Do Your Bit, Claim Your Share
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Stockholm Studies in Politics 190 Markus Furendal What does justice require of individuals, and why? These questions are increasingly important in times when the everyday advocacy of justice Do Your Bit, Claim Your Share is more and more focused on evaluating and criticising the principles and values that people find acceptable and act on in their daily lives. Justice, Ethos, and the Individual Duty to Contribute Yet, since much contemporary political philosophy generally conceives of justice as a virtue of social institutions, it is incapable both of recognising how individuals’ daily choices steer society towards, or Share Your Claim Bit, Your Do Markus Furendal away from, an ideal of justice, and to evaluate and guide the practice of socially sanctioning unjust behaviour. This dissertation answers the questions above, by arguing that justice requires individuals to not only comply with just institutions, but to also fulfil a pro tanto duty to contribute in their daily lives towards the furthering of a just society – to do their bit. Further, it argues that a system of informal and decentralised social sanctions – an ethos – is the best way to promote adherence to this duty. The study thereby develops and defends an account of contributive justice, specifying who should contribute to justice and why, as well as what a contribution is and how an individual duty to contribute should be enforced. Markus Furendal ORCID iD: 0000-0002-2378-750X ISBN 978-91-7911-304-9 ISSN 0346-6620 Department of Political Science Doctoral Thesis in Political Science at Stockholm University, Sweden 2020 Do Your Bit, Claim Your Share Justice, Ethos, and the Individual Duty to Contribute Markus Furendal Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Wednesday 4 November 2020 at 13.00 in Aula Magna, Frescativägen 6. Abstract Contemporary political philosophy primarily conceives of justice as a virtue of major social institutions. Yet, much advocacy of justice is increasingly focused on how well particular individuals live up to its demands, and proceeds by calling out and criticising their unjust behaviour. The institutional focus renders political philosophy unable to inform and evaluate such attempts to change, not legal frameworks, but rather the principles that people find acceptable and act on in their daily lives. To address this shortcoming, this dissertation provides a political philosophical analysis of what justice requires of individuals, and why. It does so by developing and defending an account of contributive justice, which answers the inquiry’s guiding questions of who should contribute to justice and why, as well as what a contribution is, and how individual duties of justice should be enforced. The arguments provided support the conclusion that achieving a just society is not simply a question of designing and complying with the right kind of institutions, but that we all have a pro tanto duty to contribute in our day-to-day lives towards the furthering of a just society, and that relying on informal and decentralised social sanctions is the best way to promote adherence to this duty. The duty to contribute defended in this dissertation differs from existing policies that make access to welfare state services conditional on individuals’ willingness to work or study. It also differs from prominent existing philosophical defences of similar positions, centred around the ideas of equality, reciprocity, and fairly sharing burdens. Critically analysing these accounts, the dissertation shows that, although each account can justify a duty to contribute, their specific answers to the guiding questions are ultimately unsatisfactory. For instance, they are unable to explain both why it is unjust to opt out from doing your bit of the labour necessary to meet the demands of justice, and why individuals who cannot contribute should nevertheless be able to claim the share that they are due. These shortcomings can be avoided, however, by combining concerns about equality, reciprocity, and fairly sharing burdens into a hybrid account. This generates a two-part pro tanto duty to contribute whereby, firstly, everyone has a duty to contribute towards making sure that everyone receives what they are due as a matter of justice. If and when this level is reached, everyone then has an obligation to benefit others, conditional upon them benefitting from the work of others. While it is unjust to refuse to contribute in the first way, the hybrid account leaves room for people to reject additional benefits and thereby absolve themselves from having to contribute further. Furthermore, the pro tanto nature of this duty means that it could be outweighed by other morally important considerations. Although demanding, it will hence not crowd out all personal pursuits. The dissertation also suggests that adherence to this duty should be enforced not through state action, but rather by individuals responding to and upholding a system of social sanctions. Contrasting this so-called ethos of justice with similar systems of social control, such as peer-to-peer online monitoring and sanctioning, and the Social Credit System currently being implemented in China, arguably shows that the informal and decentralised nature of the ethos allows it to avoid the potentially freedom-curtailing effects of the similar systems. Keywords: duty to contribute, distributive justice, contributive justice, reciprocity, fair burdens, markets, ethos, social sanctions, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen. Stockholm 2020 http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-185258 ISBN 978-91-7911-304-9 ISBN 978-91-7911-305-6 ISSN 0346-6620 Department of Political Science Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm DO YOUR BIT, CLAIM YOUR SHARE Markus Furendal Do Your Bit, Claim Your Share Justice, Ethos, and the Individual Duty to Contribute Markus Furendal ©Markus Furendal, Stockholm University 2020 ISBN print 978-91-7911-304-9 ISBN PDF 978-91-7911-305-6 ISSN 0346-6620 Cover illlustration: "Pigen i køkkenet" ("Girl in the kitchen") by Anna Ancher, 1883-86. Anna Ancher / Public domain. Digital image: Villy Fink Isaksen https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Girl_in_the_Kitchen_(Anna_Ancher).jpg Printed in Sweden by Universitetsservice US-AB, Stockholm 2020 For Lovisa, Lilly, and Henning Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. x Chapter 1 – Introduction. An account of contributive justice ..................................... 1 1. Summarising the account and the political and philosophical context of the inquiry .................. 2 2. Guiding questions and the structure of the inquiry .................................................................... 8 3. Theoretical background and the contributions of the inquiry .................................................... 9 3.1 Rawls’s theory of justice and Cohen’s critique ................................................................... 9 3.2 Literature about who should contribute........................................................................... 13 3.3 Literature about why contributing is a duty ..................................................................... 16 3.4 Literature about what a contribution is............................................................................ 19 3.5 Literature about enforcing the duty to contribute ............................................................ 21 3.6 Distributive, productive, and contributive justice ............................................................ 23 3.7 Summary – What the account contributes....................................................................... 26 4. Theoretical framework ............................................................................................................ 27 4.1 Preliminary notes on the taxonomic tree of justice ........................................................... 27 4.2 The scope, ground, site, and currency of justice ............................................................... 29 4.3 Outcome-based and procedure-focused theories of justice ............................................... 31 4.4 Comparative and non-comparative justice ....................................................................... 34 4.5 What does it mean for justice to require something? ........................................................ 36 4.6 Summary – How the account conceives of justice ............................................................ 39 5. Methodological framework ..................................................................................................... 43 5.1 The pro tanto nature of the duty ..................................................................................... 46 5.2 Pluralism and the metatheoretical disagreement between Rawls and Cohen ..................... 47 5.3 Summary – How the account is developed and defended................................................. 50 Chapter 2 – Who should contribute? The division of labour and individual duties of justice ...................................................................................... 53 1. The division of labour and the primacy thesis.......................................................................... 55 1.1 A preliminary argument for the non-division thesis ......................................................... 60 2. Three kinds of primacy ..........................................................................................................