If allowance were made for increasing the size of the intake canal, at an additional CFAF 55 million, the cost of the DSI, DS2 an- M4 extensionswould total CFAF 1,092 million for 1,271 ha gross, or CFAF 889,000/ha.

27. It would be worthwhile, however, studying a version of the project under which major infrastructurewould be built on contract, since the present very competitivebusiness environmentoffers a promise of cost reductions achievable through the use of more suitable equipment than OMVSD possesses.

Return on the expansion prolect

28. Assuming a yield of 2.5 t/ha, net income per hectare of expansion would be CFAF 80,165. Under intensive cropping at yields of 3.5 t/ha, income could reach CFAF 113,767/ha. Without this further development,only 30% of the zone is arable, giving net income of CFAF 58,962/ha. With total expansion of the perimeterby 1,272 ha gross (1,144 ha net), the annual increasein income would thereforebe CFAF 69.2 million with present yields, and CFAF 107.7 million under intensive farming. Expansionat a total cost of CFAF 1,092 million thereforeappears justified,although the rate of return is a low one. It must also be pointed out, however, that the project would put both the rice mill and OMVSD itself (since its farmer training costs would increaseonly slightly) on a sounder cost-benefitfooting. _ 57 _ ANNEX2 -~~~~ - ~~~P. 7 of

V. Irrigationfor DoubleCropping Irrigationfrom the Logone 29. Therehave been severalproposals for irrigatingthe blocksof polderM situatedclosest to the river to make doublecropping possible, the necessarywater being taken from the Logoneby means of a sill built acrossit or by pumps. 30. None of the studiesdone has takeninto accountthe inevitablewater lossesfrom a main canalwith a bottomwidth of 20 m and a water depth of 1.85 m (sectiona 42 ml; wettedperimeter * 27 m) betweenthe Logoneitself and the blockMl intake,a distanceof 4.5 km. It might well provenecessary to excavatea smallsubsidiary canal between the Logoneand blockMl. Soil permeabilityon these blocksclosest to the river is high accordingto the findingsof the soil study (over 1 cm/hour,or 240 m /ha/dayand 24,000ml/ha during the 100-dayirrigation season!,. Unfortunately,spot measurementscan often give an erroneouspicture of soil permeabilityacross a largeirrigated polder block.

31. This uncertaintycan easilybe clearedup - by installingtwo or three flood-levelmarking scales at low pointsin judiciouslychosen subdivisionswhich show significantwater depth and are representativeof the soil typesfound withinthe irrigatedperimeter: as soon as irrigation finishesin October,the daily drop in the water level on thesepolder blocks can be measuredand a reliableidea obtainedof the extentof infiltrationand evapotranspiration.These data, which shouldbe takenby OMVSD,would also be very usefulin determiningthe actualvolumes of water neededfor controlled floodingof the perimeter. Irrigationfrom the MD compensationbasin 32. At the end of October,when irrigationof the paddy comes to a halt, the MD basinwould stillhold 3 millionm3 of water. Proposalshave been made to use this reserveto irrigatezones downstream of the basin. At a depth of approximately 50 cm, the water in the basin would disappear through evaporation and infiltration in less than two months,meaning that no irrigatedcrop could be grown. It may be possible to supplythe basin from the Logone in November so as to keep up its water level for a longerperiod probably difficult, however, since the floodsubsides so quickly. The idea of utilizingthe-reservoir in this way shouldperhaps be put aside,therefore althoughthe assertionson which theseproposals are based couldbe testedby settingup a two-metermark1ag scale at the outletstructure and recordingthe movementof the water levelwntil the basin is dry.

VI. Conclusions 33. To summarize,the conclusionsto be drawn from this briefsurvey of the proposalsfor improvementand expansionof the Sat6gui-Deressiairrigated perimeterare as follows: ANNEX 2 - 58 P. 8 of 8

- An early study should be made on improving flooding of existing polder blocks by excavationof the main canal (at an approximate cost of CFAF 90 million) and perhaps by reduction of the capacity of the MD compensationbasin (at an approximate cost of CFAF 50 million). This study should be combined with assembly of an authoritativeset of documents on the existing polder blocks, includingoperation and maintenance instructions.

- A study should also be made on extending polder blocks DSI and DS2 (811 ha gross) and M4 (460 ha gross) and improvingflooding. The overall cost of the study/designcomponent and the works themelves would be CFAF 1,092 million for a total of 1,271 ha gross.

- The proposals to provide irrigation for double cropping would be very costly to implement;neither are they priority concerns, especiallynot in the light of existing soil studies. However, soil permeabilitymeasurement should go ahead; the cost would be insignificantbut the data obtained could be used to evaluate the studies themselves.

34. All these technicalstudies could be undertaken by the present OMVSD team with help from the assistant FAO expert and support from consultants (computercalculation of canal excavation,works design, intake construction study). Draft terms of referencewill be found in the accompanyingAnnex 3. ANNEX3 P. 1 of 7 - 59-

CHAD

Sat4pui-DeressiaIrrigation Proiect (Credit 489-CD/489-1-CD) ProiectCompletion Report

Draft Terms of Reference for Technical Studies Relating to Imgrovementand Lcpansionof the IrrigatedPerimeter

I. Introduction

1.1 It is anticipated that these technicalstudie3 Gn improvement and expansionof the irrigatedperimeter will clear up uncertainties on several points (soil permeability,for instance)and provide necessarydocumentation on civil works for both presentextension proposals and possiblesubsequent proposals. II. HydrologicalStudy

Study of the floodinapatterns of the Locone

2.1 Utilizingreadings taken at Lai and at scale No. 21, and also the correlationbetween these two locations,the consultantswill developa series on flood levels in the Logone in relationto the canal Intakepoint. River levelswill be reconstitutedin terms of five-dayaverages) from July 15 to November15 and wheneverthe Logone exceedsan elevationof 349. Levels will be reconstitutedday-by-day for the 1972, 1984 and 1987 wet seasons,when floodingwas the loweston record. A statisticalstudy in graph form should be providedshowing water depths during successivefive-day periods using variousfrequencies (0.8 - 0.9 - 0.95).

Water distributionand infiltration

2.2 So that water lossesduring distributionand by infiltratloncan be measured,the follovingwater-level marking scales shouldbe installedand re"d every day:

A scale 2 m in height will be associatedwith the outlet from the compensationbasin. It can be used to measurethe time the basin takes to fill before water is releasedto polderblocks M2 and M3, as well as losses throughevaporation and infiltrationonce irrigationhas ceased.

Two markingscales will be installedon the main canal at the locationof the MDI and MD2 intakes. Thwy will enable the hydraulic grade line to be monitoredalong the canal.

Three markingscales, each I m in height,will be installedat low lying points on three of the irrigatedpolder blocks. They will be used to measurethe speed with which the blocks flood and the volume of evaporationand infiltrationlosses once irrigationceases. ANNEX3 -60- P. 2 of 7

- Two markingscales, each 3 m in height,will be installedat points 5 m on either side of the main intake structure,where they will be used to measurehead loss.

2.3 Each time measurementsare taken, it will be noted whether structuresadjacent to the markingscales were open or closed. Provided it can be done easily,an attemptshould be made to gauge velocityof stream flow in the main canal whenevermarking scales are being read, as a means of checkingthe appropriatenessof the formulas in use. There shouldalso be an attemptat making a visualassessment of the velocityhead of the water in the canal as floodingbegins, so that losses throughsoil saturationcan be estimated.

III. TopographicSurveys

3.1 Basic topographicsurveys of the polders to a scale of 1/2,000 (1 point per 50 m) will be consideredadequate. However,a surveyof existing dikes,roads, canals and drains on polder blocks DS1, DS2 and M4 will be neededfor monitoringpurposes. Longitudinalsections on a scale of I point for every 50 m, accompaniedby cross sectionsevery 200 m, will be sufficient. The scale map (1/2,000)already available can be used to show existinginfrastructure on polderblocks DSI, DS2 and M4: alignmentof dikes, roads,canals, drains; locationand elevationof structures;outline of works begun but not finished.

IV. Hydraulic Studies

Comprehensiveupdated files

4.1 For each of the three existingblocks in polderM (M1, M2 and M3), a comprehensiveupdated file is to be set up consistingof:

- a map (scale of 1/2000)of the block and its subdivisions(showing water levels,irrigable areas, nonirrigableareas);

- standard longitudinaland cross sectionsof dikes, main and secondary canals, drains;

- plans and elevationsof concrete structures.

4.2 A memorandumwill be producedsetting out the flows and elevations needed in each canal to supply the subdivisionsand verifyingthat the dimensionsof existing canalsmean that these flows and elevationscan be achieved. If the characteristicsof a canal differ too much from those reco_uended,proposals for modificationshould be provided.

4.3 A study is to be made of the possibilityof installingupstream flow-regulationdevices on main and secondarycanals, in the form of transverseand lateralweirs, fixed if possible. This regulationsystem shouldmake it possible- with advice from 4griculturalspecialists -- to carry out nonsimultaneousinundation of polder blocks when flood levels are low. ANNEX 3 -61 - P. 3 of;'

Polderblocks DS2. DS3, M4 and DN 4.4 The studyof polderblocks DS2, DS3 and M4 now in progressis to allow for the followingchanges:

- a reductionin blocksection size to a maximumof approximately 30 ha;

-* block sectionsare to be equippedwith intakesat theirlowest-lying point;

- nonirrigablezones to be separatedoff by a small dike; - stepsare to be taken to regulateflow in main and secondarycanals; - the possibilityof buildingsmall structuresout of roughblock masonryis to be studied;

- existinginfrastructure facilities are to be rehabilitatedwherever possibleand reused;this may entailslight departure from the recommendedstandards, which will have to be justifiedin the study. 4.5 As far as block DN is concerned,the same typesof study will be requiredexcept that there is no existingbody of documentationto be supplementedand updated,and no old structuresto be reutilized. 4.6 For each polderblock the followingshould be provided: - a scaleplan (1/2,000)showing subdivision pattern, water levels, sectionsurface areas, boundaries of nonirrigablezones;

- standardlongitudinal and cross sectionsof dikes,canals, drains and roads;

- designsfor concretestructures (with elevation drawings for standardstructures);

- the correspondingbills of quantities;

- a brief statementof the reasonsfor selectionof the solutions proposed. Ioorovincfillint

4.7 On the basisof data from the low-floodtyearsof 1972, 1984 and 1987,studies are to be made of the possibilityof fillingthe irrigated perimetermore effectivelyby excavatinga small canal withinthe main canals. Designcalculations carried out on a PC shouldbe made for each of the followingscenrios:

- irrigationo! polderblocks Ml - M3 only (possible abandonment of the higher-lyingsection of Ml); ANNEX 3 - 62 - .4 f 7

- irrigationof DSI, DS2 and M4 only;

- irrigationof D North only;

- reductionof the size of the MD compensationbasin so as to speed the start of filling. 4.8 In each case,both the rate of fillingand the civil works quantitiesnecessary should be calculated.Since 1984 flood figuresmay prove too low to providea basis from which to achieveproper filling in the future, even with a supplementarycanal, what the consultantswill need to calculate is the fillingthat wouldhave been achievedin 1984 with a canal designedto give satisfactoryinundation with a floodof frequency0.95 or tha same as that recordedin 1972.

4.9 An experton river hydraulicsshould be retainedto adviseon tL) problemof sandingup of canals. Using existingaerial photographs and satelliteimages of the zone, he shouldpropose a solution: a small canal openingbeside the old one and havinga specialgate, modificationsto the existingstructure, groynes in the Logone,etc. in each case, the following shouldbe provided: longitudinalsection, standard cross-sections, design of concretestructures, bill of quantitiesand a brief statementgiving the reasonswhy the particularsolution is recoumnded.

V. OtherStudies Cost estimatesand worksorganization 5.1 On the basis of the billsof quantitiesaccompanying the hydraulic studiesand the findingsfor the varioushypothesis examined, works cost estimatesshould be drawn up coveringthe two followingsituations:

- all works,except major structures,to be carriedout entirelyon forceaccount by OMVSD;

- majorworks to be let to contractors,with OMVSD limitingitself to rehabilitationjobs, smalldikes, small canalsand minor structures.

5.2 In both instances, the consultants should indicate what equipment OMVSDwill need to purchase, what technical assistance it will need in carrying out works on force account, ana - if applicable - what supervision requirements will be associatedwith works contractedout. They should also provide a timetable consistent with the equipment available and the exigencies of the whole development process. Ooerations and maintenance

5.3 In every case, a memorandumshould be provided on the principles and costs of water administration on the polders, with special emphasis on management of the intake structure and main Lntake canal and the principles that should govern water regulation whenever the flood level is exceptionally low. Maintenance costs and methods of maintenance organization should be AMEE 3 - 63 - P5 of 7 evaluatedin the lightof experiencegained since 1977. At least in the case of new polderblocks, the currentbody of experienceshould be takenas the basis for an attemptto institutea type of organizationthat leavesa muzimim of responsibilityto farmersthemselves: allocation of land, water administration,supplies of inputs,etc. Processiniand marketing 5.4 OMVSD will be able to balanceits books only on the strengthof its marginson its processingand marketingoperations. This beingso, a study shouldfirst be made of the impactof additionaloutput on the rice mill (organization,inventory, operating costs). It may be necessaryto undertake studieson the constructionof a centerfor the storageof paddy bales (consideringexperience with such facilitiesin West Africa)and on the setting up of a rice-flour mill. Measures should also be proposed for improving paddy purchases from farmers and sales of rice to the ONC (National CerealsBoard), private traders, and consumers,in light of domesticdemand in Chad. Attentionshould be givenas well to ways of improvingOMVSD performance by transferring some functions to farmers: seedand input supplies, water administration, etc. An assessmentof the cost of these various measures should be given. Economic and financial study 5.5 The financial and economic study of the project should obviously take in all agents or agencies involved in it: sm_llholder farms (not forgettingthose outside the projectperimeter), the LaL rice mill, OHVSD,the budget,trade and customsrevenues of the Governmentof Chad, and the Chadian economy.

Preparation rePort

5.6 The consultants' Preparation Reportshould present the conclusions reachedas a result of the various studies referred to above and should use reasoned arguments to propose a choice among the various options identified, whether with regard to works,the developmentprocess, OMVSD organization,or processingand marketingoperations.

VI. Orcanization.Plannina and Cost of Studies OrEanzition

6.1 It is proposed that OMVSDconduct the hydrological study and topographicsurveys, and put togetherthe comprehensive updated files, assistedby the team of experts associated with UNDP/FAOChad project No. 83/020. It would be an advantageif this teas couldalso take an active part in otherstudies (particularly the hydraulicstudy of polder blocks DS1, DS2 and M4), especiallyIf their stay in Chad were prolonged(although such participationcannot be takenfor granted). The remining concernsehould be referred to P consultingengineer, but it shouldbo rememberedthat a major part of the earlierdocumentary material is probablystill held by the Carlo LettiCompany and simplyneeds to be copied(some of the documentsand files held by Chad no longerexist). -64- _ 64 - ~~~~~~P.ANNEX6 of 3 7

Planning

6.2 It to assumed that the studies left to OMVSD could be completed between now and the end of 1988 since they mainly deal with actions to be taken during the flooding and emptying of tthepolders, as well as some topographicsurveys for monitoring purposes. The studies to be commissioned from consultantsought to be completedwithin an 8-month period that includes at least one full dry season for the expert on river hydraulics.

Costs

7.3 The assessmentof study costs given below is based on the assumption that the expenses incurredby OMVSD would already be covered by its operating budget. Accordingly,only engineeringconsulting costs have been estimated. .Unit costs could be brought down substantiallyif suitably qualified personnel from Chadian institutionsand agencies were to participate.

CFAF millions (a) HYdraulicstudy

- Copying of documents and graphics 3.0

- Engineer's field mission: - I roundtrip Europe-N'Djamina-Lai 1.5 - 15-day mission with vehicle and per diem 3.5

Subtotal 5.0

- Hydraulic study of polder blocks DS2, DS3 and M4; rehabilitationof MI - M3 - I Engineer, 2 months 8.0 - I Engineer, I month 3.5 - Design,copying, bills of quantities 14-0

Subtotal i5.5

- Hydraulicstudy of block D North; detailed draft of terracingproject, with estimate of executioncosts 60.0

- Expert on river hydraulics (senior, confirmed) - Purchaseof aerialand satellite photos 1.0 - 1 roaudtrip Europe-Lai 1.5 - 7-day mission with vehicle and per diem 2.5 - Report 1.5

Subtotal 6.5

- Study on flooding improvement - Engineer, 2 months 8.0 - Design and copying 5.0

Subtotal 13.0 ANNEX 3 - 65 P 7 of 7

Total for hydraulicstudy 113.0

(b) PreparationReport

- Field mission: - Engineer, 3 weeks (with per diem) 3.5 - Socioeconomist,3 weeks (with per diem) 3.5 - Agronomist,3 weeks (with per diem) 3.5 - Marketingexpert, 3 weeks (with per diem) 3.5 - Expert in financialmanagement, I month (with per diem) 4.0 - 5 roundtrips Europe-Lai 6.0 - Vehicles 3.0 - Expert to advise on central bale facility and flour mill (including1 week trip to -othercountries in region), 3 weeks 4.0

Subtotal 31.0

- Reports - Coordinator, 1 month 4.0 - Engineer, 1 month 4.0 - Marketing expert, 1 month 4.0 - Socioeconomist, I month 4.0 - Expert in financial management, I month 4.0 - Agronomist, 1 month 4.0 - Publication of report 6.0 - Expert re central bale facility and mills, 1 month 4.0

Subtotal 34.0

Total for PreparationReport 65.0

TOTAL 178.0 - 67- Annex 4 Table1 CHAD SATEGU?-DEUSSZARRIWGATION PROJECT (Credit 489-CDI489-1-CD) EconomLc Price of Rice (constant 1988 terms) US$ ton Rice prico (WorldBank EPD) 301 Qualitydlicount 201 60 Overseastransport to Douals 90 Transportby road Douala-N*Djnas 1t80 Price c.i.f.N'Djauen 511 CIAV ton

Pricec.i.f. NMlDjana 143,080 Transportto projectarea 20,000 Price at Lai 163,080 Paddy equlvalent(601) 97,848 Processing 15,000 Losses (3S) 2,840 Transportto farm gate 6,750 fPrm gate price 73,258 - 68 - Annex 4 Table 2 CHAD

SATEGZI-DERESSIAIRRZIOTION PROJECT (Credit489-CD, 489-1-CD)

Total Investment Costs in Financial Termsby Fiscal Year (US $ mlllion) FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY$4 PY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 T

IDA 0.3 3.6 3.6 5.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.2 15.5 IDA other 11 0.2 0.4 0.1 ADF 0.5 2.8 2.5 2.6 0.5 8.9 UNCDF 2.2 0.4 0.5 3.1 UNDP 0.3 0.7 0.4 1.4

WFP 0.1 0.1

------_ _ . ------t -…-" ------n.T 0.8 6.4 6.1 7.7 0.5 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.9 3.7 2.0 1.2 29.7 21

1/ PY86 Italian Trust minsis FY87 + FY88 monies from Sahelian zone project (Cr. 739) under revisedcredit agreement of 1986. 21 An additional $1 million was disbursed In FY89 and PY90 for O0IVSD's operating costs under the Emergency Fund Category of the Agriculture Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 1775-CD). \4 0 TCHIAD PROJETOPRIGATION SAEGUI ODERESSA \s S SITUATIONDE LA ZONEOU PROJET

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