China Goes Soft in Africa

A Monograph

by

Mr~ Patrick Wesner US AID

School ofAdvanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2016

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14. ABSTRACT Over the last 15 years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has substantially increased its deployment to Africa of economic, diplomatic, and cultural assets with the goal of garnering African support for Chinese international ambitions. Some scholars describe this approach as a broad charm offensive orchestrated through what Joseph Nye referred to as soft power. While many scholars assert that Chinese soft power in Africa has been successful, few have proposed measures with which to assess its actual effectiveness. This monograph explores the extent to which China's soft power efforts in Africa have been successful. To begin to make this determination, favorability polling data, trends on Taiwan's diplomatic relations with African nations, and voting patterns on UN human rights resolutions were examined over the last 20 years. Taken together, these findings suggest that Chinese soft power has been at least moderately successful at helping the PRC achieve its foreign policy objectives in Africa.

1S. SUBJECT TERMS China -Soft Power, Relations with Africa, China's favorability in Africa, Isolation of Taiwan, UN Human Rights Resolutions 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES Mr. Patrick J. Wesner (U) 61 a. REPORT Ib. ABSTRACT Ic. THIS PAGE 19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) (U) (U) (U) 1-913-558-8294 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

Abstract

China Goes Soft in Africa, by 'Mr. Patrick Wesner, 42 pages

Over the last 15 years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has substantially increased its deployment to Africa of economic, diplomatic, and cultural assets with the goal of garnering African support for Chinese international ambitions. Some scholars describe this approach as a broad charm offensive orchestrated through what Joseph Nye referred to as soft power. However, while it is apparent that China presumes that soft power is important to achieving these ambitions, the secretive Chinese government has not published information about how it evaluates the outcomes of its soft power efforts. While many scholars assert that Chinese soft power in Africa has been successful, few have proposed measures with which to assess its actual effectiveness.

The paucity of evidence supporting claims of effective Chinese soft power leads to an obvious research question, namely, to what extent have China's soft power efforts in Africa been successful? To begin to make this determination, it was reasonable to first identify PRC goals. The Chinese foreign policy goals in Africa include bolstering its image and influence in African nations, gaining African support for isolating the Republic of China, and persuading African nations to collaborate with China to shape international norms. Therefore, favorability polling data, trends on Taiwan's diplomatic relations with African nations, and voting patterns on UN human rights resolutions were examined because over time the changes in these measures would indicate the degree to which China has achieved its policy goals.

African public polling information revealed a steady increase in Chinese favorability and influence since China began its push to develop soft power in Africa. Next, the number of African states that have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan has dwindled over the past 20 years, and is at its lowest point since the PRC was recognized in 1971. Lastly, UN voting information on human rights resolutions, although limited, shows that African countries voted with China more frequently after China's soft power push in Africa than before. Taken together, these findings suggest that Chinese soft power has been at least moderately successful at helping the PRC achieve its foreign policy objectives in Africa.

lll Contents

Acknowledgements...... :...... v

Acronyms ...... vi

Tables ...... vii

Introduction ...... 1

The Soft Power Concept ...... 6

Analysis of Soft Power Indicators ...... 17

Pew Research Center Favorability Ratings ...... 19 BBC World Service Country Ratings Poll ...... 19 Afro barometer Polling Information ...... 21 Recognition of Taiwan ...... 28 Attracting Votes at the United Nations ...... 31

Conclusion ...... 36

Limitations of the Study and Areas for Future Research ...... 38

Bibliography ...... 40

IV Acknowledgements

' I would like to thank Ms. Judy Latta for reviewing each draft of this paper and providing extremely useful feedback and suggestions. She was a sounding board throughout the process and motivated me to keep on keeping on in the early days of drafting the paper when I could not see any light at the end of the tunnel.

v Acronyms

AU African Uni~n

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

CAR Central African Republic

CCP Chinese Communist Party

FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

PRC Peoples Republic of China

Roe Republic of China

UN United Nations

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

VI Tables

China's Favorability Ratings in Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania 19

2 Does China have a positive or negative influence in the world? ...... 20

3 Does China has positive or negative influence in your country? ...... 23 ..

4 Which country has the most influence in your country? ...... 24

5 Which country has the best model for future development? ...... 26

6 African countries that have switched to recognize China since 1995 ...... 30

7 Votes on Human Right and Coercive Measures Resolution from 1996-1998 and 2011­ 2013 ······························································································································· 33

8 Votes on Right to Development Resolution from 1997-1999 and 2011-2013 ...... 34

Vll Introduction

The People's Republic of China's (PRC) robust economic growth over the last 15 years

has substantially affected world trade and international relations. This growth has enabled the

PRC to emerge as a global power and has emboldened the Chinese government to use non­

military means to shape international norms and to gamer sway outside of its traditional sphere of

influence. Scholars on China have called attention to the PRC's rapidly increasing deployment of

economic, diplomatic, and cultural assets in support of its international ambitions. Some of these

scholars view China's enhanced deployment of a variety of non-military means as a broad charm

offensive orchestrated through what Joseph Nye referred to as soft power.1

China views sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter referred to as Africa) as a geographic region

critical to the PRC's future and targets Africa with substantial soft power assets. Because of

Africa's size, the number of nations, and its relative potential for broad economic growth,

emerging powers such as China have tried to establish stronger relationships with African leaders and populations. Many African leaders, often faced with domestic poverty and stagnant economic growth, have been receptive to China's attention and influence. Chinese leaders have nurtured these relationships by referring to China as the world's largest developing country and by comparing China's so-called hundred years of humiliation with Africa's suffering under colonialism.2 China's non-interference policy, or promise to not intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries, also makes China's entreaties attractive to African leaders. In contrast,

Western countries are often perceived as paternalistic and hypocritical.3 These partnership

1 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 5-7. Simply stated, soft power refers to the ability to attract others to follow instead of coercing or threatening them to do so.

2 · Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War, 3rd ed. (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012) 310. 3 Jennifer G. Cooke, "China's Soft Power in Africa," In Chinese Soft Power, ed. Carola Mcgiffert (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 27. building endeavors are part of a broader Chinese effort to make international partners comfortable with and supportive of China's rise.4

By all indications, China presumes that soft power enhances its partnerships with African leaders and governments, helps to achieve long and short-term Chinese international objectives, and ultimately, supports the PRC's position as a global super power. However, the secretive

Chinese government has not published any information about how it evaluates the effectiveness of soft power in Africa. Additionally, many scholars have closely followed China's renewed engagement in Africa and have asserted that Chinese soft power in that region has been successful. Few of these commentators, if any, however, have proposed actual measures with which to assess the effectiveness of Chinese soft power efforts. Thus, assertions that China has gained significant influence in Africa through the use of soft power have not been confirmed.

A paucity of evidence supporting claims of effective Chinese soft power leads to an obvious important research question, namely, to what extent have China's soft power efforts in

Africa been successful? There have been several attempts to create soft power indices,5 but these indices have not been adequate for actually evaluating China's soft power in Africa. To begin, they have generally been broad and have assigned cursory soft power rankings to a limited number of countries. Moreover, the existing indices do not specifically measure China's soft power effectiveness in various regions of the world. Therefore, to date, no real measures have been developed for determining whether Chinese soft power efforts in Africa are worthy and effective investments.

4 China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, ed. Robert Rotberg (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008), 297.

5 See, for example, Jon~than McClory, "The New Persuaders: An International Ranking of Soft Power," Institute for Government, December 2010, accessed December 1, 2015, http://prasino.eu/2011 /12/20/soft-power-can-it-be-measured/.

2 To begin to make de~erminations about China's soft power effectiveness, it's reasonable

to tum attention towards Chinese foreign policy goals in Africa. According to Lloyd Thrall,

China's foreign policy seeks to bolster its image and influence in African nations, to gain African

support for isolating the Republic of China (commonly known as Taiwan), and to persuade

African nations to partner with China to counter international norms that China perceives to be

problematic.6 The research task, therefore, was to develop indicators to compare Chinese progress toward achieving its policy goals before and after China substantially increased its soft power

initiative in Africa.

The research revealed that Joseph Nye, in his work on soft power, had suggested a way to measure soft power effectiveness. He argued that favorability polls taken over time using a consistent methodology could be used as proxy indicators to demonstrate soft power effectiveness.7 Thus, one way to measure the success ofthis soft power initiative is to take stock of opinion polls conducted in Africa over the last ten years. Research on this topic determined that the Pew Research Center, BBC World Service, and Afrobarometer have conducted relevant surveys over this period. The polls focused on measuring Africans' perceptions of China's favorability, influence in their country and the world, and economic and political model. Data from these polls provided one measure by which to assess Chinese influence in Africa.

With regards to the second foreign policy objective listed by Thrall, the isolation of

Taiwan, China has sought to undercut Taiwan's sovereignty and isolate it from the international community ever since the People's Republic of China was first recognized by the United Nations in 1971.8 China believes that Taiwan is a renegade province that must eventually be re­

6 Lloyd Thrall, China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 14. 7 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 18. 8 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story ofChina in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 34.

3 incorporated into mainland China. To achieve this end, China has tried to deter African nations

from formally recognizing Taiwan. Thus, the research sought to identify the African nations that

still recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation and maintain formal diplomatic relations with

Taiwan. Further, the research brought to the fore some obvious trends regarding recognition of

Taiwan among African states since 1998. These data provide clear indication that China has been

effective in gaining African support to isolate Taiwan.

Finally, China's reengagement with international organizations grew after Deng Xiaoping

came to power in the late 1970's. Since that time, the Chinese have sought to play a greater role

within international organizations to influence international norms and behavior. Therefore,

voting patterns in the UN General Assembly on matters important to the Chinese, such as, human

rights, provide some insight into the extent to which Chinese soft power has influenced African

nations to support Chinese positions. Vote tallies on UN General Assembly resolutions on human rights in the periods of 1995-1999 and 2011-2013 highlighted the notable differences in African voting patterns before and after China expanded its soft power efforts in Africa. The inquiry was

limited to the votes relating to human rights where China and the United States were on opposite sides of the vote. The difference of opinion between these two countries on issues of human rights mirrors differences of opinion on these issues across the world. For consistency, only votes taken on human rights-related resolutions during both time periods were included. These controls narrowed the number of UN resolutions to be evaluated to two. The extent to which African countries voted with China on these resolutions provides an indicator, although weak, of China's success at garnering African support to shape international norms.

Comparing the public polling information related to China's favorability ratings and perceived positive influence among African populations during these periods revealed a steady increase in Chinese favorability. More recent polling data indicate that China's supposed development model competes well with that ofthe United States and former colonial powers.

Next, the number of African states that have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan has

4 continued to dwindle, over the last fifteen years and is at its lowest point since the People's

Republic of China was recognized in 1971. Currently, only three African countries officially

recognize Taiwan. Since 1998, no African country has switched diplomatic recognition from

China to Taiwan, but seven countries have switched from recognizing Taiwan to recognizing

China. The newest country in Africa, South Sudan, chose to recognize China instead of Taiwan at

its creation in 2011. Lastly, despite the limited sample size, the UN record of votes on human

rights resolutions data showed that African countries voted with China more frequently after

China's soft power push in Africa than before. Therefore, taken together, the findings from these

three analyses suggest that Chinese soft power has been at least moderately successful at helping

the PRC achieve its foreign policy objectives over the last fifteen years.

To understand the findings and conclusions of this research, it is important to provide

context by first examining background infmmation related to Joseph Nye's original soft power concept and to discussing why Chinese leaders believe soft power is critical to China's foreign

policy. The Chinese approach to foreign relations closely aligns with Nye's soft power concept.

Thus, discussion of Nye's work helps explain what China expects to receive in return for deploying soft power assets. Further, a review of Chinese leaders' statements about soft power provides additional insight into why soft power has taken on such prominence within the Chinese foreign policy establishment. Finally, it is useful to review the tactics that the Chinese

Government has used in Africa to understand the scale of China's soft power investments and to gain insight into how these tactics have ultimately lead to the moderately positive outcomes revealed in the data. Against this background, the findings of the study are presented, along with recommendations for possible future research on this subject that may address identified shortcomings.

5 The Soft Power Concept

i Joseph Nye originally coined the te1m soft power in 1990 in a book entitled Bound to

Lead. He wrote Bound to Lead and a related article in Foreign Affairs entitled "Soft Power" to challenge the view that the United States was in decline, a notion that at the time had been gaining credence in some foreign policy circles. He theorized that states generate soft power through the manipulation of culture, ideology, and international institutions.9 Soft power created goodwill with leaders of other nations, according to Nye, and, thus, these leaders are more inclined to provide support and compliance. Nye claimed, therefore, that countries could use soft power to induce other countries to follow their lead within the international arena.

He supported his assertions by pointing out that the US government and society at large used communications and cultural products to spread American values and ideals. He posited that

US leadership by forming and operating international institutions after World War II, such as the

United Nations, spread American beliefs. The United States based those institutions on free- market and democratic principles and influenced how their leaders set their institutional agendas.

As a result of American leadership, Nye argued, the United States was able to exercise substantial influence over how countries engaged with each other on issues that crossed national borders. 10

Nye continued by claiming that while military force remained the prominent form of power, its use had become more complicated in a shrinking world. Growing economic interdependence was changing the perception of national interest, which diluted military power and made it less attractive. He argued that continued globalization would demand greater

9 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 153-155, 167. This article in Foreign Policy mirrors the arguments that Nye makes in Bound to Lead but is much more concise. 10 Ibid, 167-169.

6 cooperation among states, including superpowers. He concluded by predicting that soft power would grow in importance as the world continued to become more interdependent. I I

Chinese leaders, foreign policy experts, and members from the elite and the media took ·" notice of Nye's soft power concept soon after he published Bound to Lead. Mingjiang Li noted that the first article on soft power in China was written by Wang Huning as far back as 1993.

Wang Huning later rose and became a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central

Committee Secretariat. 12 Since the early 1990's, Chinese intellectuals have gravitated towards

Nye's soft power concept and have had an ongoing and often public debate regarding its utility and role in China's foreign policy. In 2015, for example, a search of the world's largest online collection of Chinese language journal articles, the CNKI, generated more than 1,700 entries with soft power in the title since 2000. 13 Many Chinese intellectuals argue that the development of

Chinese soft power not only engenders international support for Chinese initiatives, but also helps to demonstrate China's benevolent intent. 14 Additionally, the Chinese government considers the wielding of soft power through handsome aid packages, large infrastructure activities, and leader to leader diplomacy as a symbol of its emergence as a global power. 15 Thus, Chinese soft power serves practical foreign policy objectives as well as supports a narrative of China's peaceful rise.

Joshua Kurlantzick has closely followed China's evolving use of soft power. He claims that the Chinese have revised Nye's initial soft power concept to make it more encompassing and inclusive of coercive measures. In Kurlantzick's book on the topic, he argues, "For the Chinese,

11 Nye, "Soft Power," 162-166, 170-171. 12 Mingjiang Li, ed., Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics, (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2009), 22-29. 13 Xie Tao, "China's Soft Power Obsession," The Diplomat, April 15, 2014. 14 Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift, 86. 15 Ian Taylor, China's New Role in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 24-25.

7 soft power means anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only pop culture and public diploma~y but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral institutions."16 Thus, China has reshaped the soft ... power concept to be much more expansive and to support China's cultural context and governing philosophy.

The highest levels of the Chinese Government have given notable attention to soft power.

Michael Barr, a lecturer on international politics, asserts that by the 2000s the "(Communist)

Party had largely adopted the view that soft power was a key aspect of Chinese policy and that the country needed to do more to promote its cultural traditions and idea of harmony between

17 1 peoples." The Report From the J6 h CCP Congress in 2002 highlighted the importance of promoting Chinese culture abroad. "In the present-day world, culture is interactive with economic and political activities, and its status and functions are becoming more and more outstanding in the competition in overall national strength." 18 China's propaganda chief at the time said that

China's cultural reforms were created to make "socialist culture with Chinese characteristics a powerful attraction and inspiration ... to the people throughout the world."19 Thus, from the time

Nye introduced soft power until the Presidency of Hu Jintao, China increasingly used soft power and cultural promotion as a means of attracting support from other countries.

16 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World (Binghamton: Vail-Ballou Press, 2007) 6. 17 Michael Barr, Whose Afraid ofChina? The Challenge ofChinese Soft Power (New York: Zed Books, 2011 ), 27. 18 "Full Text ofJiang Zemin's Report at the 16th Party Congress," 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, accessed December 1, 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/english/ features/49007 .htm. 19 Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, "Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics." In Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States, ed. Carola Mcgiffert (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 15.

8 Former Chinese President Hu Jintao often promoted the merits of soft power. He

proclaimed to the influential Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group in 2006 that "the enhancement

of China's international status and international influence must be reflected both in hard power ...

and in soft power such as culture." Later that same year he declared in a speech to literary and art

experts that the one who takes commanding point on the battlefield of cultural development will

gain the upper hand in fierce international competition.20 These statements were followed up

1 shortly thereafter in the Report ofthe 17h CCP Congress in October 2007 in which President Hu said, "Culture has increasingly become an important source of national cohesion and creativity and an important factor in the competition of overall national strength." In 2011, at the conclusion of the 17th Central Committee Meeting of the CCP, the Communist Party leaders approved continuous reforms to China's cultural system and promotion of China's cultural industry. The aims of these reforms were to boost China's soft power and maintain cultural security.21 Soft power remained a prominent feature of President Hu's administration during his entire tenure.

More recently, current Chinese President Xi Jinping picked up where President Hu left off. President Xi has popularized the idea ofthe Chinese Dream, a concept that embodies Chinese culture, prosperity, and ambition. Aside from stoking nationalism and pride, the Chinese Dream forms the foundation of China's aim to attract international followers. In 2014, President Xi promised to promote Chinese soft power by "disseminating modem Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture to the world."22 At another event that same year, he proclaimed that

"we should increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate

20 Glaser and Murphy, "Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics," 15. 21 "China Adopts Cultural Development Guideline to Boost Soft Power," CCTV, October 19, 2011, accessed December 2, 2015, http://english.cntv.cn/201l1019/101966.shtml. 22 Mu Xuequan, "China to Promote Cultural Soft Power," Xinhua, January 1, 2014, acce­ ssed January 15, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-0l/O l/c_l2594 l 955.htm.

9 23 1 China's messages to the ~orld." A routine google search with the words "President Xi and soft

power" will return pages and pages of articles that quote him on his devotion to the importance of

soft power. Given President Xi's frequent references to soft power and promotion of the Chinese

Dream, there is a strong likelihood that soft power will continue to be a key component of

Chinese foreign policy in the years ahead.

In fact, the tremendous value that China places on soft power is evident in the immense

scope and reach of its soft power initiatives in Africa. Because Chinese leaders believe that soft

power is both a sign ofthe country's emergence as a global power and a means by which to

achieve their foreign policy objectives, they have taken a spare no expense approach to

implementing their soft power programs on the African continent. The shift to incorporate soft

power into Chinese foreign policy back in the early 1990's corresponded with China's emergent

economic advance, and as its economy has grown, China has deployed increasing amounts of soft

power resources in Africa. As a result, China's influence on the continent is becoming ubiquitous,

cultivated in a wide variety of ways, including through the Chinese media, volunteer

organizations, cultural programs, scholarship programs, infrastructure development assistance,

diplomacy, peacekeeping missions, trade and investment, and debt relief support.

The first of those mechanisms for developing soft power, the media, is critical because

the media in just about any country is influential in establishing norms and attitudes. In particular,

in a country as tightly controlled as China, the state-owned media plays an important role in

promoting internal stability and continued rule of the Communist Party. Recently, China has

increasingly deployed the state-owned media outward to support China's international ambitions.

Chinese leaders believe that the western media has for too long had a monopoly on international

23 David Feith, "China's Soft Power Problem," Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2015, accessed January 20, 2016, http://www. wsj .com/articles/chinas-soft-power-problem-14503 76440.

10 news and has been bia~ed against Chinese interests.24 In response to this perceived Western media

bias, Chinese state-run inedia outlets have substantially increased their presence in Africa to

facilitate greater penetration and put a more positive spin on Chinese activities and objectives.

This Chinese media expansion comes at an opportune time when western media companies seem

to be reducing their presence and retrenching staff.25 David Shambaugh estimates that the

Chinese Government spent in the neighborhood of $10 billion for external propaganda in 2014

through its state-owned media houses.26 Thus, the expanding Chinese state-owned media

presence aims to improve China's image at a time when China's engagement in Africa is

increasing.

To complement this media expansion, and the media push to promote mutually-beneficial

relations and to bolster the Chinese image in Africa, the Chinese government'has also established

seemingly benevolent programs as another way to cast a positive light on China. Copying a

chapter right out of America's foreign policy playbook, China has set up a volunteer organization

to send volunteers to developing countries around the world.27 Designed to be like the United

States Peace Corps and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, the Chinese Youth

Volunteers Association started sending volunteers to a very small number of African countries in

2005. The program has since been expanded by increasing the number of volunteers and adding

new recipient countries. By the end of 2012, China had sent more than four hundred volunteers to

sixteen African countries.28 With very little investment, the Chinese government is able to send

24 David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century ofEngagement (Philadelphia: University ofPennsylvania Press: 2012), 194. · 25 Andrew Jacobs, "Pursuing Soft Power, China Puts Stamp on Africa's News," New York Times, August 16, 2012, accessed November 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/ world/africa/chinas-news-media-make-inroads-in-africa.html. 26 David Shambaugh, "China's Soft Power Push: The Search for Respect," Foreign Affairs, (July-August 2015), 4. These reflect worldwide expenditures. 27 Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift, 123-124. 28 Information Office ofthe State Council, People's Republic of China, China-Africa

11 young professionals to Africa who then transmit Chinese values and culture to their African counterparts.

Additionally, Chinese leaders also believe that China's long history and deep culture can be used as a tool to attract leaders and peoples to the Chinese way of life. As such, in another attempt to breed positive feelings among Africans, China has re-emphasized the promotion of

Chinese culture and language in Africa. For example, China has established 38 Confucius

Institutes in 26 African countries since 2005.29 These institutes are housed at African universities and colleges and are initiated with small grants from the Chinese government. According to Tian

Xuejun, China's Ambassador to South Africa, Confucius Institutes aim to promote Chinese culture to the whole world, and to showcase the image of the Chinese nation and people as open, peace-loving, and hardworking.30 There is evidence that these institutes are gaining credibility in

Africa. For example, in Kenya, the Confucius Institute at Kenyatta University was ranked the second best department out of sixty-two in 2011.31 Despite complaints that they may jeopardize academic freedom, Confucius Institutes are becoming prominent fixtures in Africa.32

In addition to providing cultural assets directly to Africa, one of the most direct ways to expose Africans to Chinese culture is to bring them to China to study. Thus, since 2000, China

Economic and Trade Cooperation (Beijing, August, 2013), 10. 29 Information Office of the State Council, China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, 15. See also Shannon Tiezzi, "The Future of China's Confucius Institutes," The Diplomat, September 30, 2014. 30 Ambassador Tian Xuejun, "Address at the Joint Conference of Confucius Institutes in Africa," Embassy ofthe People's Republic of China, September 13, 2013, accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/dsxx/dsjh/t968980.htm. 31 Hebert Benon Oluka, "Confucius Institutes Changing African Perceptions of China," The Observer, September 22, 2013, accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.observer.ug/sports/ 85-education/education/27609-confucius-institutes-changing-african-perceptions-of-china. 32 Christina Larsen, "Is Beijing's Most Successful Effort at "Soft Power" About to Unravel?," Bloomberg Business, October 3, 2014, accessed October 15, 2015, www.bloomberg. com/bw/articles/2014-10-03/is-beijing-s-most-successful-effort-at-soft-power-about-to-unravel.

12 • has consistently increased the number of scholarships established to enable African students to

attend Chinese universities and technical and vocational institutes. At the FOCAC held in Beijing

in 2012, President Hu Jintao pledged to train 30,000 Africans and provide 18,000 scholarships

over the next three years. This pledge constituted a 300% increase to the number of scholarships

compared to the pledge made at the 2009 FOCAC.33 While these university and technical school

scholarships are focused on teaching hard skills, they are also meant to "win hearts and minds

along the way."34 President Xi Jinping called these people to people exchanges "an important

pillar for the new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa. "35

While many of the aforementioned soft power tactics are aimed at African populations,

China also courts African leaders and elite in order to bolster its soft power in Africa. Since 2000,

China has endeavored to strengthen partnerships with African leaders and institutions by funding

large infrastructure projects. For example, China funded construction of a new, $200 million

African Union (AU) building in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and handed it over to the AU in 2012. In

another example, after the Malawian government switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to

the PRC in 2008, China funded a new national parliament building, several roads, a national

stadium, and a hotel and conference center.36 African leaders have great interest in these types of

high-visibility infrastructure projects because the leaders view the projects as symbols of regime

legitimacy and power.37 Moreover, new government buildings often replace colonial-era

buildings. This symbolic transition from the colonial past reportedly ingratiates the Chinese

33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, President Hu Proposes Measures in Five Priority Areas to Boost China-Africa Ties (Beijing, July 19, 2012). 34 Shambaugh, "China's Soft Power Push," 10. 35 "China will be Africa's All-Weather Friend and Partner: Chinese President," Xinhua, March 30, 2013, accessed October 15, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013­ 03/30/c 124522273.htm. 36 Hanauer and Morris, Chinese Engagement in Africa, 7-8. 37 Taylor, China's New Role in Africa, 24.

13 government with the African elite.38 The infrastructure projects constitute a large part of China's

development assistance to Africa and demonstrate "China's rising prominence" on the African

continent.39

In recent years, in addition to the cultural and infrastructure support discussed above,

China's soft power efforts have moved in a somewhat new direction as China has stepped up financial relationships with African countries. These relationships have evolved from Chinese support for Communist insurgencies to support for economic and trade partnerships. As a result, this century has witnessed a substantial expansion of Chinese development assistance to African states and trade between China and Africa. With regards to trade, the Rand Corporation, for example, cites multiple Chinese sources to estimate that trade has grown twenty-fold from 2000 to 2012, from $10 billion to $199 billion.40 Other sources claim the growth has been less robust.

Needless to say, although exact figures are difficult, if not impossible, to pin down, China's development assistance and trade with Africa have grown significantly over the past fifteen years.

China has also warmed to the idea of debt relief as a means to gamer support in Africa.

Starting around the year 2000, China announced various debt relief programs for highly indebted

African countries. From 2000 to 2009, the Chinese government reports that it forgave approximately $2.8 billion dollars by canceling the 312 debts of thirty-five African countries.41

Chinese debt relief has not been part of the IMF and World Bank's Highly Indebted Poor Country program, however, which demands macroeconomic reform to ensure that resources were used for poverty reduction programs.42 Instead, only African countries that officially recognized China as

38 Alden, China in Africa, 23. 39 Taylor, China's New Role in Africa, 24. 40 Hanauer and Morris, Chinese Engagement in Africa, 26. 41 Information Office of the State Council, "China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation," The People's Republic of China, December 23, 2010, accessed November 11, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english201O/china/201O-l2/23/c_ 13661632.htm. 42 Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift, 127-129.

14 opposed to Taiwan are eligible for Chinese debt relief. Debt relief, combined with greater aid and trade, has become a potent symbol of expanding China-Africa ties.

While infrastructure and prestige projects appease African leaders, a major element to really winning their longer-term allegiance has been China's ability to use personal diplomacy to foster feelings of dignity and respect among the African elite. China's prominent recognition of

African leaders reflects the Chinese cultural emphasis on rank, face, and gift giving, which often closely aligns with African cultural norms.43 When African leaders come to China for a state visit they are treated the same as leaders from the most powerful countries.44 This treatment impresses and flatters African leaders, who reportedly feel they get less respect from the United States or

European countries.45

This more intimate approach to diplomacy highlights their (Chinese) ties to individual

African politicians who might otherwise be neglected on the world stage.46 For instance, China's top leaders often travel to the continent to nurture personal relationships. Former Chinese

President Hu Jintao visited eighteen African countries over four official visits during his ten-year tenure.47 Current President Xi Jinping's first international trip included stops in Africa and he has visited four African countries in his three years in office. This compares with the five African countries that President Obama visited in his seven years in office. This level of attention from

China's head of state has been supplemented by a plethora of visits from Chinese Ministers and mid-level bureaucrats. Because of the symbolic importance of Africa to China, the Chinese

43 Taylor, China's New Role in Africa, 35. 44 Ibid, 24. 45 Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift, 68. 46 Alden, China in Africa, 27. 47 "China to Announce New Measures on Cooperation with Africa," Xinhua, July 12, 2012, accessed January 16, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-07/12/c_l3 l 712 115.htm.

15 Foreign Minister's first trip of each year has -been to Africa since the early l 990s.48 Chinese leaders use this treatment and the resulting influence it produces as leverage to gain support from

African leaders on international issues important to China. Thus, the attentiveness of Chinese leaders to developing personal relationships with African leaders plays a direct and important role in China's soft power outreach in Africa.

Taking the courtship of Africa by China one step further, China has vowed to support the region's leaders not only economically and diplomatically, but also militarily in the form of security missions. Sensing an opportunity to win praise and enhance its international image,

China has delved into the peacekeeping arena. Prior to 2000, China rarely contributed soldiers to peacekeeping operations, but this changed after 2000. China now deploys the largest number of peacekeepers in Africa and has sent over 11,000 peacekeepers to the continent since 2001.49

African leaders, many of whom have not been able to quell ethnic conflict or end low-intensity civil war, appreciate China's support. Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf publicly praised the role of Chinese peacekeepers in her country, saying, "Liberians will never forget the friendship of Chinese peacekeeping soldiers."5°China's increasing willingness to participate in

UN peacekeeping missions in Africa demonstrates that Chinese officials are committed to their great power responsibilities.51

So, given these many generous initiatives China has launched in Africa, it becomes clear that China has gone to great lengths to ingratiate itself with African politicians and populations.

The assumption, once again, is that these efforts aim to encourage Africa to assist China with achieving China's foreign policy objectives. However, the discussion so far has only shown that

China believes soft power is useful and that China has expended a considerable amount of

48 Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift, 68. 49 Thrall, China's Expanding African Relations, l, 18, 53. 50 Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa, 183, 438. 51 Thrall, China's Expanding African Relations, 18.

16 money, time, and effort on developing soft power in Africa. The question is, have these efforts have actually been effective.

Analysis of Soft Power Indicators

As was mentioned earlier, one way to measure the effectiveness of soft power is to evaluate public polling results. Joseph Nye, subsequent to his original research on soft power, occasionally elaborated on the soft power concept in response to contemporary events. After the

US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, for example, Nye revised his soft power concept to address the implications of the war on terrorism. He argued soft power was instrumental to combating terrorism because the challenge demanded multilateral cooperation. In addition, he suggested that public polling could provide valuable feedback regarding a country's ability to harness soft power resources to achieve its political goals.

The four week war in Iraq was a dazzling display of America's hard military power that removed a dangerous dictator, but it did not solve the problem of terrorism. It was costly in terms of America's soft power to attract others. In the aftermath ofthe war, polling by Pew Research Center showed a dramatic decline in the popularity ofthe United States even in countries like Britain, Spain and Italy whose governments had supported the war.52

Nye revisited this idea again in 2015 in an article specifically focused on China's expanding use of soft power methods to gain influence and attract followers. In that article, Nye argued, "The billions of dollars China is spending on its charm offensive have had only a limited return." To back up his assertions that Chinese soft power had been only minimally effective, he again noted polling information that showed that China's influence in North America, Europe,

India and Japan was viewed negatively. However, he noted that China's favorability in Africa

51 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power and the Struggle Against Terrorism," Project . Syndicate, April 21, 2004, accessed November 15, 2015, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/ soft-power-and-the-struggle-against-terrorism.

17 polled much higher, whjch he implied resulted from the Chinese applying soft power more effectively in that region.53

Nye's notion of assessing public polling information as a soft power indicator can be implemented by using available favorability polling information on China in Africa over the last

15 years. Ifthe African public polling data on China shows a significant improvement over that period, then China's use of soft power across the African continent, in Nye's view, has been effective. Higher or improving polling results in conjunction with increased Chinese soft power efforts might then be reasonably seen as the result of soft power. While lower or declining favorability despite increased soft power efforts certainly would suggest that Chinese soft power had been ineffective.

Unfortunately, the number of reliable polls that focus on African perceptions of China is small. The Pew Research Center has measured favorability ratings in a number of specific countries in Africa. The BBC World Service has tried to measure through polling how Africans assess the influence of individual countries, positively or negatively. An upside to these polls is that these institutions also used consistent methodologies and asked the same questions over time.

However, the polls sampled only a small handful of African countries. Additionally, these polls are relatively recent, going back only ten years so there is no comparable polling information prior to the year 2005. In addition to Pew and BBC polling there is the Afrobarometer series of polls. Afro barometer surveys on many different issues regarding Africa, including China's perceived influence in Africa. Afrobarometer polling, however, has only recently included questions pertaining to China's influence and image. Therefore, because ofthis lack of consistent data regarding China in the Afrobarometer poll, Afrobarometer results cannot be used to infer the impact of Chinese soft power on African opinions. Despite the limitations of the available

53 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Limits of Chinese Soft Power, Project Syndicate," October 2, 2015, accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-civil­ society-nationalism-soft-power-by-joseph-s--nye-2015-07.

18 instruments, however, 'the df!ta was still sufficient to make a number of useful observations concerning the effectiveness of Chinese soft power.

Pew Research Center Favorability Ratings

The Pew Research Center polling data was collected in 2007 and 2015, and, thereby, provides a comparison of Chinese favorability ratings in Africa in five countries over that period.

The countries polled were Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, and South Africa. This grouping of countries is geographically diverse, including countries from west, east, and southern Africa.

Table 1 China's Favorability Ratings in Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania

Country 2007 2015 Ghana 75 80 Kenya 81 70 South .Africa 37 52 Tanzania 70 74 Uganda 45 65 Average Rat ing 62 68

Source: Data adapted from the Pew Research Center, "Global Indicators Database," accessed December 1, 2015, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/group/5/.

This table shows that Chinese favorability ratings increased in four out ofthe five countries surveyed between 2007 and 2015. During that period, China's favorability rating improved the most in Uganda, twenty points. Those gains were followed by gains in South Africa of 15 points, and gains in Ghana of five points. Chinese favorability decreased only in Kenya, a loss of 11 points. In total, Chinese favorability ratings in these five countries averaged 68% in

2015 in comparison to 62% in 2007. This information suggests a definite yet modest increase in

China' s aggregate favorability rating across four of the five countries polled from 2007 to 2015 in the Pew Research Center favorability polls.

BBC World Service Country Ratings Poll

Every several years the BBC World Service measures whether countries are perceived to be having a positive or negative influence in the world. Only three countries from Africa were

19 consistently included in these polls over the last ten years. They are Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya. 1

Unfortunately, although the polling represents east and west Africa, no southern African countries were included. The table below illustrates to what extent people in these three countries believe ... China's influence in the world has been mainly positive or mainly negative.

Table 2 Does China have a positive or negative influence in the world?

Country Mainly Positive Mainly Negative Year Ghana 46% 9% 2005 63% 14% 2010 67% 18% 2014 Nigeria 68% 11% 2005 73% 17% 2010 85% 10% 2014 Kenya 59% 7% 2005 73% 15% 2010 650/o 25% 2014

Sources: These data are adapted from three separate BBC World Service polls taken in 2005, 2010, and 2014. See "World Service Country Ratings Poll," BBC, accessed December 1, 2015, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb06N iewsCountries_ F eb06 _ quaire. pdf, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pipa/pdf/apr 1O/BBCViews _Apr 1O _ rpt.pdf, and http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/country-rating-poll.pdf.

This table shows that the percentage of people who believe that China's influence in the

world has been mainly positive has increased in all three countries from 2005 to 2014. The

African country where views of China's positive influence has changed the most is Ghana. As the table shows China's favorability rating increased from 46% to 67% in Ghana, a 21 % increase

from 2005 to 2014. Similarly, Nigeria saw a significant 18% increase while in Kenya the gain was more modest. On average, in all three countries, the percentage of people questioned in these polls who viewed China's influence in the world as mainly positive increased by 14% from 2005 to 2014. It should be noted that while the percentage of people in Kenya who believed that China had a mainly positive influence in the world jumped fourteen points between 2005 and 2009, that figure had dropped back down to 65% by 2014. Nevertheless, the favorable response in in Kenya in 2014 was still higher than 2005, which perhaps indicates a leveling off in China's favorability

20 in that country. These :BBC polls support findings from the Pew Research Center polls and indicate that in this limited number of countries that China's favorability ratings have risen at a statistically significant rate since 2005. ... In contrast, however, although the polls have shown a consistent rise in the percentage of respondents who view China favorably, the same polls show a similar, albeit, smaller rise in those who view China's influence negatively. In 2005, only 9% of the respondents in these countries viewed China's influence in the world as mainly negative. In 2010 that percentage increased to

15%, and by 2014 18% of respondents viewed China's influence in the world as mainly negative.

While the rise in negative ratings are more modest than the increase in positive responses, they are still significant and worthy of notice.

The data highlights that people in these three African countries are increasingly forming opinions on China's influence in the world. For example, in 2005 approximately 28% of respondents held neutral feelings or did not have an opinion on China's influence in the world.

That figure had decreased to 15% in 2010. By 2014, only 10% of respondents held neutral feelings or did not have an opinion on this topic. This may, in part, be the result of the increasingly visible role that China is playing in African countries through its investment and infrastructure activities, media expansion, and cultural exchanges. It is likely that the percentage of people who have neutral feelings or do not have an opinion on China's influence in the world will continue to decrease as communications in Africa improve and literacy rates increase.

Afrobarometer Polling Information

The Afrobarometer Network is a non-partisan research organization that has conducted broad-based research in Africa since 1999. Since that time Afro barometer has published six rounds of survey information that measured national public attitudes on democracy and governance and other topics in African countries. The number of countries that are included in

21 each survey round has· climbed from 12 in 1999 to 34 in 2015, enabling Afrobarometer to provide ' greater clarity on African perceptions on many social issues across the continent.54 Afrobarometer uses a standard questionnaire, allowing comparison across countries and ... over time. However, each Afrobarometer survey round also includes unique questions related to the year when the survey was conducted. The questions on China were unique to the 2015 survey

round, making it difficult to measure changes in African perceptions of China's influence,

China's influence compared to US influence, and China's development model. Nonetheless,

information on these topics from the 2014/2015 survey round provides relevant data to consider.

Table 3 presents data regarding whether African citizens think that China has a positive or negative influence in their country. Respondents in 24 out of 25 countries say China's influence is more positive than negative. Respondents in Ghana were the only ones in the poll who rated China's influence in their country as more negative than positive, with ratings of 36% and 34%, respectively. The largest percentage ofrespondents who believed that China's influence in their country was positive was from Mali. There 92% of those polled rated China's influence to be very or somewhat positive.

54 "Round 6 2014/2015 Survey Results," Afrobarometer, accessed December 1, 2015, http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online. As of December 2015, the 2014/2015 Afrobarometer survey round included Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Survey results for countries not located in sub-Saharan Africa were not included in the analysis of this paper, nor were survey results for additional sub-Saharan African countries that became available since December 2015.

22 :I,

Ta~le 3 Does China have a p9sitive or negative influence in your country?

Country '"ery/Somel't~ ba t Negatb~t

~-0 -' Benin l ./ o­ 70% .. 74% 4% Burundi 2% 67% Cameroon 79% Cape Verde 8% 77% Ghana 36% 34% Guinea 76% Kenya 8% 76% 30% 'Liberia 7% 81% Madagascar 39% 26% 50% Mali 4% 92% Mauritius Nainibia 21. % 66% Niger 4% 84% Ni2eria 67% Senegal 13% 66% 71% i'\0/ Togo 7 F O Uganda 7% 58% Zambia 11% 31% 48% 68%

Source: Data adapted from "Online Data Analysis Tool," Afrobarometer, Last modified 2016, accessed December 1, 2015, http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online.

The average number ofpeople who believe that China's influence is very or somewhat

positive across all twenty-five countries included in the poll was approximately 68%. More than

seventy percent of respondents in fifteen countries rated China as having a very or somewhat

positive influence, while majorities of respondents in twenty out of twenty-five countries rated

Chinese influence this way. Approximately 13% of respondents from across all countries rated

China's influence in their country as being very or somewhat negative. Less than I 0% of

23 respondents in fifteen ~ountries rated China' s influence as very or somewhat negative. The highest negative rating was in Madagascar, where 39% of respondents rated China's influence as being very or somewhat negative, followed by Ghana (36%), Zimbabwe (31%), and Lesotho .. (30%), which were the only other countries that had negative ratings of 30% or more. For a country that has been as economically and diplomatically active in Africa as China has been over the fifteen years, these negative ratings are as impressively low as the positive ratings are high.

Table 4 Which country has the most influence in your country?

China us Former Colonial Ponrer South Africa Benin 14.6 6.9 L4 27.3 11 15.3 Burkina Faso 9.6 12.9 61.1 2.5 Burundi 10.5 34.5 Cameroon 14.7 75 66.9 0.9 Cape Verde 27 31.4 1.2 Cote d'koire JJ 45 89 o.s 27.4 33.3 8.6 2J Guinea 13.1 11.5 6t5 0.5 Kenva 38.4 38.6 6.7 .2.2 Lesotho 30 9.4 35.5 Liberia 87.2 0 0.8 27.3 11.9 42.3 12.3 315 13.4 16 ~ 1 11.6 SJ 7:2.6 lJ 24.9 10J ll.9 L9 Namibia 34.5 14.2 30.6 Ni~er 16 10.S 60.l Nigeria 29.8 40.3 8.4 L6 Senegal 11.6 14 39.5 31.2 Togo 7 . ~ l 62.4 l .5 U~anda 20.2 39.7 . 5J 4J Zambia 463 17.8 5.4 8 Zimbabwe 54 ~ 8 14.3 12.3 22A l l

Source: Data adapted from "Online Data Analysis Tool," Afrobarometer, Last modified 2016, accessed December 1, 2015, http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online.

24 Afrobarometer also investigated which country or international entity respondents ' thought had the most influence on their own country. Table 4 provides their responses on China, the United States, the former colonial power and South Africa.ss China is perceived to have the .. most influence by respondents in four of the countries polled, including Namibia, Zambia,

Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. This compares with respondents in nine countries that view the United

States as having the most influence in their country: Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Ghana,

Liberia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda. Respondents in several ofthe other eighteen countries that participated in the poll often viewed their former colonial power as having the most influence. As a general trend, China and the US are viewed as having much less influence in former French colonies where ties with France still remain fairly strong.

On average, across all twenty-five countries, over one in every five respondents believes that China has the most influence in their country. This figure is almost identical to the figure which describes the perceived US influence on the African continent. Together, nearly 45% ofthe respondents believed that the US or China had the most influence. These figures are illustrative of the competition for influence that is taking place around the world between the United States and

China. The data is furthermore interesting when considering that neither China nor the United

States colonized African countries and do not have the historical economic and social links - both positive and negative - that the former colonizers have with African nations.

Finally, Afrobarometer asked respondents which country in the world offered the best model for the future development of their country. Table 5 displays the results for this question and compares the results for China, the US, former colonial power, and South Africa. There were several other countries for respondents to choose (such as Russia, India, Japan), but results for these countries are not included because of the small percentage of respondents selecting them.

ss The only other country that received a plurality of votes was India, which respondents in Mauritius believed had the most influence in their country.

25 Of the twenty-five countries·included in this poll, pluralities in five countries considered

China to be the best model for future development when compared to the others. More than 20%

of respondents in twelve countries rated China as the best model for future development. Among

all respondents in the twenty-five countries, 24% or nearly a quarter believed that China provided

the best model for future development. This is a fairly remarkable number given China's relative

isolation in the world for a good part of the last sixty-five years since it was established.

Table 5 Which country has the best model for future development?

Country Cltina us Former Coloai:d Potver South Africa 25.9 n.s 27 23.9 30.3 10.l 20.4 Burkina Faso 19.6 27.9 Burundi 16.7 44.9 4.6 12.7 Cameroon 20.2 5.9 9.6 Cape Verde 20.6 52 l .S Cote d'Ivoire 26.4 33.2 15.5 14.5 36.4 10.6 7.S Guinea 22J 19.7 3.5 Kenva 24J 48.5 7.4 7~3 17.6 14.2 3.6 37.7 Liberia 24.6 66.7 2J Madagascar 23.9 31 29 16.7 23.7 9.6 30.1 36.3 HU 3.4 Mauritius 12.9 22.3 25.4 4.9 Namibia 22 20.S 13.8 31.2 23.S 2l.l 3*2 Nigeria 24.6 44J 10A 2.5 Senegal 21.6 15.5 3..l 34.8 30.1 5.5 10.l 18.5 Ll.5 l8.6 40.6 Zambia 3:l .8 24.2 7. 8 16.6 19.5 24.8 8.8 24 32.l 14 U.9

Source: Data adapted from "Online Data Analysis Tool," Afrobarometer, Last modified 2016, accessed December 1, 2015, http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online.

26 As was stated e~rlier, there is no Afrobarometer data for prior years with which to compare these favorability ratings. Therefore, it is not possible to gauge whether the

Afrobarometer figures have increased since 2000, the time period over which China has significantly reengaged in Africa. However, given the relatively high marks for China across the three questions, it is plausible that the percentage of positive responses would have increased over the period. For example, it is entirely reasonable to infer that the figures related to China's influence in Africa as well as ratings on China as a model for development would have been nowhere near the levels of 2015 had the Afrobarometer survey asked a similar question earlier.

Specifically, it is almost inconceivable that China would have been identified as nearly having the most influence on the continent in the year 2000. While China's economy had, by 2000, started to grow rapidly, the country had not yet experienced the high levels of annual sustained growth that it experienced after 2000 through 2015. Moreover, its increasing evolution into a potential near­ peer competitor with the United States was not yet considered to be as probable as it is currently; meaning China would not likely have had as much influence in Africa at the tum of the century.

Taken together, the polling information regarding China's favorability, influence, and model for development amongst African populations has steadily and positively increased over the last ten years. China's polling information on these topics varies from African country to country, but, when aggregated, competes with and sometimes exceeds polling results for the

United States and former colonial powers. China's favorability ratings in Africa are also notably much higher than they are in other regions of the world. Assuming that Nye's claim that the effects of soft power can be demonstrated in public polling information has merit, these poll results support the assertion that China's soft power efforts have, in fact, been effective at improving its image in Africa.

It should be noted, however, that polling information from these institutions only begins to scrape the surface regarding China's evolving influence in Africa. The increase in favorability ratings and percentage of people who think that China is having a mainly positive role in the

27 world, along with the polling data on which country offers the best model for development, may provide some indication regarding whether China's continuous promotion of soft power is having the desired effect, but due to the myriad factors that actually influence favorability ratings, gains cannot definitively be attributed to any particular factor. Thus, these polls only suggest that

Chinese soft power has been effective. Increased confidence in the data will be possible once these polls have been conducted over several consecutive years using the same methodology.

· While public perception certainly seems to be of importance to the Chinese leadership, nothing appears to be more important to China than the fate ofTaiwan. According to most experts and observers on China, isolating Taiwan from the international community remains as one of China's predominant foreign policy objectives. Thus, reviewing China's success at reducing the number of African states that maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan is a reasonable and effective method for measuring China's soft power efforts in Africa.

Recognition of Taiwan

Since the People's Republic of China was first recognized by the United Nations in 1971, it has used diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks to isolate Taiwan from the international community.56 As was discussed previously, China sees Taiwan as a renegade province that must be re-incorporated into mainland China. China believes that safeguarding its territorial integrity and sovereignty are core national security objectives. Those objectives include restoring control over Taiwan as part of one China. Therefore, China's position is that the fate of Taiwan as an independent entity must be subject to a national referendum that enables all 1.3 billion mainland

Chinese citizens along with the twenty-three million Taiwanese citizens to vote on Taiwan's independence.57 The most visible and concrete way that China has tried to isolate Taiwan is by

56 Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift, 34. 57 China Daily, "President Sets Forth Guidelines on Taiwan," March 4, 2005, accessed December 15, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/04/content_421902.htm.

28 restricting the formal rec~gnition of Taiwan by other countries, including those in Africa. From

1 about 1970 to the tum of the 20 h century, China and Taiwan used financial incentives, or dollar diplomacy, to entice other countries to either maintain or switch diplomatic recognition. More ·" recently Taiwan has refrained from this type of diplomacy as it has become apparent that China has greater means to engage in this manner.

As of January 2016, only three African countries still maintain diplomatic relations with

Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Swaziland, and Sao Tome and Principe58 as compared to 1971 when eighteen African nations recognized the ROC. Since 1998, all countries that have switched from recognizing one or the other have gone from recognizing Taiwan to recognizing China. The

Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Liberia, Senegal, and Chad have veered back and forth between recognizing China and Taiwan since 1971. The change in recognition was probably influenced by financial packages offered by each country. The CAR recognized China in 1998 after switching allegiance three times. Guinea-Bissau recognized China in 1998 after switching twice. Liberia recognized China in 2003 after switching three times. Senegal recognized China in 2005 after switching twice, and Chad has recognized China since 2006 after switching twice.59 Despite a see-saw contest between Taiwan and China that saw many countries switch back and forth between recognizing one or the other of these countries from the l 970's to the mid-1990s, China has definitely gained the upper hand recently. No African country has switched its recognition from China to Taiwan since 1995.

South Africa was one of the most important and largest countries in the world that still recognized Taiwan heading into the late 1990s. This changed in 1998 when South Africa

58 J.R. Wu, "Taiwan Says Burkina Faso Coup Won't Affect Ties," Reuters, September 18, 2015, accessed December 15, 2015, http://af.reuters.com/article/saoTomeNews/idAFL4Nl 10 1VF20l509 l 8?sp=true. 59 Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa, 244, 297, 310, 316, 319.

29 switched to recognize C~ina as the legitimate, independent country.60 Malawi followed suit in

2007 and was handsomely rewarded by the Chinese government with new infrastructure and

economic aid. When South Sudan became a new and independent country in 2011, it chose to

establish diplomatic relations with China instead of Taiwan.61 Finally, the Gambia chose to end

formal recognition of Taiwan in 2013 but, interestingly, has not established diplomatic relations with China since.62

Table 6 African countries that have switched to recognizing China over Taiwan since 1995

Country Year South A.£rica 1998 Central African Republic 1998 Guinea,.Bissau 1998 Liberia 2003 Senegal 2005 Chad 2006 Malatvi 2007 South Sudan 2011

Source: Data adapted from David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 244, 255, 297, 310, 316, 319, 346, 359.

Taiwan's isolation in Africa goes further than the extremely limited number ofAfrican countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Across the world, some countries formally recognize China, but still have established non-diplomatic representative or trade offices in

Taiwan. These offices offer the opportunity for a country to maintain some level of contact with

Taiwan's government, and they can also perform duties usually performed by embassies or consulates such as promoting cultural exchanges, issuing visas, and, to some lesser extent,

60 BBC News, "Taiwan Loses Major Ally," December 30, 1997, accessed December 15, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/analysis/43290.stm. 61 Shinn and Eisenman, China and Africa, 250. 62 Joel Atkinson, "Gambia's Break with Taiwan," The Diplomat, December 2, 2013, accessed December 15, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/gambias-break-with-taiwan/.

30 unofficial diplomatic exchanges.63 It is telling, however, that few African countries have ' established this type of representative or trade office in Taiwan. This complete lack of even informal relations has resulted in Taiwan's further isolation from African countries. ... In sum, the evidence suggests that China has been increasingly successful at isolating

Taiwan from African states. Since 1998, China has established, re-established, or maintained formal diplomatic relationships with the large majority of African nations, while Taiwan has increasingly lost most ofthe few formal diplomatic relationships that it still had. As a result of this reshuffling, only three African countries had maintained official diplomatic relations with

Taiwan by the end of 2015. There is also a paucity of any informal relations between Taiwan and

African states such as those that Taiwan has established with some European, Asian, and North and South American countries. There does not appear to be anything on the horizon that would suggest that this trend will reverse anytime soon. At the same time, economic, diplomatic, and military ties between Africa and China continue to deepen. Thus, these data suggest that China has been successful at achieving its foreign policy objective of isolating Taiwan in Africa.

Attracting Votes at the United Nations

Support for Chinese objectives by African nations in the UN represents another way to determine the extent to which China influences Africa through soft power. All African nations with permanent membership in the UN have the ability to vote on UNGA resolutions and those two to three African countries that have temporary membership on the UN Security Council are able to record their position on Security Council resolutions. Given China's desire to dampen attempts to have international consensus on some issues related to human rights, and/or to influence that consensus in its favor, votes relating to human rights in particular were assessed to

63 Sigrid Winkler, "Biding Time: The Challenge of Taiwan's International Status," The Brooking Institution, November 2011, accessed March 29, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/ research/papers /2011/11/17-taiwan-international-status-winkler.

31 provide a direct measure of Chinese influence over Africa. The votes that were analyzed were i limited to instances where China and the United States were on opposite sides ofthe vote because

the difference of opinion between these two powers on the issue of human rights fairly represents ·" the opinion world-wide on this issue.

Votes between 1996-1999 were compared with votes between 2011-2013 to determine

whether there was a notable difference in African voting patterns before and after the soft power

push in Africa. In order to evaluate changes over time on specific issues, only votes on the same

resolution were considered. Lastly, only votes that generally discussed human rights were

included in the analysis. Votes on the human rights situation in specific countries; e.g., Myanmar,

were excluded. These controls reduced the number of UN votes to be evaluated to two

resolutions. These included the "Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures" and "The

Right to Development" resolutions. Although each year these resolutions are modified in some

way, the general thrust of each resolution is covered below.

The "Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures" resolution had been voted on

annually from 1996 to 2013. This resolution seeks to diminish the occurrence of nations

unilaterally taking punitive actions against other nations. It states that no nation may use or

encourage the use of economic, political, or any type of other measure to coerce another state to

submit to the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights. The resolution bases its

authority on international law, international humanitarian law, and the United Nations Charter. It

affirms that unilateral coercive measures are an obstacle to the implementation of the UN

Declaration on the Right to Development. It urges all states not to adopt any measure that could

impede the full achievement of social development by the populations of all countries.64

64 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 681162, Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures (New York: General Assembly, 2013).

32 Given China'~ problematic human rights record and suppression of individual liberties,

China is interested in diminishing attempts by other nations to enact coercive measures to affect its behavior. As such, China voted in favor of this resolution annually. The table below illustrates that African states increasingly voted with China on the "Human Rights and Coercive Measures

Resolution" over the last twenty years. The average percentage of African countries that voted yes to this resolution along with China during the 1996-1998 time period was 58%. This compares with the 94% of African states that voted with China on this resolution during the 2011­

2013 time period. While only one African country voted against the resolution in each year during the 1996-1998 time period, no African country voted against the resolution in the latter years. The number of abstentions also decreased from twenty in 1996 to zero in 2013. Overall, there was a 36% change in the numher of African countries that voted with China on this resolution between these two time periods. By contrast, the United States has voted against this resolution during the years in question. US representatives to the UN have noted that the resolution "undermines the international community's ability to respond effectively to acts that, by their very nature and enormity, are offensive to international norms."65

Table 7 Votes on Human Right and Coercive Measures Resolution from 1996-1998 and 2011­ 2013

Percent of Total·.African In Not in Non­ Year Abstained African States Votes Fal·or Favor Voting in Fa~vor 1996 48 14 l 20 13 1997 48 29 10 60% 1998 48 40 0 7 83%

20U 49 49 0 0 0 100%> 2012 49 42 0 3 4 86~/~ 2013 49 47 0 0 2 96~-'0

Source: Data adapted from "United Nations Bibliographic Information System," United Nations, last modified 2016, accessed January 3, 2015, http://unbisnet.un.org/.

65 United Nations General Assembly, Official Record of the 31st Plenary Meeting of its Fifty-Seventh Session (New York: General Committee, 2002), 12.

33 The "Right to De~elopm ' ent'' resolution was submitted annually from 1997 to 2013. That resolution sought to promote the social and economic advancement of all peoples in the world. It emphasized that the right to development is an unalienable right and is a prerogative both of ·" individuals and nations. It stressed that the state has the primary obligation to promote and protect human rights while reaffirming that social and economic development is solely the state's responsibility.66 China has supported this resolution because it focused on the importance of the state and the right to self-determination.67 By so doing, China wished to increase the state's ability to pursue development free from outside interference while veering away from individual rights in favor of collective rights. China views UN resolutions pertaining to human rights in strongly aspirational rather than legal terms. Further, China believes that the focus ofthe right to development should be on economic development and that human rights should be implemented according to a country's national conditions.68 This interpretation gives China a freer hand to deal with internal human rights issues in the manner it sees fit.

Table 8 Votes on Right to Development Resolution from 1997-1999 and 2011-2013

Percent of Total African In Not in Non­ Year Abstained AI.rican States Votes Favor Favor voting inFa,1or 1996 48 42 0 0 6 1997 48 42 0 0 6 1998 48 37 0 0 l1

2011 49 49 0 0 0 100% 2012 49 48 0 0 1 98% 2013 49 48 0 0 l 98%

Source: Data adapted from "United Nations Bibliographic Information System," United Nations, last modified 2016, accessed January 3, 2016, http://unbisnet.un.org.

66 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 681158, The Right to Development (New York: Third Committee, 2013). 67 Sonya Sceats and Shawn Breslin, China and the International Human Rights System (London: Chatham House, 2012), 8-9. 68 Sceats and Breslin, China and the International Human Rights System, 1.

34 China annually vote,d for this resolution. Table 8 shows that while the shift in the number

of African countries that voted along with China on this resolution is not as dramatic as with the

"Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures" resolution, there was still a noticeable change. ... The average percentage ofAfrican countries that voted with China from 1997 through 1999 was

84%. The average percentage of African countries that voted with China from 2011 to 2013 was

99%. This accounts for a ·15% increase from the earlier to the latter period. The changes had

mostly to do with the fact that the number of countries not voting dropped during the latter

period. In both periods, no African country actually voted against the resolution or even

abstained, which indicates there was never much African opposition to this resolution. The

United States, on the other hand, has consistently voted against this resolution because it has not

addressed "aspects of development that related to the universal rights held by individuals,

including civil and political."69

Therefore, the analysis of voting patterns on two UN resolutions related to human rights

from the late 1990's and the early 2010's indicate that African states have increasingly voted with

China over the last twenty years. China has thus been effective at garnering support from African

countries on some international issues of special interest to China. This support has helped China

deflect criticism on its own internal human rights record and move the focus of international

norms away from individual rights to the rights of states. While the data is limited, the voting data

on these two UN resolutions supports the claim that China has been successful at garnering

African support to help shape international norms.

69 United Nations General Assembly, Summary Record ofthe 5J5' Meeting ofthe Sixty­ Ninth Session (New York: Third Committee, 2015), 13.

35 1,

Conclusion

The evidence presented in the paper shows that senior Chinese government officials and ·"' other senior members ofChina's Communist Party, media, and elite believe soft power is an important means for achieving Chinese foreign policy objectives. China has increasingly employed soft power in Africa throughout this century through economic means, media outreach, cultural promotion and exchange, and deeper diplomacy. Although many scholars on China have proclaimed that these soft power efforts have been successful, a review of the literature revealed no known quantitative evaluations of soft power effectiveness in Africa, and the Chinese government has shared no information publicly on actual outcomes. Therefore, the research task was to develop indicators to assess Chinese progress toward achieving its policy goals before and after China substantially increased its soft power initiative in Africa.

For the purposes of this paper, China's success at bolstering its image and influence in

African nations was measured by assessing polls taken during the last ten years. Secondly,

China's ability to gain African support for isolating Taiwan was assessed by analyzing how recognition of China and Taiwan has shifted among African nations since 1998. Finally, China's ability to persuade African nations to partner with China to counter international norms that

China perceives to be problematic was measured through analyzing voting patterns of several UN votes from the late 1990's and early 2010's.

The data suggests that China's soft power efforts have been at least moderately successful at achieving Chinese foreign policy objectives in Africa. In regard to China's image in

Africa, public polling results indicate that among Africans China's favorability and influence, and support for the Chinese development model have steadily increased over the last ten years.

China's favorability ratings in Africa are notably much higher than they are in other regions of

36 1 ,

the world. These findings ~upport the assertion that China has succeeded in improving its image in Africa.

Next, evidence concerning Taiwan's isolation makes clear that Taiwan is formally recognized by a small and shrinking list of African countries. Only three African countries maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and there is a paucity of any informal relations between Taiwan and African states. At the same time, economic, diplomatic, and military ties between Africa and China continue to deepen. This data suggests that China's efforts to isolate Taiwan in Africa have been effective.

Lastly, in regard to Chinese international priorities, the research suggests that China uses soft power to court support from African countries on some international issues of special interest to China. This support has helped China deflect criticism on its own internal human rights record and move attention away from individual rights to the rights of states. While the data source for this analysis was limited, the trend on this indicator supports the claim that China's soft power efforts have been successful at garnering African support to help shape international norms.

These findings are relevant for the international community. While the Western world has been occupied with war and terrorism in the Middle East, a resurgent Russia, mass migration to Europe, and other more pressing matters, China has made strides, surpassing many Western nations, at cultivating strong partnerships with African countries. It seems that Western powers cling to the notion that African countries offer few economic opportunities and limited alliance appeal. The Chinese government, on the other hand, holds Africa in higher esteem and hopes that its burgeoning partnerships with African countries will pay long-term dividends. Because of the large number of countries and potential for economic growth in Africa, a strong Chinese-African alliance could spell trouble for Western interests, particularly Western human rights interests.

It should be noted, however, that despite these large Chinese investments in cultural promotion and exchange with African countries, it remains to be seen whether Chinese culture will be able to penetrate into Africa like Western culture. The Chinese government consistently

37 refers to its long and continuous history and rich culture, and seeks to convince other countries

that China is a civilization worth emulation. There is reason to believe that many African leaders see a viable development model in China; one that promotes rapid economic development ... coupled with strong state control. However, while China has been relatively effective at

improving its image in Africa, garnering African support to isolate Taiwan, and attracting votes

within the UN, cultural ties between African populations and the Chinese do not appear to be

deep. When Chinese cultural products such as movies, music, and art displace Western cultural

products, then it will be evident that China has become a dominant cultural influence in Africa.

Limitations of the Study and Areas for Future Research

Whereas the findings of this research, when woven together, appear to support the claim

that Chinese soft power efforts in Africa have been at least moderately successful, it should be

noted that there were limitations to the study that present opportunities for additional research. To

begin, using existing data, there is no way to directly correlate China's soft power efforts with

China's increasing favorability ratings over the last fifteen years. While it is conceivable to

believe that China's increasing favorability ratings are at least partially related to this soft power

push, there is no direct evidence that ties the latter to the former. To buttress the argument, more

comprehensive polling data would be helpful to ascertain African perceptions of China.

Specifically, a multi-decade longitudinal polling study, focused on China's image and influence

in Africa, could yield information critical to determining the effectiveness of China's soft power efforts.

Next, it is important to acknowledge that the gradual, yet definite, diplomatic shift by

African countries from Taiwan to China reflects global trends on this issue. It is not possible to

link directly Chinese soft power efforts in Africa to these worldwide gains. Countries from every region of the world have been making this shift and, given China's robust economic growth, increasing international influence, and military might, any student of international relations would

38 likely suggest that reeognizing China over Taiwan is good strategy. Thus, additional research is

needed in this area to provide a more nuanced understanding ofthe contributing factors affecting

this issue.

Additionally, the data presented on African votes at the UN related to issues prioritized

by the Chinese are likely to be too limited and shallow to provide a clear picture regarding

China's influence on Africa related to these votes. Further research extending the analysis of UN

votes to include a much larger sample size or a more in-depth analysis of the limited number of votes that China sponsors would be beneficial for confirming the findings of this study.

Further, to shed greater insight on the effectiveness of China's soft power efforts in

Africa, additional indicators should be identified and analyzed. For example, given the increasing

scale of Chinese funding in Africa for soft power type activities, it is natural to ask whether these

investments are paying a comparable dividend. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis of China's soft power efforts could shed light on whether this type of international relations program is worth the investment. A critical analysis of African media coverage on China would also be useful to demonstrate China's ability to shape news reporting, as would assessing the extent to which

Chinese cultural products are gaining ground on the African continent.

Finally, given discussion regarding China's development model and how it purportedly provides an attractive alternative to the liberal democratic model, future researchers may wish to clearly identify the components ofthis supposed development model (including the economic, governance, and social aspects). Once defined, it becomes possible to investigate the extent to which African countries have adopted those components. Ifsoft power is about the ability to attract rather than coerce, assessing the extent to which African countries are deciding to voluntarily adopt China's development model may provide another measure of the effectiveness of China's soft power efforts in Africa.

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