Governing from the Centre: Reconceptualizing the Role of the Pm and Cabinet

GOVERNING FROM THE CENTRE: RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF THE PM AND CABINET

Paul G. Thomas

As Paul Martin becomes prime minister and makes his cabinet choices, he is also deciding how the government will operate at the centre. For all his talk of addressing “the democratic deficit” and enhancing the importance of Parliament, the real power to decide still lies with the PM, the Cabinet and the central agencies of government, notably the Prime Minister’s Office, Privy Council Office and Department of Finance. How Martin “reconceptualizes” government at the centre will be one of the most interesting and important tests of his capacity to govern. “The prime minister works in a number of different worlds,” writes University of Manitoba’s Paul Thomas, from the trusted inner circle he sees every day, “to the everyday world of national politics which involves the media, powerful interest groups, provincial governments…and the shrinking, interdependent world of bilateral relations (with the US) and international relations with other countries and institutions.” Welcome to your new life, Mr. Martin.

En choisissant les ministres de son cabinet, Paul Martin indiquera comment il entend gouverner au centre. Malgré son intention de combler le « déficit démocratique » et de valoriser le rôle du Parlement, le véritable pouvoir reste en effet aux mains du chef de l’État, du cabinet et des organismes de l’administration centrale, notamment le Bureau du premier ministre et celui du Conseil privé, de même que le ministère des Finances. Ce « recentrage » de l’appareil d’État constituera un test décisif pour ce qui est de sa capacité de gouverner. Tout premier ministre évolue dans une variété d’univers, note Paul Thomas, du cercle de ses collaborateurs de confiance au milieu de la politique nationale, qui comprend les médias, de puissants groupes d’intérêt et les gouvernements provinciaux, sans oublier le monde de plus en plus petit et interdépendant des relations bilatérales (avec les États-Unis) et internationales (avec les pays et institutions de partout). Bienvenue dans vos dans vos nouvelles fonctions Monsieur Martin !

ne of the prerogatives that Paul Martin will inher- he has clearly left the impression that he favours a less reg- it as leader of the Liberal party and prime minister imented, more open and more pluralistic policy process in O of Canada is the right to design the formal struc- which there is less concentration of authority and power in ture and procedures of Cabinet, including the important the hands of a small inner circle of political and adminis- role to be played by powerful central agencies like the Prime trative elites. Minister’s Office, the Privy Council Office and the Treasury Most commentators have welcomed these promises to Board Secretariat. During his leadership campaign, Martin share power more widely and to create more diffuse sources of has been critical of the undue and dangerous concentration policy influence. The prevailing view is that the Canadian of power in the hands of the PM and his key advisors. Apart political system centralizes power unduly, leading to poor pol- from his speech on parliamentary reform, he has been icy choices and a lack of accountability for results. I suggest a vague about possible broader and institutional reforms, but countervailing interpretation of prime-ministerial power. I

POLICY OPTIONS 79 DECEMBER 2003 – JANUARY 2004 Paul G. Thomas

would also recommend that Martin be Such labels represent good rhetoric ● providing information and advice careful in promising that everyone will but poor analysis. I submit that there to individual ministers on the per- get into the act, because the result may are more constraints on the exercise of formance of both their collective be that on the toughest policy issues we prime-ministerial power than is popu- responsibilities in cabinet and will get no action and accountability larly assumed. I would also argue in their individual responsibilities will become even more blurred. favour of a broader, more pluralistic within particular portfolios; In formal, constitutional terms, cab- conception of the policy process than ● planning the legislative program inet-parliamentary government is inher- emerges from a debate over whether and achieving a strategy for secur- ently centralized and secretive. Based upon the Understanding the shifting dynamics of cabinet decision- constitutional principles of making is difficult for outsiders because of the practices of collective and individual cabinet confidentiality and cabinet solidarity. Such practices ministerial responsibility, power is concentrated in the help the PM and the Cabinet to maintain an outward hands of a few partisan appearance of unity and the maintenance of majority support politicians — the prime min- in the House of Commons. ister and Cabinet — and they, in turn, are held continuously there is cabinet or prime-ministerial ing the passage of bills and expen- accountable for the exercise of that government. A full understanding of ditures through Parliament; power to the public’s elected representa- the contemporary policy process ● providing oversight and coordina- tives in Parliament through a variety of requires knowledge of the power relation of the implementation of pol- mechanisms. This approach to the tionships among numerous actors and icy through the bureaucracy; assignment of political responsibility institutions, both inside and outside of ● providing a forum for political and accountability differs fundamental- government. Power depends not only debate on the political standing of ly from the presidential-congressional on constitutional principles, institu- the government, the health of the model. Rather than concentrating power tional structures and the formal proce- party and the issues of the day. and focusing accountability, the Ameri- dures used, but also on the wider Understanding the shifting dynam- can political system disperses power context and the personalities of the ics of cabinet decision-making is diffi- based on the constitutional principles of people involved. Clearly, actors depend cult for outsiders because of the separation of powers and checks and bal- upon the prime minister, but he also practices of cabinet confidentiality and ances. As a result, the policy process in depends on them. cabinet solidarity. Such practices help the United States is usually seen to be the PM and the Cabinet to maintain an more open, permeable, pluralistic, com- inally, in an increasingly compli- outward appearance of unity and they plicated and diffuse in terms of account- F cated, turbulent and unpredictable are contributing factors to party loyalty ability for actions or inactions. governance environment, formal and the maintenance of majority sup- While constitutional principles structures will matter less and political port in the House of Commons. provide an important starting point, management skills will become even The charge that prime-ministerial they cannot explain everything that more crucial. government has replaced cabinet gov- happens at the center of contemporary It has usually been assumed that ernment rests upon an assumption government. Commentators have long the Cabinet is the forum where the and a number of claims. The assump- recognized the gap between the theory most important decisions in govern- tion is that power resides in one loca- and the practice of cabinet-parliament ment are taken. Formal constitutional tion and is finite in nature. In other government. Over the decades, power is niceties aside, the Cabinet might be words, relationships within the politi- said to have shifted from Parliament to said to perform the following list of cal executive are seen as zero-sum Cabinet and eventually from Cabinet to functions: games, in which there can only be the prime minister. Most recently, it has ● providing information and advice winners and losers. The PM has the become fashionable to talk about prime for the PM to perform his respon- power and he refuses to share it with ministerial power and the dangers to sibilities as leader of the govern- others. It is suggested that the preroga- democracy posed by the undue concen- ment and leader of the governing tives granted to the prime minister as tration of power in the hands of one party; leader of the governing party and as individual. Prime ministers have been ● securing agreement among minis- leader of government mean that he is described as “friendly dictators” and the ters on priorities and arbitrating able to decide policy on all issues in Cabinet has been portrayed as a mere disputes on issues which extend which he takes an interest and, by “focus group” which exists to pre-test beyond the boundaries of a single deciding key issues, he sets the con- prime-ministerial ideas. ministerial portfolio; texts and direction for all other issues

80 OPTIONS POLITIQUES DÉCEMBRE 2003 – JANVIER 2004 Governing from the centre: reconceptualizing the role of the PM and Cabinet facing government. This interpreta- ment. However, the impression left of prime minister’s control over them is tion makes cabinet a residual organiza- one-person rule is a gross exaggeration. potentially great and has probably tion. Ministers become agents of the There are a number of constraints increased during the past three prime minister’s will and the Cabinet on the exercise of prime ministerial decades. However, in the other two ceases to function as the key forum power that need to be recognized. In worlds of national and international where the collective deliberation on combination these constraints mean politics, the PM has probably lost some policy takes place. that the PM must be careful about how influence because he is less free to set the agenda of his govern- Once issues reach the agenda of the inner circle of government, ment. In the more compli- the prime minister’s control over them is potentially great and cated, interdependent and has probably increased during the past three decades. However, unpredictable policy envi- ronments outside of govern- in the other two worlds of national and international politics, the ments there are more PM has probably lost some influence because he is less free to surprise events which set the agenda of his government. require a prime-ministerial response, often on an In support of the view that the he spends his “political capital,” that instantaneous basis, the events of prime minister has become all-impor- is, his reputation for being on the win- September 11, 2001 being a notable tant, commentators point to several ning side when problems arise. The example. Furthermore, the national sources of his power: political capital of the prime minister government is increasingly tied down ● the prime minister makes thou- depends on doing what “significant by legal and political agreements with sands of appointments which he others” expect, including Cabinet col- provincial governments and other uses to promote and to maintain leagues, the party caucus, powerful countries which leave prime ministers loyalty to his personal leadership; interest groups, other governments, less policy room in which to maneuver. ● the threat of calling an election is the media and the electorate. Given the need to deal simultane- a way to block challenges to his The PM works in a number of dif- ously with issues in all three worlds, leadership; ferent worlds. There is the immediate, the PM is forced by circumstance to ● control over the agenda of intimate, intense and introverted world practice “management by exception.” Cabinet and the right to sum up of the inner circle of most trusted Time may be the most fundamental the consensus within cabinet; Cabinet colleagues, key political advi- limit on prime-ministerial power. No ● the use of Cabinet committees, sors, representatives of central agencies, matter how well-organized, well-staffed informal “kitchen cabinets” and full Cabinet, and certain Cabinet com- and energetic he is, no prime minister outside advisers, including pollsters; mittees. There is also the sprawling can arrange to be present when all the ● the availability of a powerful group expanse of the rest of the government “important” decision within govern- of central agencies — the PMO, world: individual ministers and their ment are being made. Sharing the bur- PCO, TBS and the Department of departments, the party caucus, den of running government necessarily Finance — to provide countervail- Parliament and the vast agglomeration means sharing power. Departmental ing advice to that coming from of non-departmental bodies. A second ministers carry on the great bulk of individual ministers and their world in which the prime minister lives government programs with little or no departments; is the everyday world of national poli- direction from the PM. ● participation in meetings of first tics which involves the media, powerful As governments expanded their ministers where federal-provincial interest groups, provincial govern- scope, there were fewer and fewer new bargains are struck; ments, the non-parliamentary wing of policy spaces to be occupied. Together ● the media’s focus on the prime the party and so on. Finally, there is the with the fact of financial restraint, this minister to the virtual exclusion of shrinking, interdependent world of means that most policies announced by everyone else; bilateral and international relations governments today are modifications ● a loyal and disciplined backbench with other countries and international to existing programs, rather than in the House of Commons and a institutions. entirely new innovations. When prime docile Senate that make manage- ministers enter office they inherit a ment of the legislative process pre- f course, these worlds overlap, legacy of accumulated policies which dictable compared to other politi- O intersect and collide at times to they usually have no desire or time to cal systems. make political management of the change. Prime ministers who become I accept that all of these factors prime-ministerial agenda very chal- involved with individual departments make the prime minister the single lenging. Once issues reach the agenda and programs will soon discover that if most important figure within govern- of the inner circle of government, the operational matters are allowed to

POLICY OPTIONS 81 DECEMBER 2003 – JANUARY 2004 Paul G. Thomas

The Gazette, Montreal Paul Martin at a town hall meeting during the Liberal leadership campaign. These voters are far from the centres of power where Martin will run his government, but their concerns will be at the centre of his agenda if he is to succeed as prime minister.

come to the top of government, policy- the past have been supplemented in ties who cannot be easily pushed making will move downward because recent decades by gender, ethnicity around, even by the prime minister. It there will not be time for it. and race. Often the balancing act of is hard to imagine that a powerful Cabinet selection must be performed regional minister like Allan J. he PM clearly has important levers within the confines of parliamentary MacEachen of Nova Scotia during the T of influence in relation to his caucus which lacks balanced regional Trudeau years or Don Mazankowski of Cabinet colleagues. Most importantly, strength. The onus for making the gov- Alberta during the Mulroney years he is free to appoint, promote, demote ernment appear responsive and legiti- would be excluded from key decisions and dismiss people from Cabinet. mate to all segments of Canadian affecting their regions. Critics suggest that this leads to society rests with the prime minister. The fact that the media focuses its Cabinets consisting of “loyalists” and Secondly, while the PM is “free” to attention on the prime minister gives “yes persons.” Two things can be said appoint whomever he wants, this does him prominence but it does not make about such criticisms. First, the critics not mean he is surrounded by political his Cabinet colleagues any less ambi- ignore or underestimate the impor- nobodies. There are always a number of tious. Given the political challenge of tance and the difficulty of creating and individuals who will have to be includ- finding Cabinet unity and the political maintaining a ministry which can ed in the Cabinet because of their sta- strength of certain Cabinet ministers, reflect and accommodate the diversi- tus in the party and in the country. there is limit to how long a prime min- ties of the country. Traditional repre- There is a well established practice of ister will want or will be able to keep a sentation criteria such as region, designating regional ministers within contentious issue off the agenda of religion, language and occupation the Canadian cabinet system and these Cabinet. Smart prime ministers recog- which shaped Cabinet selections in individuals are often strong personali- nize the need to mobilize consent and

82 OPTIONS POLITIQUES DÉCEMBRE 2003 – JANVIER 2004 Governing from the centre: reconceptualizing the role of the PM and Cabinet support for actions of the government roles have remained unchanged. The ed that his Cabinet system overesti- and they depend on other ministers to core agencies are: PMO, PCO, Finance mated the willingness of ministers to contribute to this process. and Treasury Board. The number of cen- act in a collective fashion. Critics of tral agencies peaked during the early the Trudeau system also argued that he power to dissolve Parliament 1980s when there were separate min- leaders of the central agencies often T and to call an election is often istries of state for economic and social exaggerated the extent to which their seen as a weapon in the hands of the policy. During the first term of the organizations could match the range PM. It is, however, very much a two- Mulroney government (1984-1988), the and depth of expertise found in the edged sword. The threat of an election Ministry of Environment temporarily line departments and were too ready may bring rebellious ministers and assumed something like the status of a to second-guess the policy advice com- backbenchers into line, but no leader central agency when the government ing through those channels. will want to face the electorate if his embarked on a “Green Plan” that was party is openly divided. Control over meant to be system-wide. More recently, ne of the PM’s prerogatives is to election timing is mainly an advantage it has been suggested that the O decide the internal structures of in relation to opposition parties. Department of Justice plays a central- Cabinet (such as the number of Cabinet In his highly praised book, agency role in ensuring that proposed committees) and the procedures for Governing from the Centre: The legislation is “Charter proof.” generating and dealing with policy pro- Concentration of Power in Canada, During the Trudeau years, the gov- posals. Decisions on these matters are Donald Savoie argues that “power has ernment of Canada became blessed (or not neutral; they have implications for shifted within the centre itself…the cursed) with the most fully developed the centralization or decentralization of prime minister, with the support of cabinet support system in the world. power. For example, greater use of advisors in his own office and senior That system required ministers to Cabinet committees has been seen by public servants in central agencies, has work within an elaborate, specialized some ministers as a way to enhance the gained a great deal of power power of the prime minister by while Cabinet has lost influ- The constellation of central agencies eroding the role of full Cabinet. ence.” Savoie places great has changed somewhat over time There is no “perfect” design for emphasis on the role of “cen- but the core agencies and their basic Cabinets. Choices about how tral agencies” in bolstering the power is distributed within control of the prime minister roles have remained unchanged. The Cabinets will reflect the context over the machinery of govern- core agencies are: PMO, PCO, of government at the time (i.e. ment. The rise of an extensive Finance and Treasury Board. the types of issues which domi- central agency apparatus began nate its agenda) and the person- during the first term of Pierre Trudeau and hierarchical network of Cabinet ality of the PM (i.e. his personal between 1968 and 1972. The intent committees and central agencies. leadership philosophy and style). was, and to a large extent still is, to Ministers spent endless hours lobby- In this regard, it is interesting to provide the PM, the Cabinet and ing, bargaining and making recom- compare the Cabinet model used by Cabinet committees with countervail- mendations to one another, to central Trudeau during the 1970s and 1980s ing sources of policy advice to that agencies and to deputy ministers serv- and the model adopted by Jean flowing from line departments and to ing on so-called mirror committees. Chrétien when he became prime min- help manage the larger volume of busi- There was growing resentment of the ister in 1993. First, in terms of leader- ness being transacted by the political powerful influence of the central agen- ship style, Chrétien never had the executive today. cies, especially of the enlarged Prime philosophical and conceptual orienta- While the principal role of central Minister’s Office, which to its critics tion to politics and government that agencies is to provide support to the resembled the personal advisory sys- Trudeau brought to office. Trudeau political executive, they must also be tem available to presidents of the aspired to make government more role models of independent, profes- United States. Also, there was confu- rational, innovative, coherent and sionalism for the rest of the public sion, overlap and rivalry among the effective and he believed that this service. As corporate leaders within the central agencies over their respective could be accomplished through a series public service, central agencies must duties and the philosophy that should of structural and procedural reforms. develop a collaborative approach in guide policy-making. Ministers felt Most of the time Trudeau preferred a their interactions with line depart- greatly restricted in their freedom to collegial approach to Cabinet decision- ments and agencies. run their own departments and to pur- making. In contrast, Chrétien saw gov- The constellation of central agen- sue their own political careers. By the ernment as the accommodation of cies has changed somewhat over time end of the Trudeau era, many interests; his leadership style was trans- but the core agencies and their basic informed commentators had conclud- actional not collegial, and he relied

POLICY OPTIONS 83 DECEMBER 2003 – JANUARY 2004 Paul G. Thomas

greatly on his personal political skills at increasing enormously. By gover- and partnership with private sec- managing issues and people within the nance, I mean the setting of directions tor institutions. Cabinet process. and the achievement of change within In this kaleidoscopic world of society. This function has always been swirling relationships the management he context is also important in shared between governments and of horizontal policy and programs rep- T comparing the approaches of the other institutions, but the trend in resents a much larger challenge than in two leaders. In terms of achieving uni- recent decades has been for govern- the past because governments can rely fied direction within his government, Chrétien The fact that the media focuses its attention on the prime obtained the benefit of a minister gives him prominence but it does not make his context which demanded Cabinet colleagues any less ambitious. Smart prime ministers centralized control. From 1994 onward the Chrétien recognize the need to mobilize consent and support for government embarked on a actions of the government and they depend on other major exercise in deficit ministers to contribute to this process. reduction called Program Review. Most economic departments ments to steer more by remote control less on formal structure and command- saw their expenditures, programs and and to rely less upon direct interven- and-control relationships to achieve staff cut by at least 30 percent. Some tion. Governance is increasingly inter- coordination. As was seen with the departments were completely trans- organizational in character, in part Trudeau model, structures and proce- formed. As the dominant department reflecting the fact that we live in a dures intended to improve coordina- of the day, Finance used a policy para- more interdependent world. tion may only complicate the Cabinet digm of deficit reduction and In more practical terms, there are system and create their own problems. enhanced competition to provide the a number of recent developments that intellectual coherence necessary to give rise to new coordination chal- ow do we prescribe for successful achieve unified direction and fiscal lenges: H coordination based upon a con- discipline within government. Once ● issues are increasingly cross- stantly evolving pattern of interac- Program Review had been completed cutting and do not fit neatly into tions and relationships among sets of and the deficit had been eliminated, the traditional ministerial boxes; multiple actors and institutions who the normal tendencies of ministers to ● even though governments have are often equal, or nearly equal, in sta- advocate on behalf of their depart- somewhat reduced their activities, tus and power? ments and regions came to the fore there is still a high probability that The Canadian experience demon- again, although in a somewhat muted the impacts of one program will strates that there is as much art as sci- manner because more realistic expec- spill over into other program ence involved with the design of tations of government had taken hold. fields; Cabinet systems. There are no ideal Coordination (or more popular ● the existence of federal-provincial models existing separately from the peo- today, “horizontality”) has been a agreements on policy and pro- ple who use the system and the circum- perennial quest of practictioners within gram delivery means sharing stances they face. Different patterns of government. Coordination refers to the responsibility, money, risk and interaction and decision-making have harmonization of decisions and activi- accountability; operated during different time periods. ties in the pursuit of an identified goal ● international and bilateral rules of The constant factor throughout is that or purpose. There is both a strategic and trade and other deals introduce the Cabinet and its related structures are preventive purpose to coordination. The another set of policy considerations; above all the PM’s own instruments for strategic purpose involves relating par- ● governments are relying more on achieving his government’s goals, secur- ticular decisions to overall goals and to semi-autonomous agencies, coming agreement on horizontal actions, one another. Prevention involves both missions and foundations; allowing for representation, “the chal- the avoidance and the resolution of ● even within traditional integrated lenge function” and due process, and conflicts within and among decisions. departments all the talk (and some demonstrating responsiveness to chang- Successful coordination also entails the of the action) is about decentral- ing conditions. These principles confirm avoidance of gaps in the design and ization, empowerment of front- that Cabinet is first and foremost a polit- implementation of policy. line staff and responsiveness to ical body for the expression and recon- As the governance environment the customer and providing seam- ciliation of competing values and changes, the policy and management less integrated service; interests. Not surprisingly given this challenges facing governments in ● there is more widespread use of central purpose, there is little consensus terms of successful coordination are contracting out service delivery over the details of Cabinet design.

84 OPTIONS POLITIQUES DÉCEMBRE 2003 – JANVIER 2004 Governing from the centre: reconceptualizing the role of the PM and Cabinet

There is no disputing the fact that departments to carry them out. With- politics, driven by the headlines and prime ministers have important levers in the administrative apparatus of the deadlines of the media, daily life in of influence that make them the single government there is more fragmenta- the central agencies seems to an out- most important figure in government tion and risk of incoherence due to sider to be chaotic, frantic, intense and today. The office is not becoming pres- trends and developments in public short-term. Not all the forces with- Chrétien never had the philosophical and conceptual in the Canadian Cabinet orientation to politics and government that Trudeau brought to system are centripetal in office. Trudeau aspired to make government more rational, character. There are many innovative, coherent and effective and he believed that this centrifugal forces at work as well. In a diverse and open could be accomplished through a series of structural and country like Canada we procedural reforms. In contrast, Chrétien saw government as need strength at the centre the accommodation of interests; his leadership style was of government. Strength- transactional not collegial. ening the centre is not necessarily inconsistent with identialized because no prime minister management. Many policies today are Cabinet or with parliamentary gov- would agree to the checks and bal- what Richard Rose calls “intermestic,” ernment. Whether we have the bal- ances which a president in the United that is, they straddle the international ance between centralization and States faces. Even though the PM is and domestic worlds. The prime min- decentralization of power right at any central to the governing process, the ister rarely has a free hand to decide point in time is a subjective, value- institutional norms of Cabinet govern- such policies. laden matter for debate. I doubt that ment mean that issues do not flow as Also, governments have tied anyone could make the case that automatically or as quickly to his desk themselves down with an elaborate Canadians obtain poorer performance as they do to the desk of the US presi- web of linkages and relationships to and less accountability from their dent. The Cabinet has not become an other orders of government and pri- national government than do Ameri- anachronism or a “dignified part” of vate organizations. The proliferation cans who live in a political system the constitution. The cabinet may not of well financed and articulate pres- where power is more dispersed and deliberate collectively about policy as sure groups and more numerous accountability is more diffused. often as it once did (but even that view think tanks of various ideological Up to a point, the Canadian con- of the past is historically suspect), but persuasions means that there are stitution and related political practices it continues to contribute to the defi- more outside sources of policy ideas let the PM decide how power will be nition of what actions and inactions and demands so that policy analysts distributed at the centre. This allows are politically acceptable and feasible. within government (including those for flexibility in a changing and uncer- To maintain his personal political cap- within central agencies) have far less tain world. If a prime minister abuses ital and to preserve the reputation of of a monopoly on the provision of his power or screws up in policy terms, his government, the prime minister advice to the prime minister. there is no doubt where blame will be needs on most occasions the unco- We have seen during the past assigned. Paul Martin as prime minis- erced support of his ministers and to a three decades the rise of an extensive ter in waiting has made clear his inten- lesser extent his backbench followers. central agency apparatus. But the tion to strengthen Parliament, and he influence of central agencies in gener- has implied that many other actors he constitutional principle of al, and of particular agencies, has been (provincial governments, cities, abo- T individual ministerial responsibil- seen to fluctuate over time depending riginals and citizens in general) will ity and the tyranny of the clock oblige upon the issues before government gain influence. However, Paul Martin the prime minister to share authority and the leadership approach of the has to be careful about managing and power with other Cabinet mem- PM. At times there have been inconsis- expectations that everyone can obtain bers. Most government activity today tencies, contradictions and rivalries what they want from the national pol- consists of running and modifying among the central agencies, which icy process and he has to be prepared existing programs in their details — have weakened their influence. to defend the crucial role of the centre not matters that normally attract Central agencies remain relatively of government. prime-ministerial attention. Com- small compared to the rest of govern- pletely new policy innovations are ment. There are limits to their capaci- Paul G. Thomas is Duff Roblin Professor few. Even with respect to new policies ty to intervene everywhere on behalf of Government and Political Studies at pushed by the prime minister, he ulti- of the prime minister. Finally, in the St. John’s College of the University of mately depends upon ministers and instantaneous world of contemporary Manitoba.

POLICY OPTIONS 85 DECEMBER 2003 – JANUARY 2004