IS S U E 1 , 2 0 1 8
140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
Tanzania Zanzibar
Malawi Zambia
Zimbabwe Namibia Mozambique
Botswana Mauritius Madagascar Swaziland Lesotho
20 YEARS OF CONFLICT TRENDS
TfP
1 9 9 2 – 2 0 1 7
CONTENTS
EDITORIAL 2 by Vasu Gounden
FEATURES 3 Sustaining Peace in the “New Gambia”: The Need for Investment in Peace and Development by Lesley Connolly
10 Civic Space Restrictions in Africa: How does Civil Society Respond? by David Kode
18 Repatriation and Reconciliation Challenges in North- eastern Nigeria: Toward an Integrated Framework of Analysis and Action by Tatsushi Arai
27 The National Dialogue Initiative in South Sudan: Assessing Progress and Pitfalls by Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu
35 Post-conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Sri Lanka by Dhammika Herath
42 What do Networks of Women Mediators Mean for Mediation Support in Africa? by Irene Limo
50 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration is Not Enough: Improving the Micro-level (Re)Integration of Former Child Soldiers by Anne-Lynn Dudenhoefer
Cover montage: Images sourced from the United Nations Photo gallery and other Creative Commons sources.
conflict trends I 1 EDITORIAL BY VASU GOUNDEN
The year 2018 is significant on the global calendar, as we year, the world will observe the 50th anniversary of the celebrate the birth of Nelson Mandela exactly 100 years ago. signing of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Mandela – the lawyer, the political activist, the prisoner, the Weapons, limiting the spread of military nuclear technology peacemaker and finally the president – started an armed to non-nuclear states wishing to acquire them. Despite the resistance movement, Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the signing of this treaty and Mandela’s impassioned plea, the Nation”) to fight against apartheid. Following his release world is again confronted by the prospect of nuclear war. from prison and 27-years of a life sentence served, he did It is encouraging that Africa’s position was declared when what many thought would be impossible: he led his political the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty was signed in movement, the African National Congress, into negotiations 1996. The treaty, which, ultimately became known as the with the apartheid regime’s ruling party. Pelindaba Treaty, came into effect on 15 July 2009 with the Mandela was elected in 1994 as the first president of a 28th ratification. democratic South Africa. He used the strong mandate his The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines party received in that first democratic general election to the basic rights and fundamental freedoms to which all begin the process of uniting a divided country, through a human beings are entitled. It was adopted 70 years ago, on number of reconciliation initiatives. Mandela stepped down 10 December 1948, and was motivated by the experiences after one term in office, despite having the opportunity to of the preceding two world wars. In the same address to the serve another term as president. As South Africans and UNGA in 1998, Mandela said, “ Born in the aftermath of the others around the globe prepare to observe and celebrate defeat of the Nazi and fascist crime against humanity, this the 100th anniversary of Mandela’s birth, many conflicts in Declaration held high the hope that all our societies would, in the world sadly continue to be driven by deep divisions, future, be built on the foundations of the glorious vision spelt exclusion and marginalisation, as well as the refusal of out in each of its clauses.” It is also significant that in 2018 leaders to step down from office after reaching their statutory we will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the end of the First term limit – and, in some cases, even using violence and World War – the armistice was signed on 11 November 1918. other means to extend their terms in office. As we celebrate all these events and the remarkable Mandela used his international standing as a global icon life of Mandela, we must remember his closing remarks to to build a new normative framework for a peaceful world. that 53rd Session of the UNGA, when he hoped for an end to On 21 September 1998, Mandela addressed the United poverty and war and said, “Were all these hopes to translate Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and called on the nuclear- into a realisable dream and not a nightmare to torment weapon states to make a firm commitment to eliminating the soul of the aged, then will I, indeed, have peace and nuclear weapons. Mandela recalled the very first United tranquillity.” The greatest tribute we can bestow on Mandela Nations resolution, adopted in January 1946, which called for is to work to realise his dream for us and our children. “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons Our modest contribution to Mandela’s dream will be and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. the launch of the Global Peace Forum in 2018. It will build a He said that “we still do not have concrete and generally global compact between civil society, the private sector and accepted proposals supported by a clear commitment by governments to create a peaceful world free from poverty, the nuclear-weapon States to the speedy, final and total unemployment and inequality. elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities”. Mandela went on to ask those who justify “these terrible and terrifying weapons of mass destruction – why do they need them anyway?” In the context of Mandela’s impassioned plea at the Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive Director UNGA in 1998, it is significant to note that on 1 July this of ACCORD.
2 I conflict trends SUSTAINING PEACE IN THE “NEW GAMBIA”: THE NEED FOR INVESTMENT IN PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
BY LESLEY CONNOLLY REUTERS/OFFICE OF THE SENEGAL PRESIDENCY
Introduction1 effort to avert a crisis, the Economic Community of West According to the 2017 Global Peace Index, The Gambia African States (ECOWAS), with the support of the United has fallen 18 places since 2016 and is among the top five Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), responded countries to have experienced the largest deterioration of an swiftly, launching a series of high-level dialogue efforts ongoing conflict situation.2 In addition, The Gambia is facing and deploying ECOWAS troops to the border. These efforts a range of socio-economic challenges including increasing were successful and President Barrow was sworn into office poverty, high unemployment, a growing rural-urban divide in January 2017, paving the way for a peaceful political and a decreasing literacy rate.3 transition. Yet despite the country’s fragile socio-economic and This transfer of power was heralded as a landmark political climate, in 2017 The Gambia peacefully transitioned win for democratic governance on a continent that has to a new political authority through democratic means. struggled to rid itself of the stigma of authoritarian rule. On 1 December 2016, Gambians took to the polls and replaced The “New Gambia”, as it is now commonly referred to, is then-president Yahya Jammeh with the current president, re-engaging with the international community, and political Adama Barrow. Jammeh, who had been in power since 1994, and development initiatives are already underway. surprised the international community by initially conceding the electoral defeat, and committing to make way for Barrow. 4 A week later, however, Jammeh contested the results Above: Adama Barrow is sworn in as the president of and, subsequently, declared a state of emergency. In an The Gambia on 19 January 2017.
conflict trends I 3 16° 15°30' 15° 14°30' 14° Aleg 13°30' 13° 12° 12° 11°30' SENEGAL Lac Rkiz M A URIT ANIA
Bogué Rosso Podor 16°30' Dagana Sé Ndiayène né NORTH ATLAN Richard-Toll Haïré Lao ga TIC l OCEA Lac de N Guier Kaédi Saint-Louis Mbout 16° Mpal Thilogne V Lagbar a Léona Ndia l ol Lou ye lé âng gg e d Ti uéré Louga u Mbeulleukhé Matam Ferlol 15 30' 15 30' Koki a ° ° Tioukougne Peul Qued Gar f o Kébémèr Daraa Linguère r o k a Darou Khoudos r Sélibaby o K Fourdou 15 Tiv Vélingara Mamâri Va 15 ° aouane llée ° Kayar National capital Va du Bakel Touba llée F Tièl du er s DIOURBELRegional capital M lo Cap Bambey bo Gabou Vert Mbaké un Sé Rufisque Town, village ne e né Dakar Diourbel Si The Gambia gal Airports 14 30' e 14 30' ° in Nayé ° ngu InternationalGossas boundary Payar Kayes Pope Mbour Fatick Va alou Regional boundarGuinguiny éo llée du S m F a
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SENEGAL m Joal-Fadiout Main road Kaffrine Kolomba Goudiri é Saloum Niahène Bala 14 SecondarKaolacy road 14 k o ° ° Koumpentoum K Sadiola Ndofane i SakOtherone road or track er Nganda Koungheul Koussanar Ni RailroadKeur MALI Maka Tambacounda Dalafi ou ug Banjul Georgetown Sando Dialafara 13°30' Kerewan 13°30' Mansa Konka Basse F Gambia Santa Su a THE GAMBIA lé m é Gunjur Kalagi SENEGAL Khossanto K 0 25 50 75 100 km o Bounkiling Vélingara Médina u 13 13 l ° u o ° ro Diana Gounas u ug n 0 25 50 75 mi ro t Soung Malari o Mako Kolda a u Saraya Kayang G Sédhiou am C Tanaf bie Ziguinchor asamanc e 12 30' 12°30' Goudomp Farim GUINEA-BISSAU Kédougou ° Diembéreng Siganar Sao Domingos ba Koundara Gê Gabú The question remains, however, whetherCa The Gambia Youth Empowerment and Entrepreneurship ch Bissora K GUINEA eu o Kali Cacheu l will be able to sustain its peaceful state during this transition The Institute for Economics and Peace has found a istrongb a and in the long term. In an effort to answer this question, correlation between “positive peace” (a concept similar to 12 . ° this article examines The Gambia through16° the lens15° 30' of sustaining15° peace)14 and°30' the Youth 14Development° 13 Index.°30' While 13° 12°30' 12° 11°30' “sustaining peace” – a concept formally introduced into the relationship between youth and peace is not simple or MapUN No. 4174vocabulary Rev. 3 UNITED in NA AprilTIONS 2016 by dual resolutions of the linear, there is evidence that “peaceful and resilient societies Department of Peacekeeping Operations January 2004 Cartographic Section Security Council and General Assembly. The resolutions can better promote and benefit from youth development and define sustaining peace as “a goal and a process to build youth-led entrepreneurship”.8 This is especially true in The a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of Gambia, where youth make up 65% of the population.9 Youth all segments of the population are taken into account”.5 unemployment in The Gambia is at 70%, while the ratio of It is further stated that sustaining peace is “a shared task and youth unemployment to adult unemployment is 2.3. A major responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by the Government contributor to youth unemployment is lack of access to high- and all other national stakeholders”.6 The concept should be quality education and training systems and a lack of skills, or seen as flowing through all three pillars of the UN’s work to mismatch between the skills possessed and those demanded promote an integrated approach to peace, development and in the labour market. This has contributed to young people human rights, where peace is seen as both an enabler and seeking alternative means of livelihood, including irregular an outcome.7 migration and employment in the informal sector. This article highlights three main areas that, in the name The youth in The Gambia, however, are a strong force of sustaining peace, should be prioritised in The Gambia: that, during the political impasse, emerged as a political youth engagement, women’s empowerment, and transitional force in the movement challenging Jammeh’s authority. justice and rule of law. It explains how investment in This group of the population was largely responsible for the these areas prevents the escalation of conflict, and how it #GambiaHasDecided movement, by popularising it via social contributes to the maintenance of long-term national peace media platforms. This movement was created to ensure the and stability. people’s voice was heard through the election results, and played a crucial role in educating Gambians on their rights as THE YOUTH IN THE GAMBIA, HOWEVER, voters and in opening space for political debate, especially during the political impasse. 10 ARE A STRONG FORCE THAT, DURING With the change in government in The Gambia came THE POLITICAL IMPASSE, EMERGED AS the expectation of a higher quality of life, with better employment opportunities, greater access to education A POLITICAL FORCE IN THE MOVEMENT and improved delivery of social services. The Barrow CHALLENGING JAMMEH’S AUTHORITY government has realised this need and has made tackling
4 I conflict trends GETTY IMAGES CARL DE SOUZA education and training. One example is the UN Conference on Trade Empretec programme, which works to “help existing and aspiring entrepreneurs become innovative and internationally competitive small and medium- size enterprises”.14 The initiative focuses on assisting entrepreneurs through an “integrated behavioral change program anchored on two flagship methodologies: Entrepreneurship Training Workshops and a comprehensive Business Development Support and Advisory Service”.15 With the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the initiative was set up in 2014 and has worked with 2 500 entrepreneurs across six regions in the country so far. It delivers seven programmes that focus on entrepreneurship-training workshops, including specific programmes for youth and women. Investment in these programmes could not only help expand their reach but would also assist in developing and strengthening the skills youth need to increase their economic opportunities. Due to The Gambia’s high youth population, prioritising initiatives aimed at empowering youth should be a central focus of the new government’s work for the purpose of The youth made the #GambiaHasDecided movement sustaining peace within the country. In this regard, among popular through social media. The movement challenged other things, investing in entrepreneurship as a means of job President Jammeh’s authority and ensured that the creation is an investment in sustaining peace. people’s voice was heard during the elections. THE NATIONAL YOUTH COUNCIL WAS
youth unemployment a priority, offering skills training and ESTABLISHED IN 2000 AND HAS PLAYED A apprenticeship schemes through the National Youth Service CENTRAL ROLE IN EMPOWERING GAMBIAN Scheme. However, a recent survey of 16- to 30-year-olds found that “many young people were unaware of these YOUTH DURING THE TRANSITION programmes, or did not believe they were effective”.11 More is needed from the government to communicate Women’s Empowerment opportunities and connect with youth to understand The connection between women’s empowerment, their expectations. The National Youth Council offers an stability and peace is supported by a wealth of evidence. opportunity to establish this link. Indeed, “gender equality is a stronger predictor of a The National Youth Council was established in 2000 state’s peacefulness than its level of democracy, religion, and has played a central role in empowering Gambian or gross domestic product (GDP). Where women are more youth during the transition. Several interviewees from civil empowered, the state is less likely to experience civil conflict society and the private sector stressed that there has been or go to war with its neighbors.”16 Moreover, there is a little communication from the new government on what is positive correlation between economic growth and gender being done and what plans it has for the country. There have equality and evidence that increasing “women’s participation only been isolated incidents of protests and demonstrations, and representation in leadership and decision-making but many interviewees warned that these illustrate brewing positions leads to higher levels of peacefulness and better tensions. The National Youth Council has managed to diffuse development outcomes for society”.17 a number of protests planned by youth, but the fear is that The Gambia ranked 173 out of 188 on the UNDP’s 2016 if youth are not engaged in the short term, their “energy Gender Inequality Index, with women still struggling to [to bring about change] can easily slip to dissent”.12 There access economic resources, healthcare and education.18 is a sense that they feel responsible for putting this new Women and girls continue to be disadvantaged due to government in power, so they are anxious to see the results patriarchal norms and practices, including in customary of this change, including more employment opportunities law, which does not allow women to inherit land, and which and a better quality of life.13 does not give women equal status in judicial processes. In addition to the government initiatives, several In addition, women cannot control or own land, despite private institutions have launched initiatives in an effort to their predominant role in farming and the reduction of meet the demand for improved access to and delivery of malnutrition. Women disproportionately face financial
conflict trends I 5 GETTY IMAGES MYLOUPE access barriers that prevent them from participating in the economy and from improving their lives, including lack of access to credit and bank accounts.19 Many women have poor access to social services, healthcare and education, and work in low-wage jobs. Gender-based violence is a frequent occurrence in The Gambia, with 20% of women (15–49 years) having experienced physical and/or sexual violence at least once in their lifetime.20 Further, despite being illegal, underage marriage is still prevalent, with 30% of women (20–24 years) married before the age of 18, forcing many girls to leave school prematurely.21 Fully 75% of women (15–49 years) have undergone female genital mutilation,22 and the maternal mortality rate in 2015 was 706 deaths per 100 000 live births – which, while it has been decreasing over the past 25 years, is still high in comparison to the global average.23 The Jammeh regime did demonstrate a commitment to addressing gender inequality by, among other things, empowering women through establishing the National Women’s Council within the Department of State for Women’s Affairs. The National Women’s Council acts as a forum for women to access legal support. The ensuing adoption of the Women’s Act (2010), the Sexual Offences Act (2013) and the Women’s Amendment Act (2015), banning female genital mutilation, also signified progress in advancing the rights of women. In 2012, The Gambia adopted a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, recognising the impact that conflicts in neighbouring countries continue to have on women in the country. Enforcement, however, has been a challenge. This is particularly the case in the provinces, where certain cultural practices, such as female genital mutilation, are still prevalent. Further, there is concern that many in the The National Women Farmers Association in The Gambia country associate strict enforcement of these laws with the promotes commercially viable agriculture and food security among female farmers. former regime, and that the change of government will result in greater disregard for these protections.
THE GAMBIA ADOPTED A NATIONAL There are however, efforts by non-state actors to address some of the challenges faced by women, and thereby ACTION PLAN ON WOMEN, PEACE AND advance gender equality and equal opportunities for women. SECURITY, RECOGNISING THE IMPACT The National Women Farmers Association (NAFWA), for THAT CONFLICTS IN NEIGHBOURING example, is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) with the aim of promoting commercially viable agriculture and COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO HAVE ON food security among female farmers, to move them from WOMEN IN THE COUNTRY subsistence agriculture towards economic self-sufficiency. NAFWA builds women’s capacity to open and manage small businesses and advocates for more land ownership Furthermore, women in The Gambia face financial rights for women. The Association of Non-Governmental exclusion, mainly due to limited access to land and credit. Organisations (TANGO), an umbrella organisation of NGOs Social and cultural norms make it difficult for women to operating in The Gambia, takes a slightly different approach. acquire vital information on available financial services, It works to educate men in The Gambia on how women can while the lower literacy rate among women (35.5% compared contribute to society, and how they can support women to 45.7% for men) means more women have difficulty in this effort. It is also teaching fathers the importance of processing and comprehending the information they do have education for girls, especially in rural regions. access to.24 Simply being able to open a bank account and Taking into consideration the strong links between access credit would help expand the economic opportunities gender equality and sustaining peace, initiatives targeted at available to women in The Gambia. increasing women’s empowerment and improving gender
6 I conflict trends equality should be prioritised on The Gambia’s national for past and present human rights abuses. Having strong agenda. This should include ensuring the mobilisation of national institutions “plays an important role in promoting necessary resourcing of organisations working to empower and monitoring the implementation of international human women, the upholding of laws promoting gender equality rights standards at the national level”.26 and women’s empowerment, and efforts to ensure that In line with this approach, when Barrow assumed office, women have equal access to all resources and opportunities he committed to enhancing and improving “human rights, in the country. access to justice and good governance for all”.27 To achieve this, the government has formulated a plan Transitional Justice and Good Governance that consists of efforts to improve the rule of law and address The resolutions sustaining peace emphasised the grievances of the past though a transitional justice process. importance of addressing the root causes of conflict, After decades of bad governance, the Barrow administration strengthening the rule of law and fostering national appears dedicated to regaining the trust of the population, reconciliation. This includes ensuring “inclusive dialogue strengthening the country’s institutions and rebuilding and mediation, access to justice and transitional justice, The Gambia’s historical reputation as a beacon of democracy accountability, good governance, democracy, accountable on the continent. institutions, gender equality and respect for, and protection To strengthen the rule of law in the country, the of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”.25 Transitional government will be reforming the judicial sector and justice refers to the ways that countries which have emerged solidifying proposals for the establishment of a national from periods of conflict and repression address mass human human rights commission. This will include a comprehensive rights violations, for which the traditional justice system review of existing criminal justice legislation to reform laws cannot provide the necessary response. Some of the aims restricting political and civic freedoms, particularly those of transitional justice include establishing a functioning relating to freedom of expression. The government intends rule of law system and accountable institutions in society, to establish more courthouses and ensure that judges and which enable individuals to voice grievances and seek justice magistrates can work full time in rural areas, where justice GETTY IMAGES SEYLLOU
Women’s participation and representation in leadership and decision-making positions leads to higher levels of peacefulness and better development outcomes for society.
conflict trends I 7 GETTY IMAGES SEYLLOU
Initiatives that aim to strengthen the rule of law and deal with past violations are important for enabling national reconciliation and the unity needed for the country to move peacefully forward into a new era.
is often difficult to administer and access. These efforts to and structure them in line with the provisions of the policy, expand the judicial infrastructure will help make people more ultimately strengthening the rule of law and accountability in aware of their rights. the country. Another key area of concern in regard to the rule of law The government has also committed to establishing a is the personal security of Gambians during the political truth and reconciliation commission to address the gross transition. Paradoxically, during the Jammeh rule, the human rights violations of the past. This process seeks to country was considered one of the safest on the continent. hold perpetrators accountable for their actions, provide The Jammeh regime had zero tolerance for crime, with closure for those affected by human rights violations, help the harsh punishment. The intention behind this was to ensure government establish and document an accurate historical that The Gambia remained a safe country and attractive record of events, and pay reparations to victims.30 The Ministry for tourists.28 However, since Jammeh left office, reports of Justice held a three-day National Stakeholders Conference of rape, home break-ins and petty crime have been rising, on Justice and Human Rights in May 2017 to conceptualise leaving many concerned that the new government is not the mechanism. The conference identified challenges and prioritising the safety of Gambians.29 To strengthen the gaps in the justice system, and allowed for discussions on the population’s trust in the security forces, the government has design of a transitional justice strategy and the establishment begun to undertake security sector reform. Central to this of applicable transitional justice mechanisms for The Gambia process is the formulation and adoption of a comprehensive moving forward.31 national security policy, along with the necessary legislation. Many interviewees, however, highlighted that there is The policy would aim to identify threats to national security, anxiety around whether transitional justice should be the clarify the functions of the country’s key security institutions, priority for The Gambia, and how it should tie in to other aspects of development. Many question why the central focus TO STRENGTHEN THE POPULATION’S has been transitional justice when there is widespread lack of TRUST IN THE SECURITY FORCES, THE access to electricity and a need for economic growth.32 While the focus of the new government should not rest exclusively GOVERNMENT HAS BEGUN TO UNDER- on transitional justice, initiatives that aim to strengthen the TAKE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM rule of law and deal with past violations are important for
8 I conflict trends enabling national reconciliation and the unity needed for the (2016), Available at:
conflict trends I 9
CIVIC SPACE RESTRICTIONS IN AFRICA: HOW DOES CIVIL SOCIETY RESPOND?
BY DAVID KODE REUTERS/AFOLABI SOTUNDE
Introduction an online tool that monitors the state of civic space in countries Across Africa, major advances in democracy have been across the world, shows that half of the countries whose civic affected by restrictions on civic space and on the activities of space is rated as closed in the world are found in Africa.1 civil society organisations (CSOs), the media and individual The Monitor defines closed as contexts where state and activists. Civic space is the foundation for civil society to make non-state actors create an atmosphere of violence and its contribution to society, provoking discussion and debate, intimidation, and kill, detain, persecute and injure people who advocating for a more inclusive society, providing services, building community spirit and challenging those in authority on the decisions they make. CSOs, individual activists and journalists who raise Above: Civic space is the foundation for civil society to make its contribution to society, provoking discussion concerns about the actions of governments, or who call and debate, advocating for a more inclusive society, for transparency and accountability, often face reprisals building community spirit and challenging those in from both state and non-state actors. The CIVICUS Monitor, authority on the decisions they make.
10 I conflict trends
simply exercise their right to assemble, express themselves political opposition and civil society groups that work on and associate. These closed countries include Burundi, the electoral issues and the media are targeted. Media houses Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, are often closed or have their accreditation withdrawn – Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan. sometimes for simply providing space for members of the Overall, civic space in Africa is shrinking and this political opposition to express their views. Governments downward trend is precipitated by laws, policies, physical sometimes accuse the private media and CSOs of colluding attacks, threats and demonisation of those who stand up for with the political opposition. the rights of citizens. While the state, government officials and Civil society groups that work on human rights, corruption security and intelligence services are the main perpetrators of and governance, and activists and citizens who speak out these restrictions, non-state actors – including armed groups, against the excesses and policies of the government, are terrorist organisations and the private sector – also carry out mostly victims of the restrictions perpetuated by the state. such restrictions. These restrictions continue, despite the fact There is also an increase in the spate of attacks on and that many African governments have committed to upholding persecution of activists working on land, environmental and fundamental rights as they are signatories to international and indigenous rights. Governments justify these restrictions by regional human rights instruments, such as the International stating they are aimed at ensuring state security, protecting Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the sovereignty and addressing challenges related to terrorism. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR). This article looks at the various sources of these In addition, the constitutions of most countries guarantee the restrictions or threats to civic space and examines how they most fundamental rights including freedom of association, affect those who are critical of government actions. It also assembly and expression. looks at how civil society and individual activists are pushing Restrictions increase in many countries during politically back on these restrictions. As governments across the African sensitive periods such as elections, as has been observed continent use legal means and policies to regulate and recently in Kenya, Uganda, Gabon and Zambia, and when restrict the activities of CSOs and physically target human incumbents amend constitutions and electoral laws to extend rights defenders, CSOs and human rights defenders now use their mandates and terms in office, as experienced in Burundi innovative ways to raise awareness of human rights violations and the DRC. During periods of elections, members of the and the excesses of governments. REUTERS/THOMAS MUKOYA
Members of the Kenyan media march in a peaceful protest to denounce the new draconian laws tabled by parliament to impose fines and restrictions on journalists (December 2013).
conflict trends I 11
2 3 The HRCO has a track record of doing advocacy on human human on advocacy doing of record track a has HRCO The In Egypt, the government ratified a new law regulating from from foreign sources if they focus on human rights including CSOs rights. gender and resolution conflict rights, democratic budget their of 30% than more spend to permitted not also are because problematic remains this and costs, administrative on the law does not define what administrative costs are. In the immediate aftermath of the promulgation of the law, Ethiopian authorities froze the bank accounts and assets of the Human Rights Council (HRCO) and the Ethiopian Women (EWLA). Association Lawyers non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in May 2017. The Law for Regulating the Work of Associations and Other in the NGOs Field prevents Working of Civil Institutions Work public security, national impair that activities out carrying from rights, and EWLA provided legal assistance to thousands of women each year. Several organisations that havestill operatebeen forced to self-censor becausehas the used government the term “administrativeThe ambiguity in costs”the term means inconsistently.that investigating human rights violations or providing free legal defined as administrative assistanceby the authorities. CSOs are forced can be to obtain approval from the authorities if they want to raise funds locally. The implementation of the CSP has given rise to a climate of fear, resulting in high levelsMany of human censorship.rights defenders have fled Ethiopia authorities. the by persecution to avoid
I conflict trends conflict I In Ethiopia, the environment for civil society is governed The enactment of restrictive legislation that affects not human rights-based. According to the CSP, national CSOs CSOs national CSP, the to According rights-based. human not more than 10% from of receiving are their funding prohibited adopted in 2009 and its societyeffect was almost oninstantaneous. theAlmost all humanoperations rights of organisationscivil closed down, significantly scaled down are that activities theirinclude to focus their changed or operations explains the legal dynamics affecting fundamental freedoms. freedoms. fundamental affecting dynamics legal the explains by the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP). It was worded in broad and ambiguous terms,state authorities to andinterpret them subjectively whenthis dealing enables with civil society groups. The International Center for Not-for- Profit Law recently released its freedom monitor – a tool that operate. Most of these laws contain draconian provisions that that provisions draconian contain laws these of Most operate. are carefully embedded to constrain the space and activities for civil society groups. Other provisions in the laws are Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and Malawi, many African countries have promulgated or are in the process of than rather – restrict that policies and legislation promulgating open up – the space in which CSOs and their representatives Governments in Poland,Hungary, India and Russia have put in place laws aimed at restricting the andformation, financingactivities of civil society. From Cameroon to South RestrictiveLegislation and Policies Used to Curtail Rights Fundamental the functioning of civil society is not unique to Africa. 12 A man, with his hands tied to a chain, Harab square in downtown Cairo, Egypt (December 2013). restricting demonstrations, at Talaat participates in a protest against the crackdown on activists and a new law REUTERS/MOHAMED ABD EL GHANY order, morality and public health. It provides the government into in 2014, and confidential documents and expensive with powers to monitor the activities of NGOs. The law equipment were stolen. REDHAC documents human rights controls funding for NGOs, as it states that associations must violations in eight countries in the Central Africa region and obtain permission from the authorities 30 days before they advocates to protect these rights. Unidentified individuals receive funding from funders in Egypt – and upon receipt of broke into the offices of REDHAC after its staff met with the the funds, they must inform the Ministry for Social Solidarity.4 United States ambassador several hours before. In almost all In addition, the law states that associations receiving funding the cases mentioned here, none of the perpetrators have been from outside of Egypt must notify the authorities within 60 held accountable or brought to justice. The attacks on the days of the receipt of the funds, but that associations are not premises of CSOs and the burglaries aim to send a message permitted to use the funding within 60 days. It goes further to to civil society to stop working on issues considered sensitive state that Egyptian authorities may reject the funding within by the state. 30 days. The implications of this is that several NGOs have had their bank accounts frozen for engaging in activities that Assassinations and Intimidation of Civil Society are against national interest, and many others have stopped Activists receiving funding from overseas donors.5 These restrictions In March 2016, anti-mining activist and chair of the on freedom of association increase the administrative burden Amadiba Crisis Committee, based on South Africa’s Wild on CSOs and have forced many human rights organisations to Coast in the Eastern Cape province, Sikhosiphi “Bazooka” change their focus so that they can continue to operate. Rhadebe, was brutally killed in his home after campaigning against the mining interests of Australian mining company Attacks and Burglaries on Civil Society Organisations Minerals Commodities Ltd (MRC) for more than a decade. His In September 2017, Ugandan police and security services murder was a reflection of the reality faced by anti-mining raided the offices of Ugandan NGOs Action Aid Uganda, Great activists in South Africa’s Wild Coast mining area.8 Shortly Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies, Solidarity Uganda and before he was assassinated, he had allegedly expressed fears Uhuru Institute. The attacks were part of a crackdown to curb to his colleagues about a possible hit list that included him the voices of those that opposed a parliamentary proposal and other members of the committee. to lift the presidential age limits, to allow President Yoweri In Kenya, human rights lawyer Willie Kimani was Museveni to contest elections when his current mandate assassinated, together with a client and a taxi driver, by police expires. Uganda has a long history of attacks and burglaries officers, after all three were declared missing on 23 June on the premises of NGOs. Since September 2012, the offices 2016.9 He was a lawyer and activist who defended individuals of at least 24 CSOs have been broken into.6 Most of these in poor communities and exposed corrupt police officers. organisations work on human rights issues, and sensitive At the time the three were killed, Willie was defending human rights reports, and computers and laptops are stolen his client Josephat Mwenda, who himself had been shot during the burglaries. and wounded by a police officer. In the DRC, human rights defenders Tsongo Sikuliwako Alex and Alphonse Luanda THE ATTACKS ON THE PREMISES OF were killed in 2017, and Marcel Tengeneza and Father Vincent Machozi were killed in 2016.10 In only a few cases are thorough CSOS AND THE BURGLARIES AIM TO investigations carried out and the perpetrators identified and SEND A MESSAGE TO CIVIL SOCIETY TO brought to justice. The high levels of impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators enables them to repeat such actions. STOP WORKING ON ISSUES CONSIDERED SENSITIVE BY THE STATE Internet Shutdowns African governments are increasingly taking attacks and CSOs in South Africa condemned a military-style armed restrictions on freedom of expression to online platforms. robbery on the offices of the Helen Suzman Foundation in This phenomenon started in Egypt during the Arab Spring, March 2016. A security guard was tied up and the robbers when the Egyptian government completely shut down the made away with documents and computers.7 The burglary internet for several days to prevent citizens from mobilising occurred at a time when the organisation sought to interdict and sharing images from protests. As citizens, journalists and the then-head of South Africa’s corruption and crime’s fighting CSOs increasingly use the internet and social media to share investigative unit, the Hawks, from exercising his duties while information, these platforms have become the new frontiers there was a judicial review of the process that led to his for restrictions on freedom of expression by governments appointment. around the world. Governments use shutdowns on the In Cameroon, the offices of the Réseau Des Défenseurs internet as a tool for social control and censorship. Droits Humains en Afrique Centrale (REDHAC) – a network At least nine African countries – including Cameroon, of human rights defenders and CSOs in the Central African Ethiopia, the DRC, Mali, Morocco, Senegal, South Sudan, region, headquartered in Douala, Cameroon – was broken Somaliland and Togo – shut down the internet in 2017.
conflict trends I 13 GETTYIMAGES/REUTERS/MATTHIAS HANGST The length of these shutdowns varied from a few hours to several months. Cameroon holds the unenviable record of one of the longest shutdowns on the internet in the world, after it ordered telecommunication service providers and mobile phone companies to block access to the internet and social media in the two Anglophone regions of the North West and South West for three months. Governments often claim they restrict access to the internet to preserve security, stop terrorism and protect the territorial integrity of their state. Often, access to the internet and social media is denied during politically sensitive periods, such as elections, and before or after mass protests. Like in Cameroon, the authorities in Togo shut down the internet in August 2017 as civil society and political opposition parties held demonstrations calling on President Faure Gnassingbé to step down, and for constitutional reforms.11 The government cut access to the internet to prevent protesters from mobilising and protests spreading to different parts of the country. The problem has become so pervasive that the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council passed a resolution in June 2016 recognising that the right to freedom of expression on the internet is “of increasing interest and importance”, and condemned “measures to intentionally prevent and disrupt access to or dissemination of information in violation of international human rights law and called on states to refrain from and cease such measures”.12 But the deliberate interruption of communication on the internet also has huge economic costs. Entrepreneurs who run internet cafes and their employees are without work during periods when the internet is shut down, and many other businesses that rely on the internet are unable to engage in business During the 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil, Ethiopian transactions. athlete Feyisa Lilesa crossed his hand over his head in a symbolic gesture as he crossed the finish line in the Addressing Restrictions on Fundamental Freedoms: men’s marathon. His gesture was a cry for justice and Push-back from Activists protest of the repression and marginalisation of the As African states arrest, detain and persecute Oromo people. representatives of CSOs, and as governments declare states of emergency and use violence to disperse protests, activists and CSOs are using other means to highlight restrictions at and continues to hold the government to account. However, home and to make the international community aware of Museveni’s government, in power since 1986, has often human rights violations. During the 2016 Olympic Games in targeted human rights organisations, media houses and Brazil, Ethiopian athlete Feyisa Lilesa crossed his hands over journalists who criticise the actions of the government. his head in a symbolic gesture when he crossed the finish Ugandan activist Stella Nyanzi uses unconventional means line during the men’s marathon, and made the same gesture in Uganda’s conservative society to criticise the actions of when his silver medal was presented to him.13 His gesture the government and call for reforms. In a social media post, was a cry for justice and protest of the brutal repression and she compared Museveni to a “pair of buttocks” for reneging marginalisation of the Oromo people by the government of on a promise he made during his electoral campaign to Ethiopia. Risking his life, his reputation and career, he used provide free sanitary pads to school girls in Uganda.15 the platform of the Olympics to bring to the world’s attention She was arrested for the post and spent more than a month the atrocities that have been committed in Oromia. The in prison. In Zimbabwe, human rights activist Pastor Evan gesture was a replica of that made by protesters in Oromia. Mawarire used the Zimbabwean flag and social media for Prior to these protests, the Ethiopian security forces had the #ThisFlag movement to mobilise citizens and call for massacred hundreds of Oromo people over the attempted reforms and change in Zimbabwe. In July 2016, he organised use of indigenous land in Ginchi, a town in the Oromia “stayaway” protests against corruption, the failing economy region, for investment.14 and human rights violations. He has mobilised protests Uganda has a very dynamic civil society working against the actions of government and continues to be a on human rights, democracy, elections, the Sustainable voice for citizens who call for change in the political and Development Goals (SDGs), media rights and gender rights, economic situation.
14 I conflict trends REUTERS/JAMES AKENA
15 conflict trends I trends conflict (or “We (or have“We had enough”) movement played an important role Y’en a Marre Y’en a Marre In Senegal, the Despite the increase in restrictions on civil society rights defenders, rights which defenders, enjoins states to hold of perpetrators violence towards human rights defenders accountable and the Constitution and step down, to access to clean water in youth. for opportunities employment and communities movement was formed by journalists and rappers in 2011 in music, rap uses It state. the of ineffectiveness the to response poetry, rallies and public assemblies to call for reforms, and engages in door-to-door campaigns to encourage youth to participate in democratic processes and vote inThe elections. in thwarting attempts office. in term his extend to Wade Abdoulaye by former Senegalese president Society Civil for Progress activities and fundamental freedoms, legislationseveral changes and in policy have regional and international beenlevel to improve the environment made at the in which national, civil society operates. Calls for such changes were led by civil society, which engaged in sustained effortsadvocacy and campaigns. In December 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the protection of human
Lutte pour le changement It exercises non-violence and 16 As governments target formal CSOs, their premises, ARE VOCAL ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANDCITIZENS AFFECTING ISSUES POLITICAL THESE MOVEMENTS USE SOCIAL MEDIA TO MOBILISE CITIZENS QUICKLY AND DRC. It uses peaceful sit-ins, community mobilisations and social media campaigns for advocacyfrom calls for President onJoseph Kabila of the issuesDRC to respect ranging its members are spread across the different regions of the Ugandan academic, Stella Nyanzi, stands in the dock at Bugandahis family on social media (10 April 2017). Road Court for criticising President Museveni and and comprises predominantly youth, who methods useto call innovativefor change. quickly and are vocal on socio-economic and political issues affecting citizens. In the DRC, the Kivu, North Goma, in 2012 in created was movement (LUCHA) society formations have arisen to challenge the undemocratic undemocratic the challenge to arisen have formations society reforms. for call and governments of actions authoritarian and These movements use social media to mobilise citizens leaders and representatives, using legal and policy restrictions restrictions policy and legal using representatives, and leaders civil loose informal, and movements social force, physical and Rise of Social Movements Movements Social of Rise African states must realise that representatives of CSOs, The use of restrictive legislation, policies and laws and forced to self-censor to prevent further attacks, while others continue to defy the odds while defending human rights and policies. government restrictive over concerns voicing human rights defenders and journalistsof the state.are Rather, theynot have a enemieskey role to play in holding the government accountable, contributing to policiesensuring and that governments adhere to their human rights to protect them. Burkina Faso and Mali adopted similar laws in in laws similar adopted Mali and Faso Burkina them. protect to respectively. 2018 and 2017 Conclusion physical attacks on and assassinations human ofrights defendersjournalists and other critics of andgovernments is and manner blatant the is alarming is What Africa. in new not the that surprising also is It happen. they which with frequency main perpetrators of these actions are not held to account – need is there where cases in and – known are they when even for investigations to take place for justice to be done, such investigations are not prioritised. The failure of the state to impunity breeds restrictions for these accountable those hold and leads to additional attacks. Under these circumstances, been have media the and society civil of representatives some
19 perform during a community concert in Dakar, Senegal, performencourageto duringcommunity youtha concertDakar, in 18 Y’en a Marre a Y’en 17 I conflict trends conflict I In 2016 in Swaziland, the Supreme Court ruled that In October 2017, the African Commission on Human and 16 manner. advancing economic, social and cultural rights, and calls on businesses to respect the rights of human rights defenders to assemble, associate and express themselves in a peaceful to release human rights defenders who are in detention. The resolution recognises the role of human rights defenders in Members of the hip-hop group group hip-hop the of Members (June 2011). to register and vote in the next election On 11 June 2014, Côte d’Ivoire became measure a the as defenders firstrights human on countrylaw a adopt to in Africa Organisations Act of 2013 to include more restrictions. and to restrict defeated successfully freedomsociety civil 2013, in Kenya In assembly. of expression, associationattempts by andthe government to amend the Public Benefits were unconstitutional, because they violated the of expression freedomand association. These laws had been used to Swaziland in reforms for called that groups society civil target association and assembly in Africa. in assembly and association sections of the draconian Suppression of Terrorism Act (of 2008) and Sedition and Subversive Activities Act (of 1938) of Association and Assembly in provideAfrica. direction to statesThese and serve as guidelinesa reference for civil society for the protection and implementation of rights of Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) adopted its Guidelines on Freedom REUTERS/FINBARR O’REILLY commitments. The adoption of the law on human rights shameless-ploy-to-silence-human-rights-activism/> [Accessed 14 February 2018]. defenders to recognise and protect human rights defenders 6 Kode, David and Vlamings, Lizet (2017) ‘Addressing Civic Space in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali is a commendable Restrictions in Uganda: What Role for the Universal Periodic step in the right direction. But these laws can only be useful Review’, Available at:
conflict trends I 17
i Nkonni Birn GoureGouré Zinder Bosso C H A D NIGERIA Illela Maradi Wurno NIGER Diffa Bol Dosso Sokoto Baga Daura Magaria Damasak Lake Chad gu to Nguru Komadu o SOKOTO Katsina ok ana S Gumel G Kaura u g Namoda KATSINA Hadejia u N jia ad ig Birnin ade Kom N'Djamena e H BORNO r Kebbi Zamfa ra S Gusau o JIGAWA YOBE Gummi k ZAMFARA o Kano Kamba t Maiduguri Dikwa o Wudil m Gaya Dutse Damaturu a Gulbin r Ka Azare e ds Funtua KANO Potiskum Ye Bama KEBBI Dan Backi Gulbi Kari Kandi Damboa Kandi Koko Limani Mora la Yelwa Sabon Benin Zaria o Chibok g Bajoga Gwari n Mokolo Kainj o Biu KADUNA BAUCHI G Maroua Reservoir Kontagora Kaduna Bauchi GOMBE BENIN K a d Mubi u Gombe Gombi Guider Wawa NIGER na Jos Ndali Biliri Kajama ADAMAWA Minna Kanfanchan Léré Parakou Pala Pankshin Numan Garoua Amper Lau Bida ué CHAD Ni Badeggi PLATEAU Béno ger Abuja Yola Kisi KWARA Kwolla Jalingo FEDERAL Shaki Baro CAPITAL Q NASARAWA Ganye NIGERIA u TERRITORY é
m OYO Ilorin Lafia é Ogbomosho TARABA Tungo Benue Ibi Oyo Lokoja Bali Kontcha Iseyin EKITI Wukari Iwo Osogbo Makurdi Ibadan Ife Ado-Ekiti KOGI Gboko Bohicon OSUN Akure BENUE Ngaoundéré r Ankpa
Owo e Auchi Katsina Ala Takum Abong Abeokuta g Oturkpo Ondo ONDO i National capital N Gembu Ilaro OGUN A Banyo State capital ENUGU Nkambe Ikeja Ore EDO N Enugu Ogoja Town, village Cotonou L LAGOS A a Abakaliki M m Major airport Porto- g ba os Benin City Asaba B Awka EBONYI M International boundary Novo R Ikom Lake a A Bamenda Bamendjing
h State boundary C.A.R. Bight of Benin Sapele Onits CROSS IMO ABIA RIVER Foumban Highway Warri DELTA Owerri Umuahia Bafoussam Yoko Main road CAMER OON Railroad Aba Nikongsamba a RIVERS Calabar nag N Uyo Sa0 50 100 150 200 km Gulf of Guinea i Yenagoa g Port AKWA Kumba e Harcourt Oron The boundaries and names shown and the designations r BAYELSA IBOM 0 50 100 mi D used on this map do not imply official endorsement or e acceptance by the United Nations. l t a Bight of Biafra Buea Douala
Map No. 4228 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support August 2014 Cartographic Section REPATRIATION AND RECONCILIATION CHALLENGES IN NORTH-EASTERN NIGERIA: TOWARD AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS AND ACTION
BY TATSUSHI ARAI
Introduction extermination, with respect to how they would like to interact This article analyses the findings from field research, with rehabilitated former Boko Haram foot soldiers wishing conducted in north-eastern Nigeria in late 2017, which to return home. A secondary focus of this article is to explore explored the repatriation and reconciliation needs of the how to develop practical and sustainable mechanisms of communities displaced by Boko Haram’s armed insurgency government–civil society collaboration capable of building the and the military operations that followed. Major findings trust and security necessary for repatriation and reconciliation. include the displaced communities’ diverse contested To establish an informed basis for analysing these two issues, outlooks on forgiveness, coexistence, physical separation and a brief introduction to the regional context is in order.
18 I conflict trends
CHIEF MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST ERIC A. CLEMENT, U.S. NAVY, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
The Nigerian military and police, together with local vigilante groups, have led an all-out campaign to drive Boko Haram fighters out of their strongholds and hideouts.
Regional and Social Context its active presence. Relative calm has been restored in these Boko Haram – or “Western education is prohibited” in places and normal day-to-day activities have resumed. Hausa – is a religious-inspired insurgency movement based With these military gains, the Nigerian government and in north-eastern Nigeria.1 Its campaign of violence against international agencies are terminating the crisis and Nigerian law-enforcement personnel and establishments emergency phase of their activities and refocusing their started in 2009 in Borno State and Yobe State. The resources and programmes on stabilisation, repatriation and geographic scope and nature of the targets expanded reconstruction. However, low-intensity fighting, guerrilla- exponentially in subsequent years. Boko Haram’s attacks, style attacks and security incidents caused by dispersed Boko and the government’s counter-offensives, have since killed Haram fighters, including female suicide bombers, still take tens of thousands of people on all sides. Moreover, as of place in isolated pockets of resistance. Importantly, many October 2017, some 1.6 million people remain displaced rural areas outside the government-controlled population across three of the most conflict-affected north-eastern centres remain insecure, because of the sustained presence Nigerian states: Adamawa, Borno and Yobe.2 and infiltration of Boko Haram fighters. Under the leadership of presidents Goodluck Jonathan The significant military gains and the return of relative (2010–2015) and Muhammadu Buhari (2015–current), the calm present a unique challenge to the long-term efforts Nigerian military and police have led an all-out campaign and collective self-reflections necessary to decisively tackle to drive Boko Haram fighters out of their strongholds and the three interconnected roots of the acute crisis that hideouts. Local vigilante groups fought side by side with found its distinct expression in the form of Boko Haram’s the government forces and played an essential role in armed insurgency. The first of these roots is dysfunctional intelligence-sharing, combat missions and stabilisation governance. At the heart of this systemic problem is the need support. As of early 2018, population centres in north-eastern to establish inclusive, accountable and efficient mechanisms Nigeria once controlled by Boko Haram are mostly clear of of governance, capable of making and implementing policies
conflict trends I 19 REUTERS/AFOLABI SOTUNDE
Women gather at a water collecting point at the internally displaced people’s camp in Bama, Borno State, Nigeria (August 2016).
at the federal, state and local level. Importantly, improvement large to make a fresh start. Viewed from such a historical in governance must pave the way for the effective delivery perspective, the task of repatriation and reconciliation in of law enforcement and justice. The second root cause is north-eastern Nigeria is an unprecedented opportunity for underdevelopment. The core challenge in this area is how to the country to generate political will and social conditions for secure and allocate development resources equitably so as resolving the three underlying crises. It is within this broad to uplift the rural and urban poor; how to provide education, historical context and sensitised awareness that conflict- health services and basic infrastructure universally; and affected Nigerian communities’ needs for repatriation and how to create sufficient employment, especially for the reconciliation must be analysed. growing population of unemployed youth. The third issue is identity crisis. At its very core, this crisis is about how the Findings: Diverse Outlooks on Repatriation and socio-economically deprived, politically marginalised and Reconciliation religiously misinformed population, especially the youth, can Six focus group meetings with internally displaced establish self-esteem and positive future outlooks. persons (IDPs) of diverse regional and ethnic backgrounds Importantly, neither Boko Haram’s armed insurgency from Borno State were held in Maidiguri in November 2017. nor the government’s counter-offensives have helped The participants in these meetings were all Muslims. A set of resolve these underlying crises. Instead, the campaigns of two gender-specific meetings – one for women and the other violence – however important for their respective causes – for men – was held at each of the two government-sponsored deepened the existing crises by depriving Nigerian society’s formal camps. The remaining two meetings – one for existing resources and capacities of governance reform, women and the other for men – were held in an informal IDP development and psychosocial healing. Yet, one may choose settlement, which is outside government control and hosted to view a decade of destruction and suffering in north- by a local community. These six focus group meetings aimed eastern Nigeria as a wake-up call for Nigeria, its neighbours to: (1) learn about the IDPs’ views on necessary conditions in the Lake Chad region and the international community at for their future repatriation; and (2) explore their outlooks
20 I conflict trends UNESCO AFRICA
The government should formally endorse senior traditional leaders to assume leading roles in convening and facilitating reconciliation dialogues in their respective states.
propositions presented by the researcher. In response to on the nature of relationships they would like to build with the open-ended question, “What are the most important demobilised and rehabilitated members of Boko Haram in their home communities. The gender-specific method conditions under which you will be willing to return home?”, of inquiry was intended to ensure each gender-specific the most frequently observed responses across the three group’s independent expression of opinion. A total of 130 locations were: IDPs from diverse regional and ethnolinguistic backgrounds • security assurances – some respondents elaborated participated in the meetings, which had 22 participants on on their security needs by requesting a sustained average per meeting. The language used in the meetings conspicuous presence of the military and/or well- was either Hausa or Kanuri or both, depending on the disciplined vigilante groups; participants’ needs. Interpretation in Hausa and Kanuri was • shelter; provided by local humanitarian assistance professionals with • means of livelihood including agricultural instruments, whom the meeting participants were already familiar. fishing nets and shops for petty trade; The method of data collection consisted of first asking • schools; open-ended questions about conditions under which these • health clinics; and IDPs would like to return home, and then asking them • basic infrastructure in general. to raise their hands in support of or opposition to a set of Asked to name specific leaders and organisations whose A TOTAL OF 130 IDPS FROM DIVERSE public announcements on the presence of adequate security are deemed most credible, many respondents identified REGIONAL AND ETHNOLINGUISTIC BACK- village heads, senior traditional leaders (known as emirs in GROUNDS PARTICIPATED IN THE MEET- northern Nigeria), and the military and other authoritative INGS, WHICH HAD 22 PARTICIPANTS ON government agencies. Some of the IDPs from Bama, a local government area severely affected by violence, explicitly AVERAGE PER MEETING mentioned that they would know the presence of adequate
conflict trends I 21 security when their revered king returns to his palace and members who have met these conditions. The participants’ sits there. responses are summarised in Table 1. Building on the respondents’ feedback on these At Formal Camp 1 – the first location where the focus open-ended questions, the researcher listed four possible group meetings took place – the respondents were asked conditions, the fulfilment of which may help the IDPs to consider the first three conditions (disarmament, feel safe enough to live in the same geographic areas as renunciation of violence, and confession/request for demobilised and rehabilitated Boko Haram members. More forgiveness) only. The forth condition (rehabilitation), specifically, the researcher asked the respondents to raise which was not on the initial list of conditions presented at their hands to indicate whether they would consider the Formal Camp 1, was proposed by focus group participants fulfilment of the four conditions as a sufficient reason to at Formal Camp 2, the second research site. The fourth coexist (that is, to live in the same geographic area with or condition was then added to the working list. An expanded without daily contact) with those who previously fought as list of four conditions was presented to the rest of the focus Boko Haram members. The four suggested conditions are: group meetings to learn about IDPs’ repatriation needs 1. disarmament of Boko Haram members and the seizing more comprehensively. of their weapons; In the Informal Settlement – which was the third and 2. their explicit commitment to a renunciation of force; final site for the inquiry – the respondents requested that 3. their confessions of their crimes and their expressed the separation and isolation of demobilised Boko Haram desire for forgiveness; and members be given full consideration as an alternative to 4. their completion of a government-sponsored coexistence. (For this reason, separation from Boko Haram rehabilitation programme. as a possible scenario was not discussed in any of the focus group meetings at the two formal camps.) The proposal of these four conditions stems from the To learn from a small number of respondents who researcher’s previous fieldwork and training experience rejected both coexistence and separation, additional open- in north-eastern Nigeria.3 It is also informed by the ended questions were introduced. The additional questions researcher’s cumulative experience in diverse conflict- explored what these respondents wished to see happen affected societies. in terms of demobilised Boko Haram members in the After asking about the respondents’ willingness to respondents’ home communities. Follow-up interviews with coexist with demobilised Boko Haram members under these them revealed their hope to have all the remaining Boko four conditions, the researcher then asked them whether Haram members executed. These respondents explained they would be willing to forgive former Boko Haram that their desire to completely exterminate Boko Haram
Table 1: IDPs’ views on conditions for coexistence with former Boko Haram members and for forgiveness
IDPs’ regions of origin Male Female
Yes Yes Yes Yes to coexistence to forgiveness to coexistence to forgiveness
(This question, Formal unavailable at Majority from Mafa; some 60% 95% 95% Camp 1 this point, was from Bama and Konduga (N=30) (N=25) (N=25) (N=55) not asked in the meeting)
Formal Mostly from Bama and 90% 100% 90% 95% Camp 2 Kukawa (N=12) (N=12) (N=18) (N=18) (N=30)
100% 100% 0% (N=20) (N=20) (N=20) Informal 90% (18) 25% (4) Majority from Konduga; 75% (15) Settlement demanded 0% demanded some from Gwoza and stated no to (N=40) separation from (N=20) separation from Bama coexistence Boko Haram Boko Haram 25% (5) as another as another abstained requirement requirement
Note: N refers to the number of respondents
22 I conflict trends UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS NIGER Malumfatori Abadan CHAD Yo ZabulumNgamma Bulturi Lariski Arege Bisku Giri Bidawa Dalleri Gashagar Limbori Mitile Asagar Sigaga Bomboko Bana Barre Kaririwa Yebi Bandi Kirbirum ABADAM Lake Chad Kabbarau Gawule Banowa Kabela Bagum Kuske Dimmerwa Andolo Baga Kustari Kincha Ndi Yebi Jemi MOBBAR Karna Masalaram Koundoukoundou Garema Maleri Agiri Damasak GUZAMALA Seyoram Isufuri Gatafo Kagarwa Bre Garunda Kairi Zari Kasake KUKAWA Dan Kariwa Gidimbari Kukawa Degagu Gudumbali Dudu Gazabure Tarari Karetu Goiofa Koroforti Dogoshi Gesada Lurdi Aduba Lebelebewa Magaram Kobchi Putchimiram Karelto Kanguri Gobo Moya Marlu Anomo Tutunguwa Karba Barwati Binduldul GUBIO Kurnawa GezeriyaWamiri Bundi Mellaram Gindi Gwoi Gana Badu Zogo Taskoram Bulabulin Monguno Fugu Dallari Karaguwa Kaguram Jilli Doili Felo Damakar Ngari Dabira Sabsabwa Bego Musari Sedagu Alarge Ngelewa Baga Gubio Kuda Mangal Lau Ardimini Kingoa Burdigi Kabaram Gajiram MONGUNO Mintur Zaga Wulgo Momaduru Bundi Dugula Wagiri Zilum Kumbulewari Fage Jegara Waji Gaske Umarniram Abiskata Ai Gadayi Mala Yagari Yasku Kusturi Mulma Bida Takala Marte Ardoram NGANZAI Wurge Ganga Tilo Maiba Kupti Bisugua Darolara Moma Abriski Bula Butube Gambara Damakuli Ngala Telam Bornu Yassu Degemram Aba Goderi Kabulawa Kulli Karadiri Missene Missini Mangungum Zunfur Mogolo Sambori Sigal Gombaram Galtaru Mige Kalulua Nilo Molle Leje MARTE Ala Magene Kusuma Bufejuma DamareRann Ligagin Maga Jayewa Logomani Gorigiri Bundukia Kariari Dé Kalma MAGUMERI Limna Gamage NGALA Muktu Magumeri Maska Duguma Ngigo Bukr Kimeri Subunum Kesangala Mijigine Mufe Abori Mafa Ngaiwa Kala Nkaé Banoram Kingoa Kilborani Mokholo JERE Anzamala Dikwa Mudu Hassanari Doili Farta Hoiyo Gabchari Fariram Bellam Mugdala Kasa Meleri MAFA Tikish Kalizoram Lumda Mada Kuduge Malum Maja Karasuram Geltur Khaddamari Mafa Gawa Sogoma Mola Karagawaru Jarawa Zazawa Yebel Dusuman Umarri Labado Bolori KALA/BALGE Limanti Kofe Mulehe Muzine Lefiya Kayawa Kesawa Auno Bizgi Kure Benisheikh Maiduguri Taburge DIKWA Shirraba Fadili Mainok Limlim Pompomari Aganadoa Damaturu Bimi Fuchi Mukhtari Ngamdu Belle Dungusiri Jemuri Belile Daima Murguba Goni Kurmi Jogo Wamuri Shigabaja Dubula Dibbiri Marguba Kama Kasagula Mugze Koutelaha Sugumi KAGA Gremari Dakari Baje Alhajiri Dalwa West Ajiri Tsogonari Konduga Zangeri Najiri Gowo Waroba BAMA Barguma KONDUGA Gulumba Gana Mangule Batara Dongo Tarteri Kellumiri Aka Bokwari Amindoli Kabuiri Fellatari Gujeri Lambuti Didiri Galengi Mauli Masba Kalwa Malabi Kungare Bama Bogumari Doyo Gaou Gizige Bula Morube Kumsi Urga Kajibore II Dagel Sere Maudori Mulgwe Mayirima Nugurosoye Mallamri Barwoshe Mairamri Unye Bulam Bodi Mal Umari Bula Julta Sowolwolo Kulburi Mabaraka Bembem Ambia Abalam Yajiwa Bulabulin Jeree Kuwa Arra Afa Kirikashima Kumshe Degemba Dure Awaua Dipchari Nbaga Kafa Kupta Kaimari Digamari Kuka Kowa Ngwalimiri GWOZA Jokwa Zaye Ngusa Kara Abduri Koshari Gwagwari Bugadam Gonuri Mutube Zumbulum Sendowa Budumri Tokombere Dahle Arab Talagala GardiriAbulam Jemyeri Mulgai Gazal Kéraoua Ajigin Damboa Bukar Kwareri Doksa Bitta Galmaska Ngirna Fadagwe Dawaluwa AgumDufa Munfi Pridang II Yamtage Gwoza Goumsouri Hyawa DAMBOA Kunadur Kaviri Damboa Hong Disa Gombi Garjam Sandau Kasa Mangari Wara Wara Litawa Bulagarga I Izge Rana Bam Wula Wula Dusu Apagu Hamlets FugumariAbantagari Kuburiwita Kobchi Kwamjilari Kura Kumumza Blablin Bantine Kurnari Bombula Bula Fali Balajan Ndikur Kilakasa Manicodo Geidam Alagarno Imirchika Chibok Daggu Garundana Kakilmari Tetiba Dam Mangada CHIBOK Kanzu Pumpum Yamagadu Wula Wula Gur Lawan Gwagwamdi Local Government Area Capital Gonda Chigarker Mumzu Kutsa Huyum Gulabinda Bulamalum Chibakur Garu Binowi Dille Wonka Shawa BIU Mandaragirau Alagarno I Kingking State Capital Barum Bumsa Dula Kelle Zara Garuhiza Askira Buwu Payawula Bula Pogu Charenji Bula Babalwada Chul Balbaya Kwadiga Baka Bulamakori Rumirigo Airport Barawe Biu Tampul Chongwon Wandali Gonga Haran Ali ASKIRA/UBA Njoma Dikwa Kirkidum Gaska Kwaya Dakwa Rivers Asari Bengilan Kusar Dawoma Tiraku Uvu Dayar Kadama ZangulaKudla Biriyel KWAYA Paved roads KUSAR Azare Dum Bangdi Chiroma Gedeba Whada Azare Chimabulu Bahai Gundu HAWUL Wuyo Parakwi Local Government Area Biri Deba Gidam Buma BAYOPorno Bahi Bogundu Kumdurum Bahere Chapu Pelakombo Chekaparau Buruluk Other States Jaragwol Lomar Befera Barkam Gasi Binyu SHANI Kwaba Shani Dadinkowa CAMEROON Bargu Tasha Budun Gulum
Borno State, Nigeria CHAD members stemmed from their deep distrust in Boko Haram not a single female respondent who explicitly supported the fighters’ hidden motives. There were only one to three extermination of Boko Haram members. Figure 1 summarises these findings. It presents respondents in each of the three male focus groups who the relative sizes of the selected Maiduguri-based IDP expressed options of this nature. Interestingly, there was populations favouring one future scenario over the others.
conflict trends I 23 Figure 1: Relative sizes of the IDP populations must be undertaken in the near future. To support this vision under study favouring one future scenario over the of future inquiry further, implications of the findings are others with respect to their future relationship with articulated as follows: demobilised Boko Haram members 1. Many displaced Nigerians of diverse geographic and ethnolinguistic backgrounds are open to coexistence Eliminate with demobilised and rehabilitated Boko Haram members under well-defined conditions. Isolate/ Separate 2. Many of them are also willing to forgive Boko Haram attackers once these conditions have been met. 3. Those in favour of exterminating current and former Boko Haram members make up a very small minority of Coexist the displaced population under study. 4. IDPs with a deep commitment to faith consider forgiveness as a requirement in life. (IDPs’ elaborations on their responses demonstrate their faith-based commitment to forgiveness.) 5. Forgiveness inspired by faith is a choice of religious Forgive devotees striving to honour God’s will. Victims of violence can therefore forgive their perpetrators in God’s name without accepting the prospect of intercommunal coexistence. This is why it is possible for some of the IDPs to express their willingness to forgive Boko Haram, while simultaneously demanding The overlapping areas of the circles indicate the separation from Boko Haram. overlapping options and preferences with respect to how 6. The implication presented in point 5 is significant, the IDPs would like to interact with demobilised Boko because it highlights the unique worldviews Haram members. and challenges that inform the distinct nature of reconciliation practices in north-eastern Nigeria. For IDPS WITH A DEEP COMMITMENT TO the purpose of this inquiry, reconciliation refers to a sustained reciprocal process of victim–offender FAITH CONSIDER FORGIVENESS AS A relationship-building. It requires not only forgiveness, REQUIREMENT IN LIFE but also mutual acceptance. Importantly, forgiveness in the name of God alone falls short of embracing mutual Threats to the validity of the research method, as well acceptance. as the findings of the research, must duly be acknowledged. 7. As illustrated by points 5 and 6, the relationship The small sample size for the research, and a limited between the four suggested future scenarios – geographic and demographic scope of the displaced elimination, separation, coexistence and forgiveness – population under consideration, for example, indicates is highly complex and interconnected. All the male the tentative nature of the findings. The possibility of tacit and female respondents from Konduga, for example, peer pressure to follow groupthink in the distinct culture categorically rejected the prospect of coexistence, but and structure of north-eastern Nigeria’s IDP communities they nevertheless expressed their willingness to forgive cannot be ruled out, especially when these IDPs respond to the perpetrators. Moreover, despite their commitment a foreign researcher’s questions. Moreover, the reliability to forgiveness, they requested separation from of the respondents’ verbal feedback on hypothetical demobilised Boko Haram members because of their scenarios about potentially life-threatening repatriation deep distrust in the latter. decisions as a predictor of their actual choices in real-life circumstances must be considered. Finally, the prevailing It is highly plausible that the communities in north- norm of masculinity can undermine the female respondents’ eastern Nigeria continuously alter their preferences about freedom to express their views on repatriation when they are the four suggested scenarios according to their actual brought together with their husbands, fathers and other male experiences in repatriation, stabilisation and reconstruction. decision-makers. It is also possible that within each community, multiple Despite these and other possible limitations, the findings scenarios are considered, debated, adopted and/or rejected in this study are still evocative and merit serious attention. at any given moment. Alternatively, two or more scenarios Importantly, these findings provide a promising basis for may be used sequentially in such a way to respond to more in-depth, systematic research on repatriation that the evolving dynamics of the community’s psychosocial
24 I conflict trends readiness, its perception and condition of security, and its An integrated understanding of the four requirements ability to meet its livelihood needs. of repatriation, the four future scenarios of community The findings from this inquiry, which build on the responses and the seven determinants of preferred researcher’s earlier study, suggest that there are at least collective action offers a useful framework of thinking when seven considerations whose dynamic interplay inform policymakers, communities and humanitarian agencies communities’ preferences about which future scenarios they make decisions about stabilisation, reconstruction and choose to adopt at any given moment. These considerations, reconciliation initiatives. Further research is needed to find which serve as critical determinants in community-based out how interactions between these factors work in context- decision-making, are as follows: specific situations across time and space. 1. Direct versus indirect experience: Whether the community’s experience of Boko Haram’s attacks is Institutional Mechanisms for Meeting Repatriation direct, recent and still fresh in its memory, or whether its and Reconciliation Challenges experience is indirect, secondary and somewhat remote To put the proposed framework of coexistence and due to the passage of time4. reconciliation into practice, the Nigerian government and 2. Rural versus urban: Whether the community that civil society must work together to mobilise political will and experienced Boko Haram’s attacks is located in a rural resources. The key to broad-based sustainable initiatives for public mobilisation is to activate the existing social practices area or an urban centre.5 and mechanisms of conciliation with which Nigerians are 3. Gender: Whether the community members are men already familiar. One way of envisioning such initiatives is for or women, considering that the gender difference can the federal government to formally endorse senior traditional critically affect their social experiences in violence. leaders (emirs) to assume leading roles in convening and 4. Age: Whether the community members are young facilitating broad-based reconciliation dialogues in their or old, considering that their ages may correspond to respective states, and in the Local Government Areas (LGAs) different mindsets – which can, in turn, influence their within each state.7 These traditional leaders can utilise the future outlooks. existing governance mechanisms in which they exercise 5. Nomadic north versus agrarian south: Whether the significant influence. They can support district, village community embodies the traditional nomadic culture and ward heads working within the existing mechanism of northern Borno State or the modern and/or agrarian of traditional governance to convene and facilitate 6 culture of southern Borno State. (While cultural reconciliation dialogues at the grassroots level. The federal generalisation and stereotyping must be avoided, government will need to provide these local leaders with the working assumption stated by informed local not only an overarching vision and framework of national interviewees is that unlike agrarian culture, nomadic and regional reconciliation, but also with a sustained culture tends to express a distinct commitment to commitment to offering resources, mandatory skill-building honour, remember harm done to in-group members, opportunities and technical advice to ensure programme and seek retaliation. The spread of liberal education success. Partnership with trusted religious, political and in southern Borno reinforces this cultural difference business leaders, and various other prominent figures in between the north and south.) the respective communities, must be established. Moreover, 6. Ethnicity and tribalism: Whether the ethnic and tribal to be truly impactful and sustainable, these reconciliation leadership, governance structure and norms of the initiatives must actively promote an inclusive representation community favour coexistence over separation, and of participants from different gender, ethnolinguistic, tribal, forgiveness over extermination. religious, age and urban/rural backgrounds. 7. Level of sensitisation: Whether, and to what extent, the Finally, a prerequisite to repatriation, reconciliation and reconstruction is security – a requirement mentioned explicitly community is sensitised on the sources, effects and in all six focus group meetings. Security is necessary not only responses to Boko Haram’s violence. in conflict-affected population centres and IDP camps, but also in the rural communities to which both IDPs and rehabilitated former Boko Haram members will be returning. Moreover, A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT REQUIRED adequate security must be established along the long, unprotected roads that returnees will need to travel. IN FUTURE SECURITY OPERATIONS A fundamental shift required in future security operations IS A PLANNED TRANSITION FROM is a planned transition from military-led offensive operations MILITARY-LED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO to community-based peacekeeping operations. While the former actively goes after insurgents and fights them, the COMMUNITY-BASED PEACEKEEPING latter prioritises building zones of security, livelihood and OPERATIONS coexistence capable of detecting, deterring and coping with
conflict trends I 25 existing and potential security threats. Community-based and how to coexist and reconcile with former insurgents peacekeeping also relies heavily on the collective will, they will encounter upon repatriation. To ensure the success empowerment and collaboration among local communities of this transition, formalised government–civil society and civil society actors committed to actively creating and partnerships must be established to promote reconciliation sustaining conditions for improving security. The military initiatives and community-based peacekeeping. In turn, these and police will continuously play a significant supportive activities must be purposefully designed and implemented to role in these peacekeeping operations. This is because pave the way towards overcoming Nigeria’s long-standing these operations must still rely on the use of force for law challenges in governance, development and inclusive social enforcement and self-defence from imminent threats from identity. time to time. To implement this transition on a large scale, strong Dr Tatsushi Arai is a Professor of Peacebuilding political leadership at the highest level is necessary. One way and Conflict Transformation at the School for of realising such a major transition is to establish a high- International Training (SIT) Graduate Institute and level federal security taskforce comprised of the ministers a Fellow of the Center for Peacemaking Practice of Defence, Information and Interior; the inspector general at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution in the United States. of the police; the military chiefs; and/or other senior officials capable of making or influencing decisions on matters related to national security. Working closely with the president and technical experts, the taskforce can guide the overall planning Endnotes of the war-to-peace transition, allocate necessary resources 1 For a succinct summary of Boko Haram’s rise and expansion, see the introductory section of Arai, Tatsushi (2017) Conflict-sensitive and personnel, and support the implementation of the Repatriation: Lessons from North-eastern Nigeria. Conflict 8 presidential initiative for north-east Nigeria’s reconstruction Trends, 2017 (1), Available at:
Conclusion 10 The 2016 estimate of the number of CJTF members is based on Jaafar, Mohamed (2016) ‘The Home Guard’, The Economist, The field research conducted in north-eastern Nigeria 29 September, Available at:
26 I conflict trends REUTERS/JOK SOLOMU
THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE INITIATIVE IN SOUTH SUDAN: ASSESSING PROGRESS AND PITFALLS
BY CLAYTON HAZVINEI VHUMBUNU
Introduction citizens, disunity and disintegration, which had been The 14 December 2016 announcement of a National aggravated by the near-collapse of the Agreement on the Dialogue Initiative in South Sudan by the country’s leader, Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan President Salva Kiir Mayardit, although met with divergent (ARCSS) in July 2016, following the resumption of fighting reactions locally, regionally and internationally, presented between forces loyal to Kiir against those aligned to the then- a rare and convenient opportunity for South Sudanese vice president and leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation to engage, build peace and reconcile. This came against a background of cross-country intercommunal violence, Above: President Salva Kiir of South Sudan attends the political power struggles, national governance challenges, launch of the National Dialogue Committee in Juba, South economic instability, massive internal displacement of Sudan (22 May 2017).
conflict trends I 27 REUTERS/STRINGER
South Sudanese policemen and soldiers patrol a street following renewed fighting in the capital city, Juba (July 2016).
Movement and Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), Riek following alleged orders to disarm Machar-aligned Nuer Machar Teny Dhurgon. members due to an alleged coup plot.2 This had been The National Dialogue consultation process started preceded by continued factional struggles within the Sudan in early November 2017 at local and regional level and is People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This contestation for envisaged to end in mid-2018. This process is paving the way power had become rife in 2013 as the country approached for regional dialogue conferences, which will culminate in the general elections scheduled for 2015, with the senior the National Dialogue Conference in late 2018. Accordingly, leadership openly criticizing Kiir and declaring their it may be timely and worthwhile to take stock of progress intentions to contest him in the elections.3 made so far, identify current and possible obstacles to the Since then, the Transitional Government of National process, and recommend ideas that may assist to sustain Unity’s implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution the National Dialogue. Granted, a lot of ground is yet to be of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) – covered, as the National Dialogue consultations intend to which had sought to resolve the conflict in South Sudan cover each of South Sudan’s 32 states, in addition to refugee following the initial outbreak of violence on 13 December and international outreach consultations in 15 countries in 2013 – has been minimal. After political tensions and the Africa, Australia, Europe and North America.1 An assessment clashes that followed when Machar and other influential of progress and challenges at this stage will allow for early opposition figures fled the country into exile, there was a diagnosis of impediments that may hamper and encumber general deterioration of peace, security and stability in South the smooth progression of the process, and thereby provide Sudan as conflict intensified across the country. room for amends. Thus, the National Dialogue Initiative came at a time when the political and economic situation in South Sudan Contextualising South Sudan’s National Dialogue had been so dire that it warranted more sustainable Initiative interventions to restore stability. Even Kiir, in his National The initiation of the National Dialogue in South Sudan Dialogue Initiative speech, acknowledged without denial may be traced to the outbreak of fighting between Kiir and that South Sudanese people had been distressed by the Machar’s presidential guard personnel at the presidential continued political conflict and “drastically declining palace in Juba on the night of 6 July 2016. This fighting economy”. Accordingly, the time was ripe to engage in later spread to other parts of the country. The fight was a national dialogue process to “end violent conflicts in triggered by disagreements within the presidential guard South Sudan, reconstitute national consensus, and save the
28 I conflict trends D i 24° 26° 28° 30° 32° 34° nd 36° er En Nahud
12° Abu Zabad SOUTH 12° S O U TH SUDAN Ed Damazin SUDAN SUDAN Al Fula Renk
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a l ay h i b r Junguls A 10° N 10° e Radom l Riangnom e 'A it ra Kodok h Boing b W Abyei Fagwir UPPER Malakal Kafia Kingi WESTERN Mayom NILE Bai War-awar Bentiu Daga BAHR Wun Rog Fangak Abwong Post EL GHAZAL NORTHERN The boundaries and names shown BAHR Wang Kai Kan and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or Malek Jur l Nasser Kigille Gossinga EL GHAZAL UNITY Gumbiel a n acceptance by the United Nations. Gogrial Raga f a Aweil Akop a C r i a Kuacjok Leer e Z l
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Map No. 4450 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support October 2011 Cartographic Section country from disintegration and usher in a new era of peace, The NDSC has 97 members who serve in 15 stability and prosperity”.4 subcommittees: one subcommittees for each of the 10 states of South Sudan; one subcommittee for the capital Structural Framework of the National Dialogue city, Juba; two area subcommittees for Pibor and Abyei; one Initiative Subcommittee for Refugees and International Outreach; It is imperative to examine the structural framework and one subcommittee for security matters6 The mandate that was put in place to facilitate the National Dialogue of the NDSC is to organise consultation forums and process. In a way, this constitutes part of the broader document input from forum participants, and report on this challenges that may threaten the efficacy of the dialogue. to the Steering Committee. On the other hand, the National Dialogue Secretariat, which is made up of 13 members, has The structure comprises the National Dialogue Leadership the role of vetting the work of the NDSC and leadership, as (nine members), the National Dialogue Steering Committee well as communicating to the public and the press. (NDSC) (97 members), the National Dialogue Secretariat The stakeholders to the National Dialogue are South (13 members), and the National Dialogue stakeholders and Sudanese citizens within and outside its borders, the partners.5 government, political parties, civil society organisations The National Dialogue Leadership comprises two (CSOs), academia, think-tanks, and national and co-chairpersons: Angelo Beda and Abel Alier Kwai. Gabriel international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Yoal Duk, Bona Malual and Francis Mading Deng serve as the The composition and configuration of such important deputy co-chairperson, rapporteur and deputy rapporteur/ structures define and shape their sustainability, as well as people’s confidence and trust in the National Dialogue spokesperson respectively, whilst the other members process. This will be assessed next. of the leadership are Mary Bensensio Wani, Elizabeth Achan Ogwaru and Lilian Riziq. The role of the leadership The Envisaged National Dialogue Milestones is to set policy and strategy, as well as to carry out official Local dialogue consultations are envisaged in each communication with political and diplomatic leaders. of South Sudan’s 32 states. These will feed into regional
conflict trends I 29 UN PHOTO/JC MCILWAINE
Local dialogue consultations are envisaged in each of South Sudan’s 32 states.
conferences in the capitals of all the large states, and Notable Progress and Milestones Achieved will be followed by a national conference. All in all, the A fact that cannot be disputed is that considerable effort National Dialogue will conduct 80 local consultation has been invested into the National Dialogue process, and forums, international outreach forums in 15 countries there are notable achievements that have been recorded to around the world, 20 regional consultation forums, and date by the National Dialogue institutions working with the one national consultation forum.7 Implementation of the various stakeholders. dialogue outcomes has been set for late 2018 to late 2019. The first achievement is national acceptance The milestones for the National Dialogue have also been set, of the concept. To some extent, almost all South as shown in Figure 1. Sudanese have embraced the National Dialogue in principle, although differences still exist with respect Figure 1: Timelines and phases for the South Sudan to timing and implementation modalities, among other National Dialogue agenda8 issues of contention. There appears to be a profound acknowledgement by a substantial portion of the population that there is need to engage in a national Consultation 100+ local open conversation to manage their differences, renegotiate Phase Local Local Local consultations set mid 2017– Consultation Consultation Consultation the agenda for the social contract and reach common ground on the mid 2018 regional conferences way forward to secure lasting peace, stability and prosperity. This is evidenced both by attendance at the
15+ regional national and regional consultation forums and public Regional Regional conferences opinion presented in various South Sudanese media Conference Conference set the agenda for Conference national conference platforms. Phase mid 2018– Second, the government – to its credit – was able late 2018 to set up the structure and organisational framework National 1 national conference Conference attended by delegates to operationalise the National Dialogue. The National from each consultation Dialogue Leadership, NDSC and subcommittees, and National Dialogue Secretariat are all in place. Whilst Kiir had initially self-appointed himself as Implementation Government, Phase the patron of the NDSC in 2016, his decision in Implementations opposition and late 2018– civil society groups June 2017 to recuse himself by relinquishing his late 2019 implements decisions patronage of the committee brought some semblance
Source: South Sudan National Dialogue Secretariat of independence and credibility to the institution.
30 I conflict trends GETTY/ SHAWN PATRICK OUELLETTE
Progress has already been made with a number of local consultations forums already conducted in South Sudan.
Although the committee appears to be regionally balanced, independent and transparent to ensure the credibility and there are still questions raised over the selection criteria – public acceptance of its outcomes”. It added that the process and, consequently, the extent of independence of the NDSC “should complement and not be perceived as replacement for members. This undoubtedly erodes some of the committee’s the full implementation of the ARCSS and the Revitalization credibility. A case in point is that of those who turned down process led by the IGAD Council of Ministers”.12 their appointment to the NDSC, such as Roman Catholic Fourth, progress has been made in terms of conducting Church Bishop Paride Taban, and Sudan People’s Liberation the actual consultations. To its credit, the NDSC (working Movement Former Detainees (SPLM-FDs) officials Rebecca with its 15 subcommittees) has already managed to conduct Nyadeng de Mabior and Kosti Manibe Ngai. They cited local consultation forums, regional consultation forums and various reasons, including disagreement on the terms of international outreach forums in Uganda and Kenya. In the reference, and the absence of “level ground for dialogue, and period between early November 2017 and early January 2018, lack of pre-consultation and transparency”9. local and regional dialogue consultation forums have been Third, to a considerable extent, the National Dialogue conducted in several districts in Yei River State, Central Upper institutions have managed to secure regional and international Nile State, northern Bahr El Ghazal, the Lakes states, the buy-in to the process. In principle, the United Nations (UN), eastern Equatoria region, Torit, Imatong State, Jubek State, European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and the Inter- Malakal, Renk and Terekeka State.13 In Kenya and Uganda, Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have all the Subcommittee for Refugees and International Outreach expressed their support of the National Dialogue process carried out dialogue consultation forums in the capital in South Sudan. However, their support may be interpreted cities and refugee settlements in the two countries between as equivocal and non-committal, as they have consistently 13 November and 1 December 2017. Nonetheless, the pace of stressed that they would support a National Dialogue process coverage is behind schedule, considering the stipulated time that is all-inclusive, independent, transparent and constructive, frame. whilst underscoring the fact that the dialogue initiative should complement rather than supplant the ARCSS.10 For instance, Pitfalls of the National Dialogue Initiative the IGAD Council of Ministers emphasised the need for the Notwithstanding some progress achieved thus far, the South Sudan NDSC to reach out to the opposition and ensure National Dialogue process in South Sudan faces its own that the National Dialogue was conducted in an “inclusive, challenges, and its success continues to be under threat genuine and transparent manner”.11 Similarly, the AU Peace from both internal and external factors. Drawing from an and Security Council, in its Communiqué of the Ministerial analysis of the situation in South Sudan, an evaluation of Meeting held in September 2017 relating to South Sudan, various reports emanating from the dialogue consultation reiterated that “the National Dialogue must be all-inclusive, forums conducted so far, and observation of live recordings
conflict trends I 31 of some of the consultation sessions, these challenges relate Sudanese leadership that non-inclusive peace processes are to the exclusion or non-involvement of key stakeholders to unsustainable. For example, the Agreement on Cessation of the conflict; non-existence of a conducive environment for Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access, peaceful dialogue; mistrust and misperceptions by some signed by the government and some opposition parties on stakeholders to the conflict; low levels of attendance during 21 December 2017 in Addis Ababa, has already been violated dialogue consultation forums; shortage of resources; and the several times16 – largely because it excluded some key prevalence of fear among some citizens. Whilst some of these opposition players, such as Machar. challenges can be addressed with ease, a number of them Another critical constraint is the absence of a peaceful and appear to be complex. conducive environment to maintain and sustain a genuine Perhaps the most difficult factor is that some key National Dialogue consultation process. This has been echoed stakeholders to the dialogue have excluded themselves from by the opposition. It may be argued that the initiation of a the process. Given the nature of the South Sudanese conflict, dialogue process will bring an end to the ongoing hostilities, any dialogue process that excludes the opposition parties and but that may only be the case if all the parties to the conflict rebel groups may be counterproductive. Without engaging have consented to the dialogue. influential figures who are instrumental in the power matrix As it stands, the political, social and economic situation that is perpetuating the conflict, it is difficult to achieve peace in South Sudan is not conducive for genuine dialogue within in South Sudan. Whilst agreeing to the dialogue in principle, the country. Reporting on the economic developments and almost all the influential opposition leaders – SPLM-FDs, security situation in South Sudan for the period between SPLM-IO, the National Democratic Movement (NDM), South early September and mid-November 2017, the United Nations Sudan National Movement for Change and several other Security Council (UNSC) noted that the country faced “serious parties – distanced themselves and their followers from economic challenges”, characterised by triple-digit inflation the dialogue. This was done on the basis that the dialogue and an annual consumer price index of 131.9%. In addition, lacked pre-consultation engagements, the inappropriateness there were clashes between SPLA forces and the pro-Machar of the venue, concerns over the proposed methodology SPLM/A-IO, as well as intercommunal violence in regions such or implementation modalities, inclusivity, transparency, as the Lakes, Greater Bahr el-Ghazal, Greater Upper Nile and impartiality and that there is an absence of an enabling Greater Equatoria.17 Relating to the sociopolitical status quo, security environment. 14 the UNSC Report for December 2017 indicated that 1.86 million people had been displaced by conflict across South Sudan, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE SOUTH with an additional 2.1 million people having fled as refugees SUDANESE CONFLICT, ANY DIALOGUE to neighbouring countries, including Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo and PROCESS THAT EXCLUDES THE Uganda, among others.18 The report added that an estimated OPPOSITION PARTIES AND REBEL GROUPS 4.8 million people faced severe food insecurity, and projected MAY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE that the number was likely to rise to 5.1 million people by the start of 2018.19 As of 11 January 2018, the United Nations Although Kiir decided to continue the dialogue Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) had received 204 172 process without the opposition, having failed to meet their displaced South Sudanese civilians at its bases in the Central preconditions, the entire National Dialogue becomes a Equatoria, Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei and Western Bahr monologue and risks not achieving its intended outcome. El Ghazal regions due to continued fighting, violence and As Paffenhholz et al point out in What Makes or Breaks intercommunal clashes.20 National Dialogues?, using case studies of 17 national Perhaps there was merit in the proposals tabled by the dialogues in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, opposition parties for inclusive pre-dialogue commencement one of the success factors of national dialogues is the engagements between the government and armed and inclusion of key national elites, both unarmed and armed unarmed opposition parties to commit to a mutually agreed significant opposition parties and, occasionally, the military, ceasefire. Although well intentioned, the unilateral ceasefire over and above other representative groups.15 The main declared by Kiir will remain ineffectual. Ceasefire declarations goals of the South Sudanese dialogue are to end all forms of by all parties to the conflict would have had a greater prospect violence, re-establish unity, address issues of diversity, settle of soliciting the much-needed cooperation, commitment and historical disputes and further national healing and peace – accountability from all parties in terms of implementation. yet some of the major players and parties to the conflict are Such an approach would create a conducive environment uninvolved. Above all, the resolutions of the National Dialogue where citizens are free and secure to participate in dialogue. process are expected to be binding on all stakeholders to the Mistrust, negative perceptions and misperceptions are conflict in South Sudan, against a background of exclusivity. also part of the challenges faced by the national dialogue Experiences in the recent past should remind the South process. Some citizens are still sceptical and suspicious of the
32 I conflict trends NEKTARIOS MARKOGIANNIS/UNMISS
About 17 000 people who fled to a United Nations Protection of Civilians site in Wau following recent violence, put up basic structures to shield from the hot sun (20 April 2017).
motive, intentions and goodwill behind the National Dialogue not be over-reliance on external funding sources for such an Initiative. As the Report of the UN Secretary-General on important national process, as this may have its own demerits South Sudan observed, “[M]any stakeholders perceive that in terms of process ownership and sustainability. the Government is using the national dialogue to override Further, there is a possibility that the National Dialogue the implementation of the peace agreement [ARCSS].”21 process in South Sudan may be yet another initiative that In the end, citizens and stakeholders lose confidence in will trap the country in the never-ending conflict cycle, if the the whole process, as they perceive elite manipulation. South Sudanese leadership refuse to learn from their past This may explain the reason why the attendance figures, as mistakes and calls from the UN, AU, IGAD and its immediate reported by the NDSC, are not very encouraging. This has neighbours. The consistent call has been that the South also been coupled with the fear of reprisals, which still exists Sudanese leadership should exhibit political will and the among some citizens whenever they are given the platform maturity to refuse to be ensnared in the unproductive politics to discuss National Dialogue agenda issues. For example, of a power struggle, implement all peace agreements as per the Subcommittee on Refugees and International Outreach commitment, respect the rule of law, establish and maintain reported that “[t]here was a sense of misinformation and vibrant institutions of good governance, and lead by example apprehension of what exactly was the mission of the National in cultivating and fostering a culture of peace, tolerance Dialogue in Kenya”.22 This definitely affected the quality of and unity in diversity. Whilst Kiir stated that the National deliberations, as well as the outcome of the dialogue sessions. Dialogue process will ultimately culminate in the adoption of However, it is encouraging to note that in a number of resolutions emerging from the consultations, which will then consultation sessions, citizens were reported to be engaging be forwarded to “different processes such as constitutional in frank, open, honest and fearless discussions, as observed conference, peace, healing and reconciliation, etcetera, for by the NDSC. consideration and inclusion therein”,24 the implementation of The resource factor cannot be underestimated, as it such resolutions by the leadership in power – based on the has potential to undermine the scope of coverage and to leadership’s governance track record and the South Sudanese pose logistical impediments. The NDSC admitted from political culture – may be possible, but highly improbable. the beginning that the government has no capacity to fund In any case, all the views that are emerging from the the dialogue process.23 Whilst donors – the governments consultations (such as separation of powers, unity in diversity, of Japan and Germany, the United Nations Development accountability in governance, ending power struggles, Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, anti-corruption, broad-based economic development, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and UNMISS – de-ethnicisation of politics and governance, human rights have plausibly committed to and still assist with funds, observance, among others) are not new – they are eloquently resources, technical and governance support, there should expressed and enshrined in the Transitional Constitution
conflict trends I 33 of the Republic of South Sudan, as well as the ARCSS. 8 South Sudan National Dialogue Secretariat (2017b) ‘How National Dialogue Works’, Available at:
34 I conflict trends POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND SRI LANKA
BY DHAMMIKA HERATH GETTY/ABDELHAK SENNA
The thrust of this comparative analysis is to examine the reconciliation and stabilising peace? I try to respond to these extent to which reconstruction processes in Sri Lanka and key questions through a larger study on peace education in Rwanda lead to social reconciliation, and the strengths and Rwanda in which I was one of the researchers, and several weaknesses of the divergent mechanisms of reconciliation research endeavours in Sri Lanka in the last five years. adopted in the two countries. The process and outcomes of The term “reconciliation” has Latin roots and is derived reconciliation and the effectiveness of different mechanisms from the Latin expression conciliatus, which means are subject to debate and discussion. This article argues that “coming together”. Reconciliation is social when such a Rwanda and Sri Lanka have succeeded in certain respects but failed in others, and hence can learn lessons from each other. How do countries coming out of wars achieve reconciliation Above: A Tutsi soldier from the Rwandan Patriotic Front among the polarised ethnic groups? Do we have sufficient shakes hands with Hutu soldiers from the former Rwandan knowledge on efficient and effective mechanisms of fostering army (August 1994).
conflict trends I 35 o o o o o o o 79 00' 79 30' 80 00' 80 30' 81 00' 81 30' 82 00' A Kankesanturai Point Pedro I Karaitivu I. Jaffna D Peninsula N Kayts Jaffna SRI LANKA I Palk Strait National capital J aff na Elephant Pass Punkudutivu I. Lag Provincial capital oon Kafunzo Devipattinam Delft I. Town, village Merama R W ANDA Palk Bay Kilinochchi Provincial boundary Kagitumba UGANDA Nanthi Kadal Main road National capital - Puthukkudiyiruppu Rameswaram Iranaitivu Is. Mullaittivu Secondary road Prefecture capital Lake Pamban I. Vellankulam Mutanda Lake RWANDA Ferry Town, village Bunyonyi Rwempasha Dhanushkodi Talaimannar Manjulam Nayaru Lagoon Railroad A Lubirizi da Airport, airstrip m' Airport Rutshuru Kisoro s Bridge NORTHERNNORTHERN Nedunkeni International boundary Nyagatare 9o 00' Kokkilai Lagoon Cyanika Mannar I. Mannar Puliyankulam
Kabale a Provincial boundary Ka Pulmoddai BIRUNGA b ge m ra Butaro u Road t NAT'L PARK Muvumba i Kidaho g Track Lac Katuna a Bay of Bengal K Lac Madhu Road Vavuniya Burera Rwanyakizinga Gulf of Mannar Silavatturai Ruhengeri Mulindi Gatunda Lac Kirambo Cyamba Nilaveli Busogo Gabiro AKAGERA Pankulam Ruhondo Byumba Kebitigollewa DEMOCRATIC Kora NORRE Ngarama NATIONAL Lac Trincomalee Mikindi Medawachchiya Horuwupotana ar Bay Mutura NOR D Lake diy PARK o A od SRI LANKA o REPUBLIC OF THE Lac Hago 8 30' r 8 30' Kagali Kinihira Mujunju uv K Goma i A Nemba Karaitivu I. r Hamillewa u n Gisenyi E S T a Mutur CONGO Rushashi Kinyami Y Muhura Pomparippu Anuradhapura L Nyundo Kabaya N Lac Kantalai ow Ngaru y Rutare Kivumba a a Mbogo Murambi b Lac Rukara n a o NORTHNORTH CENTRAL GISHWATI ro Kalpitiya o n Shyorongi Muhazi g Maragahewa Ngororero g Lac UNITED a Kathiraveli NATURAL L K Ile al Ihema m a O
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NAT'L PARK Butare 7o 00' ga Nuwara Badulla 7o 00' n Ruramba Kelan a Eliya Gisagara u Avissawella Colombo i G r BURUNDI Busoro a Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte UVA y Pottuvil Bugarama 0 10 20 30 40 50 km Munini n Mount Lavinia ka Moratuwa Monaragala A WESTERN Haputale 0 10 20 30 mi The boundaries and names shown and the designations used Runyombyi Horana Buttala Laccadive Sea Gang Ratnapura on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by Panadura alu a K Balangoda K the United Nations. i Okanda r a i g n
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process involves social groups rather than individuals. of conflict being solved through peace negotiations, most Kumar1 argues that in the general understanding, social intrastate conflicts have generally tended to cease with a reconciliation refers to a process of re-establishing the military victory for one of the protagonists.4 However, at the broken relationships between social groups. Therefore, at a same time, most conflicts ceasing due to a military victory very basic level, social reconciliation must begin with former end up in renewed violence after a period of five to 10 years.5 enemies accepting each other’s right to exist. Then, a process The failure to address the underlying root causes of conflict of social reconciliation attempts to promote tolerance and and address original or subsequent grievances can cause understanding between and/or among groups, to promote post-conflict reconciliation to fail, and hence increase the risk non-violent conflict resolution, and finally to heal the wounds of renewed violence. Military victories are rarely sustainable, of violence in the long term.2 There are three objectives especially while genuine grievances remain unaddressed – of a process of social reconciliation: to prevent violent seeds for future conflict can gradually grow. conflict, to address negative emotions (anger, prejudices, Sri Lanka and Rwanda have experienced violent misunderstandings), and to establish or re-establish positive conflicts in the past and have witnessed immense human relationships among the conflicting parties. Scholars cost in intrastate conflicts, although the human cost was also agree that reconciliation aims to address the trauma massively greater in Rwanda. These countries can currently experienced by the victims of conflicts to bring closure be identified as post-conflict societies, given that overt between the victims and the perpetrators. Reconciliation is violence has ended. Rwanda entered the post-conflict phase a “reciprocal and gradual process” that attempts to make it after the 1994 genocide and when the former Rwanda possible for people to live together. Reconciliation essentially government was overthrown by the Rwandan Patriotic Front has three stages: simple co-existing, democratic reciprocity, (RPF) through its armed wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army and the reconstruction of bonds among former victims and (RPA). The RPA fought against the Interahamwe militia and perpetrators.3 government soldiers who committed the genocide against Nurturing reconciliation among war-affected people is the Tutsi and certain sections of the Hutu community that seriously challenging, both theoretically and empirically, opposed the genocide.6 Compared to Rwanda, Sri Lanka is but is an existential necessity. There is ample evidence to a relatively new entrant to post-conflict status, after having show that there are many cases of violent conflict in which won a three-decade war in 2009 against a rebel group, called conflicts have restarted after brief periods of relative peace, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE fought when parties to conflict feel that their needs have not been against the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) to carve out a addressed. According to conflict resolution literature, the separate homeland for the Tamil ethnic minority in Sri Lanka.7 majority of conflicts in the world end in military victory for When the Sri Lankan military defeated the LTTE in 2009, the one of the parties. Although there are many success stories conflict – at least the military confrontations – ended.
36 I conflict trends The conflicts in Sri Lanka and Rwanda have both parallels countries presently experience post-conflict reconstruction and stark dissimilarities. In both cases, ethnic segregation in which social reconciliation supposedly constitutes an and polarisation, fuelled by politics of ethno-nationalism, important component. The Rwandan government claims to was at the root of the conflicts. Both countries involve a be attempting to build “one nation”, devoid of ethnic divides. government and a rebel group, representing the majority and For example, the Rwandan government has banned the use minority ethnic groups respectively. In both cases, colonial of ethnic labels such as Hutu, Tutsi or Tva and compels its interventions used “divide and rule” policies, fuelled hatred citizens to identify themselves as “Rwandans”, and tries to between communities and solidified the significance of build cooperation between formerly antagonistic groups ethnicity as a source of mobilisation. And in both cases, there through grassroots cooperative activities. The Rwandan were grievances attached to ethnicity and post-independent government is determined to downplay the social and discrimination of a minority by the government, which political significance of ethnic identity or differences, and largely represented the majority ethnic community. However, this approach is predicated on the belief that by creating a despite a high number of battle-related deaths (60 000– common identity as a Rwandan, the country will be able to 70 0008) in Sri Lanka, the intensity of violence was nowhere heal the wounds of violence and roll back on polarisation. near that of Rwanda, which is considered to be one of the Nevertheless, ethnic identity and differences remain strong deadliest genocides in human history. Nevertheless, in the in Rwanda, and this issue requires political space where Sri Lankan conflict, both the GOSL and the LTTE have been accused of serious and gross violations of human rights. BOTH COUNTRIES INVOLVE A GOVERN- Therefore, these two conflict settings provide interesting cases to compare from the point of view of conflict and post- MENT AND A REBEL GROUP, REPRE- conflict dynamics. SENTING THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY There is another sense in which both these cases warrant serious systematic academic scrutiny: as mentioned, both ETHNIC GROUPS RESPECTIVELY REUTERS/JAMES AKENA
The Rwandan government is attempting to build “one nation” and a Rwandan identity devoid of ethnic divides.
conflict trends I 37
Similarly, in Rwanda, distribution of state resources – In terms of transitional justice, there is a significant government appears to be determined to create a common identity and “one violence. nation” Although the Rwandan government highlights the to prevent need to a create a recurrenceviable socio-economic base, it was offorced immediately to approach the issues of reconciliation,to the due large-scale involvement of the the genocide. From Rwandanthe very inception of the reconstruction people in process, Rwanda has emphasised and implemented a schools, hospitals, highways,plants, ports railways, and state buildings. bridges, These investments powerimproved access marketsto andessential services, andhavehave fostered mutually beneficial interactions with the south country. the of such as employment and educationcausing ethnic– waspolarisation, important and inthe has thereforecurrent undertaken angovernment ambitious development drive. comparedHowever, to Sri Lanka, one finds less attention on Rwanda in grassroots the in development material equitable as a conscious tool attempts of have been reconciliation. made to provide primary education Althoughto all children, certainand to support poor families, Rwanda still has poverty. of levels high difference between Rwanda and Sri Lanka. The Rwandan This argument is especially relevant 9 I conflict trends conflict I Some scholars point out that sponsoring material The The Sri Lankan government, which came to power in 2015, reintroduced the national anthem in both Sinhala and Tamil, as compulsory subjects in primary education. and has started teaching Sinhala and Tamil into peace processes as sustainable a peace. conscious strategy aimed at in the context of civil wars where protagoniststhe inequitable fight distributionover of scarce resources. integrationdevelopmenttheoffor calls be context, canthere In such a development in post-war contexts is one of the instruments of social reconciliation.significant Development instrument can for be sustainable a highly peace, especially to power in 2015, reintroduced the national anthem in both Sinhala and Tamil, and has started as compulsoryteachingTamil subjects in primary education. Sinhala and build a society where ethnicity is recognised, acknowledged and expressed socially andco-existinpeace. Forexample, the government, which came politically, and groups can people have the freedom to expressdifferences. and The negotiateSri Lankantheir government is attempting to 1980scausedand Sinhalese. ethnic tensions between Tamils in heavilyinvested Lanka Sri 2009, in war the of end the After large-scale development projects in war-affected provinces, including the development of infrastructure such as roads, distribution of resources among was differentone of the causesethnic of thegroups ethnic conflict. Fordry agriculturalexample, development in Sri Lanka from 1930 to the in Sri Lanka, where both real and perceived inequitable 38 KARDULAKB
WAR-AFFECTED PEOPLE FIND FEW Some case studies in Rwanda commend that the structure of cooperatives in Rwanda – due to long-term interactions OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPRESS THEIR and gradual relationship-building – contributes to genuine PAINFUL MEMORIES, MOURN THEIR reconciliation among direct victims and perpetrators of the genocide.11 DEAD RELATIVES AND FIND EMOTIONAL In comparison to Rwanda, Sri Lanka has failed to CLOSURE TO THE WOUNDS OF VIOLENCE give sufficient priority for social reconciliation, and instead has employed a strategy of development-led material reconstruction. Although the Lessons Learnt and conscious strategy of transitional justice10 and various Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) was appointed, its programmes such as cooperatives (where people of mission was more fact-finding in nature, and many of its a village work together for community development); recommendations remain to be implemented. Meso-level the Ndi umunyarwanda programme (“I am Rwandan” and grassroots measures – such as peace committees or campaign, where people talk about history, repent on past forums that bring formerly divided communities together – crimes committed on the other ethnic group, and heal); have been absent in Sri Lanka, although non-governmental Umuganda (a day dedicated to collective community work organisations have undertaken micro measures such as such as cleaning infrastructure, repairing roads and so on, youth exposure visits, awareness meetings, youth camps and once a month); Umugoroba w’ ababyeyi (parents’ evening, so on. War-affected people find few opportunities to express where parents of the same village talk about various issues, their painful memories, mourn their dead relatives and find from politics and development to family issues) and Ijisho emotional closure to the wounds of violence. Therefore, one ryúmuturanyi (eye of the neighbour), as well as many other could argue that attention on social reconciliation has been measures intended to foster social reconciliation. These inadequate in Sri Lanka, except perhaps the setting up of the measures have seen various levels of success and failure. Office of Missing Persons (OMP). The GOSL hoped that the REUTERS/DINUKA LIYANAWATTE
Resettled internally displaced people listen during the government-appointed Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission’s first session in Vavuniya, Sri Lanka (14 August 2010).
conflict trends I 39 REUTERS/DINUKA LIYANAWATTE
Sri Lanka has employed a strategy of development-led material reconstruction in war-affected provinces.
physical and economic development of war-affected regions prejudices, mistrust, and perceived and real discrimination of the country would help it to win the hearts and minds of continue to plague the two countries – and hence, the the Tamil community, which had been backing the LTTE for possibility of relapsing into violence remains real. Based nearly three decades to procure them a separate homeland.12 on data collected in the two countries, including my The GOSL seems to believe that a recurrence of the conflict observations,13 it is possible to state that both Rwanda and will be prevented by addressing material conditions – which Sri Lanka have made significant strides in their post-conflict initially contributed to creating the ethnic conflict. reconstruction and reconciliation. Economic development in Rwanda has picked up in the capital city, although RWANDA HAS UNDERTAKEN LARGE- the rural areas need much more investment and state patronage. Primary education has been opened up and made SCALE JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF CASES compulsory, but it is higher education that determines socio- OF PERPETRATORS AND HAS USED THE economic mobility; opportunities to get a higher education needs improvement. Rwanda has undertaken large-scale GACACA COURTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE judicial scrutiny of cases of perpetrators and has used the 14 FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW Gacaca courts as an alternative for judicial review. This has enabled a rapid transitional justice process. However, there are still a large number of people awaiting trial. Any viable Challenges reconciliation process requires solid democratic space and a Both Rwanda and Sri Lanka face the serious challenge vibrant civil society so that people are able to debate, critique of bringing together highly polarised ethnic groups, which and change in their methods of reconciliation. Rwanda were set apart by a history of ethnic polarisation, perceived requires further scrutiny and constant reconsideration of its as well as real discrimination, prejudices and violence. methods to improve post-conflict reconciliation. In both cases, the military victory of one party against In Sri Lanka, elections have been held in the war-affected another has brought the conflict to a halt. Yet, ethnic provinces, and have enabled people to choose their
40 I conflict trends provincial representatives. At the grassroots, significant 1 Kumar, Krishna (1999) ‘Promoting Social Reconciliation in Post- attention has gone into the reconstruction of houses conflict Societies: Selected Lessons from USAID’s Experience’, US Agency for International Development, Available at:
Dr Dhammika Herath is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.
conflict trends I 41 WHAT DO NETWORKS OF WOMEN MEDIATORS MEAN FOR MEDIATION SUPPORT IN AFRICA?
BY IRENE LIMO REUTERS/JAMES GIAHYUE
Introduction The absence or low level of African women’s participation To avoid the recurrence of patterns of marginalisation, in mediation and at the peace table is the unfinished business oppression and neglected grievances that drive groups to of UNSCR 1325. The 1994 Kampala Action Plan on Women conflict in the first place, an inclusive approach to conflict and Peace2 recommended the creation of a mechanism to resolution is often considered key. The three United Nations facilitate the involvement of African women leaders in the (UN) peace and security reviews – conducted in 2014–2015 on prevention, management and resolution of conflict at the peace operations, peacebuilding and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 – highlighted an inadequate recognition among member states and within Above: The involvement of African women leaders in the the UN system of the potential of fully integrating a gender prevention, management and resolution of conflict at the perspective into peace and security processes.1 highest level, must be facilitated.
42 I conflict trends UN PHOTO/JC MCILWAINE
Participants at a mediation workshop, in Juba, South Sudan, develop a collective action plan on strategies for effective engagement of women in the prevention and management of conflicts (May 2016). highest levels. Following such early commitments, women process. Yet, current formal peace processes often remain have mobilised for peace and participated in the processes largely male-dominated, while women are simply seen in different countries such as the Democratic Republic of the as war victims and/or are often not given enough space to Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Liberia, to name engage effectively in peace processes. While there has been but a few. However, much more needs to be done to further marked improvement in inclusivity, challenges still exist realise the optimal benefits of having women as mediators, that impede the involvement of women in peace processes. part of mediation teams, part of negotiating parties, as Some of these challenges include lack of access to formal signatories, as observers and in other substantive roles in processes by women mediators or women with mediation peace processes. expertise. In some cases, women lack sufficient and The capacities, expertise, lessons and good practices sustainable funding to support the peace process directly from the experiences of women mediators and women or indirectly. Sometimes, women lack the capacity and mediation experts can inform and strengthen mediation experience in mediating conflicts, and this locks them out processes. However, there is a disconnect between the from opportunities to be involved in mediation efforts. There available mediation capacities of women and the formal are insufficient trained women mediators in most African and informal peace processes. There are efforts to bridge countries; even where they exist, they are mostly involved this, in some cases, through organised approaches such at the grassroots and in local mediation efforts, but absent in as networks and associations that bring the experiences of high-profile mediation or negotiations. To ensure the active women in mediation to a common or/and shared platform, participation of women mediators, there must be increased for ease of access and use. training of women in negotiation and mediation skills. This article discusses the emergence of and the role Women remain drastically under-represented in peace of networks for women mediators, and their impact in processes. This is not entirely due to lack of capacity, but also responding to needs and gaps associated with the different due to lack of power and access. In most African contexts, aspects of mediation support in Africa’s mediation efforts. patriarchy continues to play a key role in excluding women from formal and informal peace processes. Further to this, Challenges Hindering Women’s Participation in culture, perception and beliefs play a key role in entrenching Mediation the exclusion of women in peace processes, and in some For peace initiatives to remain sustainable in the contexts, men already represent women’s and general long term, women must be included in every level of the societal needs. For example, when women show interest in
conflict trends I 43 UN PHOTO/JC MCILWAINE comprehensive way of addressing these challenges and envisioning a collective future. This momentum has seen the rise of networks of women mediators that seek to increase the number of women who are actively involved in local, continental and international peace mediation efforts.
Some Networks/Platforms for Women Mediators in Africa and other Continents
Network Region
Network of African Women in Conflict Africa Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa)
Association of African Women Mediators Africa (AAWMN), South Africa There are insufficient trained women mediators in most African countries. Women Network for Peace and Dialogue, Africa Burundi
participating in local peace processes, they are seen by men Women in Peace Network (WIPNET), Liberia Africa as violating culture and tradition – stereotypes that have often placed women at the margins of decision-making. Mano River Women’s Peace Network In some contexts, peace processes have been – and continue Africa (MARWOPNET) to be – highly militarised with a heavy security-oriented approach, which has been considered a man’s world, South Sudan Women’s Peace Network Africa further discouraging women from getting more involved. The imbalance between what is offered and what is needed Sudan and South Sudan Joint Women’s Task in mediation support further complicates the provision Africa Force for Peace of tailored mediation support by women mediators and
mediation experts. Also, in many cases, the mediators and Regional Faith Women Peace Mediators Africa mediation teams have had challenges in accessing the Network mediation capacities of women, citing reasons such as the
women were not well known. Thus, networks have gained N-Peace Network Asia momentum as a platform to consolidate the experiences of women mediators and make it easy for them to be accessed, in a more structured manner. Sangat South Asia
Emergence of Networks of Women Mediators Swedish Network of Women Mediators Europe While important gains have been made in the implementation of UNSCR 1325, formal peace processes have lagged behind in effectively engaging and meaningfully Nordic Women Mediators’ (NWM) Network Europe involving women as members of the teams facilitating and leading peace processes. Research shows that between Peace Women across the Globe (PWAG), Europe 1992 and 2011, only 2% of chief mediators, 4% of witnesses Switzerland and signatories, and 9% of negotiators in peace processes 3 were women. The inclusion of women during peacemaking Mediterranean Women Mediators Network Mediterranean processes has, however, seemed to focus on mobilising women outside of peace processes, rather than in securing Syrian Women’s Advisory Board to the UN 4 Middle East their participation within formal peace processes. In seeking Special Envoy for Syria to create space for women’s engagement in mediation processes, several networks have been established at Commonwealth Network of Female 5 Commonwealth national, regional, continental and international level. In a Mediators (to be created) global context of increasingly complex and interconnected Global Network of Women Mediators (to be challenges, there is growing evidence to suggest that Global created)6 multiple collaborative efforts are perhaps the most
44 I conflict trends hand, can also learn and benefit from the experiences of Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and women working in Track 2 and Track 3, more particularly on Mediation (FemWise-Africa)7 the issues affecting women and the community at grassroots There is no doubt that women should have an integral part level. Thus, bringing women involved in Track 1, Track 2 and in decision-making during peace processes. To increase Track 3 together can be a powerful partnership and learning women’s access to, and participation in, peace mediation approach for women peacemakers on the ground, who are and negotiation in Africa, women’s capacity in mediation and negotiation skills needs to be improved. The impact of often not in the spotlight. women’s role in peace processes also needs to be better The networks also seek to provide a coordinated exposed and reflected on to ensure that gains made are approach to influencing policy processes at different not reversed. Against this backdrop, the African Union (AU) levels on issues relating to women’s participation in peace has taken three landmark decisions,8 ultimately leading to processes, as well as in other areas. In this regard, the the establishment of the FemWise-Africa. FemWise-Africa presence of the networks makes it easy for local women aims to strengthen the role of women in conflict prevention peacemakers to be linked with formal processes. This also and mediation efforts in the context of the African Peace ensures that their work translates into influence and impact. and Security Architecture (APSA). The network provides The networks have also been credited for activating a platform for strategic advocacy, capacity-building and and multiplying the role of women in community-level networking aimed at enhancing the implementation of the peacemaking. In Burundi, the Women Network for Peace commitments for the inclusion of women in peacemaking in Africa. and Dialogue, with 534 mediators, has engaged in resolving conflict. By their count, working as community peace Priorities of FemWise-Africa mediators, the women mediators have addressed over 1. professionalising the role of women in preventive 5 000 conflicts at the local level in 2015. They also initiated diplomacy and mediation at Track 1, Track 2 and Track dialogues in 17 provinces with political actors, security forces 3 levels;9 and civil society.10 The networks have identified and exposed 2. ensuring a channel for women’s meaningful and “hidden” women mediators who are working in community- effective participation in peace processes, including as level mediation processes – experiences often not known heads of official high-level mediation missions; at local, national and international level. They also provide 3. initiating women’s action that will catalyse and a pool for appointments of women as lead mediators and mainstream the engagement of women in mediation, special envoys. in line with the AU’s Agenda 2063 and the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); BY THEIR COUNT, WORKING AS COMMU- 4. bridging the gap between Track 1, Track 2 and Track 3 mediation, and synergising efforts towards inclusive NITY PEACE MEDIATORS, THE WOMEN peace processes with sustainable outcomes; and MEDIATORS HAVE ADDRESSED OVER 5. strengthening the mediation interventions of FemWise- 5 000 CONFLICTS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN Africa with the facilitation of quick impact projects and the establishment of local and national peace 2015 infrastructures as foundations for medium-term and longer-term initiatives to ensure stability and The networks have created opportunities for training development. women in mediation, negotiation and other mediation- related thematic areas, further equipping women with necessary skills. In addition, the networks provide a platform Importance of the Networks to Women Mediators for mentoring young women to be an integral part of peace The networks seek to broaden access and space for mediation, so building a strong base for the current and women’s participation in peace processes, as well as to future generation of women mediators. Some networks, enhance their participation in peace processes. Thus, most such as those at regional and continental level, have brought networks of women mediators serve as a repository of together women who are part of smaller networks (often at women experts in conflict resolution to be deployed in national or community level), linking their efforts to those mediation. The networks also provide a platform for sharing of the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms good practices, expertise and peer-to-peer learning, where (RECs/RMs) and the AU. The networks have also provided women engaged in mediation in different contexts learn from women and society at large the space for reconciliation each other. For example, women in the networks working between divided groups, where women use the networks as at Track 2 and Track 3 mediation efforts can benefit from a space for dialogue. For instance, in Burundi, the Women the experiences of women engaged in Track 1 mediation Network for Peace and Dialogue was developed in light of efforts, often on the dynamics of the highly political formal the ongoing need for reconciliation, post-civil war in the processes. The women engaged in Track 1, on the other country.11 Women in other countries such as South Sudan
conflict trends I 45 GETTY IMAGES/ ZOOM DOSSO
Nobel peace laureate Leymah Gbowee, head of the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET), stands in front of a sign calling for peaceful elections in Monrovia, Liberia (October 2017).
process. By having these women with mediation have also used the networks as platforms for dialogue aimed experience in a known database, the networks increase at reconciliation. mediators’ access to the women. Further, the networks have a membership of women with different levels Importance of the Networks of Women Mediators for of expertise and experience in mediation. Most of Mediation Support these women are often not known by the mandating Why do these networks of women mediators continue institutions. Their presence in the networks continues to emerge? Having names in a database or a roster is one to increase opportunities for their engagement in formal thing, but that these women have the necessary skills to and informal mediation processes. Special envoys, respond to gaps in mediation support is key. Women in mediators and their teams can access the women in the networks can support peace processes, and mediators, the networks, and this allows them to know who the special envoys/representatives, mediation teams and other supporters of the process are even before they arrive in mediation actors can access these women in the networks. the country. These networks are an important option that exists for • Rapid identification and deployment of qualified women: improving the quality of mediation support. Often, where there is a need for quick deployment, There are several roles that networks of women institutions note that they do not have a roster of women mediators play in supporting mediation: who are available immediately for deployment. Thus, • Accessibility to women mediators and women experts the availability of women who are trained and have and practitioners working on mediation and other areas key to mediation processes: Women are excluded in prior experience in mediation makes it easy for the rapid mediation processes, sometimes for the reason that deployment of women mediators. The networks can there are no competent or high-profile women with therefore be linked to operational and expert mediation adequate experience and skills to lead the mediation standby teams.
46 I conflict trends REUTERS/AKINTUNDE AKINLEYE 47 Whenmediators consult
conflict trends I trends conflict 14 Mediation teams with the mandate to 13 Structured and consistent engagementpeace actors: with women address an extensive range of issues need to speak with a broad range of stakeholders to forge an understanding of the situational dynamics and perspectives that context. conflict a to contribute women in the community to support the officialprocess. peace This was seen in Kenya’s 2008 peace process,where the AU Panel of Eminentmade Africana deliberatePersonalities move to ensure that stakeholders women’s groups, it is among oftenmany other special interesta groups, thusonce-off leaving consultation(often male-dominated) mediation teams attempting to unpack complex women’s agendas after onlyconsultation a single with provide women’s a platform for groups.more structured andengagement The with consistentwomen who are networksworking on peace processes; these women can then reach out to other making recommendations toenvoys or representatives the on gender and mediators, other thematic specialissues to be included in the discussion. Thesecontribute insights to a more comprehensive understandingthe situationof and enhance the ability to ofexplore alternativethe proposalsmediators for the resolution of the conflict.
• Like The networks create women within the networks 12 Most women in the networks Commission, publish or prepare position papers: groups and networks during the role played by women’s 2008 Kenya’s peace talks, help in triangulating the information that mediators and mediation teams get from their sources. engaging. The AfricanResolution of CentreDisputes (ACCORD) is foran example in the regard,this Constructive noting that thefeeds into research the work outputof FemWise-Africa. of and The ACCORDmediation mediators teams can work with these strengthennetworks to mediation-specific conflict analysis and to Research and analysis: already undertake research on the aspectsvarious ofissues the and conflict in which the mediators will be efforts. This research and documentation undercuts the argument that there are no qualifiedcontribute womento mediation whoprocesses caneffectively, especially in formal peace processes. Access to lessons and experiences good in practice mediation: from women’s opportunities for women mediators to documentexperiences their in mediation, with therecommendations aim of developingfor strengthening future mediation engage in constructive dialoguepapers onand common issuessubmit in the peaceposition process, further
• • •
Womenattend communitya dialogue meeting inUzo-Uwani village, Nigeria. Networks make possibleit forlocal women to be linked with formal peace processes. GETTY/ AHMED OUOBA
Mediation strategies that systematically include women are more likely to generate broad ownership and support for a negotiated settlement, as well as lead to a more sustainable peace.
such as civil society organisations and women were In addition, they can assist in explaining how normative given an effective voice in the mediation process. frameworks and cultural settings are structured in This approach was made easy because of the networks. the context in which the mediators will be operating. In some cases, such as in the peace process in Syria, the Monitoring, verification and reporting mechanisms are mediators convene a women’s advisory committee to critical for the implementation of cessation of hostilities ensure that women have access to the mediators and are or ceasefire agreements. The inclusion of women in invited to provide input to the mediator’s work. These are such mechanisms facilitates access to information and experiences that can be strengthened in peace processes reporting on violations against survivors and witnesses, in Africa. These networks have been helpful in proposing such as conflict-related sexual violence. the names of qualified women to be part of mediation teams, as well as in providing support to women to THE NETWORKS CAN ALSO PLAY AN be part of such advisory committees. In some cases, IMPORTANT ROLE IN ADVANCING INCLU- the mediators establish sub-commissions on gender, and qualified women who are in the networks may be SIVITY BY OFFERING ALTERNATIVE selected to join such committees. APPROACHES TO WOMEN’S ENGAGE- • Provision of technical expertise: The AU and RECs/ MENT IN PEACE PROCESSES RMs can also draw mediation expertise from the networks. The women in the networks have gender expertise and perspectives from different contexts and • Training of negotiating teams and the community: regions. Thus, these women can provide substantive The women and organisations in the networks support – for instance, in conflict analysis, in assessing have expertise in delivering training on mediation, the differentiated impact of armed conflict on men and negotiation, dialogue and other key areas relevant to women, and in identifying gender dynamics and the the mediation process, including gender, human rights, unique opportunities and challenges for peacemaking in reconciliation and electoral processes, among others. their contexts. The networks can also play an important Mediators and mediation teams benefit from these role in advancing inclusivity by offering alternative capacity-building efforts aimed at the negotiating teams, approaches to women’s engagement in peace processes. the parties to the conflict and the community at large.
48 I conflict trends • Trust-building and confidence-building in the process: Women, Peace and Development (jointly organised by OAU, Often, mediation teams may be small and have a UNECA and the government of Uganda, Kampala, 22–25 November 1993)’, Available at:
conflict trends I 49 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION IS NOT ENOUGH: IMPROVING THE MICRO-LEVEL (RE)INTEGRATION OF FORMER CHILD SOLDIERS
BY ANNE-LYNN DUDENHOEFER
[P]icking up the pieces of broken children after a conflict is hugely difficult, the necessary and ongoing effort is hard to sustain, and success is unpredictable to gauge.1 UNMISS / ISAAC BILLY
In most instances, post-conflict disarmament, challenging to navigate large numbers of ex-combatants in a demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes do chaotic post-war society. This is why DDR programmes have not sufficiently address the hardships of child soldiers. been significantly criticised for being uncoordinated and To achieve successful reintegration, former child soldiers lacking impact on the lives of former child soldiers: “Overall, require more than the usual DDR programme – they are […] DDR efforts are inadequate, and many children have in desperate need of community-based and community- failed to receive the assistance needed to successfully return governed initiatives. As such, it may be essential to redefine to their families and communities.”2 To investigate such the third step of DDR as an “integration” rather than criticism, the individual stages of DDR have to be assessed. “reintegration”. DDR programmes are coordinated and conducted by United Nations (UN) agencies or non-governmental Above: South Sudanese child soldiers leave their rifles organisations (NGOs) working together with national on the ground during a disarmament ceremony (February governments and local communities. In practice, it is 2018).
50 I conflict trends UN PHOTO/SYLVAIN LIECHTI
IN THIS REGARD, FINDING THE CORRECT UNIT OR DEPARTMENT TO REACH OUT TO, AND IDENTIFYING THE RIGHT OFFICIAL TO
Officers of the United Nations Children’s Fund and the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) set apart demobilised child soldiers as the Mai-Mai militia surrenders itself to Congolese government forces (November 2013).
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration arms, to prevent them from falling back into the hands of Disarmament, the first part of the programme, involves fighting forces or ending up on the black market. weapon “collection, disposal, or destruction”.3 This step can Demobilisation, the second step, describes the formal already have significant difficulties – such as former soldiers process of separating or releasing soldiers from the armed possessing more than one weapon, or having no weapon forces or groups. This is especially complicated when it at all. Reportedly, in Liberia, the effort was organised as a targets children, due to the fact that “[i]ronically, departure “one man, one gun” programme, which “worked against from an armed group can be very stressful because of the the best interests of children, especially girls, because rebel loss of valuable psychological support”.9 Another issue commanders confiscated children’s weapons prior to their undermining demobilisation efforts revolves around the release”.4 There are alternative initiatives such as “gun so-called security dilemma.10 The lack of mutual trust and buy-back” or “food for guns” programmes5 that encourage fear of being attacked might cause parties to refuse the former combatants to turn in their weapons. However, those demobilisation of their troops. Thus, demobilisation requires initiatives offering monetary rewards appear to have limited a credible and strong authority – often a third party – to make effectiveness as they leave children vulnerable to adult warring factions demobilise and discharge their fighters.11 exploitation – adult commanders can easily take advantage Often, the process of demobilisation also involves so-called by sending children with their guns to DDR initiatives, only interim care centres (ICCs), where former child soldiers to strip them of the DDR money later on.6 In addition, “[i]n remain for a certain period of time before they are reunited the countries in which these schemes have been tried, it has with their family or community. These care centres are been learned that they can only operate for a limited period, transitional places where children stay for limited periods of in order not to generate a trade of arms in the country.”7 time – up to several months – and receive healthcare, food More creative disarmament methods have proved useful and psychosocial support. In Sierra Leone, for example, in targeting children, in particular, such as “bikes for guns” “children under 15 were sent to Interim Care Centres (ICCs) or “goats for guns”.8 However, these ideas will only remain under the care of UNICEF and child protection agencies, after effective in the long run if they are part of a larger integrative which they were reunited with their families or went to foster programme that involves the destruction of collected small families, and entered education projects.”12 Based on the
conflict trends I 51 UNMISS / ISAAC BILLY 1. family tracing and reunification support; 2. participation in educational opportunities; 3. psychosocial therapy; 4. providing education, but also training in “vocational and life skills that enable youths to obtain and hold jobs and also small loans that help them to earn an income”;15 and 5. community mobilisation and sensitisation.
Regarding the complexity of any post-conflict landscape, most DDR programmes will encounter significant difficulties, which can be grouped into three main categories: programme length, age and gender, and economic environment and effectiveness.
WHEN INVOLVING RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS WHO WILL HAVE TO LEARN HOW TO CO-EXIST IN THE SAME NEIGHBOURHOOD, REINTEGRATION CAN BECOME PARTICULARLY CHALLENGING
First, reintegration processes require years – meaning that long-term funding is essential. Severe gaps in funding Girl child soldiers gender-specific needs must be taken for the reintegration phase arise because “[f]unding for into consideration and served in a more direct way. national DDR programs has typically been provided for
immediate post-conflict demobilization and short-term reintegration support, normally for a one-year period”.16 fact that it is important to cut children’s ties with recruiters Second, DDR programmes were originally designed and, as a result, minimise the risk of re-recruitment, to target adults, which is why children were often left out demobilisation remains a necessary process that has to be of the entire process and simply assumed to be taken care executed by all means. of by their families. Even today, with more child-sensitive Reintegration is commonly regarded as the most campaigns, the programmes fail to account for children’s complicated and complex part of the DDR process. For it gender-specific needs. In Sierra Leone, although 30% of to be successful, the previous two steps (disarmament and former child soldiers were estimated to be girls, only 8% demobilisation) have to be characterised by a stable design (513 girls) of former child combatants in the actual DDR and thorough implementation.13 Unlike disarmament and programme were female.17 Hence, scholars and practitioners demobilisation, reintegration is a long-term process that such as Roméo Dallaire have proposed not to have one DDR could take years to achieve measurable results. It can be programme including all former child fighters, but rather two defined as “a reciprocal process that includes not only the separate programmes. In this way, the children’s gender- adaption of former soldiers but also the rebuilding of healthy specific needs would be taken into consideration and served families and communities, without which former soldiers in a more direct way.18 have few positive roles and options”.14 When involving Third, the local environment that the children return reconciliation between perpetrators and victims who will to may hold severe existential challenges. Although well have to learn how to co-exist in the same neighbourhood, intended, DDR programmes have reportedly failed to take the reintegration can become particularly challenging. children’s economic environment into account, and hence have not provided desperately needed reintegration training DDR: Main Issues for both the former child soldiers and the local communities.19 It is precisely the duration of this last DDR step – The reintegration phase of the United Nations’ (UN) 2002 reintegration – that is significant. Few international DDR programme in Sierra Leone serves as a reminder of the institutions can afford to govern the different reintegration children’s gruesome reality. At the macro level, the Sierra phases of former child soldiers for several years. According Leone DDR programme was celebrated as a huge success: “ to Wessels, reintegration includes five key elements that A total of 72 490 combatants were disarmed, 71 043 have to be completed: demobilised, and 63 545 former combatants participated in
52 I conflict trends UNMISS / ISAAC BILLY
The challenges former child combatants face when trying to adjust to civilian life can be substantial. Among other things, they include individual issues such as identity crises and trauma. the reintegration segment, including 6 845 child soldiers.”20 other things, they include individual issues such as identity The micro-level analysis, however, tells a different tale: crises and trauma, as well as collective challenges such as despite the fact that the initial participation rates in the community involvement and emergency education. nationwide DDR programme were high, former child soldiers lacked community acceptance and support, and soon found Identity Crises themselves navigating an unstable economic environment. After staying with armed forces or groups for a certain Following the programme, “[e]vidence […] surfaced that amount of time, child soldiers may escape, be released or between two thousand and three thousand former child be formally discharged. Depending on the duration of their soldiers were subsequently engaged in heavy labor under group membership, each child will face different struggles harsh conditions in diamond mines”.21 To improve the when reintegrating into society. reintegration process at the micro level, its multilayered Many are confronted with the issue of having undergone nature has to be deconstructed and investigated in more intensive indoctrination processes during their time with the depth. fighting forces. Even though pecuniary rewards might be a powerful method to make children stay,23 indoctrination Reintegration: Challenges and Possible Improvements rituals and in-group socialisation play a more crucial role The critical challenge of the moment is to bridge in turning children into soldiers. While some former child the gap between existing standards and the combatants reintegrate easily, others have acquired the catastrophic situation of children on the ground.22 identity of a fully-fledged group member through systematic manipulation, drugs, comradeship, repeated exposure to Reintegration often appears to be successful at the macro violence and committing atrocities themselves. Some armed level, as it is measured in the numbers of former combatants groups that cannot provide pecuniary rewards rely almost who have or have not been re-recruited. This success story completely on their socialisation processes. Socialisation, in does not necessarily transpire to the micro level – on the this instance, can be defined as: contrary, the challenges former child combatants face when […] processes whereby naïve individuals are taught trying to adjust to civilian life can be substantial. Among the skills, behaviour patterns, values and motivations
conflict trends I 53 needed for competent functioning in the culture in which did not want to talk with me. […] I wanted to go back the child is growing up. Paramount among these are to the bush, back to my friends and fight. One day my the social skills, social understandings, and emotional father was angry at me because I wanted to go back. maturity needed […] to fit in with the functioning of He did not understand being a rebel is good. My social dyads and larger groups.24 mother took me into the hut and we started cooking. She asked me to go out and get some cassava from The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, for the field. She gave me a panga [machete]. When I instance, is known for relying heavily on indoctrination. came out of the house my father was sitting there. He Formal socialisation is accomplished by a so-called made me so angry. I took the panga and cut his head. “bootcamp” involving military training, whereas the He fell on the ground and I finished him. People were informal part comprises a “welcome ceremony” and screaming and crying. My mother cried and yelled registering the newly arrived children.25 When entering the to me. I did not understand why all these people LRA, the children have to take part in the “shea-nut butter screamed so much, this is what we do in the bush. He ritual”, after which they will be reborn as soldiers, leaving was not a good man and I am a good rebel.28 their old identities behind. During this ritual, “[t]he butter is smeared on the body of the abductees to protect them from To improve ex-child soldiers’ functionality and well- bullets.”26 Commanders and peers frequently become the being in civil life and overcome stigmatisation by local child soldiers’ substitute family, providing protection and communities, re-identification with a non-violent lifestyle guidance. has to be accomplished. Due to in-group socialisation There is no shortage of examples illustrating the and the time periods some children spend with armed difficulties of child soldier reintegration. Anna, a 17-year-old forces and groups, scholars argue in favour of using the girl who had been fighting with the LRA, “did not understand term “integration” instead of “reintegration”.29 Broadly the way of life in her village and according to which speaking, “reintegration is less about reinserting former standards people behaved towards each other.”27 Anna’s soldiers back into communities or jobs than about helping explanation demonstrates why third-party mediation and children become functional in their society – helping them reintegration support should be sustained over longer find meaningful and respected social roles and create periods of time: civilian identities.”30 Even though this is undoubtedly a It was very difficult. I was not used to them and I did complex undertaking, it may be possible to achieve through not like it in the village. People looked at me and they community involvement, sensitisation and reconciliation. REUTERS/THOMAS MUKOYA
Former child soldiers, in particular, girls, face severe stigmatisation by communities.
54 I conflict trends ENDRE VESTVIK community mobilisation are the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)-led Return to Happiness programmes in Mozambique,34 and another participative strategy applied in Sierra Leone.35 Both examples aim to rebuild the trust between former child soldiers and their communities. The 1992 Return to Happiness programme “was designed to provide urgent mass psychosocial support to children affected by violence […] [and] encourage […] families and communities to actively participate in the recovery process”.36 The programme’s key ingredient relied on adolescent volunteers to be trained as “play therapists”, who then learnt how to increase the trust of children by using “games, art, puppetry, song, and storytelling”.37 By not following the Western trauma therapy approach, this model supports a community-based strategy as well as the mutual goal to improve relationships between children, adolescents and teachers. The strategy used by the Christian Children’s Fund (CCF) in northern Sierra Leone aimed at “building positive A former child soldier receives vocational training in relations through cooperative activities in twenty-six Beni, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo communities”.38 Pre-existing committees, called Kankalay (2007). Committees or “togetherness groups”, were re-established or newly formed. Calling themselves CDCs, these groups Despite inherent shortcomings, pioneering programmes “served as catalysts for collective planning and action”39 and such as the 1992 Return to Happiness programme or the enabled people to gather and talk about their experiences Community Development Committees (CDCs) in Sierra during war. In addition to improving communication and a Leone attempted to achieve just that. sense of belonging, the committees and communities also planned projects – such as building a school or improving Community Involvement healthcare by constructing a health post. The fact that former One of the crucial parts of reintegration is reconciliation child soldiers were involved in most of the construction and with families and communities. As defined by Wessels, building processes made reintegration easier: villagers learnt reconciliation means “the rebuilding of positive relationships to see them as a valuable part of the community. In addition, following destructive conflict”,31 and to restore such positive conflict resolution committees, facilitated by the CCF, were relationships, local healing methods and rituals have to be established to reduce social tensions and avoid harassment supported. throughout the working process. Temporary payment for In Sierra Leone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission the workers helped former child combatants reduce the was established in 2002 to deal with people’s grief, to stigmatisation caused by their poverty and achieve the status implement transitional justice and to listen to the children of diligent workers. who had been abducted by and fought with the different The achievement of mutual goals led to the disruption armed forces and groups. Nevertheless, even though the of “us versus them” thinking, as well as to community “dual identities of children as victims and perpetrators”32 sensitisation and the rearrangement of social structures. were acknowledged by the commission, the former child Wessels calls it the “power of cooperation”, through which combatants – and, in particular, girls – still had to face the striving for achievement of shared goals can mobilise a severe stigmatisation by communities. Since child soldiers whole community, and serve the purposes of reconciliation, are mostly “recruited from settings with preexisting fragile reintegration and restorative justice at the same time. institutional realities”,33 it is the reintegration environment that remains crucial. Conclusion Restorative justice models appear to be the most Dealing with the reintegration of former child combatants applicable to the context of former child soldiers and their is a highly complex process that requires long-term funding reintegration into communities and families – for community and assistance. Although formal DDR programmes remain members to feel comfortable around former fighters, it is absolutely necessary, it is the third step – reintegration – that beneficial if the children contribute to the improvement should be emphasised. The only possibility of achieving of the whole community. This can be accomplished by successful micro-level reintegration in an unstable and the community and the children developing mutual goals impoverished post-conflict society is to combine all and working towards their achievement. Examples for the different variables in one thorough programme.
conflict trends I 55 While trauma healing and educational, 12 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers CONFLICT TRENDS (2008) op. cit., p. 298. vocational and business training are vital Editor-In-Chief 13 cf. Awodala, Bosede (2009) Comparative ingredients for success, it is community Vasu Gounden International Experience with Reintegration mobilisation that plays the most important Programmes for Child Soldiers: The Liberian Managing Editor role in the reintegration process. Experience. Peace and Conflict Review, 4(1), Venashri Pillay Reintegration efforts should not p. 1. Language Editor predominantly rely on third-party 14 Wessels, Michael (2006) op. cit., p. 160. Haley Abrahams intervention but should also help to further 15 Ibid., p. 163. Design and Layout develop already-given resources, such as 16 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2008) op. cit., p. 31. Immins Naudé the involvement and sensitisation of local 17 cf. Ibid., p. 298. Contributors communities. This has to involve improving 18 cf. Dallaire, Romeo (2011) op. cit., p. 178. Tatsushi Arai local infrastructures, providing minority- 19 cf. Özerdem, Alpaslan and Podder, Sukanya sensitive and gender-sensitive programmes, Lesley Connolly (2011) Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Anne-Lynn Dudenhoefer mobilising communities and supporting Reintegration. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, local spiritual healing rituals. International pp. 8–9. Dhammika Herath agencies have to prioritise support and 20 Solomon, Christiana and Ginifer, Jeremy David Kode (2008) Disarmament, Demobilisation and mediation over short-term solutions that Irene Limo Reintegration in Sierra Leone Case. Centre impose Western values and belief systems. for International Cooperation and Security, Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu For DDR programmes to accomplish success University of Bradford, p. 2. Publisher at the micro level, it may be necessary to 21 Özerdem, Alpaslan and Podder, Sukanya define the third stage as a post-conflict (2011) op. cit., p. 167. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes “integration” rather than “reintegration” 22 Chikuhwa, Tonderai W. (2010) The Evolution of the United Nations’ Protection Agenda for (ACCORD) process. Children. In Gates, Scott and Reich, Simon Private Bag X018 (eds) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured Umhlanga Rocks 4320 Anne-Lynn Dudenhoefer has a Masters States. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh South Africa in Criminology and Criminal Justice Press, p. 37. Tel: +27 031 502 3908 from the University of Oxford, United 23 cf. Dudenhoefer, Anne-Lynn (2016) Fax: +27 031 502 4160 Kingdom, and a Masters in Genocide Understanding the Recruitment of Child Email: [email protected] Studies from Uppsala University, Soldiers, Conflict Trends, 2016 (2), p. 49. Website:
56 I conflict trends