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"Smartness" without vision: the Moroccan regime in the face of acquiescent elites and weak social mobilization Zerhouni, Saloua

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Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs o m ments C

“Smartness” Without Vision WP The Moroccan Regime in the Face of Acquiescent Elites and Weak Social Mobilization

Saloua Zerhouni S

In contrast to other North African and Middle Eastern rulers, the Moroccan monar- chy has been able to maintain and stabilize its reign in the face of popular protest. In response to demonstrations by the 20 February Movement (M20) in early 2011, King Mohammed VI announced the reform of the constitution and the establishment of a parliamentary monarchy. In addition, the regime has successfully bought off opposi- tion by appropriating the main reform demands and by bringing in figures from the former opposition Justice and Development Party (Parti de la justice et du développe- ment, PJD) to lead the government. But although the regime was able to absorb social unrest and to pull the rug from underneath the M20, protests and discontent have continued in , as major issues such as fighting corruption, establishing social justice and dealing with youth unemployment have not been addressed. Thus, although the moves of the monarchy have earned it the label of being “politically smart” and Morocco being “exceptional,” the country is far from immune to the unrest that has rocked neighboring countries. Europeans should therefore support a peaceful path of more substantial reforms to avoid regression and potentially violent escalations.

Recent developments in Morocco show “inciting terrorism” after posting on his that reforms remain more at the level of website an indirect link to a video titled discourse than reality. There are major dis- “Morocco: Kingdom of Corruption and parities and contradictions between what Despotism,” which was released by al-Qaeda the regime claims with regards to democra- in the Islamic Maghreb and posted first on tization and respect of human rights and the website of Spain’s leading daily news- the actual practices of political control and paper El Pais. The detention of Anouzla was silencing dissident voices. Two cases con- clearly meant to silence him following a firm this trend: The first one was the arrest series of articles he had written that were in September 2013 of – who critical of the monarchy, and more specifi- has since been released on bail – one of the cally the King. The second example con- most popular independent journalists and stitutes a breach of the spirit – rather than editor of the Arabic version of the online the letter – of the 2011 constitution: The newspaper Lakome. Anouzla was charged for October 2013 cabinet reshuffle witnessed a

From June to August 2013, Dr. Saloua Zerhouni was a fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” SWP Comments 11 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in framework of February 2014 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

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major increase in the number of “techno- (AMDH). Unlike protest movements in other crats” loyal to the Palace who were appoint- Arab states, M20 has maintained its call for ed to strategic portfolios such as the Minis- “reform” rather than for the “overthrow” try of Interior, national education and of the regime and has not questioned the business. monarchy as such. The movement has asked for a democratic constitution, the indepen- dence of the judiciary and the media, as Gradual reforms, well as the separation of wealth and politi- uncertain outcomes cal power to leave the politics of a rentier The idea of gradualism has been part of economy and the monopolization of re- the Moroccan political discourse for many sources behind. decades. But the reform process has been In reaction to the M20’s demands, the open-ended, broad and has not had well- monarchy adopted a series of reforms in defined objectives. Thus, there have often the political, social and economic fields – been contradictions between the proclaimed prominently announced in the King’s speech vision and the actual implementation of on March 9, 2011, in which he promised reforms. Regardless of the shortcomings of constitutional reform and professed his the reforms, they do serve a political goal, willingness to relinquish parts of his pow- namely to keep both the political elites and ers. Accordingly, the King appointed a royal the social forces busy with these reforms committee to be in charge of drafting a new rather than guaranteeing their implemen- constitution. It was adopted by referendum tation into practice. In addition, the reform in July 2011 and promoted by the official process is meant to reinforce the image of a media as providing for a democratic sys- modernizing monarchy at the international tem. It was also supported by major polit- and regional levels. At the national level, it ical parties, which have developed an helps the monarchy to portray itself as the alliance with the Palace based on common sole credible and efficient institution that interests over the years. is able to trigger and implement reform in In the new constitution, human rights the country. and political freedoms have been expanded. Amazigh, the language of the country’s Berber-speaking population, has been recog- The M20 and the monarchy’s reactions nized as an official language. The legislative In spite of Morocco’s alleged exceptional- and oversight powers of Parliament have ism with regards to the wave of protests been broadened and the competencies of in the region, in 2011 a group of online the government enhanced. The judiciary activists led the calls for nationwide pro- has been granted more independence. A tests in favor of major political changes Higher Judicial Council has been estab- and to organize the 20 February Movement. lished and its prerogatives have been ex- The first demonstrations were massive and tended to include missions of investigation. mobilized some 200,000 citizens in 53 cities Another novelty of the text is the constitu- across the country in early 2011. The move- tionalization of existing regulatory bodies ment was originally composed of a mixed that aim at implementing principles of group of opposition forces with different good governance, transparency and equali- ideological backgrounds, ranging from left ty, such as the Competition Council, cre- and radical left-wing political parties to ated in 2009, or the establishment of new Islamist movements. The most active and ones, such as the Authority in Charge of involved among them were the Islamist Parity and Fighting All Forms of Discrimi- movement al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and nation. (For more details on the constitu- Charity), the United Socialist Union and the tional reform, see SWP Comments 30/2012 Moroccan Association of Human Rights by Amin Alsaden, http://bit.ly/SWP12C30.)

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The reforms certainly brought improve- Government’s reform initiatives ments in certain areas, in particular with The PJD-led government has launched im- regards to enshrining human rights. Yet, portant reform initiatives, such as a dia- the constitutional reform did not establish logue on the reform of the judiciary system. the proclaimed parliamentary monarchy It has also introduced measures aimed at but rather maintained the “executive mon- fighting corruption and establishing pro- archy,” in which the King retains signifi- fessional conduct in the public service, and cant powers over strategic issues, such as it has made the reform of a costly system of matters related to religion and security. The subsidies one of its priorities. However, the King can still dissolve Parliament and dis- government – and more specifically the PJD miss ministers, and he chairs the Council – does not have the clout to put pressure on of Ministers when strategic issues are dis- the monarchical institution to implement cussed. He is the head of the Supreme Judi- these reforms. cial Council and the newly created National In fact, over the past two years, the PJD Security Council, and he remains the su- has supported most of the King’s moves preme arbiter among political actors. for the purpose of normalizing its presence In parallel to the constitutional reform, within the formal political sphere and other measures were adopted. Early legis- building trust with the monarchy. This in lative elections were held in November itself constrains the performance of the 2011. A few weeks later, a coalition govern- new government and its capacity to tackle ment led by the Islamist PJD, which had reform issues directly. In this regard, the received a plurality of votes, was formed. PJD’s attempts at fighting corruption are However, with a decrease in societal pres- a significant example. Corruption is wide- sures following the adoption of the new spread in the country, where wealth and constitution, the regime put the reform political power are highly concentrated and process on hold. The elections for the Upper the political system functions based on House of Parliament, which were to take what analysts have described as “endemic place in the fall of October 2012 at the corruption,” that is, different forms of latest, have not been organized as of yet. material benefits that are granted to both Whether the reason behind this delay is the the political and the military elites. In this regime’s fear of another success of the PJD system, the monarchy’s business interests at the local and regional levels, concerns are widespread in different sectors that over a potentially low voter turnout or the range from food distribution and cement official argument given that the Moroccan production to phosphate mining and the “model of regionalization” has not been services sector. The government has little completed yet, the deferral shows that there power to address the endemic corruption is not enough will on the part of the mon- in the political regime. Sending high- archy and political parties to translate some ranking officials involved in corruption to of the provisions of the new constitution prison, such as , the former into reality. The same goes for the adoption head of Real Estate and Hotel Loans (Crédit of 20 “organic laws,” that is, laws that Immobilier and Hôtelier – CIH), for exam- define the procedures to establish regulatory ple, is more of a symbolic act than a reform bodies and some of the new institutions, as measure. In addition, Alioua was released stipulated in the constitution. So far, only in March 2013 without being sentenced. four organic laws have been adopted. The The current government also has little slow pace in the adoption of organic laws substantive political authority to tackle shows that there is no urgency in establish- other structural reform issues. In July 2013, ing transparency and accountability. it was confronted with a crisis after one of the coalition parties close to the Palace, the , withdrew its ministers from

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the government. Although the reasons among the business elites, high-level offi- behind the governmental crisis remain cials in local administration, the army, the unclear, it shows that the head of govern- religious establishment and mainstream ment, Abdelilah Benkirane, is at the mercy political parties. More recently, leading of other coalition partners who can be in- civil society actors, former leftist opposi- strumentalized by the regime as part of its tionists, and intellectuals have been drawn strategy to undermine the PJD. Keeping the into these networks. They constitute a new head of government busy with such a crisis pool for cooptation by – and legitimization – instead of allowing him to focus his ener- of – the regime. gies on pushing forward the reform process – might also be part of a regime strategy to curb the PJD’s performance and its capac- The royal cabinet’s new configuration ity to respond to the high expectations of During 2011, the monarch doubled the the Moroccans. (For more details on the number of his advisors from six to twelve. PJD-led government and its relations with The royal cabinet was reinforced first the Palace, see SWP Comments 6/2014 by through the appointments of Abdellatif Mohammed Masbah, http://bit.ly/SWP14C06.) Menouni, El Mustapha Sahel and Omar Aziman. All of them have extensive experi- ence in serving the regime and are known Acquiescent political elites for their expertise, rigor, credibility and The reforms over the last two years have loyalty to the Makhzan, that is, the monar- been accompanied by changes in the com- chy and the central state apparatus. Then, position of political elites. These changes as the head of government was forming his have mostly amounted to a rotation of cabinet, the King simultaneously appointed influential figures within the core elite three new advisors. The most surprising – around the King. Thus, while the govern- and contested – appointment was that of ment and Parliament have indeed seen a Fouad Ali El-Himma, a classmate of the renewal in personnel, there are no signs King, former Minister of Interior and the of significant changes in the relationship Palace’s man for political and security between the monarchy and the political issues. elites: The renewal of the latter has not El-Himma had been criticized by differ- gone hand in hand with the elites changing ent opposition parties, be it the PJD or the their attitudes vis-à-vis the central power Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), for and political practices. Rather, recent devel- his interference with and manipulation of opments in Morocco have shown that elite the political party scene through the estab- rotation and renewal serve mainly to main- lishment of the Party for Authenticity and tain the monarchy’s dominance and con- Modernity (PAM) in August 2008. The M20 tinuity, and that there is a persistent pat- had asked for El-Himma’s resignation tern of acquiescence by the elites. and withdrawal from the political sphere Indeed, a significant number of the because he was widely perceived as a sym- political elites have been blind supporters bol of political corruption. El-Himma’s of all initiatives stemming from the monar- appointment thus was a clear signal that chical institution. This can be explained by the monarchy was not willing to let the the clientelist networks that the monarchy people decide or influence who should has created over the years, in which eco- be included in or excluded from the close nomic self-interest has become one of the circles of decision-making. elites’ shared values, thus providing the Most of the newcomers to the royal regime with a reservoir of loyalists. These cabinet, all highly educated, have been in loyal elites are to be found among so-called charge of strategic files – with the extra- technocrats close to the Palace, but also constitutional royal cabinet serving as a

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“shadow government.” Indeed, there is since the early phases of government for- no legal framework that determines the mation. When asked by the King in Novem- functions, missions and the relationship of ber 2011 to form the cabinet, Benkirane, the royal cabinet vis-à-vis other state insti- as the leader of the party that had won a tutions. Very often, the King’s advisors plurality of seats, had no choice but to put intervene directly in issues that fall under aside ideological differences and join forces the domain of the government and for with other political parties, both from secu- which they cannot be held accountable. lar-socialist and centrist-royalist orienta- The lack of clarity regarding the roles and tions. Among the thirty ministers and depu- competencies of the royal cabinet and the ty ministers, eleven portfolios went to the government poses serious problems in PJD, six to the Istiqlal Party, three to the terms of accountability. Popular Movement, two to the Constitu- This has become particularly evident in tional Union and two to the Party of Pro- what has been referred to as “Daniel Gate.” gress and Socialism. Although the majority Due to massive popular outrage, the King of ministers have a political affiliation, in August 2013 revoked his decision to there are also six “technocrats” close to the grant amnesty to Daniel Galván Viña, a Makhzan. The latter were appointed to stra- Spanish pedophile convicted by a Moroccan tegic portfolios such as religious affairs, court of raping 11 children. The Palace said national defense and the general secretariat in a communiqué that “the King was never of the government, that is, the department informed, in any way or at any time, of the in charge of drafting most of the laws. seriousness of the abject crimes of which With the October 2013 government the person concerned was convicted.” The reshuffle, after Istiqlal had left and the PJD Minister of Justice, Mustapha Ramid, National Rally of Independents joined the had, however, declared earlier that the coalition, the number of ministerial port- Palace had indeed been informed and that folios increased from 30 to 38. Major the decision of pardon was motivated by changes included an increase in the num- “national interests” and “friendly relations” ber of female ministers (from one to six) with Spain. An investigative report pub- and of “technocrats” appointed to strategi- lished by the independent news website cally important departments, such as the Lakome mentioned the involvement of the interior and national education, thus bring- King’s advisor El-Himma in drawing up ing in new faces and, at the same time, the list of the 48 Spanish prisoners who allowing the regime to maintain control were granted pardon, among them Daniel over strategic ministries. Galván. Although the constitution grants The PJD’s margin for maneuver has thus the King the right to pardon prisoners on remained very limited. The party has opted specific occasions, preparing the lists is the for a non-confrontational approach, and its responsibility of the government. This is leader has tended to be compliant vis-à-vis but one example of ill-defined competen- the monarch. Whatever the motives behind cies creating ambiguities that are not con- the PJD’s behavior – pragmatic or tactical – ducive for good governance, but rather it is likely to turn out to be a risky busi- provide the monarchy with a sphere for ness. Recent experiences have shown that manipulation, allowing it to escape ac- the participation of opposition forces in the countability. established institutional framework has contributed toward their being discredited vis-à-vis their social basis. For example, this The PJD-led government was the case with the USFP in 1997, when, The preeminence of the monarchy and the while leading the government, the socialist prevention of most of the initiatives under- party allowed for a smooth transition of taken by PJD ministers have been apparent power between the two monarchs, Hassan

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II (1961–1999) and Mohamed VI (1999–pres- would bring rather than continue to pro- ent), rather than push for a democratic test. They have also had an eye on social opening. upheavals in the region. With the instabil- The political practices, norms, symbolic ity and violence that have characterized rituals and general submissiveness of the countries such as Egypt and Syria, many elites have remained largely the same. Yet, Moroccans have been reluctant to mobilize in August 2013, a young Member of Parlia- for regime change. ment, Adil Tchikitou, from the conservative Organizational shortcomings and the Istiqlal Party, refused to take part in the lack of a unifying issue to mobilize Moroc- annual ceremony of allegiance because he cans were also factors in diminishing objected to the practice of bowing to the the influence of the M20. During the first King, which, in his words, “reflects a slave- months of the movement, internal divi- master relationship.” During the ceremony sions between secular activists as well as of allegiance, all representatives of state the growing and visible presence of mem- institutions, elected bodies and tribes bow bers of the anti-regime Islamists of al-Adl to the King and – apart from some leading wa-l-Ihsan affected its capacity to build con- human rights organizations such as the sensus and to mobilize. But when al-Adl AMDH or the M20 – the majority of the wa-l-Ihsan suspended its support to the M20 political elites do not question or criticize in December 2011, that led to a decreasing this practice. Thus, Tchikitou’s act has been number of protestors in the streets. More an exception to the rule. importantly, during the protests, actors from civil society organizations, Islamists, youth movements and professional groups Weakened mobilization expressed mainly narrow sectoral demands The reaction of the Moroccan regime to and had divergent expectations of the state. the demands of the M20 vacillated between For instance, university professors, medical the adoption of reforms, attempts at co- nurses and Imams all demanded that the optation, intimidation and repression. The state increase their salaries and/or improve regime has allowed peaceful demonstra- their working conditions, but they organ- tions to take place, but it has occasionally ized their demonstrations and sit-ins sepa- used violence to repress protests in cities rately and in parallel to those organized by such as Rabat, Casablanca, Tangiers, Agadir the M20. This prevented them from “con- and Safi. For instance, a sit-in organized on necting the dots” and unifying around par- May 15, 2011, in front of the clandestine ticular reform issues. The groups lacked the Temara detention center was violently solidarity necessary for exerting real pres- repressed. Activists such as Kamal El Omari sure for change. Thus, rather than being from the city of Safi died in May 2011 as a confronted by a unified movement pushing result of injuries inflicted by the police. for substantial change, the regime was In addition, the official media covered the faced by a heterogeneous conglomerate of activities of the M20 in a biased way, and loosely connected actors pursuing partial activists were very often represented as a demands, and therefore it was able to deal source of instability. Some of the leading with – and either pacify or repress – one at figures of the M20, such as Oussama El a time. Khlifi, have been – successfully – invited Still, although the regime has been suc- to join the regime party, PAM. All these cessful in weakening the M20, Morocco has strategies combined have contributed to witnessed continual protests over the past the weakening of the movement and of two years. Moroccans continue to organize its capacity to mobilize around its main sit-ins, demonstrations and to sign petitions demands. Also, many Moroccans have been to express their disenchantment with state willing to wait and see what the reforms policies when their political, social and eco-

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nomic rights are at stake. Morocco is con- Loosely organized social movements fronted with many of the problems that will remain an important driving force have led to revolts and instability in other for change and a major challenge to the countries of the region. The country has a regime. For instance, M20 activists have high rate of youth unemployment (30% of already started to organize differently and Morocco’s urban youth are unemployed); mobilize against different issues, such as problems stemming from corruption at sexual harassment. They have raised civic all levels; largely discredited political insti- and political awareness among the people tutions, as different surveys have demon- by producing videos and posting them on strated; and an image crisis at the level of the net. In addition, new initiatives such the political parties, which is linked, among as “Une heure de lecture,” which consists of other factors, to the lack of internal democ- inviting young people to gather in a public racy. space, read an article or parts of a book Without addressing these deficits, the and then debate them, have started to take monarchical regime might be challenged place. These new forms of engaging in the by social groups that are less peaceful public sphere are, in fact, a nuisance to than the demonstrators who are currently the regime. In November 2013, the police calling for a real constitutional monarchy. stopped young people from gathering and The mobilization of thousands of Moroc- reading in Casablanca. Despite the regime cans in August 2013 against the King’s having extensive experience in dealing amnesty for Daniel Galván shows that the with formal and informal opposition eruption of social unrest can be surprising groups – be they from the left or from the and unforeseeable – as was the case in Islamist currents – it will likely face diffi- Tunisia in 2010 in reaction to Mohamed culties in dealing with ideologically hetero- Bouazizi’s self-immolation. It also shows geneous and leaderless movements. the willingness of people to contest even the decisions made by the monarch when they feel that their dignity has been Conclusions and recommendations trampled on. The Moroccan regime has shown its reluc- Moreover, although the regime domi- tance to introduce genuine reform unless nates the political process and has been there are internal and external pressures able to domesticate most of its political that put its interests at stake. If in the 1990s elites – apart from opposition forces such the late King was keen on ensuring a peace- as al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan and some leftist politi- ful monarchical transition and portraying cal parties – it has little control over chang- an image of a democratizing Morocco, ing attitudes among the people and their recent regional dynamics and societal pres- behavior. Two factors play a role here. First- sures have put a significant strain on the ly, alternative social media have been chal- current King to introduce constitutional lenging the official views in a variety of reforms. Yet, the regime has remained ways. In this new public sphere, more and faithful to its homeopathic manner as well more Moroccans have been engaging in as its approach of keeping tight control counter-discourses to the top-down reform over the reform process, thus preventing process. Secondly, the overall trend of any structural changes or significant reduc- decreasing participation in legislative and tions in the powers of the monarch. local elections between 1993 and 2007 is an Yet, if the regime does not deliver, espe- indicator of a rising political awareness as cially in the social and economic fields, well as of changing attitudes vis-à-vis the gradualism that does not provide for sub- state. In 2011, only 45 percent of registered stantive change might create frustration voters went to the polls, whereas in 1993 and implant the seeds of social unrest, the turnout was some 63 percent. violence and radicalization. Although it is

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difficult to gauge the degree of satisfaction More importantly, in a regional context among the general public with regards to characterized by renewed authoritarian recent reforms, due to the absence of reli- rule (Egypt) and massive instability, there is able opinion polls, the persistent social a concrete danger of Morocco sliding back- mobilization around various social, eco- wards, especially in the fields of human nomic and political issues shows that the rights and the rule of law. Europe should expectations are high and that, in the cur- act so as to prevent Morocco from back- rent conjuncture, the regime is having a tracking on reforms already decided upon difficult time responding to the growing or from abandoning the reform path alto- list of demands, not least due to the scarcity gether for the sake of a misled stability. of material resources. The new constitution sets out a list of rights, The only things that will stabilize Moroc- such as the right of access to information, co in the medium and long term are con- the implementation of which will depend sistent and profound structural reforms. on laws regulating the procedures to be

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und The country could well become a regional adopted by a Parliament that is largely Politik, 2014 model for peaceful change if the regime under the control of the monarchy. Thus, All rights reserved alters its approach to change. What is certain rights run the risk of being diluted These Comments reflect needed is a break with a number of en- by such laws. The EU should keep a close solely the author’s views. trenched political practices, in particular watch on such developments. It should also SWP the absence of accountability, transparency upgrade its programs for reinforcing the Stiftung Wissenschaft und and the dual and ambiguous nature of rul- capacities of political institutions, such as Politik German Institute for ing between the head of the state (the King) the Parliament and independent political International and and the head of government. Here, new parties, and lend more support to empower Security Affairs rules and principles need to be established civil society organizations with political Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 to govern the relations between the mon- watchdog functions. 10719 Berlin archy, political elites and social forces. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 In this context, competencies should be www.swp-berlin.org directly linked with accountability. As the [email protected] 2011 constitution recognizes this principle ISSN 1861-1761 – which the King has been emphasizing in many of his speeches – it should be applied to all political actors. If the monarchy aspires to be a constitutional one, it should be subject to the law and politically ac- countable. The EU and its member states should encourage the monarchy to go exactly in that direction. Actually, such an approach would com- plement European-Moroccan relations: In 2008 the EU elevated its relations with Morocco to an “advanced status,” while the kingdom committed itself to an advanced and measurable level of political, social and economic reforms. So far, this has not trans- lated into the regime adopting structural political reforms aimed at increased ac- countability and popular participation. Yet, European pressure could have an accelerat- ing effect on Morocco’s reform process.

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