Thomas Just ISA 2021

Germany’s Approach to Countering Anti-Semitism Since Reunification

Abstract: Since reunification in 1990, the German government has taken numerous steps to counter anti-Semitism and improve its relations with the Jewish community more broadly. The approach has consisted primarily of two parts: anti-radicalization legal measures and public diplomacy. In terms of legal measures, has banned hate speech and incitement, adjusted immigration policy for , and granted full legal status. In terms of public diplomacy, Germany has created a network of both governmental and non-governmental organizations to counter anti-Semitic attitudes within domestic society and demonstrate progress abroad. This article examines these facets of the German approach, evaluates the approach’s success through an analysis of extremist group membership and survey data measuring anti- Semitic attitudes, and discusses some evolving challenges to which the approach must adapt.

Keywords: Anti-Semitism, far-right extremism, Germany, Judaism, public diplomacy, religion

Introduction

As a reunified Germany emerged from the Cold War era, the country sought to improve its international standing and develop a cohesive image and brand to project abroad. In order to do so, Germany, which at the time faced numerous political, social, and economic challenges, also faced the continuing task of addressing fraught aspects of its history, in particular anti-

Semitism and . While the FRG and GDR indeed had their own efforts to address the issue of anti-Semitism prior to 1990, these efforts accelerated in the post-Cold War era. The central question that this analysis will seek to answer is: How has Germany approached countering anti-Semitism since reunification and how has this impacted anti-Semitic groups, the domestic Jewish community, and the current situation within the country?

Though there is no universally-accepted definition, this analysis will define anti-

Semitism as follows: hostile attitudes or attacks targeting Jewish people, symbols, or interests based on religious, economic, racial, or political grounds. This definition reflects the ways in which hatred toward Jews tends to manifest and distinguishes anti-Semitism from criticism of

1 Israeli government policy. Responding to accusations and the realities of anti-Semitism domestically has long been a concern for the German state. This point was emphasized by

Chancellor Angela Merkel in a 2014 speech where she stated that “It is our [Germany’s] national and civic duty to fight anti-Semitism.”1 As the country’s approach has developed, the two primary means of responding to this problem have been anti-radicalization legal measures and public diplomacy. In the German case, the legal measures are carried out exclusively by the state in a centralized fashion, as law is the domain of the state itself. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, tends to be far more pluralistic with numerous levels and agencies – both governmental and non-governmental.

Both aspects of Germany’s approach to countering anti-Semitism work toward the same goal of preventing hate crimes and reducing general hostility toward Jewish people and interests.

However, whereas anti-radicalization legal measures are intended to restrict behavior, public diplomacy is communication and engagement with the public intended to change attitudes. Legal measures by their very nature instruct individuals what they are and are not allowed to do and prescribe punishments for violations. In the context of countering anti-Semitism, these measures include prohibiting forms of hate speech and incitement, allowing certain populations to immigrate and providing protections, and allowing religious groups access to state resources and funding. On the other hand, public diplomacy measures lack the enforcement mechanisms of legal measures and instead rely on direct outreach to groups and individuals for purposes of research, education, and various forms of financial, administrative, and expertise support. While some may conceive of public diplomacy in merely an international context, domestic engagement is often crucial to establishing credibility for a country’s image and messaging, particularly with regard to difficult issues such as anti-Semitism. Germany has invested

2 substantial resources into both aspects of its approach in order to reduce anti-Semitic violence and reconcile with the past domestically, as well as demonstrate progress on the issue abroad.

And while there have indeed been indications of reductions in extremist group membership and general anti-Semitic attitudes over time, the country also faces new challenges of rising nationalist and xenophobic sentiments to which its approach must adapt.

Germany’s Legal Approach

Germany’s legal approach to anti-Semitism has tended to focus on three main areas: restrictions on hate speech and incitement (Volksverhetzung), adjustments to immigration law, and providing Judaism with legal status on par with major Christian denominations. Each of these areas of policy have been enacted or adjusted since reunification to either counter anti-

Semitic attitudes or work toward reconciliation with the Jewish community. The following section will examine the legislation and policy actions taken in these areas.

Hate Speech and Incitement

Article V, Clause I of Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz) stipulates that: “Everyone has the right to freely express his opinions in speech, writing, and pictures.”2 However, Article V,

Clause II states that: “These rights are limited by the provisions of the general laws, the provisions for the protection of young people and in the right of personal honour.”3 Therefore, while German law does provide for the freedom of expression, the very next clause states that criminal law may indeed provide limitations on expression. In large part, these restrictions on expression have been enacted to prevent the rehabilitation of Nazism in Germany.4 Additionally,

3 the restrictions have been aimed to prevent the incitement of hatred against Jews and other domestic minorities.

In the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), there are two sections that apply directly to restrictions on anti-Semitic speech. Criminal Code Section 86 makes illegal the

“Dissemination of Means of Propaganda of Unconstitutional Organizations.” These restrictions apply to any party that has been declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court of

Germany or “propaganda, the contents of which are intended to further the aims of any National

Socialist organization.”5 Section 86a applies similarly to the use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations. This may include “flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans, and forms of greeting.”

Penalties for such crimes may include up to three years imprisonment or a fine.6

It is worth noting that denying the Holocaust specifically was not criminalized in

Germany until a revision of Section 130 of the Criminal Code in 1994. From the language of the statute, Germany offers two primary ways to prosecute those accused of Holocaust denial.

Section 130 Subsection 3 makes Holocaust denial a crime as an offense against the public peace, while Subsection 4 considers Holocaust denial a form of libel against the victims.7

Enforcement of these laws, however, can only be carried out on German territory. As such, the internet has now become the main source for neo-Nazi and other anti-Semitic propaganda in the country. In fact, a 2018 survey conducted by the European Union

Fundamental Rights Agency (EU FRA) found that 80 per cent of European Jews reported encountering anti-Semitic comments online.8 Sites are often set up in countries such as the

United States or Denmark where the content is not prohibited. Music has also become a popular means of disseminating anti-Semitic and racist messaging. Extremist groups and political parties, such as the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), have been known to distribute music

4 and hold concerts targeting youth to increase support.9 The German government has banned over one thousand songs deemed to be anti-Semitic or sympathetic to Nazism, but until recently it had been difficult to identify such music on the radio or at rallies and other events. However, German police developed an app in 2013, known as “Nazi Shazam,” that allows authorities to recognize banned songs in just seconds via an “audio fingerprint.”10 Nonetheless, developments in technology and an inability to police activity emanating from outside the country present continuing challenges to German authorities in regard to enforcing the legal measures against anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial.

German-Jewish Immigration Policy

Germany’s Basic Law has had a provision since 1949 allowing for former German citizens and their descendants who were persecuted on political, racial, or religious grounds during the period of Nazi rule to apply to have their German citizenship reinstated.11 Of course, this provision may apply to a great number of Jews. In an effort to move toward greater reconciliation with the Jewish community and rebuild Jewish communities lost due to the

Holocaust, Germany has instituted policies to allow, and arguably encourage, Jewish immigration to the country. In 1990, Germany’s estimated Jewish population was about 28,000 – a small number compared to the pre-World War II population of 505,000 in 1933.12 However, once the Soviet Union fell and the Cold War ended, there was a substantial population of Jews and their descendants from former Soviet states, many of whom had German roots, who could now apply to have their German citizenship reinstated.

Consequently, the German government under the Chancellorship of Helmut Kohl created a law in 1991 that allowed Jews from the former Soviet Union to immigrate with few

5 restrictions. To gain entry, the prospective immigrant needed only to submit an application along with sufficient proof of his/her Jewish identity.13 In crafting the policy, Kohl met with the

Central Council of Jews in Germany and was sympathetic to the organization’s calls to loosen immigration restrictions on former Soviet Jews as a humanitarian gesture and part of an effort to work toward reconciliation with the wider Jewish community.14 Officially, most Jews emigrating from the former Soviet Union were classified by the German government as refugees – hence the humanitarian motivation. However, the loosening of immigration restrictions put Jews on a path to reclaim citizenship similar to that for ethnic Germans from former Soviet states – an equivalency drawn in part to work toward reconciliation.15 Despite calls from some government officials to limit the number of Jewish immigrants or impose stricter entry criteria, such measures were rejected. Heinz Galinski, the chairman of the Central Council and an Auschwitz survivor, strongly opposed the entry criteria proposals by arguing, “I, who was exposed to the selection process at Auschwitz, would never give way to [another] selection process.”16 Such arguments were indeed persuasive in shaping German-Jewish immigration policy in the 1990’s.

From 1990 to 2000, Germany received more than 5,000 new Jewish immigrants each year.17 In order to help integrate these new populations, the state provided the recently arrived

Jewish immigrants with a residence permit, the right to social assistance, housing, and language training.18 Consequently, the German government spent what equates to tens of millions of dollars per year on the program.19 The reestablishment of Jewish communities in Germany was a goal of Jewish leaders such as Galinski, as well as some German politicians. This was indeed one reason given to justify the costs. Manfred Becker, a senior city official, stated that, “The reestablishment of a Jewish community is a kind of victory over the Nazis . . . This is the point,

6 even if such immigration costs money. We feel a sense of moral obligation on the German side.”20

However, not all were pleased with the program and a number of problems began to spark public discussions in the early 2000’s. Consequently, the law pertaining to Jewish immigrants to Germany was reformed in 2005. Changes to the law were made in order to counter problems with integration and the financial burden to the state in the form of welfare payments.

Additionally, the Israeli government had been putting pressure on Germany to tighten its immigration laws with regard to Jewish immigration, so that more Jews would choose to settle in

Israel. In 2004, for example, 20,000 Jews migrated to Germany whereas only 11,000 went to

Israel.21 For these reasons, Germany enacted a few specific reforms, such as requirements that new Jewish immigrants be under forty-five years old, financially self-sufficient prior to immigrating, and have a working knowledge of German. These requirements are similar to those for persons wishing to enter Germany for purposes of family reunification. Jewish immigrants must also show an invitation from a Jewish Community in Germany.22

The primary motivation behind opening Jewish immigration was simple: help restore domestic Jewish communities in order to improve relations between Germans and Jews. And while the number of Jews in Germany has increased since 1990, there is no consensus on whether the initiative has been successful in achieving the objectives that motivated the policy.

Some scholars argue that by treating Jewish immigrants as a special category, this has in effect set the group apart and hindered their overall integration into German society.23 Also, given the secularity and mixed heritage of many post-Soviet Jews, many have questioned the authenticity of their Jewish identity.24 So, while it is clear that the loosening of immigration policy toward

7 Jews in the early 1990’s has greatly increased the number of Jews in Germany, debate remains as to whether or not the policy has actually improved German-Jewish relations.

The Legal Status of Judaism

It is important to remember that while Germany has no state church and guarantees for the freedom of religion in Article IV of its Basic Law, the state does in fact play a role in providing support to otherwise independent religious institutions. However, religious institutions in Germany must be considered a legal unit in order to receive the recognition and support provided by the state in the form of tax benefits and subsidies. In other words, many religious institutions in Germany may engage in partnership with the state to attain certain benefits.

Religious institutions may apply to be considered a Public Law Corporation (PLC) under

German law, which allows the institution to select chaplains for select state institutions, such as the military, and levy a tithe (averaging about 9 per cent of one’s income tax) on its members and collected by the state.25

For most of the post-WWII period, PLC status was granted to primarily Christian institutions, but in 2003 the German government took a special step to improve relations with the

Jewish community. The German government and the domestic Jewish Community (the capital C signifies the distinguishing status of the German Community as a legal unit) entered into a state treaty (Staatsvertrag) in order to officially establish a relationship that would substantially raise the amount of money the Community would receive as a religious institution and provide it legal status similar to that of the major Christian denominations.26

The treaty is known as the 2003 State Agreement on Cooperation and was agreed to by both the federal government and the Central Council of Jews in Germany. Germany’s Jewish

8 Community had long received financial help from the German federal and state governments, but the 2003 agreement provided an official, legal basis for such subsidies with gradual increases.

Since 2003, federal funding to the Central Council of Jews in Germany increased from 3 billion

Euros per year to 13 billion Euros per year in 2018.2728 The agreement emphasizes that the

Central Council is to support all branches of Judaism with the funds provided and report annually to the federal government on their use. Additionally, the German federal government provides financial support to Jewish educational institutions, such as the Hochschule für Judische

Studien in Heidelberg, the Rabbi Centre at the University of Potsdam, and the Leo Baeck

Institute. The federal government also began covering 50 per cent of maintenance costs for

Jewish cemeteries in the country.29

Another emphasis of the 2003 Agreement was security for Jewish institutions and places of worship. The Agreement was officially signed on Holocaust Commemoration Day and a number of officials, including then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, condemned all anti-Semitic acts and vowed to allocate increased resources used to investigate such incidents and prosecute the perpetrators.30 Additionally, the state pledged to provide 24-hour police protection at synagogues and other Jewish institutions.31

The 2003 Agreement legally put Judaism on a status similar to major Christian denominations, and also emphasized a degree of partnership between the state and Jewish institutions making it a transformative step in relations between the German state and its Jewish population. Increases in funding to the Jewish Community and related educational institutions may be a contributing factor in reviving modern Jewish life in the country. The increased emphasis placed on security and resources allocated to the investigation and prosecution of anti-

Semitic acts by the federal government was also a significant step.

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Germany’s Public Diplomacy Approach

A unique aspect of public diplomacy on issues such as anti-Semitism is the importance of domestic engagement in the process. Much of the literature on public diplomacy focuses on the concept of promotion and a country’s efforts to emphasize the positive aspects of its culture, political values, and foreign policies. However, events such as genocide can overwhelm international perceptions about a particular country and thus need to be addressed publicly. In order for international messaging on such issues to be credible, countries must first demonstrate domestic progress on these issues. As Claudia Auer and Alice Srugies argue, “Critical self- reflection also includes reprocessing Germany’s past as a precondition for its external representation … Against the backdrop of a growing interconnection of the national and international spheres, this strategy must also apply to domestic audiences.”32 This argument applies directly to the way in which Germany has approached public diplomacy in the post-Cold

War era. In order to develop credible messaging internationally, countries must have a certain consistency between their domestic affairs and the messages they intend to distribute abroad. In other words, the motivations behind the German government’s responses to anti-Semitism are related to both the country’s desire to ensure domestic tranquillity and promote a positive image abroad. This section will address Germany’s public diplomacy approach on this issue, the context and motivations guiding the approach, as well as some of the initiatives that have been implemented.

10 Development of Germany’s Public Diplomacy

Although Germany has long placed an emphasis on the cultural and educational aspects of foreign policy, the German conception of public diplomacy has shifted greatly and especially following the end of the Cold War. The totalitarian Nazi regime, while active in promoting their values and culture internationally, allowed little to no room for pluralistic ideas or critical self- reflection – elements central to the credibility of a state’s messages. Moreover, the GDR, while not necessarily analogous to the Nazis in their use of state repression, also maintained centralized, non-pluralistic messaging.33 However, once these governments ceased to exist, so did their goals and messaging. The reunification of Germany in 1990 strengthened the country’s place in the world and consequently thrust upon it greater responsibility for cooperation internationally, and especially within Europe.

As a response to Germany’s newfound standing and inherent responsibilities, the German

Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) developed a strategic document in 1999 called

Konzeption 2000, which sought to outline the primary goals and principles of Germany’s public diplomacy efforts. Konzeption 2000 focused on four main areas: 1) fostering German foreign cultural and educational political efforts abroad; 2) establishing and maintaining a positive modern image of Germany abroad; 3) furthering European integration; 4) preventing conflicts by setting up a dialogue on values.34 One could argue that the problem of anti-Semitism, and outsiders’ perceptions of the problem in Germany, undermined Germany’s goals in each of these four areas, and therefore became critical to address publicly.

Konzeption 2000 was a crucially important document in the formation of Germany’s public diplomacy approach and laid the groundwork for a number of programs that have become influential in addressing anti-Semitism. Notably, much of the document focuses on youth

11 education in collaboration with other countries to inform young people about the crimes and atrocities of the past in order to prevent future violence. One initiative that has been central to this effort has been the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education,

Remembrance and Research. The Task Force began in 1998 in cooperation with Sweden, the

United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Germany. Activities that the Task Force has undertaken include informational exchanges among students, developing textbooks, and educating teachers on how to discuss the topic of anti-Semitism to students.35 This initiative is done in conjunction with other youth exchange, sports, and cultural education programs. The

Task Force and its related activities are a prime example of the connections between the domestic and international realms in Germany’s public diplomacy, as well as the efforts to counter anti-Semitism and cope with issues of the past.

Beginning in 1990, Germany’s Federal Foreign Office (AA) assumed the role of identifying global problems and developing the framework through which Germany’s public diplomacy operates. In this way, the AA has acted as a leader in prioritizing the issues upon which the country’s messaging and other public diplomacy efforts are based. And since 1990, one of the AA’s primary goals has been “consolidation of the unity of the German

Kulturnation.”36 This statement means that the AA sought to integrate the public diplomacy approaches of the FRG and GDR within the structure of the FRG to project the image of

Germany as a democratic, trustworthy nation that is defined by its culture. This goal was driven in part by a desire to separate the contemporary, peaceful state to that of the aggressive, violent

Nazi past. Consequently, this message draws greater attention to Germany’s domestic environment and in some ways invites outsiders to observe closely in what ways the country has progressed beyond the negative aspects of its history.

12 This desire to demonstrate the country’s progress has penetrated numerous areas of its public diplomacy. While the AA was indeed the leading agency in facilitating and spawning

Germany’s early public diplomacy approach, today’s actors are eager to avoid any impressions of replicating the centralized nature of past propaganda ministries.37 Consequently, Germany adopted what is known as a “network oriented” strategy to public diplomacy as part of

Konzeption 2000.38 Under this approach, several federal ministries finance and coordinate public diplomacy efforts, but the majority of activities are carried out by intermediary organizations that operate largely autonomously, such as the Goethe Institute, the German Academic Exchange

Service, and the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations.39 This type of approach allows these intermediary organizations to specialize in certain issues and develop domestic and international relationships with other organizations to spread messaging and develop solutions to problems of concern. Notably, the German public diplomacy approach tends to take advantage of the relatively well-developed German civil society organizations in order to amplify messaging both domestically and internationally.

Major Civil Society Organizations

There are a number of non-governmental organizations that have been instrumental in forging relationships and delivering the messaging of Germany’s public diplomacy approach against anti-Semitism. One of the organizations most targeted on this particular goal is the

Amadeu Antonio Foundation (AAS), which was established in 1998 and named after one of reunified Germany’s first victims of right-wing extremist violence. The AAS operates under the patronage of Wolfgang Thierse, a former president of the Bundestag, and has carried out more than 1,350 projects and initiatives aimed at countering anti-Semitism and other forms of

13 racism.40 The AAS maintains a heavy online presence and tends to focus on developing and implementing strategies to counter extremist violence and rhetoric on the local level.

AAS’s online initiatives often are collaborative efforts with media and other civil society organizations with each targeting anti-Semitism from different perspectives. The AAS operates an online platform called Mut gegen rechte Gewalt (Courage against right-wing violence) in partnership with Stern magazine, which chronicles trends in anti-Semitic violence and proposes strategies to prevent future incidents.41 Similarly, the AAS operates the website Belltower News, formerly known as Netz gegen Nazis (Net Against Nazis), in partnership with Die Zeit newspaper that focuses on reporting the activities of right-wing extremist groups online and contains a database of known extremist group activities in Germany. The staff of this particular website specializes in consulting on how to deal with extremist group members online and in other settings such as the workplace.42 As technology develops and extremist groups continually adapt to new technology in their activities, the AAS has worked to develop countermeasures to oppose the spread of extremist ideology.

Additionally, the AAS has been active at the grassroots level by providing communities with financial, administrative, and expertise support to counter anti-Semitic and other extremist influences. The AAS is active in opposing Neo-Nazi groups in local, state, and national elections through a program called Kein Ort für Neo-Nazis (No place for Neo-Nazis). This initiative works to prevent the election of anti-Semitic and racist candidates to elected office. One of the most prominent examples of the program has been in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern where the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) had won six seats in the state parliament

(Landtag) in 2006 and held such seats after the state elections in 2011. That same year, the AAS launched the Kein Ort für Neo-Nazis program within the state in an attempt to ultimately defeat

14 the party and force them out of the Landtag.43 Educational initiatives were launched to counter far-right propaganda, demonstrations were organized, and a Rock Against the Right concert was held to encourage youth to vote and reject the far-right.44 The NPD was ultimately defeated in

2016 receiving only half of their previous vote share and fell below the threshold to receive seats in the Landtag. The AAS continues to operate the Kein Ort für Neo-Nazis program in

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern with the stated goal to “prevent the re-entry of the NPD into the state parliament.”45

The AAS also supports numerous youth initiatives that promote youth cultures opposed to anti-Semitism, intolerance, and racism. The goal of these initiatives is to weaken the recruitment prospects of Neo-Nazi and other extremist organizations. Finally, the AAS operates a program for victims of anti-Semitic and other racist violence called the Opferfund Cura

(Victims’ Fund Cura). This initiative provides direct support to the victims’ of extremist violence, informs others about the problems they face, and offers consultations about the best methods for support.46 Through these various initiatives, the Amadeu Antonio Foundation has become one of the most active civil society organizations in terms of responding to the problem of anti-Semitism in Germany.

Another organization that carries out similar work against anti-Semitism and extremism is the Centre for Democratic Culture (ZDK), which was founded in 1997 with a particular focus on countering extremism in the “new” German states of the former GDR. While the ZDK carries out similar initiatives to the AAS, such as outreach to media, academia, regional governments, and businesses to counter extremist influences, the tactics and emphases of the ZDK tend to differ in some important ways. The ZDK is known for employing “guerrilla tactics” in terms of confronting extremist group members and their efforts to convince members to leave their

15 particular movements. A prime example of such tactics came in 2012 when the ZDK distributed t-shirts with the words “Hardcore Rebels” at a rock concert known to be popular with extremist group followers. After the first wash, the writing on the shirts would disappear and be replaced with the words “What your shirt did, you can also. We will help you solve right-wing extremism.”47 The ZDK also organizes a number of marches, and counterdemonstrations to those of far-right and Neo-Nazi groups.48

Perhaps the most noteworthy of the ZDK’s activities is its involvement in the Exit-

Deutschland program, which provides a means for former far-right and Neo-Nazi members to leave their respective organizations and lifestyles. In fact, one of the co-founders of the program,

Ingo Hasselbach, was a former Neo-Nazi activist himself. Exit-Deutschland is largely financed by the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs but takes donations from a number of sources.49 The program helps members of extremist groups, who have a desire to leave, with counselling, education, and in some instances, security is even provided to those members who have been threatened. The goal of the program is to provide former extremists with personal skills and insight to re-orientate their personal relationships and daily lifestyles. In 2013, the German

Cabinet made the decision to promote the program long-term and agreed to provide support through at least 2019.50 In October 2019, the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs agreed to financially support Exit-Deutschland on an annual basis.51 From May 2000 to July 2020, Exit-

Deutschland claimed to have helped over 500 former extremists overcome their ideologies and leave their organizations with a recidivism rate of only 3 per cent.52

Beyond merely combatting far-right and other anti-Semitic groups, German civil society groups, at times in conjunction with governmental agencies, have also been involved in emphasizing the importance of the country’s Jewish community and culture. Many of these

16 initiatives are centred in Berlin, which has an estimated Jewish population of between 30,000 and 40,000.53 One of the most prominent examples of these efforts has been the restoration and reopening of the Jewish Museum of Berlin. The first Jewish Museum of Berlin was founded in

1933 but was closed by the Nazis in 1938. Discussions to construct a new Jewish Museum trace back to the 1970’s; however, it was not until 1992 that a cornerstone for the new museum was finally laid.54 The museum’s building was completed in 1999 and officially opened in September

2001 with a permanent exhibition entitled “Two Millennia of German Jewish History” and seeks to present Germany through the eyes of the country’s Jewish minority. The Academy of the

Jewish Museum Berlin was established in 2012 to serve as a forum for discussion in the community on issues of pluralism and the rights of minority populations in Germany.55 The museum has also worked closely with the Leo Baeck Institute and its branches in New York,

London, and Jerusalem to promote education on Jewish life in Germany.56

Another organization that has been heavily involved in engaging German Jews with others around the world has been the Jewish Community of Berlin. The Jewish Community of

Berlin was established in 1671 but has recently become an active organization in carrying out

Germany’s public diplomacy messaging with both governmental and corporate partners sponsoring these efforts. One of the more prominent initiatives has been the Days of Jewish

Culture, which began as a cultural festival in Berlin in 1987 but has since spread internationally.

Each year, the festivals are dedicated to a different theme and feature theatrical performances, readings, discussions, exhibitions, and concerts from German and international performers all in an effort to educate the public and build good will toward the Jewish community.57 Sponsors of the event have included the Israeli embassy, Mercedes Benz, and the Berliner Morgenpost among others.58

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Impacts on Far-Right Groups

As far-right groups account for approximately 93 per cent of all anti-Semitic crimes and

85 per cent of violent anti-Semitic attacks within Germany, this is where the country’s response to anti-Semitism is primarily focused. For comparison, left-wing groups account for only 0.3 per cent of anti-Semitic crimes and 1.7 per cent of violent anti-Semitic attacks within the country.59

Therefore, while some left-wing groups may express anti-Semitic beliefs, such groups are far less likely than the far-right to commit crimes or violent attacks targeting Jews. Groups classified as far-right include Neo-Nazis, skinheads, and certain political parties, such as the NPD, die

Republikaner, the former DVU (German People’s Union), and other groups with similar ideologies. Germany’s Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution tracks membership in such groups and releases the data via annual reports on extremism.

Membership in far-right groups reached its peak in 1993 with 64,500 members and remained relatively steady throughout the 1990’s. However, since the implementation of

Konzeption 2000, far-right group membership steadily declined from 52,600 in 2000 to a low of

22,150 in 2014. However, it is worth noting that despite these declines, far-right group membership increased slightly to 25,350 members as of 2018.60 Nonetheless, these data indicate that efforts to counter far-right groups have been effective in terms of decreasing membership and the ability of such groups to recruit new members. While it is true that membership in

German political parties overall declined as well – with an average decline of 27 per cent from

1993 to 2016 – far-right groups experienced a 66 per cent decrease over the same period.61 This discrepancy indicates that there are likely additional factors influencing the sharp declines in far-

18 right group membership. Particularly since these declines were sharpest after the year 2000, it is likely that public diplomacy initiatives were a contributing factor.

These declines in far-right group membership are complemented by consistent declines in general anti-Semitic beliefs among the German public. In a biannual survey conducted by the

University of Leipzig, respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement “there is something strange about Jews and they do not belong with us.” Among those surveyed, a high of

17.2 per cent agreed in 2002 with a low of 9.1 per cent agreeing in 2018. When asked if they agreed with the statement “Jews have too much influence in society,” a high of 22.9 per cent agreed in 2002 with a low of 10.1 per cent agreeing in 2018.62 With rare exceptions, the number of respondents agreeing with each statement tended to decline each year the survey was conducted. These results indicate that not only has far-right group membership declined since

2000 but so has general antipathy toward Jews.

Domestic Jewish Revival

A significant aspect of Germany’s efforts to counter anti-Semitism has also been efforts to improve the circumstances of the country’s domestic Jewish community. Since 1990,

Germany has become home to the world’s fastest growing Jewish population.63 This is in part due to the country’s loosening of immigration law for Jewish immigrants – 90 per cent of

German Jews are, in fact, immigrants.64 In 1990, there were fewer than 30,000 Jews in Germany, but, as of 2012, there were over 100,000 who belonged to Jewish religious communities, and a total population with a Jewish background estimated to be over 200,000. Included in these increases are some 20,000 Israeli Jews who have immigrated to Germany.65 These increases

19 mean that Germany, as of 2015, has not only the fastest growing, but also the third largest Jewish population in Europe following France and the United Kingdom.66

With the increases in Germany’s Jewish population, the number of Jewish institutions and representations of the religion have also risen within a number of German cities. Since 1990, the number of synagogues in Germany rose from only a handful to 130 as of 2015. While this number is still far less than the 2,800 synagogues that were in the country in 1933, there has nonetheless been a notable increase since German reunification. Cities, such as Mainz, Dresden,

Essen, and others, whose synagogues were either destroyed or heavily damaged by the Nazis or fighting in World War II have only since 2000 had these structures rebuilt.67

In order to serve these growing Jewish communities throughout the country, both Jewish organizations and even the German government have placed an emphasis on bolstering the country’s theology schools to train a greater number of rabbis domestically. In 2013, on the 75th anniversary of Kristallnacht, the University of Potsdam opened the first state-funded Jewish theology school in Europe. At the school’s opening, German President Joachim Gauck stated,

“In Germany, of all places, where the Jewish intelligentsia . . . was expelled and murdered,

Jewish theology is finally being given its proper role.”68 An important motivation behind opening the school has been to help put Judaism in Germany on equal footing with Christianity in order to both help revive the religion within the country and create new opportunities for interfaith dialogue.69 In addition to the opening of new synagogues, Jewish cultural institutions, and an increasing Jewish population, the country’s first modern school of Jewish theology is an important marker in the country’s wider Jewish revival.

Current Challenges

20 Despite the membership decline in far-right groups and revival of Jewish communities since the 1990’s, there have been numerous high-profile incidents of far-right influence and violence in recent years that have run counter to the messaging of progress in German-Jewish relations. In fact, 2019 marked the highest year of anti-Semitic crimes (2,032) in Germany since the country began keeping data in 2001. Prior to 2015, anti-Semitic crime in Germany tended to fluctuate from year-to-year without showing a consistent trend; however, there have been consistent year-over-year increases since that time. This trend has resulted in a 49 per cent increase in anti-Semitic crime from 2015 to 2019.70 This rise in violence received international media coverage with the 2019 shooting targeting a Synagogue in the city of Halle, which resulted in the deaths of two nearby individuals. The Halle attack received increased attention in large part due to the shooter live-streaming the attack online – a recent trend with regard to far- right attacks around the world.71

Accompanying this rise in anti-Semitic violence has been the rise of the Alternative for

Germany (AfD) – the first major far-right party to achieve national representation in the German

Bundestag since reunification. While running on a platform of German nationalism and anti- immigration policies, the AfD has sought to capitalize on the anxiety of many Germans regarding policies ranging from the eurozone crisis to an influx of refugees fleeing violence in

Syria. However, elements of the party have also been accused of exploiting anti-Semitism as well. For example, Björn Höcke, one of the founders of the AfD, was quoted in a 2017 speech of stating in reference to the Berlin Holocaust Memorial, “Germans are the only people in the world who plant a monument of shame in the heart of the capital.”72 Despite such comments and accusations, the AfD was able to garner 12.6 per cent of the vote in Germany’s 2017 federal

21 elections and thus became the first far-right party to pass the mandatory 5 per cent threshold and attain seats in the Bundestag.

In order to differentiate themselves from other far-right parties such as the NPD and die

Republikaner, the AfD has claimed the support of German Jews and embraced a group known as

Jews in the AfD. One of the primary reasons for this shift from other far-right parties is likely that it enables the AfD to shield itself from accusations of anti-Semitism and create a broader base of support. As Rogers Brubaker argues, “They can remain marginal and appeal to a limited sector of the electorate, or they can try to become mainstream and overcome barriers that prevent other parties from cooperating with them.”73 This has ostensibly been a more successful approach as the AfD has risen to the third largest party in the Bundestag since 2017. Cas Mudde adds to this point by arguing that parties such as the AfD “use philo-Semitism to appear more moderate, or not radical right, given that the radical right is still very much associated with anti-

Semitism in Europe.”74 In further attempting to shield itself from accusations of anti-Semitism, the AfD has contended that modern anti-Semitism is not so much a problem of the far-right, but rather Germany’s growing Muslim population. This argument aligns with the party’s anti- immigrant platform and allows the AfD to frame itself as not an adversary of the country’s

Jewish community but rather an ally. As Brubaker contends “Anti-Muslimism has become a very successful master frame for radical-right, anti-immigrant parties throughout Europe in the last 15 years. The logic is that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”75 So, while the AfD may align with other far-right parties in their platforms and rhetoric, the AfD has also developed new ways to shield itself from accusations of anti-Semitism and appear more mainstream achieving electoral successes that have eluded similar parties.

22 Conclusion

While Germany continues to grapple with its fraught history of anti-Semitism and genocide, the modern German state has worked to develop measures to counter the influences of anti-Semitism and present a renewed, progressive image of the country domestically and abroad.

This German approach is multifaceted involving numerous organizations – both governmental and non-governmental. On the governmental side, laws regarding hate speech, incitement, and immigration have been reformed and a legal partnership with the domestic Jewish community has been developed to aid in the community’s revitalisation. In terms of non-governmental participation, Germany has taken a unique approach to public diplomacy by emphasizing self- critical reflection and a decentralized structure to demonstrate the country’s progress. Though the state often plays a facilitating role, this approach has empowered various civil society organizations, such as the AAS, the ZDK, and Exit-Deutschland, to develop their own methods to counter anti-Semitism and political extremism.

This overall approach combining anti-radicalization legal measures and public diplomacy has nonetheless achieved mixed-results since reunification in 1990. Germany’s approach provides evidence of success in reducing far-right group membership and general antipathy toward Jews over time. Germany has also experienced a surge of Jewish migration in many ways rebuilding communities that had been lost following the Holocaust and World War II – part of an effort to move toward greater reconciliation between the country and the Jewish community.

Nonetheless, the growing popularity of certain populist, nationalist political parties, such as the

AfD, pervasive anti-Semitic content online, and an increasing number of anti-Semitic crimes suggest new challenges to the narrative of a progressive Germany successfully reconciling with

23 its past. While Germany’s approach to countering anti-Semitism has shown notable successes in certain areas, there remain others where the current approach must adapt.

Countering these evolving challenges will require renewed understanding and innovation on the part of scholars, policymakers, and activists going forward. Attempting to push back against extremist ideologies while maintaining open civic debate is a challenge for any free society and Germany is no exception. This becomes increasingly difficult as radical groups and parties evolve in their messaging to become more mainstream. Such developments may make applying legal measures, such as laws against hate speech and incitement, increasingly difficult.

Civic engagement through organizations such as the AAS and Exit-Deutschland have shown some promise in terms of removing far-right politicians from office and followers from such groups; however, more research is necessary to more fully understand the impacts of these efforts, particularly as the social and political dynamics of the country evolve in the twenty-first century.

Notes

1 Erik Kirschbaum and Bethan John, “At a Landmark Berlin Rally, Merkel Vows to Fight Anti-Semitism,” Reuters, 14 September 2014.

2 Bundestag, “Grundgesetz,” https://www.bundestag.de/grundgesetz (accessed 30 July 2020). 3 Ibid.

4 Michael Whine, “Expanding Holocaust Denial and Legislation Against It,” Jewish Political Studies Review 20, no. 1 (2008): 57-77, here 61, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548781.003.0027

5 German Ministry of Justice, “Verbreiten von Propagandamitteln verfassungswidriger Organisationen,” http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__86a.html (accessed 1 August 2020).

6 German Ministry of Justice, “Verwenden von Kennzeichen verfassungswidriger

24

Organisationen,” http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__86.html (accessed 1 August 2020).

7 Bert Swart, “Denying Shoah.” in Personal Autonomy, The Private Sphere and Criminal Law: A Comparative Study, ed. Peter Alldridge and Chrisje Brants (Portland, OR: Hart, 2001), 161-180, here 164.

8 EU Fundamental Rights Agency, “Experiences and Perceptions of Anti-Semitism: Second Survey on Discrimination and Hate Crime Against Jews in the EU,” https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of- -survey_en.pdf (accessed 3 August 2020).

9 “Neo-Nazis Spreading Message and Recruiting Through Music,” Deutsche Welle, 12 December 2005.

10 Rob Williams, “’Nazi Shazam’: German Authorities Plan to Use App to Banned Neo-Nazi Music at Rallies,” The Independent, 3 December 2013.

11 German Foreign Ministry, “Restored Citizenship,” https://www.germany.info/us- en/service/03-Citizenship/restoration-of-german-citizenship/925120 (accessed 25 July 2020).

12 U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Germany: Jewish Population in 1933,” https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/germany-jewish-population-in-1933 (accessed 27 July 2020).

13 Barbara Dietz, “German and Jewish Migration from the Former Soviet Union to Germany: Background, Trends, and Implications,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 26, no. 4 (2000): 635-652, https://doi.org/10.1080/713680499

14 “Einwanderer: So Leise wie Möglich,” Der Spiegel, 27 May 1996.

15 Douglas Klusmeyer and Demetrios Papademetriou, Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 192.

16 Der Spiegel, “Einwanderer: So Leise wie Möglich.”

17 Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, 190.

18 Der Spiegel, “Einwanderer: So Leise wie Möglich.”

19 Roger Cohen, “Former Soviet Jews Find Uneasy Peace in Germany,” New York Times, 6 August 2000.

20 Ibid.

21 Jabeen Bhatti, “Germany’s Jews Mull Future as Immigration Drops,” Deutsche Welle, 27 November 2006.

25

22 Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, 195.

23 Ibid., 196.

24 L. Remennick, “Idealists Headed to Israel, Pragmatics Chose Europe: Identity Dilemmas and Social Incorporation among Former Soviet Jews Who Immigrated to German,” Immigrants and Minorities 23, no. 1 (2005): 30-58, here 50.

25 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Germany.” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/171696.pdf (accessed 5 August 2020).

26 Jeffrey Peck, Being Jewish in the New Germany (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2006), 6-7.

27 “Germany Boosts Financial Support for Jewish Community,” Deutsche Welle, 25 September 2008.

28 Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Strengthening the Jewish Community in Germany,” Federal Ministry of the Interior, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/EN/2018/07/zentralrat-der-juden.html (accessed 2 August 2020).

29 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Germany.”

30 “Germany’s Jews Sign Historic Pact; France Torn by Talk of Anti-Semitism,” Haaretz, 28 January 2003.

31 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Germany.”

32 Claudia Auer and Alice Srugies, “Public Diplomacy in Germany,” Perspectives on Public Diplomacy 5 (2013) 1-56, here 26.

33 Ibid., 21-23.

34 German Federal Foreign Office, “Auswärtige Kulturpolitik – Konzeption 2000,” https://www.ifa.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ifa_studie_weigel_transnationale- auswaertige_kulturpolitik.pdf (accessed 3 August 2020).

35 Ibid.

36 Britt Inga Karten, “Staatliche Imagearbeit: Die Public Diplomacy des Auswärtigen Amtes,” in Die amerikanische Regierung gegen die Weltöffentlichkeit? Theoretische und empirische Analysen der Public Diplomacy zum Irakkrieg, ed. Thomas Jäger and Henrike Viehrig, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 163–90, here 163.

26

37 Auer and Srugies, “Public Diplomacy in Germany,” 25.

38 Thomas Bagger, “Netzwerkpolitik,” Internationale Politik, January 2013, 44-50, here 47-48.

39 Auer and Srugies, “Public Diplomacy in Germany,” 25.

40 Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, “Projektförderung,” https://www.amadeu-antonio- stiftung.de/foerderung/ (accessed 2 August 2020).

41 Mut gegen rechte Gewalt, “Über uns,” https://www.mut-gegen-rechte-gewalt.de/ueber-uns (accessed 2 August 2020).

42 Belltower News, “Startseite,” https://www.belltower.news/ (accessed 2 August 2020).

43 Ulrich Linse, “Völkisch-jugendbewegte Siedlungen im 20. Und 21. Jahrhundert,” in Jugendbewegung, Antisemitismus und Rechtsradikale Politik, ed. Gideon Botsch and Josef Haverkamp (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 29-73.

44 Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, “Against Nazis in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,” https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/gegen-nazis-in-mecklenburg-vorpommern-3457-7293/ (accessed 8 August 2020).

45 Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, “Empowerment, Youth Work, and Human-Rights Education,” https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/en/democratic-culture/ (accessed 8 August 2020).

46 Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, “Themes,” https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/en/themes/ (accessed 2 August 2020).

47 Ayla Mayer, “Ein Euro pro Hassposting: Rassisten sammeln unfreiwillig für Flüchtlinge,” Der Spiegel, 23 October 2015.

48 Zentrum Demokratische Kultur, “Startseite,” http://zentrum-demokratische-kultur.de/start/ (accessed 3 August 2020).

49 Exit-Deutschland, “Über uns,” https://www.exit-deutschland.de/exit/?c=ueber-unsx (accessed 2 August 2020).

50 Dietmar Ostermann, “’Exit’ Dropout Initiative Can Continue,” Badische Zeitung, 22 March 2013.

51 “Familienministerin Griffey will nun doch Exit-Programm fördern,” Der Spiegel, 17 October 2019.

52 Exit-Deutschland, “EXIT-Germany: We Provide Ways Out of Extremism,” http://www.exit- deutschland.de/english/ (accessed 10 August 2020).

27

53 Christoph Strack, “Berlin: Where Jews Want to Live,” Deutsche Welle, 9 November 2018.

54 Jewish Museum Berlin, “Background,” http://www.jmberlin.de/main/EN/04-About-The- Museum/02-History-Museum/01-background.php (accessed 8 August 2020).

55 Jewish Museum Berlin, “The W. Michael Blumenthal Academy of the Jewish Museum Berlin.” http://www.jmberlin.de/main/EN/03b-Academy/00-academy.php (accessed 7 August 2020).

56 Foundation of the Jewish Museum Berlin, Highlights from the Jewish Museum Berlin (Berlin: Nicolari-Verlag, 2010).

57 Jewish Community of Berlin, “Days of Jewish Culture,” http://www.jg- berlin.org/en/institutions/culture/juedische-kulturtage.html (accessed 4 August 2020).

58 Jewish Community of Berlin, “Jüdische Kulturtage 2012,” http://www.jg- berlin.org/fileadmin/redaktion/downloads/JKT_2012_Programmheft.pdf (accessed 4 August 2020).

59 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, “Annual Reports on Protection of the Constitution,” https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberic hte (accessed 8 August 2020).

60 Ibid.

61 Oskar Niedermayer, Parteimitglieder in Deutschland: Version 2016 (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2016), 2.

62 Oliver Decker and Elmar Brähler, Flucht ins Autoritäte: Rechtextreme Dynamiken in der Mitte der Gesellschaft (Giessen: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2018).

63 Associated Press, “Epicenter of Holocaust Now Fastest-Growing Jewish Community,” Haaretz, 8 April 2014.

64 Eliezer Ben-Rafael, “Germany’s Russian Speaking Jews,” in Being Jewish in 21st Century Germany, ed. Olaf Glöckner and Haim Fireberg (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015), 63-80, here 67.

65 David Crossland, “We Can Resume Our Common History: New Paper Covers Revival of German Jewish Life,” Der Spiegel, 4 January 2012.

66 Ben-Rafael, “Germany’s Russian Speaking Jews,” 69.

67 “Synagogues in Germany,” Deutsche Welle, 8 November 2018.

28

68 Alona Ferber, “Historical Milestone: Theology School Symbol of Revival of Jewish Life,” Der Spiegel, 20 February 2014.

69 Ibid.

70 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, “Annual Reports on Protection of the Constitution.”

71 Melissa Eddy, Rick Gladstone, and Tiffany Tsu, “Assailant Live-Streamed Attack on German Synagogue,” New York Times, 9 October 2019.

72 Madeline Chambers, “German AfD Rightist Triggers Fury with Holocaust Memorial Comments,” Reuters, 18 January 2017.

73 Sigal Samuel, “Why a Small Jewish Group is Supporting a German Party with Anti-Semitic Ties,” The Atlantic, 7 October 2018.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

29