International Governance of Ecosystems: 53–98 © 2008 American Fisheries Society

Chapter 3

Fisheries Management in : a Patchwork of Traditional, Modern, and Post-modern Regimes Unfolds

Aaron J. M. Russell†, Tracy Dobson‡, and John G. M. Wilson

Introduction growth of fisher populations and the expan- sion of new, more efficient gears, Malawi is a land-locked country in south- combined with poor government regulation, ern Africa that is renowned for its warm hos- led to the declines of several key commercial pitality, scenic beauty, and aquatic biodiver- fish stocks (Figure 2). These declines cul- sity (estimated at 500–1000 endemic species minated in the 1993 collapse of the chambo of fish). However, this nation has recently (Oreochromis spp.) (from 4–7,000 also been burdened by a series of droughts, tons per annum down to about 200 tons per the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which is current- annum) in Lake Malombe (a small lake con- ly estimated to infect 940,000 Malawians, nected to Lake Malawi by the Upper Shire (UNAIDS 2006) and a poor economy, that River), prompting a significant change in combine to give it one of the lowest Human the Malawi Fisheries Department’s (FD) Development Index rankings in Southern Af- management philosophy.1 Recognizing that rica (UNDP 2005). Given these livelihood it lacked the local legitimacy and resources constraints, the aquatic biodiversity of Lakes needed to enforce its centralized manage- Malawi, Malombe, Chiuta, Chilwa, and the ment regime, the government embarked on a Shire River (see Figure 1) is all the more im- process of devolving management authority portant, as it provides primary or secondary to fishing communities. livelihoods for an estimated 350,000 people, A brief discussion of the history of fish- (FAO 2005) and contributes to the incomes eries management in Malawi will allow us to of an estimated 1,000,000 people (Malawi better understand the successes and failures 1999). Finally, fish is the cheapest source of of devolution that has animal protein available to Malawians, and produced a patchwork of unique fisheries due to population growth, the annual per management regimes in what might be called capita amount of fish available has decreased a de facto adaptive management regime. The from 12.9 kg in 1976 to just 3.6 kg in 2001 extent to which each regime succeeds must (FAO 2005). Over the course of the later 1900s, the 1 Although overall catch trends in Lake Malawi have continued to increase, the declining chambo stocks †Corresponding author: [email protected] have forced a shift in effort to small pelagic fish of ‡Corresponding author: [email protected] much lower size and commercial value.

53 54 Russell et al.

Figure 1. Map of Malawi and its Major Fishing Areas.

be recognized as being inherently connected munity mobilization cannot be ignored, and with an array of local, national, and inter- are explored as well. national actors’ and institutions’ attempts to control access to resources and power over Precolonial Fishing Institutions and time. Only once we have understood the con- Practices flicted roles played by chiefs, communities, and the government in each case study can “Traditional” fishing methods varied in we hope to improve the government’s abil- terms of their technologies, however, they ity to encourage further devolution of fisher- can be roughly grouped and discussed on ies management. The overall trajectories for the basis of the numbers of people who these groups’ influences in the management participated in their construction and op- of Malawi’s fisheries are illustrated in Figure eration, and who had rights to the catches. 3, and the sources of these changes are ex- Small-scale technologies such as, spears plored in the sections to come. Additionally, (vyomba), fishing hooks (mbeja), reed traps while NGOs and donor agencies have never (mono), gillnets (machela/chilepa), and a had any official mandate to govern Malawi’s variety of dip nets (njero/pyassa/khombe) fisheries, the incentives provided through were constructed, owned and operated by their influence on policies, funding, and com- individual fishermen (or sometimes the Fisheries Management in Malawi 55

Figure 2. Trends of Fish Catches and Fisher Participation in Malawi’s Key Traditional Fisher- ies (Bulirani et al. 1999). owner accompanied by an assistant) for and regulation of larger-scale fishing meth- use in rivers, streams, and the lakeshore ods, including beach seines (mkwawo/khoka (Livingstone and Livingstone 1865; Hoole wa pansi) used on the lakeshore; and plant- 1955; Mzumara 1967; Mandala 1990).2 Al- based poisons (mkhondo/katupi) and fishing though individual fishermen would regular- weirs (vyelo/biiu) used in rivers. As these ly give tribute (in the form of fish) to their large-scale required a co- local chiefs, the fishermen had few limits on ordinated investment of labor from a large the types of fish that they could catch, and number of community-members to succeed, had sole ownership of the fish caught with and as their use prohibited any other harvests their fishing gears (Wilson 1951; Mandala of a local fish stock, various forms of regula- 1990; Chirwa 1997).3 tions became institutionalized by the chiefs A separate group of fishing technologies (Munthali 1994). The most technologically involved communal construction, ownership and institutionally advanced traditional fish- 2 Russell—Interviews with chiefs and Traditional ing institution, and the one that continues to Authorities—2004–03-10, 2004–04-08, 2004–04-12, be practiced today, is that of the fishing weir. 2005–03-20. The use of fishing weirs has been document- 3 Note an exception in some areas, as described ed along many major Southern and Eastern by Mandala (1990), where specific species of fish belonged to the chief, such as the catfish called African river systems, including the: Zam- “mlamba” (Clarias gariepinus) and the lung fish, bezi (Scudder 1960), Lake Victoria’s Nyan- locally called “dowe” (Protopterus annectens brieni) za District (Fosbrooke 1934; Whitehead in the Lower Shire River. 56 Russell et al.

Pre-colonial Colonial 1-Party Democracy Future (-1880s) (1891-1963) (1963-93) (1993-2005)

Chiefs

Government

Community

Figure 3. Trends of stakeholder roles in fishing institutions on Lake Malawi.4

1958), and the Zambian Barotse Floodplain chiefs abilities to monopolize the best fishing (Bell-Cross 1971), and Bangweulu Swamp locations stemmed from both their status as (Brelsford 1946). In the case of Lake Ma- temporal rulers of the land and their roles as lawi, they have been documented on almost mediators with the spirit world which could all major and minor rivers that flow into the influence environmental phenomena such as lake (Figure 4). Additionally, fishing weirs fish catches, rainfall, safety from crocodile were constructed in the rivers entering the and snake bites, etc. (Wilson 1939; Charsley smaller Lake Chilwa, and across the mouth 1969; Kalinga 1974; White 1987; Mandala of the single outlet of Lake Malawi, the 1990; Busse 1995).6 Shire River. The common characteristic that moti- Social and Economic Change for the vated the evolution of such elaborate fishing Lakeshore Peoples During Early technologies was the passage of the pota- Colonialism (1890–1930s) modromous (fish that migrate from lakes to spawn in streams and rivers) mpasa (Op- Even before Great Britain officially colo- saridium microlepis), sanjika/mperere (Op- nized the Nyasaland Protectorate in 1891, saridium microcephalus) and ntchila/nin- interactions between lakeshore communi- gwe (Labeo mesops). Aside from the months ties and foreign missionaries and businesses when these fish migrate upstream, the riv- were transforming the fishing economy in ers are open to all forms of fishing by both many ways. British missionaries established men and women. However, once the weirs a number of schools and missions in the are constructed each year, the exploitation 4 of spawning runs is strictly controlled by lo- While the stakeholder roles shown are based on the authors’ analysis, the conceptual layout emerged in cal chiefs and all other fishing in the rivers a discussion with consultant, John Balarin during a is banned.5 Furthermore, there is a strict hi- CBNRM conference in Zomba, Malawi, 11–25-03. erarchy to the positioning of peoples’ fishing 5 Russell—Interview with Traditional Authority— traps along this barrier with the best slots 2004–05-31, Russell – Group interview with river (generally those near the banks) allocated to fishers—2004–04-07. 6 Russell—Interview with chief - 2004–05-03; Russell the chiefs, their advisors and relatives. The – Field notes of night fish sales—2005–03-01. Fisheries Management in Malawi 57

Mbaka & Mbasi Lufirio Kiwira Legend: Grey circles denote documented fishing Rufilya weirs

Black cross denotes fishing institution based on dip nets

Black square denotes active mpasa & sanjika fisheries but no documented use of Limphasa fishing weirs & Banga

Luluzi & Kamparara

Lunyo

Kaombe Luangwa

Lilongwe

Bwanje

Watershed map adapted from African Lakes and River Research Group, U. of Waterloo website: http://www.science.uwaterloo.ca/departments/biology/research/uwaeg/african_lakes/Malawi.html.

Figure 4. Lake Malawi’s Major Tributaries with Documented Fish Weirs.7

7 Documentation of the Tanzanian river fishing weirs: 1980; Russell – Interviews with chief and fishers Documentation of the Tanzanian river fishing weirs: - 2002–07-15a, 2002–07-15b), Kaombe (Bertram Lufirio (Busse 1995; van Hekken 1986), Mbaka 1942 #78; Berry and Petty 1992 #77), Lintippe (Busse 1995; Charsley 1969; Bertram et al. 1942), (Msosa, 1999; Bertram, 1942; Tweddle, 1980), Mbasi (Busse 1995), Kiwira (Busse 1995; Charsley (Lowe 1952), Bwanje (Namagonya, 1992; 1969). Documentation of the Malawian river fishing Tweddle, 1980), Luangwa (Bertram et al.1942) and weirs: Songwe (which is shared with Tanzania)(Busse Lunyo (Bertram et al. 1942). Fishing weirs around 1995), Rufilya (Russell – Interviews with chiefs and Lake Chilwa were documented by Mzumara (1967), fishers—2004–03-10; 2004–05-31; 2005–02-01), and sources for the fishing weirs at the mouth of N. Rukuru (Lowe 1948), Luweya (Nangoma, 1991; the Shire River were presented by McCracken Hoole 1955; Jackson et al. 1963), Limphasa (Jackson (1987). The South Rukuru River (Tweddle 1980) et al. 1963; Borley 1962), Banga (Jackson et al. 1963), was also recorded as having significant mpasa or Dwambazi (Hoole 1955; Russell – Interview with sanjika fisheries, however although there is a good chief—2005–03-20), Luluzi (Russell – Interview probability that weirs may have been used in this with fishers—2005–03-06), Kamparara (Russell river at some point, neither their construction nor any – Interviews with chiefs—2005–05-03, 2004–07-03, institutionalization of the fishery harvest has been 2005–03-02), Dwangwa (Russell – Interviews with documented. chiefs—2005–05-03, 2005–03-02), Bua (Tweddle, 58 Russell et al. “Tongaland” lakeshore (present-day Nkhata land region. The establishment of a roads net- Bay District) and Karonga District, enabling work connecting nascent areas of economic people from these areas to rapidly gain a and population growth in the plantation (Mu- dominant presence in labor, clerical, and mil- lanje, Thyolo), administrative (Zomba) and itary jobs for the colonial administration and commercial (, Limbe) centres of foreign-owned commercial sectors (Kalinga Southern Malawi created a new demand for 1974). In addition to these voluntary interac- large scale fishing operations (Perry 1969). tions between colonialists and the Malawian The arrival of large numbers of British and population, the colonial administration start- South African troops in Zomba and Blantyre ed to influence local communities in a more during WW I, which coincided with episodes profound way with the 1889 introduction of a of fish scarcity in the nearby Lake Chilwa, hut tax (White 1987). were a key factor that prompted larger scale Required to pay taxes in cash, large num- investments in fishing and fish trading in Lake bers of men were forced to migrate to the Eu- Malawi (McCracken 1987). ropean-owned plantations in Southern Nyasa- During these early decades of colonialism, land in order to raise the funds needed (White although the immigration of men due to the 1987; Ng‘ong’ola 1990). However, the poor colonial hut tax drastically changed the demo- labor conditions in Nyasaland’s plantations graphic makeup of lakeshore communities, the rapidly led growing numbers of Malawians to British administration largely left the manage- seek jobs in the better paid mining and service ment of the to itself. As quoted sectors outside Malawi, in particular: the Rho- by McCracken, the colonial sentiment toward desias (today, Zimbabwe and ), South the African fishing industry was that: Africa, the Belgian Congo (today, the Demo- “no interference, official or otherwise, cratic Republic of Congo), Mozambique, and could be of any benefit to the native, who Tanzania (Tew 1950; Coleman 1974; Mc- makes his own string, his nets and his canoes Cracken 1977; Mandala 1990; Ng‘ong’ola and his basket traps…[and who] puts out his 1990; McCracken 2002). Among Nyasaland’s nets when the Lake allows him to do so” (Mc- migrant workers, much as was the case within Cracken 1987). Nyasaland itself, the more educated North- Therefore, the only regulations that lim- ern ethnic groups (Tonga, Tumbuka, Ngoni, ited fishing effort would have been those im- and Ngonde) quickly gained access to better posed by chiefs (Hoole 1955; Chirwa 1996). paid jobs than did Nyasaland’s other migrant In fact, not only were the chiefs the only reg- workers (Tew 1950; McCracken 1977; White ulatory force in fishing, many chiefs in the 1987). These Northerners, and in particular, South manipulated social relationships in the Tonga, would later become major investors their communities, making use of free labor in fishing gears throughout Lake Malawi. to accrue great wealth with the growth of the fish markets in the South (Chirwa 1996). The First Major Integration of the Lake Malawi’s Fishing Economy into The First Colonial Fishing Policies the Colonial Economy (1910–1930) Result in Erosion of Chieftain Support (1930–1950) The first major period of change to the fishing economy of Lake Malawi occurred Although the colonial government had during and following World War I, a decade seen no need to regulate the fishing industry of extreme environmental shocks and eco- during the first decades of its administra- nomic opportunities in the southern Nyasa- tion, growing concerns over the declining Fisheries Management in Malawi 59 authority of chiefs, conflicts between Eu- the relationships between chiefs and their ropean and African fishermen (see below), constituents. Whereas many chiefs’ roles deforestation, and perceived unsustainable as intermediaries with the spirit world had and unsporting traditional fishing practices historically given them a popular mandate led the government to impose a number of to govern their areas, the growing Christian- new regulations in the 1930s (Chirwa 1996). ization and economic independence of the One factor that prompted the change was the Nyasaland population had diminished their low water levels in Lake Malawi in 1910– authority (Wilson 1939; Mandala 1990). 1920s that enabled fishermen (both African Through indirect rule, however, chiefs and European) to construct a impassable found an alternative source of authority as barrage of fishing weirs across the outlet they were officially empowered to hear lo- of Lake Malawi into the Upper Shire River. cal legal cases and maintain a treasury, were By the 1930s, competition over positioning required to establish a quota system for ca- of fishing weirs at the river mouth became noe trees harvested, and retained a portion a source of conflict between African chiefs of hut tax and canoe royalties collected in and Europeans entrepreneurs, and in this their jurisdictions (Woods 1990; Willis case, the colonial government sided with 2001). Many chiefs therefore embraced the the chiefs against the Greek and German newly-given powers and sources of wealth entrepreneurs, banning them from fishing that the colonial government’s indirect rule within 2 mi of the river mouth (McCracken policy gave them (Nyasaland 1934; Nyasa- 1987; Chirwa 1996). However, the govern- land 1949; Woods 1990; Willis 2001). ment also introduced regulations requiring Ironically, the unpopularity of the tree fishers to leave a gap in the middle of the tax and numerous other conservation regu- fishing weirs to allow some adult fish to pass lations that encroached on traditional open- through, and the rising lake levels eventu- access values meant that many village chiefs ally washed away all weirs in 1935. who supported the governments’ regulations While this latter regulation at the Shire suffered a severe erosion of their communi- River mouth may have been warranted due ties’ trust and cooperation (Nyasaland 1949; to the low water levels, the colonial govern- Banda 1977).8 Due to popular resistance, ment’s additional bans on the use of fishing therefore, most conservation regulations poisons and the requirement that gaps be left were regularly ignored or circumvented dur- in the middle of fishing weirs across other ing the 1930–1940s, and colonial game war- rivers has been criticized with some merit dens were frequently willing collaborators by Chirwa (1996) and Msosa (1999). They with the ‘poachers’ (Wilson 1951; Hoole argue that in most cases these fishing tech- 1955; Njaidi 1995; Chirwa 1996). niques were sustainable, and that these regu- lations were primarily motivated by colonial Growth of Non-African Commercial administrators’ elitist Euro-centric values Fishing Industries (1930–1960) that regarded fishing weirs and poisons as “destructive, primitive, unprofessional and With the rapid growth of markets for unsporting” (Chirwa 1996; Msosa 1999). fish in the Southern Highlands and the im- Colonial regulations of the fishery were proved transportation infrastructure allow- limited in these early years, but the govern- 8 President Banda claimed that forests were common ment’s enlistment of the chiefs as local repre- property goods in traditional Malawian society, to sentatives of government through the policy which no one could be refused access or charged for of “Indirect Rule” would irrevocably change the rights to harvest timber. 60 Russell et al. ing rapid truck transfers of fish to markets, O. squamipinnis), and increased catches of a number of European settlers embraced the the open-water O. lidole and juvenile cham- new investment opportunities in Lake Ma- bo (Lowe 1952). lawi’s fisheries (Williams 1969). The Greek In comparison with the colonial gov- Yiannakis brothers were the first and largest ernment’s supportive attitude towards An- investors in in Malawi, glo-Saxon planters, the nonAnglo-Saxon, and they leased several plots of lakeshore nonProtestant, nonEnglish-speaking Greek land where they started fishing with im- fishers were seen unfavorably, and in most ported beach seine nets in 1934. They added conflicts with African fishers, the colonial small scale ring-nets to their repertoire in government sided with the Africans (Mc- 1938 (McCracken 1987; Chirwa 1996). Ad- Cracken 1987). In addition to ethnic bias, this ditionally, they purchased four trucks which tendency was motivated by the role that the they used to transport fresh fish to Zomba fishery played in providing both cheap food and Blantyre, and from 1938 they also ex- supplies for plantation workers as well as hut ported dried fish to plantations in Southern tax revenues for Africans (McCracken 1987; Rhodesia (today, Zimbabwe) (Bertram et al. Allison, Mvula et al. 2002). However, the re- 1942). lationship between Greek and African fishers The successes of the Yiannakis broth- was not a simple one of colonialist capitalists ers stimulated a large number of other Eu- threatening small-scale African fishers’ liveli- ropeans and Asians to invest in both the hoods. In fact, as will be discussed further in fishing and fish trading businesses, though the next section, many African chiefs had en- the Yiannakis remained the only year-round tered into exclusive trading relationships with fishing operation up to 1940 (McCracken European and Asian fish traders, denying lo- 1987; Chirwa 1996). Beach cal fish traders access to fish for local sale. In for chambo was the most important fishery contrast, the nonAfrican fishers supported the for these companies; however, ring nets also small-scale local fish traders by selling a por- contributed some chambo, and gillnets were tion of the fish to traders at their depot as well used to target mostly “ntchila” (Labeo me- as selling fish from their trucks at stops along sops) (Lowe 1952).9 The sharp growth of the main road (McCracken 1987; Chirwa the nonAfrican commercial fisheries in their 1996). Regardless of the government’s disap- early years (the late 1930s), and in particu- proval, Yiannakis Bros. remained the domi- lar during World War II, was due to a steady nant commercial fishing operation in Malawi increase in fishing effort. Due to poor en- in the 1950s, during which time a significant forcement of record-keeping standards prior proportion if its fishing activities was - con to 1946, however, Lowe (1952) judged the ducted with motorized trawlers (McCracken number of fish caught in that year to be sig- 1987). nificantly lower than that in 1944, raising concerns that the fishery was being exploited Advent of Western Scientific beyond a the level of maximum sustainable Management, Encouragement of yield. This conclusion was reinforced by the African Entrepreneurs, and the First declines in the proportions of inshore cham- Enclosures of the Africans’ Fisheries bo species (Oreochromis shirana, O. saka, (1940–1960) 9 10–20% of beach seine catches were composed of other species (primarily catfish:Bagrus spp. Clarias The lack of a comprehensive research spp.), although these, along with long line catches and management program for Lake Malawi’s were generally not recorded. fisheries had largely been due to the low eco- Fisheries Management in Malawi 61 nomic importance of the fishing economy Despite Lowe’s recommendations, the in relation to exported cash crops such as colonial government only applied fishing cotton, tobacco and tea (McCracken 1987). regulations to the primarily Greek-owned During the late 1930s to 1950s, however, a commercial fishers. The African fishery regu- number of research programs documented lations were not enforced due to combination the ecological, social, and technological of factors: a desire to promote African entre- characteristics of fishing industries in Lake preneurialism, a dislike of the Greek fishing Malawi, and thereby set the scene for an era businessmen, and the political concerns re- of “scientific” fisheries management (Berry garding the impossibility of enforcing these and Petty 1992). regulations on the African fishery. This posi- An exhaustive survey of Lake Malawi’s tion was defended by the Director of the De- fish stocks and fishing industries by Bertram partment of Game, Fish, and Tsetse Control, et al. (1942) concluded that the fish stocks of Mr. H. J. H. Borley, by positing the classical Lake Malawi were under-exploited. Further- image of Africans living in equilibrium with more, they recommended that the expansion nature: of both European and African fishing indus- “Left to themselves I do not believe that tries be encouraged, though in reference to the African fishermen would over-fish for the chambo-dominated (Oreochromis spp.) they tend to decrease their effort with de- European fishing industries, they suggested creasing abundance, whereas nonnative fish- that no more than a three-fold expansion by ermen, bound by capital investments, tend to the European-owned fishing industry should increase the scale of [their] activities in or- be permitted. (Bertram et al. 1942) However, der to offset the drop in catch per unit effort” less than a decade after the Bertram et al. (Lowe 1948). (1942) report, Lowe’s research showed that Even though African fishing behav- the outer limit of expansion in the nonAfrican ior was seen as benign, the lack of control fishery had already been surpassed (Nyasa- over ‘wealthy’ African fisher entrepreneurs land 1946; Lowe 1952). Though she had no led the government to pass further regula- data for the African fishery, the limited catch tions to strengthen lakeshore chiefs’ control data from the ‘European’ fishery suggested over the fishery. These regulations required that the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) all African fishermen to purchase fishing li- for the most important chambo fish stocks in censes from the lakeshore chiefs (at prices the southeast arm of Lake Malawi had been that the chiefs established), allowed chiefs exceeded and that the current harvests were to limit access to local fisheries, and gave catching a significant proportion of juveniles chiefs the right to impose price controls over (Nyasaland 1948; Lowe 1952). Lowe, there- fish sales (McCracken 1987; Chirwa 1996; fore, called for a comprehensive fisheries Hara 2001). However, given that the chiefs management policy with the stated aim “to had vested interests in the fishing economy establish a rational fishery so that the opti- and their existing unpopularity for collec- mum yield of Tilapia may be cropped from tion of hut and canoe taxes, these regula- Lake Nyasa each year over an indefinable tions too were very unpopular among fishers period” (Lowe 1948; Lowe 1952). Her man- and traders. Consequently, fishers and trad- agement recommendations, which included ers collaborated to circumvent or ignore the restrictions for both the African and nonAf- chiefs’ rules, resulting in the further margin- rican fisheries, were primarily aimed at pro- alization of chiefs’ as local leaders (Chirwa tecting the breeding movements and habitat 1996; Allison et al. 2002). of chambo (Lowe 1948; Lowe 1952). 62 Russell et al.

Figure 5. Malawi Fisheries Department Sources of Funding, 1966–1988 (Jones et al. 1990).

Independence Brings Growing partment (FD) was run by expatriates for the Conflicts Between Government and first 20 years after independence, and contin- Fishers, Leading to Fish Stock ued to call for ‘scientific’ fisheries manage- Collapse (1963–1993) ment policies. Of particular concern to the FD were the The end of colonialism brought a new increasingly capitalized chambo fisheries in government, but due to the high level of an- Lake Malombe and Southern Lake Malawi. tagonism that the independence struggle had This concern led to the establishment of a aroused against the colonial extension servic- new Fisheries Act in 1974 which introduced es and the chiefs, the new president, Dr. H. the first comprehensive fishing regulations Kamuzu Banda, found that he had inherited a for both the “traditional” and “commercial” demoralized civil service, and a rural popula- fishing sectors (Malawi 1974). In order to tion that resisted most interference with their prevent conflict between the small scale and livelihood activities (Thomas 1975). Never- commercial fishers, commercial trawlers theless, while concern over anti-colonial sen- and ringnets were banned from key chambo timent had prevented the colonial fisheries breeding grounds and shoreline of Lake Ma- authorities from enforcing implementation lawi, and all commercial and traditional fish- of their scientific management regulations ing gears received specifications as to their against African fishers, the newly indepen- legal dimensions, mesh sizes, conditions of dent government, which claimed a mandate operation, and minimum fish lengths were es- from the people, could no longer allow its tablished. Additionally, closed seasons were regulations to be ignored. Initially funded established for ringnets and beach seines in almost entirely by the British Government’s Lakes Malawi and Malombe, and the Upper Overseas Development Adminstration (ODA) Shire River (which connects Lakes Malawi (Figure 5), the newly-created Fisheries De- and Malombe). Fisheries Management in Malawi 63 The most unpopular regulation among After the Mbaluku-debacle, the services African fishers was the closed season on of the PMF were no longer used by the FD, beach seine fishing during the time when and a brief discussion of the factors that con- adult chambo migrate to shallow waters and tributed to the FD’s failure to implement their lagoons to breed. The highly autocratic gov- policies is warranted. The escalation in fish- ernment also invested relatively little effort to erfolk resistance must be partially recognized sensitize fishers of the justifications for these as a symptom of a groundswell in the general regulation, and many fishers remained poorly population’s disillusionment with the gov- informed of the regulations’ existence overall ernment’s authoritarian and corrupt policies (Donda 2000). Over the course of the 1980s, (Ihonvbere 1997). During this period, an elite popular resistance to fisheries regulation en- clique within the ruling Malawi Congress forcement drove the government to increas- Party (MCP)10 dominated all aspects of gov- ingly repressive and violent measures which ernment, whose governance was “character- in turn caused an escalation of violence by ized by ‘top-down’ flow to policy directives fishers. This trend, which has been described and government decrees [that were] largely in detail by Hara (2001), came to a climax ‘irrelevant’ to the needs of the people” (Pos- when FD and elite ‘Police Mobile Force’ ner 1995; Ihonvbere 1997). In relation to the (PFM) officers tried to confiscate fishing nets management of the fisheries, therefore, a sig- from Mbaluku beach (in Mangochi District) nificant number of MCP members who had on January18, 1989. On this day, fishermen invested heavily the fishing and fish trading attacked the government personnel with industries were able to actively undermine the stones, oars and knives, leading to the serious fishing regulations and local chiefs’ for their wounding of two police officers and one FD own benefit (Nangoma and Nyirenda 1991; inspector, and the police were only able to Chagunda and Sibale 1992; Mwandira and extricate themselves from the confrontation Samikwa 1992; Namagonya and Zamadenga by firing warning shots from a machine gun 1992; Bell and Donda 1993; Lowore and Wil- (Hara 2001). son 2000; Hara 2001; Wilson 2006). Among In addition to the direct conflicts that oc- the most blatant power brokers in fisheries curred over fishing practices, the government were the FD and the President themselves. came into conflict with fishing communities As described by Watson (1987) and Fergu- over the alienation of lakeshore land. During son and Derman (1991, 2000) the operational the three decades of autocratic Banda gov- costs for the FD’s scientific activities ernment rule, large amounts of communally were dependent on income raised by the FD owned lakeshore land were leased or sold to in the sale of collected fish, an arrangement private parties by the government for the pro- which placed the government in direct com- motion of tourism and agricultural develop- petition with fisherfolk, the stakeholders on ment (Ferguson, Derman et al. 1993; Derman 10 The MCP was the only legal political party in and Ferguson 1995; Chirwa 1996). Further- existence during the 30 years of President H. K. more, in the case of the largest areas of alien- Banda’s dictatorship. As explained by Ihonvbere ated land, President Banda’s personal busi- (1997), until the end of the cold war, most western ness empire, Press Holding Company, was a governments refrained from criticizing the “corrupt dominant stakeholder in the planned business and highly repressive [Banda government’s] bribery, intimidation, election malpractices, and suffocation of ventures, thereby providing these businesses civil society, as Banda legitimized the South African with the full support of the government (Fer- Apartheid government as well as providing support to guson, Derman et al. 1993; Derman and Fer- the brutal RENAMO [a counter-revolutionary army guson 1995; Posner 1995; Ihonvbere 1997). reknowned for its attrocities] forces in Mozambique.” 64 Russell et al. whose behalf they were supposed to work.11 entirely untrained in the social or administra- Similarly, following the nationalization of the tive sciences (Jones et al. 1990). As of 1990, Greek-owned commercial fishing fleet, the the ODA report concluded that “hardly any- Malawi Development Corporation (MAL- thing appears to be known about socio-eco- DECO), a subsidiary of the President’s Press nomic factors—e.g., incomes earned, patterns Holding Company, became the single-larg- of ownership, alternative income sources, and est fishing interest on Lake Malawi (Watson constraints on activity” in the African fishery 1987; Ferguson and Derman 1991; Ferguson (Jones et al. 1990). The value of social data and Derman 2000). remained under-appreciated by the foreign Beyond the national political scene, how- fisheries scientist community, however, and ever, there were grave oversights on the part of as the chambo stocks in Lake Malombe and the British ODA, which had contributed much the Southern Lake Malawi showed increasing to the operational funding and guidance of the signs of over-exploitation in the late 1980s, FD. The ODA’s own assessment concluded the donor agency-funded ‘Chambo Fishery that, while Management Project’ maintained a largely “[ODA funding] has had a durable impact bio-centric, chambo-focused research agenda on the Department’s capacity to manage the (FAO 1993; Ferguson and Derman 2000). Lit- country’s fisheries resources, it has also en- tle research was done to investigate the fish- couraged the Department (along with other ing communities’ perspectives regarding the donors) to undertake expenditure which was fishery, and the government failed to recog- neither financially nor economically justifi- nize that the wealthy chambo seine fishers and able” (Jones et al. 1990). mechanized trawler fishers, who they consid- In many cases this meant that while posi- ered their primary stakeholders, were a source tions were funded, the operational costs were of local conflict and inequity (Ferguson and not, leaving many staff members both idle and Derman 2000).12 frustrated. Additionally, rather than helping In a poignant intersection between de- to transfer skills and training to Malawians, clining governmental legitimacy and over- the ODA support during the 1960–1970s had exploited fish stocks, 1993 saw the collapse primarily attempted to continue providing a of both the chambo stocks of Lake Malombe functioning FD to the newly independent na- (Figure 6) and the national single-party gov- tion, meaning that most of the senior positions ernment. In fact, during that year, the annual continued to be held by expatriates (Mzumara harvest of chambo declined from 4 to 7,000 1978; Jones et al. 1990). tons to barely 200 tons per annum. In addition, the operational challenges that were not addressed by the ODA’s bio- Democracy and Participatory centric research and technocratic manage- Management Clash with Lingering ment approaches (which reflected a common Autocratic Tendencies to Produce a world-wide approach to ) had Mixed Bag of Fisheries Co-manage- left the FD staff well-versed in ecology but ment Efforts (1993–2005)

11 Despite the concerns raised by Watson regarding The first multi-party elections were held this arrangement, the Icelandic Aid Agency (ICEIDA) in 1994, a precursor to a bewildering wave donated another research vessel to the FD in 1993 (the Ndunduma), which is the second most powerful 12 The problems related to the chambo fishery, and the on the lake, and which continues to pay donor agencies and Fisheries Departments’ lack of for operational costs from fish sales (Allison et al. appreciation for the kambuzi fishery are discussed in 2002). the Lake Malombe case study below. Fisheries Management in Malawi 65

14000

12000 Others Kambuzi 10000 ) Chambo ons

(t 8000 h h tc ca 6000 al Tot 4000

2000

0 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 Year

Figure 6. Decline of the Lake Malombe Chambo Fishery (Tweddle, Alimoso et al. 1994). of new development and governance para- inevitability of over-fished stocks unless they digms that were to sweep across the nation. adopted a radical new participatory fisheries The donor agencies pushed their agendas of management regime that was achieving sci- economic and political liberalization, and the entific acclaim (Mkanda 1991; Bell and Don- “new” political leadership seemed to embrace da 1993; Martin 1993). However, as with the these concepts and all the “paraphernalia of national leadership, while the FD adopted the democracy” associated with this change.13 language and paraphernalia of participatory With the departure of the dictator, a new con- fisheries management, its operations would ception of fisheries management became a in fact continue to be highly-hierarchical and possibility. However, while some elements political, which would undermine extension of the government apparatus and modus ope- workers’ initiatives to facilitate participatory randi changed, the autocratic tendencies em- fisheries management (Donda 2000; Hara bedded in its institutions and leaders for the 2001). Interestingly, while some within the previous 33 years would not disappear over- international development community would night. (Englund 2002) Indeed most of the promote participatory fisheries management, “new” senior leadership and opposition party these agencies’ and NGOs’ short-term project leadership had worked in senior positions un- orientation and bio-centric research perspec- der President Banda, and subsequently rein- tive would actually undermine the creation of vented their histories to sell their democratic an effective long-term national fisheries man- values to the donor community (Ihonvbere agement policy. These influences are best 1997; Mapanje 2002). understood by an analysis of the present-day Simultaneously, the withdrawal of much patchwork of participatory fisheries regimes foreign assistance to the government’s bud- in Malawi. get was forcing the leadership to accept the Following the crash of the chambo fish- ery in Lake Malombe in 1993, the FD and 13 A phrase coined by Englund (2002) which includes: donor agencies alike recognized the inabil- “multipartyism, regular Parliamentary and Presidential ity of the government to control fishing ef- elections, new constitutions, freedom of expression, a fort through the centralized fisheries man- non-governmental sector.” 66 Russell et al. agement regime (FAO 1993). However the With high relevance for a Malawi FD that management recommendations provided by lacked legitimacy in the eyes of its stakehold- the Chambo Fisheries Management Project ers or the resources to enforce its regulations, which depended on either limiting access Bell argued that, “however well intentioned, to the fishery, banning certain fishing gears plans imposed from above are liable to gen- altogether, or enforcing fishing gear mesh erate social conflicts or to contain technical sizes were regarded by senior Department of errors, [meaning that for best results] input Fisheries staff as “politically unpalatable and from all parties involved [read, ‘fishing com- practically unenforceable” (Hara 2001). As munities’] must be incorporated into land-use a result of the government’s recognition that plans.” (Bell 1987) it lacked the local legitimacy and capacity to In addition to the LIRDP program in enforce such regulations, an ad-hoc commit- Zambia, the Zimbabwean CAMPFIRE pro- tee was formed to design an alternative man- gram provided further encouragement as they agement strategy, resulting in the Artisanal were controlling poaching of wildlife by giv- Fisheries Management Plan of 1992 (Gaiger ing communities actual ownership (and the 1994). This plan introduced the idea of a monetary returns) over their wildlife resources “participatory approach to management,” and (Association 1998).14 The growing popular- was guided by consultant, Richard Bell, and ity of (and financial support for) participa- FD socio-economist, Steve Donda. tory resource management approaches among Richard Bell was one of the primary ad- development professionals (Bland 1992) had vocates for participatory natural resources led the FD to commission a study by Bell and management in Malawi. He was a biologist Donda evaluating the costs and benefits asso- who had helped to establish the unorthodox ciated with different management approaches Luangwa Integrated Resource Development for Lake Malombe: centralized management, Project (LIRDP) in Zambia which integrat- community-based management, and co-man- ed rural development with conservation in agement (Bell and Donda 1993). As the gov- and around a park that had previously been ernment lacked the resources to enforce the a conflict-ridden poaching haven (Adams first option, and as the communities lacked the and McShane 1992; Morris 1996). In his capacity to take over management of the fish- book chapter, entitled “Conservation with ery in its entirety, the FD elected to attempt a a Human Face,” Bell (1987) argued that the fisheries co-management regime in collabora- seemingly inherent conflict between conser- tion with fishing community stakeholder com- vation and rural Africans’ interests, which mittees. Additionally, in order to establish a legitimized the militarization of natural re- legal basis for participatory fisheries manage- sources management enforcement, could ment, the 1974 Fisheries Act was amended to actually be managed if the rural peoples’ become the Fisheries Conservation and Man- interests were addressed directly. Whereas agement Act of 1997 based on a consultancy the scientific community and foreign con- by Tracy Dobson (Dobson 1996). servationists hailed the genetic and esthetic 14 “Under Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management values of unique fish and wildlife species, the Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), local communities’ livelihoods depended to a [first established in 1989] people living in communal certain degree on these resources, but these lands are given legal rights and technical support to needs were generally not addressed by natu- sustainably manage their natural resources. Once they ral resource management agencies whose have a management plan approved, communities are able to harvest wildlife and use its profits for rural goals were based on protectionist mission development, while also contributing to environmental statements defined by conservation science. conservation.” Fisheries Management in Malawi 67 Lake Malombe Participatory Fisheries and donors were preoccupied with recovery Management Program (PFMP) of the chambo stocks, fishing communities preferred allowing emergence of a more equi- With the collaboration of the GTZ15, table kambuzi fishery, (Bell and Donda 1993; and the assistance of the UNDP/FAO, World Quan 1993; Mdaihli and Donda 1992).16 Bank, and ODA, the Malawi-German Fish- eries and Project (MAGFAD) Unrepresentative/undemocratic BVCs.— commenced with a pilot co-management Some of BVC elections were democratic, program around Lake Malombe and the Up- however, in many cases the monetary benefits per Shire River, where, it was hoped com- of membership led the chiefs and Extension munity collaboration would bring about a re- workers to select BVC members. covery of the depleted chambo stocks (Bland 1992; Wilson 1993; Dobson 1998; Scholz Conflicts between chiefs and BVCs17.— et al. 1998; Ferguson and Derman 2000). If In some cases, the BVCs were dominated by this pilot program proved successful, the FD chiefs, and in other cases, the BVCs repre- intended to expand co-management to the sented a threat to the authority and incomes South East Arm of Lake Malawi, and then on of the chiefs, and were therefore resented and to the rest of Lake Malawi (Bell and Donda undermined by chiefs. 1993; Dawson 1997; Hara 2001). What should be noted is that this pro- Poor sense of Stewardship/Ownership.— gram started before any successful fisheries BVCs regarded their roles as replacing that co-management regimes had been document- of the government after the ineffectiveness ed in Africa, and therefore, the FD and its of the FD had resulted in the collapse of the donor agency collaborators were attempting chambo stocks. Therefore, most participa- to design a management regime with only a tion in BVCs was motivated by the financial rough theoretical framework to go by. At its benefits.18 The high level of involvement of core was the establishment of fishery stake- (European) donor agency personnel may also holder groups, called Beach Village Commit- have diminished the sense of local ownership tees (BVCs), in each community around the over the resource. lake, which would be empowered to regulate their local fishery. A number of studies have 16 As chambo declined, the “kambuzi” (a poorly assessed the successes and failures of the co- defined group of species, dominated byLethrinops management regime around Lake Malombe spp.) fishery grew to take its place. Mdaihli and Donda (1992) showed that while earnings in the kambuzi and the BVCs that were established (Dawson fishery were smaller (sold in 1993 at MK 0.60/kg) 1997; De Gabriel 1998; Donda 2000; Hara et than those for chambo (sold in 1993 at MK 2.40/kg), al. 2002), and unless otherwise indicated, we the division of profits between gear owners and crew will be making use of these primary sources were more egalitarian and this was also a cheaper to summarize some of the key issues that have fishing gear to invest in. 17 As the traditional arbiters in village conflicts, chiefs proved most vexing to the Lake Malombe co- were able to fine community members and keep the management program: money or goods (paid in the form of cash or goods) collected for personal use. As the BVCs were now Disjunctions between government and assigned the roles of fining offenders, the chiefs lost stakeholders’ goals.—While the government out financially and in prestige. 18 In particular, payment for any activity that they carried out on the BVC behalf, participation in 15 GTZ-Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit training workshops where they would be paid daily (German Foreign Technical Assistance Agency) allowances, and access to loans (see below). 68 Russell et al. Poor Effectiveness as Conduits of Exten- kambuzi) during the 1994–2001 period (Ban- sion Messages.—It was generally found that the da et al. 2002). Consequently, unless the fish- BVCs did little to share the extension informa- ers genuinely want to support the recovery of tion that they received with their communities. the chambo fishery (as outlined in Banda et al. 2002), the government might have to ac- Lack of Trust in the FD.—The fishers cept this state of affairs and focus its exten- had accepted the new fishing gear restric- sion and enforcement efforts on optimizing tions on the assumption that they would re- the communities’ management and harvest of ceive replacement fishing gears or loans, but the kambuzi fish stocks. when the donor agencies determined that they would be unwilling to sponsor either the Mbenji Island Traditional Fisheries gear replacement or loans, trust between the Management (Scholz et al. 1998; Scholz and FD and fishers was lost (Pohlvogt and Walter Chimatiro 2004; Wilson, personal 1995; Scholz et al. 1998). communication)

Poor FD commitment to participatory In contrast with the traditional river fish- management.—Although the FD and donor eries that date at least to the early 1900s, agencies spoke in the language of participa- the fishery of Mbenji Island is a somewhat tion, the fishing communities generally felt unique case as it only became a chieftain- that the FD rarely responded to their concerns. regulated fishery in the 1950s. Mbenji Island Worse yet, some BVCs were actively under- lies off-shore of Nema Village in Salima mined by FD staff when they attempted to en- District, and plays host to a thriving utaka force regulations (Dobson and Lynch 2003). fishery (Copadichromys spp.). Presumably This lack of democratic values in the field staff due to growth in the numbers of imported was modeled on the hierarchical bureaucracy beach seines during the 1950s, chief Msosa in which they worked, and the FD’s short-term established a fisheries regime to ensure the program goal orientation that defined the field sustainability of the fishery and to benefit staffs’ interactions with the BVCs. personally from this growth. He set a closed season during the rainy months, and banned Since its inception in 1994, the Lake the use of harmful fishing methods (such Malombe PFMP has struggled to achieve as beach seines lined with mosquito nets local legitimacy and ownership, and has not or light attraction for night-time chilimira20 resulted in a recovery of the chambo stocks fishing). Additionally the growing popula- (Donda 2000; Hara et al. 2002). The BVCs tion on a rocky island with few pit latrines formed a Fisheries Association; however, was vulnerable to cholera outbreaks during most of the donor agency expertise and fund- the rainy season, and so both in order to en- ing for loans and micro-loans programs end- 20 ed in the late 1990s19, bringing almost all of The chilimira is an open water seine, pulled by two vessels (usually one plank boat and one dugout canoe), these livelihood diversification activities to with an additional canoe used by the signal man who an end (Hara et al. 1999). Nevertheless, de- locates the fish shoals and when done at night uses spite the lack of strong governance structures lights to attract fish into the net. This fishing technique in this lake, Lake Malombe’s fisheries have is thought to have been introduced to the northern remained relatively stable, ranging between Likoma and Chizimulo islands by Arab traders in the 1870s, was brought to today’s Nkhata Bay District 3000 and 4000 tons caught per year (mostly around the turn of the century, and Tonga fishers 19 The last major support, GTZ funding for the introduced these to the rest of the lake in the 1950– MAGFAD and NARMAP programs ended in 2002. 1970s (Jackson et al. 1963; McCracken 1987). Fisheries Management in Malawi 69 force the closed season and to protect peo- management ethic that did not depend on the ples’ health no one was allowed to live on traditional roles of the chiefs.22 the island during this period. Social harmony Lake Chiuta is located in a remote part was enforced by banning alcohol, marijuana, of Southern Malawi, and until the late 1980s gambling and women [sic] on the island. Fi- the only institution regulating fishing in nally, by ejecting fishers during part of the this lake was based on a traditional belief year, the chief could charge a fee from them that spirits inhabiting an island in the lake, every time they returned. Phiri la Mtsatsi, would abduct any Traditional beliefs maintain that con- found fishing around the island, in effect, travention of the regulations will anger the creating a fish sanctuary (Donda 2000). The ancestral spirits who determine the bounty conditions that had protected this fishery of fish around the island, and at the opening from being commercialized changed in the ceremony for the fishery, Chief Msosa makes late 1980s, when a road was constructed to a sacrifice to these spirits in order to provide the lake, linking this fishery to more distant for good fish harvests. The opening day markets (Wilson 2004). The first new en- of fishing season is one of great spectacle, trants to the fishery, beach seine fishers from with the sacrificial ceremony, dancing, and Lake Chilwa, were tolerated by local fish- speeches. Enforcement of the regulations is ers, however, a large influx of nkhacha seine carried out by Chief Msosa and his council of fishers later on caused the 1990–91 col- elders and fishermen. This fishery and regime lapse of the chambo23 fishery (upon which has endured through several chieftaincy suc- the local communities depended) (Dawson cessions, and the FD has made much propa- 1997). The nkhacha presented a number of ganda use of it to encourage other traditional problems to the local gillnet chambo fishers: leaders to take a greater stewardship role whereas gillnets had caught chambo selec- over their local fisheries. However the future tively, the nkhacha is a fine-meshed open- success of this program has been called into water seine that catches immature fish of all question due to the corrupting influence of species, and its dragging action on the lake the increased financial incentives that NGOs bottom caused the destruction of chambo and the FD are providing in order to share breeding grounds and the macrophytes that the credit for this unique program.21 were the basis for the lake’s productivity, and made the lake water too turbid for do- Lake Chiuta Fisheries Association: Fishery mestic uses. Additionally, nkhacha fishers Stakeholders adopt CBNRM sold their catches at cheaper prices than lo- cal fishermen, and undercut local incomes Whereas, Lake Malombe was a govern- (Dawson 1997; Donda 2000). ment/donor agency-driven co-management program, the Lake Chiuta Fisheries Associa- 22 Indeed as this case study illustrates, chiefs have tion was entirely initiated by the fishing com- frequently chosen to accept bribes rather than act for the greater welfare of their communities. Therefore, munities themselves, and represents a sce- despite the success of the Mbenji Island fishing nario in which the communities have a high regime, whole-sale reliance on chiefs to establish sense of ownership and stewardship over the sustainable and equitable fishing institutions will resource. Lake Chiuta was also the first proof unlikely produce the desired effect. 23 that Malawian societal norms could be com- Note, in Lake Chiuta, the “chambo” fishery differs from that in Lakes Malawi and Malombe, and patible with a community-based resources refers specifically toO. shiranus (known locally as makumba) and Tilapia rendalii (known locally as 21 Interview conducted on 2002–06-10. chilunguni). 70 Russell et al. These threats to local livelihoods, living served in a passive advisory role to the BVCs standards, food sources and ecology came to (Donda 2000). Significantly, the seven -vil a head with the collapse of the chambo fish- lage chiefs who had shown a lack of ethics ery, and local fishers called a fishers’ meeting and leadership in accepting bribes from the demanding that the nkhacha fishers increase nkhacha fishers were omitted from the- re the mesh sizes of their nets or face eviction. gime altogether, while the two who had sup- However, when they asked their local chiefs ported the local fishers (and who were fisher- to evict the nkhacha fishers in September men themselves) were included as nonvoting 1992, they found their concerns ignored as members (Njaya et al. 1999; Donda 2000). the nkhacha fishers had established a fund Donda (2000) also found that, in contrast with which they bribed the local chiefs and with the Lake Malombe BVC members, the MCP party leaders (Wilson 2004).24 When Lake Chiuta BVC members were primarily asked to intervene on their behalf, the local motivated to join the BVCs in order to pro- FD representative could not as he lacked any tect their fisheries and for the social distinc- legal basis for evicting the outsiders, how- tion that this role provides them within the ever, through meetings with the FD staff and community.26 exposure to the FD extension radio program, By 1998, Lake Chiuta’s chambo stocks “Usodzi Wa Lero,”25 local fishers learned of had recovered to their former levels, and the the newly established Lake Malombe PFMP Fisheries Association has continued to re- program. The fishers then decided to establish fine its regulations (Wilson 2004). Addition- BVCs around their own lake, and called for a ally, these BVCs were effective collaborators general meeting on May 17th 1995 with all in the FD’s annual fisheries frame survey the local chiefs, FD officers, members of Par- (Njaya 2002). As the lake lies partly within liament and Police chiefs. At this meeting it Mozambique, an ongoing challenge to the was agreed that the nkhacha and beach seines fisheries regime comes from nkhacha fishers, would be banned from the lake and mini- many of whom are Malaawians based on the mum mesh sizes were established for gillnets Mozambican shore (Njaya et al. 1999; Donda (Dawson 1997; Donda 2000). 200–300 of the 2000; Mozambique 2005).27 Following the nkhacha fishers refused to accept these regu- failure of informal discussions between the lations, and the BVCs forced these fishers to stakeholders on either side of the border to leave by burning down the nkhacha owners’ establish a unified position on nkhacha fish- straw houses on May 19–20, 1995 (Dawson ing, in 2005 the Lake Chiuta Fisheries As- 1997; Donda 2000; Wilson 2004). sociation confiscated a number of nkhacha In 1996, the FD integrated the Chiuta seines from fishermen who had crossed over fishers into the government’s PFMP scheme. from the Mozambican shore.28 Additionally, However, BVCs remained the only active en- tensions between chiefs and fishers flared up forcers of fishing regulations while the FD again in 2005, when chiefs were physically accosted by the BVCs for accepting further 24 Wilson (2004) noted that the fishers also reported this situation to the responsible District Commissioner, bribes from Lake Chilwa beach seine own- Traditional Authority, and District Fisheries Officer, but no action was taken. 26 As a matter of policy, no sitting allowances have 25 Usodzi Wa Lero translates to “Modern Fishing,” and ever been given to the BVCs or Association at Lake was a weekly 15-minute radio program targeted at Chiuta (John Wilson, personal communication). disseminating fisheries-related information to fishing 27 Note, however, that these may not necessarily be communities. This was initiated by the MAGFAD Mozambicans. Wilson (2004) noted that after being project and sponsored by the GTZ (Mueller and chased away, several Malawian nkhacha fishers settled Saukani 2002). on the Mozambican shore. Fisheries Management in Malawi 71 ers who attempted, again, to gain access to around Lake Chilwa decided to implement a this fishery.29 The unresolved rifts between co-management regime to limit the exploita- TAs/chiefs and the BVCs, and the BVCs’ tion of fish stocks in these refugia (Scholz lack of legal standing were pinpointed as the 1998; Njaya 2001; Wilson 2004). primary sources of potential instability in the That year, a number of “River Village Lake Chiuta fishery co-management regime Committees” were established along all (Hara et al. 2002). Though the BVCs have major in-flowing rivers to regulate fish- taken all necessary legal steps (granted un- ing in riverbed pools, in particular to stop der the “Fishing Rules” passed by Parliament the use of small-meshed nets and plant- and signed by the Minister on February18th, derived poisons (Scholz et al. 1998; Wil- 2000) to establish a legal local fisheries re- son 2004). Following the re-flooding of gime, at this writing they still await the en- the lake, the River Village Committees dorsement of the FD director. program was expanded to the entire Lake Chilwa and the closely associated Mpoto Lake Chilwa and Mpoto Lagoon Fisheries Lagoon shorelines, leading to the creation Association of over 50 BVCs, established to regulate an array of other fishing practices (Njaya Lake Chilwa is a large shallow lake 2001; Nyirenda 2001; Scholz and Chimat- (roughly 2,300 km2 and 2–3 m deep) in iro 2004; Wilson 2004). Despite these ac- Southern Malawi whose Eastern shoreline tions, the Lake Chilwa and Mpoto Lagoon forms part of the national border with Mo- BVCs and Fisheries Association have suf- zambique. Given its size, it is also one of the fered from some of the same sources of il- most productive fisheries in Africa, produc- legitimacy as the co-management regime ing up to 25,000 tons of fish in a good year on Lake Malombe. In this case, the BVCs (Nyasulu et al. 2001; Wilson 2004). Due to were largely made up of chiefs and their its shallowness, however, this lake has dried appointees, most of who were not actual out almost completely seven times during fisherfolk, did not live near the lakeshore, the last century (Lancaster 1979; Scholz et and had little direct knowledge of the fish- al. 1998).30 During these periods of drought, ery (Wilson 2004; Wilson 2006). Exclud- fish stocks have found refuge in isolated ing most primary stakeholders, the BVC pools in the rivers that flow into the lake, regulations were established by the FD and making them particularly vulnerable to cap- chiefs during the course of three meetings ture by fishers. (Wilson 2004) Because of sponsored by the GTZ-MAGFAD program concerns over the sustainability of fish stocks (Wilson 2004; Wilson 2006). The primary during the most recent recession of the lake, sources of conflict have been the regula- in 1995, the FD and Traditional Authorities tions that sought to establish controls over the large numbers of fishers who operate 28 2006–08-16–personal communication–John Wilson; from floating reed islands outside the juris- Again, not all poaching is conducted by Mozambique- based fishers. Radio Mozambique (2005) aired a diction of local chiefs, the 6-month closed report in which illegal fishing and felling of trees by season on beach seine fishing, and the use Malawians was cited as a particular concern along of poisons in riverbed pools as this is a the Mozambican shores of Lakes Chiuta, Chilwa and traditional fishing method used by women Amaramba. (Scholz et al. 1998; Wilson 2006). 29 2006–08-16–personal communication–John Wilson. 30 Significant recessions or complete droughts were Following the decline of MAGFAD and recorded in 1900, 1913–1916, 1920–1922, 1934, 1954, DANIDA31 support for FD extension programs 1960–1961, 1966–1968, 1973 and 1995. in the late 1990s, the FD gained the support 72 Russell et al. of the USAID-funded COMPASS program. Chia Lagoon Fisheries Association: Chieftains COMPASS I’s approach involved providing failed but fishers are taking charge boats and engines to BVCs. However, a new iteration of the organization, COMPASS II, Chia Lagoon (in Southern Nkhotakota found that those activities stimulated conflict District) is separated from Lake Malawi by and chose instead to support the Lake Chilwa a strip of land 1–2 km wide, and is connect- and Mpoto Lagoon Fisheries Association ed to the lake by a single river outlet. This by sponsoring a series of workshops aimed picturesque lagoon and its bountiful fishery at giving the existing regulations official were first described by David Livingstone, governmental sanction (COMPASS 2002; and is one of the most productive fisheries COMPASS 2003; COMPASS 2004). Despite in the district (Livingstone and Livingstone government and NGO-attempts to give this 1865). Although Hara (2001) has document- Fisheries Association a legal identity, how- ed the existence of some informal regulations ever, its lack of popular mandate and trans- that limited fishing in the lagoon, these do parency, as well as its exclusion of women not seem to have prevented the over exploita- remained problematic. Furthermore, Chilima tion of local fish stocks. In 1996, long-term et al. (2001) noted that membership in the va- declines in chambo stocks led local chiefs to riety of development committees in this area approach the FD for help in establishing new is dominated by a select group of community regulations to protect the fish stocks.32 Upon members who tend to be motivated by indi- the FD’s suggestion, all 23 chiefs and 2 Tra- vidual economic interests. ditional Authorities (TAs) from Chia Lagoon As the fisherfolk see the financial bene- visited Mbenji Island to learn from Chief fits (in terms of fines levied and invitations to Msosa’s fishing regime.33 Having decided to attend workshops) accrue to BVC and Fish- establish a similar closed season in the lagoon eries Association members (Wilson 2006), oriented around the chambo fishery, in 1997 the motivations of the chiefs and FD for the the chiefs established BVCs in all communi- establishment of such an extensive system of ties, to “act as the eyes of chiefs.” Following BVCs may be seen with some skepticism. Ad- a public meeting with all stakeholders, appar- ditionally, the value of the establishment of ently everyone accepted the establishment of such an extensive and socially disruptive for- a closed season in the lagoon between De- mal management regime must be questioned cember1–March 31. The first few years of altogether due to biologists’ long-standing closed season enforcement brought about a recognition of this lake’s fish stock’s ability recovery of the chambo stocks, but subse- to rebound from natural refugia in swamps, quently, community support for the closed pools, and upstream tributaries (Furse et al. season declined.34 1979; Allison and Mvula 2002; July-Larsen In 1999, the FD attempted to revitalize et al. 2003; Wilson 2004). While conclusions the regime by bringing all the BVCs together regarding these BVCs’ effectiveness in man- under a single “Beach Management Group.” agement must be suspended, the BVCs are Seymour (2005) attributes the lack of BVC reported to have been effective collaborators success to the self-seeking behavior of the in generating the results for the FD’s annual chiefs: “fines accrued to the [chiefs] rather fisheries frame survey (Njaya 2002). than the BVC, rule-breaking committed or condoned by some [chiefs] themselves” 32 Russell—Interview with chief—2002–07-15. 31 DANIDA—the Danish Government’s foreign aid 33 Russell—Interview with chief—2002–07-15. agency. 34 Russell—Interview with chief—2002–07-15. Fisheries Management in Malawi 73 (Seymour 2005). Additionally, high levels the primary fishery at Chembe Village (the of community dependence on the FD to en- largest and oldest of the communities in the force fishing regulations in the lagoon, and park) was originally a beach seine fishery for the FD lack of resources to do so have been utaka, this gradually shifted to usipa with the cited as problems by both the communities arrival of northern chilimira fishers who in- and FD (Hara 2001; Seymour 2005).35 These troduced industrially-made fishing nets. The conditions have enabled a growing nkhacha unique tourism potential of the area was first fishery to displace the kambuzi seine fishery exploited in 1948 with the construction of the in this lagoon, resulting in similar declines to Cape Maclear Hotel in 1945, and in 1983 a the chambo fishery as when nkhacha fishers total of 1,308 overnight visitors stayed in the arrived at Lakes Chiuta and Malombe (Sey- government-run hotel (Grenfell 1993). mour 2005). In 1980, this area was established as the In 2005, the renewed state of ecological first freshwater, underwater park in the world, crisis prompted another round of discussion and was recognized as a World Heritage Site mediated by the FD and NGOs,36 resulting by UNESCO in 1984 (Derman and Ferguson in the chiefs’ and fishery stakeholders’ cre- 1995).37 The primary reason for its establish- ation of the Chia Fisheries Association. This ment was to provide protection within a 100- Association intends to play a larger role in m distance of the shoreline and its 13 islands overseeing BVC activities, and plans to ban where a unique diversity of colorful cichlid a number of fishing gears, including nkhacha fish species live among a patchwork of rocky nets, however these regulations will be diffi- and sandy lakeshore habitats. This 87 km2 cult to enforce as there are several communi- area is quite small in comparison with the ties that are entirely dependent on these fish- lake (6400 km2), yet it contains fully half of ing gears (Seymour 2005). The effectiveness the 500–1000 endemic fish species estimated of the new Chia Lagoon Fisheries Associa- to live in Lake Malawi (Cubberly 1991). Ad- tion remains to be seen. ditionally, in order to protect these habitats from the dangers of land-based erosion and The “Village Trusts” of Lake Malawi National pollution, the entire watershed adjacent to the Park shoreline was incorporated into a contiguous park. The four preexisting fishing communi- In addition to the FD’s efforts, the Depart- ties38: Chimpamba/Msaka, Mvunguti, Zam- ment of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) bo, and Chembe (which contains at least half has embarked on a participatory fisheries of the human population in the park), were management regime in Lake Malawi Nation- given permission to remain as enclave vil- al Park, located at the tip of the Nankhumba lages within the park, but their fishing liveli- Peninsula (which separates the South East from the South West arm of Lake Malawi). 37 A number of the components of the National Park This peninsula was the site of the first (failed) had previously been gazetted as Forest Reserves. These were consolidated into a National Park in 1980 Livingstonia Mission that was established under the National Parks Act. in 1875, and which led to rapid population 38 Although a fifth community, Chidzale, was not growth in the area (Grenfell 1993). Although included as an official enclave village in the original creation of the National Park, no enforcement 35 Russell—Interview with chief—2002–07-15, measures were ever taken to remove this community, Russell—Interview with FD staff- 2002–07-15. and later management plans include this village as an 36 Wildlife and Environmental Society of Malawi— official enclave village. This is the smallest village, Dwangwa Branch; Chia Lagoon Watershed and was settled by Northerners in the 1970s (Grenfell Management Project (CLWMP) 1993). 74 Russell et al. hoods were severely curtailed by the park’s Despite calls during the 1990s from creation (Grenfell 1993).39 within the DNPW for a more participatory While conservation was the stated goal management approach, this agency’s ap- of the park creation, towards the end of its proach remained one of “fences and fines,” regime, the Banda government saw the pos- reflecting the dictatorship’s own approach to sibilities of untold riches if this park could governance (Mkanda 1991). This top-down be developed for high-class tourism. The policy in Lake Malawi NP was supported by Malawi Development Corporation, largely the WWF whose approach to achieving con- owned by President Banda’s Press Corpo- servation goals was sensitization of fishers ration, collaborated with a South African rather than empowerment of them (Cubberly hotel chain to develop a 152-room luxury 1991). The 1993 Lake Malawi National Park hotel complex in the Chembe valley (Fer- Management plan claimed that fishers were guson et al. 1993; Grenfell 1993; Derman supportive of the nonfishing zones, how- and Ferguson 1995).40 Emboldened by the ever, the same document also recorded 45 interests that the World Wide Fund for Na- poaching-related arrests during the previous ture (WWF) and the World Bank Global year and called for greater investment in the Environmental Facility (GEF) had in con- study of poaching patterns (Grenfell 1993). serving this ecosystem, the DNPW devel- In the end, the DNPW’s inability to control oped a rival plan for small-scale tourism poaching of the fish and woodland resources development in the park (Cubberly 1991; led the government to adopt a new participa- Derman and Ferguson 1995). Additionally, tory form of fisheries management for Lake the DNPW, FD and Department of Water Malawi NP in 2000 (Abbot and Mace 1999; raised a number of concerns regarding the Bell and Donda 2000). ecological threats that such a hotel would Faced with the example and lessons pose to the delicate fish habitats, although it learned from the Fisheries Department’s BVC should be noted that no protests were made program in Lake Malombe, Richard Bell and on behalf of the human communities that Steve Donda produced a strategic manage- would have had to relocate to make room ment plan for Lake Malawi NP that would for the golf course (Derman and Ferguson enable the enclave communities to gain eco- 1995). In the end, the DNPW was able to nomic benefits from the tourism associated use the WWF publicity for the park’s bio- with the conservation of the local resources diversity to delay the construction of the (Bell and Donda 2000). Rather than follow- large hotel until 1993, when Banda’s gov- ing the co-management strategy attempted ernment collapsed (Cubberly 1991; Der- in Lake Malombe, however, Bell and Donda man and Ferguson 1995). patterned their management plan for Lake Malawi National Park on the Zimbabwean CAMPFIRE and Zambian ADMADE com- 39 Although a fifth community, Chidzale, was not munity-based natural resource management included as an official enclave village in the original creation of the National Park, no enforcement regimes. The management strategy was de- measures were ever taken to remove this community, scribed as follows: and later management plans include this village as an “The primary economic opportunity is official enclave village. This is the smallest village, nonconsumptive tourism, while consumptive and was settled by Northerners in the 1970s (Grenfell 1993). use of mbuna fish and forest products should 40 Beach seines were forbidden entirely, and the use of be reduced to sustainable and esthetically chilimira and gillnets was not permitted in the coastal compatible levels and ultimately eliminated. zone, i.e., some of the most productive areas. This can be achieved through the develop- Fisheries Management in Malawi 75 ment, in partnership with adjacent commu- the park, and has received the lion share of nities, of low volume/high cost/high quality external income generating assistance from tourism, with a focus on adventure style ac- NGOs and donor agencies. Additionally, this tivities rather than accommodation. Conces- trust has entered into a revenue-sharing ar- sions for tourist facilities and activities within rangement with an up-scale adventure kaya- the National Park will be leased to the trusts king operator, giving this operator exclusive of adjacent villages.” (Bell and Donda 2000) rights of access to two islands and the sur- In its first years, this program had little rounding waters.44 In doing so, and empow- success. Lacking a policy regarding the roles ered to claim ownership over these islands of chiefs, the first Village Trust at Chembe by the Trustees Incorporation Act of 1968, village was quickly dominated by the chief Chembe Village Trust has effectively denied (GVH Chembe) who appointed his relatives as other communities’ fishers access to the fish- Trust members in a blatant attempt to gain all ing grounds. In combination with the skewed benefits from the program.41 Unsurprisingly, distribution of benefits among Village Trusts due to the lack of community representation, in favor of Chembe village, the exclusion the Trust’s attempts to limit deforestation of of the Msaka fishers from Chembe Trust’s the hillsides met with widespread community islands, in particular, has been a source of resistance. In addition to resenting the chief’s conflicts and resentment between communi- control over any benefits that arose from the ties.45 Village Trust program, the wider communi- Aside from those activities that serve ty feared that the whole scheme might be a their interests, Chembe Village Trust has not veiled attempt (with the collaboration of the been judged to be particularly active in either chief) at further alienation of the lakeshore addressing the deforestation of the watershed for tourism purposes from which the commu- or enforcing restrictions on its own fishing nity received little benefit.42 Due to the ris- activities (COMPASS 2002).46 Nevertheless, ing animosity, TA Nankhumba called for new the DNPW is reported to have established Village Trust elections and gave chief Chem- three Village Trusts to date, and three fur- be the position of ex-officio patron. In addi- ther trusts are reported by the government tion to the problems at Chembe, other chiefs to be in various stages of creation (Nyanyale refused to protect the National Park forest as 2005). Furthermore, this report claims that they feared that all access to the nontimber collaboration with the village trusts has re- products would be denied to them. The TA sulted in dramatic declines in illegal fishing also intervened in these cases, explaining the and harvesting of woodland resources within nature and value of the Village Trust program the park, although it also acknowledges that to them, and threatened to have the village population growth in the park will increase chiefs removed from their positions if they pressure on resources. Combating poaching did not accept his rulings.43 will therefore require more, rather than less, In recent years, the “Village Trusts” have received mixed reviews. Chembe Village is 44 see Kayak Africa homepage (www.kayakafrica.net) the largest enclave village situated in the most 45 Interviews conducted on 2002–06-09; Msaka accessible, developed and scenic portion of community fishers were at a disadvantage in the conflict because many of them were Tonga fishers 41 Personal communication, John Wilson 2002–2005. who were not regarded as true residents of Msaka. 42 Russell—Interview with Traditional Authority— Additionally, Chief Chimpamba of Msaka Village was 2002–06-17. subordinate to Chief Chembe, who is a Group Village 43 Russell—Interview with Traditional Authority— Headman over Chief Chimpamba. 2002–06-17. 46 Personal communication, John Wilson 2002–2005. 76 Russell et al. funding of enforcement efforts, despite the saridium microcephalus) fishery in which a collaboration of the village trusts (Rantala significant portion of the river is protected 2004). from harvest and watershed erosion, and also provides a potentially lucrative tourist sport The government’s enclosure of the Bua River fishery (Tweddle 1980; Tweddle 1985; Bank Fishery creates ongoing conflicts 1991; Quan 1993; Tweddle 1993; Tweddle 2000; Tweddle 2001). The main dilemma for While the DNPW has experimented with the government has been to ensure that suffi- a co-management regime in the Lake Malawi cient fish are able to pass the gauntlet of fish- NP, the Bua River fishery associated with the ing weirs near the mouth of the Bua River to Nkhotakota Wildlife Reserve remains a site successfully spawn in the Wildlife Reserve. of conflict. This Wildlife Reserve was gazett- However, the local communities that previ- ed as a Forest Reserve in 1933 as it was home ously fished the Bua River sustainably are to some of the largest elephant and ungulate now forced to fish in the narrow portion of populations in the central region (Hayes 1972; the Bua between the Wildlife Reserve and the Morris 1996). Oral sources indicate that the lakeshore. Here they construct an impassable Bua River, which passes through the Wildlife barrage of fishing weirs near the river mouth, Reserve, had previously been subdivided be- and the few fish that are able to pass upstream tween different chiefs who each constructed into the reserve are targeted by poachers us- fishing weirs along the course of the river.47 ing fish poisons.49 While local chiefs deplore A local chief explains how the creation of the the situation, they blame the strong local re- Wildlife Reserve led to the decline of sustain- sistance to national fishing weir regulations able fishing practices along the river: (requiring that a gap be left in the middle of “Since then, people started to fish there the weir) on the enclosure of the portion of at night using katupi (poison). This activity the Nkhotakota Wildlife Reserve, and claim also destroyed the fish eggs, and led to de- that they could manage fishing activities sus- creases on the numbers of fish in the lake. tainably if the government gave them access Sometimes, so much poison was used, that to this area.50 it killed fish all the way down to the lake. Although the option of sharing access They do this despite knowing the effect on to the park’s fisheries with communities was fish populations because they no longer have discussed within the government in the mid- their own portions of the river in which they 1990s, the critical status of the fish stocks can fish without katupi. In the past, the com- due to siltation of spawning grounds, and munities used to divide the river into sepa- the use of fishing weirs and poisons51, prob- rate fishing areas and take care of the fish ably led the government to err on the side stocks, harvesting them selectively. After they were moved out of the reserve, there 49 Russell—Interview with FD staff—2002–07-15, was no more conservation of the fish stocks Russell—Interview with chief—2002–07-15. 50 1995–05-16—Mpasa Research and Monintoring as all the people were forced to fish a small- Programme Report, 13th to 14th May, 1995 from er stretch of the river.”48 Fisheries Research Advisor (D.Tweddle) to Directors This fishery has been regarded as - par of FD and DNPW; Russell—Interview with chief— ticularly important by the FD, DNPW, and 2002–07-15. 51 These conditions are vividly portrayed by Tweddle’s donor agencies as it is the only major mpasa annual reports: 1994–07-13—Mpasa Research and (Opsaridium microlepis) and, sanjika (Op- Monintoring Programme, 5th to 8th May, 1994; 1995–05-16—Mpasa Research and Monintoring 48 Russell—Interview with chief—2002–07-15. Programme, 13th to 14th May, 1995. Fisheries Management in Malawi 77 of caution. Consequently, the government their enforcement of these regulations, a continued their regular fishing weir destruc- number of small-scale livelihood diversifi- tion campaigns,52 supported financially and cation programs have been started in these logistically by the owner of a nearby tourist communities. Differing from lakeshore lodge53, the Illovo sugar cane company54 and BVCs and the Lake Malawi NP Village the Dwangwa Branch of the Wildlife and En- Trusts, however, the NRM committees at the vironmental Society of Malawi (WESM)55 Bua River Mouth have not gained access to (Tweddle 2000). Although these actions the river fisheries and other natural resourc- were accompanied by “sensitization” activi- es within the game reserve, or any direct ties, the irreconcilable differences between economic benefits from tourism in exchange community and government positions, and for their participation. Consequently, these the polarizing nature of the fishing weir NRM committees have little leverage over busting actions resulted in severe animosity their communities, and fishing weirs are still and retaliatory actions by local communi- being constructed every year.59 ties.56 In one such retaliation in 1993, fish- ers are thought to have dumped some form PFMP in Southern Lake Malawi Meets of chemicals into the river that resulted in with Distrust, and the North is Left to the deaths of all forms of animal life along Itself (1998–2005) many kilometers of river (Tweddle 2001).57 During the late 1990s and early 2000s, During the early 1990s, while the gov- JICA (the Japanese Aid Agency), DAN- ernment embarked on the Lake Malombe IDA, and WWF funded a number of proj- co-management pilot program, it continued ects aimed at addressing the conservation its centralized management and extension threats to the Bua fishery and its watershed. approach in the management and research of WESM-Dwangwa Branch was involved in Lake Malawi’s fisheries. Similarly, until the the implementation of a number of these late 1990s an appreciation for the need for programs, and the most tangible result has greater research on the social, economic and been the creation of three “Natural Resource political factors that undermined fisheries Management” (NRM) Committees near the management in Lake Malombe was entirely Bua River mouth, and the establishment of ignored in favor of further studies of ecol- local conservation regulations in 1999 that ogy, fishing effort, and aquatic nutrient flows included restrictions on the use of fishing (Quan 1993; Bland and Donda 1994; Hara weirs, gillnets, and poisons.58 In return for 2001). Concerns over the threatened chambo 52 1996–02-16—FD-DNPW Weir dismantling trip stocks and the steadily growing fishing effort memo, 2002–01-02-—D-WESM memo. in the South East Arm of Lake Malawi finally 53 Russell—Interview with NGO staff—2002–05-08. led the government and GTZ to expand the 54 2002–01-02—FD-Illovo memo; Russell—Interview co-management program to this fishery in with FD staff—2002–07-15. 55 1998 through the GTZ-sponsored NARMAP 1995–07-22—WESM Mpasa survey memo; 1997– 60 08-19—WESM-FD memo “Nets and Weirs placed program (Scholz et al. 1998; Hummel 2000). across the mouth of Bua River”; 2002–01-02-FD- WESM memo. 59 Russell—Field notes of river fishery—2002–07-15; 56 Russell—Interview with FD staff—2002–07- Russell—Interview with NGO staff—2004–05-08, 15, Russell—Interview with chief—2002–07-15, Russell—Interview with gillnet fisher—2005–03-17. Russell—Field notes of river fishery—2002–07-15. 60 NARMAP—National Aquatic Resource 57 1994–07-13—Mpasa Research and Monintoring Management Programme, the GTZ-sponsored Programme, 5th to 8th May, 1994. program modeled on the MAGFAD program in Lake 58 Russell—Interview with FD staff—2002–07-15. Malombe. 78 Russell et al. However, the NARMAP program in Lake of resources that is biased towards those field Malawi faced many of the same challenges as staff who claim larger numbers of functioning the Lake Malombe PFMP regarding both, the BVCs.63 Additionally, there is widespread fab- roles and relationships with BVCs, as well as rication of data by field staff who receive poor the roles of the FD extension workers. supervision, who regularly receive their sala- As had been the case around Lake ries late, and who, having learned their pro- Malombe, many BVC members were over- fessions in a culture of autocracy, were poorly whelmingly motivated by the desire to earn trained in how to facilitate the establishment sitting allowances in workshops and to gain of participatory fisheries management (IDA access to government loans. Therefore, when 1995; Hummel 2000).64 As a result, participa- the FD stopped holding workshops and loans tory fisheries management in southern Lake were not forthcoming, interest in participa- Malawi has in most cases been unsuccessful. tion declined sharply (Hummel 2000). Ad- The poor legitimacy of the FD in South- ditionally, FD–fisher collaboration has been ern Lake Malawi was punctuated in 2000 by a hampered by the FD’s close relationship with conflict in which the government was forced the commercial and semicommercial fishing to call in riot police, a move reminiscent of industries, who the small scale fishers see the repressive Banda regime. In this event, as competitors for the fish stocks (Ferguson fishers resisted the FD attempts to enforce and Derman 2000; Haraldsdóttir 2002).61 the November–December closed season on Consequently, when local fishers see the in-shore fishing gears (i.e., beach seines and MALDECO trawlers fishing in prohibited gillnets), citing MALDECO and the FD’s times or areas, or when they claim damage own continued fishing activities during the to their fishing nets from the trawlers, their closed season. In theory, these trawlers are complaints are not taken seriously by either only allowed to function in the deeper waters MALDECO or the FD (Banda et al. 1999; where they would not harvest the chambo Haraldsdóttir 2002). that come close to shore to breed during the A FD study regarding fishers’ percep- closed season. In practice, however, these tions of government collusion with law break- trawlers are known to fish close to shore at ers warrants a closer look at the conditions times, and their official catches cannot be influencing FD field staffs’ job performance taken at face value as they are known to off- (Banda et al. 1999). Extension personnel re- load fish to traders while out in the lake to ports regarding the functionality of BVCs in avoid being held accountable for catches of their areas have been judged to be highly unre- immature chambo, and some collusion with liable by both governmental and independent FD enforcement personnel has been substan- surveys62 (Banda et al. 1999), a result that has tiated by Haraldsdottir (2002).65 Therefore, been partly attributed to the perverse incen- while the late Director of Fisheries, explained tives created by the government’s distribution the conflict as due to fishers’ poor understand- ing of trawlers’ impacts, their resistance may 61 This fishing fleet had been established by the Greek Yiannakis brothers in the 1930s and was nationalized well have been valid (Chimwaza 2000). within the Malawi Development Corporation Throughout the NARMAP program, the (MALDECO) by President Banda in 1967. Central and Northern lakeshore districts re- MALDECO was then sold to President Banda’s Press Corporation in the early 1990’s, and has continued to 63 Russell—Interview with FD staff—2002–06-04. enjoy a close relationship with the DoF. 64 Russell—Field notes of Nankumba community 62 Russell—Fieldnotes of FD archive—2002–06, fishers—2002–06-10 and 2002–06-11. Russell—Field notes of Nankumba community 65 Russell—Field notes of Nankumba community fishers—2002–06-10 and 2002–06-11. fishers—2002–06-10 and 2002–06-11. Fisheries Management in Malawi 79 ceived little financial and staff support to tional leaders continue to regulate the con- implement PFMP in their regions. Ironically, struction of fishing weirs during the rainy however, the case studies of Dwangwa Fish season. In 1946 Lowe (1952) recorded a to- Sanctuary, Kambindingu Fisheries Associa- tal of eight fishing weirs constructed along tion and Kaporo BVC (discussed next) par- the lower 13 mi of river. However, since allel the case of Lake Chiuta in illustrating the 1970s, severe erosion of the watershed how a lack of financial incentives for BVC has caused the river’s tributaries to become creation may actually help some Central and silted up, turning them into seasonal rivers Northern Lakeshore communities achieve that are prone to flash floods. This situation what the Southern communities could not. has gradually diminished fishers’ incentives to invest their labor in the construction of New Cases of Successful the fishing weirs, and the last time that one Participatory Fisheries was constructed in the upper reaches of the Management on Lake Malawi river was in 2002. Fishers have continued to build the 2 fishing weirs nearest to the river The case studies discussed above illus- mouth until 2005, where our data collection trated the limits to our knowledge of the po- ends. tential for fisheries co-management to play a While up-river fishing weirs were significant role in managing Lake Malawi’s owned by individual local chiefs, the river fish stocks prior to 2000. Unfortunately, most mouth fishing weirs fall under the jurisdic- of these case studies were around small, 66 Regarding confidentiality and the sources for well-delineated water bodies or fisheries, the following case studies: A) North Rukuru River and therefore their applicability to the much Fishery—This research is based on 1 group interview, larger Lake Malawi continued to be judged 2 direct observation sessions, and 14 interviews, all by Western and Malawian scientists with of whose informants are confidential. However, TA skepticism. Having visited a large number of Karonga is a public figure and his ownership of this institution is an officially recognized fact, therefore, communities along the Malawian lakeshore his identity has not been altered. B) Chief Yiwemi in 2002, we selected a number of evolving lo- BVC—This research is based on 6 group interviews, cal fisheries management case studies along 4 direct observation sessions, 25 interviews, and the lakeshore for our research. One of the au- 33 household surveys, all of whose informants are thors lived in these communities for almost confidential. In order to protect these identities the names of this community and its chief have two years (during 2003–2005), and used a been altered. C) Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary—This combination of qualitative and quantitative research is based on 2 group interviews, more than research methods to document and analyze 24 interviews, and 73 household surveys, all of their institutional development and success. whose informants are confidential. In order to protect We present brief summaries of these case identities the names of the communities have been altered. However, there is only one sugar cane estate studies here, but a extensive description and along the lakeshore, therefore its identity and the analysis of these case studies can be found in respective Traditional Authority have not been altered. Russell (2007).66 D) Kambindingu Fisheries Association—Based on roughly 100 interviews, and 300 household surveys, North Rukuru River Fishery: Traditional all of whose informants are confidential. In order to protect identities the names of communities and chiefs institutions decline due to environmental have been altered. However, as above, there is only change large lagoon near the only sugar case estate along the lakeshore, therefore the name of the location, the The North Rukuru River is one of Ma- company, and local Traditional Authority have not lawi’s few remaining rivers in which tradi- been altered. 80 Russell et al. tion of TA Karonga, and 16 chiefs who can Chief Yiwemi’s enlightened leadership leads claim direct descent from two royal family to fish conservation, community harmony lines have the right to participate in this fish- and livelihood diversification ery. In order to minimize conflicts between these communities, TA Karonga maintains In the 1980s, the increasing local invest- a rotating roster that determines each com- ment in beach seines at this beach in the far munity’s turn to participate. On the basis North of Malawi led to alarming fish stock of this roster, three out of 16 eligible vil- declines through their disruption of fish lage chiefs are selected each year to join breeding areas and the capture of juvenile TA Karonga’s village in the construction of fish. These declines were accompanied by one of the two fishing weirs. Furthermore, rising conflicts associated with theft of fish- in order to ensure that sufficient fish pass ing gears and fish, and the competition be- upriver to be caught in the up-stream weir, tween fish traders vying to buy fish. To -ad construction of the lower weir is delayed dress these issues, Chief Yiwemi established by three weeks after the upper fishing weir a “fishery committee” in 1993 which was in- is constructed. structed to create rules regulating fisherfolk The construction of these fishing weirs behavior in the water and on the beach. As is associated with a ritual blessing by TA the FD had embarked on the experimental co- Karonga or one of his senior councilors, management program at Lake Malombe that and in recognition of his traditional role as same year, the local FD representative sup- the provider of fertility, the first large catch ported the Yiwemi fishery committee’s initia- of fish is brought to the chief in homage. tive, resulting in their incorporation into the Furthermore, following the construction of national BVC program. Following the first the fishing weir, no other fishing is permit- few years of operation, this BVC had gained ted in the river or within a ¼-mile zone in control over problems of theft, beach seine the lake or along the shoreline. This form fishing during the closed season, and conflict of fishing and its institution have remained between fish traders. The BVC members then unrestricted by any government regula- lost interest and the BVC briefly became dor- tions, except for the colonial regulation re- mant. quiring that chiefs leave a gap in the middle The BVC held new elections in 1996, of fishing weirs, a rule that continues to be and its main goal was to improve hygiene and ignored. Despite their institutional inde- cleanliness on the beach. However, this BVC pendence, these institutions are declining also lost interest quickly after a short-lived due to declining catches of mpasa and san- World Food Programme-sponsored “Food- jika, and fewer younger community mem- for-Work” program paid the BVC members bers want to participate in this practice.67 to remove invasive water hyacinth plants Indeed, most younger fishers prefer to fish in return for bags of maize. BVC members the river with drifting gillnets, and as hap- blame the introduction of this economic in- pened in the Lufilya River since the end of centive for the lack of BVC commitment its weir fishing institution in the 1970s, the after the Work-for-Food program ended 6 N. Rukuru River fishery will likely transi- months later. tion into a drifting gillnet fishery free from A third period of activity occurred after chieftain regulation. 2001, as growing numbers of visiting fishers 67 In the fishing weir observed, a number of fishing and the growth in ownership of chilimira fish- slots were empty due to a lack of interest in ing gears raised new community concerns. As communities to take part. described by the BVC members: Fisheries Management in Malawi 81 • Visiting fishers benefit from local fish “The government gave us, the chiefs, stocks at the local community’s expense; power, and people are very obedient.. [How- their fishing gears are not always legal in ever] having a committee is important be- dimensions; and they flood the local market cause sometimes chiefs are corrupt. No chief with cheap fish, thereby decreasing local in- sits on this committee, but as chiefs we do comes, and increasing conflicts between fish need to be kept informed of that which is traders. happening in the BVC.”68 This community’s successes are subse- • During the closed season or on windy quently being used as a model by the local days, chilimira fishers secretly fish in the riv- FD extension worker as he tries to motivate ers, areas considered important as shelter for other communities to take a more active role juveniles and breeding. in managing local fisheries.

New elections were held, and the third Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary: Fishers’ and land BVC directly tackled fishing regulation by owners move from conflict to create a establishing fees for visiting fishers, required registration of all fishing gears with the gov- ernment, setting minimum fish prices, and In the 1970s the Banda government in- enforcing bans on fishing in the rivers. By vited the Lonrho company to establish a sug- 2004, it appeared that the community had ar cane estate in the remote Northern part of achieved its aims, and held a new election, Nkhotakota District, relocating all local resi- allowing key leaders to retire from their roles. dents. The shoreline in front of this estate is a At the same time, a number of leaders from highly productive fish breeding area, howev- the (male) fisher and (female) fish trader er, and since the 1970s fishers have continued groups, supported by the chief, established to ply these waters, fishing from temporary a cooperative aimed at decreasing livelihood camps on the beach. These settlements soon dependence on fishing. With the ongoing became a source of conflict with the sugar guidance of the local FD extension worker, cane company due to fishers’ theft of sugar they attracted the support of a development cane, the hazards created by their encroach- NGO, the Evangelical Lutheran Develop- ment of the sugar cane fields, and fights with ment Program (ELDP), which has provided company workers who went to the beach to loans of seeds and livestock. Yiwemi Co-op drink. In actions supported by the national has been very successful in earning income government, Lonrho regularly chased away from their new activities, the first of which the fishers, and in 1987, both company em- have been allocated to the single mother co- ployees and fishers recall an occasion when op members, and ELDP is now exploring the the company’s security forces made them creation of a village banking scheme. pack up their belongings and burned all of The success of these BVCs and co-op are their grass/reed homes. considered by community members and exten- Soon after the government’s move to sion workers as being in large part due to the democracy, the sugar cane estate was sold quiet leadership provided by their chief who is to the South African Illovo company. Addi- always seen setting an example with his strong tionally, a number of senior staff established work ethic. Chief Yiwemi’s view of his role re- the Dwangwa Branch of the Wildlife and flects the sensitive balance needed to prevent Environmental Society of Malawi (WESM- chiefs’ tendencies to monopolize community development gains for themselves: 68 Russell—Interview with chief—2004–03-09. 82 Russell et al. Dwangwa), which increasingly started to another location in 2006 as extreme erosion mediate between Illovo and the fisher settle- of their shoreline pushed their shelters right ments. This tense relationship between the up against the sugar cane fields.70 estate and fishers was eventually resolved as both the utilitarian fishers and conservationist Kambindingu Fisheries Association: Fish members of WESM-Dwangwa became con- stock collapse forces fishers and leaders to cerned over local fish stock declines in the regulate fishing activities and leads to late 1990s. In a series of community meet- institutional innovation ings mediated by WESM-Dwangwa, FD and TA Kanyenda, all stakeholders reassessed the To the north of the Dwangwa Fish Sanc- fishery-Illovo relationship that had contrib- tuary (DFS), the Kambindingu Lagoon is a uted to the of local fish stocks. key fish breeding area that supports a large This process resulted in a proposed com- chambo fishery. However, growth in fishing promise between Illovo and the fishers, which effort, in particular of beach seines during the would address all parties’ concerns. The cen- 1980–1990s, resulted in a fishery collapse in tral 12 km stretch of Illovo’s shoreline was 2000. The shock of this collapse was under- declared a sanctuary on May 19th, 2000, in scored by a growth in snail populations which which no settlement or fishing was permitted. filled the fishers’ beach seines, and given TA However, fishers were allowed to establish Kanyenda’s recent experience in the creation nonpermanent settlements (named Mpoto of the DFS, he proposed the creation of a and Mwera) at either end of this zone, and similar fish sanctuary for the lagoon. With fishing leaders established BVCs that were the support of WESM-Dwangwa and the FD, trained by WESM-Dwangwa and the FD to a series of community discussions were held, enforce the closure of the sanctuary.69 The and given the high community dependence on FD also successfully supported the BVCs in the lagoon fishery, fishers only supported the applying to the USAID-funded COMPASS establishment of a half-year closed season, program for funding to purchase a motorized but they did agree to completely ban the use sanctuary patrol boat. of small meshed gillnets and beach seines. For the first year following its creation, BVCs were created by WESM-Dwangwa the DFS functioned well. However, soon ri- and the FD in order to enforce these rules, valries between the two communities over and were incorporated into a “Kambindingu use of the patrol boat severely diminished the Fisheries Association” (KFA).71 Additionally, Mpoto community’s commitment to the sanc- in order to support enforcement of the closed tuary. Nevertheless the Mwera community season, the DFS was incorporated into KFA, BVC continued to enforce the sanctuary rules quite effectively, as can be seen in the great 70 This move was strongly contended and delayed by wealth that has grown in both communities Mpoto community’s leaders for over a year as the due to the recovery of the chambo stocks alternate beach did not provide the ready access to the Illovo estate’s schools, markets, health clinics enjoyed that are caught (mostly) on the margins of from Mpoto beach. However, the government’s the DFS. The leader of Mwera BVC would Ministry of Lands supported Illovo’s claim to the land, also become a champion in the creation of and Mpoto residents relocated either to the alternate the Kambindingu Fisheries Association, to be beach suggested or to Mwera community. 71 discussed below. It must be mentioned that Though the Kambindingu fishery does not border on, or effect Illovo in any way, Illovo’s financial and Mpoto community was forced to relocate to logistical support of WESM-Dwangwa has been 69 Funding and logistical support for the training crucial for WESM-Dwangwa’s training of these sessions were provided by Illovo. BVCs. Fisheries Management in Malawi 83 and Mwera BVC agreed to help conduct pa- that he can pay the fine in the form of fish or trols of the Kambindingu Lagoon with its money! Even now, you can find some -peo motorized DFS patrol boat. ple eating chambo as relish in their homes, Following the first year, however, a num- while lying that they are protecting the fish ber of divisions emerged between communi- stocks.”73 ties, chiefs and BVCs, that severely under- During 2003–2004, WESM-Dwangwa mined the newly created KFA. Foremost, the and the FD hosted a series of workshops to gradual recovery of the lagoon fish stocks establish a common constitution for the KFA meant that a number of BVCs that were most and its constituent BVCs, but the underlying dependent on the lagoon fishery stopped conflicts were not addressed. These sources supporting the closed season. Consequently, of friction were first aired during interviews senior Chief Mkati of the lagoon-dependent with community leaders and were gradually communities resented the fact that senior addressed as the KFA took greater leadership Chief Kunja, whose communities had ready over, and increasingly took over the cost of access to the Lake Malawi’s open water fish- running its meetings from WESM-Dwangwa eries, was appointed chairperson of the KFA in late 2004 and 2005. Most significantly, the by their superior, TA Kanyenda. Addition- KFA held a meeting in March 2005 to which ally, some chiefs became resentful of the all chiefs and BVC chairs were invited, and BVCs as many fishers, government and NGO at which the KFA adapted and added regula- extension workers, and scientists targeted tions to make them more enforceable and in their visits at BVCs rather than paying hom- which the conflicts between chiefs and BVCs age (both through the respect shown and gifts were discussed and resolved. Although this brought) to the village chiefs. A final source institution is relatively young, it provides a of jealousy among chiefs and BVCs alike has model for better fisheries management at var- been the visible personal prestige that the ious scales incorporating both tradition and Mwera BVC chairperson’s visible leadership new community leadership roles. role within the KFA, and “ownership” of the DFS patrol boat have afforded him. For this Assessing Malawi’s Current variety of reasons several village chiefs, both Patchwork of Fisheries Management senior chiefs, and several BVCs have actively Regimes undermined and circumvented each others’ initiatives, as shown in the following quotes From the preceding discussion, we see from fishing community members: that Malawi’s fisheries are managed through “What happens is this, if I am a BVC a variety of different institutions, represent- member I will send my crews to fish in one ing an array of scientific and governance ap- direction and I will go patrolling in the other proaches. By analyzing these experiences, direction. Right now they are not patrolling their origins, and the respective roles played because it’s the BVC members who have by government, chiefs, and communities, gears and who fish in the lagoon.”72 we can draw some conclusions about the “After they [BVCs] catch someone and factors that have enabled the success or con- confiscate their gears, they charge him a fine tributed to the failure of different regimes. to get his gears back. Some committee mem- These regimes are presented in Figure 7, bers then tell the poacher that he can raise the below, overlaid on a scale that represents cost of the fine in two nights of fishing, and a continuum from completely government-

72 Russell—Interview with chief—2004–02-25. 73 Russell—Interview with chief—2003–12-04. 84 Russell et al.

Chia Lagoon 1960-90’s Lake Chiuta Govt. Mgt. Lake Traditional Lake Chilwa L. Malawi NP Malombe Kambindingu River Fisheries (pre-2000) Fish. Assoc. Bua River L. Malawi NP Mbenji Island Fishery Commercial Village Trust Yiwemi BVC Fisheries and Co-op Dwangwa Fish Sanct.

Government Government Government & Government Community Informs Consults with Community Advises Autonomy Community Community Co-management Community (CBNRM)

Trends in Development, Fisheries Management, and their Epistemology Dvt. Paradigm Eurocentric/Modernist Critical theory/post modern

Dvt. vs. Cons. Bio-centric Anthropocentric

Dvt. Objectives Pre-determined PRA/Freirian determined

Dvt. Methods Technocratic Participatory

Institutions Used National Laws & Regs. Community/stakeholder rules

Enforcement Technology Norms + Institutions (fines + fences) (social contract)

Figure 7. Continuum of present and past fisheries management regimes in Malawi, and their epistemological and technical bases.

directed regimes (i.e., “fences and fines”) “a situation in which two or more social to complete community-based natural re- actors negotiate, define and guarantee among sources management (CBNRM) regimes themselves a fair sharing of the management (adapted from Pomeroy (1995)). CBNRM is functions, entitlements and responsibilities the management of natural resources under for a given territory, area or set of natural re- a detailed plan developed and agreed to by sources” (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000). all concerned stakeholders. The approach is The format of each fishery regime’s box community-based in that the communities within Figure 7, indicates its current status: managing the resources have the legal rights, dashed gray indicates a regime that has been the local institutions, and the economic in- abandoned; solid gray indicates a current re- centives to take substantial responsibility gime whose success remains uncertain; solid for sustained use of these resources, Under black indicates a current regime that shows the natural resource management plan, com- promise. munities become the primary implementers, Whether a nation or an individual park assisted and monitored by technical ser- selects a fisheries management regime - to vices. “Co-management” is a commonly- ward the CBNRM or the governmental end used label by resource managers to denote of the continuum depends on the specific a resource management regime that lies at social, economic, political, and ecological the center of the continuum, and has been context of the resource and its national and defined as: local stakeholders. Indeed, the management Fisheries Management in Malawi 85 needs for a specific area may change over adaptable in some contexts. Similarly, based time, requiring revisions of once-successful on an adaptation of this traditional leadership NRM regimes. In addition to changes in the role, the Mbenji Island fishery has remained local context, such NRM revisions may be a sustainable institution, although its de- prompted by our evolving understanding of pendence on the leadership of an individual ecological and social processes, re-alignment leader may make it less sustainable in the of national governments’ goals, or changing long run. The enforcement of regulations in ethical standards regarding the amount of both cases ranges from informal sanctions to input that local stakeholders should have in formal fines. Reflecting conclusions by Hara determining NRM regimes. et al. (2002), and Allison and Mvula (2002), these cases illustrate the enduring symbol- CBNRM: Chieftain-based fisheries regimes ism and authority that may be harnessed by chiefs, and underscore the need to recognize In Malawi’s early colonial history, the chiefs as important stakeholders, whose ac- government imposed few restrictions on fish- tive support is crucial for any fisheries man- ing activities, leaving the management of key agement regime. river and beach seine fisheries up to tradition- al chieftain-based institutions, and the rest of “Fines and Fences:” Government-based the lake was “open access.”74 Although one fisheries regimes could argue that these river management in- stitutions represented a traditional centralized At the other extreme of the management control over the resource, we have placed it spectrum, the government’s attempts to man- under CBNRM due to the fact that traditional age Lakes Malawi and Malombe scientifical- chiefs generally did not have the power to ly prior to the early 1990’s proved a failure, impose regulations on their subjects, rather which can be attributed to a combination of maintaining their control through delicate factors. This regime was based on a West- balances of ritualized economic exchanges. ern, technocratic, bio-centric paradigm that With the exception of the governmental im- neglected the social and economic priorities position of a gap in fishing weirs, these insti- of its stakeholders by its focus on managing tutions have not been altered significantly by exclusively for a Maximum Sustainable Yield national governments, although depletion of of chambo. By not recognizing the fishers as fish stocks and siltation of the rivers is threat- legitimate stakeholders, the government was ening to make these institutions irrelevant. forced to impose its vision by force and in- Nevertheless, despite the spread of modernity timidation. Similarly, Lake Malawi NP was and democracy in Malawi, the institutions of established against the wishes of the local TAs and chiefs have proven to be resilient and communities, although with the support of international conservation organizations and 74 Though this is not always considered a form of researchers who prioritized bio-centric re- management, this label refers to the absence of any regulatory institutions over peoples’ interactions search goals. Given that the communities with the fishery, a natural condition for any resource were largely dependent on the local terrestri- that is considered limitless as there is no sense in al and aquatic resources, and as they received owning a resource that is freely available to all. Open little direct benefit from the tourism that the access also describes the “Tragedy of the Commons,” park attracted, the government would have a situation when existing resource management institutions collapse leading users to pursue short-term required much greater enforcement resources individualistic goals at the cost of the common good to succeed. On the other hand, the govern- (Hardin 1968). ment’s management of the commercial fisher- 86 Russell et al. ies sector in Lake Malawi has proved reason- tions). Realistically, these novel arrangements, ably successful due to the limited number of which have been largely determined by local fishing vessels involved although accusations stakeholders’ needs, are the type of co-man- of government complicity in illegal fishing agement approach which the government will activities hampers its efforts to establish sus- need to model their extension programs on tainable co-management regimes with small- due to the FD’s lack of field personnel and re- scale fishers in Southern Lake Malawi. sources. Crucially, these three cases also display the beneficial or counter-productive Government-led Co-management regimes roles that might be played by different chiefs. Indeed, chiefs who do not reflect community The stakeholders of the Bua River and needs through their management cannot be Lake Malombe fisheries have both experi- described as CBNRM rather they are rent- enced extensive government repression and seekers. Conversely, however where detailed intimidation, and both of their key fisher- analysis of chieftain-led regimes indicates ies can be regarded as highly degraded. In widespread local fisherfolk support, or where order to reverse these trends, the Malawian successive chiefs have been able to maintain government has attempted to establish co- such an institution, this regime may arguably management regimes in both locations with be described as CBNRM as it reflects fisher- extensive support from foreign donor agen- folk priorities. Therefore, although chiefs have cies and NGOs. However, in both cases, the proven vulnerable to corruption, in some cases government (or foreign sponsors) set the they may provide the driving force and ongo- management objectives along predetermined ing motivation behind successful community- bio-centric rather than stakeholder-defined based fisheries management (as in Yiwemi lines, and the resultant regimes failed to com- BVC, and to a certain degree the Kambindigu pensate stakeholders for their sacrifices. Both Lagoon). Where chiefs have been excluded of these regimes remain in existence though entirely, however, as at Lake Chiuta, they may they do not operate as intended, and a sig- prove highly disruptive. While these regimes nificant governmental and foreign sponsor have benefited from prevailing participatory revision of objectives, or means of achieving management concepts, each of these institu- them is necessary. tions has been molded by its leaders to reflect the unique local ecological, social, economic, Community-led Co-management and political contexts, and their abilities to continue reacting to these will determine their The cases of Lake Chiuta, Kambindingu sustainabilities. Lagoon, and Yiwemi BVC represent scenarios in which local fishery stakeholders designed True Co-management: Government and new institutions to address local ecological Communities explore the way forward and livelihood threats with some advice from the government. These institutions came about We have categorized the Chia Lagoon in spite of the poor leadership provided by lo- Fisheries Association and Lake Chilwa Fish- cal political and/or traditional leaders, and the eries Association, as true co-management re- national government’s role has primarily been gimes for the reason that the government and to act as an advisory and capacity-building communities are both involved in helping to resource and external legitimizing agent (al- explore and define new fisheries management though the governments’ in/action has at times regimes. While these institutions have been also undermined BVCs and Fisheries Associa- informed by western “co-management” mod- Fisheries Management in Malawi 87 els and supported by foreign donor agencies, efit of policy makers, resource managers, and the stakeholders seem to have adapted the scientists, COMPASS I-II have sponsored a concept to suit their local social context. Chia number of workshops and conferences and Lagoon Fisheries Association did not seem provided avenues for the dissemination of a very hopeful until the recent facilitations con- large array of reports from practitioners in- ducted by the government and NGO staff en- volved in all aspects of CBNRM in Malawi. abled fisher stakeholders to gain a more level Additionally, they have provided financial footing with their traditional leadership. This support to environmental NGOs and com- program is still in its infancy, however, and munity-based organizations throughout the real results remain to be seen. We have also country. With this support, Malawi’s fisheries included the Lake Malawi NP Village Trust management laws and policies have contin- program and the Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary in ued to be revised, with increased prominence this category. Although the objectives of the being given to the roles and capacities of Village Trusts were predefined by the - gov BVCs to manage local fish stocks. ernment, the communities have assumed a While the 1997 Fisheries Conservation significant ownership over the resource base and Management Act first provided the FD and are benefiting directly from the livelihood with a legal mandate to delegate some fisher- diversification projects and tourism conces- ies management responsibilities to BVCs and sions in their communities. Similarly, co- Fisheries Associations, the emphasis in this management in the Dwangwa Fish Sanctuary act remained on the centralized government’s may be regarded as being an unequal partner- roles in resource protection. However, with ship between the sugar cane estate and fishing the government’s subsequent adoption of communities, however, these communities the: have been able to gain significant livelihood benefits from the sceme. These schemes have •Fisheries Management and Aquaculture also been informed by a Western co-manage- Policy, 1999, ment paradigm based on models that have had some success in other African countries, •Fisheries Conservation and Manage- however, the extent to which local stakehold- ment (Local Community Participation) ers have been able to shape them has defined Rules, 2000, the limits to their successes. •Fisheries Conservation and Manage- Malawi’s Fisheries Co-management ment Regulations, 2000 Policies and Targets for the Future •National Fisheries and Aquaculture Pol- Since the year 2000, significant atten- icy, 2001, and tion and funding has been focused at under- standing and addressing the challenges that •Chambo Restoration Policy, 2003, the fisheries co-management has faced -in Ma national emphasis has shifted to empowering lawi. Of particular note, the USAID-funded local fisherfolk control over the fisheries - re COMPASS I and COMPASS II projects have sources under their jurisdiction. More specifi- played key roles in facilitating these learning cally the Fisheries Conservation and Manage- processes associated with community-based ment (Local Community Participation) Rules natural resources management.75 For the ben- of 2000 empower the BVCs to enforce fishing 75 For more information, see the COMPASS homepage regulations pertaining to closed seasons, fish (http://www.compass-malawi.com/cvision2.htm). sanctuaries, restrictions on gear size and type 88 Russell et al. and methods of fishing, and confirms their copies of any regulations, legal tool-boxes, and ownership of the fishery by enabling them to guidelines that they are supposed to imple- limit access to the local fishery to local BVC ment, and in general had a poor understanding licenseholders, etc. This is also supported by of how their roles were supposed to change in Schedule 6 to the 1997 Fisheries Conserva- light of the transition from centralized to com- tion and Management Act. Closely associated munity-based fisheries management (Russell with this progress toward devolution of fish- 2003). Similarly, most BVCs have been shown eries management roles to communities is the to be sorely lacking in literacy, finance, and National government’s decentralization policy management training, which can partly be at- that is devolving most governmental functions tributed to the poorly paid, motivated, trained, and line ministry direction to District Assem- and supervised field staff responsible for this blies (Trick and Manning 2002). task (Kamperewera and Wilson 2003; Russell 2003; Allison and Mvula 2002). BVC capaci- Despite these significant advances in fisher- ties for management of local resources are also ies co-management policies, “legal toolboxes,” currently undermined by the general concep- capacity building of senior government staff, tion among BVCs that their membership is and a proliferation of gray literature describing limited to the10 elected individuals when in the reasons for BVC failures and successes, lit- fact all fisherfolk are identified in the Fisheries tle of this capacity building has been focused at Conservation and Management (Local Com- the field staff in their remote living and work- munity Participation) Rules as being members, ing locations. Although the District Fisheries and therefore have the right to hold BVC com- Officers are supposed to transfer knowledge mittee members accountable for their actions. gathered at workshops to their field staff, due Finally, the roles of the Traditional Authorities to financial constraints and a lack of adminis- in fisheries co-management remains ambigu- trative oversight, little training is conducted. ous and poorly addressed by co-management In their analyses of Malawian government re- policies, and due to the factors mentioned forms, several authors have documented the above, they receive little sensitization from FD increasing gap between senior management field staff. Nevertheless, although they hold no and junior staff, whose access to workshops, official positions in the management of local promotions, and job-security is dependent on fish stocks, their customary roles as adjudica- patron-client relationships, a situation which tors and mediators make their support of local has led to widespread misappropriation and BVCs crucial (Hara 2001; Trick and Manning abuse of government resources (Anders 2002; 2002). Chinsinga 2002; Englund 2002). As has been seen in the cases discussed This marginalization of FD field staff was above, although the government is paying ex- evidenced during a workshop conducted by tensive lip-service to the notions of decentral- one of the authors to provide a venue for field ization and co-management (thereby assuring staff from the Northern half of the lakeshore to its access to donor funding), a paradigm of share experiences and lessons about co-man- centralized management remains entrenched agement inside and outside Malawi (Russell in the FD, a phenomenon reflected in other 2003).76 Most of the field staff did not possess government departments (Dobson 1997; Englund 2002). As described by Chinsinga 76 This workshop, sponsored by the U.S. Embassy (2002), such hierarchies tend toward instru- small-grants program, was organized by one of the authors to provide co-management training for the mentally participatory programs (i.e., in which lakeshore district field staff in the districts of Karonga, local communities participate in projects that Rumphi, Nkhata Bay, Likoma Island, and Nkhotakota. are predefined by the government) rather than Fisheries Management in Malawi 89 transformational ones (in which the com- These long-term capacity-building munities’ priorities define the development needs are not issues that most donor agen- projects), thereby diminishing any local em- cies, driven by short-term project cycles, powerment objectives. Despite having been are willing or able to address, and therefore, proven effective in empowering the Chembe much capacity building tends to reflect a Village Trust in Lake Malawi National Park technocratic rather than humanistic bent as by DWNP, the FD’s apparent hesitancy to use was reflected in the recently discontinued the empowering Trustees Incorporation Act NARMAP research program (Figure 8). of 1968 to give BVCs a legal personality and As can be seen in Figure 8, the histori- power to claim and defend ownership over cal tendencies for donor agencies to promote natural resources within their land and waters bio-centric research agendas to the exclusion questions the extent to which empowerment of of the real “messy” social, cultural, political, BVCs is the actual FD goal. Similarly, donor and economic issues that are confounding the agencies’ support of fisheries co-management FD’s attempts to establish co-management has tended to reinforce this pattern by focus- regimes continues (Ferguson and Derman ing most of their capacity-building efforts on 1993; Weyl 1999; Allison and Mvula 2002). strengthening the managerial elite and paying Unsurprisingly, this orientation of priorities little attention to the needs of the field staff. were reflected in the FD’s identification and In a similarly disruptive tendency, donor prioritization of research efforts, a character- agencies’ frustration with local governments, istic of this chronically underfunded agency and their need to show rapid results, has led that has taken on all short-term donor proj- to increasing NGO usurpation of the local ects regardless of their alignment with na- governmental roles as conduits for local ca- tional priorities (Allison, Mvula et al. 2002; pacity building (Chinsinga 2005). Chinsinga Hara, Donda et al. 2002). Consequently, we (2005) found that while this may result in find that the entire contribution toward- bet short-term successes for the NGOs and their ter fisheries management from the social and target communities, the long-term effects on economic sciences was limited to a single the local governments and communities may economic study that will have little to no be overwhelmingly negative. This has been impact on fisheries management itself (see borne out by the FD field staff’s experiences: highlighted entry in Table 1). communities have become accustomed to be- ing paid to participate in donor agency and Conclusion: How to Make Use of NGO programs and are unwilling to continue Our Natural Adaptive Management when external funding for the program inevi- Experiment. tably ends (Russell 2003). In addition to the effect on the sustainability of these particular The foregoing discussion has attempted programs, the widespread provision of incen- to provide the reader with an overview of how tives (in the forms of sitting allowances, re- the roles of different stakeholders and institu- freshments, t-shirts, travel to workshops) by tions in fisheries management have evolved any NGO in a region is diminishing all other during the past century. Traditionally, most government staffers’ abilities to conduct any open-water fisheries were unregulated, while capacity building due to their inability to of- access to many river fisheries was controlled fer similar financial incentives (Russell 2003). by chiefs based on their roles as spiritual me- These issues contribute significantly to the low diums and governance/military leadership. morale and unethical behavior observed on the Colonialism subsequently encouraged Mala- part of government field staff. wian entrepreneurialism related to fisheries, 90 Russell et al.

NARMAP RESEARCH PROGRAMME

Biological analysis program Fishery analysis program

Gear selectivity Determine major target • Species selectivity • Reproductive biology species Age or size selectivity • Age/size at maturity • Spawning behavior • Seasonality

Identification of potential gear specific overutilization Population dynamics • Longevity Catch statistics • Growth rate • Catch rate • Age structure • Effort • Mortality estimates

Multi-species/multi-fishery predictive modeling

Management strategy

Figure 8. NARMAP Research Programme, 1999 (Weyl 1999).

but simultaneously attempted to raise chiefs’ holders have embraced the opportunities of- roles to that of local governmental represen- fered by this new paradigm. However, while tatives. Both of these efforts resulted in a de- most claim to be motivated by a desire to cline of chiefs’ roles in fisheries management protect fish stocks from overexploitation, as well as in the community as a whole, a the challenges illustrated above demonstrate trend that continued under the postindepen- the highly contentious nature of these re- dence dictatorship. Claiming a mandate from gimes. In most cases, control over fisheries the newly-independent nation, the dictator- co-management institutions and their access ship introduced a centralized ‘scientific man- to resources have been the targets of con- agement’ paradigm to fisheries management. tention between chiefs, BVCs and FD staff, This regime was unsuccessful due to resis- and their respective adherents. Additionally, tance by fishers, leading to the sharp declines while not official participants in fisheries in key fish stocks in the early 1990s. co-management, donor agencies and NGOs Since 1993, the newly-democratic have similarly influenced (in some cases government has embarked on a participa- negatively) the success of these regimes tory fisheries management program, and through their influence on policy, and con- throughout the country a variety of stake- trol and access to resources. Fisheries Management in Malawi 91 Table 1. Ranking of Fisheries Department Research Projects for 2000–2001. (Banda, Chisambo et al. 2000)

Project Title Priority

Biological management parameters for target species in Lake Malawi 1

Monitoring of catch and effort in artisanal fisheries 1

Demersal monitoring surveys 1

Kauni Fishery selectivity survey. 2

Chilimira fishery selectivity. 2

Gillnet selectivity surveys. 2

Handline catch assessment and gear selectivity. 2

Traditional gear selectivity surveys (Northern Lake Malawi) 2

A preliminary study of the effectiveness of monofilament gillnets in Lake 2

Malawi

Lake Malombe assessment programmes 2

Lake Chiuta assessment programmes 2

Commercial pair trawl selectivity 3

Trawl net selectivity survey 3

The economics of processing and distribution of small scale fishing in 3

Lake Malawi

Demersal exploratory surveys 3

Pelagic exploratory surveys 3

Limnological Surveys 3

Aquatic ecology and fisheries of Lake Chikukutu 4

1= highest priority requiring immediate action for monitoring; 2 = high priority requiring action; 3 = intermediate priority requiring action but can be done ad hoc; 4 = low priority can be done if and when funds are available. 92 Russell et al. This wide array of participatory fisher- must become more willing to actively en- ies management institutions, while not de- gage local stakeholders (including FD field signed as such by the government, provides staff) to help them to design locally-appro- fishery managers and scientists with a de priate institutions. Additionally, scientists facto adaptive management regime. By un- and practitioners need to recognize that fish- derstanding the contentious nature of the in- eries are not the last recourse of the poor. As troduction of new institutions in this variety discussed by Allison and Mvula (2002), they of case studies, a number of key lessons may are the primary engine of rural economic be drawn out to inform the government’s growth in lakeshore areas, and provide key ongoing support for, and introduction of, sources of capital investment for local ag- fisheries co-management throughout the riculture and other businesses. The FD and country. First of all, success has taken a its donor agencies cannot expect to achieve number of shapes in different cases, depend- sustainable fisheries management unless the ing specifically upon local political, social, BVCs become more than fisheries regulat- economic, and ecological conditions. There- ing bodies and also facilitate fisherfolks’ fore, rather than attempting to apply a cen- access to credit and extension in support of trally-designed blue-print to all locations, supplementary livelihood activities, much as the government should rather become more has been the case in Yiwemi BVC and Lake intimately appreciative of the local condi- Malawi NP Village Trusts. tions, and help the communities to create in- stitutional frameworks that suit the specific Acknowledgments local conditions mentioned. Additionally, to prevent elites or chiefs from dominating Two years of field research were funded these institutions, the government needs to through a Fulbright IIE Dissertation Research ensure that all stakeholders are effectively Fellowship and a Michigan State University represented in BVCs and given adequate op- Graduate Research Incentive Fellowship. portunities to voice their opinions regarding Predissertation research was funded through any proposed regulations. In addition to the a Walker Hill International Predissertation local participants in co-management, donor Travel Grant. The African Studies Center and agencies and NGOs will need to make sig- Center for Advanced Study of International nificant qualitative changes to their support Development provided three years and two of the FD: toward ensuring greater funding, summers of FLAS Fellowships, respectively, training and support for field staff rather enabling one of the authors to learn the na- than the upper management; and toward en- tional language of Malawi, Chichewa. We couraging a long-term perspective of capac- thank the Centre for Social Research in Zom- ity-building in the FD and of BVCs, rather ba, and our many colleagues in Malawi and than intervening in local institutional growth the USA for their support of this research, by introducing perverse incentives that will and thank Yotam Msuku in particular for his ensure short-term successes. invaluable assistance and companionship in Overall, the FD and donor agencies need performing this research. We also would like to incorporate a greater appreciation of the to thank the many fisheries stakeholders for “messy” institutional, social, and economic their insights, tolerance, good humor and processes that determine the co-manage- friendship. Finally, we thank two anonymous ment success or failure. 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