14 March 2002

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After the September 11 End of a Brief Affair? attacks, relations between the United States and looked The United States and Iran more and more hopeful. The two countries’ common goal of Daniel Brumberg eliminating Afghanistan’s Associate Professor of Government, Georgetown University Taliban seemed to be an Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace opportunity to build on progress seen since the elec- tion of . ollowing the September 11 atrocities, a and having secretary of state Madeleine However, President Bush’s Fsenior U.S. administration official Albright participate in the September 2000 inclusion of Iran in an “axis of declared that Iran and the United States “see “6+2 Group” talks at the , evil” now calls into question the situation pretty much the same way,” which brought Afghanistan’s six neighbor- the likelihood of a true rap- and thus would probably “cooperate” in the ing states, Russia, and the United States to prochement. Moreover, Iranian war against the Taliban and al Qaeda. This one table. Subsequently, George Bush’s hard-liners’ growing opposition prediction soon became reality. administration launched a full-scale review to any reconciliation with not only contributed to the rout of the of United States–Iran relations, with the Washington, ongoing develop- Taliban by supplying food and arms to the guiding hypothesis that the United States ment of nuclear technology, Northern Alliance, it also provided military might best be served by replacing its “dual meddling in post-Taliban advisers, some of whom probably passed containment” of Iraq and Iran with a policy Afghanistan, and relentless their American counterparts along the road of renewing relations with Tehran. support for Palestinian terror- to Kabul. Yet when President Bush named Iran in ists all are stumbling blocks to These unprecedented developments his State of the Union address as one of improved relations. seemed to presage a dramatic shift in a rela- three states in an “axis of evil,” it became Some security issues call for tionship that had seen modest improve- clear that the advocates of rapprochement in the threat of sticks, but the ments since was his administration had lost what little influ- United States must also seek elected president in 1997. Khatami repaired ence they briefly wielded. This development to engage Iran by offering it relations with the Arab Gulf monarchies is not a consequence of the machinations carrots—cooperation in and strengthened ties with Russia, South of an all-powerful anti-Iranian lobby in Afghanistan and an end to Asia, and Western Europe. Reform in Washington. Rather, it is first and foremost economic sanctions, in return Tehran and pragmatism abroad created the a consequence of Iran’s domestic politics. for a commitment by Iran’s tantalizing prospect that Iran might be Not only does Iran’s conservative clerical leaders to cease support for weaned away from its radical policies. U. S. establishment energetically oppose the very terrorism and back a two-state president Bill Clinton gingerly explored this idea of reconciliation with Washington, it solution to the Palestinian– possibility by loosening economic sanctions, also enthusiastically backs policies that threat- Israeli conflict. promoting society-to-society exchanges, en basic U.S. interests. Iran’s development 2 Policy Brief

of nuclear technology, its expanding ballistic policy makers have long sought to prevent missile program, and most of all its relentless their country’s “encirclement” by an alliance support of Palestinian terrorist groups all between Afghanistan and Pakistan dominated greatly reinforce the view in Washington that by Sunni Pashtuns. Moreover, the bitter Iran is a “rogue state” that must be confront- struggle to control Afghanistan sapped Iran’s ed rather than engaged. economic, social, and human resources. From That said, Bush’s hard-line assertion hard- 1994 until 1998, opium smuggling across ly constitutes a coherent policy. It is unwise Iran’s 560-mile border led to a steep increase and even counterproductive for the United in domestic drug addiction, while the influx States to bounce from talk of cooperation with of 2 million Afghan refugees imposed finan- Iran to a policy of vague threats that could cial and social burdens on an economy des- Daniel Brumberg is an include anything from a military campaign to perately in need of structural reform. associate professor of govern- an effort to topple Tehran’s clerics. Iran is not Given these concerns, Iran readily provid- ment at Georgetown University Iraq or North Korea. Although Iran is ruled ed military and logistical support to the and a visiting scholar with the by a clerical elite hostile to U.S. interests, its Northern Alliance in the hope that it would Democracy and Rule of Law elected Majles (parliament) is dominated by have sufficient clout to compel Afghanistan’s Project at the Carnegie reformists, many of whom favor rapproche- largest single community, Sunni Pashtuns, to Endowment. Mr. Brumberg, who holds a doctorate from ment with the United States. There is little share power with Shiite Hazaras, as well as the University of Chicago, has that Washington can do to openly back the Sunni Tajiks and Uzbeks (the latter two taught at Emory University and reformists, but it could inadvertently harm groups constitute 24 and 6 percent of the the University of Chicago and them by adopting a bellicose position that population, respectively). After the fall of has served as an adviser to rules out all political engagement. The chal- Mazar-i-Sharif in September 1998, the killing the American Academy of Arts lenge is to define an arena for such engage- of 10 Iranian diplomats, and the massacre of and Sciences, the U.S. Agency ment, while making clear the costs that Iran several thousand Hazara civilians, Tehran for International Development, will pay if it does not address U.S. concerns mobilized 200,000 soldiers along the border. the National Democratic about its policies on terrorism, missiles, and War did not erupt, and Tehran resumed its Institute, and Freedom House. nuclear technology. Whether Afghanistan can efforts to promote a political settlement by He is the author of many publi- still provide such an arena is a key question. joining the 6+2 Group at the September cations on political and social 2000 U.N. General Assembly meeting. change in the Middle East, Iran and the Taliban During those discussions, Iranian foreign including Reinventing There is no doubt that the war against the minister and U.S. secretary of Khomeini: The Struggle for Taliban created new space for cooperation state Albright addressed questions of human Reform in Iran (University of between the United States and Iran. Years rights, terrorism, the drug trade, and Chicago Press, 2001). before Washington imagined confronting the Afghanistan. The Endowment’s Taliban, Tehran was doing just that. Iran’s Democracy and Rule of Law policy motivations were partly religious. Iran Reformists versus Conservative Clerics Project analyzes efforts by the views itself as the guardian of all Shiite Mus- Given Iran’s interests in Afghanistan, and in United States and members of lims. The Taliban’s persecution of Hazaras (a light of the Bush administration’s ongoing the international community to Shiite minority forming 19 percent of policy review, it is not surprising that promote democracy world- Afghanistan’s population), and the massacres Khatami and other Iranian leaders quickly wide. The project also exam- of Pakistani Shiites (20 percent of the popu- condemned the September 11 atrocities. ines the state of democracy lation), sharpened Tehran’s resolve to back the Their genuine revulsion was combined with a around the world, looking at Northern Alliance, and in particular Hezb-i- keen awareness that the attacks might offer patterns of success and failure Wahdat (the Unity Party), a key member of Tehran a chance to undermine its second in transitions to democracy. the Northern Alliance. most vexing Sunni adversary without paying Yet Tehran’s motives also embrace vital a military cost. Moreover, many of Iran’s for- geostrategic and economic interests. Iran’s eign policy elites believed that a carefully cali- End of a Brief Affair? 3

brated policy of implicit support for the U.S. was part of a conspiracy to destroy the Islamic campaign might yield further dividends in Republic of Iran. Foreign Ministry officials the shape of better ties with Western Europe who were aware of this backlash and were and even the United States. determined to avoid statements that seemed Although these hopes reflected the prag- to contradict those of Khamanei walked a matic reckoning of Iranian foreign policy fine line—as did Khatami himself. While elites, they were also widely shared by the they condemned any campaign not led by the country’s young people. High school and uni- United Nations, they did little to undermine versity students—frustrated by years of reli- the U.S. military campaign. Tehran’s offer to gious dogma and repression—had helped to rescue American pilots over its territory propel the reformists to victory in the 2000 demonstrated its resolve to reap the maxi- Majles elections. One year later, they backed mum benefits at the least cost. Khatami’s reelection despite growing frustra- Domestic events, however, soon undercut tion with his cautious leadership. This disap- this delicate balancing act. Spectators at an inter- pointment may explain why, several weeks national football match in Tehran—inspired by before September 11, he began a campaign to broadcasts from a Los Angeles–based satellite regain the trust of the youth. Denouncing television station—assailed the clerics and conservative clerics as “Talibanists,” he again even proclaimed their support for the exiled It is unwise and counterproductive for the U.S. to bounce from talk of cooperation with Iran to a policy of vague threats. advanced the popular thesis that democracy prince Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah. in Iran required a “dialogue of civilizations” These anti-regime protests soon spread to abroad. Several reformists in the Majles were other Iranian cities. Khamanei, smelling a inspired by his example and, seizing what satanic rat, declared on October 30 that “not seemed like a golden opportunity, formed a just relations, but any negotiation with committee to explore possibilities for renew- America, is against the nation’s interests.” ing relations with the United States. Khatami fell in line, insisting that there Unfortunately, this bold campaign to link were no “new developments between Tehran the reformists’ domestic agenda to the ques- and the U.S.” Iranian judiciary minister tion of United States–Iran relations collided Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi then threat- with the conservative clerics’ long-standing ened to arrest any advocates of talks with the opposition to the very idea of renewing ties United States, thus quashing the reformists’ with the “Great Satan.” These clerics, led by efforts to push for reconciliation. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, held that the very survival of the Iranian Foreign Policy country’s Islamic revolution hinged on main- versus U.S. Interests taining an ideological wall between Iran and Despite a timely convergence of U.S. and the United States. Armed with this sacred Iranian interests in Afghanistan, after Septem- conviction, they concluded that the ber 11 Tehran continued to pursue policies reformists’ efforts to push for rapprochement that conflicted with U.S. security interests. 4 Policy Brief

Tehran’s $7 billion arms deal with Moscow— But given the hard-liners’ power and the cycle announced on October 4, together with Rus- of tit-for-tat violence in the West Bank and sia’s agreement to deliver a previously pur- Gaza throughout late 2001, Iranian advocates chased nuclear reactor to Iran’s Bushehr of a policy change on the Palestinian issue nuclear power plant—is a case in point. had no leverage. Instead, they adhered to the Although officials asserted that Tehran had no Foreign Ministry’s long-standing formulation: intention of developing nuclear weapons, its The Palestinians have a legitimate right to use purchase of Su-27 and Su-30 Russian jet violence against Israeli civilians still living or fighters, along with the continued develop- working in the Israeli–occupied territories. ment of its Shihab-3 medium-range ballistic This familiar Iranian distinction between missile, elicited warnings from the White legitimate and illegitimate terrorism does not House that such weapons sales “could desta- resonate in Washington. Nor is the fact that bilize regional security balances or threaten Lebanon’s Hezbollah aims most of its attacks U.S. allies and friends.” at Israeli and U.S. military targets any conso- As this statement implies, the issue of lation. Along with the bitter memories of the nuclear weapons was not Washington’s only Americans held hostage by Hezbollah during worry. Its fundamental concern was and the 1980s and the reported role played by For Khamanei and his allies, opposition to a Jewish state on any part of “Muslim land” is sacred to their worldview.

remains Tehran’s support of Palestinian ter- Iranian intelligence in the 1996 bombing of rorist groups that have tried again and again the U.S. military installation in Dahran, to undermine every Arab–Israeli peace initia- Saudi Arabia, there is the possibility that tive launched by the United States. What Hezbollah might unleash Katousha rockets explains Tehran’s adherence to a policy that against Israeli civilian towns. Reports that undercuts those in Washington who favor Hezbollah was preparing for just such at rapprochement? The answer lies in the hard- attack one week before September 11 led line clerics’ objection to the very idea of a Washington to send stiff warnings to two-state solution to the conflict between the Damascus and Tehran. But Tehran’s most sig- Palestinians and Israel. For Khamanei and his nificant policy for U.S. officials turned out to allies, opposition to a Jewish state on any part be its logistical and rhetorical support for of “Muslim land” is as sacred to their world- Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which caused com- view as is their devotion to the principle of an plications for the White House at an unusual- Islamic state. Support for terrorism is an out- ly sensitive time—just when Washington bid growth of this axiomatic position. to shore up its antiterrorism alliance by There is little evidence that this hard- becoming directly involved in efforts to line position is popular among Iran’s new renew Palestinian–Israeli talks. generation. On the contrary, most second- generation reformists, including those with From Dual Containment close ties to the Foreign Ministry, have argued to Dual Rollback? that Iran should back a two-state solution. In the aftermath of September 11, Tehran’s End of a Brief Affair? 5

hard-liners regained control over the two for- Afghanistan’s reconstruction, seemed to be eign policy issues of greatest concern to them: good omens. opposition to normalization of relations with But hopes for engagement were all but the United States, and opposition to any two- dashed by Israel’s seizure in early January of state solution to the Palestinian–Israeli con- the Karine A—a ship filled with 50 tons of flict. Now that the hard-liners are firmly in armaments that, according to credible intelli- control, they are more rather than less gence sources, had been loaded by Iranians. inclined to allow the Foreign Ministry some This event confirmed the worst fears of U.S. room for maneuvering in post-Taliban administration hawks. They had long argued Afghanistan. Iranian foreign policy is thus that Iran’s reformists have no real power—or pursuing a two-track approach. Although the worse yet, that some of their leading lights, high track virtually precludes normalizing such as President Khatami himself, are using relations with the United States, the low track the appearance of reform to legitimize a might allow for modest forms of cooperation regime sinking in economic and political in arenas such as Afghanistan. quicksand. Rather than throw it a rope, the Tehran clearly has found such cooperation hawks held that Washington should pursue a both necessary and hard to swallow. After all, policy of confrontation with Tehran. Iran’s rulers have sunk institutional roots far deeper than did the late shah. the new Afghan Interim Council was led by Yet despite these developments, it is far Hamid Karzai, a Sunni Pashtun notable who from clear what President Bush means when owes his dominant position to the patronage he asserts that Iran is part of an “axis of evil.” of the United States. Moreover, none of the Does his administration intend to bomb Iran council’s Shiite Hazara members held a major if it refuses to halt all nuclear technology pro- post. Despite these drawbacks, however, grams or assistance to Hamas? Will it confront Tehran not only backed the council, but in Iran even if such a policy encourages Tehran to late November it also signaled its readiness pursue closer relations with Iraq, or to under- to work with the new regional order by send- mine the reconstruction of Afghanistan? What ing Foreign Minister Kharrazi to Islamabad if such a policy makes it harder for reformists for talks with Pakistani president Pervez to counter the xenophobic, repressive policies Musharraf. of the conservative clerics? It is not surprising that the Bush adminis- It might be argued that the last question tration at first appeared divided on how to is the least critical. After all, if the clerical respond to Tehran’s contradictory policies. regime collapses, Washington’s Iran problem Some officials openly praised Tehran’s actions will be solved, whereas if the clerics crush the in the hope that Afghanistan might provide a reformists, Washington will have no reason to useful arena for testing Iranian intentions. engage an implacably hostile regime. But The “handshake” between U.S. secretary of such either–or thinking is faulty. To begin state Colin Powell and Foreign Minister with, the notion that the regime will collapse Kharazi during the November 2001 U.N. is unrealistic. Iran’s rulers have sunk deep General Assembly meeting, and Tehran’s institutional roots, whose durability far subsequent pledge of $560 million for exceeds anything the late shah achieved. 6 Policy Brief

But even though the regime will remain As for Afghanistan, though Tehran has an secure, the reformists are hardly irrelevant interest in promoting the country’s recon- politically. Ayatollah Khamanei cannot give struction, it will not cooperate under any and his conservative allies carte blanche to com- all circumstances. In January—following pletely negate the voice of parliament without reports alleging that Iranian intelligence was doing irreparable harm to the very legitimacy assisting al Qaeda fugitives along the of the Islamic Republic. Iran–Afghanistan border—Iranian officials So the reformists will not disappear. reiterated their support for Karzai’s Interim Instead, they will continue to walk a fine Council, a message that Khatami repeated in line by trying to exert pressure on the hard- a much publicized telephone call to the line clerics without provoking a decisive and Afghan leader. Clearly, the Iranian Foreign final backlash. Although any overt attempt Ministry wants to maintain Afghanistan by the United States to assist the reformists as the one arena where it can engage will discredit them, so too will a bellicose Washington. But doing so will be difficult in policy that confirms the clerics’ axiom the face of threats suggesting, by design or that the United States is the Great Satan seek- default, that by cooperating in Afghanistan ing to topple the Islamic Republic. By Tehran is capitulating to Washington’s dictates. By branding Iran an evil state, the Bush administration is playing directly into the hands of the hard-line clerics.

branding Iran an evil state that implicitly The Need for Political merits this fate, the Bush administration is Engagement playing directly into the hands of the hard- Vague threats may keep Iran’s leaders guess- line clerics. ing about Washington’s next move. But The questions of Afghanistan and Iraq Tehran is unlikely to yield if not offered eco- are equally tricky. From the outset of the nomic or political carrots. Moreover, it is campaign in Afghanistan, Tehran has been unclear whether the administration has the torn between its desire to see the Taliban means to compel compliance, a key point that destroyed and its fear that a U.S. victory concerns U.S. friends as much as U.S. adver- would put Washington in a dominant posi- saries. The U.S. administration knows that it tion in the region stretching from Islamabad must match rhetoric with means. Indeed, to Kabul. A bombing campaign in Iraq would some officials are already “walking back” only heighten such fears, particularly if it Bush’s evil axis remark. Still missing, however, were followed by the introduction of U.S. is a coherent policy delineating both the costs ground troops to Iran’s south. The recent visit that Iran will pay by pursuing antagonistic of Iraqi foreign minister Naji Sabri to policies and the benefits it will receive if it Tehran—during which he and Khatami called chooses a moderate course. for a full resumption of peaceful relations— The United States can offer two carrots. suggests that a policy of “dual rollback” might The first is the prospect of cooperation in provoke a marriage of convenience between Afghanistan. The only effective way Iran can these two enemies. respond to the new geostrategic situation in End of a Brief Affair? 7

its backyard is with support for Afghanistan’s As for Iran’s nuclear technology and bal- reconstruction. Although Iran could stir up listic missile program, the most effective way mischief by supporting rival warlords, to get Tehran’s attention is to go to the source Washington’s alliance with Karzai means that of the problem: Moscow. Without Russia’s Iran has much to lose by not cooperating. support, it is unlikely that Iran could develop Washington should clearly (if quietly) signal nuclear weapons or the means to deliver Tehran that it can play a useful role in a post- them. Thus Bush must press Russian presi- Taliban Afghanistan—if Iran demonstrates in dent to postpone delivery of a words and deeds that it will desist from aid- nuclear reactor pending Iran’s full coopera- ing all terrorists. tion with the international community. If The second carrot is economic. Despite that does not happen, Tehran may very well the continued opposition of the conservative have to contend with the one threat that clerics to Western investment, Iran’s leaders Washington can deliver on: the eventual want an end to the sanctions regime. Although destruction of its nuclear reactor. the Clinton administration initiated a modest A policy of political engagement is no loosening of the sanctions, its initiative failed substitute for the judicious use of threats of because the paltry economic incentives it force. Clearly, some vital security issues can- U.S. friends in Tehran are on the political firing line for promoting democracy at home and dialogue abroad. offered hardly compensated for the major not be addressed without raising this stick. political concessions sought from Iran. But many others could be more effectively Rather than act as if they were haggling addressed with political and economic incen- over the purchase of a Persian carpet, tives, particularly when the United States has Washington might offer Tehran a grand bar- friends in Tehran who have put themselves on gain: the lifting of all economic sanctions in the political firing line by struggling to pro- return for Tehran’s unambiguous official com- mote democracy at home and dialogue mitment to back peace between the abroad. Palestinians and Israel and to cease all support for Palestinian groups or individuals The Carnegie Endowment normally does not take resorting to terrorism. President Khatami’s institutional positions on public policy issues; the November 10 interview with the New York views presented here do not necessarily reflect the Times, in which he stated that Iran would not views of the Endowment, its officers, staff, or trustees. oppose any solution acceptable to the “major- ity of Palestinians,” was far from © 2002 Carnegie Endowment for International sufficient. Not only was it riddled with ambi- Peace guities; it was not endorsed by a single member of Iran’s Foreign Ministry. For better or worse, the Iranian president does not have the power to bless the kind of exchange pro- posed here. Non Profit Org. U.S. Postage PAID Washington, D.C. Permit # 2090

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