THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? by G

Schinnerer’s 42nd Annual Meeting of Invited Attorneys

THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? by G. William Quatman, Esquire

IN 1981, THE COLLAPSE OF THE SKYWALKS AT THE HYATT REGENCY HOTEL IN KANSAS CITY KILLED 114 PEOPLE. WHAT WERE SOME OF THE FALSE THEORIES THAT SURFACED AFTER THE COLLAPSE? WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AND WHY? WHAT LES- SONS HAVE THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT?

THE WORST STRUCTURAL FAILURE IN U.S. HISTORY “In terms of loss of life and injuries, this was the most devastating structural collapse ever to take place in this country.” 1 This was not written about the September 11, 2001 collapse of the World Trade Center in New York, but about a structural failure twenty years prior, in July 1981 in Kansas City, Missouri. The collapse of the Hyatt Skywalks killed 114 people and injured another 216 people. It remains one of the most significant events in the construction industry of the Twentieth Century and was a turning point in terms of industry awareness of the critical role of the shop drawing process. This paper will trace the events leading up to and following that fatal collapse and will attempt to dispel some of the false theories that have cir- culated about the cause.

THE HYATT REGENCY HOTEL DESIGN The Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri is a 40-story hotel tower, capped with a rotating restaurant. It is a significant landmark on the city’s skyline. To the south of the hotel tower are other restaurants and the ballrooms (the “function block”). In between the tower and function block is a four-story glass atrium, 120 feet wide, which serves as the lobby and registration area for the hotel. To get hotel guests from the tower to the function block without having to go to the ground floor, the architects designed a system of three “skywalks” or “sky bridges,” suspended from the atrium roof steel at the second, third and fourth floors. The bridges were designed to appear light and “airy” with glass handrails and thin steel rods that suspended the walkways above the atrium floor. These bridges spanned the full 120- foot gap between the tower and function block and hung from the roof steel by 1- 1/4 inch diameter steel rods at various intervals.

G. William Quatman earned two bachelor’s degrees from the University of Kansas School of Architecture in 1980 and 1983. He earned his law degree from the University of Missouri- Kansas City in 1984. He was admitted to the Missouri Bar in 1984 and became a licensed architect in Missouri in 1986. He is admitted to the U.S. District Court, Western District of Missouri; the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit; and the U.S. Supreme Court. Mr. Quatman has authored several articles in national and regional publications, and is a fre- quent speaker. He is also an instructor at the University of Kansas School of Architecture. In 2000, Mr. Quatman was honored with admission to the prestigious AIA College of Fellows. In 2002, he was named to the inaugural class of Designated Design-Build Professionals by the Design-Build Institute of America (DBIA).

1 A unique feature of the ultimate skywalk design was that the second floor bridge hung below the fourth floor bridge, sharing the same steel rods that connected both skywalks to the structure above. The fourth floor bridge latched onto the rod at mid- point and the second floor bridge hung from the bottom of the rod. The third floor bridge was off-set and hung from its own system of steel rods, also connected to the atrium steel above.

HYATT REGENCY CONSTRUCTION TEAM The project owner was Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., an affiliate of Kansas City-based Hallmark Cards, the greeting card maker. Crown Center hired Concordia Project Management to act as the owner’s representative. Crown Center had hired renowned architect Edward Larrabee Barnes, FAIA, as the master planner for the hotel project. Two local Kansas City architectural firms, PBNA (Patty Berkebile Nelson Architects) and Duncan Monroe and Lefevre Architects, were hired as the project architects to prepare the hotel design and to perform construction administration duties. The two local firms formed a new corporation, which went by the joint name of Patty Berkebile Nelson Duncan Monroe Lefevre Architects Planners (or PBNDML). The key players in this story are Herb Duncan, FAIA, a project architect with PBNDML and Robert J. (Bob) Berkebile, FAIA, prin- cipal architect for the conceptual design of the hotel. It was Mr. Berkebile who sealed the architectural drawings, including the architectural skywalk details. The architects subcontracted the structural engineering design to Jack D. Gillum and Associates, a St. Louis firm and part of Gillum-Colaco. (After the skywalk collapse, the firm changed its name to G.C.E. International, Inc.). The engineering firm’s base contract fee was $247,500 for the structural engineering portion of the $50 million, 40-story Hyatt Hotel project. The firm’s founder, Jack D. Gillum, P.E., was the structural engineer-of-record and president of Gillum-Colaco. He sealed the structural drawings, including sheet S405.1, which contained the skywalk details. Missouri licensing law requires that corporations that practice engineering desig- nate responsibility for all engineering work to one individual, whose name is listed with the state licensing board.2 Mr. Gillum was designated by the company as the engineer in responsible charge of the firm’s engineering work in Missouri. Daniel M. Duncan was a 32-year old structural engineer at the Gillum firm who actually prepared or supervised the preparation of the project’s structural drawings. He reportedly designed the single rod concept and approved the fatal change to the two-rod connection, discussed below. Crown Center hired Eldridge and Son Construction as the general contractor and hired General Testing Laboratories as the testing laboratory and special inspec- tor.3 Eldridge and Son hired Havens Steel Company as the subcontractor and fabricator of the structural steel, including the steel skywalks. Havens subsequently hired WRW as the steel detailer to prepare shop drawings. WRW’s Ken Warner, a steel detailer, detected fabrication problems with the Gillum firm’s single-rod design for the skywalk system and raised questions with engineer Dan Duncan of Gillum.

THE CONTRACTS AND SPECIFICATIONS The contracts for the Hyatt Hotel project contained standard AIA-type language regarding shop drawing review. The August 28, 1978 general conditions stated:

2 THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? 2.2.9 Architect will review Shop Drawings and Samples as provided in Subparagraphs 4.13.1 through 4.13.8 inclusive. 4.13.1 * * * Shop Drawings shall be submitted for all work so specified. Drawings shall be complete and accurate, showing appearance, dimensions, materials, jointing methods, fasteners, and all other pertinent information required for fabrication and installation. * * * 4.13.3 The Contractor shall review, stamp with his approval and submit, to the Architect, with reasonable promptness and in orderly sequence so as to cause no delay in the Work or in the work of any other contractor, all Shop Drawings and Samples required by the Contract Documents or subsequently by the Architect as covered by Modifications. * * * At the time of submission the Contractor shall inform the Architect in writing of any deviation in the Shop Drawings or Samples from the requirements of the Contract Documents. * * * 4.13.4 By approving and submitting Shop Drawings and Samples, the Contractor thereby represents that he has determined and verified all field measurements, field construction criteria, materials, catalog numbers and similar data, or will do so, and that he has checked and coordinated each Shop Drawing and Sample with the requirements of the Work and of the Contract Documents. 4.13.5 The Architect will review and approve Shop Drawings and Samples with reasonable promptness so as to cause no delay, but only for conformance with the design concept of the Project and with the information given in the Contract Documents. The Architect’s approval of a separate item shall not indicate approval of an assembly in which the item functions. * * * 4.13.7 The Architect’s approval of Shop Drawings or Samples shall not relieve the Contractor of responsibility for any deviation from the requirements of the Contract Documents unless the Contractor has informed the Architect in writing of such deviation at the time of submission and the Architect has given written approval to the specific deviation, nor shall the Architect’s approval relieve the Contractor from responsibility for errors or omissions in the Shop Drawings and Samples. 4.13.8 No portion of the Work requiring a Shop Drawing or Sample submission shall be commenced until the submission has been approved by the Architect. All such portions of the Work shall be in accordance with approved Shop Drawings and Samples. The project specifications further addressed the shop drawing and submittal process in Section 0130, “Submittals and Substitutions,” which stated: 1.1 General. * * * b. Provide the following information on each submittal: * * * 4. Contractor’s stamp certifying that he has checked and approved the submittal for conformance with Contract requirements. * * * 6. Any variations from Contract requirements. 1.1.d The approval of submittals by the Architect will be general, and shall not be construed as: 1. permitting any departure from the contract requirements; 2. relieving the Contractor of the responsibility for any error in details, dimensions or otherwise that may exist; 3. as approved departures from additional details or instructions previously furnished by the Architect unless the Architect had specifically approved the variation in writing. (emphasis added) 1.4 Shop Drawings. a. Make all shop drawings accurately to a scale sufficient-

SCHINNERER’S 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF INVITED ATTORNEYS 3 ly large to show all pertinent features of the item and its method of connection to the work. The specifications specifically addressed structural steel in Section 0510, which stated: 1.4 Quality Assurance. * * * c. Design of Members and Connections. 1. All details shown are typical; similar details apply to similar conditions, unless otherwise indicated. * * * 2. Promptly notify the Architect whenever design of members and connections for any portion of the structure are not clearly indicated. (emphasis added) 1.5 Submittals. * * * c. Shop Drawings, Structural Steel: Submit shop drawings including complete details and schedules for fabrication and shop assembly of members, and details, schedules, procedures and diagrams showing the sequence of erection. 1. Architect’s review of shop drawings will be for general considerations only. Compliance with requirements for materials fabrication and erection of structural steel is the Contractor’s responsibility. (a) Include details of cuts, connections, camber, holes, and other pertinent data. * * * (emphasis added) 2.2 Fabrication. a. Shop Fabrication and Assembly: Fabricate and assemble structural assemblies in the shop to the greatest extent possible. Fabricate items of structural steel in accordance with AISC Specifications and as indicated on the final shop drawings. * * * b. Connections: 1. Weld of bolt shop connections, as indicated. 2. Bolt field connections, except where welded connections or other connections are indicated. Provide high-strength threaded fasteners for all bolted connections. 3. All bolted connections shall have a min- imum of two bolts. (emphasis added) c. High-strength Bolted Construction: Install high-strength threaded fasteners in accordance with AISC “Specifications for Structural Joints Using ASTM A 325 or A 490 Bolts.”

TIMELINE OF EVENTS LEADING TO FAILURE In 1976, Gillum-Colaco assigned 32-year old engineer Dan Duncan as the project engineer for the Hyatt Hotel project. At an unknown date, Dan Duncan prepared a sketch of a “box beam” hanger rod system made up of two (2) C-channels welded together to form a box. His initial design showed a 22 kip load on the box beam hanging from steel rods that had to have a yield strength of 60 ksi. Duncan had never designed a system similar to the Hyatt skywalks before. The project was “fast-tracked,” in that the construction contract was issued on February 22, 1978, though the architectural and engineering drawings and specifications were not issued until August 1978. On March 30, 1978, framing plans by Gillum-Colaco were “Issued for Review” (Sheets S303 and S305), showing the second and fourth floor skywalks framed by three box beams made of two MC 8 x 8.5 channels, spaced 29 feet, 3 inches apart to support the full length of the bridge, which was approximately 120 feet long (see Fig. 1, next page). The structural drawing noted that the box beams were connected to six 1-1/4 inch diameter rods per walkway. The structural drawings were sealed by Jack D. Gillum, P.E. On May 26, 1978 these structural details were again “Issued for Review” and on August 1, 1978 they were finally “Issued for Construction of Atrium.” A “section symbol” on these drawings referred to Detail 10, sheet S405.1 for both walkways. Detail 10 would become the critical detail leading to the controversy and eventual failure.

4 THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? Gillum-Colaco prepared Sheet S405.1, which had two details (nos. 10 and 11) of the walkway connections. However, the details only showed the bottom connection of the second and third floor bridges, not the mid-span connection at the fourth floor walkway. The detail showed a 1-1/4 inch diameter rod threaded at the bottom and continuing for an undetermined distance up into the box beam, (Fig. 1, Detail 11, Sheet S405.1) secured below the box beam simply by a nut and washer. This sheet was also sealed by Jack D. Gillum, P.E., and marked as “Issued for Construction of Atrium” on August 1, 1978. The August 28, 1978 architectural plans for the Hyatt Hotel depicted the skywalks in plan, elevation and section, with one enlarged detail of the rod and box-beam connection. Sheets A303 and A305 show the bridges in plan. Sheet A412 is a building section of the atrium, showing the second and fourth floor walkways suspended from one single rod attached to the roof structure above. Architectural notes refer to detail 51, sheet A508 for a larger detail of the glass handrail and box beam connection. Detail 51 on Sheet A508 shows the 1-1/4 inch diameter “hanger rod” pierc- ing the box beam (see Fig. 2, below). A close look shows graphically a washer and nut at the fourth floor connection and a note, which reads, “Cover brackets & nuts with fire protection mastic.” No offset is shown and a single rod is clearly depicted as supporting both bridges. Robert J. Berkebile sealed all sheets.

(Fig. 2, Detail 51, Sheet A508)

SCHINNERER’S 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF INVITED ATTORNEYS 5 Based on the August drawings and details, on December 19, 1978, the contractor Eldridge entered into a $390,000 subcontract with Havens Steel to fabricate and erect the atrium steel for the hotel project. Havens was a Category III fabricator, the American Institute of Steel Construction’s (AISC) highest rating. Havens hired WRW to prepare the steel details, including the shop drawings.

THE FATAL DESIGN CHANGE In late January or early February 1979, Ken Warner, a steel detailer at WRW, called Bill Richey of Havens Steel and pointed out a discrepancy in the engineering drawings for the skywalk hanger detail. As it appeared to Warner, the Gillum design called for a single rod, over 45 feet long, threaded at the bottom (to support the second floor walkway) and at mid-span (to support the fourth floor walkway). Warner had questions about how they would fabricate a 45-foot long threaded rod. Richey phoned Gillum structural engineer Dan Duncan and requested a clarification of the apparent discrepancy in the framing plans and the “typical” details on S405.1, sections 10 and 11. Duncan later disputed the call in court hearings. Richey, of Havens, testified that during that phone conversation, Dan Duncan suggested they move the second floor rod over, thereby offsetting the rods and creating a two-rod system. This would eliminate the need to thread the entire length of the rod and would only require threading the top and bottom six inches of the rods. With this clarification, the testimony was that Havens called the steel detailer back with the modified design of a two-rod system. WRW proceeded to prepare the steel shop drawings showing two rods instead of one. On February 7, 1979, WRW prepared shop drawing 30 showing the hanger rods connected to the lateral box beams by a nut and washers (see Fig. 3, left, and Fig. 4, next page). A subtle but critical difference was that instead of a single rod running through the fourth floor bridge and down to the second floor bridge, the new design showed the second floor (Fig. 3, Shop Drawing 30) walkway hung from the fourth floor walkway. The shop drawing showed a total of 12 rods, all 1-1/4 inches in diameter, with the top and bottom six inches threaded. Six rods measured 15 feet, 11 inches (the fourth floor rods) and six measured 23 feet (the second floor rods). The drawing specified 24 hv. hex nuts, measuring 1-1/4 inches, and 24 washers for 1-1/4 inch diameter rods. The fourth floor box beam had two holes, 1-5/16 inches in diameter, drilled in each end,

6 THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? (Fig. 4, Shop Drawing 30) four inches apart. In hearings after the collapse, the Administrative Law Judge later found that the change from a continuous single to an interrupted double rod system essentially doubled the load on the fourth floor walkway box beam members and hanger rod connections and that WRW performed no design work on the double rod system by calculating loads or testing adequacy of the connection.

THE SHOP DRAWING REVIEW PROCESS Architect Bob Berkebile, FAIA, has told this author that the shop drawing review process worked as planned on this project. As the following chronology shows, the fabricator asked questions of the engineer, the project architect and Gillum’s own reviewer all asked questions about the design change, and at least four different people detected a change in the submittal (i.e., architect Herb Duncan, Havens Steel, WRW, and Jantosik, the Gillum reviewer). The problem was that the process failed in its reliance on one person, the design engineer, to perform a simple and critical calculation to check the strength of the revised connection. The “process” did not fail, rather the licensing board and court found that one person in that chain failed to do his job. The steel shop drawings began their review process, as required by the contract documents, on February 13, 1979, when shop drawing 30 was stamped “Received and Reviewed” by Eldridge and Son Construction the general contractor. Eldridge then forwarded the drawings on to the design team and on February 16, 1979, shop drawing 30 was received by the Gillum-Colaco structural engineers in St. Louis, Missouri. Ten days later, on February 26, 1979, Edward Jantosik, a technician for Gillum-Colaco, was assigned to check the shop drawings. He was given this task because the firm was short-staffed after the resignation of two engineers originally assigned to the project. Mr. Jantosik was not previously involved in the Hyatt Hotel project. He was not a licensed engineer and had failed the licensing examination for professional engineers in 1975 (scoring 56 out of 100 points) and had not retaken the test since then. Despite his lack of experience, Jantosik apparently noticed the change from the original single-rod design and talked to design engineer Dan

SCHINNERER’S 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF INVITED ATTORNEYS 7 Duncan about the change. Duncan reportedly told Jantosik that he had been in con- tact with Havens Steel, who could not make the walkway system with one continuous rod as originally intended. Testimony at the licensing disciplinary hearing stated that Duncan told Jantosik that the change to two rods was “basically the same as the one rod concept.” Therefore, the change was made to two rods per the shop drawings and the shop drawing stamped by Gillum-Colaco (see Fig. 5, below). Mr. Jantosik later testified that he never performed any calculations on the revised design and would not even know how to perform such calculations to determine whether the skywalk system was structurally safe. Nonetheless, shop drawing 30 was stamped “Reviewed” by E.C.J. (Jantosik) with a stamp disclaimer that said the drawing was reviewed only for conformity with the design concept and compliance with the information contained in the contract documents. Interestingly, the word “Approved” was not used on the stamp, a point later argued by the engineers and rejected by the courts.

(Fig. 5, as-designed and as-build/revised design)

Based on the engineer’s review of the shop drawing, on March 5, 1979, shop drawing 30 was stamped “Approved” by PBNDML, the project architects. Architect Herb Duncan, of PBNDML, later testified that he noted the change to the two-rod system and indicated his concern to engineer Dan Duncan, of Gillum, about the change from an aesthetic standpoint and whether it would be a safe change structurally. Herb Duncan testified that he was assured by the engineer that the change was safe and did not affect the structural integrity of the system. Consistent with Jantosik’s and Herb Duncan’s recollections, Dan Duncan later testified that he became aware of the change in the hanger rod design by a phone call from an unnamed steel detailer. Dan Duncan also admitted that the architect, Herb Duncan, brought the change to his attention. Dan Duncan explained to Herb Duncan that it was acceptable to make the change. Dan Duncan also admitted that while he looked at the erection drawing E-3 and shop drawing 30 and recognized the change to two rods, he did not review the connection on the fourth floor box beam.

8 THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE FAILURE

The Kemper Roof Collapse Kansas City, Missouri was host to the AIA National Convention in June 1979 and the city was crowded with thousands of architects when, during a rain storm, the roof of the city’s major arena (Kemper Arena) collapsed and crashed 95 feet to the floor below. The event was front-page news in Kansas City and brought about a heightened sense of awareness of potential structural failures. Later that summer, steel workers began erecting the skywalk bridges at the Hyatt Hotel. In inspection reports dated August 17 and 20, 1979, General Testing Laboratories noted that the bolted connections were checked but that the hanging walkways were “inaccessible” and that connections were not checked by a calibrated torque wrench. By mid- September, the metal deck was welded onto the walkways, and by the end of the month lightweight concrete topping 3-1/4 inches thick was poured over the deck.4

The Atrium Roof Collapse On Sunday, October 14, 1979, just four months after the Kemper Arena collapsed, a portion of the steel in the Hyatt atrium roof collapsed during the night and fell to the lobby floor below. Though nobody was injured, the event caused significant concern to all involved. The project owner and the architect directed Gillum- Colaco to re-check the design of the entire atrium, for an additional fee. The owner’s representative, Stephen Byers, later testified that he specifically requested engineer Dan Duncan to inspect the steel in the bridges, including the connections. Duncan later advised Mr. Byers that this had been done. Duncan reported, “We went back, myself and another engineer, and checked all the atrium steel…Everything in the atrium checked out very well.” (Evidence later showed that the engineers only checked the roof steel, not the bridges.) In addition to Duncan’s statements, another owner’s representative, Keith Kelly, testified that immediately after the roof collapse, engineer Jack Gillum assured Mr. Kelly “that he was going to check every detail in that hotel to be sure it was safe and met good engineering practice.…” Kelly later testified, “Mr. Gillum also assured me he would personally look at every connection in the hotel.” On October 20, 1979, Jack Gillum sent a preliminary evaluation of the atrium roof collapse to the owner. Gillum told the owner in a subsequent meeting that his firm would run a “detailed, thorough re-analysis of all of the structure” to determine if there was any other areas with any kind of a design deficiency. Construction on the three steel bridges continued.5 On November 13, 1979, a meeting was held with representatives of the owner, architect, construction manager and Jack Gillum, the structural engineer. The meeting was tape-recorded and the tape and minutes show that Mr. Gillum said his firm had been reviewing all the connections in the field and, “What one found up there is an abomination. There are 36 separate connections up there and probably there is something wrong with every single one of them.” The connections were later ordered redesigned, modified or repaired. (It appears that Gillum was referring to the atrium roof steel and not to the skywalks.) In a final review meeting held on December 12, 1979, with the owner, architect, engineer and others, the minutes of the meeting show that the engineers had reviewed the steel-to-steel and steel-to-

SCHINNERER’S 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF INVITED ATTORNEYS 9 concrete connections in the atrium. The Administrative Law Judge later found that the owner and architects to whom these false representations were made did not know, nor could they discover, that those statements were false, saying that the engineer’s statements “constitute fraudulent misrepresentations...and a fraudulent con- cealment of material facts.” 6

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SKYWALKS In July 1980, the Hyatt Hotel opened to the public, though punchlist and other work remained to be completed. Work continued into early the next year and in February 1981, John E. Holmes, a drywall worker for Morford Dry Wall, observed the box-beam connections as he covered the exposed ends with drywall caps. Though not an engineer, Mr. Holmes noticed a “bowing” or deflection in the flanges of the box beams when he covered them with drywall. He saw no significance in his observation and told nobody because he knew that some bending is normal in all steel. This deflection was likely the start of a failure of the box beam connection from the simple dead weight of the bridges, which weighed more than 32 tons each. In the summer of 1981, the Hyatt Hotel began to hold “tea dances” on Friday evenings in the atrium lobby. These were popular events, drawings hundreds to hear big band music and to compete in ballroom dancing contests. One of those “tea dances” was held on Friday, July 17, 1981. By 3:00 p.m., people begin to arrive for the dance event and by 4:30 p.m., seating on the first floor of the atrium was fully occu- pied. As a result, people began to occupy seating on the atrium terrace and to assemble on the suspended walkways. At 7:00 p.m., the crowd in the atrium area was estimated at 1,500 to 2,000 people when the band took a break. As happens in these types of events, when the band took a break, many attendees headed for the bar, which was located directly beneath the second and fourth floor skywalks. At 7:04 p.m., the band returned from its break and began to play Duke Ellington’s “Satin Doll” for the dance contest. It is estimated that approximately 7 to 13 people were standing on the fourth floor walkway, and another 40-50 people were on the second floor walkway, mostly at the east handrail overlooking the dancers below. An estimated 200 people were crowded on the atrium floor at the bar area below the walkways. At 7:05 p.m., one or more of the hanger rod connections failed, triggering a sys- tematic overloading of the remaining connections. The two 32-ton skywalks for the second and fourth floors fell to the Hyatt atrium floor. As attendees and hotel staff tried to help the injured and dazed, emergency workers, police and ambulances rushed to the scene unaware of the enormous tragedy that had occurred. When it became apparent that heavy equipment would be needed to lift the 32-ton bridges to rescue people trapped below, large construction cranes were moved into the lobby area to lift the heavy sections of concrete and steel. The rescue effort lasted all night, and the death toll was listed in the morning paper headline, “46 Killed in Hyatt Collapse as Tea Dance Turns to Terror.” When the final count was made, there were 114 dead and 216 injured. The collapse sent shock waves throughout the construction industry, with every- one asking “How could this happen?” There was speculation of poor work by the contractor and steel fabricator, defective materials, etc. Nobody suspected that a design error could have caused such a failure. Many theories began to circulate, ranging from defective materials, to defective construction to “harmonic vibration” brought on by

10 THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? the rhythm of the music and the swaying of the dancers on the bridges. One live tel- evision report from the scene announced to viewers that the dancers on the bridge, swaying back and forth to the music, may have led to the collapse. Though few suspected that an engineering error could have caused such a catastrophe, engineer Jack Gillum’s first words when he saw the wreckage were, “Where are the stiffeners?” He knew immediately what was wrong and what had caused the collapse. It was not music or the swaying of dancers, but an improper design.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE HYATT COLLAPSE

The Investigation Within days of the collapse, Missouri Senator Thomas F. Eagleton’s office con- tacted the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) and requested technical assistance. Kansas City Mayor Richard L. Berkley joined the request and asked NBS to determine the most probable cause of the walkway collapse. Senators Eagleton and Danforth endorsed the mayor’s request. On July 21, 1981, NBS researchers arrived in Kansas City to conduct a study and perform testing. It would take over six months to issue the findings in a report that stated what was obvious to any engineer who examined the two-rod system. In February 1982, the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards issued its report on the Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse, concluding: Based on the results of this investigation, it is concluded that the most probable cause of failure was insufficient load capacity of the box beam-hanger rod connections. * * * [I]t is concluded that the maximum load on the fourth floor box beam-hanger rod connection at the time of collapse was only 31 percent of the ultimate capacity expected of a connection designed under the Kansas City Building Code. * * * With this change in hanger rod arrangement, the ultimate capacity of the walkways was so significantly reduced that, from the day of construction, they had only minimal capacity to resist their own weight and had virtually no capacity to resist additional loads imposed by people. (emphasis added) The NBS report studied the “vibration theory” and concluded: The effects of horizontal vibrations on hanger rod forces would be expected to be negligible…it does not appear that dancing involving a reasonable number of walkway occupants would give rise to steady state oscillations that would warrant a more detailed analysis.7

The Lawsuits and Criminal Investigation Numerous lawsuits were filed in state and federal court in Kansas City in the months following the collapse, including suits by firemen and other rescue workers who sued for physical and emotional damages as a result of their rescue work after the collapse.8 In April 1982, the Jackson County Prosecutor’s Office initiated a criminal investigation into allegations that state and federal crimes had been committed that contributed to the collapse. In February 1983, the United States Attorney’s Office joined the criminal investigation into crimes of manslaughter, perjury, false declarations, and criminal conspiracy preceding the tragedy and in the subsequent civil litigation. The criminal investigation was later closed after the Jackson County

SCHINNERER’S 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF INVITED ATTORNEYS 11 Grand Jury determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause that crimes had been committed in connection with the collapse. On December 6, 1982, the insurers for Hyatt, Crown Center and Hallmark Cards entered into a class action settlement agreement, later approved by the Jackson County Circuit Court on January 6, 1983, agreeing to pay damages to all class members without litigating liability. The court set a deadline for any person with claims of injuries to file a claim in the class action lawsuit. Claimants were given the option to accept $1,000 for a full release, negotiate a settlement or go to trial. In May 1983, Jack D. Gillum and Associates, the structural engineering firm, changed its name to G.C.E. International (GCE). In 1984, the project contractor, Eldridge and Son Construction, Inc., the general contractor, forfeited its corporate charter and went out of business.

The Industry Reaction The engineering community began an introspective look at what went wrong and how such failures could be prevented in the future. Edward O. Pfrang, then executive director of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), stated that an engineer’s shop drawing stamp used to provide a clear-cut statement that drawings were approved, disapproved or approved with corrections, but that such stamps had been revised over the years to include longer, vague statements, “artfully put together by insurance companies and lawyers.” 9 In June 1983, ASCE formed a task committee to “investigate the perceived problem of the transfer of certain aspects of responsibility for design of steel structures to the structural steel fabricator and to make recommendations for guidelines to professional practice in this regard.” In October 1985, the ASCE task committee released its “Final Report and Recommendations on Assignment of Authority & Responsibility for Design of Steel Structures.” 10 The following March, ASCE convened a construction industry roundtable meeting in Kansas City to discuss public safety and professional responsibility in the constructed environment. The two-day panel included 39 leaders from the legal, architectural, engineering, construction and insurance industry.11

THE LICENSING BOARD INQUIRY AND COURT ACTION In February 1984, Missouri state attorney general John Ashcroft filed a complaint against engineers Gillum, Duncan and GCE with the state licensing board. That summer, from July 16 to August 24, 1984, 26 days of hearings were held in the St. Louis County Courthouse and over 6,000 pages of testimony were taken. Duncan and Gillum’s primary defense was that it was expected by them, in keeping with custom and practice in the industry, that the steel fabricator would design the connections and they were not responsible for deficiencies in the fabricator’s shop drawings or design. Gillum testified: First of all, the employees of the companies that prepared that [the connection detail] were not under my personal direction, and therefore I had no authority over these employees, and without authority and ability to direct them in how they are preparing that drawing, I cannot accept the responsibility for anything that they do. 744 S.W.2d at 536, fn.9. More than a year later, on November 15, 1985, following 14 months of delibera- tions, Missouri Administrative Law Judge James B. Deutsch issued his now-famous

12 THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? 442-page opinion finding that cause for discipline existed under the Missouri licensing statutes to suspend or revoke the certificates of registration of Daniel M. Duncan and Jack D. Gillum and the certificate of authority of GCE for gross negligence, mis- conduct and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. In the opinion, Gillum was found vicariously liable for the acts of Duncan. Shortly thereafter, Duncan and Gillum resigned their positions with the company. On January 22, 1986, the Missouri licensing board met for five hours behind closed doors and voted unanimously to revoke the licenses of Gillum and Duncan and to revoke the certificate of authority of GCE. Dan Duncan was later quoted as saying, “Perhaps I placed too much trust in others. One engineer cannot do it all.” Jack Gillum said, “I am virtually out of the practice of structural engineering. I have been publicly denounced, demeaned and chastised by the press. My career has been destroyed.” GCE folded its business, and liquidated and sold its assets to a Colorado engineering firm, KKBNA. The stockholders of GCE reportedly lost more than $1 million and Gillum reported more than $200,000 in legal bills. Gillum and Duncan stopped practicing engineering “voluntarily.” However, on February 20, 1986, the Hyatt engineers appealed the licensing board’s action on constitutional grounds. In May 1986, a St. Louis judge denied an attempt by the Gillum firm’s engineers to prevent the licensing board from revoking their licenses and permitted the board to act immediately on its decision to revoke the licenses.

THE HYATT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION On January 26, 1988, the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the licensing board’s disciplinary action against the engineers and rejected constitutional arguments raised by the engineers. The court held: That Chapter [327, R.S.Mo.] imposes upon the engineer a non-delegable duty of responsibility for projects to which he affixes his seal...[I]t is inconceivable that the legislature contemplated relieving certified engineers of responsibility for engineering decisions made by non-certified engineers or laymen. Design of connections is, under the [licensing] statute, a matter for which the engineer is responsible. Custom, practice, or “bottom line” necessity cannot alter that responsibility. 744 S.W.2d at 537. The 442-page administrative law judge’s decision stated, in part:

On the Role of the Engineer: The structural engineers…have certain control and authority over the construction team members by virtue of the contract documents…The structural engineer “reviews and approves” structural steel shop drawings and, by rejecting a set of shop drawings submitted by a contractor, the structural engineer could prevent the contractor from proceeding with construction. The structural engineer is, in fact and in law, the team leader bearing overall responsibility for structural design. The structural engineer on a project may, as a matter of custom, elect to have connections designed by the fabricator...[but] The adequacy of the connection design remains the responsibility of the structural engineer.

On Shop Drawing Stamps: Although the contract documents require that shop and erection drawings be

SCHINNERER’S 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF INVITED ATTORNEYS 13 submitted to the engineer of record for “review and approval,” testimony at trial indicates that engineers never use the term “approved” when indicating review and approval of these drawings. This custom apparently rests upon the dubious basis that most engineers’ insurance carriers have directed that the word “approve” not be used. Based upon all the evidence, this Commission finds that the “review stamp” of the structural engineer of record on the Hyatt project, placed on shop and erection drawings, functionally indicates both review and approval of such drawings. (emphasis added)

On What Went Wrong? Although Respondent Duncan looked at [the shop drawings] and knew there were two rods shown instead of a single rod, he did not “review” the connection of the fourth floor box beam shown. By placing his firm’s shop drawing review stamp on these shop drawings, Respondent Duncan finalized a series of mistakes, errors, misjudgments and non-judgments made by him throughout the course of the design work on the walkways. Under no set of circumstances presented in this record can such conduct be interpreted as acceptable.

On the Meaning of the Seal: R.S.Mo. 327.411. 2. The personal seal of a registered architect or professional engineer or land surveyor shall be the legal equivalent of his signature...and the owner of the seal shall be responsible for the whole architectural or engineering project...when he places his personal seal on any plans, specifications...for or to be used in connection with any architectural or engineering project or survey...unless he shall attach a statement over his signature, authenticated by his personal seal, specifying the particular plans, specifications, plats, reports, surveys or other documents or instruments intended to be authenticated by the seal, and disclaiming any responsibility for all other plans, specifications, estimates, reports, or other documents or instruments relating to or intended to be used for any part or parts of the architectural or engineering project or survey.12 (emphasis added) This responsibility is total and continues until the engineer disclaims that responsibility and specifies which documents and parts of the project he does and does not take responsibility for.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS RESPOND TO HYATT COLLAPSE Several professional associations reacted to the Hyatt tragedy, some directly against the engineers involved, others more generally. In August 1986, ASCE joined the licensing board’s action and suspended the membership of Jack Gillum for three years for violating the organization’s canons of ethics. Also in 1986, the Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee (EJCDC), comprised of members of several professional engineering associations, published a “white paper” on the topic of the shop drawing process called Focus on Shop Drawings. The paper’s conclusions included recommendations that: v The functions and responsibilities of the engineer and contractor in the process must be clearly stated in the project agreements and understood by all;

v The shop drawing submission, review and approval process must be taken

14 THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? seriously, and engineering firms should insist on strict compliance by their personnel with each step in the review and approval process;

v Call only for those submittals that are necessary;

v Engineers must understand that an approval of a shop drawing means that what has been proposed is acceptable; and

v Engineers must be continually mindful of their duties and responsibilities as licensed professionals. In 1987, The American Institute of Architects (AIA) published its new edition of the Architect’s Handbook of Professional Practice, which recommended that shop drawing stamps use the terms, “Approved,” “Approved As Corrected,” “Revise and Resubmit” and “Rejected.” The Handbook stated, “There has been a tendency for some architects to shy away from the word approve. Yet both owners and contractors expect that architects will approve and not hedge their actions in euphemisms such as reviewed or no exceptions taken.” The Handbook contained a sample stamp which contained “Approved” as the recommended terminology. In May 1987, the AIA released its new version of the B141, C141 and A201 standard forms of agreement and general conditions. The shop drawing review clause tripled in length, adding numerous disclaimers as to the intent of the architect’s review. In 1993, DPIC Insurance published two alternative recommended shop drawing stamps, one with the word “Reviewed” and other with word “Approved.” DPIC’s guidebook stated: The reality is that no matter how carefully you and your attorney craft your stamp and contract language, you will still be held to the standard of care...Conservative language on your shop drawing stamp may not protect you...a court may well say you “approved” it—regardless of the language you use on your stamp. That was certainly true in the Hyatt case, where the “Reviewed” stamp was held to be the functional equivalent of “Approved.”

HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE HYATT TRAGEDY? More than twenty years have passed and the industry is far different. Use of computers to check and back-check steel connections is common. But human error is still possible even in this computer-age. Is fraudulent misrepresentation possible by a structural engineer? Sure it could happen, though we shudder to think professionals could engage in such behavior when lives are at stake. But what about the industry’s reliance on design by fabricators? Gillum and Duncan claimed they relied on others to detail the connections. This “passing off” of the design to the contractor has grown as design-build and “performance specifications” have become commonplace. When the AIA issued the 1997 editions of its standard form documents, the shop drawing clauses remained the same as the 1987 edition, but a new concept was added permitting the contractor to design certain portions of the project. The clauses in paragraph 3.12.10 state that if professional design services related to systems, materials or equipment are specifically required of the contractor by the contract documents, the owner and architect must specify the performance criteria. The con-

SCHINNERER’S 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF INVITED ATTORNEYS 15 tractor shall provide such services through licensed professionals, whose signature and seal shall appear on the documents, shop drawings and other submittals. The document states, “The Owner and the Architect shall be entitled to rely upon the adequacy, accuracy and completeness of the services...performed by such design professionals.” The architect’s review of such submittals is “only for the limited pur- pose of checking for conformance with information given and the design concept.” This raises the issue of whether the industry has learned from the Hyatt tragedy and whether permitting design professionals to rely on designs prepared by fabricators is good engineering or architectural practice. On July 15, 2001 (twenty years after the Hyatt Skywalk Collapse), Jack Gillum, then age 72, was quoted in the Kansas City Star as saying that poor communications among contractors and pressure to fast-track the project led to the tragedy. A fatal design change was made too casually over the phone, he said. “Any first-year engineering student could figure it out.” Gillum urged engineers to take personal responsibility for every structural connection, take their time, communicate every concern, and never assume someone else has double-checked the details. With the fast-paced world of business today, design professionals have more pressure than ever to push projects forward, with fast-track and “flash” track speed. Junior staff are still used in many firms to check shop drawings, and under the AIA’s documents, architects are almost encouraged to rely on design work done by the contractor. The unfortunate answer is “Yes,” a critical design issue, delegated to a fabricator could still slip through the system and end up built in the field. But the more the Hyatt story is told and taught in the engineering schools and architecture schools of the U.S., the more young professionals will be made aware of the impor- tance of the small details of large construction projects. u

16 THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? ENDNOTES

1U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards report on the Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse, page 1 (Feb. 1982). 2R.S.Mo. 327.401 3The Specifications stated in Section 0510, Structural Steel, Par. 1.4.b that, “Materials and fabrication procedures are subject to inspection and test in the mill, shop, and field, conducted by a qualified inspection agency retained by the Owner. Such inspections and tests will not relieve the Contractor of responsibility for providing materials and fabrication procedures in compliance with specified requirements.” Section 0510 also stated in Par. 3.3, Field Quality Control, that, “The Owner will engage an independent testing and inspection agency to inspect high-strength bolted connections and welded connections and to perform tests and prepare test reports.” 4Testing by the National Bureau of Standards found that this “lightweight” concrete topping weighed 9,880 pounds per span, which was 55% of the total weight of each bridge. 5The Oct. 30, 1979 architect’s field report #344 states, “...fitters were refusing to work on the 151 bridge [4th floor] because of a comment made by the inspection team now looking at the atrium connections.” 6Administrative Law Judge opinion of Hon. James B. Deutsch, Nov. 15, 1985, page 414, Case No. AR-84-0239. 7NBS report, note 1, above. 8On May 13, 1985, the trial court dismissed a fireman’s lawsuit against Hallmark. In April 1986, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the decision in the fireman’s lawsuit against Hallmark in a 2-1 decision and permitted the rescue worker to sue. The Court overturned the “fireman’s rule,” which prevented professional rescue workers from suing for injuries received in the course of their duty. Then, on June 6, 1986, given the Court of Appeals ruling in April overturning the “fireman’s rule,” many other rescue workers, including several construction workers, filed a class action lawsuit seeking $150 million from owners of the hotel for emotional trauma. On July 16, 1986, in light of the Court of Appeals ruling, and to avoid the 5-year statute of limitations, 74 new lawsuits were filed on behalf of a combined total of 169 per- sons for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of participating in the rescue efforts following the collapse on July 17, 1981. On Dec. 16, 1986, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ decision in the fireman’s case, re-establish- ing the rule that barred claims by firemen and police officers. While firemen and police could not sue, other rescue workers (such as construction workers) were allowed to pursue their remedies and on Dec. 15, 1987, Hallmark Cards, Inc. and Crown Redevelopment Corp. settled the rescue workers’ suit for $500,000, approved by federal court. In March 1990, the Missouri Supreme Court held that although firemen and police officers are barred from suing, “other” professional rescue workers, such as ambulance attendants, could recover for their injuries sustained in a rescue effort. It has been reported that a total of $140 million in judgments and settle- ments were paid by insurers and others to people affected by the tragedy of the skywalk collapse. 9Engineering News Record, Sept. 27, 1984. 10In October 1985, ASCE Task Committee released its Final Report and Recommendations on Assignment of Authority & Responsibility for Design of Steel Structures. Those included: - The Engineer of Record should have responsibility and authority for all

THE 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF INVITED ATTORNEYS 17 aspects of the structural design. The EOR’s contract should specify that he/she either (a) design the connections, or (b) review and approve the connections selected and detailed by the Fabricator. - The Fabricator should have responsibility and authority for properly imple- menting the design drawings [and] should prepare shop drawings in accordance with the design information supplied in the contract documents and subsequent instructions from the EOR. - The contract documents should specify that the Fabricator either (a) detail the connections as designed by the EOR, or (b) select and detail the connections for review and approval by the EOR. - For complex steel structures, the EOR may specify in the contract documents that the Fabricator have a licensed professional engineer design the connections. In such cases, the EOR should still review and approve the connections. - The EOR should review and approve shop drawings prepared by the Fabricator for compliance with the strength and stiffness requirements of the design. - In those cases where the Fabricator requests permission to revise certain connections to facilitate fabrication and/or erection, the EOR should review and approve the Fabricator’s revisions. The Fabricator should reimburse the EOR for costs incurred in making this review. - On-site observation by the EOR as well as the services of an independent agency for shop and field inspection are also essential project elements with a cost. The Engineer and the Architect should apprise the Owner of these facts at the time of entering into the contract for professional services. 11The March 1986 ASCE Construction Industry Roundtable Meeting in Kansas City produced the following recommendations: Problem: Project design review is an effective fail-safe mechanism that is too rarely exercised. Recommendation: “Peer review or the provision of independent examination of the procedures and decisions of the design professionals by other similarly qualified professionals can provide a significant service to public safety. We recommend that all of the participants in the construction industry undertake organization peer review on a regular basis...directed at the overall organization, procedures, and professional practices of that firm.” Problem: The engineer of record is rarely on site throughout the life of a project. Recommendation: “Engineers of record involved in life safety aspects [should] be involved throughout the life of the construction project and be responsible for the review and approval of shop drawings and for observation during construction.” Problem: Competitive bidding for design professional services is far too common. Problem: State licensing laws and registration procedures vary widely. Recommendation: “Use of a model law for state use, acknowledging that there may be some state variances, will help a great deal...[A]dd appropriate sections to registration statutes to incorporate specific rules of conduct based on ‘Canons of ethics/conduct’...Licensing boards should include questions on professional conduct in registration examinations.”

18 THE HYATT SKYWALK REVISITED: WHAT HAPPENED? COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN? Problem: There is a major communication gap in the construction process, which can lead to inadequate work, if not to failures. Recommendation: “Professional responsibility should be established by a Standard of Practice incorporated by reference in design agreements. Communication of design intent, design assumptions and performance expectations is necessary. The obligation lies with the organizer of the document...In case of misunderstanding or break-down of communication, all parties are urged to use timely mediation for solution of conflicts. 12Missouri has since revised R.S.Mo. 327.411 and no longer states that an architect or engineer who seals one sheet is thereby responsible for the entire project. Use of the disclaimer is optional under the revised statute.

THE 42ND ANNUAL MEETING OF INVITED ATTORNEYS 19