PHL-03 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems attached to army brigade with People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command fire salvo of 300mm surface-to-surface rockets at simulated ground targets during live-fire training exercise in Gobi Desert of Northwest China, August 8, 2017 (Courtesy China Military Online/Jiang Xiaoliang)
1986 are as important. In late 2015, the Reverse Engineering PLA instituted wide-ranging reforms, arguably the most far-reaching in its modern history. This agenda carried an ambitious completion date of 2020. Goldwater-Nichols Even though scholars have examined the reorganization, some even referring China’s Joint Force Reforms to it as “China’s Goldwater-Nichols,” none have yet examined the modifica- tions as indicators of China’s analysis of By Shane A. Smith, Thomas Henderschedt, and Timothy D. Luedecking 30 years of U.S. joint force reform.1 Using the objectives of Goldwater- Nichols as a lens, this article examines the t is no secret to observers of China’s blunt or defeat American efforts in the progress of PLA developments toward a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that western Pacific, the PLA’s incorpora- more modern, joint military capable of I it closely observes the Department tion of organizational changes likely significant operations within the People’s of Defense (DOD). While many focus influenced by studies of U.S. efforts Republic of China (PRC), as well as more on the PLA’s incorporation of U.S.-like under the Goldwater-Nichols Depart- in the direction of an expeditionary force. tactics, techniques, and procedures to ment of Defense Reorganization Act of It demonstrates, too, that the PRC has already taken significant steps, particularly in the creation of new joint warfight- ing commands, reorganization of its Colonel Shane A. Smith, USAF, is Director of Operations and Intelligence, Twenty-Fifth Air Force. Captain Thomas Henderschedt, USN, is the Naval Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. Colonel Timothy D. department system, and creation of new Luedecking, USA, is Director of Logistics (G4) for III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. military services. It also reveals, however,
68 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 limitations such as a continued internal command, placing that authority in the behaviors became dominant in order focus, entrenched bureaucratic interests, hands of combatant commanders. The to protect each Service’s interests, and and the necessity for President Xi Jinping Services were to focus on organize, train, innovation suffered as a result. Budget to use his positional power to enforce and equip functions. The Secretary re- plans were uncoupled from joint capabil- top-down reform without the benefit of ceived greater administrative control over ity warfighting needs and the realistic lessons learned in combat operations or a DOD, while the Joint Chiefs were desig- level of pairing to resources available. senior military champion. Understanding nated as that position’s military staff. The Huntington observed that campaign this PLA effort is crucial for U.S. mili- staff of the Joint Chiefs was also enlarged, planning efforts often appeared like the tary and civilian leaders going forward and the Chairman could now formally Services were preparing to fight differ- both to provide a fresh look at our own vote on matters.6 ent conflicts. Overall readiness suffered. joint developments and to see how they Even President Eisenhower later Furthermore, the system undermined alter the threat picture for our planning recognized that the 1958 act was only the combatant commanders’ ability to development. an interim step. Members of Congress lead with Service component command- had fought him vigorously over his at- ers maintaining an inordinate amount Goldwater-Nichols tempt to unify the appropriations process. of control through their Service chiefs, In 1984, Samuel Huntington called Additionally, Service interests continued who maneuvered to ensure a “piece of “Servicism,” or Service parochialism, to dominate joint considerations, which the pie” for their organization. All in “the central malady of the American saw minimal real change.7 As James all, Service interests trumped strategic military establishment.”2 To combat Locher highlighted, the provisions of the considerations.11 As General Jones put it this, Goldwater-Nichols was born. Far 1958 legislation “were not effectively in a 1982 article, “We need more time on from the first attempt at reform, the implemented. The military departments our warfighting capabilities and less on an act sought to update a system with retained a de facto role in the operational intramural scramble for resources.”12 its origins in the makeshift actions of chain of command and never complied Commencing in 1982 and 1985, re- World War II.3 The National Security with the provision strengthening the uni- spectively, the House and Senate Armed Act of 1947 intended to repair many fied commanders.”8 This set the stage for Services Committees advocated a pro-re- of the pre–World War II defects and future reform efforts. form stance. After extensive resistance by incorporate lessons learned during that General David Jones, USAF, was the Services and Reagan administration, conflict but left most Service-centered the first seated Chairman to speak out legislation named after its champions, inefficiencies in place.4 Not unlike the for reform. Testifying before the House Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and situation during the war, the new order Armed Services Committee on February Representative William Nichols (D-AL), functioned as a system where the Joint 3, 1982, he stated, “The system is bro- passed into law on October 1, 1986.13 Chiefs of Staff were essentially a com- ken. I have tried to reform it from inside, Public Law 99-433 explicitly identified mittee of equals with the Chairman cast but I cannot. Congress is going to have eight objectives for building the joint in the role of a consensus seeker. Una- to mandate necessary reforms.”9 Almost force: nimity was the watchword, not decisive 5 years of debate followed. Many issues decisionmaking focused on enhancing led to this point in time. Subpar military In enacting this Act, it is the intent of joint mission execution. Thus, Service advice, an inability to effectively operate Congress, consistent with the congressional interests dominated, resulting in diluted together, and chain of command issues declaration of policy in section 2 of the planning and advice to the National were cited as the core issues for negative National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Command Authorities.5 events as far-reaching as the outcome of 401)— Building on his experiences in World the Vietnam War, the Beirut barracks (1) to reorganize the Department of War II and seeking to overcome the bombing, Operation Eagle Claw in Iran, Defense and strengthen civilian authority compromises contained in the 1947 problems during the invasion of Grenada, in the Department; law, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the seizures of two U.S. ships by secured passage of the Department of North Korea and Cambodia in 1968 and (2) to improve the military advice provided Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. 1975, respectively.10 to the President, the National Security His stated goals to Congress included Officers viewed a joint assignment as Council, and the Secretary of Defense; a desire to unify strategic and tactical career threatening. Service leaders tended (3) to place clear responsibility on the planning, create an efficient weapons to retain those viewed as their top talent commanders of the unified and specified acquisition process under the oversight for Service staffs. Promotion rates of combatant commands for the accom- of the Secretary of Defense, and organize Joint Staff officers trailed their counter- plishment of missions assigned to those forces into unified commands that fought parts on the Service side. Commentators commands; as one unit, irrespective of Service. In also observed that the Joint Chiefs this vein, the act removed the military simply proved inadequate in the realm of (4) to ensure that the authority of the Services from the operational chain of strategic planning. Status quo–seeking commanders of the unified and specified
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 69 combatant commands is fully com- upon which DOD was to build its future. and Germany. The PLA analyzes its mensurate with the responsibility of those The PRC was watching and would even- own history and filters its examinations commanders for the accomplishment of tually follow suit. of others through this lens; however, missions assigned to their commands; Through revisiting categories pre- since the PRC has not fought an actual scribed in Goldwater-Nichols legislation, war since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict (5) to increase attention to the formulation we can evaluate China’s progress. We first of 1979, it must look outside its own of strategy and to contingency planning; examine the PRC’s approach to strength- experience for how warfare in the infor- (6) to provide for more efficient use of de- ening civilian authority. Second, we look mation age has evolved. fense resources; at the organizational changes being im- Many of the ills previously described plemented to enhance the military advice in the pre–Goldwater-Nichols system are (7) to improve joint officer management provided to senior party decisionmakers. applicable to the PLA. As such, China’s policies; and Third, we scrutinize how the authority joint reforms “hope both to tighten cen- (8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness and responsibility of joint commanders tral political control over a force that was of military operations and improve the to accomplish their tasked missions is seen as increasingly corrupt and to build management and administration of the being reinforced, with a particular focus the PLA into a credible joint warfight- Department of Defense.14 on the new theater command structure. ing entity.”17 Almost three decades after Fourth, we describe further organiza- Goldwater-Nichols passage, the PLA’s or- Importantly, Goldwater-Nichols tional changes intended to improve the ganizational reforms commenced in late strengthened both the Secretary and formulation of strategy and contingency 2015 and early 2016. Perhaps heeding Chairman. No actor in DOD possessed planning. Fifth, new personnel manage- an observation by General Jones, “after authority outside the control of the ment policies, seeking a more efficient nearly 2 years of studies, committee re- Secretary. The act further recognized the use of defense resources and improve- ports, and presidential interventions, the Chairman as the senior military officer ments in joint officer management, are National Security Act of 1947 emerged and military advisor to the President, explored. Sixth, a description of the as a compromise between those who Secretary of Defense, and National PRC’s steps toward enhancing the ef- favored full Service integration and those Security Council. Consensus with other fectiveness of PLA military operations is who feared centralization of military au- Joint Chiefs was no longer a necessity. reviewed. Finally, as we survey how the thority.”18 It remains to be seen, however, Goldwater-Nichols subordinated the PRC is approaching its joint force future, if the PLA reform process proves to be an Joint Staff to only the Chairman. The this article investigates China’s creation of aggressive Goldwater-Nichols legislation authorities of the combatant commanders new military services and its collaboration effort, or a weakened compromise like over forces assigned them was empha- with industry. the National Security Act of 1947. sized, and the direct chain of command While much of the reform has been relationship between these commanders PRC Reforms public, the PLA’s opaqueness makes and the Secretary and President was We do not argue that the PLA is just in-depth analysis somewhat challenging. codified, excluding Service chiefs from learning lessons in jointness and military However, enough is already understood operational roles. Perceived deficiencies operations from the United States. to facilitate some assessment. Either inde- in planning were addressed. The act re- Nonetheless, we do maintain that U.S. pendently or at President Xi’s direction, quired the President to submit a National joint force reforms and experiences in it appears that the PLA arrived at many of Security Strategy upon which DOD its conflicts were both a catalyst and a the same conclusions as the Goldwater- would base budgeting decisions and cam- focus for the PLA. As multiple authors Nichols framers. Although similar, each paign plan preparations. The Chairman highlight, the Gulf War in 1991 was an has characteristics specifically applicable was made the independent voice on the eye-opening episode for Chinese civil- to the PRC political system, current stra- budget previously missing from military ian and military leaders. Additionally, tegic context, and complicated cultural counsel. Finally, officer management was Russian experiences in both of the post- military history. The article now turns greatly altered with a new joint officer Soviet Chechen wars, as well as reforms to the previously identified objectives management system—a very controver- after the Russia-Georgia conflict, of Goldwater-Nichols to evaluate their sial part of the legislation.15 provided insights for PLA efforts. The actions. In relation to this issue, Huntington PLA studied the Falklands War between Strengthen Civilian Authority. cogently observed that “capable people Argentina and the United Kingdom, As Wuthnow and Saunders state, “The are important, but it is also a mistake to given the situation’s similarity to the main political driver of the reform was downgrade the significance of formal Taiwan issue. Joel Wuthnow and Phillip the desire to tighten political control organizational structure. Organizational Saunders highlight that besides the and supervision of the PLA.”19 While structure both reflects and shapes an United States, United Kingdom, and Goldwater-Nichols attempted to entity’s priorities.”16 Goldwater-Nichols Russia, the PLA focused on reform strengthen civilian authority in DOD, provided that organizational structure experiences in Japan, India, France, recent PLA reforms appear to strengthen
70 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Soldiers from People’s Liberation Army listen to briefing in preparation for search and extraction exchange during 13th annual U.S.-China Disaster Management Exchange at Camp Rilea Armed Forces Training Center, Warrenton, Oregon, November 16, 2017 (U.S. Army/April Davis)
President Xi’s authority over the PLA. In take place in parallel to Xi’s overall anti- lack of a real interagency perspective, this vein and unlike the U.S. desire for corruption campaign, a tool he has used while potentially providing more latitude an unpolitical military, the goal is a PLA to consolidate power over and within the for military leaders to formulate plans that is a direct defender of the Chinese PLA, relieving two CMC vice chairmen outside civilian interference. In effect, an Communist Party that embodies endur- and over 200 other officers.20 organizational personnel mix that previ- ing “revolutionary ideals.” As head of One alarm bell Richard Weitz ously enabled periodic unresponsiveness the party, state, and Central Military sounded regarding enhanced civilian to civilian direction was left in place. Commission (CMC), Xi’s civilian control control in the Chinese system is that few This leads some to conclude that achiev- of the PLA and its reforms is further senior civilian leaders have served in the ing the goal of strengthening civilian solidified. Organizational changes like military and that there is a dearth of op- authority and political control over the transforming the previous General Staff portunities to develop civilian strategic PLA will depend on Xi’s personally as- Department (GSD) into 15 offices work- thinkers either inside or outside the sertive leadership style and his continued ing directly for the CMC, in addition to government. The reforms likewise do not ability to dedicate significant time to implementing Xi’s “chairman responsi- alter the civilian-military balance in the military issues, along with the appoint- bility system”—which raises day-to-day PLA; it remains a military-led organiza- ment of trusted officers to implement his national defense decisionmaking to his tion without the types of civilian political initiatives.21 level—help ensure that all major military- appointees or senior civil servants who Improve Military Advice. The related decisions rest in his hands, and are seen across DOD. All CMC members expansion of organizations directly he possesses a number of levers to ensure except Xi are military officers. This is a subordinate to the CMC deepens the compliance. For instance, PLA reforms weakness, as it highlights the continued pool of advisors who can directly provide
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 71 PLA soldier participates in attack exercise observed by General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., and General Song Puxuan, commander, Northern Theater Command, at base in Shenyang, China, August 16, 2017 (DOD/Dominique A. Pineiro) counsel to party decisionmakers.22 For and services to develop joint training Staff Department. In addition to focusing example, interactions with foreign mili- standards and to monitor the implemen- on joint training, operational planning, taries, even during tensions such as the tation of those standards via its inspection capability assessments, 24/7 situational 2009 Impeccable incident, were managed function, measuring the effectiveness of awareness, and overall force readiness, its by the Ministry of National Defense’s exercises and training programs at the portfolio includes acting as a conduit be- Foreign Affairs Office (MND-FAO).23 theater, service, and unit levels. The de- tween the CMC and theater commands. Reform efforts removed MND-FAO partment also inherited a number of PLA Moreover, the Joint Staff Department from the Ministry of National Defense, academies previously supervised by GSD serves as the planning arm and command an organization largely devoid of real organizations, as well as oversight of the and control hub for global actions out- purpose, and moved it into the CMC professional military education system, side the established theaters, which will as the Office of International Military with a charge to improve joint education be described later. This organization and Cooperation (OIMC). Even though and to begin it earlier in careers. This the 14 others formed were designed to OIMC still performs the same duties as move gives CMC leaders better visibility improve training, political indoctrination, MND-FAO, as a body directly subordi- on the progress of joint training across weapons system acquisition, mobiliza- nate to the CMC, it can provide advice the PLA and more opportunities to di- tion of forces, and strategic planning. more directly. rectly influence what is happening in the The staffs are to be manned in a joint In another move, a GSD sub- training realm. fashion and are designed to provide joint department for training was elevated Additionally, the Joint Staff military counsel to senior CMC leaders to a separate entity, the Training and Department, akin to a hybridization of considered missing by many under the Administration Department, directly U.S. J3 (Operations) and J5 (Strategic old system.24 reporting to the CMC. Its portfolio Plans and Policy) staff functions, was cre- Clarify Combatant Command includes working with theater commands ated on the basis of the former General Responsibilities. In a nod to U.S. unified
72 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 combatant command structure, the PLA with the Strategic Planning Office reform, acquisition methods are under departed from its previous seven military retaining the responsibility to conduct review to weed out the high degree of region construct (Beijing, Shenyang, long-range strategic analysis. This analysis waste and to ensure that the PLA’s rapid Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, is particularly focused on developing increase in systems translates to a true and Lanzhou) to a five-theater command approaches to multidomain, information- increase in overall joint combat capability. structure (Eastern, Southern, Western, dominant warfare, integrating China’s A further step toward efficiency, as well as Northern, and Central). Under this ground, sea, air, space, and cyber forces to deal with corruption issues, includes a new paradigm, theater commanders are in a truly joint fashion to address threats push to standardize what the U.S. system now joint force commanders. Breaking seen on the horizon. The combination of refers to as regulations and operating down a situation similar to that which the Joint Staff Department, the theater- instructions.29 existed previously in U.S. history where specific contingency planning conducted Improve Joint Officer Management. the Services maintained an operational by the theater commands, and the A significant impact in the joint officer role, these commands are now the main Strategic Planning Office demonstrates management arena was the previously warfighting arm of the PRC. The theater a focus on current and future strategy mentioned assignment of former North commander will operationally control the formulation and operational planning in Sea Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Yuan forces of services assigned to his region. keeping with Goldwater-Nichols.27 Yubai, as the commander of the Southern This directly stems from China’s interpre- Use Defense Resources More theater command, a first for the PLA. tation of its threat environment and the Efficiently. The PRC started the process While a data point of one, this was previ- nature of modern war. They diligently of reform at a low-efficiency baseline with ously considered unthinkable and points observed U.S. joint warfighting and a number of opportunities to address. in an overall positive direction for the cre- the evolution of information-dominant, The most obvious was in manpower; ation of truly joint staffs at the CMC and precision-oriented combat since the Gulf much of the PLA structure has served theater command levels. As senior leaders War. The former system was peacetime as a “jobs program” historically. While like Yuan rise, they can be expected to oriented and put the PRC at a distinct previous downsizing simply trimmed bring co-service representatives with disadvantage in case of unforeseen or overall numbers, this effort concentrates them.30 Another indicator of joint inten- rapidly developing events. The new on a more efficient and effective use of tions for the officer corps is the creation structure seeks to remedy that shortfall resources. Against this backdrop, the of “a new ‘operational command track’ in by making the transition from peace to PLA announced a reduction of 300,000 PLA National Defense University courses conflict faster and smoother. A cadre of personnel. Most observers predict cuts that train PLA officers for promotion joint officers will staff each theater head- will focus mainly on noncombat and low- to senior positions. Attendance in com- quarters. The individual services now skilled positions in the army, as well as mand track courses will likely become a carry out the man, train, and equip func- those working with out-of-date weapon requirement for future joint command tions, providing the forces and systems systems overall. Potentially demonstrat- assignments.”31 One measure of progress the theater commanders will fight with. A ing the rebalancing effect of these cuts, will be how many attendees originate major challenge in this area is the historic officially unverified reporting in March from non-army services. Others include dominance of army interests in the PLA. 2017 indicated that the PLA Navy may examining if joint courses become avail- All initial theater commanders were from increase the force structure of the PLAN able for lower ranking officers, as well as that branch. However, the assignment Marine Corps to support likely expedi- how joint the staffs actually become and of PLA Navy Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai tionary deployments abroad, along with how assignments to the staffs translate as the Southern theater commander an increase in navy technical personnel. into promotion opportunities. Challenges and PLA Air Force Lieutenant General Additional winners in the move include to this effort are not insignificant. Part of Yi Xiaoguang as the Central theater rocket force, air force, cyber, and intel- the need for reform is to curb rampant commander may indicate a new joint ap- ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance corruption in the ranks. As Saunders and proach to theater command leadership.25 (ISR) mission sets. Military accessions at Wuthnow point out, this even extends to Increase Attention to Strategy and PRC academies demonstrate this with the promotion system itself.32 Contingency Planning. A newly created a one-quarter cut in ground-focused Enhance Effectiveness of Military office, the Strategic Planning Office, students and commensurate increases in Operations. China’s former military is directly subordinate to the CMC. It those other prioritized areas.28 region structure did not effectively merge was formerly a component within the Moreover, an examination of the service forces into geographic or regional GSD known as the Strategic Planning multiple academies per service, duplica- commands, with many operational con- Department, which had responsibilities tive bureaucracies constructed for the trols maintained at service headquarters. for “long-term strategic analysis, resource previous military region construct, re- Additionally, a regional commander allocation analysis, and organizational re- serve force structure, and overall militia would not have automatically served as form analysis.”26 A portion of these roles numbers will be reviewed for cuts or re- the operational commander if conflict was spun off into other organizations, organization. As part of overall budgetary erupted. That was determined as the
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 73 USS Bunker Hill participates in maneuvering exercise with People’s Liberation Army Navy frigates Daqing (FFG 576) and Yancheng (FFG 546) off coast of Southern California following routine port visit to San Diego, December 9, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Craig Z. Rodarte) situation developed, causing a time lag in training, and career field composition, quickly.”35 Dempsey argues that these response. The previously described move will be formed at the CMC level in technologies, particularly cyber capabili- to a theater command structure was an order to match requirements with actual ties, are expanding at a rapid rate, with intended remedy for this and many oper- budgetary decisions. Likewise, the PLA a commensurate impact on the joint ational concerns, streamlining command will need to move away from its single- warfare environment. He further argues and control arrangements by cutting the service-oriented exercise regime to one that the future U.S. joint force must services out and preordaining that the that builds joint interoperability. Even be- operate across geographical boundar- theater commander is the operational yond all these, the PLA simply does not ies, Service affiliations, and all domains. commander for whatever situation arises have a historic joint operational culture to Dempsey calls for globally integrated in the zone.33 build on. This will have to be inculcated if operations that “assemble quickly and As with joint officer management, reform is to lead to operational success.34 apply decisive force anywhere in the challenges remain to effective implemen- world with a wide array of partners.”36 tation. While the United States promotes The Joint Force Future The PLA appears to possess similar initiative by commanders, the PRC Following 30 years of Goldwater-Nich- views and is taking steps accordingly. system continues to heavily centralize ols, the U.S. military continues to work decisions, restricting freedom of action. at refining joint force capabilities and Creating New Services In the vein of Vice Admiral Yuan’s and processes. Similarly, the PLA will con- As part of the reform agenda, three Lieutenant General Yi’s assignments, tinue to examine areas to improve due major new military organizations were commanders will need to be selected to institutional maturation, the chang- created. For the first time, a separate from the service most appropriate for ing threat environment, and develop- PLA Army ground service was stood up the mission to be executed in that the- ments to the methods of warfare. As in January 2016. This break with the ater, lessening army dominance. It also General Martin Dempsey points out, past serves to lessen army dominance remains to be seen how the connection “the diffusion of power in an era of of the entire PLA, while also provid- between theaters and services, as relating hyper-connectivity is allowing destruc- ing a platform to more effectively to weapons system acquisition, personnel tive technologies to proliferate more concentrate on ground warfighting
74 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 tactics and service needs. Rather than likely conflicts between the United States has significant challenges, the Chinese function through the old GSD, the and China, the capabilities contained defense industry appears to have a army now sits on par (at least in the within the Rocket Force and SSF em- faster acquisition cycle in recognizing organizational chart) with other service phasize the systems designed to defeat requirements, acquiring information, headquarters. Additionally, a separate the American concept of operations. Put and integrating technologies than does PLA Rocket Force was constructed, in perspective, over 5,100 miles sepa- DOD. Even if one can readily argue replacing the Second Artillery Corps. rate Honolulu, Hawaii, from Taiwan, that a significant advantage within the Some, like Richard Weitz and Song while the Taiwan Strait is only 110 authoritarian Chinese system is the Zhongping, conjecture that its ulti- miles wide. In addition to the Taiwan incorporation of cyber espionage and mate portfolio will include not only scenario, as a RAND report highlights, cyber theft—efforts likely to get even conventional and nuclear missiles but the United States has three treaty allies stronger under the PLA reform initia- also strategic People’s Liberation Army (the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic tive—DOD must discover a method to Navy submarines and strategic People’s of Korea) with territorial or maritime replicate the results needed within its Liberation Army Air Force bombers, claims in conflict with the PRC. From legal framework. should reports of the development of that standpoint, the PRC can prepare for a new nuclear-capable platform bear a fight in its “own backyard” with short Conclusion fruit. No evidence currently exists that logistics and supply chains. Its reorgani- Nearly 30 years after the landmark this will occur. Others, such as David zation efforts play to PRC strengths in Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the PRC Logan, maintain a more likely option the antiaccess/area-denial realm. Its nu- has ushered in reforms pursuing a more is that a hybrid command and control merous, and increasingly more accurate, efficient, capable joint force. Although structure will emerge reminiscent of ballistic and cruise missile systems, along a point of potential debate, it appears U.S. Strategic Command with the other with counterspace, electronic warfare, in- that Chinese decisionmakers learned services maintaining tactical control of formation operations, and cyber warfare some of the U.S. joint lessons without a the platforms and the Rocket Force pos- capabilities, already appear to put U.S. similar level of trauma, cost, and frustra- sessing operational control, furthering bases in the Republic of Korea, Japan, tion, which initially drove Goldwater- the PLA’s stated objective of more joint and Guam at risk and will present chal- Nichols. These significant changes have approaches. Finally, while the elevation lenges to effective entry into the region in been affected within a system that has of U.S. Cyber Command to a separate the event of a conflict.39 a luxury of largely working toward a unified command was finally announced single benchmark, the United States. in August 2017, the Chinese elevated Improving Collaboration The ultimate measure of PLA cyber, electronic warfare, ISR, and space with Industry success in joint force reform will be elements into the Strategic Support An important development in build- its performance in combat. While Force (SSF), which is directly subordi- ing industry collaboration in the PRC Goldwater-Nichols was congressionally nate to the CMC and provides forces was the establishment of the Central driven, previous operations and senior to the theater commands, in late 2015. Commission for Integrated Military leader observations lent credibility and It is a sign of the committee’s concerns and Civilian Development. This orga- emphasized the need to reform. Even over information dominance in multi- nization is charged with civil-military in the face of Service opposition, there domain warfighting.37 The SSF design integration in the technology spec- existed pockets of “believers” and lead- concept trum. Its goal is to bring the military ers who recognized civilian leadership in and industry together to collaboratively the American system and who enabled is the idea of “integrated reconnaissance, pursue the integration of dual-use Goldwater-Nichols–based reforms. attack, and defense,” which requires that technologies, while cutting costs and Unlike the United States in the 1980s, the intelligence, offensive, and defensive promoting the strength of China’s however, the PLA lacks combat experi- elements are integrated together to enable defense industrial base.40 Defense col- ence on which to base its actions. It full-spectrum warfighting in a particular laboration with industry like this is key also lacks an obvious senior leader like domain. This new organizational con- going forward given the rapid advance General David Jones to champion it. struct is also intended to enable previously of technology and its corresponding Joint reforms in China appear to be top- impossible levels of unified planning, force effects on the battlefield. While former down driven by President Xi without construction, and operations.38 U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s that military advocacy. In essence, the and House Armed Services Committee PLA is not learning its own lessons and It appears the PRC is now potentially Chairman Mac Thornberry’s similar modifying accordingly; rather, it is learn- ahead in operationalizing command and efforts at industry collaboration and ing those of DOD. The one simplifying control in the information domain. acquisition reform represent moves in factor in their situation, nonetheless, is When analyzed in conjunction with the right direction, the United States an authoritarian political system that can the geographic proximity of the most lags the PRC in this area. Although it enforce change.41
JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 75 Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness,” Political Science Quarterly 113, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 93. 5 Roman and Tarr, 92; Locher, 97–98. 6 Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-599, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., August 6, 1958; Jones, 140; Hunting- ton, 21–23; Locher, 99; Jason Zaborski et al., Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.01: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2014), 14–15; Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Special Mes- sage to the Congress on Reorganization of the Defense Establishment,” speech, April 3, 1958, available at
76 Features / Reverse Engineering Goldwater-Nichols JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Pejsova, “A New PLA for a New Era,” Issue Northern: Korean Peninsula; Western: Central bomber-boost-plaaf-strategic-role-create-cred- Alert 13 (April 1, 2016), 1, available at JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Smith, Henderschedt, and Luedecking 77