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A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce: a Defence of the Claim That His Pragmatism Is Founded on His Theory of Categories

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A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce: a Defence of the Claim That His Pragmatism Is Founded on His Theory of Categories The University of Notre Dame Australia ResearchOnline@ND Theses 2002 A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce: A Defence of the Claim that his Pragmatism is Founded on his Theory of Categories Siosifa Ika University of Notre Dame Australia Follow this and additional works at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses Part of the Philosophy Commons COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regulations 1969 WARNING The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further copying or communication of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act. Do not remove this notice. Publication Details Ika, S. (2002). A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce: A Defence of the Claim that his Pragmatism is Founded on his Theory of Categories (Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)). University of Notre Dame Australia. https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/ theses/16 This dissertation/thesis is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES S. PEIRCE A Defence of the Claim that his Pragmatism is Founded on his Theory of Categories Siosifa Ika A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Notre Dame Australia College of Theology October, 2002. Table of Contents: Abstract vi Declaration vii Acknowledgements viii Abbreviations ix Dedication x INTRODUCTION 1 PART I: PEIRCE’S THEORY OF CATEGORIES 1. PEIRCE’S THEORY OF CATEGORIES AND ITS UNIQUENESS 11 1.1 Some Preliminary Remarks 12 1.1.1 Reasons for Beginning with Peirce’s Theory of Categories 12 1.1.2 What is Meant by a ‘Theory of Categories’? 13 1.2 ‘On a New List of Categories’: An Introduction to Peirce’s Theory of Categories 14 1.2.1 The Aim of the ‘New List’ 14 1.2.2 The Method Employed in the ‘New List’ 15 1.2.3 The Categories of the ‘New List’ 17 1.2.3.1 Substance and Being: The Beginning and End of Conception 18 1.2.3.2 Quality, Relation, Representation: The Intermediate Conceptions 20 1.2.4 Numerical Description of the Categories 23 1.2.5 Types of Representations and Logic 24 1.3 Aristotle, Kant, and Peirce on Categories: A Brief Comparison and Contrast 28 1.3.1 Aristotle’s Categories 28 1.3.2 Kant’s Categories 31 1.4 Some Changes to the Categories of the ‘New List’ 33 1.4.1 From Five to Three Categories 33 1.4.2 The Impact of the Logic of Relations and Quantification Theory on Peirce’s Approach to Categories 37 1.4.2.1 Logic of Relations 38 1.4.2.2 Theory of Quantification 40 1.5 Theory of Categories and the Classification of the Sciences 42 1.5.1 Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences 43 1.5.2 Sciences of Discovery (or Theoretical Sciences) 44 1.5.2.1 Semiotic and Observation in Science of Discovery 46 1.5.3 Divisions of Philosophy 48 2 2. PEIRCE’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE CATEGORIES 49 2.1 Peirce’s Conception of Phenomenology 50 2.1.1 Why does he call his approach ‘Phenomenology’? 50 2.1.2 The Aim and Scope of ‘Phenomenology’ 51 2.1.3 The Methods of Phenomenology 54 2.2 The Categories as Phenomenologically Described 55 2.2.1 The Category of ‘Firstness’ 56 2.2.2 The Category of ‘Secondness’ 58 2.2.3 The Category of ‘Thirdness’ 59 2.3 Phenomenology as Part of a System of the Sciences 60 2.3.1 An Argument for Peirce’s Phenomenology as Part of Philosophy 61 2.3.2 Phenomenology as Considered from the Point of View of Categories 65 2.3.3 The Importance of Peirce’s Phenomenology to his Philosophy 65 2.3.3.1 Philosophy as an “Observational” Science and a “Science of Discovery” 67 2.3.3.2 The Object of Discovery 68 PART II: PRAGMATISM AND THE THIRD GRADE OF CLARITY 3. THE ORIGIN, PURPOSE, AND PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PEIRCE’S PRAGMATISM 70 3.1 ‘Pragmatism’ as a Theory of Inquiry for Meaning Clarification 71 3.1.1 The Object of Reasoning and Guiding Principle 71 3.1.2 Doubt, Belief, and Inquiry 72 3.1.2.1 “Belief”: Its Impacts on Pragmatism 74 3.1.2.2 The “Misfortune” of “Sensible Effects” 75 3.2 Psychological Doubt and Its Limitation in Inquiry 79 3.2.1 Two Purposes of Inquiry 80 3.2.2 Methods of Fixing Belief 81 3.2.3 The Ideas of “Purpose” and “Method” Connected 83 3.3 Pragmatism and the Categories 84 3.3.1 The Categories as Constitutive Principles for Pragmatism 85 3.3.2 Categories and the Scientific Method 88 3.3.3 The Question of the Proof of Pragmatism 89 3.3.4 Pragmatism and the Principle of Abduction 90 3 4. THE PLACE OF REALISM IN PEIRCE’S PRAGMATISM 92 4.1 Peirce on Nominalism-Realism Controversy 93 4.1.1 Introduction 93 4.1.2 What Does ‘Realism’ Mean for Peirce? 93 4.1.3 From Nominalism to Realism: Accepting that External Reality Exists 95 4.2 Pragmatism within the Framework of Realism 96 4.2.1 One-Category Realism 96 4.2.1.1 The Early Formulation of Pragmatism 102 4.2.2 Two-Category Realism 104 4.2.3 Three-Category Realism 105 4.2.3.1 The Later Formulation of Pragmatism 107 4.3 Is Peirce’s Realism a Presupposition or Consequence of his Pragmatism? 108 4.3.1 The Specific Sense of Realism as a Consequence of Pragmatism 110 4.4 Conclusion 111 5. PRAGMATISM AND METAPHYSICS 113 5.1 Collingwood’s Notion of “Absolute Presupposition” 114 5.2 The Absolute Presupposition of Pragmatism 120 5.2.1 The ‘Community of Inquirers’ 121 5.2.2 The Common-sense Position of Pragmatism 122 5.3 Peirce’s Critique of the Positivist View of Metaphysics 124 5.3.1 “The Love of Life” 126 5.4 A Brief Account of Peirce’s Own View of Metaphysics 127 5.4.1 What is Metaphysics for Peirce? 128 5.4.2 Some Characteristic Features of the ‘Future’ Mode of Being 130 5.4.3 Metaphysics as an Observational Science 131 5.4.4 ‘Continuity’ and the Metaphysics of the ‘Future’ 133 5.5 The Metaphysical Side of Pragmatism 136 5.5.1 The Metaphysical Problem as Pragmatically Formulated 137 5.5.2 Does Pragmatism Make Any Metaphysical Assertion? 138 4 PART III: PEIRCE’S THEORY OF SIGNS 6. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THEORY OF SIGNS 141 6.1 The Science of Semiotic 142 6.1.1 Logic Considered as Semiotic 144 6.1.1.1 The Division of Semiotic 145 6.1.2 Semiotic and the Sciences 146 6.2 The Components and Relationships of Signs as Paradigmatic for Truth and Meaning 148 6.2.1 Representamen 148 6.2.2 The Object of a Sign 149 6.2.3 Interpretant 150 6.3 Semiotic as the Basis for Inquiry 152 6.3.1 Observation in Inquiry 152 6.3.2 The Metaphysical Neutrality of Semiotic 153 6.3.3 The Question of the Relation between Objectivity and Realism in Peirce 154 7. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEIRCE’S CATEGORIES, HIS THEORY OF SIGNS, AND HIS PRAGMATISM 157 7.1 The Categories and Signs as Understood within the Context of Inquiry 159 7.1.1 The Reasons for Adopting ‘Inquiry’ as the Framework for Considering the Relation between the ‘Categories’ and ‘Signs’ 159 7.1.2 The Categories as Pertinent to Logic 160 7.2 The Distinction between the Categories and Signs 161 7.2.1 The Distinction between ‘Beings of Reason’ and ‘Real Beings’ 161 7.2.2 The Distinction between Categories and Signs as both Relative and Absolute 162 7.2.3 Clarifying the Question of ‘Extra-Semiotic Entities’ 164 7.3 A Consideration of the Relation between Logic and Metaphysics within the Framework of Inquiry 165 7.3.1 Some General Features of Peirce’s View on the Relation between Logic and Metaphysics 165 7.3.2 Some Fundamental Ideas of Intentional Logic 166 7.3.3 The ‘Sign’ is not a Category 167 CONCLUSION 168 Bibliography 177 5 Abstract This thesis explores the relation in Peirce’s philosophy between his theory of categories and his pragmatism. My most central claim is that the possibility and validity of metaphysics as a philosophical science depend on the appropriateness of its method. I argue that an appropriate method for metaphysics is possible, and that in Peirce’s pragmatism as founded on his theory of categories we find such a method. In developing this thesis I seek to demonstrate four key propositions: 1. Peirce’s ‘pragmatism’ is fundamentally a form of metaphysical and epistemological realism and in this respect differs from logical positivism and other types of pragmatism that are overtly anti-metaphysical and skeptical about the possibility of our knowledge of real generals. 2. Peirce’s ‘theory of categories’ is the key to understanding his philosophy and demonstrates the extent to which he embraces a form of dialectical realism that bears striking resemblance to certain forms of scholastic metaphysics. 3. Peirce’s ‘semiotic’ or theory of signs can only be properly understood if we take full account of his theory of categories and the form of metaphysical and epistemological realism it implies. 4. Peirce’s account of semiotic is based on an irreducible trichotomy that he holds to exist between the categories, and which is reflected in the triadic relationship between Sign, Sign User and Thing Signified.
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