Tiger: a Fast New Hash Function
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Nshield CONNECT Hsms
Product Sheet /EN nSHIELD CONNECT nSHIELD CONNECT HSMs Certified appliances that deliver cryptographic key services across networks nShield Connect HSMs are FIPS-certified nSHIELD CONNECT appliances that deliver cryptographic services to applications across the network. • Maximizes performance and availability with high cryptographic transaction These tamper-resistant platforms perform rates and flexible scaling such functions as encryption, digital signing and key generation and protection • Supports a wide variety of applications over an extensive range of applications, including certificate authorities, code including certificate authorities, code signing and more signing, custom software and more. The nShield Connect series includes • nShield CodeSafe protects your nShield Connect+ and the new, high- applications within nShield’s secure performance nShield Connect XC. execution environment HIGHLY FLEXIBLE ARCHITECTURE • nShield Remote Administration helps nCipher unique Security World architecture you cut costs and reduce travel lets you combine nShield HSM models to build a mixed estate that delivers flexible scalability and seamless failover and load balancing. nSHIELD CONNECT PROCESS MORE DATA FASTER – now also available from Nexus! nShield Connect HSMs support high transaction rates, making them ideal for enterprise, retail, IoT and other environments where throughput is critical. Available Models and Performance nShield Connect Models 500+ XC Base 1500+ 6000+ XC Mid XC High PROTECT YOUR PROPRIETARY RSA Signing Performance (tps) for NIST Recommended Key Lengths APPLICATIONS 2048 bit 150 430 450 3,000 3,500 8,600 4096 bit 80 100 190 500 850 2,025 The CodeSafe option provides a secure ECC Prime Curve Signing Performance (tps) for NIST Recommended Key Lengths environment for running sensitive 256 bit 540 680 1,260 2,400 5,500 14,400 Client Licenses applications within nShield boundaries. -
Security Policy: Informacast Java Crypto Library
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: InformaCast Java Crypto Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy InformaCast Java Crypto Library Software Version 3.0 Document Version 1.2 June 26, 2017 Prepared For: Prepared By: Singlewire Software SafeLogic Inc. 1002 Deming Way 530 Lytton Ave, Suite 200 Madison, WI 53717 Palo Alto, CA 94301 www.singlewire.com www.safelogic.com Document Version 1.2 © Singlewire Software Page 1 of 35 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: InformaCast Java Crypto Library Abstract This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for InformaCast Java Crypto Library. Document Version 1.2 © Singlewire Software Page 2 of 35 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: InformaCast Java Crypto Library Table of Contents 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 5 1.1 About FIPS 140 ............................................................................................................................................. 5 1.2 About this Document.................................................................................................................................... 5 1.3 External Resources ....................................................................................................................................... 5 1.4 Notices ......................................................................................................................................................... -
Bicliques for Preimages: Attacks on Skein-512 and the SHA-2 Family
Bicliques for Preimages: Attacks on Skein-512 and the SHA-2 family Dmitry Khovratovich1 and Christian Rechberger2 and Alexandra Savelieva3 1Microsoft Research Redmond, USA 2DTU MAT, Denmark 3National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia Abstract. We present the new concept of biclique as a tool for preimage attacks, which employs many powerful techniques from differential cryptanalysis of block ciphers and hash functions. The new tool has proved to be widely applicable by inspiring many authors to publish new re- sults of the full versions of AES, KASUMI, IDEA, and Square. In this paper, we demonstrate how our concept results in the first cryptanalysis of the Skein hash function, and describe an attack on the SHA-2 hash function with more rounds than before. Keywords: SHA-2, SHA-256, SHA-512, Skein, SHA-3, hash function, meet-in-the-middle attack, splice-and-cut, preimage attack, initial structure, biclique. 1 Introduction The last years saw an exciting progress in preimage attacks on hash functions. In contrast to collision search [29, 26], where differential cryptanalysis has been in use since 90s, there had been no similarly powerful tool for preimages. The situation changed dramatically in 2008, when the so-called splice-and-cut framework has been applied to MD4 and MD5 [2, 24], and later to SHA-0/1/2 [1, 3], Tiger [10], and other primitives. Despite amazing results on MD5, the applications to SHA-x primitives seemed to be limited by the internal properties of the message schedule procedures. The only promising element, the so-called initial structure tool, remained very informal and complicated. -
David Wong Snefru
SHA-3 vs the world David Wong Snefru MD4 Snefru MD4 Snefru MD4 MD5 Merkle–Damgård SHA-1 SHA-2 Snefru MD4 MD5 Merkle–Damgård SHA-1 SHA-2 Snefru MD4 MD5 Merkle–Damgård SHA-1 SHA-2 Snefru MD4 MD5 Merkle–Damgård SHA-1 SHA-2 Keccak BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Skein Outline 1.SHA-3 2.derived functions 3.derived protocols f permutation-based cryptography AES is a permutation input AES output AES is a permutation 0 input 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 key 0 AES 0 0 0 0 0 0 output 0 Sponge Construction f Sponge Construction 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 f 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Sponge Construction 0 0 0 1 r 0 0 0 1 f 0 1 0 0 c 0 0 0 1 Sponge Construction 0 0 0 1 r 0 0 0 1 f r c 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 key 0 AES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sponge Construction message 0 1 0 1 0 ⊕ 1 0 0 f 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Sponge Construction message 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ 0 f 0 0 0 0 Sponge Construction message 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ 0 f f 0 0 0 0 Sponge Construction message 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 f f 0 0 0 0 Sponge Construction message 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 f f f 0 0 0 0 Sponge Construction message 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 f f f 0 0 0 0 absorbing Sponge Construction message output 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 f f f 0 0 0 0 absorbing Sponge Construction message output 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 f f f f 0 0 0 0 absorbing Sponge Construction message output 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 f f f f 0 0 0 0 absorbing Sponge Construction message output 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 f f f f f 0 0 0 0 absorbing Sponge Construction message output 0 0 0 ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 0 f f f f f 0 0 0 0 absorbing squeezing Keccak Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michaël Peeters and Gilles Van Assche 2007 SHA-3 competition 2012 2007 SHA-3 competition 2012 SHA-3 standard -
NISTIR 7620 Status Report on the First Round of the SHA-3
NISTIR 7620 Status Report on the First Round of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition Andrew Regenscheid Ray Perlner Shu-jen Chang John Kelsey Mridul Nandi Souradyuti Paul NISTIR 7620 Status Report on the First Round of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition Andrew Regenscheid Ray Perlner Shu-jen Chang John Kelsey Mridul Nandi Souradyuti Paul Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 September 2009 U.S. Department of Commerce Gary Locke, Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Patrick D. Gallagher, Deputy Director NISTIR 7620: Status Report on the First Round of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition Abstract The National Institute of Standards and Technology is in the process of selecting a new cryptographic hash algorithm through a public competition. The new hash algorithm will be referred to as “SHA-3” and will complement the SHA-2 hash algorithms currently specified in FIPS 180-3, Secure Hash Standard. In October, 2008, 64 candidate algorithms were submitted to NIST for consideration. Among these, 51 met the minimum acceptance criteria and were accepted as First-Round Candidates on Dec. 10, 2008, marking the beginning of the First Round of the SHA-3 cryptographic hash algorithm competition. This report describes the evaluation criteria and selection process, based on public feedback and internal review of the first-round candidates, and summarizes the 14 candidate algorithms announced on July 24, 2009 for moving forward to the second round of the competition. The 14 Second-Round Candidates are BLAKE, BLUE MIDNIGHT WISH, CubeHash, ECHO, Fugue, Grøstl, Hamsi, JH, Keccak, Luffa, Shabal, SHAvite-3, SIMD, and Skein. -
Advanced Meet-In-The-Middle Preimage Attacks: First Results on Full Tiger, and Improved Results on MD4 and SHA-2
Advanced Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks: First Results on Full Tiger, and Improved Results on MD4 and SHA-2 Jian Guo1, San Ling1, Christian Rechberger2, and Huaxiong Wang1 1 Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 2 Dept. of Electrical Engineering ESAT/COSIC, K.U.Leuven, and Interdisciplinary Institute for BroadBand Technology (IBBT), Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B–3001 Heverlee, Belgium. [email protected] Abstract. We revisit narrow-pipe designs that are in practical use, and their security against preimage attacks. Our results are the best known preimage attacks on Tiger, MD4, and reduced SHA-2, with the result on Tiger being the first cryptanalytic shortcut attack on the full hash function. Our attacks runs in time 2188.8 for finding preimages, and 2188.2 for second-preimages. Both have memory requirement of order 28, which is much less than in any other recent preimage attacks on reduced Tiger. Using pre-computation techniques, the time complexity for finding a new preimage or second-preimage for MD4 can now be as low as 278.4 and 269.4 MD4 computations, respectively. The second-preimage attack works for all messages longer than 2 blocks. To obtain these results, we extend the meet-in-the-middle framework recently developed by Aoki and Sasaki in a series of papers. In addition to various algorithm-specific techniques, we use a number of conceptually new ideas that are applicable to a larger class of constructions. Among them are (1) incorporating multi-target scenarios into the MITM framework, leading to faster preimages from pseudo-preimages, (2) a simple precomputation technique that allows for finding new preimages at the cost of a single pseudo-preimage, and (3) probabilistic initial structures, to reduce the attack time complexity. -
Data Intensive Dynamic Scheduling Model and Algorithm for Cloud Computing Security Md
1796 JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS, VOL. 9, NO. 8, AUGUST 2014 Data Intensive Dynamic Scheduling Model and Algorithm for Cloud Computing Security Md. Rafiqul Islam1,2 1Computer Science Department, American International University Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh 2Computer Science and Engineering Discipline, Khulna University, Khulna, Bangladesh Email: [email protected] Mansura Habiba Computer Science Department, American International University Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh Email: [email protected] Abstract—As cloud is growing immensely, different point cloud computing has gained widespread acceptance. types of data are getting more and more dynamic in However, without appropriate security and privacy terms of security. Ensuring high level of security for solutions designed for clouds, cloud computing becomes all data in storages is highly expensive and time a huge failure [2, 3]. Amazon provides a centralized consuming. Unsecured services on data are also cloud computing consisting simple storage services (S3) becoming vulnerable for malicious threats and data and elastic compute cloud (EC2). Google App Engine is leakage. The main reason for this is that, the also an example of cloud computing. While these traditional scheduling algorithms for executing internet-based online services do provide huge amounts different services on data stored in cloud usually of storage space and customizable computing resources. sacrifice security privilege in order to achieve It is eliminating the responsibility of local machines for deadline. To provide adequate security without storing and maintenance of data. Considering various sacrificing cost and deadline for real time data- kinds of data for each user stored in the cloud and the intensive cloud system, security aware scheduling demand of long term continuous assurance of their data algorithm has become an effective and important safety, security is one of the prime concerns for the feature. -
Cryptographic Hash Workshop (2005)
SHA-160: A Truncation Mode for SHA256 (and most other hashes) John Kelsey, NIST Halloween Hash Bash 2005 1 What’s a Truncation Mode? • Rule for chopping bits off a hash output • We have a big hash fn we trust, Like SHA256 • We need a smaller hash output Like 160 bits • We need to specify how this is done – Interoperability and security reasons 2 Why Do We Need One? • Need drop in replacement for SHA1 (MD5?) • Have unBroken hashes of wrong size – ECDSA/DSA key sizes – File and protocol formats • OBvious approach: Truncate SHA256/SHA512 • This has Been done Before: Snefru, Tiger, SHA384, SHA224 3 Our Proposal in a Nutshell H(X,M) = hash M from initial value X • Start with different IV for each truncation length n: n has fixed-length representation T IV n = H(IV xor 0xccc…c,n) • Run bigger hash normally T T H n(m) = truncate(H(IV n, m),n) • Generic: Any n, many big hashes – (Rivest comment to SHA224) 4 Intuition: Why should this be okay? • If hash “good”, seems like truncation should be good, too. – Fits our intuition about hash functions – Easy proof in Random Oracle Model – Prior art suggests other people agree • So, is intuition correct here? 5 Security Considerations • Issue #1: Related hash outputs T – H n(X) ! H(X’) • Issue #2: Can we safely truncate? – No reduction proof – “Near collisions” 6 Issue #1: Related Outputs T Why we need IV n!IV T What if IV n =IV? Then we get collision before truncation: T H 160(M) = ABCDE T H 192(M) = ABCDEF 7 Does This Matter? A Common KDF • KDF(S,P,n): – T = “” – for j = 1 to n: T = T || hash(S||P||j) • Two people use different truncations: – Result: Two closely related keys “AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD” “AAABBBCCCDDD” • Very unintuitive property! – Related key attack? Protocol problem? 8 Broader Issue: Related Outputs T T H n(m) = truncate(H(IV n, m),n) T • What if H n(m) ! H(m’)? – Broader property: can’t prove it won’t happen – Narrow property: collision before truncation 9 Does Our Scheme Prevent This? We prevent collision before truncation: T • Can’t choose M’ -> IV n (preimage) • Can’t cause intermediate collision (DM constr. -
Tiger Hash Attribute Encryption for Secured Cloud Service Provisioning
Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research 25 (1): 181-191, 2017 ISSN 1990-9233 © IDOSI Publications, 2017 DOI: 10.5829/idosi.mejsr.2017.181.191 Tiger Hash Attribute Encryption for Secured Cloud Service Provisioning 12P. Muthusamy and V. Murali Bhaskaran 1Department of Computer Science & Engg, Anna University, Chennai - 600 025, Tamil Nadu, India 2Principal, Dhirajlal Gandhi College of Technology, Salem - 636 309, Tamil Nadu, India Abstract: Cloud Computing facilitates organization to share various operation services in a high secure manner. In cloud based communication, the confidentiality of the systemis the major concern. Hence, the secured message communication is to prevent unauthorized access of confidential information. Several encryption approacheshave been developed for cloud service provisioning. But, cloud users still have major security and confidentiality about their outsourced data due to unauthorized access within the service providers. In order to improve the confidentiality in cloud service provisioning, Tiger Cryptographic Hash Function based Attribute Encryption and Decryption (TCHF-AED) technique is introduced. Tiger is a cryptographic hash function for achieving higher confidentiality rate in cloud service provisioning. Initially, the attribute cloud request is sent from the users to cloud server. Next, Tiger Cryptographic Hash Function is used to achieve cloud data confidentiality based on output of hash value.TheAttribute Encryption is performed for converting actual message into cipher textand the hash value of each encrypted message is calculated. The encrypted message with hash value is stored in cloud server. Whenever the cloud user accesses the data from cloud server, the hash value is recomputed to achieve the correctness of the message. If the correctness is achieved the decryption is performed to attain the confidentiality. -
Performance Analysis of Cryptographic Hash Functions Suitable for Use in Blockchain
I. J. Computer Network and Information Security, 2021, 2, 1-15 Published Online April 2021 in MECS (http://www.mecs-press.org/) DOI: 10.5815/ijcnis.2021.02.01 Performance Analysis of Cryptographic Hash Functions Suitable for Use in Blockchain Alexandr Kuznetsov1 , Inna Oleshko2, Vladyslav Tymchenko3, Konstantin Lisitsky4, Mariia Rodinko5 and Andrii Kolhatin6 1,3,4,5,6 V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Svobody sq., 4, Kharkiv, 61022, Ukraine E-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 2 Kharkiv National University of Radio Electronics, Nauky Ave. 14, Kharkiv, 61166, Ukraine E-mail: [email protected] Received: 30 June 2020; Accepted: 21 October 2020; Published: 08 April 2021 Abstract: A blockchain, or in other words a chain of transaction blocks, is a distributed database that maintains an ordered chain of blocks that reliably connect the information contained in them. Copies of chain blocks are usually stored on multiple computers and synchronized in accordance with the rules of building a chain of blocks, which provides secure and change-resistant storage of information. To build linked lists of blocks hashing is used. Hashing is a special cryptographic primitive that provides one-way, resistance to collisions and search for prototypes computation of hash value (hash or message digest). In this paper a comparative analysis of the performance of hashing algorithms that can be used in modern decentralized blockchain networks are conducted. Specifically, the hash performance on different desktop systems, the number of cycles per byte (Cycles/byte), the amount of hashed message per second (MB/s) and the hash rate (KHash/s) are investigated. -
Some Attacks on Merkle-Damgård Hashes
Overview Some Attacks on Merkle-Damg˚ardHashes John Kelsey, NIST and KU Leuven May 8, 2018 m m m m ||10*L 0 1 2 3 iv F h F h F h F h 0 1 2 final Introduction 1 / 63 Overview I Cryptographic Hash Functions I Thinking About Collisions I Merkle-Damg˚ardhashing I Joux Multicollisions[2004] I Long-Message Second Preimage Attacks[1999,2004] I Herding and the Nostradamus Attack[2005] Introduction 2 / 63 Why Talk About These Results? I These are very visual results{looking at the diagram often explains the idea. I The results are pretty accessible. I Help you think about what's going on inside hashing constructions. Introduction 3 / 63 Part I: Preliminaries/Review I Hash function basics I Thinking about collisions I Merkle-Damg˚ardhash functions Introduction 4 / 63 Cryptographic Hash Functions I Today, they're the workhorse of crypto. I Originally: Needed for digital signatures I You can't sign 100 MB message{need to sign something short. I \Message fingerprint" or \message digest" I Need a way to condense long message to short string. I We need a stand-in for the original message. I Take a long, variable-length message... I ...and map it to a short string (say, 128, 256, or 512 bits). Cryptographic Hash Functions 5 / 63 Properties What do we need from a hash function? I Collision resistance I Preimage resistance I Second preimage resistance I Many other properties may be important for other applications Note: cryptographic hash functions are designed to behave randomly. Cryptographic Hash Functions 6 / 63 Collision Resistance The core property we need. -
Block Cipher Based Hashed Functions
ANALYSIS OF THREE BLOCK CIPHER BASED HASH FUNCTIONS: WHIRLPOOL, GRØSTL AND GRINDAHL A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY RITA ISMAILOVA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHYLOSOPHY IN CRYPTOGRAPHY SEPTEMBER 2012 Approval of the thesis: ANALYSIS OF THREE BLOCK CIPHER BASED HASH FUNCTIONS: WHIRLPOOL, GRØSTL AND GRINDAHL submitted by RITA ISMAILOVA in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Department of Cryptography, Middle East Technical University by, Prof. Dr. Bülent Karasözen ____________ Director, Graduate School of Applied Mathematics Prof. Dr. Ferruh Özbudak ____________ Head of Department, Cryptography Assoc. Prof. Dr. Melek Diker Yücel ____________ Supervisor, Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering Examining Committee Members: Prof. Dr. Ersan Akyıldız ____________ Department of Mathematics, METU Assoc. Prof. Dr. Melek Diker Yücel ____________ Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, METU Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Doğanaksoy ____________ Department of Mathematics, METU Assist. Prof. Dr. Zülfükar Saygı ____________ Department of Mathematics, TOBB ETU Dr. Hamdi Murat Yıldırım ____________ Department of Computer Technology and Information Systems, Bilkent University Date: ____________ I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last Name: RITA ISMAILOVA Signature : iii ABSTRACT ANALYSIS OF THREE BLOCK CIPHER BASED HASH FUNCTIONS: WHIRLPOOL, GRØSTL AND GRINDAHL Ismailova, Rita Ph.D., Department of Cryptography Supervisor : Assoc.