MIT Election Data & Science
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
MIT Election Data & Science Lab (MITEDSL) 1 Election Audit Summit December 7 & 8, 2018 – Boston, Massachusetts The Election Audit Summit is a collaboration between the MIT Election Data & Science Lab and the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project. The Election Audit Summit (EAS) provided a space for academics, election officials, data and social scientist, activists, and the public to discuss new strategies in the field of post-election auditing. Over the course of seven sessions, participants heard from panelists that discussed key issues and perspectives from across the scientific, policy, and legal worlds1. The EAS was organized by: R. Michael Alvarez (Caltech) Jennifer Morrell (Democracy Fund, Election Validation Project ) Ronald Rivest (MIT) Philip Stark (UC Berkeley) Charles Stewart III (MIT) Introduction: Charles Stewart, III (MIT) Dr. Stewart began the Summit by explaining that the EAS was born out of the 2016 election, and clouds that hung over that election, namely cyber-attacks and methods of vote tabulation. Dr. Stewart pointed to three examples since 2016 (Virginia, Nov. 2017; Los Angeles County, June 2018; and Broward County, Florida, Nov. 2018) which prove that the nation needs more efficient and effective means of auditing elections. Dr. Stewart laid out the three themes of the conference: 1) Risk-Limiting Audits (RLA); 2) Putting post- election audits in a broader context of election audits; and 3) Integrating election audits and quality assurance more thoroughly in to elections- How do we get to that point? Day 1, Session 1: Current Status of Post-Election Auditing and Recount Practices Presenters: R. Michael Alvarez, Caltech; Jennifer Morrell, Democracy Fund; Philip Stark, UC- Berkeley; Dylan Lynch, National Conference of State Legislatures. Dr. Alvarez began the session by giving an overview of some basics of election audits, including terminology (Recount vs. post-election ballot audit, fixed vs. risk limiting audits, ballot audits vs. procedural audits vs. comprehensive audits). He noted that audit requirements vary greatly by state but that 30 states and the District of Columbia require some sort of fixed audit. Only 3 states currently require an RLA. He noted that post-election audits are important because they can help confirm the outcome of an election as well irregularities, abnormalities, and fraud in the voting process, as well as increase voter confidence in the election. Dr. Alvarez ended by noting the importance of comprehensive audits, which can be costly, but can point out problems in other areas of election administration (ballot design, voter registration, polling place problems, etc.). Jennifer Morrell spent years working in state and local elections in Colorado. She was recently hired by the Democracy Fund to head up its new Election Validation Project (EVP). As part of the EVP She is working on a manual for election official on administering RLAs, entitled, “Risk Limiting Audits: A Practical Guide for State and Local Election Officials,” which she expects to be published in early 2019. She pointed out that there are gaps in audits, such as uniformity across election bodies, and no one 1 It is important to note that for each session, each speaker gave a presentation or talk, as opposed to a question- and-answer panel with a moderator. If there was time at the end, the presenters may have taken questions but did not always. There were no moderators for each session, instead, one of the organizers listed above introduced the upcoming presenters. Copies of Power Point presentations are linked on the EAS website, https://electionlab.mit.edu/election-audit-summit. MIT Election Data & Science Lab (MITEDSL) 2 Election Audit Summit December 7 & 8, 2018 – Boston, Massachusetts governing body to set standards. She also stated that other parts of the election process, not just voting equipment, should be audited also. Finally, she argued that audits ideally should be performed by professional auditors and quality control experts. Phillip Stark is one of the nation’s leading experts on RLAs. His presentation started by noting the importance of a durable, trustworthy, and verifiable paper trail. Dr. Stark gave an overview of RLAs and Bayesian audits, which both take a statistical approach to post-election audits. Dr. Stark recommended that everyone read his article A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits, which can be found in the “Further Reading” section of the EAS website, or here: https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/gentle12.pdf. Dylan Lynch gave a brief overview of the work that the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) does. He then gave a breakdown of what state require what, if any, type of post-election audit. Currently only three states- Colorado, Rhode Island, and Virginia, require RLAs, while 31 require a traditional, or “fixed” audit, 10 require no post-election audit, and 6 require some other form of an audit. Day 1, Session 2: New Statistical Approached to Auditing Vote Tabulation and Recounts Presenters: Ron Rivest, MIT; Walter Mebane; University of Michigan; Emily Beaulieu, University of Kentucky Ron Rivest compared the statistical approaches to RLAs, Bayesian audits, and sampling with k-cuts, showing the differences in what each is trying to prove (probability that reported winner is incorrect, vs. probability that reported winner would lose in a full recount) and the limits on being able to perform each. Walter Mebane, Jr. spoke on the topic of using statistical methods for election forensics, which differs from audits, to determine if the results of an election accurately reflect the intent of the electors. Election forensics encompass all areas of fraud, but he stresses that fraud can be hard to differentiate from other behavior or patterns that are not intentional but still abnormal or problematic. Election forensics can be used in almost any aspect of elections, and social media (namely Twitter) has given election forensics a new tool for analysis. Dr. Mebane has done extensive research on election forensics internationally, and gave many examples from Kenya, Honduras, and Russia. Emily Beaulieu spoke on international perspectives on election audits & statistics. She began by differentiating between a recount and an audit. Her definition of an audit differed from other presenters in that her definition states that allegations of fraud or malpractice are investigated. She gave an overview of some basics of performing an audit, and shared various audit experiences in Haiti, Honduras, Venezuela, and Kenya. Day 1, Session 3: What Colorado Can Teach Us about Post-Election Audits Presenters: Hillary Hall, Boulder County Elections; Neal McBurnett, Independent Consultant; Hilary Rudy; Colorado Secretary of State; Pam Anderson, Colorado County Clerks Association Hillary Hall gave brief presentation on the evolution of elections in Boulder County, CO, from the implementation of HAVA in 2006 to an all vote-by-mail system and conducting the nation’s firs RLAs. She advises on the pros and cons of conducting an RLA. Neal McBurnett is an independent consultant who worked on the ColoradoRLA project with Democracy Works. He presented on lessons learned from his experiences in Colorado, including a 10-item, very MIT Election Data & Science Lab (MITEDSL) 3 Election Audit Summit December 7 & 8, 2018 – Boston, Massachusetts detailed, protocol checklist for implementation. He states that there needs to be governing oversight of RLAs, and other challenges that remain with RLA implementation. Hilary Rudy is the Colorado Secretary of State who oversaw the implementation of RLAs in Colorado. She presented on successful ways to implement such a change in terms of training. Trust and frequent, clear communications are key, she stated. Layered training (general concepts and theories, technical steps, process changes, hands-on practice) and debriefing and improvement allow for staff to slowly understand a major change, and gives an opportunity for making changes and improvements. Pam Anderson is the Executive Director of the Colorado County Clerks Association. She gives a history of the legislation passed in Colorado since HAVA in 2006 to get Colorado to where it is today. Her office, along with the Colorado Secretary of State, produced a RLA County Playbook to help counties implement RLAs. Day 1, Session 4: Auditing Stimulation Led by Professor Philip Stark, this session involved a hands-on exercise intended to provide insights into the statistical principles that support risk-limiting post-election auditing. Summit participants were divided up into teams and performed a mini-RLA using a deck of cards. Day 1, Session 5: Looking Beyond Colorado: Changing Technology and State Policy. Presenters: Jay Bagga, Ball State University; Jerome Lovato, US Election Assistance Commission; Robert Giles, New Jersey Division of Elections; Mark Lindeman, Verified Voting. Jerome Lovato spoke on the use of technology in post-election audits. Current limitations to implementation include varying state-level certification requirements, lack of paper records in some states, and confusing exports from software. Jerome gave an overview of current voting system design, and what technology might look like in the future. Jay Bagga gave an overview of the first RLA pilot that was conducted in Indiana, which took place in May 2018, as well as brief explanation of the legislation that let to the RLA. Mark Lindeman spoke about the software that is available to help with implementing and conducting an RLA. He talked about his experience assisting as software software with the pilot-RLA in the City of Fairfax, VA that occurred in August, 2018. He stated that there are many different types of software available, many of which are open-source. His take-away message was that the statistics involved in conducting an RLA do not consume the operation, and should not scare people away. Robert Giles spoke on how New Jersey used HAVA funds to purchase 3 new voting systems in 3 different counties to test out what works best for implementing an RLA. New Jersey, which does not have paper ballots, plans to purchase new voting systems with the ability too perform RLAs.